Francesco Galofaro*

Structural reason, metalanguage and infinity

Abstract
Influenced by Hilbert metamathematical program, Hjelmslev
states that linguistic theory must come to contain within itself its
own definition. Using a goedelization technique, the article shows
how this position leads to a paradox. Hjemslev’s refusal of infin-
ity is old fashioned, whereas his conception of metalanguage and
identity is innovative if compared to the logical one, also inherited
by Chomsky. These features are still interesting in order to com-
prehend the morphodynamical development of semiotic systems.

Keywords
Metalogics; metasemiotics; goedelization; morphodynamics;
identity.

0. Introduction

We are living in trying times. Not only with regards to the distrust in the
market laws and their ability to ensure progress and welfare, or to resist
colonization by new economic giants and their cultures; it is also the crisis
of our epistemic postulates, the beliefs which guide our interpretation
of reality and that meaningful bond which links people to their environ-
ment. Let’s have a look at the cognitive sciences: thanks to the neurologi-
cal advancements in imaging techniques, all the phenomena, which had
been considered innate by cognitive psychology, are once more brought
under investigation. The prefix “neuro-“ has taken the place of “psycho-“
in every title: cf. Legrenzi–Umiltà (2011). As a reaction to these new forms
of reductionism, many scholars have abandoned the cognitive perspec-
tive in favour of a neo-culturalist turn. New researchers focus their atten-
tion on the influence of culture and the environment on meaning. In this
situation, a closer look at structuralism and semiotics can be useful: the
purpose is not a nostalgic return to the old dogma, but a revision of the
ancient Weltanschauung, and a new actualization.
For these reasons, I will look at the papers by Louis Hjelmslev (1899 –
1965). His “glossematics” has been the glagolithic alphabet for structural
semiotics, in particular with regard to the formal and relational concep-
tion of semiotics, the differential vision of the identity, the commutation
test, and the metalinguistic point of view on meaning.

* Centro Universitario Bolognese di Etnosemiotica – CUBE; semioatp@gmail.com

0071_086.indd 71 29/10/12 17:18

 72 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

1. Hjelmslev and Philosophy

In order to understand Hjelmslev’s contributions, the first problem is

the link between his thought and the philosophy of his time. His roots, in
particular, are the Vienna Circle, the Lwów-Warsaw school of logic, and
a third stream which we can consider as influenced by Brentano’s works:
principally Marty, with regard to language, even if Hjelmslev (1935) criti-
cized his point of view; and Husserl’s “Logical investigations”, which will
lead to phenomenology1.

1.1 The Vienna Circle

The Vienna Circle had a great impact on Hjelmslev’s work. It is worth
noting that Hjelmslev’s interest in this approach was sincere. He criti-
cized the limits of the logical approach to language - cf. Hjelmslev (1943).
Nevertheless, many of the concepts that he imported from the Vienna
Circle are still present in his post-war works – cf. Hjelmslev (1975). For
example, Hjelmslev’s typology of functions derives from the logical one.
Logics in general seem to fit well with structuralism, due to the tenden-
cy expressed by many of its founders to consider “form” as a combinatory
of simple elements and “structure” as the result of a calculus starting
from them. But the Vienna Circle failed in many of its thesis, and in par-
ticular in its attempt to found all scientific knowledge in a logical fashion
on a finite number of “true” postulates. Accordingly, the Vienna Circle
involves many structuralistic conceptions in the same epistemological
failure. As we will see, one relevant problem is its inability of taking into
account infinity in the construction of such an epistemology. Likewise,
the metalinguistic model is an issue as well: the hjelmslevian hierarchy of
meta-semiotics, coupled with the idea of stratification, is a science clas-
sification by relevance criteria wherein each scientific discipline studies its
object from the point of view of its form. At the same time Glossematics,
being a general theory of form, constitutes the finite foundation of knowl-
edge. Glossematics takes the place of logic at the base of the neo-positivist
building, but the dream and its dilemmas are the same: what about the
“foundation of the foundation”?

1.2 The Lwów-Warsaw school of logic and the Logical investigations

In Galofaro (2006a) I reconstructed the genesis of the commutation test
in Hjelmlsev’s theory. Basically, with a commutation we can reconstruct
the system of disjunctive oppositions that generated a particular process.
Given the expression and the content plan in language, by replacing a
section of one plan we can observe the results on the other one. A similar
procedure may be found in the fourth “Logical investigation” by Husserl,

1
Cf. Zinna (1997) with regard to the relationships between Hjelmslev and the Third
Logical Investigation.

0071_086.indd 72 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 73

in which it is called substitution. Afterwards, the method was formalized

by Ajdukiewicz (1935): the Polish logician proposes it as an alternative to
Russell’s Type Theory. The essay opens the issue of Studia Philosophica.
Hjelmslev (1943) does not directly quote the paper by Ajdukiewicz, but
refers to a second paper by Tarski present in the same number, regard-
ing the concept of metalanguage. The first work by Hjelmlsev on com-
mutation dates 1937. In that work the commutation test is still named
“substitution”, exactly like in Husserl and Ajdukiewicz. Therefore we
can conclude that Hjelmslev has been inspired by both Ajdukiewicz’s
and Husserl’s works.
The general function of the Lwów-Warsaw school of logic in Hjelmslev’s
formation is mediating between the Vienna Circle and traditional or alter-
native philosophical categories. The Lwów-Warsaw school shares Vienna
Circle’s interest in precision and the use of formal languages in order to
clarify philosophical problems. Nevertheless, the Lwów-Warsaw school
maintains an interest towards a wide range of investigations like ontology
and ethics, which the Vienna Circle would have considered pointless.
Furthermore, phenomenology played a great role in Polish philosophy,
thanks to another student of Twardowski: Roman Ingarden. Tarski may
be considered a bridge between the two attitudes, and his work is the
sourcebook for the metalinguistic horizon in Hjelmslev’s researches.
Hjelmslev’s empirical principle, which guides the construction of the
theory, comes from Tarski’s conditions (formal coherence and material
adequacy):

The description shall be free of contradiction (self-consistent); exhaustive and as

simple as possible (Hjelmslev 1943, Eng. tr.: 11).

As we will see, the relationship between coherence and exhaustiveness is a real

problem in the logic tradition.

2. On Metalanguage

After this general introduction, I will propose my argument on meta-

language, focusing on the close relationship between Hjelmslev and the
Vienna Circle, which in my opinion inhibited some of the more revo-
lutionary ideas expressed both by him and by Structuralism in general.
In particular, the problems arise when we consider the degree of com-
prehension shown by Hjelmslev with regard to the metalinguistic debate
in mathematical logic. We can distinguish two positions. The first is the
one expressed by Hilbert and Carnap - e. g. Carnap (1934). According
to them, metalanguage represents the solution to the problem of the
foundation of mathematics and scientific knowledge in general in a fi-
nite number of steps. The second position is the one expressed by Gödel

0071_086.indd 73 29/10/12 17:18

 74 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

(1986) and Tarski (1956). The role of metalanguage in their theorems has
been misunderstood not only by Hjelmslev, but also by great philoso-
phers like Wittgenstein (1956). Wittgenstein enlisted Gödel in the army
of the enthusiastic meta- linguists. He did not understand that Gödel’s
two immortal theorems express the impossibility of the Hilbert program.
Nowadays, Gödel and Tarski’s theorems are known as limitative theo-
rems of mathematical logic. In particular, Tarski does not just show that no
formal language can represent its own semantics, which can be expressed
by a richer metalanguage; in fact, this richer metalanguage is still a formal
language, so it will be incapable of representing its own (meta-) seman-
tics. This leads directly to a never-ending fugue of formal meta-languages,
without hope of reaching a conclusion in a finite number of steps, a limit
or a final interpretant, in the words of Charles Peirce. Unfortunately,
Hjelmslev didn’t understand this point:
The systematics of the study of literature and of general science thus find their
natural place within the framework of linguistic theory, and under the analysis
linguistic theory must come to contain within itself its own definition – Hjelmslev
(1943, Eng. tr.: 98).

In the dream of a self-defining theory we once more find the traces of the
finitist nightmare.

2.1 Paradox of the Definition

The idea of a theory that contains its definition brings to mind a series
of paradoxes. According to Sextus Empiricus, nothing can be defined,
because every definition must be based on something undefined that
must be defined in its turn, and so on. In order to amuse my reader, I’ll
propose a new version of the paradox. First, I’ll use the word “theory” (T)
with the same value of “scientific semiotic” in Hjelmslev. Let’s say that T
consists of three definitions (def1; def2; def3) of three distinct elements. The
first two elements will be respectively called a and b, whereas the third
element will be T itself, because we want represent the fact that our theory
contains its definition:
T = def1(a); def2 (b); def3 (T);

But, as we said, a theory is nothing more than the definitions contained in

it. Hence, we may substitute to the last T the second part of the equation
as a whole, thus obtaining:
T = def1(a); def2 (b); def3 [def1(a); def2 (b); def3 (T)];

and so on, recursively:

T = def1(a); def2 (b); def3 {def1(a); def2 (b); def3 [def1(a); def2 (b); def3 (T)]}
The situation reminds me of the acronym G.N.U. What is G.N.U.? Well,

0071_086.indd 74 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 75

G.N.U. stands for “G.N.U. is Not Unix”. We can recursively substitute

a second “G.N.U is Not Unix” instead of the first part of the definition
and so on, recursively. We learnt that G.N.U. is not Unix, but it’s difficult
to say that we now have a clearer idea. The strange part in all this is that
one of its parts is “infinite” and so it is a “partially undefined” definition,
a contradiction. The ghost of infinity has been evoked.
But let’s read what Hjelmslev meant by “definition”. According to
Hjelmslev:

a) A definition is the partition of content or expression of a sign (1943, def. 42)

b) A partition is the analysis of a process (1943, def. 31);
c) As every operation, an analysis has to be repeated until it reaches a conclusion,
registering the minimum number of objects, which cannot be further analyzed
(“economy” and “reduction” principles, 1943, Eng. tr.: 61).

Can a doctor transplant a heart into his own chest? Can a theory analyze
itself in a finite number of steps? And what will be the results of such an
analysis? As Hjelmslev says:

In deference to the simplicity principle, metasemiologies of higher orders, on the

other hand, must not be set up, since, if they are tentatively carried out, they will
not bring any other results than those already achieved in the metasemiology of
the first order or before – Hjelmslev (1943, Eng. tr.: 125).

According to Hjelmslev, if I use my theory to split my theory in parts

according to their relationships, I will obtain exactly all the parts of my
theory: nothing new, nothing unknown before. But – Your Honor – be-
tween these parts I will also have the definition, that is to say the analysis,
of the theory itself. So I have to start analyzing it once again. This would
lead to a bizarre never-ending analysis without any hope of reaching new
knowledge, against Hjelmslev’s requirements: every analysis should reach
a conclusion, thus registering the minimum number of objects, which
cannot be further analyzed.

2.2 Russell’s Paradox

Now I’ll demonstrate another problem with the self-contained theo-
ries, in line with Russell’s paradox. A theory can be considered as the set
of its formulas (we’ll return to this point later on). So, if a theory contains
its definition, it can be considered a self - contained set.
According to Hjelmslev, a theory, a scientific semiotics, is an operation
– again: an analysis. Let us divide theories (i. e. the analyses) in two parts:
(1) those theories that contain their own analysis (some self-analyzing
analyses), and (2) those that do not contain their own analysis (non-self-
analyzing analyses). So, what may be said concerning the exhaustive the-
ory (i. e. an analysis) of all the non-self-analyzing analyses? If it analyzes
itself, it can’t, for we defined it as “the theory of the non-self-analyzing

0071_086.indd 75 29/10/12 17:18

 76 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

theories”. If it does not, it should, because we said it must be exhaustive,

and we say it according to the empirical principle. Such a theory does
not exist. The reader could express doubt regarding the fact that such a
theory should be set up: the point is that, in practice, every non-scientific
semiotics does not contain its definition: language, music, visual arts …
We need a scientific semiotics capable of analyzing such objects. And
Hjelmslev requires that this theory contain its own definition. This kind
of paradox led Russell (1924) to its type – theory in which self-referential
sets are forbidden.

2.3 Undecided propositions

The sad truth is that every weapon developed by logicians against log-
ic, in order to test and reject their research programs, can be used against
a naively logistical semiotics. New problems involve Hjelmslev’s hope
to found a semiotic calculus on the model of logic. Naturally, semiotic
perspective should be somehow different from the logical one: after all,
semiotics aims to describe how meaning is, not to prescribe how it should
be – cf. Caputo 2010: 1202. In order to show this, I will test the hypothesis
of analyzing an analysis3.
Let’s say that our theory T, which has to be coherent according to
the empirical principle, is composed by a list of formulas, which use the
functions described in Hjelmslev (1943) and further developed in (1975).
Now we will associate to each function its own unique number – its
Gödel number. There are many ways to do this operation. For example,
we can proceed this manner: let’s order in a row all the symbols used by
Hjelmslev (1975), and let’s give an odd number to each symbol:

Numbers 1 3 5 7 9 …
Symbols * I … g ° ...

Table 1: The table associates a progressive number to each symbol in a hjelmslevian

formula

Now, each formula will be composed by a certain number of symbols,

each one in its own place. We’ll mark each place in the formula by a prime
number (2, 3, 5, 7, … ) and we’ll raise each of them to an exponent, which
is the number of the symbol that occupies that place in the formula, a
number that results from a table like the one we have already drawn.
Finally, we will multiply them. So, for example, we’ll have:

2
From a morpho-dynamic point of view, in 3.5 I propose another argument against the
naïve identification between semiotic analysis and a finite calculus.
3
My argument has been inspired by Frixione and Palladino (2011).

0071_086.indd 76 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 77

Formula: Gödel Number:

*gI 21 • 37 • 53

Table 2: the table shows how to translate a formula in a Gödel Number

Using this technique, we are sure that there’s one and just one Gödel
number for each hjelmslevian formula, because the fundamental theorem
of arithmetic states that there’s just one possible factorization of prime
numbers for every natural number. Furthermore, our operation is revers-
ible, and we can reconstruct the formula starting from a Gödel number.
Every Gödel number is a code. Now, we can order each Gödel Number
in a third table. We’ll start from the minimum number and we’ll end with
the maximum one.

GN0: F0(0) F0(1) F0(2) F0(3) F0(4) …

GN1: F1(0) F1(1) F1(2) F1(3) F1(4) …
GN2: F2(0) F2(1) F2(2) F2(3) F2(4) …
GN3: F3(0) F3(1) F3(2) F3(3) F3(4) …
… … … … … … …
… … … … … … …

Table 3: The table shows how to order all the Gödel numbers

What’s the Gödel number of the whole theory T? We can proceed in the
same manner: as a basis, we take a prime number for each formula listed in
table 3; as an exponent, we use the Gödel number of the formula. The Gödel
number of the theory will be (1GN1 • 2GN2 • 3GN3 • 5GN4 • 7GN5 • …).
Why go to such lengths? Because in this manner we can arithmeti-
cally represent the syntax of the theory, exactly like in a supermarket the
relationships between the people in a queue can be represented by num-
bered tickets4. In particular, “being an analysis of” can be represented as
a relationship R between the Gödel number of the class and the Gödel
numbers representing its elements: R (GNx, GNy … GNz).
Now, as it was mentioned earlier, according to Hjelmslev some of the
analyses reach a conclusion, registering a minimum number of objects,
which cannot be analyzed further. Other analyses don’t reach a conclu-
sion, so they must be repeated on the components of the analyzed class.
As the reader may suppose, my argument is quite similar to Turing’s
Entscheidungsproblem. The reason for this comparison will be clear in
the third part of the work, when I will underline a difference between the

4
The example come from Nagel and Newman (1958). The arithmetization of metama-
thematics has been a remarkable result of Gödel’s most famous theorems.

0071_086.indd 77 29/10/12 17:18

 78 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

inner logic of Hjelmslev’s and Chomsky’s linguistics. I start from an issue:

is there a meta-analysis5 (MA), a coherent and complete “analysis of any
analysis”, that can be used in order to ascertain if a particular analysis A
applied to the object x will reach a conclusion? We can imagine MA as a
computer program. We don’t know if it is possible to write this software
now, but let’s imagine that:

1) Given the input Ax, MA gives us the result 1 if Ax reaches a conclusion, and 0 if
Ax does not reach a conclusion.

Let’s go on: If (1) is possible, imagine the case in which the object x is A
itself: we will represent the situation writing AA. This is quite simple, be-
cause A can be represented using its Gödel number: the computer reads
it, then it decodes the analysis, and finally it tests it. So:

2) Given the input AA, MA gives us the result 1 if AA reaches a conclusion, and 0
if AA does not reach a conclusion.

Now let’s construct a certain type of meta-meta-analysis (MMA): again we

can consider MMA as a computer program, which analyzes the program
MA, alerting us when it does not stop:

3) MMA reaches a conclusion if MA of AA gives us the result 0 (i.e. when MA of

AA does not reach a conclusion), and does not reach a conclusion if MA of AA gives
us the result 1 (i.e. when MA of AA reaches a conclusion);

So, MMA immediately stops its calculus and alerts us when MA gives the
result 0, whereas it simply repeats the procedure when MA gives the result
1. Now let’s consider a particular case in which we use MMA in order to
analyze itself. Also this step finds a direct justification in Hjelmslev, when
he says that a theory must contain its own definition. So we can see that:

4) MMA reaches a conclusion when MMA does not reach a conclusion, and it
does not reach a conclusion if MMA reaches a conclusion.

Hence, by admitting (1) we constructed a contradictory meta-analysis,

so we have to exclude that there’s a meta-analysis capable to state if analy-
ses will reach a conclusion. This does not mean that every meta-analysis
is impossible, because this would lead to the impossibility of any theory;
our result means that it is impossible to know in principle if our analyses
will reach a conclusion or not.
Now we can try to find an undecidable formula in our theory. Let us

5
Generally speaking, meta-analysis must be possible, because a theory (i. e. an analysis)
which contains its own definition (i. e. an analysis again) cannot be other than a meta-
analysis.

0071_086.indd 78 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 79

suppose that there’s an analysis Ax, whose Gödel number is m, and let’s
consider Am. Now let’s say that MA(Am) gives as a result 1 if and only if Am
reaches a conclusion in h steps. Now let’s consider the hypothesis:

5) There’s always a x number of steps that allows that MA(Am) gives as a result 1,
because Am reaches a conclusion in x steps;

Is this sentence part of the theory? We know that no meta-analysis can be

used in order to state that analyses will reach a conclusion, so the answer
is: who knows? Inside the theory, we can’t decide if (5) is part of the
theory. So, a coherent theory can’t be complete. This does not mean that
we should abandon the empirical principle, because self-consistency has
priority over exhaustiveness; nevertheless, meta-semiotics cannot ensure
a finite foundation of knowledge, because such a foundation is an impos-
sible mission.

3. Beyond the Infinite

Hilbert had good reasons to prohibit arguments that make use of the
mathematical infinity. He reasoned this way: if mathematics has to explain
infinity, then it cannot presuppose infinity – cf. Rogers (1971). However,
in the 1930s mathematics reached a turning point and Hilbert’s program
was soon abandoned. Somehow infinity became the norm.
Hjelmslev was strongly interested in the most up-to-date philosophy of
sciences available at the time6. Nevertheless, he has also been influenced
by a traditional way of considering the analysis in epistemology, which at
the very least, belongs to Kant’s Logic. The refusal of infinity is even old-
er: it is related to the whole history of western philosophy. Nevertheless,
advancements in mathematics and physics during the last two centuries
led us to reconsider such an unwilling attitude. This specific feature of the
hjelmslevian epistemology is definitively old fashioned.

3.1 A Different Metalanguage

A good retrospective to Hjelmslev’s work should underline all those
traits of his conception that are still interesting nowadays in order to cast
a new light on the relationship between language (and semiotic systems in
general) and knowledge. An indication concerning metalanguage comes
from Hjelmslev himself (1948):

We can wind up this discussion by stating that linguistics describes the relational
pattern of language without knowing what the relata are, and phonetics and se-
mantics do tell us what the relata are, but only by means of describing the relations

6
Not just Carnap, but also Cassirer and Husserl cf. Caputo (2010: 36).

0071_086.indd 79 29/10/12 17:18

 80 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

between their parts and parts of their parts. This would mean, in logistic terms,
that linguistics is a metalanguage of the first degree, whereas phonetics and se-
mantics are metalanguages of the second degree.

In the same article Hjelmlsev shows appreciation for Carnap’s concep-

tion of metalanguage, but the linguistic concept is a different one: it has a
double nature, in the same way that a sign is a two-folded unit according
to Saussure: signifier and signify. The real secret of meaning is this coun-
terpoint between (at least) two metalanguages: if the natural language con-
sists in two planes (the expression plane and the content plane), also his
metalinguistic model consists in a class of relations between two distinct
parts of the technical metalanguage7.

3.2 Metalanguages and Trees

Eco (1984) is a great work: it shows the impossibility of a substantial-
istic hierarchical classification of realia. In a sense, this work represents
the conclusion of medieval philosophy. At the same time, Eco assimilates
Hjelmslev’s model into a Porphyrian tree. As we will see, this move is less
convincing.
First of all, Eco narrows his analysis to the semantic components of
language. He compares the models described by Hjelmslev and Carnap,
and he shows that both are hierarchical trees:
animal

sheep human

ewe ram girl boy

Fig. 1 Isomorphism between Hjelmslev’s and Carnap’s metalanguage
according to Eco (1984:51).

Imagine a foreigner asking, what is a «sheep» and an Englishman

answering, it is an animal: it is difficult to consider this a good expla-
nation. Even if the foreigner already knows what an animal is, still he
doesn’t know the difference between a sheep and a human being or a
cat. He needs some more encyclopaedic information in order to under-
stand. That’s the shape of Eco’s argument. That’s a valid point, but,
when comparing Hjelmslev’s analysis to a Porphyrian tree, Eco gives
to the former a substantialist interpretation, which the Danish linguist
would not allow. For example, Eco asks himself what Hjelmslev’s figu-

7
In a work on radio-diagnostics (Galofaro 2006b) I found that also medical meta-
language on radiograms is a counterpoint between categories that describe the expression
plan (all what you perceive in the radiogram) and categories that provide a content for the
radiograms (what is “there”, in the body).

0071_086.indd 80 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 81

rae, which he represents in fig.1 by the superordinate classes, could be.

In Eco’s hypotheses figurae are always something positive (the simplest
concepts; objects in our experience; platonic ideas). That’s why he iden-
tifies something like a semantic tree with a metaphysical hierarchy. But,
along the same line as Saussure, Hjelmslev has a differential concept of
form, not a crypto-substantialist one. Figurae are just meta-linguistic
names for the terminals of a differential semantic function. Moreover,
the representation with a tree in fig.1 is misleading: depending on the
grammar, the word “girl” has some formal properties as “feminine”,
“singular”, “animated” and so on: not one of these is more important
than others in allowing the formation of a semantic chain – an isotopy,
in the terms used by Greimas. Furthermore, narrowing the analysis to
semantics and avoiding morphosyntax, Eco does not consider the fact
that Hjelmslev (1943, Eng. tr.: 71) proposes a reduction of unlimited
sets (like the lexical ones) to limited sets (like the cases or the preposi-
tions): that’s why he is so interested in marks like “masculine/feminine”:
they are the kind of values that many languages register in their morphol-
ogy. Now, if I own just two suits, one blue and the other brown, the
choice of the colour of the suit will condition the choice of the shirt and
the tie, even if these were an indefinite number. The same thing happens
with language: that’s why our point of view on the world is conditioned
by a small set of morphologic categories, different from language to
language and diachronically changing with language. How about semi-
otic metalanguage? Isn’t it universal? Well, the object of metalanguage
is a semiotic system, and never reality, substances, and metaphysical
qualities. It should be evaluated considering its empirical adequacy: in
the words by Wittgenstein, it is just as a toolbox (1953: §11). Finally,
as it was mentioned previously, meaning is a counterpoint between the
whole form of the expression plan and the whole form of the content
plan. By considering just one semantic tree, Eco misses the fact that
meaning is a dialectics between (at least) two different trees.
Eco proposes to substitute hierarchical trees with an encyclopaedic
representation of the semantic relationships in the form of a net. I agree
with him: tree-representations of Hjelmslev’s metalanguage are mislead-
ing. However, the encyclopaedic model describes every conceivable se-
mantic relation, without exclusions; as it is a model for all occasions,
of every possible culture, it is not the model of any actual one. It fails
in describing how culture changes. That’s why Eco re-introduces local
hierarchical descriptions of the encyclopaedia. But even this solution
is partially unsatisfactory: metalanguage is not simply the unavoidable
portrait of a culture as an ordered structure: in this way metalanguage
also becomes an ordering structure. The metalinguistic description of a
culture is not neutral; it has an effect on further developments. Foucault
examined the historical changes in the same Porphyrian classifications
considered by Eco:

0071_086.indd 81 29/10/12 17:18

 82 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its func-
tions, in its economy, in its internal relations (Chomsky – Foucault 2006: 26).

Let’s take a look at musical grammars, treatises on film editing, medical

dictionaries and so on. They are active cultural products, with a strong
influence on cultural change: cf. what Lévi-Strauss (1994) wrote about
the theoretical works by Rameau, or my work on the Harmonielehre by
Schönberg in Galofaro (2004).
A new conception of meta-language is necessary in a morpho-dynam-
ic perspective. There is no definitive metalanguage: metalanguages are
continuously generated by the encyclopaedia; and they in turn change
the encyclopaedia, in connection to different scientific enterprises; at the
same time, as they become obsolete, metalanguages can explode (Lotman
2009) because scientific knowledge is never certain or complete as certain
philosophical or religious knowledge pretend to be.

3.3 The Trouble With the Identity Principle

Why is Hjelmslev’s differential point of view on the elements so far
from the philosophical tradition criticized by Eco? As Milner (2002)
points out, the work of structural linguistics often violates the principle
known as “identity of the indiscernibles”, formulated by Leibniz. In fact,
the properties of every linguistic element are the phonic form and the
meaning. If these properties are equal, according to Leibniz we should
identify a single element instead of two. But this cause us to err: for ex-
ample, despite of the appearances, Latin words like servus and servare,
or salvus and salvere have different roots. The logical consequence is that
the Aristotelian identity principle (a = a) simply postulates what should
be proven in a structural perspective: in order to speak about a linguistic
entity we should exclude that we deal with two or more elements. That’s
why Hjelmslev couples the commutation test with the derivative test:

Two functives are said to be conformal if any particular derivate of the one func-
tive without exception enters the same functions as a particular derivate of the
other functive, and vice versa. We can accordingly set up the rule that two ten-
tatively recognized segments of one and the same class shall be reduced to one
segment if they are conformal and not commutable. (1943, Eng. tr.:125)
This is also the main methodological difference with Husserl’s substi-
tutions. Husserl seems to intuitively know the elements, and the result is
that the categories of his “formal ontology” recall distinctions typical of
any Indo-European language – cf. Costa, Franzini and Spinicci (2002:
89). On the contrary, Hjelmslev extends the same proof to the smallest
phonetic elements in order to demonstrate their identity.
3.4 Chomsky vs. Hjelmslev
The identity of the elements represents a hiatus between structural and
cognitive tradition. Chomsky’s thesis (1955) has been influenced by the

0071_086.indd 82 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 83

work of Emil Post, a Polish logician - cf. Pullum (2010). According to Post,
a canonical system is constituted by a finite alphabet of strings (“words”);
a finite set of “initial words”; and a finite class of production rules, which
transform the strings into other strings. In order to formally concatenate the
different language levels, Chomsky (1955: II - 60) poses his algebra in an axi-
omatic fashion. In particular, he postulates the existence of the class which
comprehend all the elements of language and of an “identity element” (U),
which is unique, and which may be explained in this way:

X*U = U*X = X

In the formula, X is a symbol for every language string. Elements are

given. On the contrary, in a structural perspective like Hjelmslev’s one
must prove that “something” is an element. When the astronomer sees a
planet, he doesn’t have to exclude that he is seeing two planets (or more).
However, the linguist must prove that his way of parsing the linguistic
flux is adequate, and that’s precisely the function of both the commuta-
tion and the derivative test: to isolate words, roots, prefixes, suffixes, mor-
phemes, phonemes and so on. Structural logic turns out to be a unique
logic, in which the identity principle is weakened8. Furthermore, it must
be noted that elements of language never have a complete independent
identity, but they are always related to their category – another similar-
ity between Hjelmslev’s work and the fourth “Logical investigation” by
Husserl. An interesting example is given in the participative oppositions9:
according to Hjelmslev (1935) we have a participative opposition when
an item is opposed to a category, which includes it. E. g. in English, the
Saxon genitive is opposed to the “non-genitive” category. The Saxon
genitive carries the value of “departure”, and it is opposed to a “non-
genitive” category that can, without distinction, mean “approach”, “qui-
etness”, and even “departure”, when using the preposition “of”.

3.5 Structural identity and instability

Another characteristic of linguistic elements is the instability of their
differential identity. Structuralism explains linguistic changes as the at-
tempt of a system to reach a new equilibrium – cf. Martinet (1962). The
equilibrium is lost when there is an empty square in the system, or when a
new element comes into being in it. This generates respectively a “traction
chain” or a “propulsion chain”, which changes all the values of the former
elements – cf. also Luraghi (2006: 90), Deleuze (2002). So, there’s no pos-
8
Even this logic can be formalized. An example is Takeuti’s work on Quantum Logic
– cf. Takeuti (1981).
9
According to many scholars - Cf. Caputo (2010: 34) - the participative oppositions
constitute an interesting subterranean stream in Hjelmslev’s works. He never abandoned
them: they are still present in Hjelmslev 1975, as a correlation between functives wich share
common variants (def. 71).

0071_086.indd 83 29/10/12 17:18

 84 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

sibility to construct a definitive substantialistic classification as the ones

criticized in Eco (1984). This is also a limit on the identification between
semiotic analysis and calculus: nothing guarantees that our list of ele-
ments is definitive as the symbols manipulated by a Turing Machine. The
number of symbols in a theory can change exactly like the elements dur-
ing the diachronic development of a linguistic system. This is also an argu-
ment against Chomsky’s formalism - which is as finitist as the hjelmslevian
one. I found it in a conference in which Gödel criticized Turing’s identifi-
cation of calculus and thought – reported in Wang (1974: 325):
Turing (…) gives an argument which is supposed to show that mental procedures
cannot carry any farther than mechanical procedures. However, this argument is
inconclusive, because it depends on the supposition that a finite mind is capable
of only a finite number of distinguishable states. What Turing disregards com-
pletely is the fact that mind, in its use, is not static, but constantly developing. […]
Therefore, although at each stage of the mind’s development the number of its
possible states is finite, there is no reason why this number should not converge
to infinity in the course of development.

4. Some Conclusions

Semiotic elements are not positive independent individuals. Their

identity depends on an on-going process of individuation, an old philo-
sophical problem which seemed to be definitively closed with Leibniz –
see also Simondon (1964). The question about the development of lan-
guage and metalanguage and the one about the process of individuation
of their elements do intersect. Metalanguages can be considered pro-
tocols10: modal systems regulating both the cognitive and the pragmatic
performances, which allow or prohibit the individuation of scientific
element by researchers. The problem is not reaching a definitive, stable,
finite or final truth (cognitive innatism has simply been the last incar-
nation of this perennial dream); rather, we should try to comprehend
the transformations of the understanding, in the words of Foucault –
(see Chomsky Foucault 2006), seeking for its structure, if present. The
continuous development of our semiotic and cultural systems shifts
the issue to the formation of the form, its morphogenesis. This is also
the hiatus between classical structuralism, which considered “form” as
a combinatory of simple elements, and the morpho-dynamic tradition
represented by Vladimir Propp, inspired by Goethe’s morphogenesis11,
which is still alive and being developed 12.

Cf. Neurath (1935).

10

Cf. the discussion between Propp and Lévi-Strauss in Propp (1966). More in Galofaro,
11

Pisanty and Proni (2010).

12
About recent deveolpments, cf. Boi (2005). With regard to language and neuro-sci-

0071_086.indd 84 29/10/12 17:18

 STRUCTURAL REASON AND INFINITY 85

References

AJDUKIEWICZ, K.
1935 “Die syntaktische Konnexität”, in Studia Philosophica, 1: 1-27.
BOI, L.
2005 Geometries of nature, living systems and human cognition: new interactions of math-
ematics with natural sciences and humanities, USA: World Scientific.
CAPUTO, C.
2010 Hjelmslev e la semiotica, Roma: Carocci.
CARNAP, R.
1934 Logische Syntax der Sprache, Wien: Springer.
CHOMSKY, N.
1955 The logical structure of Linguistic Theory, typescript, http://alpha-leonis.lids.mit.edu/
chomsky/ partially published in New York: Plenum Press, 1975.
1957 Syntactic Structures, The Hague: Mouton.
CHOMSKY, N. AND FOUCAULT, M.
2006 The Chomsky – Foucault Debate: on Human Nature, New York: New Press.
COSTA, V., FRANZINI, E., SPINICCI, P.
2002 La fenomenologia, Torino: Einaudi.
DELEUZE, G.
2002 “How Do We Recognise Structuralism?”, in Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-
1974, New York: Semiotext(e): 170-192
ECO, U.
1984 “Dictionary Vs. Encyclopedia”, in Semiotics and the Phylosophy of Language,
Bloomington: Indiana U. P.
FRIXIONE, M AND PALLADINO, D.
2011 La computabilità: algoritmi, logica, calcolatori, Roma: Carocci.
GALOFARO, F.
2004 “Protonarratività in Schönberg”, in Versus, 98 – 99: 139-162.
2006a “Dall’intuizione alla commutazione. Hjelmlsev, Husserl e i logici polacchi”, in E/C,
www.ec-aiss.it.
2006b “Dal reperto al referto. Traduzione intersemiotica nella diagnostica per immagini”,
in Tradurre e Comprendere, Roma: Aracne.
GALOFARO, F., PISANTY, V., PRONI, G.
2010 “La nonna di Cappuccetto rosso era una strega! Dialogo sulla morfogenesi della fia-
ba”, Oculaflux, www.ocula.it.
GÖDEL, K.
1986 Collected Works; vol.1, Publications 1929-1936, Oxford: Oxford U. P.
HJELMSLEV, L.
1935 “La catégorie des cas”, I, in Acta Jurlandica, VII, 1: I-XII and 1-184.
1937 “Accent, intonation, quantité”, in Baltic Studies, 6: 1-57.
1943 Omkring sprogteoriens grundlasggelse, Munskgaard, København; (Engl. tr. F.J.
Whitfield (ed.), Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, Madison (Wis.): University of
Winsconsin Press, 1961).
1948 “Structural Analysis of Language”, in Studia Linguistica”, I: 69-78.
1975 “Résumé of a theory of language”, in Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague,
XVI: 1 – 279.
LEGRENZI, P. AND UMILTÀ, C.
2011 Neuromania: On the limits of brain science, Oxford: Oxford U. P.
LÉVI - STRAUSS, C.
1994 Regarder, écouter, lire, Paris: Plon.

ences, a morpho-dynamical structuralism has been proposed by Piotrowski (2005), an essay

of great interest. These researches seems to be relevant also in a biosemiotic framework, cf.
Caputo (2010:191).

0071_086.indd 85 29/10/12 17:18

 86 FRANCESCO GALOFARO

LOTMAN, J.
2009 Culture and Explosion, De Gruyter, Berlin.
LURAGHI, S.
2006 Introduzione alla linguistica storica, Roma: Carocci.
MARTINET, A.
1962 A Functional View on Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
NAGEL, E. AND NEWMAN, J. R.
1958 Gödel’s proof, New York: New York U. P.
NEURATH, O.
1935 “Pseudorationalism of fasification”, in Erkenntnis, V.
PETITOT, J.
2004 Morphogenesis of meaning, New York: P. Lang.
PIOTROWSKI, D.
2005 “Du sens en langue. Aspects neurobiologiques, structuraux et phénoménologiques”,
in Les Cahiers du Crea , 21.
PROPP, V.
1966 Morfologia della fiaba, con un intervento di Claude Levi-Strauss e una replica dell’autore.
Torino: Einaudi.
PULLUM, G.K.
2010 “Creation Myths of Generative Grammar and the Mathematics of Syntactic
Structures”, in The mathematic of Language, Berlin–Heidelberg: Springer Verlag:
238-255.
RUSSELL, B.
1924 The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, UK: Routledge.
SIMONDON, G.
1964 L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique. Paris: PUF (partially translated in “The
Individual and Its Physico-Biological Genesis”, in Fractal Ontology, October 2007).
TAKEUTI, G.
1981 “Quantum Set Theory”, in Beltrametti and Van Frasssen (eds.), Current Issues in
Quantum Logic, 8, Ettore Majorana International Science Series, New York: Plenum.
TARSKI, A.
1956 Logic, semantics Metamathematics, Oxford UK: Oxford U. P.
THOM, R.
1990 Semio Physics: A Sketch, Boston Massachussets: Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
WITTGENSTEIN, L.
1953 Philosophical investigations, Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell.
1956 Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, Oxford UK: Basil Blackwell.
ZINNA, A.
1997 (ed.) Hjelmslev aujourd’hui, Brepols: Turnhout.

0071_086.indd 86 29/10/12 17:18