Memorial Respondent

TEAM CODE:20
BEFORE THE
HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DHARMASTHAN
WRIT PETITION FILED

UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
IN THE MATTER OF:
SNEHA RETREAT CENTRE
……………….PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF DHARMASTHSAN
.……….…. RESPONDENT
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………….3
2) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………….………….…4
3) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………..….10
4) STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………11
5) ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………...........…....12
6) SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………….….13
7) ARGUMENTS ADVANCED……………………………………….….14
(1) THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.…………………………...….….14
(2) SECTION 14 OF THE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON GROUNDS THAT IT

DOESNOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND THERE IS
NO EXCESSIVE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER ………….….…19
(3) SECTION 3 OF THE ACT READ WITH SECTION 2 (c) OF THE ACT AND
PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SCHEDULE DOESNOT VIOLATES HIS FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION………………………………….….23
(3.1) SECTION 3 OF THE ACT READ WITH SECTION 2(c) OF THE ACT AND
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 19(1) (a) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
…….……………………………………………………………………….…23
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 19(1) (g) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
…………………………………………………………………….…….…….29
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE
CONSTITUTION?........................................................................................... 33
8) PRAYER……………………………………………………………….……40
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS DEFINITIONS
& AND
H.C High Court
Sec. Section
A.I.R. All India Reporter
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
Art. Article
J. Justice
Vol. Volume
Ed. Edition
IPC Indian Penal Code
v. versus
Co. Company
Ltd. Limited
Sec Section
S.C.R Supreme Court Reports
Govt. Government
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A. TABLE OF CASES
SL NO: CASES: CITATION:
1. Veluswami v. Raja, A.I.R.1959 S.C.422.
2. Ashok kumarpandey v. Collector, A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1112.
3. Union of India v. T.R.Varma, A.I.R.1957 S.C.882.
4. Madhya Pradesh v. Income Tax (1965) 57 I.T.R. 637

Officer, S.C.
5. Salil hali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 S.C.C.705.
6. Secretary, Minor, Irrigation and Rural (2002) 5 S.C.C.521.

Engineering Services v. Sahngoo Ram
Arya,
7. State of Kerala v. Markose A.I.R. 1962 Ker 78 b.
8. Mani Subrit Jain v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1977 S.C.276.
9. State of Orrisa v. Ram Chandra Dev, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.685.
10. Vijay Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R.1980 Raj,207.
11. Altemesh Rein v. Union of India, A.I.R.1988 S.C.1768.
12. State of Jammu Kashmir v. A R A.I.R.1992 S.C.1546.

Zakki,
13. Maqsoodan v. State of U.P, A.I.R.1983 S.C.126.
14. State of MP v. Desh Raj, (2004) 13 S.C.C.199.
15. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia c. Board of A.I.R.2004 S.C.1815.

Trustees, Port of Mumbai,
16. Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West A.I.R. 1962 S.C.1044.

Bengal,
17. S.P.Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R.1982 S.C.149.
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18. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union A.I.R. 1981 S.C.344.
v. Union of India,
19. Daya v. Joint Chief Controller, A.I.R.1962 S.C.1796.
20. Guruswamy v. Sate of Bihar, (1955) 1 S.C.R.305.
21. Chandrasekar v. State of Orissa, (1971) II S.C.D 1171.
22. Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, (1969) 2 S.C.R.185.
23. R.D.Shetty v. International Airport (1979) 3 S.C.C.489.

Authority,
24. Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State A.I.R.1991 S.C.537.

of U.P.,
25. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of (1973) 4 S.C.C.225.

Kerala and Anr,
26. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfd Co v. The A.I.R.1973 S.C.123.

Asstt. Commissioner of Sales,
27. The State of Madras, Represented v. (1969) 2 M.L.J.324.

Sri Vanamamlaimutt,
28. Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, P. A.I.R.1954 S.C.569.

A.Committee
29. HarishankerBagla v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1954 S.C.465.
30. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of A.I.R.1960 S.C.554.

India,
31. Narain das v. State of MP, A.I.R.1974 S.C.1232.
32. Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Workmen, A.I.R.1972 S.C.1917.
33. RomeshThopar v. State of Madras, A.I.R.1950 S.C.124.
34. Arjun Gopal &Ors v. Union of India A.I.R.2018 S.C.5731.

&Ors,
35. Moulana Mufti Sayeed Mohdv.. State A.I.R.1999 Cal.15.

of West Bengal
36. Superintendent ,Central Prison v. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633.
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Ram Manohar Lohiya,
37. Life Insurance Corpn. Of india v. A.I.R 1994 S.C.171.

Prof. Manubhai D Shah ,
38. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881.

Maharashtra,
39. E.M.S.Namboodiripadv.T.N.Nambiar, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015.
40. Babul Parate v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 884.
41. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,. A.I.R1978 S.C. 597.
42. Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, 1975 SCR (3) 333.
43. ChaintanyaPrakesh v. Board of A.I.R. 1981 SC 344.

Secondary Education Rajasthan,
44. Municipal Corpn. of the city of A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1205.

Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed
Usmanbhai,
45. Hathisingh Mfg. Co Ltd v. Union of A.I.R 1960 S.C.923.

India,
46. All Delhi Rickshaw Union v. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 648

Municipal Corpn., (para. 5).
47. State of Mahrashtra v. HimmathBhai , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1157.
48. Glass Chatons v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1514.
49. Narendra v. Union of India, 1960 2 S.C.R. 375.
50. sakhawant v. state of Orrisa,. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 166.
51. sukhnandan v. union of india, A.I.R.1982 S.C. 902.
52. Gn md v. State of Gujarat , 1966 (1) S.C.R.

505(515).
53. Ram dan das V. state of Punjab, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1559.
54. sree kali madha v. union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1030.
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55. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of A.I.R 1967 S.C.
J&K, 1368,1371
56. State v. V.G Row (1952) 3 SCR 597 :

(AIR 1952 SC 196),
57. DattamalChiranjilal (M/s) v. Lodhi A.I.R. 1960 All. 622.

Prasad;
58. Pothumma v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 771.
59. Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P,. (1950) S.C.R. 759.
60. Punjab Rao v. D.P.Meshram, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1179.
61. Commissioner of Hindu Religious A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282.

Endowments,Madras v. Sri
LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri
Shirur Mutt,
62. Rev Stainislaus v. State of M.P, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 908.
63. Church of God v. K.K.R. Majestic 2002 Cri.L.J. 4022.

colony welfare association,
64. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620.
65. Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586.
66. N.Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom A.I.R 2002 S.C. 3538.

Board,
67. The Durgah Committee Ajmer v. (1962) 1 S.C.R. 383,

SyedHussainAli, 411.
68. H.H.SrimadPerarulalaEthiraja A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586.

Ramanuja Jeevar Swami v. State of
Tamil Nadu,
69. P.L.Lakhanpal v. Union of India, A.I.R 1967 S.C.908.
70. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya (2004) 12 S.C.C. 770

Jagdishwarananda,
71. Sree Mohandas v. State of Kerala , A.I.R. 2007 Ker 289
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72. A.M. Mohammed & Co., Madras& A.I.R. 1982 Madras
ors v. Union of India & ors, 247.
B. BOOKS REFFERED
1) M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Lexis Nexis 415(7th Ed. 2014)
2) P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt.
Ltd.,41(5th Ed. 1997)
3) V.N. Shukla, Constitutional Law of India, Eastern Book Company, 355(13th Ed.,
2013)
4) Dr. S.R. Myneni, Interpretation of Statutes, Lexis Nexis, 268(4th Ed., 1991)
5) B.M. Gandhi, Constitutional Law of India, Lexis Nexis, 379(6th Ed., 2003)
6) Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, (3rd Ed. Cavendish

Publishing Limited,2000.)
7) Durga Das Basu, Commentary on The Constitution of India (8th Ed. Lexis Nexis)
8) T.K. Tope’s, Constitutional Law of India (3rd Ed. Eastern Book Company,2010)
C. LEXICONS
1) Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, (9 Th Ed.2010)
2) RamanathaAiyer, Advanced Law Lexicon, 2391(3rd Ed.,2005)
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3) The Oxford Dictionary, 2nd Ed. P.433.
4) Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary.
D. STATUTES
1) The Constitution of India, 1950
2) The Indian Penal Code, 1869
3) Code Of Criminal Procedure,1973
4) The Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil Practices, Sorcery And
Black Magic Act,2019.
5) Drugs and Magic Remedies Act,1954.
6) Delhi Laws Act,1951
E. REFFERED LINKS
1) www.indiankanoon.org
2) www.manupatra.com
3) www.westlawindia.com
4) www.vakilnol.com
5) www.prsindia.com
6) www.academia.edu.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE RESPONDENT HUMBLY SUBMITS THIS MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO

THE PETITION FILED BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT.THE PETITON
INVOKES ITS WRIT JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA.IT SETS FORTH THE FACTS AND THE LAWS ON WHICH THE CLAIMS
ARE BASED.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.Dharmasthan is a state in Indian Union. On 16.04.19 the state of Dharmasthan Times

published that in the state of dharmasthan spiritualism has become a holy cover for unholy
deeds.
2.Santhu Mahavir popularly known as Swami Mokshananda wanted by the interpol since 2014
was arrested two years ago. He was accused of cheating a gulf-based lady from Dharmasthan
of Rs 45 lakhs. Santhu Mahavir was arrested and sentenced by a sessions court in 2018 to 16
years rigorous imprisonment for raping two girls. Other charges against him included real
estate swindle, tiger skin trade etc.
3.Santhu Mahavir’s arrest triggered a flood of complaint from India and abroad against scores
of Godmen and God women accusing them of cheque fraud, tax dodging rape and even murder.
On 25.04.2019 the Dharmasthan Times published some allegations against the largest Catholic
healing Centre in Kalkotti, Dharmasthan.Sneha Retreat center was in news recently after one
of the devotees send an anonymous letter to the chief minister. The letter reportedly carried
serious charges against the centre. Soon the director general of police constituted a high-level
team headed by an inspector General of Police to inquire into the charges.
4.The probe team found that several persons were locked filed in cells in the name of healing.
Besides the FIR filed at kalkotti City police station the team filed a report before first class
judicial magistrate.
5. In the wake of these situation on 6.11.2019 Dharmasthan Legislative assembly passed

Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman and sorcery and Black Magic bill 2019
and it became an act and came into force with effect from 12.11.2019
6.On 3.12.2019 Sneha Retreat Centre filed a writ petition challenging the validity of the act.
On behalf of the state all the contentions were refuted. Now a writ petition is filed before the
Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of Indian constitution.
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ISSUES RAISED
1) WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION IS MAINTAINABLE?
2) WHETHER SECTION 14 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENTION AND

ERADICATION OF INHUMAN PRACTICES, SORCERY AND BLACK MAGIC
ACT, 2019 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON GROUNDS OF VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE 14 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND EXCESSIVE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER?
3) WHETHER SECTION 3 OF THE ACT READ WITH SECTION 2(c) OF THE ACT
AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SCHEDULE VIOLATES HIS FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(a), ARTICLE 19(1)(g) AND ARTICLE 25(1) OF
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1)THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF CONSTITUTION OF

INDIA IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
The petitioner is not having locus standi to file the instant writ petition before this hon’ble
Court. The said Act does not violate Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(g) and Article 25(1) of
Constitution of India. The amendment of said Act was according to procedures established by
Constitution of India thus it is not against the Constitution of India. The Present Act is not
violative of Fundamental rights even though was a matter related with public importance.
2)THE SECTION 14 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENTION AND ERADICATION

OF INHUMAN EVIL PRACTICES, SORCERY AND BLACKMAGIC ACT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AS THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 AND NO
EXCESSIVE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
The amendment of the said Act is not violative of the amending procedures defined in Article
368 of Constitution of India. That is Section 14 of the Act go through legally of the amendment
procedure needed to amend any of the provisions and hence it is not arbitrary and therefore it
is not violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
3)THE SECTION 3 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENRION AND ERADICATION

OF INHUMAN EVIL PRACTICES, SORCERY AND BLACKMAGIC ACT READ
WITH SECTION 2(C) OF THE ACT AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SCHEDULE
DOES NOT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(a),
ARTICLE 19(1)(g) AND ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
The right to freedom of speech and expression of the petitioner is notviolated by the said act.
Under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, even though it provides for the freedom of
speech and expression to all and here, the freedom of speech and expression, there are some
reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution ,The freedom
of trade guaranteed by article 19(1)(g) is not violated by the said act.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1)THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE INDIAN

CONSTITUTION ISNOT MAINTAINABLE.
[1] The exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is largely
discretionary in nature1 . it is argued that the present case is not maintainable. Art 226 of the
constitution confess power on all High Court of India to issue any person or authority, including
in appropriate cases any government, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, for enforcement of any of the
rights confirmed by part III and “for any other purpose” that is even for the enforcement of the
legal rights.
[2] The power of High Court under Article 226 is very wide, but subject to certain limitations.
These limitations may be divided into three classes namely
(a) Constitutional limitation, (b) territorial limitation; and (c) self-imposed limitations.
[3] In Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector2 , it was held that it is well settled that the power of
High Court under Article 226 of the constitution to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary
and if the high court finds that there is no satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay and if it
finds that the issue of writ will lead to public inconvenience and interfere with the right of the
others, it may reject the petition.
[4] The High Court before granting a relief is required to satisfy itself, the delay on the part of
the citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the constitution
on alleged violation of his legal rights, was wholly justified, Therefore, where a high court
grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the constitution against any
person including the state without considering his blameworthy conduct such as delay,
1Veluswamiv. Raja, A.I.R 1959 S.C 422

2
Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector, A.I.R 1980 S.C 112
14 | P a g e
acquiescence or wavier, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief so granted
is in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the state.
[5] Under article 226, the High Court does not decide disputes for which remedy is available
under general law. The principle has been stated by Supreme Court as follows 3 :“It is well
settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should
be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to
issue a prerogative writ. The existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into
consideration in the matter of granting writs…”
[6] Furthermore, it is submitted that when a right or liability is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to
that particular statutory remedy and not the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution4. In the case of Madhya Pradesh v. Income Tax Officer5 the Supreme Court has
held that,
“when there existed an adequate alternative remedy, then the writ petition would be dismissed
by the court in limina. The petitioners, in the case at hand, did not exercise the proper course
of action provided by the alternative remedies before filing the writ petition.”6
[7] It is humbly submitted that the constitutional validity of Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was upheld in the case of Salil bali v. Union of India7,
therefore the act is well within the ambit of constitution and is not violative of any Fundamental
right. Hence, the writ petition to this regard cannot be maintainable, Lastly, it is submitted that
a statutory forum or tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified
grievances of persons on certain matters and the HC should not normally permit such persons
to ventilate their specified grievances before it by entertaining petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution8 .
[8] Mandamus is a judicial remedy which is in the form of a superior court to any government,
court, cooperation or public authority to do or to forbear from doing some specific act which
3
Union of India v. T.R. Varma, A.I.R.1957 S.C.882.
4
Seth Chand Ratan v. Pandit Durga Prasad, (2003) 5 S.C.C 399
5
Madhya Pradesh v. Income Tax Officer, (1965) 57 I.T.R 637 S.C.
6 Ibid.
7
Salil bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 S.C.C. 705.
8
Secretary, Minor, Irrigation and Rural Engineering Services v. Sahngoo Ram Arya, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 521.
15 | P a g e
that body is obliged under law to do or retrain from doing, as the case maybe and which is the
nature of a public duty and in certain cases of statutory duty A.T Markose89 .
[9] It cannot beissued to do something against the statutory provisions. The writ has been so
defined in Halsbury10 . No one can ask for a Mandamus without a legal right. There must be a
judicially enforceable as well as legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance
can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to aggrieve only when he is denied a legal right
by someone who has a legal duty to do something and abstains from doing it Mani Subrit Jain
v. State of Haryana 11Article 226 does not specify the person who can approach the court under
it. But as this provides a public law remedy similar to article 32, similar provisions of locus
standi apply to it as to Article 32.
Ordinarily a person whose legal right or other legally protected interests are adversely affected
should approach the court for relief State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev12.
[10] Mandamus cannot be issued to the State Government directing it to appoint a commission
to inquire into changes in climatic cycle, floods in the State etc. because the power to appoint
a commission discretionary and optional 13. Mandamus cannot be issued to the government
directing it to bring a statute into force14. The writ cannot be issued to the legislature directing
it to enact a particular law 15 Mandamus cannot also be issued to the legislature directing a
delegated legislative authority to make rule in furtherance of a statutory provision.
• NO SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION OF LAW ARISES IN THE PRESENT CASE.
[11] It is contended by the respondents that no substantial question of law is involved in the
present case and the interference is based on pure question of fact which is entitled to be
dismissed16. This court had laid down the test which says if the general principles to be applied
in determining the question of those principles the question would not be a substantial question
9
State of Kerala v. Markose, A.I.R 1962 Ker 78 b.
10
HALSBURY LAWS OF ENGLAND (4TH Edition) (Vol 1,Para 89).
11
Mani Subrit Jain v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1977 S.C 276.
12
State of Orrisa v. Ram Chandra Dev A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 685
13
Vijay Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1980 Raj.207.
14
Altemesh Rein v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1768 : (1988)
15
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. A.R. Zakki, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1546.
16
Maqsoodan v. State of UP, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 126.
16 | P a g e
of law. There is neither a case of miscarriage of justice nor any violation of the petitioner’s
fundamental rights.
[12] It might involve question of law but not „substantial‟ question of law. The present case
does not involve such „substantial‟ question of law 17. In Jamshed Hormsuji Wadia v. Board
of Trustees, Port of Mumbai18 the court emphasized that,
“The very conferment of the discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive definition of
power. The power is permitted to be invoked not in a routine fashion but in very exceptional
circumstances as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision
sought to be impugned before the High Court shocks the conscience. This overriding and
exceptional power has been vested in the High Court to be exercised sparingly and only in the
furtherance of cause of justice in the High Court in exceptional cases only when special
circumstances are shown to exist”.19
• THE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE WRIT
PETITION
[13] The traditional rule is that a person whose constitutional or legal right is infringed can
apply for relief under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. Generally, a person can approach
the high court under art 226 to enforce his legal right. The person does approach the court
should have sufficient interest in the matter 20 . Such right should ordinarily be the personal
right of the petitioner. In S.P Gupta v. President of India21. The Supreme Court has observed
that the traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only when
a person has suffered a legal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation
of his legal right.
So therefore, in the present case, since there is no violation of Article 14, Article 19(1)(a) and
Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution.
17
State of MP v. Desh Raj, (2004) 13 S.C.C. 199
18
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, A.I.R 2004 S.C. 1815
19
Ibid.
20
Calcutta Gas Co v. State of West Bengal A.I.R 1962 S.C 1044
21
S.P Gupta v. President of India A.I.R 1982 S.C 149
17 | P a g e
[14] In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India22 of the Supreme Court has
observed that the question whether a person has the locus to file a proceeding depends mostly
and often whether he possesses a legal right and that right is violated. But in an appropriate
case, it may become necessary in the changing awareness of legal rights and social obligations
to take a broader view of the question of locus to initiate proceedings be it under Article 226
of the constitution23 .
[15] The grounds on which Mandamus may be refused, even though the foregoing conditions
are satisfied, relief by the way of mandamus, which is discretionary and not ’of right ’maybe
refused on any of the following grounds. Where the act against which Mandamus is sought has
been completed and the writ, if issued, will be in fructuous24. On the same principle, the Court
refuse a writ of mandamus where it would be meaningless owing to lapse of time or
otherwise25. Where the application is premature, for instance, where no action contrary to law
has yet been done or proposed 26. It may be refused on the ground of laches or unexplained
delay27.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the instant writ petition is not
maintainable as statute does not violate the fundamental or legal rights of the Petitioner and the
has followed the due procedure laid down by the statute. Moreover, there has been no violation
of principles of natural justice; hence, the petition be dismissed.
22
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India A.I.R 1981 S.C 344
23
1981 2 S.C.R. at 65.
24
Daya v. Joint Chief Controller, A.I.R.1962 S.C.1796.
25
Guruswamy v. State of Bihar,(1955) 1 S.C.R.305.
26
Chandrasekar v. State of Orissa,( 1971) II S.C.D 1171(1175).
27
Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, ( 1969) 1 S.C.R.185.
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2) SECTION 14 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENTION
ANDERADICATION OF INHUMAN SORCERY AND BLACK
MAGICACT,2019 DOESNOT VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION AND THERE IS NO EXCESSIVE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER.
[16] Section 14 of the Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman and Black Magic Act states
Power to amend the Schedule: (1) The State Government may by notification published in the
Official Gazette add, amend or alter the Schedule. (2) Every such notification issued under
Sub- Section (1), shall be laid before the State Legislature.28 This Section does not
(2.1) SECTION 14 OF THE PREVENTION AND ERADICATION OF INHUMAN
SORCERY AND BLACK MAGIC ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS THERE IS NO
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE.14.
[17] The above-mentioned Section does not violate the nature of arbitrariness included in
Article 14. In R.D.Shetty v. International Airport Authority29, the Court held that ,
“The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an

essential element of equality or non- arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it
mustcharacterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of
executive power without making of law.”30
28
Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Sorcery and Black Magic Act, 2019.
29
R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority(1979) 3 S.C.C..489.
30
Ibid.
19 | P a g e
Likewise, in the present case also, the Section is clear as it is non arbitrary and irrational. As
the act was enacted by State legislative Assembly and it is clearly mentioned that the State
Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette add, alter or amend the
Schedule, and all such notification should be laid before the State Legislature.
[18] In a case, A.M. Ahamed and Co. Madras and Others v. Union of India and others31,the
court held that
“State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle
which is non-discriminatory; it must not. Essential element of equality ornon- arbitrariness is
projected by Article 14, and it must characterize every State action, whether it be under
authority of law or not”32
In a case, Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P33,
“The preamble of the Constitution of India resolves to secure to all its

citizens; justice, social, economic and political; and equality of status and opportunity. Every
state action must be aimed at achieving this goal.This being the philosophy of the constitution,
can it be said that it contemplates exclusion of Article 14 non- arbitrariness which is basic to
rule of law from State actions in contractual field when all actions of the State are meant for
public good and expected to be fair and just.”
[19] In the present case, even though the Section does not explain the amendment procedure,
it cannot be raised as an issue. The Constitution had provided for a variety of amendment
process. Even though an Amendment of the Constitution stated under Article 368 of the Indian
Constitution can be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill in either House of Parliament.
The Bill must then pass in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and
by a majority of not less than two- thirds of the members of that House present and voting34,
there are exception to the above-mentioned procedure.
[20] However, there is another limitation imposed on the amending power of the constitution
of India, which developed during conflicts between the Supreme Court and Parliament, where
Parliament wants to exercise discretionary use of power to amend the Constitution while the
Supreme Court wants to restrict that power. This has led to the laying down of various doctrines
31A.M. Ahamed and Co. Madras and others v. Union of India and others.
32
Ibid
33
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P, A.I.R 1991 S.C. 537.
34
Supra note 2.
20 | P a g e
or rules in regard to checking the validity/ legality of an amendment, the most famous among
them is the basic structure doctrine as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala35Therefore , it is humbly submitted that Section 14
of the Act does not violate Article 14 as there is non- arbitrariness.
(2.2) SECTION 14 OF THE PREVENTION AND ERADICATION OF INHUMAN
SORCERY AND BLACK MAGIC ACT IS CONSTITUTION AS THERE IS NO
EXCESSIVE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
[21] Section 14 of Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Sorcery and

Blackmagic Act is constitutional as there is no violation of Article 14 in connection with
Section14 of the Act as there is non arbitrary in relation with the provisions of the Act. Section
14 of the Act is very clear and reasonable. It states that the State Government may by
notification published in the Official Gazette add, amend or alter the Schedule and that
notification after publishing should be laid before the State legislature.
[22] In a case, Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.Co. v. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales 36, it was
stated that “Section 8(2) (b) of the central Sales Tax Act 37 does not suffer from the vice of
abdication or excessive delegation of legislative power. Likewise, in the instant case also, there
is no excessive delegation of legislative powers. The state government is having the jurisdiction
and the power to make this act as the matter was listed in the State list and hence there is no
excessive delegation of legislative power.
[23] In a case, The State of Madras, Represented v. Sri vanamamalai mutt38,the court held
that here the delegated power cannot be delegated, the third ground is that Article 14 is not
violated by the grant of discretion, it is specified officers. There was denial by the state of the
charge of excessive delegation and arbitrary uncontrolled discretion capable of abuse and
indiscriminate action. Likewise, in this case also, there is no excessive delegation of legislative
powers.
35
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and Anr (1973)4 S.C.C.225.
36Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfd.Co v. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales A.I.R.1973 S.C.123.
37Sales Tax Act.
38
The State of Madras, Represented v. Sri vanamamlaimutt(1969) 2 MLJ 324.
21 | P a g e
[24] Consistent with their sovereign character, Legislatures in India have been held to possess
wide powers of delegation 39This power is, however, subject to one important limitation. The
Legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions which consist in the determination
or choosing of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into abiding rule of
conduct40The Legislature cannot delegate “ unchained and uncontrolled power”41the power
delegated must not be “ unconfined and vagrant42” but must be “canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing”.
[25] The banks that set the limit of power delegated are to be constructed by the legislature by
declaring the policy of law and by laying down standards for guidance of those on whom the
power to execute the law is conferred 43.So the delegation is valid only when the legislative
policy and guidelines to implement it are adequately laid down and the delegate is only
empowered to carry out the policy within the guidelines laid down by the legislature.
[26] However in the event of an instance of law enforcement within a class to which it refers,
full spectrum judicial review is permitted as a person has the right to full protection of the
rationality and law. So hence in the Present case also, there is no excessive delegation of
legislative powers and hence it is humbly submitted that the Section 14 of the act is
constitutional and there is no violation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution.
In the instant case, there is no violation of Article 14 as there is no arbitrariness in it. The State
Government have all the power to amend the act and there is no excessive delegation in it.
39
See Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, P.A. Committee, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 569.
40
See HarishankerBagla v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1954 S.C.465.
41
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, A.I.R.1960 S.C.554.
42
Naraindas v. State of MP, A.I.R. 1974 S.C.1232.
43
Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Workmen A.I.R. 1972 S.C.1917.
22 | P a g e
3. SECTION 3 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENTION AND
ERADICATION OF INHUMAN SORCERY AND BLACK MAGIC
BILL,2019 ACT READ WITH SECTION 2(C) OF THE ACT AND
PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SCHEDULE DOESNOT VIOLATES HIS
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(a), ARTICLE
19(1)(g) AND ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA:
The right to promote, propagate their speech and expression is protected under Article 19 and
the right to promote and propagate any religion of their choice in any manner is protected under
Article 25(1)44. But here this promotion is found to be against morality, public order and health
and hence does not violate the fundamental rights mentioned above.
(3.1) SECTION 3 OF THE DHARMASTHAN PREVENTION AND ERADICATION OF

INHUMAN SORCERY AND BLACK MAGIC BILL,2019 ACT READ WITH SECTION
2(C) OF THE ACT AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE SCDEDULE DOESNOT VIOLATES
ARTICLE 19(1) (a) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
[27] The Section 3 of the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman, Evil Practices
Sorcery and black magic Act,2019 does not violate the fundamental rights under Article
19(1)(a) of the constitution of India because the restriction imposed by the act is reasonable
and not arbitrary.Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution of India states that all the citizens shall
have the right to freedom of speech and expression.45
The first principle of a free society is an untrammelled flow of words in an open forum. Liberty
to express opinions and ideas without hindrance, and especially without fear of punishment
plays significant role in the development of that particular society and ultimately for that state.
It is one of the most important fundamental liberties guaranteed against state suppression or
regulation.This right is available only to a citizen of India and not to foreign nationals
44T.K. Tope’s, Constitutional Law of India (3rd Ed. Eastern Book Company,2010) pg no: 23.
45Supra n8.
23 | P a g e
[28] The phrases “speech and expression” used in Article 19(1) (a) has a broad
connotation. This right includes the right to communicate, print and advertise the
information. In India, freedom of the press is implied from the freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a). The freedom of the press is regarded as a “species
of which freedom of expression is a genius”. On the issue of whether ‘advertising’ would fall
under the scope of the Article, the Supreme Court pointed out that the right of a citizen to
exhibit films is a part of the fundamental right of speech and expression guaranteed by Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.46
[29] But this right is subjected to limitations imposed under Article 19(2) which empowers the
state to put “reasonable restriction” on various grounds namely security of the states, friendly
relations with foreign States, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court,
defamation, incitement of the offence and the integrity and sovereignty of India 47.In the instant
case Sneha Retreat center V. State of Dharmasthan,2019 Article 19(1)(a) is not been violated
because the restriction imposed are subjected to public order, decency and morality.
Freedom of speech enjoys special position as far India is concerned. The importance of freedom of
expression and speech can be easily understood by the fact that preamble of constitution itself ensures
to all citizens inter alia, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship.
[30] Security of the State: Reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the freedom of speech
and expression, in the interest of the security of the State. All the utterances intended to
endanger the security of the State by crimes of violence intended to overthrow the government,
waging of war and rebellion against the government, external aggression or war, etc., may be
restrained in the interest of the security of the State. It does not refer to the ordinary breaches
of public order which do not involve any danger to the State.48
Public order: This ground was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 in order
to meet the situation arising from the Supreme Court's decision in Romesh Thapar's case49.The
expression 'public order' connotes the sense of public peace, safety and tranquillity.
[31] It is also necessary that there must be a reasonable nexus between the restriction imposed
and the achievement of public order. In Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar
46T.k.Tope’s, Constitutional Law of India(3rd Ed, Eastern Book Company, 2010) pg no: 23.
47
See 19(1)(2) of the Constitution of India
48 Ibid.
49
Romesh Thopar v. state of Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 124
24 | P a g e
Lohiya 50, the Court held the Section 3 of U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932, which punished a
person if he incited a single person not to pay or defer the payment of Government dues, as
there was no reasonable nexus between the speech and public order. Similarly, the court upheld
the validity of the provision empowering a Magistrate to issue directions to protect the public
order or tranquillity.
[32] The decision of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corpn. Of india v. Prof. Manubhai
D Shah51was cited for the proposition that it was manifest from Article 19(2) that the right
conferred by Article 19(1)(a) was subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest
of, amongst others, public order, decency and morality or in relation to defamation or
incitement to an offence. The Supreme Court held that it has always placed a broad
interpretation on the value and content of Article 19(1)(a), making it subject only to the
restrictions permissible under Article 19(2). Efforts by intolerant authorities to curb or
suffocate this freedom have always been firmly repelled. More so when public authorities have
autocratic tendencies.
Likewise, in the instant case also, there is no violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian
Constitution as due to the reasonable restrictions mentioned under Article 19(2) of the Indian
Constitution stating about the decency and morality. The Government enacted the law in
supporting the decency and morality that one should uphold.
[33] Decency and morality: The word 'obscenity' is identical with the word 'indecency' of the
Indian Constitution. This test was upheld by the Supreme Court in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State
of Maharashtra52In this case the Court upheld the conviction of a book seller who was
prosecuted under Section 292, I.P.C., for selling and keeping the book Lady Chatterley's Lover.
The standard of morality varies from time to time and from place to place.
Contempt of court: The constitutional right to freedom of speech would not allow a person to
contempt the courts. The expression Contempt of Court has been defined Section 2 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The term contempt of court refers to civil contempt or criminal
contempt under the Act. But judges do not have any general immunity from criticism of their
judicial conduct, provided that it is made in good faith and is genuine criticism, and not any
attempt to impair the administration of justice. In E.M.S. Namboodripad v. T.N. Nambiar53 ,
50
Superintendent ,Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohiya, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 633
51Life Insurance Corpn. Of india v. Prof. Manubhai D Shah A.I.R 1994 S.C.171.
52
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881
53
E.M.S.Namboodiripad v.T.N.Nambiar, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015
25 | P a g e
the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the High Court, holding Mr. Namboodripad guilty
of contempt of court.
[34] Defamation: The clause (2) of Article 19 prevents any person from making any statement
that injures the reputation of another. With the same view, defamation has been criminalized
in India by inserting it into Section 499 of the I.P.C. Where defamation is concerned, in case
of a criminal defamation suit as laid down in Sections 499 and Section 500 of the Indian Penal
Code, the issue - in question - being the truth isn’t considered a defense. Even if a person has
spoken the truth, he can be prosecuted for defamation.
[35] Incitement to an offense: This ground was also added by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951. The Constitution also prohibits a person from making any statement
that incites people to commit offense.
[36] Sovereignty and integrity of India: This ground was also added subsequently by the
Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963. This is aimed to prohibit anyone from making
statements that challenge the integrity and sovereignty of India.
[37] There are certain restrictions which can be imposed by the state according to the procedure
established by law. However, these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitratory.The
fundamental rights guaranteed under 19(1) are not absolute They are subjected to restriction
placed under Subsequent clauses of Article 19 54.Section 3 of the Dharmasthan Prevention and
eradication of Inhuman Evil Practice sorcery and sorcery and black magic Act, 2019 states that;
No person by himself or through any other person, promote propagate or practice or cause to
promote propagate or practice inhuman evil or sinister practices, black magic or sorcery
specified in the schedule. The Sneha retreat center is practicing mantra tantra in order to cure
the diseases. Also, drugs were injected to person who was showing violent signs These were
done by untrained hands.
[38] In the case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India55it was said that the procedure established
by law should be reasonable and it should not be arbitrary. In the present case also, the
restriction imposed are not arbitrary the restriction imposed is for the welfare of the people.
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens the right to freedom
54Babul Parate v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 884.

55Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R1978 S.C. 597.
26 | P a g e
of speech and expression. The law states that, “all citizens shall have the right to freedom of
speech and expression”.
Under Article 19(2) “reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of this right for
certain purposes. Any limitation on the exercise of the right under Article 19(1)(a) not falling
within the four corners of Article 19(2) cannot be valid. The case in hand is not violative of
article 19(1)(a) of the constitution because it comes under the ambit of reasonable restrictions.
56
[39] The judiciary has time and again opined that the right to receive information is another
facet of the right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to communicate and receive
information without interference is a crucial aspect of this right. This is because, a person
cannot form an informed opinion or make an informed choice and effectively participate
socially, politically or culturally without receipt of adequate information. The Supreme Court
in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain 57 has held that Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
guarantees the freedom of speech and expression to all citizens in addition to protecting the
rights of the citizens to know the right to receive information regarding matters of public
concern. In this case Article 19 (1)(a) of the constitution is not violated
[40] However, Article 19(2) of the Constitution provides that this right is not absolute and
‘reasonable restrictions’ may be imposed on the exercise of this right for certain purposes. The
right to freedom of expression includes the right to express one’s views and opinions on any
issue and through any medium whether it be in writing or by word of mouth.
[41] The phrase “speech and expression” used in Article 19(1) (a) has a broad connotation.
This right includes the right to communicate, print and advertise the information. In India,
freedom of the press is implied from the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(a). 58
[42] The freedom of the press is regarded as a “species of which freedom of expression is a
genus. On the issue of whether ‘advertising’ would fall under the scope of the reasonable
restriction. Article, the Supreme Court pointed out that the right of a citizen to exhibit films is
56B.M.Gandhi, Constitutional Law of India, Lexis Nexis, 367( 6 th Ed., 2003.)

57Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain 1975 SCR (3) 333.
58 Ibid.
27 | P a g e
a part of the fundamental right of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution59.
[43] The citizens of India have the right to receive ‘commercial speech’ and they also have the
right to read and listen to the same. This protection is available to the speaker as well as the
recipient. Freedom of Speech and Expression also includes artistic speech as it includes the
right to paint, sign, dance, write poetry, literature and is covered by Article 19(1)(a) because
the common basic characteristic of all these activities is freedom of speech and expression.
[44] This aspect of the right to freedom of speech and expression extending the concept of
citizenship to include socio-political participation of a person is critical in the process of
determining the scope of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Freedom of speech and expression is the bulwark of democratic government. This freedom is
essential for the proper functioning of democratic process and is regarded as the first condition
of liberty. It occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of liberties giving protection to all
other liberties. It has been truly said that it is the mother of all other liberties. That liberty
includes the right to acquire information and disseminate the same. It includes the right to
communicate it through available media without interference to as large a population of the
country, as well as abroad, as is possible to reach. Right to know is the basis right of the citizens
of a free country and Art. 19(1)(a) protects that right. Right to receive information springs
from Art 19(1)(a).60
[45] It is important to note that the scope of the “freedom of speech and expression” in Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution has been expanded to include the right to receive and disseminate
information. It includes the right to communicate and circulate information through any
medium including print media, audio, television broadcast or electronic media.

59 Supra note 34.

60B.M. Gandhi, Constitutional Law Of India, Lexis Nexis, 379(6th Ed., 2003).
28 | P a g e
ARTICLE 19(1) (g) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
[46] Article 19 (1) (g) of Constitution of India provides Right to practice any profession or to
carry on any occupation, trade or business to all citizens subject to Art.19(6) which enumerates
the nature of restriction that can be imposed by the state upon the above right of the citizens.
Sub clause (g) of Article 19 (1) confers a general and vast right available to all persons to do
any particular type of business of their choice. Further Art 19(1) (g) does not mean that
conditions be created by the state or any statutory body to make any trade lucrative or to procure
customers to the business/businessman 61.
[47] Under this act there are certain reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public
and also it must be a reasonable restriction.
The “expression” in the interest of general public the court has held:
“is of wide import comprehending public order, public health, public

security, morals, economic welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in part 4 of the
constitution. A law providing for basic amenities; for the dignity of human labour is a social
welfare measure in the interest of general public”62
[48] Keeping in view of controlled and planned economy the Supreme Court in a series of
cases upheld the socially controlled legislation in the light of directive principles and the
activities of the private enterprises have been restricted to a great extent..However under Article
19(6)the state is not prevented from making a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the fundamental right in the interest of the general public or,
(i) A law relating to professional or technical qualifications is necessary for practicing a

profession. A law laying down professional qualification will be protected under Article 19(6).
No person can claim as of right to possess a certificate for the profession of acting as guide,
and the certificate once granted can be cancelled without hearing the person concerned.
(ii) A law relating to the carrying on by the state, or by any corporation owned or controlled by
it, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of
citizens or otherwise.
61
ChaintanyaPrakesh v. Board of Secondary Education Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1981 SC 344.
62
Municipal Corpn. of the city of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1205.
29 | P a g e
[49] Under article 19(6)(ii) nothing contained in Sub-clause(g) of Clause (1) of Article 19 shall
affect carrying on by the State any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion,
complete or partial of citizens.
In Hathisingh Mfg. Co Ltd v. Union of India63, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 923 of the Supreme Court
held that freedom to carry on trade or business under Article 19(1)(g) is not an absolute one,
and reasonable restrictions can be imposed on it in the interest of the general public vide Article
19(6) of the Constitution.
Moreover, in this present case also, there is no violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian
Constitution as even though they have the right to open up business.
[50] Interest of general public is a wide expression 64 and would comprise within its ambit the
interest of public health and morals,65economies satiability of the country, 66equitable
distribution of essential commodities at fair prices67; maintenance of purity in public
life68,prevention of fraud69, amelioration of the conditions of the farmers 70 or
workmen71,reserving the land for the Tiller of the soil only72
Non-citizens cannot claim fundamental right under Article 19, though the rights under Articles
20, 21, 22 are available even to non-citizens. A foreigner national, though not entitled to the
rights under Article 19, however he is entitled to equality before law and equal protection of
the laws, guaranteed under Article 14. Under Article 19 (1) (g) a foreigner company has no
fundamental right to carry on any trade business or profession in this country
Any restriction imposed by the state by any law on the right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g)
can be challenged on the ground either that the restriction is unreasonable, or that the restriction
is in excess of the right, or that even activities which are not pernicious or that the procedure
laid down for curbing any activity is unjust, arbitrary or unreasonable.
63Hathisingh Mfg. Co Ltd v. Union of India, A.I.R 1960 S.C.923.

64
All Delhi Rickshaw Union v. Municipal Corpn., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 648 (para. 5).
65
State Of Mahrashtra v. HimmathBhai , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1157.
66
Glass Chatons v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1514.
67
Narendra v. Union of India, 1960 2 S.C.R. 375.
68
sakhawant v. state of Orrisa,A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 166.
69
sukhnandan v. union of india ,A.I.R.1982 S.C. 902.
70
gn md v. State of Gujarat ,1966 (1) S.C.R. 505(515).
71
Ram dan das V. state of Punjab,A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1559.
72
sree kali madha v. union of India,A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1030.
30 | P a g e
[51] The Supreme Court, has taken the view that whether an activity or business comes within
the purview of Article 19(1)(g) should not be determined by applying the standards of morality
obtaining at a particular time in our country. Standards of morality can afford a guidance to
impose restriction, but cannot limit the scope of the right. 73
For a considerable period, the approach of the Judiciary had been that the rights which are
given to the citizens by way of fundamental rights as included in Part III of the Constitution
are the guarantee to the citizens against State. But actions as distinguished from violation of
such rights from private parties is the private action and is sufficiently protected by the ordinary
law.
[52] Sub-clause (2) of Article 19 pointedly and clearly states, amongst other things, that the
restriction would be reasonable with regard to the exercise of the right conferred on a citizen
under sub-clause (a) of Cl. (1) of Article 19, if the restriction so imposed is in the interest of
maintaining decency or morality or public order. The question of decency and morality is
always involved in matters of political defection. What has been guaranteed as a right of
freedom of speech was not an absolute right but subject to permissible restrictions and the same
was obvious from the nature of the right conferred as fundamental right under Article 19(1).
The freedom of speech would not mean a freedom to say whatever one likes. It is always subject
to laws of libel, sedition and the like. It would be only in a very clear case that the Court may
reach a conclusion that the challenged law was invalid, being the law putting
unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in Art. 19. In State v. V.G
Row74,, the above statement was mentioned.
[53] Article 19 (1) (g) does not abrogate the law under torts relating to private business between
individuals and individuals, and in case of individual disputes between individuals, inter se,
involving trade or business, the subject matter of disputes can be made liable to an injunction
from the Civil Court.75
[54] The expression reasonable restriction seeks to strike a balance between the freedoms
guaranteed by any of the sub clauses. (1) of Art.19 and the social control permitted by any of
the clauses (2) to (6). 76It connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of
the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the
73
Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of J&K, A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1368,1371
74
State v. V.G Row74, (1952) 3 SCR 597 : (AIR 1952 SC 196),
75Dattamal Chiranjilal (M/s) v. Lodhi Prasad; A.I.R. 1960 All. 622
76
Pothumma v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 771
31 | P a g e
interest of the public. In order to reasonable restriction must have a reasonable relation to the
object which the legislation seeks to achieve, and must not go in excess of that object. 77
[55] In the instant case. The Police team had to- file a FIR against the Sneha Renewal Centre
due to the reason that they were treating their patients with unknown drugs which results the
patients to show violent signs.
In the instant case the act done by the Sneha retreat Centre is against the public morals as the
act in which they looked up the inhabitants in cells in the name of healing as well as giving
unknown medicines by untrained hands.
[56] According to 19(6), law can lay down the professional or technical qualifications
necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. Here,
in the instant case, the patients were treated by untrained persons who don’t have any eligibility
or qualification. Thus, it is clear that the act does not violates the petitioner’s right to freedom
to profess, practice any occupation, trade or business stated under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution.
Clause 19(6) of the Constitution authorizes the statei) To impose reasonable restrictions on the
freedom of trade, business, occupation and profession, in the interest of the general public. ii)
Professional and technical qualifications. iii) To carry on any trade or business. A proper
understanding of the following areas is essential: 1) Reasonable restrictions. 2) In the interest
of general public 3) Professional/Technical Qualifications under Article 19(6) (i) 4) Trading
by the state under Article 19(6) (ii).

77
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P, (1950) S.C.R. 759.
32 | P a g e
ARTICLE 25(1) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.
[57] The Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution is a basic human right guarantee that cannot
be subverted or misinterpreted in any manner.
Under the scheme of Constitution of India, Article 25(1) provides:
Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part,all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely toprofess,
practise and propagate religion.
[58] From the Article,
• Freedom of conscience connotes a person’s right to beliefs and doctrines conscience

matter which are regarded by him to be conducive to his spiritual well being 78
Thewording of article 25 of the Indian Constitution, however, seems to suggest that
theindividual’s right to hold such belief is subject to public order, morality and health
and tothe other provisions of part III of the Constitution.
• Freedom of profession means the right of the believer to state his creed in public and
hisright to declare freely and openly one’s faith. 79 The constitutional right to profess
religionmeans a right to exhibit one’s religion in such overt acts as teaching, practicing
andobserving religious precepts and ideals in which there is no explicit intention
ofpropagation involved. Taking out religious processions, worship in public places,
puttingon specific garments include within the ambit of profession of religion
• Freedom of practice means right to give any expression in forms of private and public
worship80 practice &religion is to perform the prescribed religious duties, rights
78
RatilalRanachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 388
79
Punjab Rao v. D.P.Meshram, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1179
80
Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments,Madras v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282
33 | P a g e
andrituals, and to exhibit his religious belief and ideas by such acts as prescribed by
religiousorder in which he believes.
• Freedom of ‘propagation’ of one’s religion means the right to communicate ones
beliefsto another person81 . But the word propagation only indicates persuasion and
exposition without any element of coercion. The right to propagate ones religion does
not give a right to convert any person to one’s own religion.
[59] According to the Article, any one has the right to profess, promote, propagate and practice
any religious of their choice in any manner. This right to freedom is not only given to the
citizens of India, but also to all persons. Section 2(c), Section 3 and paragraph 9 of the schedule
of the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Sorcery and Black Magic bill,2019
does not violate that right of a person by not allowing to promote black magic, sorcery, chanting
prayers for treatment etc.
[60] The right to propagation is to expose the tenets of one’s faith, but would not include the
right to convert another person to the former faith82
[61] Religious freedom cannot be used as a protection against acts that affects the public order,
morality and health. Freedom of religion cannot violate any of the fundamental rights given in
the Constitution of India.83
Here in the instant case, Sneha Retreat centre is using their religious beliefs as a mode to
indulge people in their own race to drugs and forceful confinement.They are covering their acts
of violence in the name of religion.
[62] The exceptions of this Article include public order, morality and health:
• Public order: No freedom can flourish in a state of disorder, there for; it is the duty of
thestate to maintain peace and order so that people can enjoy the rights conferred on
them by the constitution
• Morality: No state can allow immorality in the name of religious freedom, nor is it
desirable. Religion aim at the moral wellbeing man but sometimes, certain religious
81
Rev Stainislaus v. State of M.P, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 908
82
Ibid
83
Church of God v. K.K.R. Majestic colony welfare association, 2002 Cri.L.J. 4022
34 | P a g e
practicehave resulted immoral acts, It is the duty of the state to see that such immoral
practice under the grab of religious freedom are not allowed to flourish in the society.
• Health: It is the duty of a welfare State to provide legal safeguards to protect
individual’s life and to maintain good health of the community. However, this
lifesaving objective of the State may run counter to certain religious beliefs and
practices.
[63] In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U. P84the Supreme Court held that section 295-A is not
inconsistent with article 25(1) as it imposes a restriction in the interest of public order, that is,
makes punishable deliberate and malicious outraging of the religious feelings of any class of
citizens of India.
[64] Rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship considered by a religion to be
its integral and essential part are also secured what constitutes an integral and essential part of
a religion or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of
that particular religion and includes practices regarded by the community as part of its
religion85
Also, as has been stated by the Supreme Court in N.Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board
86..
“The protection under Article 25 extends guarantee for rituals and

observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are integral parts of religion and as to
what really constitutes an essential part of religion or religious practice has to be decided by
the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion or practices regarded as parts
of religion”
[65] It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this Court
struck a note of caution in the case of The Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali87and
observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion they
must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely
secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed
84
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 620
85
Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586
86
N.Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, A.I.R 2002 S.C. 3538
87
The Durgah Committee Ajmer v. SyedHussainAli(1962) 1 S.C.R. 383, 411.
35 | P a g e
with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the
meaning of Art. 25(1).
[66] Therefore, whenever a claim is made on behalf of an individual citizen that the impugned
statute contravenes his fundamental right to practice religion or a claim is made on behalf of
the denomination that the fundamental right guaranteed to it to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion is contravened, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question
is religious or the affairs in respect of which the right of management is alleged to have been
contravened are affairs in matters of religion.
If the practice is a religious practice or the affairs are the affairs in matter of religion then of
course, the rights guaranteed by Art. 25(1)88 cannot be contravened. It is true that the decision
of the question as to whether a certain practice a religious practice or not, as well as the question
as to whether an affair in question is an affair in matters of religion or not, may present
difficulties because sometimes practices, religious and secular, are inextricably mixed up.
[67] This is more particularly so in regard to Hindu religion because as is well known, under
the provisions of ancient Smritis, all human actions from birth to death and most of the
individual actions from day-to-day are regarded as religious in character.
As an illustration, we may refer to the fact that the Smritis regard marriage as a sacrament and
not a contract.
Though the task of disengaging the secular from the religious may not be easy, it must
nevertheless be attempted in dealing with the claims for protection under Articles 25(1). If the
practice which is protected under the former is a religious practice, and if the right which is
protected under the latter is the right to manage affairs in matters of religion, it is necessary
that in judging about the merits of the claim made in that behalf the Court must be satisfied that
the practice is religious and the affair is in regard to a matter of religion.
[68] As the Supreme Court observed in the case noted below:89
“What constitutes an essential part of a religion or religious practice has to be

decided by the courts with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion and include
practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its religion.”
88The Constitution Of India,1950

89
H.H.SrimadPerarulalaEthiraja Ramanuja Jeevar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1586
36 | P a g e
The court has the ultimate, supreme power to decide what is right and what needs to be
followed looking on to the doctrines or tenets of the catholics.
[69] If a person, the court said, purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to
hisreligion,that would impinge on the freedom of conscience guaranteed to all citizens alike in
Article 25(1).90
[70] The principled approach founded on reason as held by the Indian Supreme Court regarding
religion is an important requirement to keep religions to be authentic in their practices. Such
aninterpretation of religion would remind believers to shed away non-religious and, at times,
even unreligious accretions added to religious practices.91
It would enlighten the followers of various faith traditions not to thwart the legitimate activities
of the State to further the cause of human dignity, the types of religious practices or beliefs or
even ideologies protected under article 25(1) arethe ones, which support some of these
fundamental humanistic objectives of the Constitution.
[71] In Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda92 ,
“the claim of Ananda Margays a separate religion was not acceptable in

view of the clear assertion that it was not an institutional religion but as a religious
denomination. They did belong to the Hindu religion. Accordingly, itwas violative of Article
25(1) of the Indian Constitution.The court said that Essential part of areligion means the core
beliefs upon which a religion is founded.”93
Essential practice means those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious belief. The
confinement of people for healing or saying manthras, doing tantras, chanting prayers for the
purpose of treatment is not an essential practice. People can be treated in other means and do
not need any kind of pressure.
It is upon the cornerstone of essential parts or practices that the superstructure of a religion is
built, without which a religion will be noreligion. A test involved in this case is to find whether
the nature of religion will be changed without a practice or part. If the takin away if that part
or practice could result in the fundamental changein the character of that religion or in its behalf
then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. Likewise permitting women to
90
P.L.Lakhanpalv. Union of India, A.I.R 1967 S.C.908.
91Supra note 89.
92
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwarananda, (2004) 12 S.C.C. 770
93
Ibid.
37 | P a g e
enter the SreeGuruvayoor temple by wearing churidar could notbe prohibited since the wearing
of traditional saree for entry into the temple was not going to bea customary practice or value94
[72] This test for essential religious practices or popularly known as the Doctrine of Essentiality
was invented by a seven-judge bench in the case Commissioner of Hindu
ReligiousEndowments,Madras v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Shirur Mutt95 . The
court heldthat the term “religion” will cover all rituals and practices “integral” to a religion,
and took upon itself the responsibility of determining the essential and non-essential practices
of areligion.
Essential religious practice test is a contentious doctrine evolved by the court to protect only
such religious practices which were essential and integral to the religion. The essential part of
a religion depends upon the doctrines of a religion. We can prescribe offerings of food to idols
at home which part of our religion but anything against public order, morality and health will
not be allowed or is not essential.
[73] In Arjun Gopal &ors. v. Union of India &ors96 it is said that if a particular religious
practice is threatening the health and lives of people, such practice is not to entitled to
protection under Article 25(1).
The practice of sorcery or black magic may even lead to the death of the persons.Black
magic has traditionally referred to the use of supernatural powers or magic for evil and selfish
purposes. With respect to the left-hand path and right-hand path dichotomy, black magic is the
malicious, left-hand counterpart of the benevolent white magic.
Sorcery is a category of beliefs and practices considered separate from religion and
science.These two practices are very inhuman, evil practices. The chanting of prayers or doing
manthra-tanthra for the religious activity is considered to be as an offence,
[74] In Moulana Mufti Sayeed Mohd. v. State of West Bengal97 , the Calcutta high court has
held that the restrictions imposed by the state on the use of loudspeakers at the time of Azan is
notviolative of article 25(1) Azan is certainly an integral and essential part of the religion but
the use of loud speakers is not an essential and integral part of Islam.
94
Sree Mohandas v. State of Kerala A.I.R. 2007 Ker 289
95
Supra note 48
96
Arjun Gopal &ors. v. Union of India &ors., A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 5731
97
Moulana Mufti.Sayeed Mohd v. State of West Bengal.A.I.R. 1999 Cal. 15
38 | P a g e
[75] Therefore in the instant case also there is no violation of Article 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution as even though Article 25(1) states for the practice and propagation of religion,
there are some reasonable restrictions under this Article. 98
Hence it is humbly submitted that the Section 3 read with Section 2(c ) read with paragraph 9
of the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman, Evil Practices, Sorcery and Black
Magic Act,2019 is not violative of Article 19(1) (a), Article 19(1)(g) and Article 25(1) of the
Indian Constitution.Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the Dharmasthan Prevention and
Eradication of Inhuman, Evil Practices, Sorcery and Black Magic Act,2019 doesnot violate any
of the above-mentioned fundamental rights of Sneha Retreat Centre.
Therefore, the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman, Evil Practices, Sorcery
and Black Magic Act,2019 99is constitutional as the Sections in that Act does not violate Article
14 as their no arbitrariness and there is no excessive delegation of legislative powers in the Act
and also there is no violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution as all the
fundamental rights have there own reasonable restrictions in each.
PRAYER
98
Supra note 81.
99
Supra note26.
39 | P a g e
In the light of issue raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most humbly
submitted that the court may please adjudge and declare that:
1. Writpetition filed under article 226 of the Indian constitution is maintainable.
2. Section 14 of the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil

Practices, Sorcery and Black Magic Act, 2019 is unconstitutional on grounds of
violation of Article 14 and excessive delegation of legislative power.
3. Section 3 of the Dharmasthan Prevention and Eradication of Inhuman Evil

Practices, Sorcery and Black Magic Act, 2019 read with Section 2(c) of the Act and
paragraph 9 of the Schedule violates his fundamental right under Article 19(1) (a),
Article 19(1)(g) and Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution.
And the Court may pass any other order, writ or directions that deems fit in the interest
of justice, equity and good faith.
Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Respondent
SD/-
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT.
40 | P a g e

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TEAM CODE:20

WRIT PETITION FILED

IN THE MATTER OF:

SNEHA RETREAT CENTRE

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

(2) SECTION 14 OF THE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON GROUNDS THAT IT

H.C High Court

A.I.R. All India Reporter

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

IPC Indian Penal Code

S.C.R Supreme Court Reports

SL NO: CASES: CITATION:

1. Veluswami v. Raja, A.I.R.1959 S.C.422.

2. Ashok kumarpandey v. Collector, A.I.R. 1980 S.C.1112.

3. Union of India v. T.R.Varma, A.I.R.1957 S.C.882.

4. Madhya Pradesh v. Income Tax (1965) 57 I.T.R. 637

5. Salil hali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 S.C.C.705.

6. Secretary, Minor, Irrigation and Rural (2002) 5 S.C.C.521.

7. State of Kerala v. Markose A.I.R. 1962 Ker 78 b.

8. Mani Subrit Jain v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1977 S.C.276.

9. State of Orrisa v. Ram Chandra Dev, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.685.

10. Vijay Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R.1980 Raj,207.

11. Altemesh Rein v. Union of India, A.I.R.1988 S.C.1768.

12. State of Jammu Kashmir v. A R A.I.R.1992 S.C.1546.

13. Maqsoodan v. State of U.P, A.I.R.1983 S.C.126.

14. State of MP v. Desh Raj, (2004) 13 S.C.C.199.

15. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia c. Board of A.I.R.2004 S.C.1815.

16. Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West A.I.R. 1962 S.C.1044.

17. S.P.Gupta v. President of India, A.I.R.1982 S.C.149.

19. Daya v. Joint Chief Controller, A.I.R.1962 S.C.1796.

20. Guruswamy v. Sate of Bihar, (1955) 1 S.C.R.305.

21. Chandrasekar v. State of Orissa, (1971) II S.C.D 1171.

22. Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller, (1969) 2 S.C.R.185.

23. R.D.Shetty v. International Airport (1979) 3 S.C.C.489.

24. Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State A.I.R.1991 S.C.537.

25. Keshavananda Bharati v. State of (1973) 4 S.C.C.225.

26. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfd Co v. The A.I.R.1973 S.C.123.

27. The State of Madras, Represented v. (1969) 2 M.L.J.324.

28. Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, P. A.I.R.1954 S.C.569.

29. HarishankerBagla v. State of M.P., A.I.R.1954 S.C.465.

30. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of A.I.R.1960 S.C.554.

31. Narain das v. State of MP, A.I.R.1974 S.C.1232.

32. Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Workmen, A.I.R.1972 S.C.1917.

33. RomeshThopar v. State of Madras, A.I.R.1950 S.C.124.

34. Arjun Gopal &Ors v. Union of India A.I.R.2018 S.C.5731.

35. Moulana Mufti Sayeed Mohdv.. State A.I.R.1999 Cal.15.

37. Life Insurance Corpn. Of india v. A.I.R 1994 S.C.171.

38. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881.

39. E.M.S.Namboodiripadv.T.N.Nambiar, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2015.

40. Babul Parate v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R 1961 S.C. 884.

41. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,. A.I.R1978 S.C. 597.

42. Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, 1975 SCR (3) 333.

43. ChaintanyaPrakesh v. Board of A.I.R. 1981 SC 344.

44. Municipal Corpn. of the city of A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1205.

45. Hathisingh Mfg. Co Ltd v. Union of A.I.R 1960 S.C.923.

46. All Delhi Rickshaw Union v. A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 648

47. State of Mahrashtra v. HimmathBhai , A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1157.

48. Glass Chatons v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1514.

49. Narendra v. Union of India, 1960 2 S.C.R. 375.

50. sakhawant v. state of Orrisa,. A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 166.

51. sukhnandan v. union of india, A.I.R.1982 S.C. 902.

52. Gn md v. State of Gujarat , 1966 (1) S.C.R.

56. State v. V.G Row (1952) 3 SCR 597 :

57. DattamalChiranjilal (M/s) v. Lodhi A.I.R. 1960 All. 622.