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Smith 1-WPS Office
Peter Bowbrick
Ted Smith
Modern South Asian History
Introduction
In the current age of climate change, massive migrations, and regional conflicts, a look at
historical famines and other such tragic events provides an enriching insight for our
understanding of societal problems and allows us to come up with better solutions. The 1943
Bengal famine is one such tragic event that happened in Bengal (present-day Bangladesh and
the Indian state of West Bengal) in 1943-44. The famine killed almost three million people of
Bengal due to the scarcity of food. This research endeavours to investigate the historical causes
of 1943 Bengal Famine and then analyzes them from the perspectives of Bengali economist
Amartya Sen and British market economist Peter Bowbrick.
Research methodology
This is a qualitative research in which historical approach has been used by adopting
observational and analytical tools. Various primary and secondary sources have been consulted
for the development of content: historical books, journal articles, official reports, historians'
perspectives, etc. In the development of the research, initially, a general description of the
causes of 1943 Bengal famine, on which most of the historians agree, have been layed down
and then each one of the causes has been specifically analyzed by comparing and contrasting
the perspectives of Amartya Sen and Peter Bowbrick. Lastly, conclusion and findings have been
drawn to comprehend the research.
Historical background
Bengal had witnessed many crises in history due to a number of natural and anthropogenic
factors. Bengal was an agrarian economy that had been administered by British colonial
government. The economy was highly volatile to natural disasters (drought, cycloon, floods,
etc) that, joined with various other factors, impacted the local population from time to time. In
1770s, Bengal faced the severist famine due to drought that killed almost 10 million people.
However, all the famines that occurred before 1943 were because of drought; the 1943 Bengal
famine was mainly because of heavy rains and wrong policies of British colonial government
that killed almost three million people in the province. Moreover, the famine occured during
World War II that devastated the conditions further. This research tries to investigate the
causes of 1943 Bengal famine and then analyzes them from the perspectives of Amartya Sen
and Peter Bowbrick.
Malnutrition
The primary and the most drastic cause of 1943 Bengal Famine, where all the other factors and
causes converged to leave an ultimate impact, was malnutrition: the available food was not
sufficient enough to meet the essential energy requirements of the population. Many natural
and anthropogenic factors, coupled with many economic, social, and political conditions
(discussed below) provoked and ultimately created an imbalance between the supply and
demand of food: a huge number of population was left short of food. The scarcity of food-food
being the most essential prerequisite for the survival of any being- resulted body weakness that
triggered multiple diseases and ultimately drew almost 3 million people towards death.
Both, Amartya Sen and Peter Bowbrick, hold that the 1943 Bengal famine was mainly because
of malnutrition. However, they have varying positions on the nature of this cause. Sen argues
that malnutrition was not a natural cause of the 1943 Bengal Famine; rather it was man-made
that happened due to the wrong policies of British government. However, Bowbrick contends
that malnutrition was not preventable; malnutrition was inevitable because Bengal faced
natural disasters-war, floods, etc.- that were, to a greater extent, out of the control of British
government.
War-time Crises
Japanese intervention: trade Barriers; stoppage of imports
Japan expansion in South East Asia and its occupation of Burma stopped the importation of rice
from Burma and put a severe trade barrier for India in the Indian ocean which contributed to
the food availability decline (FDA) in Bengal. Bengal used to import a significant supply (almost
oneof rice from Rangoon (Burma) to meet its food consumption. The occupation of
Rangoon(Burma) by Japanese forces in March 1942 stopped this import. Moreover, the
expansion of Japanese forces in Bay of Bengal prevented Bengal to trade in the Bay; Japanese
destroyed 100,000 tones of merchant shipping in the Bay. Also, the Japanese forces started
attacking major locations of Bengal in December 1942. This created a sense of emergency and
jolted the supply-demand process significantly, pushing the inducement of famine towards
norrower ends.
Sen and Bowbrick hold similar opinions that the World War II caused a severe disturbance in
the supply-demand chain of food in Bengal. However, Sen call the war an anthropogenic
phenomenon while Bowbrick consider it a natural one. Sen believes that authoritative regimes
tend to provoke instability and warfare; the nations involved in World War II were
authoritative in nature that pulled the war onto people and drew them into misery. He believes
that 1943 Bengal Famine might not have been as devastating if Britain had not pulled India into
WWII. However, Bowbrick believes that nations could not prevent wars due to conflicts of
interests. He believes that war impacted Bengal severally but considers it an inevitable course
of history.
British Indian government's 'denial policies of rice and boats' to 'scorch the earth' for Japanese
destabilized the running food-chain supply significantly that worsened the already deteriorated
conditions further. In response to Japanese occupation of Burma, its expansion in the Bay of
Bengal, and its air-attacks on major Bengal cities, the British Indian government feared the
occupation of Bengal by Japanese forces and adopted the 'scorched earth' initiative under
'denial policy' to limit the access of Japanese forces to food, transport, and other resources.
Under 'denial policy of rice', the government removed or destroyed the surplus rice in the
coastal districts which severally damaged the food availability in the respective regions. Under
"the denial policy of Boat' army confiscated, destroyed, or relocated the larger boats-
approximately 45,000- in the coastal regions that damaged the fishery- a source of food for
approximately 15% of total population-and food transport system severally. These denial
policies colloquially aggravated the food crises further.
Sen and Bowbrick consider the denial policies of British government as the ones that disturbed
the balance of supply and demand. Ben believes that the Britishers policies were always meant
to defend the interests of the Crest Britain; they had no concerns about how much local people
will suffer from it. Ben calls the denial policies of the government as a complete failure, an
anthropogenic act of the government that drew millions of people towards misery. On the
other hand, Bowbick defends the stance of government and considers that the need of hour
demanded the government to enact such policies. He believes that emergencies always
happen in the history of nations; they have to come across such policies; the crises of the time
forced the government to enact such policies.
Anticipating the food crises, the provincial governments in India put barriers on inter-provincial
trade that affected the Bengal province severally. There has been an ongoing shortfall in the
availability of food due to various natural and war-time crises (some discussed above, some
below). This raised the concerns of provincial administrations. To prevent famine in their
respective areas, the provincial governments, through the Defence of India Act, 1939, put
barriers on inter-provincial trade. Bengal, which had been among the last ones to stop the
exportation of Bengal to other provinces, lost a significant portion of its proportional food, and
the inter-provincial trade barriers left no way for it to import food from anywhere.
Consequently, Bengal suffered the most when it was hit by shortage of food and famine.
Ben and Bowbrick, both, call this action of government an unwise dicision. Sen calls this policy
as another act of government that provoked unequal distribution of resources. He believes that
this policy restricted the Bengal to overcome the crises of famine. On the other hand, Bowbrick
believes that free flow of goods always stabilizes the supply-demand chain through 'invisible
hand'. Bowbrick believes that this policy of government restricted the 'invisible hand's to work
freely.
Displacement
There had been a huge displacement, both military and civil, in Bengal during the war-time
crises that increased the food demand and put a huge burden on the food supply. The influx of
soldiers and refugees from across the borders and from within was massive in Bengal. Fearing
the Japanese invasion, a large number of allied soldiers of USA, china, and the Great Britain
have camped in Bengal. Moreover, the Burman occupation by Japanese forces pushed almost
half million of refugees to Bengal. The local food resources had already been lagging to meet
the needs of local people; this influx further worsened the condition and put an extra burden
on the Bengal. Moreover, this influx worsened the sanitary conditions, spread diseases, and
triggered malnutrition.Resultantly, the rate of the expansion of 1943 Bengal famine increased
further.
Sen and Bowbrick consider that the influx of refugees and soldiers put a pressure on the food
supply that increased the rate of famine. Sen believes that the government should first
prioritize the welfare of local people. He asserts that government should not have allowed this
displacement, especially in Bengal when it was already going through so many crises. While
Bowbrick puts that displacement was not as much bigger problem. The influx was not asuch a
big problem if government had somehow managed to increase the supply of food in Bengal.
To maintain control, British colonial policies, historians claim, distributed resources on the basis
of loyalties and favouritism and this trend increased especially during famine and war-time
crises which contributed to severe impoverishment of 'unprivileged' sections of society. In
1943, Bengal had already been facing a significant shortage of food. The unequal distribution of
resources worsened the conditions further. The British government grabbed thousands of acres
of land from farmers for military purposes. Moreover, through its Food Stough Scheme, it
distributed food and services on preferential basis to those who are associated with high
priority roles such as armed forces, war industry, civil servants, etc. so that they won't leave
their positions. Consequently, there developed a higher polarity: some sections enjoyed high
privileges while, on the other hand, some lived a life of hunger and impoverishment.
Both, Sen and Bowbrick, condemns this act of government. Sen blames this factor as the major
reason of famine in Bengal. He claims that Bengal would not have faced famine if the
government had distributed the resources and efficiently. He claims that this policy allowed
some sections of society to have extra privileges while another section suffered to death
because of this policy. Bowbrick also condemns this policy. He goes further that government
should limit its interventions in the property affairs of its citizens and should encourage a free-
market.
Minimized Subsidies
Due to war-time crises, the British government stopped subsidizing the food shortage in India
that put an extra burden on the food economy. During famine crises, governments used to
subsidize the food, and the British government did too in previous times, but this time, in 1943
Bengal Famine, due to war-burden, it stopped all kind of subsidy to food industry.
Consequently, the effect of the famine became more lethal than it could have been otherwise.
Ben and Bowbrick have contradictions on the minimized subsidy policy of British government.
Ben asserts that government ought to have subsidized the food. He claims that through
rationing and subsidizing, the government could have prevented thousands of people from
dying. On the other hand, Bowbrick considers that rationing and subsidizing might not have
been an effective policy. He states that subsidizing disturbs the free market, and if government
had subsidized food, then food crises might have been much severe than the one being faced
by Bengal.
Political crisis
Political crises in India also became one of the factors that played role in worsening the famine
conditions. Famine occured in a time period when political crises in India were at their peak.
British Indian government was completely indulged in World War II and political movements-
like Quit-india Movement-were highly mobilized throughout India. To prevent civil war in India,
the government put severe instructions on political rights and freedoms. It jailed many leaders
of the Quit-india movement; banned popular gatherings; and censored printing press. In
reaction, local people held violent strikes. Consequently, political crises in India provoked
disruption and instability in the mechanism of food supply which increased the impact of
famine further.
Ben and Bowbrick both considers that political crises disturbed the supply-demand chain of
food. However, Sen blames the government for political crises but Bowbrick puts this blame
on the local people. Ben asserts that the government had restricted the rights and freedoms of
its citizens; the citizens could not participate in the demand-making process; they could not get
their voices heard in the political arena; the authoritative government was not accountable to
anyone. Consequently, government did not care about people and adopted such policies that
impacted the local people the most. Ben believes that the consequences might not have been
that much dark in a democracratic state as they were there in the authorian regime of British in
India.
Inflation
The war-time crises, coupled with many other factors (discussed above), devolped a massive
inflation of food- an increase in the prices of food and services- which became one of the most
fatal reasons in 1943 Bengal Famine. To fund military escalations, government grabbed land
from thousands of farmers; printed excessive money; payed farmers in cash-devalued one-
instead of monetary fund. These conditions multipled with shortage of food, increase in
demand, and irregular distribution of resources aggravated the inflation and increased the
prices of food to an exponential level. Consequently, it became more and more difficult for a
greater portion of population to buy food, increasing the lethality of the famine further.
Sen and Bowbrick shares the opinion that a severe inflation occurred during 1943 Bengal
Famine. However, Sen blames that this inflation was triggered by the wrong policies of
government that allowed speculations and unequal redistribution of resources which allowed
the prices to rise at their peak. On the other hand, Bowbrick condemns this opinion and holds
that inflation was inevitable during the famine and government could not prevent it because a
there was a massive shortage of supply of food in the market.
Market failure
Market failure, historians claim, has also been one of the major factors that triggered the
devastations of famine. Market forces failed to keep the balance between supply and demand
that resulted massive instability in the steady flow of food. The rising demand, the declining
supply, and the elevating inflation of food resulted extensive speculation in the market. This
speculation worsened the conditions, triggered black mafia, and rose prices to its peak. The
'invisible hand' of the market failed to keep all these forces in control that ultimately resulted a
massive shortage of food in the market that became the prime reason of the famine.
Ben and Bowbrick, both, accepts that during 1943 Bengal famine, market failure was at its peak.
However, Sen calls the improper redistribution of resources as the real cause of this failure
while Bowbrick holds that the shortage of supply was the principle factor behind this inflation.
Diseases
Diseases became apparent in the second phase of famine -late 1943- but left denting marks in
the devastations of famine. After malnutrition, diseases became the second most lethal cause
of deaths during the famine. Almost half of the total deaths (almost 1.5 million) in the famine
resulted from diseases-cholera, malaria, etc- that spread due to: malnutrition; displacement;
and bad sanitary and health conditions. By the end of 1943, most of the issues related to food
scarcity has been tackled but the weakness that have prevailed among population because of
starvation killed almost one and half million people in the next six times.
Ben and Bowbrick both accepts that diseases triggered the lethality of the 1943 Bengal famine.
However, Sen considers that it was the negligence of the government that provoked diseases
while Bowbrick holds that diseases were the natural disasters that the government could not
prevent from happening.
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