NCRP Report No. 182 - 8635 - 1608622667

NCRP REPORT
NCRP REPORT No. 182No. 18
RADIATION SAFETY OF
SEALED RADIOACTIVE
SOURCES
National National Council

Council on on Radiation
Radiation Protection
Protection and Measuremen
and Measurements
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NCRP REPORT No. 182
Radiation Safety of Sealed

Radioactive Sources
Recommendations of the
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION
PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
April 5, 2019
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, issuing

body.
Title: Radiation safety of sealed radioactive sources.
Other titles: NCRP report ; no. 182.
Description: Bethesda, Maryland : National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, April 2019. | Series: NCRP report ; no. 182 | Includes
bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019013936 | ISBN 9781944888084 (hard copy)
Subjects: | MESH: Radiation Protection--standards | Elements, Radioactive |
Safety Management
Classification: LCC RA569 | NLM WN 650 | DDC 363.17/990289--dc23 LC
record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019013936
Copyright © National Council on Radiation

Protection and Measurements 2019
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Cover
The images represent use of a sealed source, a diagrammatic presentation of a
transmission gauge, and an example of a sealed source.
[For detailed information on the availability of NCRP publications see page 112.]
Preface
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

(NCRP) has a long history of issuing guidance on operational radiation
safety topics regarding use of radioactive materials and radiation-gen-
erating devices in research laboratories, academic institutions, medi-
cal facilities, industry, nuclear power generation, space missions, and
the environment. This Report represents an enhancement on the guid-
ance provided in NCRP Report No. 127, Operational Radiation Safety
Program (1998).
This Report provides information on the safe design, acquisition,
use and disposition of sealed radioactive sources from “cradle to grave”
in a variety of occupational settings. The essential elements of a com-
prehensive sealed radioactive source program are of interest to opera-
tional radiation safety professionals, regulatory authorities, and users
of sealed radioactive sources.
This Report was prepared by NCRP Scientific Committee 2-7. Serv-
ing on the Committee were:
Kathryn H. Pryor, Chair
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Richland, Washington
Members
Edgar D. Bailey Christine A. Donahue
Pflugerville, Texas APTIM
Concord, California
John R. Frazier Eric M. Goldin
Knoxville, Tennessee Oceanside, California
Barbara L. Hamrick Michael Littleton
University of California, Irvine Winterville, North Carolina
Health
Orange, California
David S. Myers John W. Poston, Sr.
Livermore, California Texas A&M University
College Station, Texas
Debra M. Scroggs Kathleen L. Shingleton
Olympia, Washington San Ramon, California
Glenn M. Sturchio Joshua Walkowicz
Mayo Clinic Englehardt and Associates, Inc.
Jacksonville, Florida Lyons, Colorado
iii
iv / PREFACE
James S. Willison James G. Yusko

AECOM Canonsberg, Pennsylvania
Aiken, South Carolina
NCRP Secretariat
Cindy L. O’Brien, Managing Editor
Laura J. Atwell, Director of Operations
The Council wishes to express its appreciation to the Committee

members for the time and effort devoted to the preparation of this
Report. NCRP also thanks the Health Physics Society for financial
support contributed during preparation of the Report.
John D. Boice, Jr. Kathryn D. Held

President (2012 – 2018) President (2019 – )
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
2. Definition, Classification and Control of Sealed Sources .2

2.1 Sealed Radioactive Source Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
2.2 Classification of Sealed Radioactive Sources . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2.3 Regulatory Control and Security of Sealed Radioactive
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
3. Fabrication and Manufacturing of Sealed Sources . . . . . .14

3.1 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3.1.1 Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3.1.2 Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3.1.3 Custom Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
3.1.4 Exempt and Nonaccountable Sealed Sources . . .15
3.2 Design and Manufacturing Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
3.2.1 Regulatory Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
3.2.2 Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
3.2.3 Testing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
3.3 Specifications of Use Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
3.4 Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
3.5 Source Certification and Device Registration . . . . . . . . . .20
4. Acquisition and Receipt of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

4.1 Acquisition of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
4.2 Receipt Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
4.3 Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
4.3.1 Issue, Return and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
4.3.2 Special Nuclear Material Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
4.3.3 Nationally Tracked Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
5. Safety Considerations in the Use of Sealed Sources . . . . .28

5.1 General Safety Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
5.1.1 Safe Use of Low-Penetrating Power Sealed
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
5.1.2 Exposure Control and ALARA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
5.1.3 Limitations on Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
5.1.4 Effective Use of Radiation Survey Meters and
Counting Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
5.2 Storing Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
5.3 Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
vi / CONTENTS
5.4 Industrial Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

5.4.1 Nuclear Gauging Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.4.2 Well-Logging Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.4.3 Industrial Radiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.4.4 Ion Generators/Static Eliminators . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.5 Large Irradiators and Sterilization Facilities . . . . . . . . . 47
5.6 Academic Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.7 Nuclear Power Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6. Transportation of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7. Testing and Inspection of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

7.1 Leak Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.2 Leak-Test Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.3 Instrumentation Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.4 Failed Leak Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.5 Inspections for Degradation and Potential Failure . . . . . 57
7.6 Test Documentation and Records Retention . . . . . . . . . . 57
8. Disposal of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
9. Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
10. Historical Review of Sealed-Source Incidents . . . . . . . . . 64

10.1 Types of Incidents and Specific Corrective Actions . . . . . 64
10.1.1 Lost Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
10.1.2 Theft of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.1.3 Damage to Sealed Sources/Devices . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.1.4 Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.1.5 Personnel Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
10.2 Other General Corrective Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.2.1 Additional Labeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.2.2 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
10.2.3 Procedures and Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11. Summary of Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix A. Sealed-Source-Specific License Program

Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix B. Example Sealed-Source Inventory Procedure . 77
Appendix C. Requirements for Transportation of

Radioactive Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
CONTENTS / vii
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
Scientific Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
The NCRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
NCRP Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
1. Introduction
Sealed radioactive sources (also referred to as sealed sources)

are used in a wide variety of occupational settings, including aca-
demic and medical institutions, the oil and gas industry, manufac-
turing industries, nuclear power plants and sterilization facilities,
and are subject to different regulatory and licensing structures
depending on the type of source and its application. The purpose of
this Report is to provide information and guidance on the essential
elements of a comprehensive, “cradle to grave” sealed radioactive
source program, and information on the use of sealed radioactive
sources in specific occupational settings.
This Report is intended for individuals with responsibility for
any aspect of a sealed radioactive source management program,
as well as operational radiation safety professionals and users of
sealed radioactive sources. It may also be useful to regulatory
authorities in establishing the requirements for sealed radioactive
source programs.
This Report provides information and recommendations for the
definition of a sealed radioactive source and for a categorization
scheme for applying regulatory controls to sealed sources. Radia-
tion safety considerations associated with the design, fabrication
and manufacturing of sealed radioactive sources and the acqui-
sition, receipt and inventory of sealed sources are also discussed.
This Report provides guidance and information for the use of
sealed radioactive sources in specific occupational settings, includ-
ing the handling and use of low-penetrating power sources, such as
electroplated or foil sources. This Report addresses radiation safety
and security for sealed radioactive source storage, transportation
and disposal, and emergency preparedness for accidents and inci-
dents involving sealed radioactive sources. A review of historical
incidents and events associated with sealed radioactive sources is
also provided, along with general corrective measures.
This Report does not address short half-life, low dose-rate sealed
sources used in the practice of medicine for manual brachytherapy
(e.g., 125I seeds) or microsphere procedures (e.g., 90Y), as these sources
are typically received, used, and any excess disposed of in less than
a calendar quarter. This Report also does not address radiation
safety precautions for the use of unsealed radioactive material even
if the material is packaged in a form that is not readily dispersible.
2. Definition, Classification
and Control of Sealed
Sources
This section summarizes federal and state regulations that pro-

vide sealed radioactive source definitions and hazard-classification
schemes, and the national and international standards for the
design, manufacture, use, and recycle or disposal of sealed sources
which are often referenced in these regulations. This section also
addresses the need for safe handling, licensing, accountability, and
storage of sealed sources.
Current regulations and standards include similar, but not iden-
tical, definitions for sealed radioactive sources, as well as some dif-
ferences in regulatory requirements for similar hazard sources.
These inconsistent sealed-source definitions and regulatory require-
ments can contribute to the inconsistent application of radiation
safety precautions for similar hazard sources. As the use of sealed
sources continues to increase and diversify, often crossing regula-
tory boundaries, a single definition of a sealed source is needed to
ensure that there is a common understanding among manufactur-
ers, regulators and users; controls are consistently implemented;
and sealed sources are not inadvertently excluded from control. Sim-
ilar benefit would be achieved from standardizing the sealed-source
hazard classification and categorization scheme, as doing so would
support consistent and prudent application of radiation safety pro-
gram elements during the manufacture, use, tracking and disposal
of sealed sources.
2.1 Sealed Radioactive Source Definition
Different definitions of “sealed radioactive source” can be found
in national and international standards, and in state and federal
regulations. The definitions have similarities as well as notable
differences.
Examples of state and U.S. regulatory definitions include:
• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): “Sealed source
means any byproduct material that is encased in a capsule
designed to prevent leakage or escape of the byproduct
material” [10 CFR Part 30 (NRC, 2015a)].
2.1 SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCE DEFINITION / 3
• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): Sealed radioactive

source means “a radioactive source manufactured, obtained,
or retained for the purpose of utilizing the emitted radia-
tion. The sealed radioactive source consists of a known or
estimated quantity of radioactive material contained within
a sealed capsule, sealed between layer(s) of non-radioactive
material, or firmly fixed to a non-radioactive surface by elec-
troplating or other means intended to prevent leakage
or escape of the radioactive material. Sealed radioactive
sources do not include reactor fuel elements, nuclear explo-
sive devices, and radioisotope thermoelectric generators.”
Accountable sealed radioactive source means a “sealed
radioactive source having a half-life equal to or greater than
30 days and an isotopic activity equal to or greater than the
corresponding value provided in Appendix E of [10 CFR
Part 835]” [10 CFR Part 835.2 (DOE, 2008)].
• U.S. Food and Drug Administration: “A radionuclide brachy-
therapy source is a device that consists of a radionuclide
which may be enclosed in a sealed container made of gold,
titanium, stainless steel or platinum and intended for medi-
cal purposes to be placed onto a body surface or into a body
cavity or tissue as a source of nuclear radiation for therapy”
[21 CFR Part 892.5730 (FDA, 1988)].
• U.S. Food and Drug Administration: “A radionuclide tele-
therapy source is a device consisting of a radionuclide
enclosed in a sealed container. The device is intended for
radiation therapy, with the radiation source located at a dis-
tance from the patient’s body” [21 CFR Part 892.5740 (FDA,
1988)].
• Example Agreement State definition: “Sealed source” means
radioactive material that is encased in a capsule designed to
prevent leakage or escape of the radioactive material [Ore-
gon Administrative Rules 333-100-0005 (OHA, 2015)].
Examples of definitions in various national and international

standards include:
• American National Standards Institute (ANSI): A sealed

source is a “radioactive source sealed in a capsule or having
a bonded cover, the capsule or cover being strong enough to
prevent contact with and dispersion of the radioactive mate-
rial under the conditions of use and wear for which it was
designed” [N43.6-2013 (ANSI/HPS, 2013)].
4 / 2. DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): “Radioactive

material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or is
closely bonded and in a solid form. The capsule or material
of a sealed source shall be strong enough to maintain leak-
tightness under the conditions of use and wear for which
the source was designed, also under foreseeable mishaps”
[TECDOC-1344 9, revision of IAEA-TECDOC-1191) (IAEA,
2001; 2003).
• International Organization of Standardization (ISO): A
sealed source is “radioactive material sealed in a capsule or
associated with a material to which it is closely bonded, this
capsule or bonding material being strong enough to main-
tain leak-tightness of the sealed source under the conditions
of use and wear for which it was designed” [2919:2012 (ISO,
2012)].
Considering these and other definitions, the National Council
on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) recommends
standardization of the definition of a sealed radioactive source as
follows:
A sealed radioactive source is a manufactured item con-

taining radioactive material to be used as an ionizing radiation
source and is encapsulated, plated or bonded in a matrix to pre-
vent the dispersal of the radioactive material under the condi-
tions of use and wear for which it was designed.
Whereas all sealed sources are designed to remain “sealed”

under conditions of their intended use, the robustness of encapsu-
lation varies with the potential hazard should the source encapsula-
tion or seal be breached. Sealed sources containing large quantities
of radioactive material (e.g., those used in irradiators, industrial
radiography devices, radiation therapy, and well logging devices),
must be doubly encapsulated and meet rigorous testing require-
ments (Section 3.2.1). Extreme care is required to ensure that
worker doses are maintained as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA). Other sealed sources typically with much smaller quan-
tities of radioactivity (e.g., instrument check sources) are designed
to permit the emission of radiations with low-penetrating power
(e.g., alpha, beta, and low-energy x rays) and the containment bar-
rier, of necessity, is less robust. These sealed sources include elec-
troplated sources, glass-vial encapsulated sources (glass ampules),
and Mylar® (DowDuPont, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware) covered
sources. Increased care is required when handling these sources to
ensure the integrity of the containment barrier (Section 5.1.1).
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES / 5
In addition to traditional sealed sources, radioisotope thermo-

electric generators are sealed and contain radioactive material but
are manufactured and used for the heat (converted to electricity)
generated by the ionizing radiation within the device. Just as is the
case with other sealed sources, radioisotope thermoelectric genera-
tors are encapsulated and meet rigorous requirements to prevent
the dispersal of radioactive material under the conditions expected
during use. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators are used in
highly specialized environments and may require security and
operational controls that exceed those needed for the common types
of sealed sources discussed in this Report.
2.2 Classification of Sealed Radioactive Sources
The three most-widely applied classification schemes for sealed
radioactive sources were developed by NRC or Agreement State,
DOE, and IAEA.
Under the regulations of NRC or an Agreement State, each
sealed source distributed or transferred to a person (an individual,
institution or business) falls into one of three categories. The three
categories are commonly referred to as “exempt,” “generally
licensed,” or “specifically licensed.” These categories relate to the
degree of regulation exercised over the entity that possesses and
uses the sealed source.
• Exempt sealed source:1 the sealed source and/or the device
containing it must have been manufactured and initially
distributed under an NRC radioactive material license
authorizing the distribution to persons “exempt” from NRC
regulations [10 CFR Part 32 (NRC, 2015a)]. Licenses autho-
rizing the distribution of items to persons exempt can only
be issued by NRC; an Agreement State cannot authorize
such distribution. The guidelines for the licensing of these
items and the requirements for the source/device are pro-
vided in NRC regulatory guidance (Greene et al., 1998).
• Generally licensed: the sealed source and/or the device con-
taining it must have been manufactured and distributed
under an NRC or Agreement State radioactive material
1While commonly referred to as “exempt sealed sources,” the items
listed in 10 CFR Part 30.15 (NRC, 2015a) (and comparable Agreement

State regulations) are not exempt themselves per se, but rather the per-
son receiving them from a licensed manufacturer or licensed initial dis-
tributor is exempt from the requirements for a license. This is a subtle
distinction, often without practical impact, but merits a mention for the
sake of accuracy.
license authorizing the distribution to persons “generally

licensed” in NRC or Agreement State regulations [10 CFR
Part 32 (NRC, 2015a) or comparable Agreement State regu-
lations]. Additional guidance for the licensing of these items
and for the design, prototype testing, and quality assurance/
quality control procedures for the source/device are provided
in NRC guidance or similar Agreement State guidance
(Jankovich et al., 2015). Persons receiving these sources or
devices must comply with all the terms of the general
license, granted by NRC (and comparable Agreement State)
regulations [10 CFR Part 31 (NRC, 2015a)]. The regulation
itself is the license, and may contain requirements for leak
testing, transfer, or disposal, among other things. Certain
generally licensed items may also require registration with
the licensing authority [10 CFR Part 31.5 (NRC, 2015a)].
• Specifically licensed: sealed sources that require the owner
to have a document issued and authorized by NRC or an
Agreement State are referred to as “specifically licensed”
sources. To possess these sealed sources, the person must
file an application for a radioactive material license with
NRC or an Agreement State. These license applications are
evaluated and, if found to address in a satisfactory manner
the items contained in the regulations and implementing
regulatory guidance for the proposed quantity of radioactive
material and uses, a radioactive materials license is issued.
This license is issued to a named person2 and contains the
authorization for that person to receive, possess and use the
radioactive materials enumerated on the license. Appendix A
outlines the elements of a program to possess and use sealed
sources under a license issued by the NRC or an Agreement
State.
DOE and its contractors possess and control sealed sources in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 835 (DOE, 2008). DOE categorizes
sealed sources as “accountable” or “non-accountable.” Accountable
sealed sources require periodic inventory and leak test. Nonac-
countable sealed sources are all other sealed sources.
The IAEA categorization system was developed with input
from scientists from several nations, including the United States,
to provide “a fundamental and internationally harmonized basis
2“Person” is specifically defined in NRC and Agreement State regula-

tions, and generally includes any individual, corporation, partnership, firm,
association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government
agency, with certain limited exceptions [10 CFR Part 30.4 (NRC, 2015a)].
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES / 7
for risk-informed decision making” which could be “used as an input

to many activities relating to the safety and security of radioactive
sources” (IAEA, 2003). The IAEA categorization system is based on
the quantity (activity) and inherent hazard of the radionuclide con-
tained in the sealed source. The categorization is based upon the
activity of a radionuclide that corresponds to a “dangerous source”
(as defined by IAEA) which is identified as the “D-value.” The D-
value is radionuclide-specific and has been established considering
internal and external exposure pathways separately (IAEA, 2006).
The activity, “A,” is the radionuclide content of a specific sealed
source. The “A/D ratio” is a means of ranking a source by relative
risk, which allows it to be assigned an IAEA category. For the pur-
poses of classification within the categorization system, the more
restrictive exposure pathway D-value is used in the A/D ratio.
The IAEA categorization system is structured in five “catego-
ries” (i.e., Categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, with Category 1 presenting
the greatest risk). These categories are defined (in plain language)
by IAEA as follows (IAEA, 2003):
• Category 1 sources, “if not safely managed or securely pro-
tected would be likely to cause permanent injury to a person
who handled it, or were otherwise in contact with it, for
more than a few minutes. It would probably be fatal to be
close to this amount of unshielded material for a period of a
few minutes to an hour.” Category 1 sources have an A/D
ratio of 1,000.
tected, could cause permanent injury to a person who han-
dled it, or were otherwise in contact with it, for a short time
(minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to
this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period
of hours to days.” Category 2 sources have an A/D ratio of
10 and <1,000.
tected, could cause permanent injury to a person who han-
dled it, or were otherwise in contact with it, for some hours.
It could possibly — although it is unlikely — be fatal to be
close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a
period of days to weeks.” Category 3 sources have an A/D
ratio of 1 and <10.
• Category 4 sources are “unlikely to be dangerous” and “it is
very unlikely that anyone would be permanently injured by
this amount of radioactive material. However, this amount of
unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or
securely protected, could possibly — although it is unlikely —
temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise

in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many
weeks.” Category 4 sources have an A/D ratio of 0.01 and <1.
• Category 5 sources are “not dangerous” and “no one could be
permanently injured by this amount of radioactive mate-
rial.” Category 5 sources have an activity (A) greater than
the IAEA exempt value (IAEA, 2014) and have an A/D ratio
<0.01.
Table 2.1 provides examples of common uses of sealed sources
and devices containing them, mapped into their respective IAEA
category (IAEA, 2005).
A more complete listing of radionuclides and associated activity
levels corresponding to each category, and explanation of the deri-
vation of the D-values, may be found in IAEA technical documents,
which also provide the underlying methodology to apply to radionu-
clides not listed (IAEA, 2006).
NRC has adopted the IAEA categorization scheme in some of its
recent recommendations and regulations pertaining to radioactive
source controls. The intent is to more closely align domestic efforts
with international efforts to increase safety and security of radio-
active sources (NRC, 2008).
NCRP recommends that the IAEA International Categoriza-

tion System for sealed sources in Category 1 through 5 be
adopted for expanded use in the United States. This system pro-
vides a uniform basis, both nationally and internationally, for
the classification of sealed sources of similar hazard levels.
In determining categories for the purpose of regulatory control,

aggregates of sealed sources should be considered. This Report
defines an aggregate as a group of sealed sources that are located
within a common accessible area (e.g., within the same room in a
facility).
2.3 Regulatory Control and Security of

Sealed Radioactive Sources
The IAEA categorization scheme for radioactive sources is incor-

porated into the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radio-
active Sources (the “Code”) (IAEA, 2004). The Code stipulates the
D-values and specifies the levels of regulatory control (including
those for international transfers) that must be exerted by signatory
nations. The United States is a signatory to the Code, and therefore
has agreed to implement its provisions and recommendations.
TABLE 2.1—Examples of IAEA category and A/D ratios for select sealed sources.a
Typical Quantity
Category A/D Ratio Example Uses Radionuclide
Ci TBq

1 1,000 Irradiators Co-60 4.0E+06 1.5E+05
Teletherapy sources Cs-137 5.0E+02 1.9E+01
Multi-beam teletherapy Co-60 7.0E+03 2.6E+02
Radioisotopic thermoelectric generators Sr-90 2.0E+04 7.4E+02
Pu-238 2.8E+02 1.0E+01
2 1,000 > A/D  10 Industrial radiography sources Co-60 6.0E+01 2.2E+00
Ir-192 1.0E+02 3.7E+00
3 10 > A/D  1 Fixed industrial gauges with high-activity sources Co-60 5.0E+00 1.9E–01
Well-logging sources Cs-137 2.0E+00 7.2E–02
Am-241/Be 2.0E+01 7.4E–01
High/medium dose-rate brachytherapy sources Ir-192 6.0E+00 2.2E–01
4 1 > A/D  0.01 Low dose-rate brachytherapy sources Cf-252 8.3E–02 3.1E–03
Industrial thickness gauges Am-241 6.0E–01 2.2E–02
Static eliminators Po-210 3.0E–02 1.1E–03
Bone densitometers Cd-109 2.0E–02 7.4E–04
5 0.01 > A/D and X-ray fluorescence analyzers Fe-55 2.0E–02 7.4E–04
A > exempt Electron capture detectors Ni-63 1.0E–02 3.7E–04
Positron emission tomography check sources Ge-68 3.0E–03 1.1E–04
2.3 REGULATORY CONTROL AND SECURITY
Mossbauer spectrometry sources Co-57 5.0E–02 1.9E–03

a
The “A/D ratio” is a means of ranking sources by relative risk. “A,” is the activity of a radionuclide content of a specific sealed source. The
/ 9
“D-value” corresponds to a “dangerous source” (as defined by IAEA, 2004).

NRC and Agreement States implement the Code’s recommenda-

tions for a national register for Category 1 and 2 sources and
provisions for the safety and security of sealed sources via 10 CFR
Part 37 and the corresponding Agreement State regulations (NRC,
2015a). DOE implements the sealed-source tracking provisions
through DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health
Reporting (DOE, 2011a). At the time of this Report, NRC enhanced
physical security requirements apply only to Category 1 and 2
sources and aggregates of smaller activity sources reaching the
threshold values.
Under current NRC and Agreement State regulations, Cate-
gory 1 and 2 sealed sources must be used under a specific license.
Category 3 sealed sources can be used under a specific license in
some cases, and as an integral part of a device that is used under a
general license in other cases (see Section 2.2 for discussion on spe-
cific and general licensing). Currently, specific licensing is not uni-
formly required for use of IAEA Category 3, 4, and 5 sealed sources.
IAEA also provides source activity levels that may be exempted
from the requirements of the IAEA International Basic Safety Stan-
dards (IAEA, 2014) without further consideration (including regis-
tration or licensing), provided that under all reasonably foreseeable
circumstances the effective dose expected to be incurred by any
individual from the exempt source is 10 µSv or less in a year. The
IAEA exempt values are presented in Table 2.2 for information only.
The radionuclides addressed by the Code and the threshold val-
ues for Categories 1 to 5 and exempt values provided in the Inter-
national Basic Safety Standards are shown in Table 2.2 (IAEA,
2004; 2014). The basis for the calculation of the D-values, as well as
the methodology for calculation of D-values for other radionuclides,
are provided in Dangerous Quantities of Radioactive Material (D-
Values) (IAEA, 2006).
IAEA considers sealed sources in Categories 1, 2, and 3 as “dan-
gerous” (to varying degrees, as defined by IAEA). In 2006, NRC
amended its regulations to improve source accountability and pro-
vide better information to decision-makers by implementing the
National Source Tracking System (NSTS) for IAEA Category 1 and
2 sources. In 2008, NRC proposed expansion of the NSTS [NRC-
2008-0200 (NRC, 2008)] to include Category 3 sources. NRC noted
that commenters cited several reasons supporting the new rule,
including:
• An accumulation of several higher activity Category 3
sources may pose a threat nearly comparable to the threat
posed by Category 2 sources.
TABLE 2.2—Select radionuclides and IAEA category activity threshold values (IAEA, 2004; 2014).
Category 1a Category 2a Category 3a Category 4a Category 5a Exemptb
Radionuclide

TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic
Am-241 6.E+01 1.6E+03 6.E-01 1.6E+01 6.E–02 1.6E+00 6.E–04 1.6E–02 6.E–06 1.6E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Au-198 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+00 5.4E+01 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 2.E–05 5.4E–04 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Cd-109 2.E+04 5.4E+05 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+01 5.4E+02 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Cf-252 2.E+01 5.4E+02 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–02 5.4E–01 2.E–04 5.4E–03 2.E–06 5.4E–05 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Cm-244 5.E+01 1.4E+03 5.E–01 1.4E+01 5.E–02 1.4E+00 5.E–04 1.4E–02 5.E–06 1.4E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Co-57 7.E+02 1.9E+04 7.E+00 1.9E+02 7.E–01 1.9E+01 7.E–03 1.9E–01 7.E–05 1.9E–03 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Co-60 3.E+01 8.1E+02 3.E–01 8.1E+00 3.E–02 8.1E–01 3.E–04 8.1E–03 3.E–06 8.1E–05 1.E–07 2.7E–06
Cs-137d 1.E+02 2.7E+03 1.E+00 2.7E+01 1.E–01 2.7E+00 1.E–03 2.7E–02 1.E–05 2.7E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Fe-55 8.E+05 2.2E+07 8.E+03 2.2E+05 8.E+02 2.2E+04 8.E+00 2.2E+02 8.E–02 2.2E+00 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Gd-153 1.E+03 2.7E+04 1.E+01 2.7E+02 1.E+00 2.7E+01 1.E–02 2.7E–01 1.E–04 2.7E–03 1.E–05 2.7E–04
Ge-68d 7.E+01 1.9E+03 7.E–01 1.9E+01 7.E–02 1.9E+00 7.E–04 1.9E–02 7.E–06 1.9E–04 1.E–07 2.7E–06
H-3 (tritium) 2.E+06 5.4E+07 2.E+04 5.4E+05 2.E+03 5.4E+04 2.E+01 5.4E+02 2.E–01 5.4E+00 1.E–03 2.7E–02
I-125 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+00 5.4E+01 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 2.E–05 5.4E–04 1.E–06 2.7E–05
I-131 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+00 5.4E+01 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 2.E–05 5.4E–04 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Ir-192 8.E+01 2.2E+03 8.E–01 2.2E+01 8.E–02 2.2E+00 8.E–04 2.2E–02 8.E–06 2.2E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Kr-85 3.E+04 8.1E+05 3.E+02 8.1E+03 3.E+01 8.1E+02 3.E–01 8.1E+00 3.E–03 8.1E–02 1.E–08 2.7E–07
2.3 REGULATORY CONTROL AND SECURITY
Mo-99 3.E+02 8.1E+03 3.E+00 8.1E+01 3.E–01 8.1E+00 3.E–03 8.1E–02 3.E–05 8.1E–04 1.E–10 2.9E–09
Ni-63 6.E+04 1.6E+06 6.E+02 1.6E+04 6.E+01 1.6E+03 6.E–01 1.6E+01 6.E–03 1.6E–01 1.E–04 2.7E–03
/ 11
TABLE 2.2—(continued)
Category 1a Category 2a Category 3a Category 4a Category 5a Exemptb
Radionuclide
TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic TBq Cic

P–32 1.E+04 2.7E+05 1.E+02 2.7E+03 1.E+01 2.7E+02 1.E–01 2.7E+00 1.E–03 2.7E–02 4.E–08 1.1E–06
Pd-103 9.E+04 2.4E+06 9.E+02 2.4E+04 9.E+01 2.4E+03 9.E–01 2.4E+01 9.E–03 2.4E–01 1.E–04 2.7E–03
Pm-147 4.E+04 1.1E+06 4.E+02 1.1E+04 4.E+01 1.1E+03 4.E–01 1.1E+01 4.E–03 1.1E–01 1.E–05 2.7E–04
Po–210 6.E+01 1.6E+03 6.E–01 1.6E+01 6.E–02 1.6E+00 6.E–04 1.6E–02 6.E–06 1.6E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Pu-238 6.E+01 1.6E+03 6.E–01 1.6E+01 6.E–02 1.6E+00 6.E–04 1.6E–02 6.E–06 1.6E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Pu–239 6.E+01 1.6E+03 6.E–01 1.6E+01 6.E–02 1.6E+00 6.E–04 1.6E–02 6.E–06 1.6E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Ra-226b 4.E+01 1.1E+03 4.E–01 1.1E+01 4.E–02 1.1E+00 4.E–04 1.1E–02 4.E–06 1.1E–04 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Ru-106 (Rh-106) d 3.E+02 8.1E+03 3.E+00 8.1E+01 3.E–01 8.1E+00 3.E–03 8.1E–02 3.E–05 8.1E–04 1.E–07 2.7E–06
Se-75 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+00 5.4E+01 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 2.E–05 5.4E–04 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Sr-90 (Y-90) d 1.E+03 2.7E+04 1.E+01 2.7E+02 1.E+00 2.7E+01 1.E–02 2.7E–01 1.E–04 2.7E–03 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Tc-99m 7.E+02 1.9E+04 7.E+00 1.9E+02 7.E–01 1.9E+01 7.E–03 1.9E–01 7.E–05 1.9E–03 1.E–05 2.7E–04
Tl-204 2.E+04 5.4E+05 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+01 5.4E+02 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 1.E–08 2.7E–07
Tm-170 2.E+04 5.4E+05 2.E+02 5.4E+03 2.E+01 5.4E+02 2.E–01 5.4E+00 2.E–03 5.4E–02 1.E–06 2.7E–05
Yb-169 3.E+02 8.1E+03 3.E+00 8.1E+01 3.E–01 8.1E+00 3.E–03 8.1E–02 3.E–05 8.1E–04 1.E–05 2.7E–04
a
Applicable to single sources or an aggregate of sources. [This Report defines an aggregate as a group of sources/devices that would be accessible
by the breach of a single barrier (e.g., in the same room in a facility.)]
bIAEA exempt values are presented in this Report for information only.
c
The primary values to be used are given in terabecquerel. The curie values are rounded to two significant digits and are provided for reference
only. They are not to be used for compliance.
dParent radionuclides and their progeny whose dose contributions are taken into account in the dose calculations (thus requiring only the exemp-
tion level of the parent radionuclide to be considered) are listed here.

2.3 REGULATORY CONTROL AND SECURITY / 13
• Category 3 sources are more likely to be introduced into the

recycle stream and present a danger to the metals-recycling
industry, its employees, and their communities.
• IAEA has indicated that Category 3 sources carry a poten-
tial risk of harm including permanent injury as well as seri-
ous social and economic impact if not managed or securely
protected.
Opponents of the proposed rule emphasized the economic burden
placed on licensees if NRC were to require tracking of Category 3
sources in the NSTS. At the time of the proposed rule expansion, it
was suggested that NSTS be fully operational and successfully
tracking Category 1 and 2 sources before Category 3 sources were
added. The Commission was unable to reach a decision on the staff’s
recommendation to publish the final rule, and that recommendation
was not approved.
In 2014, the Disused Sources Working Group (DSWG, 2014)
evaluated the risks associated with Category 3 sources and con-
cluded that the enhanced control and accountability of Category 3
sources is warranted. NRC initiated a new effort to examine the
advantages and disadvantages (including costs and benefits) of
requiring additional controls on Category 3 sources (NRC, 2017a).
NCRP considered both the advantages and additional burdens
imposed by increased tracking controls of Category 3 sources, but is
not offering a recommendation on this issue at this time.
Subsequently, NRC staff concluded that the threat, vulnerability
and consequence data did not justify the cost associated with “inclu-
sion of Category 3 sources in the National Source Tracking System
(NSTS)” and did not recommend that the Commission require such
a change in regulations (NRC, 2017b).
3. Fabrication and
Manufacturing of
Sealed Sources
Sealed sources, and devices that contain sealed sources, are

manufactured and tested to ensure they can be marketed, used,
stored, transported and disposed of safely, and that the radioactive
material will remain contained under normal use and foreseeable
mishaps. Safety considerations should be included during the
design, fabrication and manufacturing phases. This section con-
tains information on safety considerations in the design and man-
ufacturing of sealed sources that are generally applicable to all
sealed sources. Detailed requirements consistent with the level of
licensing required for users are specified by regulatory authorities
who authorize distribution for commercial use.
3.1 General Considerations

3.1.1 Sealed Sources
Sealed sources that are constructed with capsules or bonded
covers should be constructed and tested in accordance with ANSI
N43.6-2013, Sealed Radioactive Sources — Classification (ANSI/
HPS, 2013), or ISO 2919:2012, Radiation Protection — Sealed
Radioactive Sources — General Requirements and Classification
(ISO, 2012). (These tests may not be appropriate for sources con-
taining low-penetrating power radionuclides.) If the sealed source
is to be shipped or transported as special form, it must also meet
the requirements for “Special Form Class 7” materials as outlined
in the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in 49
CFR Part 173.469 (DOT, 2008) or NRC’s regulations in 10 CFR Part
71.75 (NRC, 2015a).
3.1.2 Devices
The sealed source is the primary containment of radioactive
material within a device. ANSI/HPS (2013) and ISO (2012) stan-
dards specify that each device that incorporates a sealed source
must be classified for its intended use. Sources/devices must be
constructed and tested in accordance with applicable industry and
14
3.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS / 15
consensus standards. Supplemental testing may be necessary for

all expected use, handling, storage and transport conditions, as
well as relevant foreseeable mishaps.
3.1.3 Custom Sealed Sources

Institutions that perform certain research and development
activities that involve the use of sealed sources often require flexi-
bility in device specifications and limitations. These institutions
are typically qualified by training, experience, facility design, and
regulatory approvals to handle sources that do not meet the typical
conditions of use, have been custom-designed, or that have been
modified from their original manufacturing design to serve a spe-
cific purpose. Custom sealed sources with activity levels <7.4 GBq
(200 mCi) or, for 3H sources, <740 GBq (20 Ci) are not required
to be submitted to NRC or the Agreement State for registration
(Jankovich et al., 2015).
Institutions that use custom sealed sources must demonstrate
to their regulator that they can use the sealed source safely and
that applicable occupational and general public dose limits will not
be exceeded under conditions of routine use and foreseeable mis-
haps. The institution’s radiation safety committee may be required
to review and approve the custom sealed source before use. These
custom sealed sources cannot be transferred to others unless they
are transferred to another authorized research/development insti-
tution with equivalent regulatory approvals.
3.1.4 Exempt and Nonaccountable Sealed Sources
Certain types of sealed sources that contain low levels of radio-
activity and present a negligible public health hazard may be sold
to persons without a requirement for NRC or Agreement State
licensing or registration. NRC requires manufacturers of such
sources/devices to hold a specific license of their own for manufac-
turing and distribution, and the design of these sources/devices
must be approved [10 CFR Part 32 and Part 40.52 (NRC, 2015a)].
These “exempt” sources may include those items listed in 10 CFR
Part 30.15 (e.g., certain watches or instrument check sources) and
10 CFR Part 40.13 (NRC, 2015a) (e.g., certain vacuum tubes or
welding rods containing thorium), as well as sources containing no
more than the quantities listed in 10 CFR Part 30.71 (NRC, 2015a),
Schedule B. Sources distributed to persons exempt from licensing
do not require leak testing; however, certain requirements still
apply despite their exempt status. These requirements include a
prohibition on aggregating sources that individually are exempt
quantity sources if the purpose is to produce an increased radiation
16 / 3. FABRICATION AND MANUFACTURING OF SEALED SOURCES
level; and, a prohibition on further commercial distribution by the

end-user.
While the regulations that authorize the exempt distribution of
these sources do not contain any specific prohibitions on the dis-
posal of these sources, they also do not specifically authorize
disposal. In addition, there may be state and local laws that prohibit
their disposal in municipal landfills. When purchasing these
sources, it is prudent to ask the supplier about disposal options, as
they may have a recycling or other source-return program available.
Separately, DOE has established accountable sealed source lev-
els for sealed sources having a half-life 30 d and activity levels
greater than those provided in Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 835
(DOE, 2008). All other sealed sources are nonaccountable and do
not require the semiannual leak testing and inventory control.
IAEA has established the exempt sealed source quantities shown
in Table 2.2
3.2 Design and Manufacturing Specifications

3.2.1 Regulatory Considerations
The specifications for design of a sealed source/device will
depend on its intended use. Specifications for level gauges, for
example, will differ from industrial radiography cameras or tele-
therapy unit specifications because their purpose and use condi-
tions differ. Therefore, manufacturers should ensure the intended
use of the sealed source/device, and the recommended level of
licensing or authorization, is clear in the design specifications. The
objective of the specifications is to ensure the sealed source/device
will perform safely under normal-use conditions and will not result
in a potential for excessive radiation dose under conditions of fore-
seeable mishaps.
Sources that will be manufactured under an NRC or Agreement
State license must meet specific regulatory performance require-
ments. NRC provides a toolkit containing sealed source/device
requirements on their webpage (NRC, 2017c). An example set of
regulatory requirements for the manufacture of sealed sources
used in irradiators appears in 10 CFR Part 36.21 (NRC, 2015a):
• certificate of registration;
• doubly encapsulated;
• nondispersible or insoluble as practicable;
• encapsulating material resistant to corrosion; and
• leak tested successfully after performance testing that
includes: temperature, pressure, impact, vibration, puncture
and bending.
3.2 DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING SPECIFICATIONS / 17
3.2.2 Design Considerations

Engineering drawings are prepared for each sealed source/
device, and should include a construction diagram with dimensions,
tolerances and materials of construction. For devices, shielding
materials/thicknesses, label locations, source mounting, and source
security features should be present on the drawings. For safety-crit-
ical components, such as housings, secondary shielding, or control
systems, an increased level of detail on the drawings is recom-
mended. In addition, materials of construction (e.g., raw materials,
manufactured components, dimensions/tolerances, assembly meth-
ods (welds, bolts, screws), and manufacturing/production processes)
should be specified for all components.
The design specifications for a sealed source/device should
include the critical features of the on/off mechanisms and indica-
tors, sealed source containment and shielding, the movement of
sealed sources or shielding during operations or installation,
mounting features, shutter controls, and tamper-resistant fea-
tures. Special provisions for devices that are intended to be porta-
ble (as opposed to those that are meant to be mounted in one
location during use) should be addressed in the design.
The design specifications should clearly state the radionuclides
and maximum allowable quantities present in each sealed source.
Acceptable levels of contaminants or impurities should also be
specified, particularly if they can influence the primary or scat-
tered radiation hazard during routine use or extreme environmen-
tal conditions.
Finally, design specifications should include the recommended
leak-test frequency for each sealed source/device. Typically, sealed
sources/devices are leak tested at intervals no greater than six
months using procedures that are capable of detecting the presence
of 185 Bq (0.005 µCi) of removable contamination. However, longer
leak-test intervals are acceptable if justified by device-specific
safety or risk analysis.
3.2.3 Testing Considerations

Each model of sealed sources/devices must be tested in accor-
dance with regulatory requirements, and (if there is no specific
requirement) should be tested by the manufacturer to ensure it will
maintain its integrity when subjected to conditions of normal use,
under foreseeable mishaps, and during handling, maintenance,
storage and transportation. Testing methods may include prototype
testing, engineering analysis, operational history studies, equiva-
lent model comparisons, or some combination of these methods.
The prototype for testing must be a complete representation of the

final design, safety features, and operational features as the final
product.
If the manufacturer uses prototype testing, the prototype must
represent the final design and incorporate the final product safety
features, shielding, markings and other items necessary for safety
and integrity. It must also be constructed of the same materials and
to the same dimensions as the final product. Markings and labels
should be included on the prototype before testing as these can
sometimes affect source integrity and exposure rates, particularly
for sealed sources with thin wall thicknesses.
Testing by engineering analysis should extend to the design and
materials of construction, manufacturing processes, and normal
use as well as foreseeable mishaps. Sufficient calculations, model-
ing, and sample testing should be included to ensure that any
applicable industry standard for the type of product can be met
[e.g., ANSI N43.7-2007 (ANSI/HPS, 2007) for dry storage source
irradiators, ANSI N43.9-2015 (ANSI/HPS, 2015) for gamma radi-
ography units] (NRC, 2015b). Supporting documentation sufficient
to permit independent evaluation of the sealed source/device per-
formance should be an integral part of the written analysis.
If acceptable to the regulatory authority, it may be possible to
use operational history to demonstrate the performance of a sealed
source/device type. For example, testing of an identical device but
with accessory equipment that has no impact on safety or integrity
may suffice. Reliance on operational history as a test method
should ensure environmental/operating conditions, use cycles, and
product failures over equal years of use are equivalent to the final
product. However, operational history should not be used as a test
method for demonstrating safety or integrity under extreme condi-
tions if the historical device was never subject to those conditions.
NRC typically only accepts actual prototype testing results for the
source/device to demonstrate source integrity, although compari-
son to a similar or equivalent model of source/device that was
previously reviewed and registered is acceptable under certain cir-
cumstances (Jankovich et al., 2015).
3.3 Specifications of Use Limitations

The manufacturer’s design basis must include those items that
could feasibly impact the proper performance of a source/device.
The manufacturer should have a clear understanding of and clearly
describe the intended use of each sealed source/device, as users
may not be aware of the potential for regulatory violations associ-
ated with unauthorized use.
3.4 LABELING / 19
It is important to specify conditions that may impact the proper

performance of a sealed source/device. These should include envi-
ronmental limitations (e.g., high or low temperature, humidity, cor-
rosion, air quality, vacuum conditions); conditions that may lead to
degradation or breach of source containment; or loss of the source
during use, handling, storage or transportation (e.g., fire, floods,
theft); and extreme operating conditions (e.g., vibration, compres-
sive loads). Manufacturers should include a clear and concise spec-
ification of use limitations in their instructions to the users of the
sealed source/device.
It is also important to note that even though sealed sources
meet the performance test criteria in ANSI N43.6-2013 (ANSI/
HPS, 2013) or ISO-2919:2012 (ISO, 2012), they may not retain
their integrity if routinely subjected to the maximum testing condi-
tions for the duration of their recommended working lifetime. The
manufacturer of the sealed source/device should specify the recom-
mended working lifetime (which is the period of time over which
the source is expected to maintain its integrity) as a part of use lim-
itations (ANSI/HPS, 2013). The limitations should also specify
maximum operating cycles of the sealed source/device if relevant to
safe operations.
In their instructions to users, manufacturers should clearly
state the types of maintenance that may be performed by the user
of the source/device, and those maintenance activities that must be
performed by a licensee who is specifically licensed to do so. Users
must be able to recognize their limitations on source/device main-
tenance; the manufacturer’s instructions should clearly delineate
any limitations.
3.4 Labeling
Regulations typically specify the markings or labels necessary

for sealed sources/devices, and in some cases, exempt the labeling
of sealed sources/devices completely [10 CFR Part 30, Appendix B
(NRC, 2015a)] or in part (e.g., from the yellow and magenta or black
color requirements).
Regardless of the sealed source/device type or size, the radiation
symbol or words “Caution Radioactive Material,” a serial number
or unique identifier, the distributor’s name or trademark, model
number, radionuclide, activity, and date of assay should be present
on markings (Jankovich et al., 2015). In the event of an incident
involving the sealed source/device, this information should be read-
ily available to facilitate proper emergency response and recovery
actions.
Markings and labeling should be durable and legible under

normal-use conditions and over the recommended working lifetime
of the sealed source/device. This information may be engraved or
etched onto the sealed source/device, or onto a metal tag or label
that is firmly affixed to the device. Labels should be mounted to the
portion of the device that contains the sealed source and not on a
detector housing or guard barrier. However, this does not preclude
the placement of additional labels elsewhere on the device. Finally,
labels should be readily visible to users or personnel working in
near proximity to the device when it is in operation or in storage.
3.5 Source Certification and Device Registration

In general, certification or registration standards are set by the
issuing regulatory agency, with sealed sources/devices meeting the
standards assumed to be eligible for entry into commerce. However,
controls beyond those in the standards (i.e., licensing) or additional
use limitations may be imposed by regulatory authorities if deemed
necessary.
The purpose of a sealed source/device certification program is to
ensure a sealed source, or a device holding one or more sealed
sources, is constructed such that its intended use will not jeopardize
public health and safety, or result in danger to life and property.
Specific information is associated with sealed source certificates
and device registrations. This information covers the design, man-
ufacture, prototype testing, quality control program, labeling, pro-
posed uses, leak testing, installation, service and maintenance,
operating and safety instructions, and other aspects that are neces-
sary to justify an implied level of safety. Certificate holders may
also be required to justify the level of licensing or control required
for the use of the device in question.
From the 1950s in the United States, manufacturers of sealed
sources or devices containing sealed sources have been submitting
their safety information to a regulatory authority, which performs
an independent safety evaluation and issues a certificate. Registra-
tions, through the Sealed Source and Device Registry (SSDR), are
issued by either NRC or an Agreement State to distributors or
manufacturers that are within their jurisdiction. SSDR certificates
issued by one regulatory authority (i.e., NRC or Agreement State)
are generally recognized by the other. However, only NRC may
authorize distribution of a sealed source/device as exempt from reg-
ulatory control, which is done through the issuance of an exempt
distribution license.
Certification or registration programs can be beneficial to man-
ufacturers and distributors, as well as to end-users. The certificate
3.5 SOURCE CERTIFICATION AND DEVICE REGISTRATION / 21
can provide a significant amount of the information that must

be submitted to obtain a specific license for the use of the sealed
source/device, minimizing the workload on the end-user.
The SSDR provides necessary information regarding the safe
use of the sealed source/device.
NCRP recommends that the SSDR be made available to users

by the regulatory agencies, particularly in cases where users
cannot obtain the SSDR from the manufacturers because they
have gone out of business.
In addition, NCRP recommends that manufacturers provide

clear and concise statements of use and maintenance limitations
for the sealed source/device in the instructions to users.
4. Acquisition and Receipt
of Sealed Sources
Sealed sources may be procured or acquired by individuals,

institutions or businesses for many different purposes. These
include (but are not limited to) determination of proper instrument
operation and calibration of radiation protection instruments, mea-
surement of thickness and density in manufacturing, measure-
ment of soil density and moisture content in construction,
evaluation of weld quality in pipelines, and as irradiators and in
medical treatment devices. This section presents information on
the acquisition, receipt and inventory of sealed sources.
4.1 Acquisition of Sealed Sources
Sealed sources with exempt quantities of radioactivity [10 CFR

Part 30.71 (NRC, 2015a)] may be purchased without a license. Fed-
eral and state regulations, however, may limit the number of these
sources that any one person may possess at a time [10 CFR Part
30.18 (NRC, 2015a)]. Sealed sources with activities greater than
the exempt quantity require the purchaser to be either generally or
specifically licensed by NRC or an Agreement State.
If under NRC or Agreement State jurisdiction, a person must
have a radioactive materials license to procure and possess a sealed
source that is not authorized for exempt distribution. (NRC regula-
tions do not apply to DOE or its contractors.) To deliver such a
source to a customer, the distributor or manufacturer must verify
the customer is authorized to receive it [10 CFR Part 30.41 (NRC,
2015a)]. In most cases, this is accomplished by sending the distrib-
utor or manufacturer a copy of the customer’s radioactive material
license (or a written certification that the customer is authorized by
license to receive the material). Depending on the radionuclide and
quantity, the transfer may need to be reported to NRC or Agreement
State agencies. Some high-activity sealed sources require permits
and regulatory notifications simply to transport the source from one
licensee to another. In addition, there are also DOT requirements
[49 CFR (DOT, 2018)] for radioactive material shipment.
A person does not need a specific radioactive materials license
to purchase or possess a sealed source/device for which NRC or an
22
4.1 ACQUISITION OF SEALED SOURCES / 23
Agreement State has granted a general license in regulation; the

regulation itself is the license, and specifies the requirements for
the possession, use, transfer and disposal of the source/device. A
general license is valid only when a person purchases a generally
licensed device that has been manufactured and initially distrib-
uted with a sealed source installed according to the specific license
issued by a regulatory agency to the manufacturer (or initial U.S.
distributor). Certain sources/devices used under a general license
may require registration with NRC or the Agreement State [10 CFR
Part 31.5 (NRC, 2015a)]. Most sealed sources/devices used under a
general license can be transferred from one person to another, pro-
vided the sealed source/device remains in the same physical loca-
tion. If transferred under other circumstances, the recipient may be
required to obtain a specific radioactive materials license.
A person importing sealed sources into the United States must
meet the requirements in NRC 10 CFR Part 110 (NRC, 2015a) or
DOE’s Order 462.1 (DOE, 2016). NRC grants a general license
to import radioactive material (with some limitations), provided
the recipient possesses a general or specific license to possess the
imported material [10 CFR Part 110.27 (NRC, 2015a)]. NRC also
grants specific licenses for import, and both general and specific
licenses for the export, subject to various requirements. Due to the
complexity of international shipping and packaging regulations,
the restrictions on imports and exports in NRC regulations in
10 CFR Part 110 (NRC, 2015a), and the applicable laws in other
countries around the world, licensees should seek an experienced
consultant to ensure all of the applicable regulations are followed
for imported or exported sources.
Regardless of the proposed use of the sealed source(s), the indi-
vidual or institution ordering the sealed source should ensure that
the appropriate radiation safety personnel at the facility are noti-
fied of the planned purchase to ensure that the sealed source is
appropriate for the planned use. While it may seem rudimentary,
many sealed sources have been procured with an end use in mind,
only to find out later after arrival that the sealed source does not
meet the user’s requirements. Most radiation safety officers (RSOs)
and their staff can assist with the proper selection of sealed sources
and ensure the following requirements are met:
• properly inspecting the sealed source upon arrival;

• adding the sealed source to the institution’s sealed-source
inventory;
• assuring the source does not exceed license limitations;
• completing proper leak testing (Section 7); and
24 / 4. ACQUISITION AND RECEIPT OF SEALED SOURCES
• verifying that users are properly trained in the safe storage

and use of the sealed source.
When received by an institution with an existing specific radio-
active materials license, it is up to that institution as to whether
or not they want to control generally licensed sources/devices and
exempt-quantity sealed sources under the conditions of their spe-
cific license. NRC neither requires nor encourages addition of these
sources/devices to a specific license (Howe et al., 2008). However, it
is a good practice to inform the RSO (or other designated radiation
safety program staff) of any purchases of sealed sources/devices,
even if they can be procured and used under a general license.
Another very important consideration is planning for the
end-state for a sealed source/device purchase and accounting for
the potential cost for disposal. Before procuring a sealed source, the
person or institution should be aware of, and account for, the cost of
disposal of that sealed source/device (Section 8). Some sealed
sources may be easy to dispose of; others may be transferable to
another licensee; others may not have a disposal option. In many
cases, transfer and/or disposal can be costly and can require spe-
cific and costly packaging and shipping.
4.2 Receipt Inspection
All packages, regardless of sealed-source activity level [10 CFR
Part 20.1906 (NRC, 2015a)], must be visually inspected for damage
and, if damaged, must be monitored for radiation and contamina-
tion levels. Visual inspection suggesting integrity failure of a pack-
age (including signs of crushing or other damage or observation of
dampness from release of a liquid) warrants immediate additional
attention as discussed in Table 9.1. Actions typically include secur-
ing the area, implementing contamination and movement controls,
and notification of responsible individuals.
DOT regulatory requirements for shipping sealed sources are
found in 49 CFR (DOT, 2018). If a received package has a White I,
Yellow II, or Yellow III label [as defined in 49 CFR (DOT, 2018)], a
contamination survey of the external surfaces must be performed
unless the package contains only a gas or special form as defined in
NRC regulations 10 CFR Part 71 (NRC, 2015a). Additional require-
ments are contained in NRC regulations 10 CFR Part 71 (and com-
parable Agreement State regulations) and 10 CFR 20.1906 (NRC,
2015a), which requires that a survey of package radiation levels be
made unless the quantity in the package is less than that specified
in 10 CFR Part 71, Appendix A (NRC, 2015a). In addition, interna-
tional shipments are subject to IAEA (2012) and International Air
Transportation Association (IATA, 2018) requirements.
4.3 INVENTORY / 25
When conducting a receipt survey, contamination-control prac-

tices should be used to prevent the unwanted spread of radioactive
materials at the receipt facility. Acceptance criteria for removable
contamination and radiation levels are found in Appendix B. In
addition to a receipt survey, it is a good practice to survey for con-
tamination when opening the inner sealed-source package, regard-
less of the level of activity contained therein.
NRC requires receipt surveys to take place as soon as practical
after receipt of the package, but not later than 3 h after the package
is received at the licensee’s facility if it is received during the
licensee’s normal working hours, or not later than 3 h from the begin-
ning of the next working day if it is received after working hours. If
under DOE jurisdiction, receipt surveys must be completed within
8 h.
In some cases, notification of receipt is required to report that
the radioactive source has been received. For example, receipt of
nationally tracked sealed sources [10 CFR Part 20, Appendix E
(NRC, 2015a)] must be reported to NRC by the end of the following
business day. Additional requirements relating to physical protec-
tion of sources during transit, and other notification requirements
for nationally tracked sealed sources are contained in 10 CFR Part
37 (NRC, 2015a).
Any packages that exhibit removable contamination levels or
radiation levels that exceed the acceptance criteria in Appendix C
should be reported to the receiving institution’s RSO. Some condi-
tions require notification to regulatory agencies within a specific
time frame (see Appendix C for more details).
4.3 Inventory
Sealed sources/devices used under a specific license should be
included in the licensee’s sealed-source inventory. The licensee
should maintain records that show the receipt, transfer and dis-
posal of licensed sealed sources. Inventory records should be main-
tained for a minimum period of 3 y after transfer or disposal of the
sealed source.
As discussed above, NRC and Agreement States allow some
devices containing sealed sources subject to regulatory control to be
distributed as “generally licensed.” These sources are typically
installed in devices that require the radioactivity for proper opera-
tion. One example is an inline device for measuring level or density
in manufacturing applications. These devices often come with their
own specified requirements for tracking, registration with NRC
or Agreement State, or other reporting mechanisms, and they
may also have their own leak-testing requirements that may not be
26 / 4. ACQUISITION AND RECEIPT OF SEALED SOURCES
consistent with annual or semi-annual leak tests required for other

licensed sources.
NCRP recommends that sealed sources/devices used under

a general license be included in an inventory and tracking
mechanism.
4.3.1 Issue, Return and Control

The sealed-source inventory should provide for a readily acces-
sible means of determining where each sealed source is stored,
when and to whom it was issued for use, dates and results for leak
testing, and final disposition if the source is transferred to another
licensee or sent for disposal. For an inventory-control system, users
should be trained on how to enter new sources into the database
upon receipt, update the database when sources are checked in or
out, track the timing for leak testing if applicable, and indicate the
disposition when sources are removed for transfer or disposal. The
ideal inventory-control system may also verify qualifications for
users (e.g., current training, experience) and identify any special
radiation protection requirements for use of the sealed source.
Sealed sources distributed as exempt (under NRC regulations)
or nonaccountable (under DOE regulations) are not required to be
inventoried or leak tested. The safety evaluation that was per-
formed as part of the licensing process for the source manufacturer
assures that, under normal use and foreseeable mishaps, the radio-
active material will not be released to the environment. Even under
worst-case conditions, if the exempt/nonaccountable sealed source
is compromised such that radioactivity is released, the conse-
quences are not significant for the user or members of the public.
Note that any discrepancies within the inventory may require
regulatory notifications. An example notification protocol is con-
tained in Appendix B, Section V, Missing Sources – Notifications.
The actual notification requirements depend on the category of the
source, regulatory agency, and source license requirements.
4.3.2 Special Nuclear Material Sources

Special nuclear material is defined in regulations as fissile
material, typically 239Pu, 233U, or uranium enriched in either the
isotope 233U or the isotope 235U. Licensees who possess sealed
sources that contain special nuclear material are required to com-
ply with additional inventory and reporting requirements that can
be found in NRC 10 CFR Part 70 (NRC, 2015a) regulations or
equivalent Agreement State regulations. [DOE requirements are
4.3 INVENTORY / 27
found in DOE O 410.2 and DOE O 474.2 (DOE, 2009; 2011b).] The
IAEA D-values for special nuclear material are typically based on
consideration of the criticality limit, as described in IAEA Danger-
ous Quantities of Radioactive Materials (D-Values) (IAEA, 2006).
4.3.3 Nationally Tracked Sources

NRC’s 10 CFR Part 20.2207 (NRC, 2015a) requires reporting of
transactions (manufacture, transfer, receipt, disassembly and dis-
posal) involving certain high-activity sources (e.g., industrial radi-
ography sources, calibration sources, blood irradiators, medical
treatment devices) in the NSTS. These sealed sources (referred to
as “nationally tracked sources”) require annual inventory verifica-
tion and reporting to NRC, as well as transaction reporting. Simi-
larly, DOE maintains a centralized reporting capability, the
Radiological Source Registry and Tracking database, which serves
as DOE’s centralized repository for inventory and transaction data
on sealed sources. DOE uses the Radiological Source Registry and
Tracking database to provide appropriate data on IAEA Category
1 and 2 sealed sources to the NSTS. Currently, NSTS includes only
those sources with activities levels in Category 1 and 2. When
licensed by NRC or an Agreement State, the loss of a Category 1
or 2 sealed source must be reported immediately upon discovery
[10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a)] to the licensing agency.
5. Safety Considerations in
the Use of Sealed Sources
Sealed sources are used in a wide variety of applications. The

quantity of radioactive material contained in sealed sources may
range from a few tens of becquerel (e.g., a small instrument check
source) to multi-petabecquerel (e.g., in food irradiators). Depending
on the application, the sealed source may emit only alpha or beta
particles, neutrons, or gamma/x rays or a combination of these radi-
ations. The quantity and type of radiation(s) emitted from the
sealed source determine the rigor needed for the safety program for
the use of the sealed source. This section presents information on
general safety considerations in the use of sealed sources, as well
as safety considerations for specific occupational settings.
5.1 General Safety Considerations
Depending on the type and quantity of radioactive material in a
sealed source, the source may present an external radiation haz-
ard. If the encapsulation is breached, the source can spread con-
tamination and present an internal radiation hazard. In addition,
failure to follow proper procedures when using sealed sources can
have serious regulatory consequences and can significantly impact
programmatic operations. Given these potential risks, the use of
sealed sources should conform to the requirements of an applicable
and relevant radiation safety program.
The primary purpose of a radiation safety program is to main-
tain radiation exposures to employees and the public within regu-
latory limits and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The
basic principles and guidance for planning and implementing a
radiation safety program are presented in NCRP Report No. 127,
Operational Radiation Safety Program (NCRP, 1998).
Individuals working with sealed sources/devices should be
trained in the potential hazards commensurate with their assigned
tasks. Guidance on training is provided in NCRP Report No. 134,
Operational Radiation Safety Training (NCRP, 2000). Individuals
should also receive training on how to properly monitor the radia-
tion fields and potential contamination associated with the sealed
sources. Guidance on monitoring for radiation fields and contami-
nation is provided in NCRP Report No. 57, Instrumentation and
28
5.1 GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS / 29
Monitoring Methods for Radiation Protection (NCRP, 1978). Guid-

ance on the use of access controls and warning systems to minimize
the potential for dangerous radiation doses to personnel from large
sealed sources is contained in NCRP Report No. 88, Radiation
Alarms and Access Control Systems (NCRP, 1986).
The size and scope of a program for the safe use of sealed
sources/devices should be commensurate with their potential risks.
Accountability, safety and security should be considered in the
design of the program. Also, the size and complexity of the opera-
tions in a facility will influence the design of the program. For
example, at a large research laboratory or university where a wide
variety of sealed sources with varying quantities of radioactive
material are in use, the radiation safety program should be
detailed and comprehensive. At facilities where only a single den-
sity gauge or a few instrument calibration sources are used, the
radiation safety program can be much more focused and simple.
The following sections contain general guidance for consideration
in the development of radiation safety programs of any type.
In addition to general safety considerations, NRC (2009) pro-
moted research into the potential phase-out of radioactive cesium
chloride sources used in many blood irradiators, well logging
devices, and other equipment, due to the physical form of the
cesium-chloride chemical, which is a powder. Usually these sources
are Category 1 or 2 and are therefore subject to considerable secu-
rity and tracking in accordance with current regulations. In devel-
oping a radiation safety program, it may be prudent to weigh the
use of cesium-chloride sources against other options, if there are
alternatives available.
5.1.1 Safe Use of Low-Penetrating Power Sealed Sources

The encapsulation of most sealed sources, especially those con-
taining large quantities of radioactive material such as in indus-
trial radiography devices, is generally quite robust. However, there
are many sealed sources that are designed to permit the emission
of low-penetrating power radiation (alpha, beta, and low-energy
x rays). These sources may have thin windows, such as a Mylar®
film, or be designed as glass ampules, or may be electroplated to
allow the radiation of interest to escape the source. Although these
sources are designed to retain their integrity during routine and
anticipated use and wear, they are more susceptible to damage,
thus creating a higher potential for contamination. This potential
can be mitigated by the following precautions:
30 / 5. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF SEALED SOURCES
• Visually inspect the active surface of the source before

each use if it is accessible. If the encapsulation appears to be
discolored or degraded, or if the electroplated surface is
scratched or appears worn, the source should be evaluated
for potential loss of containment before it is used. If the
active surface of the source is not directly accessible, the
source storage area should be checked for contamination in
order to determine if the containment has been breached.
• Do not touch the active surface or take any actions that
could abrade the thin window or the surface of an electro-
plated source. Specifically, the active surface should not be
subject to direct leak testing. Instead, other surfaces and
the storage location should be tested (see Section 7 for addi-
tional guidance).
• Wear gloves when handling these sources and check hands
for contamination during and after each use.
• If the source encapsulation is compromised during use, base
any requirements for personal protective equipment and/or
secondary containment (e.g., a hood or glovebox) on the type
and quantity of radioactive material in the source and the
potential hazard.
• Do not use these sources in environments for which they are
not intended. They should not be subject to impacts or strong
vibrations, compressed, submersed in liquids, subject to tem-
perature extremes, subject to increased humidity, or put in a
vacuum unless specifically designed for these purposes.
• If the integrity of a source has been or appears to have been
breached, work should stop immediately and facility radia-
tion safety personnel should be contacted to assist with con-
trolling radiological conditions, evaluating the ramifications
of the breach, assessing potential personnel exposures, and
determining regulatory reporting requirements.
5.1.2 Exposure Control and ALARA
The use of sealed sources can present an external radiation haz-

ard, an internal radiation hazard, or both, depending on the type
of sealed source and its physical condition. Radiation exposures
to sealed-source users, other employees, and the general public
should comply with applicable regulatory dose limits. In addition,
a primary objective when using sealed sources should be to main-
tain external and internal radiation exposures ALARA. A general
discussion of the application of the ALARA principle in a radiation
safety program is provided in NCRP Report No. 127 (NCRP, 1998).
5.1 GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS / 31
The following considerations for maintaining radiation exposures

ALARA when using sealed sources are provided:
• Follow the guidance in Section 5.1.1 to minimize the poten-
tial for internal exposure when handling low-penetrating
power sources.
• Ensure the sealed-source container and the source itself, if
practical, are labeled with the radiation symbol, the amount
and type of radioactive material, and the date it was mea-
sured (see Section 3.4 on labeling of sealed sources).
• Never put sealed sources into pockets or otherwise carry
them on the body.
• Do not directly handle sealed sources other than those with
negligible external radiation fields. Tweezers or small tongs
are appropriate for handling calibration sources with small
amounts of radioactivity; tongs are often suitable for han-
dling higher activity sources. The selection of remote handling
tools and techniques should be based on the external radia-
tion fields present, the type of source encapsulation, and the
source manipulation to be performed.
• Keep portable devices (e.g., soil density, thickness and mois-
ture gauges) that are used in field applications under con-
stant surveillance during use. Lost or stolen gauges and
radiography sources can result in the potential for serious
radiation exposures if improperly handled or deliberately
modified.
• Ensure that sealed sources with high activity (e.g., those
used in radiography, radiotherapy, and gamma irradiators)
have comprehensive engineered and administrative controls
in place. These include (but are not limited to) appropriate
shielding, access controls, fail-safe systems and warning
methods (NCRP, 1986), training, and radiation monitoring
programs (NCRP, 2000). Guidance on shielding for radio-
therapy facilities is provided in NCRP Report No. 151, Struc-
tural Shielding Design and Evaluation for Megavoltage X-
and Gamma-Ray Radiotherapy Facilities (NCRP, 2005).
5.1.3 Limitations on Use
A sealed source is designed to withstand routine use and has
been tested under conditions of routine use and foreseeable mishaps
before being authorized for approval and licensed. See Section 3.2.1
for details on the rigorous manufacturing requirements. The
manufacturer also lists certain limitations on the use of the sealed
source, such as temperature, pressure, humidity or other condi-
tions. These should appear in the user manual, as well as in an NRC
or Agreement State SSDR certificate issued to the manufacturer.

Users or operators of all devices should secure a copy of the SSDR
certificate, if available, and maintain it with the manual while the
device is in their possession. It is critical that sealed sources not be
used in environments for which they are not intended.
5.1.4 Effective Use of Radiation Survey Meters and

Counting Equipment
Radiation detection instruments are necessary in order to
ensure the safe use of sealed sources and devices that contain
sources. There are three primary types of instrumentation used for
this purpose: (1) exposure rate or dose equivalent rate survey
meters, (2) contamination detection equipment, and (3) counting
equipment for evaluating swipes and smears used to evaluate leak-
age and removable contamination.
When selecting a survey meter, it is important that the instru-
ment be capable of detecting the radiation of interest. The selection
and use of survey instrumentation is discussed in more detail in
NCRP Report No. 57 (NCRP, 1978).
Counting equipment used to evaluate radioactivity on swipes or
smears must comply with regulatory requirements on detection
levels [i.e., <185 Bq (0.005 µCi)] (DOE, 2008; Jankovich et al.,
2015). The basic equation for calculating the detection limit (LD) for
counting equipment, with a probability of a false positive or a false
negative result set at 5 % (e.g.,  and  errors of 0.05), is shown in:
LD = 2.71 + 4.65 B (5.1)
Where LD = the signal level such that a signal at or above this level
is likely to be detected (in counts) and B = the background (counts).
Equation 5.1 assumes paired observations (i.e., background count-
ing time equals sample counting time).
If the background is well-known, the LD can be determined using:
LD = 2.71 + 3.29 B (5.2)
Equation 5.2 is valid for low counter background rates [e.g., 0.05
counts per minute (cpm)], and sample counting times which result
in less than 30 counts (Homann, 1991). If the well-known back-
ground is actually zero, LD  2.71 counts.
The minimum detectable activity of the counter is thus deter-
mined by dividing LD by the counting efficiency of the detector [cpm/
decays per minute (dpm)] and multiplying by the counting time.
5.2 STORING SEALED SOURCES / 33
Guidance on calculating detection levels for counting equipment is

provided in NCRP Report No. 58, A Handbook of Radioactivity
Measurements Procedures (NCRP, 1985).
5.2 Storing Sealed Sources
When not in use, sealed sources should be stored in a manner
that minimizes the potential for exposure to workers and members
of the public and that deters loss, theft or damage. The following
guidance on storage of sealed sources is provided:
• Both sealed sources and their storage containers should be
labeled, with labels durable enough to remain legible for the
recommended working lifetime of the source (see Section 3.4
on labeling sealed sources) and as long as the sealed source
is possessed.
• Storage locations should be posted with the type of infor-
mation and warning based upon the degree of potential
radiation hazard that the source presents. Guidance on post-
ing radiation warning signs is provided in NCRP Report No.
88 (NCRP, 1986). Postings should also conform to applicable
regulatory requirements of DOE (2008) or NRC (2015a).
DOE also provides guidance on the storing and posting of
sealed-source storage locations (DOE, 2011c).
• Sufficient shielding should be provided to minimize the
potential exposure in occupied or potentially occupied areas
near the source storage area. The adequacy of the shielding
should be checked following the introduction of a new source
into the storage area to ensure exposure rates in occupied
areas have not changed or remain acceptable. The adequacy
of the shielding should also be confirmed any time the
shielding is modified.
• Provisions should be in place to protect sealed sources from
unauthorized access, loss, damage and theft. Access to
sealed sources should be limited to those individuals who
are authorized to use, inventory or transport them, with the
level of security commensurate with the potential radiation
hazard that the sealed sources present. Certain sealed
sources, and sealed-source collections that exceed certain
activity levels, require additional locks (e.g., two indepen-
dent locks) or other increased security controls [10 CFR Part
37 (NRC, 2015a)].
• Sealed sources should be protected from hazards such as
damage, fire and flooding. For low-activity calibration
sources (e.g., Category 5), storage in a fire-resistant cabinet
or safe is normally sufficient. The level of protection should

be commensurate with the hazard potential.
• The use of flammable liquids and other materials in or near
source storage areas should be minimized.
• Information should be made available to potential emer-
gency responders as to the location, type of radioactive
material, the type of encapsulation, and the degree of poten-
tial hazard that the sealed sources could present.
• The radiation fields from high specific-activity sources can
potentially damage containers over time. Select a storage
container that is constructed with materials resistant to
radiation damage.
• Sources/devices used under a general license must not be
stored more than 2 y when not in use [10 CFR Part 31.5
(NRC, 2015a)] (see Section 8 for information on disposal of
these sources/devices.)
• If the radiation field will increase significantly when open-
ing a storage container, warning information should be pro-
vided (e.g., dose equivalent rate of 1 mSv h–1 at 30 cm when
storage container is open).
5.3 Medical Facilities

Sealed sources are used routinely in medical facilities. As
described in NCRP Report No. 105, Radiation Protection for Medi-
cal and Allied Health Personnel (NCRP, 1989), sealed sources are
used clinically in radiation therapy to treat patients, in nuclear
medicine for quality assurance of equipment, and in transfu-
sion medicine to irradiate blood products. In the United States the
possession and use of radioactive materials for medical uses is sub-
ject to licensure and regulation by NRC [10 CFR Part 35 (NRC,
2015a)] or an Agreement State under regulations compatible with
those of NRC.
The uses of sealed sources in radiation therapy include telether-
apy, brachytherapy, and gamma stereotactic radiosurgery. In tele-
therapy, the radiation beam from a terabecquerel source external
to the patient is focused on the diseased tissue. Gamma stereotactic
radiosurgery devices use several hundred 60Co sources to irradiate
tumors or lesions within the skull of the patient.
Brachytherapy involves placing the radiation source inside the
patient in close proximity to the diseased tissue. Some used
brachytherapy applications involve placing the radioactive source
in the treatment site, exemplified by 90Sr sources for ophthalmic
applications. Brachytherapy sources may be inserted directly into
the treatment site (for example, 192Ir seeds or strands) or may be
5.3 MEDICAL FACILITIES / 35
placed into applicators surgically placed inside the patient and

loaded afterward with radioactive sources (examples of which are
192Ir low and high dose-rate after-loader devices). Where treatment
involves the temporary placement of sources inside the patient,

radiation surveys of the patient and room after removal of the
sources are critical. Failure to remove such a source can result in
debilitating harm or death (NRC, 1993a). This Report does not
address short-lived, low dose-rate sealed sources used in the prac-
tice of medicine for manual brachytherapy (e.g., 125I seeds) or micro-
sphere procedures (e.g., 90Y) — these sources are typically received,
used, and any excess disposed of in less than a calendar quarter.
Because of the elevated radiation levels associated with these
sealed sources, it is important that all users and ancillary staff
have proper radiation safety training and programmatic control to
ensure doses are ALARA. Guidance on these topics can be found in
NCRP Report No. 105 (NCRP, 1989) and Report No. 127 (NCRP,
1998). With proper procedures in place, it is unlikely that users or
ancillary staff would receive a significant occupational radiation
dose.
Although high-activity 137Cs sealed sources are used in blood
irradiators, the sources themselves are well shielded; therefore,
there are few routine occupational exposure concerns. The blood
products are loaded and the machine spins the sample into the irra-
diate position, so there is no opportunity for the operator to be
directly exposed to the radiation source.
Iridium-192 and 60Co sealed sources are routinely exchanged by
the owner (licensee) as the radiation output approaches nonclini-
cally useful levels. The owner notifies the sealed-source vendor,
who then prepares and ships a replacement. The vendor typically
makes arrangements to have one of their service representatives
perform a periodic maintenance check on the device at the same
time. The vendor service representative will perform the unloading
and reloading of the device, as well as the packaging and paper-
work for source return.
In the United States, the quantities of radioactive materials
used in teletherapy, radiosurgery, blood irradiation, and some high
dose-rate brachytherapy practices are such that they are subject to
the enhanced security requirements in Part 37 of NRC’s regula-
tions (or equivalent regulations promulgated by the Agreement
States) [10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a)].
While the potential for occupational exposure varies from appli-
cation to application, there is still a need to inventory and leak
test these sources to ensure that none are misplaced or leaking.
The requirements for inventory and leak testing are described in
Sections 4 and 7, respectively. In addition, the level of shielding

associated with use and storage locations should be periodically
confirmed, as outlined in Section 5.2.
Sealed sources of 238Pu were used until the early 1980s as the
power source for human cardiac pacemakers. Use of 238Pu power
sources minimized the need for frequent surgical intervention or
removal of short-lived battery-powered pacemakers. These devices
typically contained ~185 GBq (5 Ci) of 238Pu. When longer-lived
nonradioactive batteries became available, the use of these sources
declined steeply and they are no longer prescribed. In the event
that a patient with one of these 238Pu battery-powered pacemakers
is deceased, special care must be taken when cremating the
deceased individual and, if extracted, in returning the pacemaker
for disposal.
5.4 Industrial Facilities
Sealed sources are used in numerous industrial settings with
the choice of radionuclide and activity dependent on the specific
application. Although some sealed sources used in industry have
relatively low activities with minimal potential for human expo-
sures, sources used for certain applications (e.g., thick-metal radi-
ography) contain very high activities of gamma emitters that
produce very high external radiation dose rates. In addition, beta-
emitting radionuclides affixed (electroplated) onto metal substrates
are often used in industry to measure material thicknesses by
transmission or backscatter methods. These sources generally do
not present direct external exposure hazards, but could potentially
result in contamination of products or personnel if not properly
used and maintained. Conversely, gamma-emitting sources having
activities of 15 TBq (405 Ci) or more are used for industrial radiog-
raphy of metals. These sources have the potential to produce harm-
ful or lethal radiation doses if improperly operated or maintained.
The following radiation safety considerations are applicable to
the use of all industrial sealed sources/devices. Subsequent subsec-
tions describe some typical applications of sealed sources/devices in
industrial settings, along with additional considerations for their
safe use specific to those applications:
• Develop a written radiation safety program commensurate
with the types of sources/devices used and their potential
hazards.
• Perform radiation safety program audits (at least annually)
• Ensure the program has an appropriately trained and qual-
ified RSO, if required by regulation or specific license condi-
tion; general licensees, especially those with multiple sealed
5.4 INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES / 37
source/devices, are encouraged to also appoint an appropri-

ately trained RSO.
• Ensure that personnel in positions of authority over the use/
control of the devices are trained on radiation safety consid-
erations, including supervisors and assistants, and receive
retraining on a periodic (usually annual) basis, or whenever
radiation safety conditions change.
• Provide ready access to radiation detection instruments
capable of assessing exposure rates and contamination in
the vicinity of the sealed sources/devices, where they are
used and when in storage.
• Perform planned and periodic inventories of all sources/
devices.
• Perform planned and periodic leak testing of all sources/
devices [tests should be performed with the device in a safe
configuration (i.e., when shutters are closed or beam-dis-
abling methods are activated)].
• Implement a manufacturer-compliant maintenance pro-
gram, including both daily and periodic visual inspections
and maintenance, and including planned and periodic test-
ing of device-specific safety features, such as shutters, cov-
ers, beam alignments, shielding integrity, and electrical
signals (e.g., device warning lights).
• Establish and maintain a radiation monitoring (dosimetry)
program for those personnel with the potential to receive
external radiation doses of significance when working near
or with the devices, or as required by regulation.
• Perform a prospective assessment of the potential radiation
doses to individuals working in the vicinity of these devices
during routine use and storage, and to members of the gen-
eral public, if applicable, in order to maintain doses ALARA.
• Develop and implement written procedures for routine use
and for responding to the most likely emergency conditions,
and for approved disposition methods for devices that are no
longer required.
• Ensure that posting and labeling of the devices and
restricted areas are legible and consistent with manufac-
turer requirements, those listed on the SSDR certificate,
and as required by regulation or license provisions.
• Develop and maintain a recordkeeping system that is acces-
sible and complete throughout the time the device/source is
in the owner’s or user’s possession.
• Establish a clear notification to operators, device custo-
dians, or others that any damage to the device, failure of or
compromises to safety features (i.e., shutters that are stick-

ing), or loss of or reduced visibility of the labels on the
devices, triggers the removal of the device from operation,
and that it cannot be returned to operation until the item is
resolved/corrected.
• Establish a written “lock-out/tag-out” procedure to preclude
a compromised device from being used until it can safely be
returned to operation.
• Ensure that all sources/devices are removed from piping
and properly disposed of before demolition of the building in
which the sources/devices are installed.
• Additional important considerations for the use of portable
devices include:
- Assignment of a specific individual(s) to maintain control
of the gauge or device when it is used at a temporary job
site. This individual has authority over use of the device
and the work environment.
- Maintenance of a use log at the home location which
indicates when the gauge or device was removed, where
it went, and when it will be returned.
- Transport of the device in accordance with DOT require-
ments (i.e., with proper labeling and shipping papers,
blocked and braced in a container, secured from unau-
thorized removal or under constant surveillance, in a
position on the vehicle that is away from the driver).
- Continuous attendance by the operator when a device is
in use.
- Management of the potential dose to operators, observers
and members of the public in each use location to main-
tain doses ALARA.
- Methods for preventing or deterring access to the device
while in use or in storage are in force.
- Establishment of a safety perimeter based upon the
potential dose at various distances from the device while
in use.
- Prompt return of the device to its carrying or transport
case upon completion of a measurement.
5.4.1 Nuclear Gauging Devices

Devices using radiation from sealed sources to measure density,
thickness, flow rates or composition of materials and surfaces are
referred to as nuclear gauges. These devices can be portable or
fixed at a specific location. Fixed nuclear gauges are typically
installed on manufacturing process lines to monitor material
densities or thicknesses, levels of liquids or solids in tanks, and

presence/level of liquids in flow lines. The radiation sources in
these devices can be beta emitters or gamma emitters, depending
on the application.
The two main types used in industrial settings are transmission
gauges and backscatter gauges. These sources are typically in the
IAEA Category 4 range (Table 2.1) although some higher activity
fixed gauges can be Category 3.
Transmission gauges are used to measure either the presence,
volume or flow of material in a pipe or vessel. A transmission gauge
(Figure 5.1) consists of a sealed source on one side of the item to
be evaluated (e.g., pipeline, container/bottle) and a detector on
another. The detector provides the desired information based upon
the amount of radiation absorbed within the measurement item.
For example, if the density of slurry running through a pipeline
drops, the radiation intensity measured by the detector will
increase. The radionuclides and activity used in transmission
gauges are dependent on the intended application of the gauge. For
example, if the item to be evaluated is a relatively thick pipeline,
penetrating radiations (e.g., 137Cs gammas) are generally required.
On the other hand, if the item being evaluated is a bottle at a filling
station, less penetrating radiations are sufficient (e.g., 241Am).
A backscatter gauge (Figure 5.2) consists of a sealed source
located on the same side as the detector. The detector provides
information on the surface being assessed (e.g., moisture content,
percent composition, coating thickness), based on the magnitude of
radiation that scatters off of the surface and into the detector.
Portable nuclear gauges are widely used in industry. Moisture/
density gauges typically contain a 137Cs source (0.3 GBq) and a
241
AmBe neutron source (1.5 GBq) and weigh <15 to 20 kg, with
most of the mass being associated with the shield. This type of
device can be operated in either a transmission mode or backscat-
ter mode to measure the density and moisture of various solid
materials (e.g., asphalt, concrete, aggregate and soil). Paint analyz-
ers typically contain 109Cd and are used to determine the lead con-
tent of applied paint.
5.4.2 Well-Logging Devices

Well logging is an industrial activity that involves the making
of a detailed record (a well log) of the geologic formations pene-
trated by a borehole; hence another name for the activity is bore-
hole logging. Well logging is routinely performed in boreholes
drilled for exploration, evaluation and management of oil and gas,
groundwater, geothermal, and other mineral or energy resources.
Fig. 5.1. Transmission gauge (for use with media such as pipes and
vessels). Red arrows are meant to show higher levels of radiation as com-
pared to the blue arrows (lower levels of radiation that are not stopped
altogether).
Fig. 5.2. Backscatter gauge (for use with media such as roads, sheets
and conveyors). Red arrows are meant to show higher levels of radiation
as compared to the blue arrows (lower levels of radiation that are not
stopped altogether).
In well logging, measurements are made by instruments lowered

into the borehole with the data being transmitted to the ground
surface via electrical wirelines for analysis and data storage. This
service industry is also referred to as “wireline service.”
In conducting well logging, either gamma-ray-emitting sealed
sources or neutron-emitting sealed sources may be used, depending
upon the geophysical parameters being evaluated.
In the early days of well logging, 226Ra was the radionuclide used
for logging involving gamma rays. As other radionuclides became
available, the use of 226Ra was replaced by 137Cs as the gamma-ray
source of choice in the well-logging industry. Typically, the 137Cs
sealed sources have activities ranging from ~0.37 to 370 GBq (i.e.,
0.1 to 10 Ci) and are normally in the IAEA Category 3 range. Fig-
ure 5.3 shows some examples of 137Cs sealed sources used for well
logging.
Fig. 5.3. Cesium-137 sealed sources for well logging (courtesy: Eckert
and Ziegler Isotope Products, Inc., Valencia, California).
Similarly, 226RaBe sealed sources were initially used for neu-

tron-emitting sealed sources. The radionuclide for these sealed
sources has evolved through 210PoBe, 239PuBe, 238PuBe, 241AmBe,
and 252Cf. At the present time only 241AmBe and 252Cf sealed sources
are commonly being used. The trend appears to be substituting
downhole particle accelerators for neutron-emitting sealed sources,
which may range up to 740 GBq (i.e., 20 Ci) of activity. Figure 5.4
shows some examples of 241AmBe sealed sources for well logging.
Due to the extreme pressures and temperatures to which these
sealed sources may be subjected in logging boreholes up to several
miles in depth, standards for their design, fabrication and testing
are the most strenuous of all uses both in U.S. standards (ANSI/
HPS, 2013) and international standards (ISO, 2012). The typical
design and construction details of sealed sources used in well log-
ging are shown in Figure 5.5.
In the United States the possession and use of radioactive mate-
rials in the performance of well logging is subject to licensure and
regulation by NRC [10 CFR Part 39 (NRC, 2015a)] or an Agreement
State under regulations compatible with those of NRC. Additional
information on well-logging licenses can be found in NUREG-1556,
Vol. 4 (Whitten et al., 2000).
There are efforts underway to develop and deploy methods for
real-time tracking of well-logging sources through the use of sen-
sor-based, active radiofrequency identification technology. These
systems will provide enhanced physical security for the well-log-
ging sources, both in their home locations and out in the field.
The following special radiation safety considerations are appli-
cable to well-logging devices:
Fig. 5.4. Americium-241-beryllium sealed sources for well logging

(courtesy: Eckert and Ziegler Isotope Products, Inc., Valencia, California).
Fig. 5.5. Common construction of sealed sources used in well logging

(courtesy: Eckert and Ziegler Isotope Products, Inc., Valencia, California)
• Ensure the written radiation safety program incorporates

all the requirements of 10 CFR Part 39 (NRC, 2015a) (or
comparable Agreement State regulations).
• Ensure the annual radiation safety program audit includes a
job performance audit of logging supervisors to ensure proce-
dures are being implemented appropriately and effectively.
• Document and control the minimum distance between the
device and the unrestricted area boundary during usage to
maintain dose rates in the unrestricted area <0.02 mSv in
any 1 h (Whitten et al., 2000).
• Ensure that written procedures for emergency conditions
include instruction on procedures to be implemented if the
source becomes lodged (or breaches) in a well, including sur-
vey, assessment, isolation and notification procedures.
• Establish and implement an appropriate device storage pro-

gram that extends to field sites and includes agreements
with the well site owner/operator.
5.4.3 Industrial Radiography

Gamma-emitting sealed sources are used in industrial radiogra-
phy as a nondestructive test of the integrity of metal components.
The most common application of industrial radiography is the
assessment of the quality/integrity of welds of metallic compo-
nents. Another common application is measurement of the thick-
ness of the walls of pipe used in oil and gas wells.
Radiography using sealed sources and photographic film has a
long history, beginning in the late 1920s with the use of relatively
low-activity sources of 226Ra that required very long exposure dura-
tions. With the development of high specific activity, manufactured
gamma sources (especially 192Ir) in the mid-1940s, better images
were obtained. However, the very small physical dimensions of the
sources that allowed for better image resolution also led to greater
potential for sources being misplaced or lost. The portable radiog-
raphy device most commonly used today is the radiography “cam-
era.” A typical radiography camera is shown in Figure 5.6. The
camera serves as the portable housing for the source and its shield.
The camera weighs ~20 kg (primarily due to the shielding) and can
be hand-carried by one person. The source is attached to a pigtail
and is housed inside of the shielded camera housing. When used, a
drive cable is attached to the pigtail, and the source is then cranked
out through a guide tube to the exposure location. When the expo-
sure is completed, the source is cranked back into the shielded cam-
era housing via the drive cable. The typical activity of 192Ir in a
Fig. 5.6. Sentinel 880 Delta Industrial Radiography Camera [cour-

tesy: Sentinel(Honesdom International Limited, Hong Kong)].
radiography camera is ~0.5 to 15 TBq (14 to 400 Ci), usually IAEA

Category 2. The use of sealed sources of 75Se for industrial radiog-
raphy has been authorized through licensure, but its use (with
digital-imaging devices instead of radiographic film) has not sig-
nificantly increased. For these cameras, sources of activity up to
5.55 TBq (150 Ci) have been used.
For many years, the mechanism for moving the source from the
camera through the guide tube to the radiography location was
prone to failure, such that the sealed source could be accidentally
released and left in an unshielded position (sometimes without
being realized by the operator). During this time, the most common
and serious overexposures from sealed sources were from indus-
trial radiography sources. Improvements in the design of cameras
and source connections, coupled with increased training of opera-
tors and supervisors, have greatly reduced the number and sever-
ity of overexposures from these devices. Annual occupational doses,
however, may accumulate to levels where late health effects have
been detected (NCRP, 2018).
Industrial radiography is also performed with fixed-beam sys-
tems that are heavily shielded with a “shutter” to control the irra-
diation period. The activity of sealed sources used at fixed-beam
facilities is much higher than the activity of those used in the field.
Materials or items to be radiographed are passed between the radi-
ation source and one or more radiation detectors. The signal from
the radiation detector is recorded and compared with known (refer-
ence) transmission signals. These systems are typically operated
from a control panel that is in a low exposure rate area.
Industrial radiography with portable cameras is often per-
formed in remote and difficult work environments by personnel
who are not health physicists, health physics technicians, or radia-
tion safety professionals. The operator should not leave the device
unattended while it is being used and should watch over the area
in which it is used. The operator should also prevent or deter access
to the device when in use, establish a safety perimeter (if war-
ranted), and promptly return the device to its carrying or transport
case upon completion of a measurement.
With portable and fixed industrial radiography devices, active
and passive radiation detectors/monitors are used by the operator
to measure and document external radiation dose rates in all per-
sonnel work locations. Active instruments include hand-held, por-
table radiation survey instruments, electronic (alarming) personal
dosimeters, and fixed-area radiation monitors. Passive detection/
measurement instruments include personal dosimeters and area
radiation dosimeters.
In the United States, the possession and use of radioactive

material in the performance of industrial radiography is subject to
licensure and regulation by NRC [10 CFR Part 34 (NRC, 2015a)] or
an Agreement State under regulations compatible with those of
NRC. Industrial radiography cameras contain quantities of radio-
active material that would present an imminent threat to health
and safety if not secured properly. These quantities are such that
they are now subject to the enhanced security requirements in
NRC’s Part 37 regulation (or equivalent regulations promulgated
by the Agreement States) (NRC, 2015a). Because these radioactive
materials could be used in terrorism threats (as an exposure
device), these radiography cameras are required to be transported
more securely than other mobile or portable devices. For example,
the cameras are to be transported inside a locked container in the
radiography truck which is additionally locked to prevent or deter
unauthorized access to the radioactive materials. Similar to the
well-logging sources, there are efforts underway to develop and
deploy methods for real-time tracking of industrial radiography
cameras through the use of sensor-based, active radiofrequency
identification technology.
the use of industrial radiography devices:
• Ensure the written radiation safety program incorporates
all the requirements of 10 CFR Part 34 (NRC, 2015a) (or
comparable Agreement State regulations).
• Ensure the program has a trained and qualified RSO [as
defined in 10 CFR Part 34.42 (NRC, 2015a)] and an estab-
lished organizational structure.
• Establish and maintain a comprehensive training and
retraining program for the RSO, supervisors, radiographers
and assistants as required by 10 CFR Part 34.43 (NRC,
2015a).
• Ensure the annual radiation safety program audit includes
a job performance audit of each radiographer and assistant
at least every six months to ensure procedures are being
implemented appropriately and effectively.
• Ensure that written procedures for emergency conditions
include instruction on procedures to be implemented if the
source becomes stuck in an unshielded or partially shielded
condition, including survey, assessment, isolation and notifi-
cation procedures.
• Ensure the radiation monitoring program includes alarming
dosimeters available for, and used by, all radiographers and
assistants.
• At permanent installations with high radiation areas,

ensure postings are visible and access controls are effec-
tively implemented and periodically tested. At temporary
locations, ensure postings, access controls, and security pro-
visions are effectively implemented.
• Establish and implement a source/device inventory and
leak-test program that is appropriate for the type of source/
device in use.
• Maintain use logs and include provisions for a chain-of-
custody record for each device.
• Ensure that a safety perimeter is established based upon
the potential dose from the device while in use.
• Provide for security of the source/device while in use and
during transport, and provide a means to secure and lock
the source/device that is compliant with 10 CFR Part 37
(NRC, 2015a) (or equivalent Agreement State regulations)
when not in use.
• Ensure calibrated radiation survey instruments are used
during the performance of compliance and other surveys at
job sites. The performance of a post-irradiation survey is the
primary means by which an operator can detect a failure of
the source to retract back into the shielded camera.
• Ensure all surveys are documented, including those required
every time the source is exchanged and whenever the device
is placed in a storage area to ensure that the sealed source
is in its shielded position prior to placing the source into
storage.
• Ensure appropriate, periodic surveys are conducted to
demonstrate unrestricted area boundaries are properly set,
posted and controlled.
5.4.4 Ion Generators/Static Eliminators
Ion generators/static eliminators use alpha-emitting radioac-

tive sources such as 210Po and 241Am to densely ionize the air near
the sealed source. The ionized air is subsequently used to reduce or
eliminate electrostatic charge of components during manufactur-
ing processes (e.g., plastics manufacturing, electronics manufac-
turing and testing, and textile production). Ion generators/static
eliminators are also used by automotive body shops in preparing
repaired or replaced exterior auto body parts for painting, to ensure
that the surfaces to be painted are clean of dust or other airborne
particles that may affect the adhesion of the paint to the vehicle.
These devices often have small dimensions and can be easily lost or
5.5 LARGE IRRADIATORS AND STERILIZATION FACILITIES / 47
misplaced; increased attention should be given to device account-

ability. In addition, harsh environmental conditions (i.e., very high
humidity, corrosive atmospheres) can impact the ability of the sub-
strate to hold the radioactivity to the surface. Ion generators/static
eliminators typically fall in IAEA Category 4.
Radiation safety considerations for these devices should be
consistent with those provided by the manufacturer, in the appli-
cable SSDR, if available, and as required by regulations. Pro-
cedures should be in place to ensure the devices are used, stored
and disposed of appropriately and consistent with manufacturer
instructions.
5.5 Large Irradiators and Sterilization Facilities

Extremely high radiation doses are needed in some applications,
such as sterilization of medical supplies and surgical equipment,
and certain types of food and spices. Facilities that use sealed
sources for high-dose irradiation are specially designed and oper-
ated to prevent exposures of workers and members of the public and
to prevent releases of radioactive materials from the sources and
facilities. Cobalt-60 is the most common radionuclide used in high-
dose irradiation facilities. Tens of petabecquerel of 60Co are used in
such facilities to produce dose rates of 3 to 5 Gy s–1 or greater. These
irradiation facilities use IAEA Category 1 quantities of radioactive
material. With such high-dose rates, shielding of the sources is par-
amount; yet, the sources must be configured and moved in such a
way that there is little or no shielding between the sources and the
target items during irradiation. In a typical facility, the sources are
stored in a deep-water pool and raised/lowered remotely. Similarly,
items to be irradiated are transported via remotely-operated con-
veyor systems that also have shielded entries and exits.
As with high-activity sources in other applications, the radioac-
tive sources used in sterilization facilities are tested indirectly for
leakage, but this is often accomplished by monitoring items irradi-
ated at the facility, sampling and analyzing the water used in the
shield pools, and performing contamination surveys of internal
components of the materials handling systems used at the facility.
An extensive network of active and passive external radiation
detection and measurement instruments is integral to the steriliza-
tion facility design and operation.
Irradiator facilities are regulated under NRC regulations
10 CFR Part 36 and 10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a) for security. The
following radiation safety considerations are applicable to high-
dose irradiators:
• Incorporate ALARA considerations into the radiation safety

program, including the provision for conducting prospective
dose assessments.
• Document potential dose to members of the public in adja-
cent unrestricted areas.
• Develop, test and implement procedures for routine opera-
tions and for addressing emergency conditions. Clearly
indicate the location of emergency procedures on operator
control panels and other key access points.
• Implement increased physical security controls as required
by 10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a).
• Implement the manufacturer’s instructions for routine
maintenance, cleaning, lubrication, and mechanical/electri-
cal system repair.
5.6 Academic Institutions
Academic institutions use sealed sources with a wide variety of

radionuclides and activities for an array of applications, including
as irradiation sources, check and calibration sources, measurement
devices (e.g., moisture/density gauges), and in research equipment
(e.g., gas chromatographs and liquid scintillation counters). Many
larger academic institutions are licensed under a broad scope
license issued by NRC or an Agreement State, which covers a wide
range of radionuclides and activities.
In larger academic institutions, the individual researcher (or
research group) must apply to the institution’s radiation safety pro-
gram for a sub-license or use permit, issued under the broad scope
license to possess and use radioactive sources or radiation produc-
ing devices. A use permit application typically describes the sources
to be used, their form and activities, the location of the research and
storage facilities for the sources, individuals (with appropriate
training) authorized to handle the sources, descriptions of the edu-
cational or research purposes of the sources, and the planned use of
the sealed sources. In many institutions, the application must also
be approved and signed by a department head or research manager
in addition to the individual researcher. These applications are typ-
ically reviewed by the RSO for the broad-scope license and submit-
ted to the institution’s Radiation Safety Committee for final
approval. The application process may include detailed discussions
with the investigator, visits/tours of the research areas, specific
questions to clarify the application, requests for additional infor-
mation, and specific procedures to address any identified concerns.
Arrangements for sealed-source disposition after its useful life,
5.7 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS / 49
including return to the manufacturer or costs for disposal by the

researcher or institution should also be addressed in the applica-
tion process.
Acquisition of the sealed source/device is normally arranged
with the RSO and those responsible for purchasing equipment and
materials. Details on acquisition and receipt of sealed sources are
described in Section 4 of this Report. In some academic institutions,
the quantities of radioactive materials used in specific applications
fall into IAEA Category 1 and 2 and are subject to the enhanced
security requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a) (or equiva-
lent regulations promulgated by the Agreement States).
Frequently, the RSO at an academic institution is responsible
for the use, control and maintenance of sealed sources. However, at
many large institutions where multiple research activities are
occurring simultaneously, authorized users are designated and
assigned responsibility for the sealed sources. In either case, that
individual is accountable for the source and is responsible for
ensuring that it is inventoried and leak tested at the required fre-
quency, it is only used for authorized purposes, and that its physical
condition has not been compromised during use. Regardless of who
serves as the source custodian, sealed sources that are no longer
needed should be returned to the radiation safety office for reas-
signment to another source custodian or disposal. The RSO must
be copied on all compliance-related information and correspon-
dence (e.g., leak-test certificates).
In addition to the components of a radiation safety program
described above, it is critical that academic institutions using
sealed sources assign trained and qualified source custodians,
implement a purchasing, storage and accountability program, and
that authorized users have a demonstrable understanding of
license requirements and the liabilities associated with inappropri-
ate sealed source use.
5.7 Nuclear Power Plants
Commercial nuclear power plants possess a wide variety of

sealed sources, which may be exempt, generally licensed, or specif-
ically licensed.
High-activity sources (including 137Cs, 60Co, 239PuBe, and 241AmBe)
are used to calibrate radiation survey instruments and some in-
plant radiation monitors, including a multitude of area radiation
monitors for personnel protection, plant process monitors, and
monitors for emergency plan requirements. Neutron startup sealed
sources are used to initiate the reactor startup.
Lower activity sources are used for periodic performance testing

of portable survey instruments and to confirm proper instrument
response. For example, many explosive detectors in both fixed and
portable security systems use 63Ni as a required component for
instrument operation. In the chemistry laboratory, some gas chro-
matographs and liquid scintillation detectors contain radioactive
sources for proper operation.
Ex-core detectors (i.e., located outside of the reactor core) may
contain fissile material and are used to monitor reactor power
levels. Some process monitors, such as those responsible for moni-
toring gaseous radioactive effluents, may require the use of gas
sources depending on the detector design. Similarly, liquid effluent
monitors may use liquid or solid sealed sources to ensure proper
operation.
nuclear power plants:
• ensure sealed-source use and storage controls are in accor-
dance with the plant’s radiation safety program;
• restrict sealed-source use to specifically qualified individuals;
• implement a rigorous source inventory and leak-testing pro-
gram; and
• review the inventory of sealed sources against the physical
security requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (NRC, 2015a). This
may affect where the sealed sources must be located on site
(e.g., within the protected area).
6. Transportation of
Sealed Sources
Sealed sources may be used in a single fixed location or they

may be transported for use in multiple locations. For NRC and
Agreement State licensees, authorized locations are specified in
their radioactive materials licenses.
Once the user is authorized to receive a sealed source/device, the
manufacturer or vendor prepares to ship the source or device to
the user in a manner that is compliant with DOT requirements
contained in 49 CFR (DOT, 2018). DOT requirements include
proper packaging, labeling, vehicle loading, documentation, emer-
gency response instructions, and allowable radiation levels.
When sealed sources are to be transported, either initially or by
future users, the person offering them for shipment must ensure
DOT requirements are met before the vehicle is released.
It is important to note that there may be differences in transpor-
tation requirements promulgated by DOT and NRC (and Agree-
ment States). The International Air Transportation Association
(IATA) promulgates the Dangerous Goods Regulations (IATA,
2018), governing the transportation of hazardous materials by air.
The IATA works closely with the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization in the development of these regulations. For international
shipments, there may be multiple sets of regulations (e.g., DOT,
IAEA, IATA) governing the transport of sealed sources. DOT, IAEA
(2012), and IATA transport rules are generally similar. It is advis-
able to consult with a qualified radioactive materials shipper in
preparing international shipments of sealed sources.
In many cases, sealed sources may be transported in personal
or company vehicles by physicians, radiographers, portable-gauge
users, or others. In most of these cases, the applicable DOT require-
ments are in force while the sealed source/device is on public roads.
There is an exemption for physicians transporting licensed radio-
active material under certain circumstances [10 CFR Part 71.13
(NRC, 2015a)]; they must be licensed under 10 CFR Part 35 (NRC,
2015a) or the equivalent Agreement State regulations.
If a sealed source/device remains in a single location after pur-
chase and original shipment, the user does not need to include
transportation provisions in its routine use procedures. However, if
51
52 / 6. TRANSPORTATION OF SEALED SOURCES
there is a need to dispose of the source/device or return it to the

manufacturer, a means of ensuring DOT requirements are met is
required. This is especially important for shipments of sealed
sources that must comply with the transportation security require-
ments in 10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a). In these cases, it is recom-
mended that a qualified radioactive materials shipper or the
manufacturer be contracted to ensure a compliant shipment.
Many sealed sources/devices [e.g., elemental identification (e.g.,
lead-in-paint) analyzers, moisture/density analyzers, and indus-
trial radiography cameras] are designed to be transported from one
location to another. If specifically licensed, the radioactive materi-
als license usually specifies or limits the location(s) of use, based on
information provided by the applicant. Since these radioactive
devices are intended to be moved from a “home” location to a remote
location, the device manufacturer or vendor usually supplies a
DOT-compliant shipping container for the device. The licensee is
required to verify that radiation and contamination levels meet the
allowable limits and that the transportation documentation is
maintained properly. The licensee must also train and retrain
employees at least every 3 y on DOT regulations and requirements
[49 CFR Part 172 (DOT, 2008)]. Most licensees prepare their
job-site paperwork to include the transportation requirements as
fill-in items on their forms.
In addition to complying with DOT regulations, shippers must
also comply with any transportation-related conditions of the
radioactive material license under which they operate (e.g., timely
reporting of transfers of Category 1 and 2 sources that are also sub-
ject to the NSTS). Agreement States have equivalent regulatory
reporting requirements. Prompt reporting of transfers is required
when a licensee ships Category 1 or 2 sources to another licensed
entity, and timely action (e.g., an investigation) is mandated when
such a source does not arrive at its intended destination when
expected.
Appendix C contains additional information on transportation
of sealed sources.
7. Testing and Inspection of
Sealed Sources
Sealed sources present a potential hazard if the integrity of the

source becomes compromised and some or all of the radioactive
material is dispersed into the environment. Should the source
integrity become compromised, radioactive contamination of per-
sonnel, equipment or facilities can occur. This section presents
information regarding the types and frequencies of leak testing and
inspection of sealed sources.
7.1 Leak Testing
As a result of current tightly regulated manufacturing prac-
tices, there is substantial confidence that most sealed sources will
not leak under ordinary conditions of use and for intended applica-
tions. Very old sealed sources that were not manufactured under
the same current-day standards may have a higher probability of
leakage. Sealed sources should, and often are required, to be eval-
uated periodically to verify the source integrity. If the source integ-
rity becomes compromised, personnel and facility contamination
can result.
Detailed performance requirements for the manufacture of
sealed sources may be found in regulations, such as those in 10 CFR
Part 36.21 (NRC, 2015a) for irradiators. As noted in Section 3.2.1,
sources that will be manufactured under an NRC or Agreement
State license must meet specific regulatory performance require-
ments, which may be found by accessing the NRC website toolkit
on sealed source/device requirements (NRC, 2017c). Sources that
are manufactured and found leak-free after the rigorous testing,
and are approved for distribution by the appropriate regulator,
have a substantial likelihood of remaining leak-free throughout
their useful life.
Regulations also contain detailed requirements for leak testing
sealed sources that exceed specified activity thresholds. In 10 CFR
Parts 31 through 39 (NRC, 2015a), NRC stipulates leak tests for
specifically licensed and generally licensed sealed sources; DOE
stipulates leak tests for accountable sealed sources in 10 CFR Part
835 (DOE, 2008). All of these regulations establish a semi-annual
leak-test frequency for licensed/accountable sealed sources, with
53
54 / 7. TESTING AND INSPECTION OF SEALED SOURCES
exceptions for sealed sources containing only radioactive gases, tri-

tium sources, and those with half-lives <30 d. In some cases, sealed
sources/devices may require leak testing at other frequencies as
specified in the SSDR and/or license conditions. License conditions
[or for DOE, 10 CFR Part 835 (DOE, 2011c)] typically allow defer-
ral of leak tests for sealed sources that are in storage, installed in
equipment, inaccessible, or that cannot be safely accessed. For
these sealed sources, leak tests are conducted when the sealed
source is put back into service or otherwise becomes accessible, or
as specified by the regulator.
Sealed sources that are distributed under an exempt distribu-
tion license are not required to be leak tested. However, given that
these sources can also leak (depending on their construction) and
potentially cause contamination-control problems, it is prudent to
survey either the individual sources or the sealed-source storage
and use areas on the same frequency as for those sources that
require leak tests.
7.2 Leak-Test Methods
The radiation emitted by the sealed source typically prevents
the performance of leak tests by direct survey. Therefore, the most
common method for determining if contamination is present is to
perform a removable contamination survey on the source or its con-
tainer using a “smear” or “wipe” and analyzing the sample using an
appropriate radiation detector. This indirect method of surveying
for removable activity can verify whether or not the source integ-
rity remains intact.
Performing a removable contamination survey on the source
should be done by applying moderate pressure on a smear tab, disc,
or appropriate filter paper, covering the:
• external surfaces of the source (for fully encapsulated, lower
dose rate, robust sealed sources); or
• nonactive portions of the source, avoiding the electroplated
surfaces or windows of sealed sources using low-penetrating
power radiation (e.g., alpha sources that are electroplated
onto a surface, beta sources manufactured with thin win-
dows, often Mylar, to permit transmission of beta radiation
with minimal attenuation); or
• interior of the container that houses the source when not in
use (for sealed sources using low-penetrating power radia-
tion); or
• port that is near to the source (for high dose-rate sealed
sources).
7.3 INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS / 55
Leak tests for pool irradiator sources may be conducted by tak-

ing an aliquot of the water from the pool and analyzing it for the
presence of the source radionuclide.
Leak testing of high-activity sources should be done with
extreme care, and may require the use of remote handling equip-
ment so that personnel are not exposed to radiation unnecessarily
when a source is withdrawn from its shield. Alternatively, high-
activity sources may be leak tested by performing a removable con-
tamination survey on the nearest accessible component that is
likely to become contaminated if the source were leaking. Contam-
ination of the access port for a high-activity source, such as a radi-
ography camera, would be indicative of a leak.
Wet wipes or smears may be used if the radioactive material is
suitable and the wipe is moistened with a solvent that does not
damage the source integrity. The wet smear should be allowed to
dry before counting unless the counting technique employs liquid
scintillation. Use of a solvent may result in chemiluminescence in
liquid scintillation counting; the solvent selected should be compat-
ible with the source as well as the technique used to analyze the
sample.
During leak testing, proper operation of any on-off mechanisms
should be verified for devices that have such safety devices. In addi-
tion, leak-test smears should be field screened to ensure contami-
nation is not transferred inadvertently to the counting room, or
contaminated items are not inadvertently shipped as noncontami-
nated while awaiting the result of off-site analysis of the smears.
7.3 Instrumentation Requirements
The instruments used to determine if a sealed source is leaking
should be capable of detecting (NRC, 1981):
• 17 Bq (1,000 dpm) of removable beta/gamma contamination;
or
• 0.33 Bq (20 dpm) of removable alpha contamination.
Most laboratory instruments are capable of meeting the above
detection requirements. Common instrumentation includes liquid
scintillation counters and gas-flow proportional counters for alpha
or combination alpha/beta counting, as well as Geiger-Mueller
detectors for beta counting. Due to the poor counting efficiency for
low-energy beta radiation, a liquid scintillation counter is needed
for radionuclides with maximum beta energies lower than ~100 keV
(e.g., 3H, 14C, 63Ni). A gamma scintillator or spectrometer may be
needed for sealed sources that emit only gamma radiation (e.g.,
109
Cd).
7.4 Failed Leak Tests

Regulations [e.g., 10 CFR Part 31.5 (NRC, 2015a) and 10 CFR
Part 835.1202 (DOE, 2008)] specify that leak tests must be capable
of detecting radioactive material leakage equal to or exceeding
185 Bq (or 0.005 µCi). Given that most laboratory detectors have
minimum detectable activities well below 185 Bq (0.005 µCi) and
most sealed sources are not expected to have detectable contami-
nation, it is prudent to consider a sealed source potentially com-
promised if a leak-test result indicates contamination >17 Bq
(1,000 dpm) beta/gamma or 0.33 Bq (20 dpm) alpha. Such sources
should be withdrawn from use and sealed to prevent the spread of
contamination, pending further assessment of the source’s integrity.
It is sometimes possible to decontaminate a slightly contami-
nated source and return it to use. If this avenue is pursued, the
source should be carefully examined to ensure that damage did not
cause the low levels of loose surface contamination. If a decision is
made not to attempt to decontaminate or repair the source, then
the source should either be returned to the manufacturer or dis-
posed. In either case, staff should ensure the area and components
around the source and location of its most recent use are not contam-
inated. Once the source is removed from service, the source inven-
tory (Section 4.3) must be updated to indicate that the source is no
longer available for use.
For sources >3.7 MBq (100 µCi) of beta/gamma emitters with
a half-life >30 d found to be leaking, NRC regulations [10 CFR
Parts 31 and 39 (NRC, 2015a)] require the following information be
reported:
• information on the source (radionuclide/activity);

• leakage activity levels;
• date of discovery;
• probable cause of leakage; and
• circumstances of last use if known.
The source inventory should be updated indicating that the

source is no longer available for use and the radiation safety staff
should ensure the area and components around the source and
location of its most recent use are not contaminated. Management
should be advised of the failed source and a decision rendered
whether to dispose of the source or transfer it back to the manufac-
turer. In some cases, the manufacturer or other authorized licensee
may be able to repair a leaking source. Under all circumstances,
the recipient must be licensed to receive the source in its compro-
mised condition.
7.6 TEST DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS RETENTION / 57
Special precautions and procedures may be necessary in cases

of leaking high-activity sources to prevent unnecessary personnel
radiation exposure. In the event of a leaking high-activity source
such as a calibration device, it is advisable to contact the manufac-
turer or an experienced consultant for assistance.
A leaking source used under the provisions of a general license
must be reported to NRC or the Agreement State within 30 d
[10 CFR Part 31.5 (NRC, 2015a)].
7.5 Inspections for Degradation and Potential Failure

Sealed sources can age and degrade over time, and it is possible
for even robust encapsulation to fail, particularly if a sealed source
is beyond the end of its recommended working lifetime. It is thus
important to examine sealed sources before and after each use. If
there is any reason to suspect damage, the source should be with-
drawn from use and sealed or packaged to prevent the spread of
contamination. The responsible radiation safety personnel should
be contacted to perform follow-up surveys to ensure contamination
has not been spread and to perform a confirmatory leak test.
Sealed sources that have reached the end of their recommended
working lifetime should be inspected by the manufacturer of the
device into which the source is installed. At this point, the sealed
source should be checked for physical damage and functionality.
For sealed sources used in industrial gauges, if the sealed-source
activity has decreased significantly, one solution is to replace an
older detector with one using newer technology which can boost the
detectable signal. If the sealed source/device has reached the end of
its useful life, it should be returned to the manufacturer for recy-
cling/reuse or disposed of in a licensed radioactive waste disposal
facility, as discussed in Section 8.
7.6 Test Documentation and Records Retention

Leak-test records should include:
• identity of the sealed source being tested;
• results of the leak tests;
• sensitivity or background of the counting instrumentation;
• instrument identification and calibration information;
• date the sample was acquired and the date the sample was
analyzed;
• names of persons performing the test;
• if applicable, the names of those who installed or performed
maintenance on a device that required removing the source
from a shield; and
• results of failed leak tests, including investigation results of

cause of failure.
Records of the leak-test results should be kept for at least 3 y
after the test (or discovery of leakage) and for 3 y after the source
is transferred or sent for disposal. Related NRC regulatory require-
ments appear in 10 CFR Parts 31 through 39 (NRC, 2015a).
8. Disposal of Sealed
Sources
Sealed sources/devices that have been determined to be at the

end of their recommended working lifetime should be inspected for
physical damage and functionality. If it is determined that the
source has reached the end of its useful life, it should be either
returned to the manufacturer for recycling/reuse or disposed of at
a licensed radioactive waste facility.
NCRP recommends that owners of disused and spent sealed

sources return them to the manufacturer or dispose of them
promptly, rather than maintain them in extended storage. These
sealed sources should be returned to the manufacturer or dis-
posed within 2 y after their last use.
As discussed in Section 4.3, NCRP recommends inclusion of sealed

sources/devices used under a general license in an inventory and
tracking system. Inventorying and tracking of these sources/devices
can increase user awareness of the location of these sources/devices,
preventing them from becoming abandoned or “orphaned.”
There is a distinction to be made between a disused sealed source
and a spent sealed source. A spent sealed source is one whose radio-
activity has decayed to the point where there is insufficient activity
to cause harm. A disused sealed source is one that is no longer used,
and is not intended to be used for the practice for which an autho-
rization has been granted. The source’s radioactivity content may
have decayed to the point where it is too low to be practical for its
intended use; however, there may still be sufficient radioactivity to
cause severe health effects to humans if the source shielding is
breached or control over the source/device is lost. Examples of dis-
used sealed sources include a teletherapy unit whose activity has
decayed to the point where treatment times are so long that the
patient cannot remain motionless, or an industrial radiography
source whose activity has decayed to the point that very long expo-
sures are required to achieve the proper film density.
Sealed sources/devices that are distributed as exempt generally
may be disposed of without restrictions. However, there may be
state and/or local regulations that prohibit the disposal of exempt
sealed sources in municipal sanitary landfills. In some cases, the
59
60 / 8. DISPOSAL OF SEALED SOURCES
manufacturer may provide specific disposal instructions for the

source/device that they distribute as exempt.
Sources/devices used under a general license and not in use
must not be held more than 2 y [10 CFR Part 31.5 (NRC, 2015a)].
The disposal of a sealed source/device possessed under the terms of
a general license requires the return of the source/device to the
manufacturer or vendor, or to a licensee specifically authorized to
possess the device. Transfer of generally licensed sealed sources/
devices is permitted if a new business entity establishes operations
at the same location and plans to use the sources/devices. Other-
wise, the services of a low-level radioactive waste vendor or broker
are required to properly dispose of the sealed source/device.
Sealed sources possessed under a specific license must be
returned to the manufacturer or vendor (providing this entity is
still in business and its license authorizes such transfers) or to
another licensee authorized to possess the radioactive materials
under the terms of its license (which includes a licensed radioactive
waste disposal facility or licensed radioactive waste broker).
Since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, concerns about
the security of radioactive materials have come to play an equally
important role in sealed-source control as do radiation safety con-
cerns. As of this writing, there are programs funded by DOE to
remove certain disused sealed sources and dispose of them, with the
cooperation of NRC and the Agreement States. The goal of these pro-
grams is to eliminate potentially unsafe storage or endangered secu-
rity for disused sealed sources. In some cases, sealed-source disposal
has been free of cost to the owners; in others, costs were minimal.
One of DOE’s programs is the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration’s Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP), which has
successfully recovered tens of thousands of sealed sources, princi-
pally 239Pu and 241Am sources. The other successful program is the
Source Collection and Threat Reduction Program, which has col-
lected many old sealed sources used in a variety of settings (e.g.,
57
Co or 195Au flood sources used for quality control in nuclear med-
icine applications). In cooperation with the Conference of Radiation
Control Program Directors, Inc. (CRCPD, 2014), owners have listed
their disused sources on the OSRP’s website and grants to the var-
ious states have allowed the consolidation of large numbers of these
disused sources for collection and disposal (CRCPD, 2018). The
funding grants helped to overcome a large obstacle to owners as the
costs associated with contracting with a low-level radioactive waste
vendor and actual disposal of the sealed sources at a licensed radio-
active waste facility could be significant. Due to logistical and fund-
ing issues, the time frame between notifications to OSRP regarding
an unwanted source until actual disposal of that source could be
quite lengthy.
9. Emergency Preparedness
Emergencies involving sealed sources can result from fires,

explosions, mechanical damage to sources/devices, floods, earth-
quakes, electrical power failure, and security breaches (e.g., theft or
loss of sources). If not dealt with promptly and appropriately, emer-
gency conditions can result in severe overexposures, the spread of
contamination in and outside of organization-controlled areas, seri-
ous programmatic interruptions, and significant loss of public
trust.
For industrial settings where gauging devices are used, it is typ-
ically not the gauge or sealed source that is the cause of an emer-
gency; it is almost always some other hazard that puts the sealed
source in harm’s way. Explosions, fires, or chemical spills can harm
the sealed source/device. In addition, weather-related events such
as tornados, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes can cause harm to
industrial process-control equipment containing gauges or sealed
sources. It is important to make local law enforcement and fire-
fighters aware of the presence of sealed sources and gauges on a
site so that they can respond appropriately.
To minimize the impact of emergency conditions, emergency
procedures for responding to likely incidents (e.g., major spills,
leaking sources, medical events, interlock failures, stuck sources)
should be developed and provided to users. In the case of higher
activity sources, emergency procedures should be posted in the
immediate vicinity of the sources, if practical. At a minimum,
the location of the approved procedures should be posted.
The licensing process for sealed sources requires that emer-
gency response procedures be developed, and NRC regulatory guid-
ance documents provide general direction for a variety of source
types (e.g., medical, gauging, radiography, research and develop-
ment) (NRC, 2015b). Emergency procedures should be specific to
the source type and area of use (e.g., laboratory, hospital, construc-
tion site), following the general approach shown in Table 9.1.
Emergency instructions posted at the use location should be
brief and to-the-point, and will normally include direction to
“immediately contact the radiation safety officer.” The radiation
safety staff should develop detailed emergency procedures, com-
mensurate with the potential hazards of the sealed sources/devices.
The following elements should be included, as applicable:
61
TABLE 9.1—Steps for responding to emergencies involving sealed sources.
Breached,
Source Condition / Action Malfunctioning Lost, Stolen
Damaged

Secure the area (i.e., cease operations involving the source or device; close the X X
shutter or return the source to a shielded position, if possible; restrict access
to the area)
Implement contamination controls (e.g., have potentially affected people X

remain in the area; minimize movement of people and tools until surveyed)
Contact responsible individuals (i.e., the RSO, the device manufacturer, X X X

emergency services (e.g., fire department), or other emergency responders) as
appropriate
62 / 9. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Report the incident as required in the applicable regulation X X X
Do not attempt repair or recovery unless specifically qualified and authorized X X

to do so
9. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS / 63
• dose control:
- management of potential extremity and the whole body
overexposures that may have already occurred;
- prevention or minimization of additional exposure prior
to the situation being rectified; and
- minimization of dose during recovery operations.
• contamination control:
- locating/monitoring potentially contaminated individu-
als and areas.; and
- method of determining internal dose (e.g., bioassay,
in vivo measurements).
• concerns of management and members of the public:
- Is there an ongoing security issue?
- Is there an ongoing hazardous condition?
- Is a press release warranted?
• concerns of regulatory agencies:
- Who needs to be notified?
- What is the requisite time frame for notification?
Comprehensive emergency response procedures are essential
for minimizing the impact of emergency conditions. In addition to
laying the groundwork for a smooth and comprehensive response,
the process needed to develop emergency response procedures can
also help identify weaknesses in the sealed-source safety and secu-
rity protocols which, when addressed, will further diminish the
likelihood of an emergency occurring.
10. Historical Review of
Sealed-Source Incidents
Many incidents involving sealed sources have occurred over

years of use that have led to improved security and emergency
response programs. The most common types of incidents involving
sealed sources include loss (due to theft or abandonment), damage,
leakage, and radiation exposures resulting from misuse of a source.
Regulations and standards continue to evolve to lessen the likeli-
hood of future problems with the use of sealed sources; however,
there is still room for improvement in their implementation by
users of sealed sources.
10.1 Types of Incidents and Specific Corrective Actions

Incidents can occur when a sealed source is lost, stolen or dam-
aged. Consequences vary widely and can result in widespread con-
tamination or overexposure of workers or members of the public.
Owners of sealed sources are required to report the loss, theft or
damage of sealed sources to the appropriate regulatory authority
(i.e., NRC, Agreement State, or DOE). The time frame for notifica-
tion varies depending on the category of the source, the source
licensing requirements, and the regulatory agency involved.
10.1.1 Lost Sources

Loss of control represents a large fraction of the incidents asso-
ciated with sealed sources. Many of the significant events have
occurred when positive controls are removed from sources and they
are either abandoned or forgotten. Other sources become lost
because owners or users are unaware that a device contains a
sealed source. This frequently can be the case with sealed sources
in devices that are distributed for use under a general license. Loss
of a sealed source (greater than an exempt quantity) must be
reported to the appropriate regulatory authority. The time frame
for notification varies depending on the category of the source, the
source licensing requirements and the regulatory agency involved.
When a source is lost, the owner may face regulatory enforce-
ment actions including fines and violations. A lost source can also
pose a potential health hazard to members of the public.
64
10.1 TYPES OF INCIDENTS AND SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS / 65
There have been numerous incidents in which sources were mis-

placed and ended up in scrap metal. NCRP has reviewed this topic
in extensive detail in NCRP Report No. 141, Managing Potentially
Radioactive Scrap Metal (NCRP, 2002). In a number of cases, metal
was sorted and eventually melted into new material to be used for
manufacturing. In these cases, the encapsulation containing the
radioactive material could not withstand the extreme heat associ-
ated with metal recycling. These sealed sources subsequently
melted, distributing the radioactivity throughout the metal and
byproducts (e.g., flue dusts, slags, dross) and contaminating other
areas within the plant. In some cases, the presence of the contami-
nated metal was not discovered until after the manufacturing pro-
cess was complete, resulting in contaminated reinforcing steel used
in construction and in contaminated consumer products. In most of
these situations, the concentration of radioactivity was such that
public radiation exposures were low. Nevertheless, in some cases,
decontamination of the affected steel mill’s feedstock and lost pro-
duction during the cleanup has cost upwards of tens of millions of
dollars, while the manufacturer’s contaminated products resulted
in loss of consumer confidence and poor sales.
There have been close to 50 confirmed instances where sealed
sources were melted inadvertently in metal manufacturing and
recycling facilities throughout the world, with approximately half
of these occurring in the United States. Most common incidents
resulted in the contamination of steel products (~80 %); followed by
aluminum (~10 %); and to a lesser extent, copper, zinc and lead
(Lubenau and Yusko, 1998).
Sealed sources that find their way to metal scrap pose a risk to
workers involved in the transportation of scrap, mill workers, and
the mill infrastructure itself. The response of many facilities, such
as landfills and metal recyclers, to the potential for inadvertent
radioactivity in their feedstock has been the installation and use of
sensitive radiation monitoring equipment at the facility entrances.
The degree of sophistication of this detection equipment has
improved tremendously in recent years.
These monitors have identified many shipments of materials
that contained or were contaminated with lost or abandoned radio-
active sources. These monitors also alarm due to the presence of
naturally occurring radioactive materials. The rejection of these
loads at metal mills has led their suppliers to obtain and use detec-
tion systems as well.
These detectors are also in use at ports of entry to the United
States. The workers monitoring these detectors must be well
trained to recognize and separate potential sources in the feedstocks
66 / 10. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SEALED-SOURCE INCIDENTS
from material containing higher concentrations of naturally occur-

ring radioactive material (e.g., brick).
Improved controls over licensed material are necessary to
decrease the likelihood of loss of control of sealed sources. This is of
particular importance with generally licensed devices when many
users are unaware of their responsibilities.
Examples of losses of sealed sources:
• Mayapuri, India (2010): illegal disposal of irradiator (Dey
et al., 2012);
• Meet Halfa, Egypt (2000): loss of industrial radiography
source (El-Nagger and Mahmoud, 2000);
• Samut Prakarn, Thailand (2000): orphaned teletherapy unit
(IAEA, 2002a);
• Yanango, Peru (1999): loss of industrial radiography source
(IAEA, 2000);
• Gilan, Iran (1996): loss of industrial radiography source
(IAEA, 2002b);
• Goiânia, Brazil (1987): loss of irradiator (IAEA, 1988);
• Taipei, China (1982 to 1984): contaminated steel from
source melt used in building (Hwang et al., 2001); and
• Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (1983 to 1984): contaminated steel
from source melt (Lister, 1985; Lushbaugh et al., 1982).
The severe flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in
2005 generated challenges in accounting for the many sealed
sources left behind that had to be identified and retrieved (Leach
et al., 2006).
10.1.2 Theft of Sealed Sources

Theft of a source can result in significant regulatory enforce-
ment for failure to control radioactive material, as well as signifi-
cant health and safety consequences to workers and members of
the public. In many cases, the thieves are not actually targeting the
sealed source; they are simply looking for items of value and do not
realize that the item contains radioactive material. The risk of
theft is highest for portable devices such as moisture density
gauges or radiography cameras. For this reason, these sources usu-
ally have a requirement for two independent locking devices.
Thefts have also occurred when a vehicle used for transportation of
the source is stolen. Some sources subject to increased regulatory
control (e.g., radiography cameras) now require means to prevent
vehicle theft if those sources are present.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, NRC, in coopera-
tion with Agreement States developed rules to place greater control
on sources of concern, thus limiting the possibility that these

sources will be stolen in the future. These rules have been devel-
oped further and are in 10 CFR Part 37 (NRC, 2015a) for NRC (and
Agreement State) licensees. Improving facility security, control
over sources and maintenance of sealed-source inventories can also
lessen the possibility of theft or loss. It is noteworthy that, of the
thefts of sealed sources in the past 10 y, only 50 events involved
Category 1 or 2 sources, and of these, only one (Category 2) source
was not recovered (Smith et al., 2016).
Examples of theft of sealed sources:
• Hueypoxtla, Mexico (2013): theft of radiotherapy source
during shipment (IAEA, 2013);
• Tammiku, Estonia (1994): theft of sealed source from waste
facility (IAEA, 1998); and
• Jilin, China (1992): removal of a source during decommis-
sioning (Genyao et al., 1997).
It should be noted that, while there are requirements for the
reporting and notifications of source thefts, there are no require-
ments to report or track the return or recovery of sources. The
vast majority of sources that are reported as missing, are, in fact,
recovered.
10.1.3 Damage to Sealed Sources/Devices
Sealed sources are designed and manufactured to meet very
strict standards for environmental conditions that may include
pressure, temperature, vibration, corrosion, and even chemical
exposures. Users need to know and understand the limitations and
treat sealed sources with the care expected. This is especially true
for the more fragile sources such as electroplated sources or foils.
Most sealed sources, except those designed specifically for the con-
ditions, will not be able to withstand prolonged exposure to fire or
extreme temperatures. An example of exceeding the use limita-
tions for a sealed source was a documented event involving an
industrial radiography source that was damaged and leaked after
coming into contact with an electrical circuit (LADEQ, 2002).
Users should become familiar with the manufacturer’s specifi-
cations for use to lessen the likelihood of damage to sources. Man-
ufacturers improving the ability of their devices to withstand
potential stresses will lower the risk and the extent of the damage
that could occur in the future. For example, using stainless steel
rather than lead for shielding industrial gauges increases the abil-
ity of the gauge and the sealed source to withstand temperatures
and vibration.
10.1.4 Leaks
A leak of radioactive material from a sealed source is almost
always due to some type of damage that occurs to the source
containment. Regulated sealed sources are required to be leak
tested periodically to verify the integrity of the containment.
Leak-test methods and requirements are described in Section 7.
Occasionally, a design or manufacturing defect results in a loss
of containment integrity. Once recognized, the source/device is typ-
ically recalled and redesigned. For example, in the late 1980s a
recall was issued for a certain type of static eliminator because of
failure of the sealed sources and several incidents of contamination
(Danna, 2001). Low-penetrating power sources, such as electro-
plated sources, check sources, and foils, have limited to no external
containment and consequently have higher likelihood of leakage if
not handled properly (Section 5.1.1). Users can minimize the poten-
tial for a source leaking by avoiding situations that may compro-
mise the source integrity. They can decrease the likelihood of a
leaking source going unrecognized by periodically surveying the
source or the work area while it is in use, or by conducting leak tests
more frequently than required by regulation or license condition.
10.1.5 Personnel Exposures
Even though use of higher-activity sealed sources is regulated

and many safety measures are in place, excessive exposures due to
the use of sealed sources continue to occur.
The failure to understand the hazardous nature of a sealed
source led to a serious incident in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2002
(IAEA, 2004). After a series of radiographs of a natural gas pipeline
was performed, a worker attempted to retract the source (0.67 TBq
192Ir) into the safe position within the camera. When the drive cable
would not disconnect properly, the worker failed to use a dose-rate

meter and thus could not confirm that the source had successfully
retracted into the shielded camera. The worker believed the source
was in a safe position when in fact it was detached and located in
the unshielded guide tube. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to
resolve the problem with the drive cable, the worker coiled up the
cable, put the equipment into two boxes, and placed the gear into
the cargo compartment of a passenger bus in accordance with his
instructions. After an ~8 h bus ride, the radiography equipment
(with the source in the unshielded position) sat in the bus cargo
compartment overnight. Upon return of the equipment to the radi-
ography company’s facility, the workers performed a radiation sur-
vey and discovered that the source had never been fully retracted
into a shielded position. These workers eventually managed to

recouple the source to the drive cable and retract it into the camera.
This event resulted in several individuals receiving estimated
doses approaching 1 Gy each. The dose estimates were based on
time-motion studies because the workers had failed to wear their
dosimeters. Dozens of bus passengers received doses ranging from
0.02 to 0.5 Gy.
There are numerous examples of other excessive exposures from
radiography sources. While mechanical failure may set the stage
for accidental radiation exposure, following procedures for safe use
are sufficient to prevent harm. Human error and failure to imple-
ment these procedures are typically the cause of unnecessary expo-
sures. Because the exposures can be significant and well over
regulatory limits, both workers and members of the public can be
placed at risk. In addition, the radiography company responsible
for the source can lose their license to operate. Corrective measures
implemented to decrease problems with industrial radiography
sources included the use of calibrated survey instruments, more
frequent survey requirements, improved training, requirement for
dedicated supervision, and the use of direct reading and audible
alarming dosimeters.
In 1992, failure to follow procedures resulted in the most recent
confirmed fatality in the United States due to radiation exposure.
The fatality occurred because a medical team failed to perform the
required survey after a brachytherapy source was to have been
removed from a patient. The source detached from its guide tube
and remained inside an implanted treatment catheter. An error
message displayed on the console readout, but did not require oper-
ator verification and the message cleared itself. Attending person-
nel did not survey the patient with a dose-rate meter, and also
ignored the radiation exposure alarm installed within the treat-
ment room. The source was left inside the patient, who was sent to
her care facility where she died a few days later (NRC, 1993b).
Large pool irradiators make use of a large number of sealed
sources to provide extremely high exposure rates. These pool irra-
diators have been associated with overexposures and injuries
(some fatal). After incidents began occurring, several enhanced
protection methods were implemented, including access control,
use of survey meters for entry and exit, monitors at all exit points
to ensure no source exits via the conveyor system, pressure sensi-
tive mats at entry points, audible/visible alarms, and emergency
stop cables and buttons located throughout the entry maze.
Other incidents where overexposures of personnel at pool irra-
diators occurred include:
• Soreq, Israel (1990): pool irradiator safety features overrid-

den (IAEA, 1993);
• Nesvizh, Belarus (1991): failed to follow procedures at pool
irradiator (IAEA, 1996); and
• Kjeller, Norway (1982): pool irradiator without protective
measures (Reitan et al., 2005).
10.2 Other General Corrective Measures
10.2.1 Additional Labeling

IAEA, in concert with ISO, introduced a new symbol to warn
individuals of the presence of a dangerous source (UN, 2007). This
symbol is shown in Figure 10.1. The label is placed on the source
itself, and is not intended to be visible during normal use or on
transportation packages or containers. Its intent is to warn individ-
uals who may not have any training or familiarity with radiation
that the source can cause them severe bodily harm. It was devel-
oped also to use iconic displays so that uneducated or illiterate
members of the public would recognize that the device is danger-
ous. The accident in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, occurred, in part,
because warning signs present on the devices were not in a lan-
guage understood by members of the public (IAEA, 2002a). In the
United States, NRC has issued guidance to place the symbol on
the device shielding so that it can be seen prior to accessing the
source itself. The supplemental symbol must be closely associated
with the device housing the source, as a warning not to dismantle
the device or get closer to the source (NRC, 2007).
This recently developed radiation warning symbol is not used in
every country, including in the United States. However, it may
appear in the United States on sealed sources manufactured in a
country where this symbol is in use. The U.S. warning symbol for
radiation and/or radioactive material is the well-known trefoil
(ANSI/HPS, 2016), shown in Figure 10.2.
10.2.2 Training
The implementation of proper training and well developed pro-
cedures is vital to preventing incidents such as the ones described
above. In addition to the United States, and with guidance from
IAEA, other countries continue to improve their training and
enforcement of the use of sealed sources as well, reducing the
potential for future events. Proper surveying with a working
instrument is perhaps the most critical tool in preventing accidents
with sealed sources.
10.2 OTHER GENERAL CORRECTIVE MEASURES / 71
Fig. 10.1. Radiation warning symbol (UN, 2007).
Fig. 10.2. Radiation warning symbol, 2015.
Sealed-source users should be trained and periodically retrained

on radiation safety, procedures, limitations, and the equipment.
The extent of training should be commensurate with the potential
hazard associated with the sealed source.
10.2.3 Procedures and Assessments

Development and implementation of good working procedures
that cover all aspects of sealed-source use, including emergency
response actions, will help to avoid potential problems with sealed
sources. Procedures should be periodically reviewed and updated
as needed to ensure they remain current and reflect how workers
are implementing practices in the field.
One of the key elements of a comprehensive radiation safety

program is the periodic assessment of program implementation
and effectiveness. NCRP Report No. 162, Self Assessment of Radi-
ation-Safety Programs (NCRP, 2009) covers in detail the purposes,
planning, conduct, documentation, and corrective action develop-
ment for self-assessments. Effective and thorough self-assessments
can help prevent serious incidents by identifying and addressing
lower level problems before they become significant problems.
When an incident does occur, it should be investigated and cor-
rective measures should be identified and implemented to reduce
the likelihood such an incident could be repeated. A complete dis-
cussion of the activities taken in response to an incident, along with
development of proper corrective actions is the subject of NCRP
Report No. 173, Investigation of Radiological Incidents (NCRP, 2012).
This Report covers the initial responses, assignment of an investi-
gating team, analysis of the causes, and development of corrective
actions with recommended follow-up. Serious incidents, such as
those involving injuries or regulatory violations, should be consid-
ered important enough to bring in outside expertise for the conduct
of a proper cause analysis.
11. Summary of
Recommendations
This Report contains the following recommendations of NCRP,

summarized below:
The definition of a sealed radioactive source should be

adopted: “A sealed radioactive source is a manufactured item
containing radioactive material to be used as an ionizing radia-
tion source and is encapsulated, plated or bonded in a matrix to
prevent the dispersal of the radioactive material under the con-
ditions of use and wear for which it was designed” (Section 2.1).
The IAEA International Categorization System for sealed

sources should be adopted for expanded use in the United States.
This system provides a uniform basis, both nationally and inter-
nationally, for the classification of sealed sources of similar
hazard levels. In determining categories for the purpose of regu-
latory control, aggregates of sealed sources should be considered
(Section 2.2).
SSDR certificates for sealed sources/devices should be made

readily available to users and manufacturers and should provide
clear and concise statements of use and maintenance limita-
tions for the sealed source/device in the instructions to users
(Section 3.5).
Sealed sources/devices used under a general license should be

included in an inventory and tracking mechanism (Section 4.3).
Owners of disused and spent sealed sources should return

them to the manufacturer or dispose of them promptly, rather
than maintain them in extended storage. These sealed sources
should be returned to the manufacturer or disposed of within 2 y
after their last use (Section 8).
73
Appendix A

Sealed-Source-Specific License Program
Elements
Program Element Expectation
Obtain license Initiate license application process at least six months prior to taking
possession of sealed source(s). The regulatory authority should be
consulted for the appropriate lead time. License required prior to
receipt of sealed source(s).
74
Develop radiation safety program operating and Program documents may be required to be submitted with license
emergency procedures. application, otherwise established prior to taking possession of sealed
source(s).
Radiation safety program documents to include:
• control/security Program documents must address routine and nonroutine
• training maintenance; leak testing; calibration, if needed; and special uses of
• leak testing sources. Identify appropriate instrumentation, required training and
• inventory ongoing control and security of sources.
• maintenance
• instrumentation
• posting/labeling
• surveys
• audits
• records management
Control and security Develop appropriate control and security for sealed source(s). May
require a security review by the regulatory agency.

Training Develop and implement training program appropriate for sealed-source
use. Training provided initially, annual refresher, and as needed due to
program changes or events.
Leak testing Leak-test frequency is specified in manufacturer SSDR and license
(quarterly, six month, annual, or 3 y).
Inventory Maintain inventory of sealed sources and add new sources upon
receipt. Verify inventory every six months.
Maintenance Routine maintenance may be specified by the manufacturer.
Shutter checks are generally performed every six months concurrent
with inventory. Nonroutine maintenance, as needed. Properly dispose
of leaking sources. Some devices may require maintenance only by a
licensee who is specifically licensed to do the work.
Instrumentation Obtain appropriate dose-rate and contamination instrumentation prior
to receipt of sealed source. Contamination instrumentation required to
detect <185 Bq (0.005 µCi).
Annual recalibration required, or as needed due to damage or
suspected failure. Industrial radiography instrumentation calibration
required every six months.
Survey Surveys and dose compliance performed initially, and:
• as needed (problems, changes);
• regulatory compliance (various); and
A. SEALED-SOURCE-SPECIFIC LICENSE PROGRAM ELEMENTS
• dose compliance survey may involve using personal dosimetry.

/ 75
Program Element Expectation
Posting/labels Verify appropriate posting/labels during routine surveys. Confirm
during six month inventory and annual audit.
Auditing Annual audit/review of program elements, license, and required

documentation.
Documentation Review documentation annually as part of audit. Maintain records (life
76 / APPENDIX A
of license for most, 3 or 5 y for few). Following regulatory inspection,

archive older documentation and maintain current year records readily
available.
Update license Amend license, as necessary. Note that license renewal is required —
frequency specified by the appropriate regulatory agency.
Appendix B
Example Sealed-Source
Inventory Procedure
I. Objective
To ensure sealed sources are included in the sealed-source
tracking system and periodically inventoried as required
II. Receipt
a. Notify the RSO upon delivery of any radioactive shipment
b. Depending on the type of shipment, the RSO may have
only 3 h during normal business times, or 3 h on the next
business day for delivery during nonbusiness hours to
perform the following [note: when working under DOE
jurisdiction, 8 h are allowed to perform these surveys]:
i. Examine the package for adequate integrity (no
crushing, signs of leakage)
ii. Perform radiation and contamination surveys of the
package to ensure shipment requirements have been
met
iii. Check the package contents with the packing slip to
ensure all the sources have been received
c. Leak test any newly arrived sources unless exempted (e.g.,
gas sources, tritium)
d. Inform the RSO of any discrepancies
e. Add the source to the inventory tracking system
f. Either deliver the source to the owner or notify the owner
to pick up the source
III. Inventory Control
a. General requirements
i. Inspect sources before and after each use
1.If damage is suspected
– seal the source to prevent spread of contamination
77
78 / APPENDIX B
– label the container

– notify the RSO
ii. Obtain approval from the RSO before changing the
storage location of any source
iii. When not in use or installed in equipment, store
sealed sources in a locked or controlled area
b. Issue
– Check the source out of the inventory tracking system
c. Return
i. Upon completion of work requiring a source, return
the source to the storage location
ii. Check the source into the inventory tracking system
iii. Ensure cabinets and doors are secured and keys are
returned to their proper location
IV. Periodic Verification
a. At the designated frequency (typically every six months),
generate a listing of sources
i. Ensure each source is in its designated location or has
been properly issued
ii. Ensure each stored source or storage location is
properly labeled
b. Ensure labels are legible, replace as necessary
c. Update the inventory tracking system to reflect changes or
resolve discrepancies
d. Leak test each source as required
e. Document the results of the inventory and leak testing
f. Indicate any sources that are inaccessible; for example,
due to installation in equipment
g. Perform an inventory of any nationally tracked sources
each January and submit the required report to NRC (or
DOE as applicable)
h. If possessed, special nuclear material has specific
requirements for inventory and reporting as found in NRC
regulations 10 CFR Parts 70 and 74 (NRC, 2015a).
V. Missing Sources — Notifications (process and time frames
may differ slightly for DOE)
a. If, based on the inventory system or a verification, a
specifically licensed source is believed to be missing
i. Notify the RSO
ii. Within 24 h of discovery, notify NRC or the
Agreement State as appropriate, if the missing source
B. EXAMPLE SEALED-SOURCE INVENTORY PROCEDURE / 79
could result in a regulatory overexposure to a member

of the public
iii. Within 30 d, send written report to NRC or the
Agreement State
iv. Immediately notify NRC or the Agreement State of
the loss of a source with activity >1,000 times the
10 CFR Part 20 Appendix C (NRC, 2015a) values
v. Within 30 d, notify NRC or the Agreement State of
the loss of a source with activity >10 times the
10 CFR Part 20 Appendix C (NRC, 2015a) values
vi. Investigate and implement corrective actions
b. If an exempt source is missing
i. Notify the RSO
ii. Investigate and implement corrective actions
c. If a generally licensed source/device is missing, notify the
RSO promptly, as a written report must be sent to NRC or
the Agreement State within 30 d
VI. Source Disposal
a. If a source is transferred for disposal (to a licensed
recipient)
– Update the source inventory mechanism to reflect the
disposal or transfer
b. Notify NRC or the Agreement State of the transfer or
disposal of a generally licensed source [10 CFR Part 31.5
(NRC, 2015a)] within 30 d
VII. Documentation
Maintain documents related to source acquisition, possession,
leak-test results, regulatory reports, source transfer, and dis-
posal for minimum of 3 y
Appendix C
Requirements for
Transportation of
Radioactive Material
Transportation of radioactive material requires a graded effort

depending on the magnitude, physical form, and radiological char-
acteristics of the source. Regardless of what level of radioactivity is
in the package, whether a terabecquerel radiography source or a
small kilobecquerel check source, the requirements for shipping
primarily depend on the radiation levels that could affect a member
of the public. Therefore, DOT limits are based on values that will
not cause unnecessary or excessive radiation exposure to a member
of the public. The listing below provides the regulatory require-
ments as delineated in DOT regulations in Title 49 (DOT, 2014).
Note that other regulations may apply, such as those of NRC, IATA,
the International Civil Aviation Organization, and IAEA.
The shipping regulations are quite complex and therefore the
packaging, loading, labeling, marking, placarding, and confirma-
tion of radiation exposure rate compliance must only be imple-
mented by properly trained and experienced personnel. Personnel
who prepare sealed sources for shipment or receive sealed sources
onto their site must have DOT-required training in order to do so.
This can range from activities as simple as signing for a shipment,
to being capable of performing a survey, wipe test, and placing the
shipment into storage. In addition, these persons must be trained
in the security of radioactive materials, such as double-restraining
shipments in storage until they are processed onto the site. In addi-
tion, shipments leaving a site must be signed by someone with
appropriate DOT training. This is very important for returning
high-activity sealed sources from a hospital, research or industrial
site to a supplier. The manufacturer or licensee authorized to per-
form such duties must sign for the shipment.
80
C. TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL / 81
For a sealed-source user or RSO, the following limits are pro-

vided to guide the proper receipt of sources and ensure compliance
with regulations.
For exclusive-use shipments (where the transport vehicle is
used only for radioactive material shipment and for no other prod-
uct transport), 49 CFR Part 173.441 (DOT, 2008) provides the fol-
lowing limits:
• <10 mSv h–1 (1,000 mrem h–1) on contact with the package
for closed transport vehicles or <2 mSv h–1 (200 mrem h–1)
at contact with the package for open transport vehicles (e.g.,
a flat-bed trailer as opposed to a closed shipping van);
• <2 mSv h–1 (200 mrem h–1) on the outer surface of the vehi-
cle or from the vertical planes projected from the outer
edges of the vehicle.;
• <0.1 mSv h–1 (10 mrem h–1) at any point 2 m from the outer
surface of the vehicle or from the vertical planes projected
from the outer edges of the vehicle; and
• <0.02 mSv h–1 (2 mrem h–1) in any normally occupied posi-
tion of the vehicle unless the persons occupying the vehicle
are being monitored with personal radiation monitoring
devices. Typically, this would be the maximum dose rate in
the driver’s seat position.
For nonexclusive use shipments (where the transport vehicle
could be a commercial truck used to transport any number of pack-
ages to a variety of customers), 49 CFR Part 173 (DOT, 2008)
requires the following:
• <2 mSv h–1 (200 mrem h–1) on contact with the package; and
• <0.1 mSv h–1 (10 mrem h–1) at 1 m from outer surface of the
package.
Upon receipt of a radioactive shipment, personnel should com-
plete radiation surveys on the package surface and at 1 m from the
surface and record the highest readings from each of these loca-
tions. Document whether or not the readings meet the regulatory
limits of 2 mSv h–1 (200 mrem h–1) at contact with the surface
and 0.1 mSv h–1 (10 mrem h–1) at 1 m. If either of these criteria is
exceeded, personnel should notify supervision promptly as notifica-
tions to regulatory agencies may be required for readings higher
than regulatory limits.
Detectable radioactive contamination on the exterior of a package
is highly unusual and should be taken as indication of a potentially
damaged source. External package contamination may not exceed
24,000 dpm over a 100 cm2 wipe sample (24,000 dpm/100 cm2) for
82 / APPENDIX C
total beta/gamma radiation or 2,400 dpm/100 cm2 alpha emission, as

stated in 49 CFR Part 173.443 (DOT, 2008). Typically, packages
should not be offered for transport if the contamination levels exceed
1,000 dpm over a 100 cm2 wipe sample (1,000 dpm/100 cm2) for total
beta/gamma radiation or 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha emission. Proper
instrumentation must be employed to ascertain these relatively low
levels of detection. The level of 1,000 dpm/100 cm2 is essentially the
limit for detection of most common beta-emitting radionuclides
(100 cpm above background with a Geiger-Mueller meter that has
a total counting efficiency of 10 %). The 20 dpm/100 cm2 alpha value
is difficult to detect with most hand-held alpha detectors. Typically,
a 60 s integrated count is needed to detect this level of contamina-
tion, presuming a 2 cpm background using an instrument with a
minimum detectable activity of 100 dpm/100 cm2. Liquid scintilla-
tion and benchtop alpha counters can more readily detect this level
of contamination.
Regulatory requirements for sealed-source leakage are based to
some extent on detectability of 185 Bq (equivalent to 0.005 µCi).
Conversion of this level yields 11,100 dpm, or an easily detectable
level of 1,100 cpm using the same 10 % efficiency above.
If levels are >24,000 dpm/100 cm2 beta/gamma or 2,400 dpm/
100 cm2 alpha, a shipping violation may have occurred. Generally,
one should assume a standardized smear collection efficiency. A
commonly used efficiency for a distribution of mixed beta/gamma
emitters is 10%. However, to determine if a shipping violation has
occurred, a more specific calculation can be employed to account for
the efficiency of the smear technique used for contamination sur-
veys. As an example, if the smearing technique results in the more
efficient removal of 20 % of the contamination, then the acceptable
contamination levels would be reduced by a factor of two. Guidance
for this type of evaluation can be found in NRC Information Notice
85-46 (NRC, 1985).
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable

cpm counts per minute
dpm decays per minute
IATA International Air Transportation Association
LD detection limit
NSTS National Source Tracking System (U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission)
OSRP Off-Site Source Recovery Program (National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy)
RSO radiation safety officer
SI Système International (d’Unités) (International System
of Units)
SSDR Sealed Source and Device Registry
83
Glossary
activity (A): Rate of transformation (or disintegration or decay) of radio-

active material. The International System of Units (SI) unit of activity
is the reciprocal second (s–1) (meaning one transformation per second),
and its special name is the becquerel (Bq). In previous units often used
by state and federal agencies, activity is given in curies (Ci); 1 Ci =
3.7 × 1010 Bq.
aggregated sources: Sources accessible by the breach of a single physi-
cal barrier that would allow access to radioactive material in any form,
including any devices that contain the radioactive material [10 CFR
Part 37.5 (NRC, 2015a)]
Agreement State: State which has entered into an agreement with the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to regulate the use of
radionuclides which would otherwise be subject to NRC licensing
(byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials). States which have
not entered into such an agreement and in which NRC regulates the
use of regulated radionuclides are termed Non-Agreement States.
alpha radiation: Energetic nuclei of helium atoms, consisting of two pro-
tons and two neutrons, emitted spontaneously from nuclei in the decay
of some radionuclides. Alpha radiation is weakly penetrating, and can
be stopped by a sheet of paper or the outer dead layer of skin. Also
called alpha particle and sometimes shortened to alpha (e.g., alpha-
emitting radionuclide). Alpha particles may represent a hazard when
radionuclides are deposited inside the body (e.g., via inhalation, inges-
tion or wounds).
as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA): A principle of radiation
protection philosophy that requires that exposures to ionizing radia-
tion be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social fac-
tors being taken into account. The protection from radiation exposure
is ALARA when the expenditure of further resources would be unwar-
ranted by the reduction in exposure that would be achieved.
background (instrument): When an instrument is turned on, counts
will be observed with or without a sample or sealed source near it.
This is because background radiation is always present. Background
radiation comes from cosmic sources, naturally occurring radioactive
material in the Earth and in the body (including exposure from
radon), and global fallout as it exists in the environment from past
testing of nuclear explosive devices. The background count rate will be
different for each count because of the inherent variability of the pro-
cess of radioactive decay.
becquerel (Bq): The special name for the unit of activity in the Interna-
tional System of Units (SI) [i.e., one nuclear transformation per second
84
GLOSSARY / 85
(s–1)]. The special unit previously used was curie (Ci); 3.7 × 1010 Bq =
1 Ci; 37 MBq (megabecquerels) = 1 mCi (millicurie).
beta radiation: Energetic electrons or positrons (positively charged elec-
trons) emitted spontaneously from nuclei in decay of some radionu-
clides. Also called beta particle and sometimes shortened to beta (e.g.,
beta-emitting radionuclide).
brachytherapy: Method of radiation therapy in which an encapsulated
source is utilized to deliver gamma or beta radiation at a distance up
to a few centimeters either by surface, intracavitary or interstitial
application.
calibration: For an instrument intended to measure dose, dose rate, or
contamination, calibration is the determination of the instrument
response to a known radiation field or source. Calibration sources are
often used for this determination.
contamination (radionuclide): Radioactive material that is present in
undesired locations, including on sealed sources, on devices holding
the sealed sources, or in storage areas.
curie (Ci): The previous special name for the unit of radioactivity equal to
3.70 × 1010 becquerels (or disintegrations per second) (see becquerel).
decay (radioactive): The spontaneous nuclear transformation of one
nuclide into a different nuclide or into a different energy state of the
same nuclide.
disused source: A source of radioactive material that is not in active use
or is no longer suitable for its intended use. This may result from
decay, from obsolete equipment, alternative technology, changes in pri-
orities, or other removal from service (but not from declaration as
waste).
dose: A general term used when the context is not specific to a particular
dose quantity. Dose is the amount of energy from ionizing radiation
absorbed per unit mass of any material. When the context is specific,
the name for the quantity is used, such as absorbed dose.
dose limit: A limit on dose that is applied for exposure to individuals in
order to prevent the occurrence of radiation-induced tissue reactions
or to limit the probability of radiation-related stochastic effects.
dosimetry: The science or technique of determining dose from ionizing
radiation.
exempt: Excluded from regulation as hazardous or radioactive material.
exposure: A general term used to express the act of being exposed to ion-
izing radiation.
gamma radiation: Electromagnetic radiation emitted in de-excitation of
atomic nuclei, and frequently occurring in decay of radionuclides. Also
called gamma ray and sometimes shortened to gamma (e.g., gamma-
emitting radionuclides).
general license: Permission to possess and use radioactive material
without formal review and issuance of documents by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission or an Agreement State.
86 / GLOSSARY
half-life (radioactive): The time in which one-half of the atoms (on aver-
age) of a particular radioactive substance disintegrate into another
nuclear form (also called physical or radiological half-life).
ionizing radiation: Any radiation capable of displacing electrons from
atoms or molecules, thereby producing ions. Examples include alpha
radiation, beta radiation, gamma rays, x rays, and cosmic rays. Mini-
mum energy of ionizing radiation is a few electron volts (eV); 1 eV =
1.6 × 10–19 J.
irradiation: The process of being exposed to ionizing radiation.
isotope: One of several nuclides of a chemical element having the same
number of protons in their nuclei, but different nuclear mass numbers
due to different numbers of neutrons in the nucleus. An element may
have numerous stable or unstable (radioactive) isotopes.
license: Permission issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
or an Agreement State in accordance with applicable laws or regula-
tions.
limit: In radiation protection, the level of dose established by authorita-
tive or consensus bodies above which the consequences to an individ-
ual would be regarded as unacceptable.
members of the public: All persons who are not considered occupation-
ally exposed by a source or practice under consideration.
monitoring: The measurement of radiation levels, concentrations, sur-
face-area concentrations, or quantities of radioactive material and the
use of the results of these measurements to evaluate potential expo-
sures and doses.
neutron: An elementary particle that is electrically neutral. The nuclei of
all atoms except hydrogen contain neutrons.
occupational dose/exposure: The dose/exposure received by an individ-
ual in a restricted area, or in the course of employment in which the
individual’s duties necessarily involve exposure to radiation (medical
doses involving diagnosis or treatment of the exposed individual are
excluded).
personal (individual) monitor or dosimeter: A small radiation detec-
tor that is worn by an individual. Common individual dosimeters con-
tain film, thermoluminescent or optically stimulated luminescent
materials as the radiation detector.
quality assurance: The planned and systematic activities necessary to
provide adequate confidence that a product or service will meet the
given requirements.
radiation (ionizing): Electromagnetic radiation (x or gamma rays) or
particulate radiation (alpha particles, beta particles, electrons, posi-
trons, protons, neutrons, and heavy charged particles) capable of pro-
ducing ions by direct or secondary processes in passage through
matter.
radiography: The production of images produced on a film or other
media by the action of x rays transmitted through an individual or an
object.
GLOSSARY / 87
rem: The previous special unit for equivalent dose and effective dose.
1 rem = 0.01 J kg –1; 100 rem = 1 Sv (see sievert). 1 mrem = 1/1,000 rem.
sealed radioactive source: A manufactured item containing radioactive
material to be used as an ionizing radiation source and is encapsu-
lated, plated or bonded in a matrix to prevent the dispersal of the
radioactive material under the conditions of use and wear for which it
was designed.
sievert (Sv): The special name [in the International System of Units (SI)]
for the unit of equivalent dose and effective dose (or effective dose
equivalent); 1 Sv = 1 J kg –1. 1 Sv = 100 rem.
special form: Radioactive material that is either in a single piece or is
contained in a sealed capsule that can be opened only by destroying
the capsule, or material that satisfies the test requirements of U.S.
Department of Transportation regulation 49 CFR Part 173.469 (DOT,
2008).
specific license: Written permission to possess and use radioactive
material issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or an
Agreement State after the agency reviews and approves an applica-
tion for the possession and use of the radioactive material.
survey: An evaluation of the presence of radiation or radioactive contam-
ination under a specific set of conditions to determine actual or poten-
tial radiation hazards.
survey meter: An instrument or device, usually portable, for monitoring
the level of radiation or of radioactive contamination in an area or
location.
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Scientific Committee
Kathryn H. Pryor, Chair, has been a member of Program Area

Committee (PAC) 2 since 2007 and a member of NCRP since 2010.
She has served on Scientific Committees 1-19, 2-4, 2-5, 2-7, and
6-9. Ms. Pryor is currently on the NCRP Board of Directors and is
Scientific Vice President of PAC 2. She received her BS in Biology
in 1979 and MS in Radiological Sciences in 1981, both from the
University of Washington.
Ms. Pryor was the Chief Health Physicist at the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL) in Richland, Washington, until 2018
and provided management and technical support to the PNNL
Radiation Protection Division. She also served as the Chief Radio-
logical Engineer for the design of the Pit Disassembly and Conver-
sion Project. Ms. Pryor previously held Radiation Protection
technical support positions at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station and the Trojan Nuclear Plant, and was the Radiation
Safety Officer at the University of Southern California Health Sci-
ences Campus.
Ms. Pryor is a Fellow member of the Health Physics Society (HPS)
and served as President-Elect, President, and Past President from
2010 to 2013. She is certified in comprehensive practice by the
American Board of Health Physics (ABHP), and has served on the
ABHP both as a member and Chair from 1998 to 2002. Ms. Pryor
was awarded the William McAdams Outstanding Service Award
by ABHP in 2007 and the John P. Corley Meritorious Service
Award by the Columbia Chapter of HPS in 2003.
Edgar D. Bailey is an Independent Health Physics Consultant,

specializing in radiation and nuclear safety and security. He has
more than 40 y of radiation safety experience, including 17 y as the
Branch Chief of the California Radiologic Health Branch. In this
position Mr. Bailey was responsible for the management of the
State of California's radiation protection program, including the
Agreement State Program for the licensing, inspection and
enforcement of the California laws and regulations for the posses-
sion, use and disposal of radioactive materials. He also had Cali-
fornia regulatory responsibility for the registration, inspection and
enforcement programs for x-ray machines and accelerators and the
testing and state certification programs for doctors and technolo-
gists supervising and using these machines and for nuclear medi-
cine technologists.
Prior to his work with the California Radiologic Health Branch,
Mr. Bailey worked for 19 y for the Texas Bureau of Radiation
Control, where he held positions as the Director of the Division of
Licensing, Registration, and Standards, as the Director of Inspec-
tions and Enforcement, and as a Radioactive Materials License
Reviewer.
95
96 / SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
Mr. Bailey earned an MS in Environmental Health Engineering

and a BES (Nuclear Power Option) both from the University of
Texas.
Christine A. Donahue was elected to NCRP in 2009 and has

served on the Scientific Committees 1-18 and 1-19. She is certified
in comprehensive practice by the American Board of Health Phys-
ics (ABHP), and has served on the ABHP exam development panel
and as Chairperson of the Professional Development Committee.
Ms. Donahue received a BS in Biophysics from University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley in 1981, Nuclear Engineering MS program at Uni-
versity of Virginia, Charlottesville in 1982, and MS in Radiological
Engineering from California State University, San Jose in 1987.
Ms. Donahue is currently Director of Radiological Safety Programs
at CB&I managing radiological controls and program development
in support of environmental remediation efforts including Navy
Base Realignment and Closure activities. Ms. Donahue was the
Operational Health Physics Manager and Radiological Control
Manager at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory in California from 1994 to 2008
responsible for site-wide radiological protection activities. She has
served as a DOE lead auditor for nuclear facility readiness reviews
and provided technical support to radiological safety programs at
Argonne National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site.
Prior to work with DOE national laboratories, she was a senior
Health Physicist at Stanford University and served as the Radia-
tion Safety Officer at the Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospi-
tal from 1987 to 1991. Ms. Donahue began her career in 1982 as a
nuclear engineer with Bechtel National, Inc. in San Francisco and
Pacific Gas & Electric where she provided health physics support
during the first outage at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power.
John R. Frazier is an independent, health physics consultant

with over 40 y of professional experience in a wide range of radia-
tion protection areas. His areas of expertise include external and
internal radiation dosimetry, environmental dose assessment,
radiation risk assessment, radiation spectroscopy, health physics
training, radiation detection and measurement, environmental
assessment of technologically enhanced naturally occurring radio-
active material and radiological site characterization. Dr. Frazier
earned a BA in Physics from Berea College, an MS in Physics from
the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, and a PhD in Physics
(with health physics emphasis) from the University of Tennessee
in Knoxville. His dissertation research was performed at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory in the study of interactions of
low-energy electrons with large molecules. He completed Compre-
hensive Certification in health physics from the American Board of
Health Physics in 1981 and has been recertified through 2021.
Dr. Frazier is a past-president of the American Academy of Health
Physics and a fellow and past-president of the Health Physics Soci-
ety. He is a Distinguished Emeritus member of NCRP after serving
two terms as a member of Council. He has served on Scientific
Committees 46 and 2-1 and on Program Area Committee 2 for the
past 12 y. Dr. Frazier received the 1988 Elda E. Anderson Award of
the Health Physics Society, presented the 2007 John C. Villforth
Lecture to the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors,
and received the 2016 Joyce P. Davis Memorial Award of the
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE / 97
American Academy of Health Physics. He has served as an advisor

to numerous federal agencies on a wide range of health physics and
radiation protection topics from operational health physics pro-
gram design to environmental radiation dose and risk assess-
ments. Dr. Frazier has also served as a consultant to private
companies and individuals on numerous health physics issues.
Eric M. Goldin is radiation safety specialist with 35 y of experi-

ence in power reactor health physics. He earned a BS in Nuclear
Engineering from The University of Arizona and an MS in
Nuclear Engineering/Health Physics from Texas A&M University.
He completed a PhD in Biomedical Sciences at the University of
Texas Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, Houston. Dr. Gol-
din has been a member of NCRP Program Area Committee 2 since
2004, participating in report writing for Scientific Committees
46-17, 2-4, 2-5, and 2-7. He is an active member of the Health
Physics Society (HPS), served on the Board of Directors, several
committees and sections, and on the American Board of Health
Physics (ABHP). Dr. Goldin has been certified by the ABHP since
1984 and was awarded HPS Fellow status in 2012.
Dr. Goldin's radiological engineering experience includes ALARA
(as low as reasonably achievable) programs, instrumentation,
radioactive waste management, emergency planning, dosimetry,
decommissioning, licensing, effluents, and environmental monitor-
ing. In addition, he taught graduate/upper division level courses in
radiation biology, radiological assessment, and power reactor
health physics at San Diego State University for over 20 y and
assisted in the development and implementation of a Radiation
Protection Technician training program at MiraCosta College.
Dr. Goldin retired from Southern California Edison in 2012 and
currently provides technical support and decommissioning plan-
ning to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
Barbara L. Hamrick is the Radiation Safety Officer at the Uni-

versity of California (UC), Irvine Health. Prior to joining the UC
Irvine Health team, Ms. Hamrick spent nearly 20 y as a health
physicist in regulatory agencies, including the U.S. Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, Los Angeles County Radiation Management,
and the California Department of Public Health.
Ms. Hamrick currently serves on the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's Radiation Advisory Committee, which advises the
Scientific Advisory Board on matters of radiation protection, radia-
tion science, and radiation science applications. She is currently
serving on the National Academies of Sciences committee provid-
ing an independent assessment of science and technology for the
U.S. Department of Energy's Defense Environmental Cleanup Pro-
gram. She previously served as Chair of the Organization of Agree-
ment States (2005 to 2006), as President of the Health Physics
Society (2014 to 2015), and as a committee member of the National
Academies of Sciences Committee on Lessons Learned from
Fukushima (2012 to 2016).
Ms. Hamrick received a BS and MS in physics from UC Irvine, in
1985 and 1987, respectively. She earned a law degree in 1999
from Loyola Law School in Los Angeles and is an active member of
the California State Bar. In 2002, Ms. Hamrick was certified by the
American Board of Health Physics.
Michael Littleton is currently working as a consultant in radia-

tion protection. Formerly, he was the Director of quality control,
industrial safety, and radiological control at a U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) facility. He has over 30 y of experience in applied
radiation protection, radiological engineering, quality assurance,
and safety at radiological facilities such as naval reactors, power
reactors, and DOE facilities. Mr. Littleton is a certified health
physicist from the American Board of Health Physics and a certi-
fied quality auditor from the American Society for Quality. He has
a BS in physics and an MS in applied nuclear science both from
the Georgia Institute of Technology. Mr. Littleton is an active ama-
teur astronomer fostering the wonders in the night sky in mem-
bers of the public especially the young.
David S. Myers received a BS in physics from Ripon College

and an MPH in health physics from the University of Michigan
under an AEC Fellowship. He was a health physicist at the Law-
rence Livermore National Laboratory from 1965 to 2000 where he
held various positions including Health Physics Group Leader and
Radiation Safety Division Leader. Mr. Myers is a member and Fel-
low of the Health Physics Society and certified by the American
Board of Health Physics. He has served on the American Board
of Health Physics and as a director of the American Academy of
Health Physics. David Myers served on the Council from 1996 to
2013 and has served on NCRP SC 46 (now PAC 2) on operational
health physics since 1988. He served as chairman of PAC 2 from
2006 to 2013. He and his wife, Linda, reside in Livermore, Califor-
nia and have a daughter Anne and a son Steve.
John W. Poston, Sr. is a Professor in the Department of Nuclear

Engineering and Associate Director of the Nuclear Power Insti-
tute. He has been at Texas A&M University since 1985 and served
for 10 y as the Department Head. Prior to coming to Texas A&M,
he was on the faculty at the Georgia Institute of Technology and,
earlier, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Babcock
and Wilcox Company in Lynchburg, Virginia. He is a Fellow of the
American Nuclear Society, the Health Physics Society, the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Distin-
guished Emeritus Member of NCRP.
Debra M. Scroggs is retired after 30 y working at the Depart-

ment of Health, Olympia, Washington. For many years before
retirement, she was manager of Environmental Radiation and
Assessment. She received a BS in Physics and an MS in Radiologi-
cal Sciences from the University of Washington. She is certified
by the American Board of Health Physics. Her interests include
policy and government relations and homeland security. She is a
member and past chair of the Conference of Radiation Control Pro-
gram Directors and received their James Miller Award. She is also
a member of the Health Physics Society serving on the Board of
Directors for 3 y ending July 2018.
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE / 99
Kathleen L. Shingleton is retired from Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory where she was employed for more than 38 y
in a variety of positions in the Radiation Safety Program. Through-
out her career she was involved with the Health Physics Society
(HPS), serving as Treasurer, a Director, and Committee Chair; the
American Academy of Health Physics, serving as the President
and Secretary; the American Board of Health Physics, serving on
both the Part I and Part II exam panels; and the Northern Califor-
nia Chapter of the HPS where she held numerous positions. In
2007 she was selected as a Fellow of the Health Physics Society.
In 2017 she became a member of the National Council on Radia-
tion Protection and Measurements and currently serves on the
Finance Committee and Program Area Committee 2. She has a BS
degree from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, a
Master's Degree in Health Physics from San Jose State University,
and is comprehensively certified by the American Board of Health
Physics.
Glenn M. Sturchio is the Radiation Safety Officer for the Mayo

Clinic facilities in Jacksonville, Florida and Rochester, Minnesota
supporting the use of radiation sources in the clinical, research
and education areas. In addition, he is an Assistant Professor of
Physiology in the Mayo College of Medicine; his teaching duties
include two courses in the Graduate School and a course in the
School of Health Sciences. Dr. Sturchio is the Section Manager,
Medical and Operational Health Physics on the ANSI N13 commit-
tee that develops American National Standards Institute / Health
Physics Society standards. Dr. Sturchio received his PhD from the
School of Public Health at the University of Minnesota and is certi-
fied in the comprehensive practice of health physics by the Ameri-
can Board of Health Physics.
Joshua Walkowicz has a BS in Nuclear Engineering from the

University of Illinois and a Masters in Health Physics from Texas
A&M University.
He worked at Purdue University as a Health Physicist and transi-
tioned to Engelhardt and Associates, specializing in industrial
radiation safety since 1998. He is a certified Health Physicist and
has been a member of NCRP PAC 2 since 2008.
James S. Willison is a Consulting Engineer for AECOM N&E

Technical Services in Aiken, South Carolina. He has over 30 y of
experience in a broad range of staff and management assignments
supporting the safe use of radiation and radioactive material. He
has provided health physics and radiological engineering support
to projects around the world, and has worked on projects for the
U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, among others.
He also served on the radiological engineering staff at the Trojan
Nuclear Plant for 10 y.
Mr. Willison is a Registered Professional Engineer (Oregon, Ten-
nessee) and is certified in comprehensive practice by the American
Board of Health Physics (ABHP), and served on the ABHP both as
a member and Chair from 2002 to 2006. He has served a total of
12 y on both the Part 1 and Part 2 Panel of Examiners for the
ABHP and was the Part 2 Panel Chair in 1999. Mr. Willison was
awarded the William McAdams Outstanding Service Award by
ABHP in 2008 and the National Service Award by the American
Academy of Health Physics in 2015. He is the current chair of the
History Committee for the Health Physics Society (HPS) and was
named a Fellow of the HPS in 2018.
Mr. Willison earned both a BS and MS in Nuclear Engineering
from Oregon State University, receiving one of the inaugural fel-
lowships from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
James G. Yusko received a BS in Physics from Carnegie Mellon

University and an MSc from the University of Pittsburgh. He is a
Certified Health Physicist and a diplomate of the American Board
of Radiology. He is now a consultant, having served most of his
40 y of professional practice with the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, where he was Regional Manager of Radiation Protection,
managing and running the program that included inspection and
enforcement over facilities with radiation-generating machines
and radioactive materials. His position also involved emergency
planning and response, indoor radon, environmental monitoring,
accident and incident investigation, and response to orphan radio-
active materials and sources. He is a Fellow of the Health Physics
Society (HPS), and has served on various HPS committees, as
well as having held various offices of the Western Pennsylvania
Chapter, HPS.
The NCRP
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements is a non-

profit corporation chartered by Congress in 1964 to:
1. Collect, analyze, develop and disseminate in the public interest infor-

mation and recommendations about (a) protection against radiation and
(b) radiation measurements, quantities and units, particularly those con-
cerned with radiation protection.
2. Provide a means by which organizations concerned with the scientific
and related aspects of radiation protection and of radiation quantities,
units and measurements may cooperate for effective utilization of their
combined resources, and to stimulate the work of such organizations.
3. Develop basic concepts about radiation quantities, units and measure-
ments, about the application of these concepts, and about radiation
protection.
4. Cooperate with the International Commission on Radiological Protec-
tion, the International Commission on Radiation Units and Measure-
ments, and other national and international organizations, governmen-
tal and private, concerned with radiation quantities, units and measure-
ments and with radiation protection.
The Council is the successor to the unincorporated association of scientists

known as the National Committee on Radiation Protection and Measurements
and was formed to carry on the work begun by the Committee in 1929.
The participants in the Council’s work are the Council members and mem-
bers of scientific and administrative committees. Council members are selected
solely on the basis of their scientific expertise and serve as individuals, not as
representatives of any particular organization. The scientific committees, com-
posed of experts having detailed knowledge and competence in the particular
area of the committee’s interest, draft proposed recommendations. These are
then submitted to the full membership of the Council for careful review and
approval before being published.
The following comprise the current officers and membership of the Council:
Officers
President John D. Boice, Jr.

Senior Vice President Jerrold T. Bushberg
Secretary and Treasurer Kathryn D. Held
101
102 / THE NCRP
Members
Sally A. Amundson Eric M. Goldin Christopher N. Passmore
Armin Ansari Helen A. Grogan David J. Pawel
A. Iulian Apostoaei Willie Harris Leticia Pibida
Kimberly E. Applegate Kathryn D. Held Kathryn H. Pryor
Edouard I. Azzam Kathryn A. Higley Mark J. Rivard
Judith L. Bader Roger W. Howell Adela Salame-Alfie
Stephen Balter Janice L. Huff Ehsan Samei
Daniel J. Barnett Randall N. Hyer Debra M. Scroggs
Jonine L. Bernstein William E. Irwin J. Anthony Seibert
William F. Blakely Thomas E. Johnson George Sgouros
Daniel J. Blumenthal Cynthia G. Jones Kathleen L. Shingleton
John D. Boice, Jr. Timothy J. Jorgensen Igor Shuryak
Wesley E. Bolch William E. Kennedy, Jr. Steven L. Simon
Michael Boyd Katherine A. Kiel David C. Spelic
Richard R. Brey Gladys A. Klemic Michael D. Story
James A. Brink Linda A. Kroger Daniel O. Stram
Brooke R. Buddemeier Amy Kronenberg Glenn M. Sturchio
Jerrold T. Bushberg John J. Lanza Steven G. Sutlief
Polly Y. Chang Edwin M. Leidholdt, Jr. Tammy P. Taylor
C. Norman Coleman Jill A. Lipoti Julie K. Timins
Donald A. Cool Mark P. Little Michael M. Weil
Michael L. Corradini Paul A. Locke Jeffrey J. Whicker
Francis A. Cucinotta Alan G. Lurie Chris G. Whipple
Lawrence T. Dauer Mahadevappa Mahesh Robert C. Whitcomb, Jr.
Scott Davis Donald M. Mayer Jessica S. Wieder
Sara D. DeCair Ruth E. McBurney Jacqueline P. Williams
Christine A. Donahue Donald L. Miller John P. Winston
Joseph R. Dynlacht Stephen V. Musolino Gayle E. Woloschak
Cynthia Flannery Bruce A. Napier X. George Xu
Patricia A. Fleming Wayne D. Newhauser R. Craig Yoder
Donald P. Frush Michael A. Noska Pat B. Zanzonico
Ronald E. Goans Harald Paganetti Cary Zeitlin
Distinguished Emeritus Members

Thomas S. Tenforde, President Emeritus
S. James Adelstein, Vice President Emeritus
Kenneth R. Kase, Vice President Emeritus
W. Roger Ney, Executive Director Emeritus
David A. Schauer, Executive Director Emeritus
THE NCRP / 103
John F. Ahearne John R. Frazier Carl J. Paperiello

Lynn R. Anspaugh Thomas F. Gesell John W. Poston, Sr.
Benjamin R. Archer Ethel S. Gilbert Andrew K. Poznanski
John A. Auxier Joel E. Gray R. Julian Preston
Harold L. Beck Raymond A. Guilmette Jerome S. Puskin
Joel S. Bedford Eric J. Hall Genevieve S. Roessler
Eleanor A. Blakely Naomi H. Harley Marvin Rosenstein
Bruce B. Boecker William R. Hendee Lawrence N. Rothenberg
Thomas B. Borak F. Owen Hoffman Henry D. Royal
Andre Bouville Bernd Kahn Michael T. Ryan
Leslie A. Braby Ann R. Kennedy Stephen M. Seltzer
Robert L. Brent David C. Kocher Roy E. Shore
Antone L. Brooks Ritsuko Komaki Paul Slovic
S.Y. Chen Susan M. Langhorst Daniel J. Strom
J. Donald Cossairt Martha S. Linet John E. Till
Allen G. Croff John B. Little Richard E. Toohey
Paul M. DeLuca Roger O. McClellan Lawrence W. Townsend
Sarah S. Donaldson Barbara J. McNeil Robert L. Ullrich
William P. Dornsife Fred A. Mettler, Jr. Richard J. Vetter
Keith F. Eckerman Charles W. Miller F. Ward Whicker
Thomas S. Ely Kenneth L. Miller Susan D. Wiltshire
Stephen A. Feig A. Alan Moghissi Marvin C. Ziskin
David S. Myers
Lauriston S. Taylor Lectures

Hans-Georg Menzel (2018) Radiation Dosimetry Research for Medicine and
Protection: A European Journey
F. Ward Whicker (2017) Environmental Radiation and Life: A Broad View
John W. Poston, Sr. (2016) Radiation Protection and Regulatory Science
Keith F. Eckerman (2015) Dosimetry of Internal Emitters: Contributions of
Radiation Protection Bodies and Radiological Events
Fred A. Mettler, Jr. (2014) On the Shoulders of Giants: Radiation Protection
Over 50 Years
John E. Till (2013) When Does Risk Assessment Get Fuzzy?
Antone L. Brooks (2012) From the Field to the Laboratory and Back: The “What
Ifs,” “Wows,” and “Who Cares” of Radiation Biology
Eleanor A. Blakely (2011) What Makes Particle Radiation so Effective?
Charles E. Land (2010) Radiation Protection and Public Policy in an Uncertain
World
John D. Boice, Jr. (2009) Radiation Epidemiology: The Golden Age and Remain-
ing Challenges
Dade W. Moeller (2008) Radiation Standards, Dose/Risk Assessments, Public
Interactions, and Yucca Mountain: Thinking Outside the Box
Patricia W. Durbin (2007) The Quest for Therapeutic Actinide Chelators
Robert L. Brent (2006) Fifty Years of Scientific Research: The Importance of
Scholarship and the Influence of Politics and Controversy
104 / THE NCRP
John B. Little (2005) Nontargeted Effects of Radiation: Implications for

Low-Dose Exposures
Abel J. Gonzalez (2004) Radiation Protection in the Aftermath of a Terrorist
Attack Involving Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
Charles B. Meinhold (2003) The Evolution of Radiation Protection: From Ery-
thema to Genetic Risks to Risks of Cancer to ?
R. Julian Preston (2002) Developing Mechanistic Data for Incorporation into
Cancer Risk Assessment: Old Problems and New Approaches
Wesley L. Nyborg (2001) Assuring the Safety of Medical Diagnostic Ultrasound
S. James Adelstein (2000) Administered Radioactivity: Unde Venimus Quoque
Imus
Naomi H. Harley (1999) Back to Background
Eric J. Hall (1998) From Chimney Sweeps to Astronauts: Cancer Risks in the
Workplace
William J. Bair (1997) Radionuclides in the Body: Meeting the Challenge!
Seymour Abrahamson (1996) 70 Years of Radiation Genetics: Fruit Flies, Mice
and Humans
Albrecht Kellerer (1995) Certainty and Uncertainty in Radiation Protection
R.J. Michael Fry (1994) Mice, Myths and Men
Warren K. Sinclair (1993) Science, Radiation Protection and the NCRP
Edward W. Webster (1992) Dose and Risk in Diagnostic Radiology: How Big?
How Little?
Victor P. Bond (1991) When is a Dose Not a Dose?
J. Newell Stannard (1990) Radiation Protection and the Internal Emitter Saga
Arthur C. Upton (1989) Radiobiology and Radiation Protection: The Past Cen-
tury and Prospects for the Future
Bo Lindell (1988) How Safe is Safe Enough?
Seymour Jablon (1987) How to be Quantitative about Radiation Risk Estimates
Herman P. Schwan (1986) Biological Effects of Non-ionizing Radiations: Cellu-
lar Properties and Interactions
John H. Harley (1985) Truth (and Beauty) in Radiation Measurement
Harald H. Rossi (1984) Limitation and Assessment in Radiation Protection
Merril Eisenbud (1983) The Human Environment—Past, Present and Future
Eugene L. Saenger (1982) Ethics, Trade-Offs and Medical Radiation
James F. Crow (1981) How Well Can We Assess Genetic Risk? Not Very
Harold O. Wyckoff (1980) From “Quantity of Radiation” and “Dose” to “Expo-
sure” and “Absorbed Dose”—An Historical Review
Hymer L. Friedell (1979) Radiation Protection—Concepts and Trade Offs
Sir Edward Pochin (1978) Why be Quantitative about Radiation Risk
Estimates?
Herbert M. Parker (1977) The Squares of the Natural Numbers in Radiation
Protection
Warren K. Sinclair Keynote Addresses

Marvin Rosenstein (2018) Justified and Commensurate
Jack Herrmann (2017) Aren’t We Ready Yet? Closing the Planning, Response and
Recovery Gaps for Radiological Terrorism
Richard E. Toohey (2016) WARP: Where are the Radiation Professionals?
THE NCRP / 105
Kenneth R. Kase (2015) Influence of the NCRP on Radiation Protection in the

United States: Guidance and Regulation
Jerrold T. Bushberg (2014) Science, Radiation Protection, and the NCRP: Build-
ing on the Past, Looking to the Future
Shunichi Yamashita (2013) Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident and Com-
prehensive Health Risk Management
Fred A. Mettler, Jr. (2012) Childhood Exposure: An Issue from Computed
Tomography Scans to Fukushima
Marco Durante (2011) Heavy Ions in Therapy and Space: Benefits and Risks
Vincent T. Covello (2010) Effective Risk Communication Before, During
and After a Radiological Emergency: Challenges, Guidelines, Strategies and
Tools
Peter B. Lyons (2009) The Role of a Strong Regulator in Safe and Secure Nuclear
Energy
Dudley T. Goodhead (2008) Issues in Quantifying the Effects of Low-Level
Radiation
James A. Brink (2007) Use and Misuse of Radiation in Medicine
Mikhail Balonov (2006) Retrospective Analysis of Impacts of the Chernobyl
Accident
B. John Garrick (2005) Contemporary Issues in Risk-Informed Decision Making
on Waste Disposition
John W. Poston, Sr. (2004) Current Challenges in Countering Radiological
Terrorism
Thomas S. Tenforde Topical Lectures

Roy E. Shore (2018) Do the Epidemiologic Data Support Use of the Linear-Non-
threshold Model for Radiation Protection?
Jacques Lochard (2015) Ethics and Radiation Protection
Currently, the following committees are actively engaged in formulating

recommendations:
CC 2 Meeting the Needs of the Nation for Radiation Protection

Program Area Committee 1: Basic Criteria, Epidemiology,
Radiobiology, and Risk
SC 1-24 Phase 2 Radiation Exposures in Space and the Potential for
Central Nervous System Effects
SC 1-26 Approaches for Integrating Radiation Biology and Epidemiology
for Enhancing Low Dose Risk Assessment
Program Area Committee 2: Operational Radiation Safety
SC 2-8 Operational Radiation Safety Program — Revision to Report
No. 127 (1998)
Program Area Committee 3: Nuclear and Radiological Security
and Safety
SC 3-1 Phase 2 Implementation of Guidance for Emergency Responder
Dosimetry
Program Area Committee 4: Radiation Protection in Medicine
SC 4-5 Radiation Protection in Dentistry Supplement: Cone Beam
Computed Tomography, Digital Imaging and Handheld Dental Imaging
106 / THE NCRP
SC 4-7 Evaluating and Communicating Radiation Risks for Studies

Involving Human Subjects: Guidance for Researchers and Reviewing
Bodies
SC 4-8 Improving Patient Dose Utilization in Computed Tomography
SC 4-9 Medical Exposure of Patients in the United States
SC 4-10 Error Prevention in Radiation Therapy
SC 4-11 Gonadal Shielding During Abdominal and Pelvic Radiography
Program Area Committee 5: Environmental Radiation and
Radioactive Waste Issues
SC 5-2 Radiation Protection for Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials
(NORM) and Technologically Enhanced NORM (TENORM) from Oil and
Gas Recovery
Program Area Committee 6: Radiation Measurements and
Dosimetry
SC 6-11 Dosimetry Guidance for Medical Radiation Workers with a Focus
on Lung Dose Reconstruction
SC 6-12 Development of Models for Brain Dosimetry for Internally
Deposited Radionuclides
Program Area Committee 7: Radiation Education, Risk
Communication, and Outreach
In recognition of its responsibility to facilitate and stimulate cooperation

among organizations concerned with the scientific and related aspects of radia-
tion protection and measurement, the Council has created a category of
NCRP Collaborating Organizations. Organizations or groups of organizations
that are national or international in scope and are concerned with scientific
problems involving radiation quantities, units, measurements and effects, or
radiation protection may be admitted to collaborating status by the Council.
Collaborating Organizations provide a means by which NCRP can gain input
into its activities from a wider segment of society. At the same time, the relation-
ships with the Collaborating Organizations facilitate wider dissemination of
information about the Council’s activities, interests and concerns. Collaborating
Organizations have the opportunity to comment on draft reports (at the time
that these are submitted to the members of the Council). This is intended to cap-
italize on the fact that Collaborating Organizations are in an excellent position
to both contribute to the identification of what needs to be treated in NCRP
reports and to identify problems that might result from proposed recommenda-
tions. The present Collaborating Organizations with which NCRP maintains
liaison are as follows:
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

American Academy of Dermatology
American Academy of Environmental Engineers
American Academy of Health Physics
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
American Association of Physicists in Medicine
American Brachytherapy Society
American College of Cardiology
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
American College of Radiology
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
American Dental Association
THE NCRP / 107
American Industrial Hygiene Association

American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine
American Medical Association
American Nuclear Society
American Pharmacists Association
American Podiatric Medical Association
American Public Health Association
American Radium Society
American Roentgen Ray Society
American Society for Radiation Oncology
American Society of Emergency Radiology
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists
American Society of Nuclear Cardiology
American Society of Radiologic Technologists
American Thyroid Association
Association of Educators in Imaging and Radiological Sciences
Association of University Radiologists
Bioelectromagnetics Society
College of American Pathologists
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, Inc.
Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Electric Power Research Institute
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Genetics Society of America
Health Physics Society
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
International Society of Exposure Science
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Association of Environmental Professionals
National Center for Environmental Health/Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Nuclear Energy Institute
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Product Stewardship Institute
Radiation Research Society
Radiological Society of North America
Society for Cardiovascular Angiography and Interventions
Society for Pediatric Radiology
Society for Risk Analysis
Society of Cardiovascular Computed Tomography
Society of Chairs of Academic Radiology Departments
Society of Interventional Radiology
108 / THE NCRP
Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging

Society of Radiologists in Ultrasound
Society of Skeletal Radiology
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
U.S. Department of Labor
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Navy
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Public Health Service
Utility Workers Union of America
NCRP has found its relationships with these organizations to be extremely

valuable to continued progress in its program.
Another aspect of the cooperative efforts of NCRP relates to the Special
Liaison relationships established with various governmental organizations
that have an interest in radiation protection and measurements. This liaison
relationship provides: (1) an opportunity for participating organizations to des-
ignate an individual to provide liaison between the organization and NCRP;
(2) that the individual designated will receive copies of draft NCRP reports
(at the time that these are submitted to the members of the Council) with an
invitation to comment, but not vote; and (3) that new NCRP efforts might be
discussed with liaison individuals as appropriate, so that they might have an
opportunity to make suggestions on new studies and related matters. The fol-
lowing organizations participate in the Special Liaison Program:
Australian Radiation Laboratory

Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz (Germany)
Canadian Association of Medical Radiation Technologists
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection (Poland)
China Institute for Radiation Protection
Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (France)
Commonwealth Scientific Instrumentation Research Organization
(Australia)
European Commission
Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities
Health Council of the Netherlands
International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection
International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements
International Commission on Radiological Protection
International Radiation Protection Association
Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission
Japan Radiation Council
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
Public Health England
THE NCRP / 109
Russian Scientific Commission on Radiation Protection

South African Forum for Radiation Protection
World Association of Nuclear Operators
World Health Organization, Radiation and Environmental Health
NCRP values highly the participation of these organizations in the Special

Liaison Program.
The Council also benefits significantly from the relationships established
pursuant to the Corporate Sponsor’s Program. The program facilitates the
interchange of information and ideas and corporate sponsors provide valuable
fiscal support for the Council’s program. This developing program currently
includes the following Corporate Sponsors:
Landauer, Inc.
The Council’s activities have been made possible by the voluntary contribu-
tion of time and effort by its members and participants and the generous
support of the following organizations:
3M
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Agfa Corporation
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Alliance of American Insurers
American Academy of Dermatology
American Academy of Health Physics
American Academy of Oral and Maxillofacial Radiology
American Association of Physicists in Medicine
American Cancer Society
American College of Medical Physics
American College of Nuclear Physicians
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
American College of Radiology
American College of Radiology Foundation
American Dental Association
American Healthcare Radiology Administrators
American Industrial Hygiene Association
American Insurance Services Group
American Medical Association
American Nuclear Society
American Osteopathic College of Radiology
American Podiatric Medical Association
American Public Health Association
American Radium Society
American Roentgen Ray Society
American Society for Radiation Oncology
American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology
American Society of Radiologic Technologists
American Veterinary Medical Association
American Veterinary Radiology Society
110 / THE NCRP
Association of Educators in Radiological Sciences, Inc.

Association of University Radiologists
Battelle Memorial Institute
Canberra Industries, Inc.
Chem Nuclear Systems
Center for Devices and Radiological Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
College of American Pathologists
Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination
Commonwealth Edison
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Consolidated Edison
Consumers Power Company
Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals
Defense Nuclear Agency
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Duke Energy Corporation
Eastman Kodak Company
Edison Electric Institute
Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr. Foundation
EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Electric Power Research Institute
Electromagnetic Energy Association
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Florida Institute of Phosphate Research
Florida Power Corporation
Fuji Medical Systems, U.S.A., Inc.
GE Healthcare
Genetics Society of America
Global Dosimetry Solutions
Health Effects Research Foundation (Japan)
Health Physics Society
ICN Biomedicals, Inc.
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
James Picker Foundation
Landauer, Inc.
Lillian and Robert Brent Fund
Martin Marietta Corporation
Mirion Technologies (GDS), Inc.
Motorola Foundation
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Association of Photographic Manufacturers
National Cancer Institute
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
National Institute of Standards and Technology
New York Power Authority
Philips Medical Systems
Picker International
Public Service Electric and Gas Company
THE NCRP / 111
Radiation Research Society

Radiological Society of North America
Richard Lounsbery Foundation
Sandia National Laboratory
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc.
Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging
Society of Pediatric Radiology
Southern California Edison Company
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Labor
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Navy
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Victoreen, Inc.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Initial funds for publication of NCRP reports were provided by a grant from
the James Picker Foundation.
NCRP seeks to promulgate information and recommendations based on
leading scientific judgment on matters of radiation protection and measure-
ment and to foster cooperation among organizations concerned with these mat-
ters. These efforts are intended to serve the public interest and the Council
welcomes comments and suggestions on its reports or activities.
NCRP Publications
NCRP publications can be obtained online in both PDF and hardcopy for-
mats at http://NCRPonline.org. Professional societies can arrange for discounts
for their members by contacting NCRP. Additional information on NCRP pub-
lications may be obtained from the NCRP website (http://NCRPonline.org) or by
telephone (301-657-2652, ext. 1) and fax (301-907-8768). The mailing address
is:
NCRP Publications
7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 400
Bethesda, MD 20814-3095
Abstracts of NCRP reports published since 1980, abstracts of all NCRP com-
mentaries, and the text of all NCRP statements are available at the NCRP
website. Currently available publications are listed below.
NCRP Reports
No. Title
8 Control and Removal of Radioactive Contamination in Laboratories
(1951)
22 Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible
Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational
Exposure (1959) [includes Addendum 1 issued in August 1963]
25 Measurement of Absorbed Dose of Neutrons, and of Mixtures of
Neutrons and Gamma Rays (1961)
27 Stopping Powers for Use with Cavity Chambers (1961)
30 Safe Handling of Radioactive Materials (1964)
32 Radiation Protection in Educational Institutions (1966)
35 Dental X-Ray Protection (1970)
36 Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (1970)
37 Precautions in the Management of Patients Who Have Received
Therapeutic Amounts of Radionuclides (1970)
38 Protection Against Neutron Radiation (1971)
40 Protection Against Radiation from Brachytherapy Sources (1972)
41 Specification of Gamma-Ray Brachytherapy Sources (1974)
42 Radiological Factors Affecting Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack
(1974)
44 Krypton-85 in the Atmosphere—Accumulation, Biological
Significance, and Control Technology (1975)
46 Alpha-Emitting Particles in Lungs (1975)
47 Tritium Measurement Techniques (1976)
49 Structural Shielding Design and Evaluation for Medical Use of
X Rays and Gamma Rays of Energies Up to 10 MeV (1976)
112
NCRP PUBLICATIONS / 113
50 Environmental Radiation Measurements (1976)

52 Cesium-137 from the Environment to Man: Metabolism and Dose
(1977)
54 Medical Radiation Exposure of Pregnant and Potentially Pregnant
Women (1977)
55 Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of
Radioiodine (1977)
57 Instrumentation and Monitoring Methods for Radiation Protection
(1978)
58 A Handbook of Radioactivity Measurements Procedures, 2nd ed.
(1985)
60 Physical, Chemical, and Biological Properties of Radiocerium
Relevant to Radiation Protection Guidelines (1978)
61 Radiation Safety Training Criteria for Industrial Radiography (1978)
62 Tritium in the Environment (1979)
63 Tritium and Other Radionuclide Labeled Organic Compounds
Incorporated in Genetic Material (1979)
64 Influence of Dose and Its Distribution in Time on Dose-Response
Relationships for Low-LET Radiations (1980)
65 Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with
Radionuclides (1980)
67 Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields—Properties, Quantities and
Units, Biophysical Interaction, and Measurements (1981)
68 Radiation Protection in Pediatric Radiology (1981)
69 Dosimetry of X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Beams for Radiation Therapy in
the Energy Range 10 keV to 50 MeV (1981)
70 Nuclear Medicine—Factors Influencing the Choice and Use of
Radionuclides in Diagnosis and Therapy (1982)
72 Radiation Protection and Measurement for Low-Voltage Neutron
Generators (1983)
73 Protection in Nuclear Medicine and Ultrasound Diagnostic
Procedures in Children (1983)
74 Biological Effects of Ultrasound: Mechanisms and Clinical
Implications (1983)
75 Iodine-129: Evaluation of Releases from Nuclear Power Generation
(1983)
76 Radiological Assessment: Predicting the Transport, Bioaccumulation,
and Uptake by Man of Radionuclides Released to the Environment
(1984)
77 Exposures from the Uranium Series with Emphasis on Radon and Its
Daughters (1984)
78 Evaluation of Occupational and Environmental Exposures to Radon
and Radon Daughters in the United States (1984)
79 Neutron Contamination from Medical Electron Accelerators (1984)
80 Induction of Thyroid Cancer by Ionizing Radiation (1985)
81 Carbon-14 in the Environment (1985)
82 SI Units in Radiation Protection and Measurements (1985)
83 The Experimental Basis for Absorbed-Dose Calculations in Medical
Uses of Radionuclides (1985)
114 / NCRP PUBLICATIONS
84 General Concepts for the Dosimetry of Internally Deposited

Radionuclides (1985)
86 Biological Effects and Exposure Criteria for Radiofrequency
Electromagnetic Fields (1986)
87 Use of Bioassay Procedures for Assessment of Internal Radionuclide
Deposition (1987)
88 Radiation Alarms and Access Control Systems (1986)
89 Genetic Effects from Internally Deposited Radionuclides (1987)
90 Neptunium: Radiation Protection Guidelines (1988)
92 Public Radiation Exposure from Nuclear Power Generation in the
United States (1987)
93 Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States
(1987)
94 Exposure of the Population in the United States and Canada from
Natural Background Radiation (1987)
95 Radiation Exposure of the U.S. Population from Consumer Products
and Miscellaneous Sources (1987)
96 Comparative Carcinogenicity of Ionizing Radiation and Chemicals
(1989)
97 Measurement of Radon and Radon Daughters in Air (1988)
99 Quality Assurance for Diagnostic Imaging (1988)
100 Exposure of the U.S. Population from Diagnostic Medical Radiation
(1989)
101 Exposure of the U.S. Population from Occupational Radiation (1989)
102 Medical X-Ray, Electron Beam and Gamma-Ray Protection for
Energies Up to 50 MeV (Equipment Design, Performance and Use)
(1989)
103 Control of Radon in Houses (1989)
104 The Relative Biological Effectiveness of Radiations of Different
Quality (1990)
105 Radiation Protection for Medical and Allied Health Personnel (1989)
106 Limit for Exposure to “Hot Particles” on the Skin (1989)
107 Implementation of the Principle of As Low As Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA) for Medical and Dental Personnel (1990)
108 Conceptual Basis for Calculations of Absorbed-Dose Distributions
(1991)
109 Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Aquatic Organisms (1991)
110 Some Aspects of Strontium Radiobiology (1991)
111 Developing Radiation Emergency Plans for Academic, Medical or
Industrial Facilities (1991)
112 Calibration of Survey Instruments Used in Radiation Protection for
the Assessment of Ionizing Radiation Fields and Radioactive Surface
Contamination (1991)
113 Exposure Criteria for Medical Diagnostic Ultrasound: I. Criteria
Based on Thermal Mechanisms (1992)
114 Maintaining Radiation Protection Records (1992)
115 Risk Estimates for Radiation Protection (1993)
116 Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation (1993)
117 Research Needs for Radiation Protection (1993)
118 Radiation Protection in the Mineral Extraction Industry (1993)
119 A Practical Guide to the Determination of Human Exposure to

Radiofrequency Fields (1993)
120 Dose Control at Nuclear Power Plants (1994)
121 Principles and Application of Collective Dose in Radiation Protection
(1995)
122 Use of Personal Monitors to Estimate Effective Dose Equivalent and
Effective Dose to Workers for External Exposure to Low-LET
Radiation (1995)
123 Screening Models for Releases of Radionuclides to Atmosphere,
Surface Water, and Ground (1996)
124 Sources and Magnitude of Occupational and Public Exposures from
Nuclear Medicine Procedures (1996)
125 Deposition, Retention and Dosimetry of Inhaled Radioactive
Substances (1997)
126 Uncertainties in Fatal Cancer Risk Estimates Used in Radiation
Protection (1997)
127 Operational Radiation Safety Program (1998)
128 Radionuclide Exposure of the Embryo/Fetus (1998)
129 Recommended Screening Limits for Contaminated Surface Soil and
Review of Factors Relevant to Site-Specific Studies (1999)
130 Biological Effects and Exposure Limits for “Hot Particles” (1999)
131 Scientific Basis for Evaluating the Risks to Populations from Space
Applications of Plutonium (2001)
132 Radiation Protection Guidance for Activities in Low-Earth Orbit
(2000)
133 Radiation Protection for Procedures Performed Outside the Radiology
Department (2000)
134 Operational Radiation Safety Training (2000)
135 Liver Cancer Risk from Internally-Deposited Radionuclides (2001)
136 Evaluation of the Linear-Nonthreshold Dose-Response Model for
Ionizing Radiation (2001)
137 Fluence-Based and Microdosimetric Event-Based Methods for
Radiation Protection in Space (2001)
138 Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material (2001)
139 Risk-Based Classification of Radioactive and Hazardous Chemical
Wastes (2002)
140 Exposure Criteria for Medical Diagnostic Ultrasound: II. Criteria
Based on all Known Mechanisms (2002)
141 Managing Potentially Radioactive Scrap Metal (2002)
142 Operational Radiation Safety Program for Astronauts in Low-Earth
Orbit: A Basic Framework (2002)
143 Management Techniques for Laboratories and Other Small
Institutional Generators to Minimize Off-Site Disposal of Low-Level
Radioactive Waste (2003)
144 Radiation Protection for Particle Accelerator Facilities (2003)
145 Radiation Protection in Dentistry (2003)
146 Approaches to Risk Management in Remediation of Radioactively
Contaminated Sites (2004)
147 Structural Shielding Design for Medical X-Ray Imaging Facilities
(2004)
148 Radiation Protection in Veterinary Medicine (2004)

149 A Guide to Mammography and Other Breast Imaging Procedures
(2004)
150 Extrapolation of Radiation-Induced Cancer Risks from Nonhuman
Experimental Systems to Humans (2005)
151 Structural Shielding Design and Evaluation for Megavoltage X- and
Gamma-Ray Radiotherapy Facilities (2005)
152 Performance Assessment of Near-Surface Facilities for Disposal of
Low-Level Radioactive Waste (2005)
153 Information Needed to Make Radiation Protection Recommendations
for Space Missions Beyond Low-Earth Orbit (2006)
154 Cesium-137 in the Environment: Radioecology and Approaches to
Assessment and Management (2006)
155 Management of Radionuclide Therapy Patients (2006)
156 Development of a Biokinetic Model for Radionuclide-Contaminated
Wounds and Procedures for Their Assessment, Dosimetry and
Treatment (2006)
157 Radiation Protection in Educational Institutions (2007)
158 Uncertainties in the Measurement and Dosimetry of External
Radiation (2007)
159 Risk to the Thyroid from Ionizing Radiation (2008)
160 Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States
(2009)
161 Management of Persons Contaminated with Radionuclides (2008)
162 Self Assessment of Radiation-Safety Programs (2009)
163 Radiation Dose Reconstruction: Principles and Practices (2009)
164 Uncertainties in Internal Radiation Dose Assessment (2009)
165 Responding to a Radiological or Nuclear Terrorism Incident: A Guide
for Decision Makers (2010)
167 Potential Impact of Individual Genetic Susceptibility and Previous
Radiation Exposure on Radiation Risk for Astronauts (2010)
168 Radiation Dose Management for Fluoroscopically-Guided
Interventional Medical Procedures (2010)
169 Design of Effective Radiological Effluent Monitoring and
Environmental Surveillance Programs (2010)
170 Second Primary Cancers and Cardiovascular Disease After Radiation
Therapy (2011)
171 Uncertainties in the Estimation of Radiation Risks and Probability of
Disease Causation (2012)
172 Reference Levels and Achievable Doses in Medical and Dental
Imaging: Recommendations for the United States (2012)
173 Investigation of Radiological Incidents (2012)
174 Preconception and Prenatal Radiation Exposure: Health Effects and
Protective Guidance (2013)
175 Decision Making for Late-Phase Recovery from Major Nuclear or
Radiological Incidents (2014)
176 Radiation Safety Aspects of Nanotechnology (2017)
178 Deriving Organ Doses and Their Uncertainty for Epidemiologic
Studies (with a focus on the One Million U.S. Workers and Veterans
Study of Low-Dose Radiation Health Effects) (2018)
179 Guidance for Emergency Response Dosimetry (2017)

180 Management of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation: Radiation Protection
Guidance for the United States (2018) (2018)
181 Evaluation of the Relative Effectiveness of Low-Energy Photons and
Electrons in Inducing Cancer in Humans (2018)
182 Radiation Safety of Sealed Radioactive Sources (2019)
The following bound sets of NCRP reports are available:
Volume I. NCRP Reports Nos. 8, 22
Volume II. NCRP Reports Nos. 23, 25, 27, 30
Volume III. NCRP Reports Nos. 32, 35, 36, 37
Volume IV. NCRP Reports Nos. 38, 40, 41
Volume V. NCRP Reports Nos. 42, 44, 46
Volume VI. NCRP Reports Nos. 47, 49, 50, 51
Volume VII. NCRP Reports Nos. 52, 53, 54, 55, 57
Volume VIII. NCRP Report No. 58
Volume IX. NCRP Reports Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62, 63
Volume X. NCRP Reports Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67
Volume XI. NCRP Reports Nos. 68, 69, 70, 71, 72
Volume XII. NCRP Reports Nos. 73, 74, 75, 76
Volume XIV. NCRP Reports Nos. 81, 82, 83, 84, 85
Volume XV. NCRP Reports Nos. 86, 87, 88, 89
Volume XVI. NCRP Reports Nos. 90, 91, 92, 93
Volume XVII. NCRP Reports Nos. 94, 95, 96, 97
Volume XVIII. NCRP Reports Nos. 98, 99, 100
Volume XIX. NCRP Reports Nos. 101, 102, 103, 104
Volume XX. NCRP Reports Nos. 105, 106, 107, 108
Volume XXI. NCRP Reports Nos. 109, 110, 111
Volume XXII. NCRP Reports Nos. 112, 113, 114
Volume XXIII. NCRP Reports Nos. 115, 116, 117, 118
Volume XXIV. NCRP Reports Nos. 119, 120, 121, 122
Volume XXV. NCRP Report No. 123I and 123II
Volume XXVI. NCRP Reports Nos. 124, 125, 126, 127
Volume XXVII. NCRP Reports Nos. 128, 129, 130
Volume XXVIII. NCRP Reports Nos. 131, 132, 133
Volume XXIX. NCRP Reports Nos. 134, 135, 136, 137
Volume XXX. NCRP Reports Nos. 138, 139
Volume XXXI. NCRP Report No. 140
Volume XXXII. NCRP Reports Nos. 141, 142, 143
Volume XXXIII. NCRP Report No. 144
Volume XXXIV. NCRP Reports Nos. 145, 146, 147
Volume XXXV. NCRP Reports Nos. 148, 149
Volume XXXVI. NCRP Reports Nos. 150, 151, 152
Volume XXXVII, NCRP Reports Nos. 153, 154, 155
Volume XXXVIII, NCRP Reports Nos. 156, 157, 158
Volume XXXIX, NCRP Reports Nos. 159, 160
Volume XL. NCRP Report No. 161 (Vols. I and II)
Volume XLI. NCRP Reports Nos. 162, 163
Volume XLII. NCRP Reports Nos. 165, 166, 167
Volume XLIII. NCRP Reports Nos. 168, 169
Volume XLIV. NCRP Reports Nos. 170, 171

Volume XLV. NCRP Reports Nos. 172, 173
Volume XLVI. NCRP Report No. 174
Volume XLVII. NCRP Report No. 175
NCRP Commentaries
No. Title
1 Krypton-85 in the Atmosphere—With Specific Reference to the Public
Health Significance of the Proposed Controlled Release at Three Mile
Island (1980)
4 Guidelines for the Release of Waste Water from Nuclear Facilities with
Special Reference to the Public Health Significance of the Proposed
Release of Treated Waste Waters at Three Mile Island (1987)
5 Review of the Publication, Living Without Landfills (1989)
6 Radon Exposure of the U.S. Population—Status of the Problem (1991)
7 Misadministration of Radioactive Material in Medicine—Scientific
Background (1991)
8 Uncertainty in NCRP Screening Models Relating to Atmospheric
Transport, Deposition and Uptake by Humans (1993)
9 Considerations Regarding the Unintended Radiation Exposure of the
Embryo, Fetus or Nursing Child (1994)
10 Advising the Public about Radiation Emergencies: A Document for
Public Comment (1994)
11 Dose Limits for Individuals Who Receive Exposure from Radionuclide
Therapy Patients (1995)
12 Radiation Exposure and High-Altitude Flight (1995)
13 An Introduction to Efficacy in Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear
Medicine (Justification of Medical Radiation Exposure) (1995)
14 A Guide for Uncertainty Analysis in Dose and Risk Assessments
Related to Environmental Contamination (1996)
15 Evaluating the Reliability of Biokinetic and Dosimetric Models and
Parameters Used to Assess Individual Doses for Risk Assessment
Purposes (1998)
16 Screening of Humans for Security Purposes Using Ionizing Radiation
Scanning Systems (2003)
17 Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis System Used in Security Surveillance
(2003)
18 Biological Effects of Modulated Radiofrequency Fields (2003)
19 Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and
Radiological Terrorism (2005)
20 Radiation Protection and Measurement Issues Related to Cargo
Scanning with Accelerator-Produced High-Energy X Rays (2007)
21 Radiation Protection in the Application of Active Detection
Technologies (2011)
22 Radiological Health Protection Issues Associated With Use of Active
Detection Technology Systems for Detection of Radioactive Threat
Materials (2011)
23 Radiation Protection for Space Activities: Supplement to Previous
Recommendations (2014)
24 Health Effects of Low Doses of Radiation: Perspectives on Integrating

Radiation Biology and Epidemiology (2015)
25 Potential for Central Nervous System Effects from Radiation Exposure
During Space Activities Phase I: Overview (2016)
26 Guidance on Radiation Dose Limits for the Lens of the Eye (2016)
27 Implications of Recent Epidemiologic Studies for the
Linear-Nonthreshold Model and Radiation Protection (2018)
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting
No. Title
1 Perceptions of Risk, Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting held
on March 14-15, 1979 (including Taylor Lecture No. 3) (1980)
3 Critical Issues in Setting Radiation Dose Limits, Proceedings of the
Seventeenth Annual Meeting held on April 8-9, 1981 (including
Taylor Lecture No. 5) (1982)
4 Radiation Protection and New Medical Diagnostic Approaches,
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting held on April 6-7,
1982 (including Taylor Lecture No. 6) (1983)
5 Environmental Radioactivity, Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual
Meeting held on April 6-7, 1983 (including Taylor Lecture No. 7) (1983)
6 Some Issues Important in Developing Basic Radiation Protection
Recommendations, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting
held on April 4-5, 1984 (including Taylor Lecture No. 8) (1985)
7 Radioactive Waste, Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting
held on April 3-4, 1985 (including Taylor Lecture No. 9)(1986)
8 Nonionizing Electromagnetic Radiations and Ultrasound,
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting held on April 2-3,
9 New Dosimetry at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Its Implications for
Risk Estimates, Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting
held on April 8-9, 1987 (including Taylor Lecture No. 11) (1988)
10 Radon, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting held on
March 30-31, 1988 (including Taylor Lecture No. 12) (1989)
11 Radiation Protection Today—The NCRP at Sixty Years, Proceedings
of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting held on April 5-6, 1989
(including Taylor Lecture No. 13) (1990)
12 Health and Ecological Implications of Radioactively Contaminated
Environments, Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting held
on April 4-5, 1990 (including Taylor Lecture No. 14) (1991)
13 Genes, Cancer and Radiation Protection, Proceedings of the
Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting held on April 3-4, 1991 (including
14 Radiation Protection in Medicine, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth
Annual Meeting held on April 1-2, 1992 (including Taylor Lecture
No. 16) (1993)
15 Radiation Science and Societal Decision Making, Proceedings of the
Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting held on April 7-8, 1993 (including
16 Extremely-Low-Frequency Electromagnetic Fields: Issues in

Biological Effects and Public Health, Proceedings of the Thirtieth
Annual Meeting held on April 6-7, 1994 (not published).
17 Environmental Dose Reconstruction and Risk Implications,
Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting held on April 12-13,
18 Implications of New Data on Radiation Cancer Risk, Proceedings of
the Thirty-Second Annual Meeting held on April 3-4, 1996 (including
19 The Effects of Pre- and Postconception Exposure to Radiation,
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting held on April 2-3,
1997, Teratology 59, 181–317 (1999)
20 Cosmic Radiation Exposure of Airline Crews, Passengers and
Astronauts, Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting held on
April 1-2, 1998, Health Phys. 79, 466–613 (2000)
21 Radiation Protection in Medicine: Contemporary Issues, Proceedings
of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting held on April 7-8, 1999 (including
22 Ionizing Radiation Science and Protection in the 21st Century,
Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting held on April 5-6,
2000, Health Phys. 80, 317–402 (2001)
23 Fallout from Atmospheric Nuclear Tests—Impact on Science and
Society, Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting held on
April 4-5, 2001, Health Phys. 82, 573–748 (2002)
24 Where the New Biology Meets Epidemiology: Impact on Radiation
Risk Estimates, Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting
held on April 10-11, 2002, Health Phys. 85, 1–108 (2003)
25 Radiation Protection at the Beginning of the 21st Century–A Look
Forward, Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting held on
April 9–10, 2003, Health Phys. 87, 237–319 (2004)
26 Advances in Consequence Management for Radiological Terrorism
Events, Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting held on
April 14–15, 2004, Health Phys. 89, 415–588 (2005)
27 Managing the Disposition of Low-Activity Radioactive Materials,
Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Meeting held on March 30–31,
2005, Health Phys. 91, 413–536 (2006)
28 Chernobyl at Twenty, Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual
Meeting held on April 3–4, 2006, Health Phys. 93, 345–595 (2007)
29 Advances in Radiation Protection in Medicine, Proceedings of the
Forty-Third Annual Meeting held on April 16-17, 2007, Health Phys.
95, 461–686 (2008)
30 Low Dose and Low Dose-Rate Radiation Effects and Models,
Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting held on April 14–15,
2008, Health Phys. 97, 373–541 (2009)
31 Future of Nuclear Power Worldwide – Health, Safety, and
Environment, Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting held on
March 2–3, 2009, Health Phys. 100(1), 2–112 (2011)
32 Communication of Radiation Benefits and Risks in Decision Making,
Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting held March 8–9, 2010,
Health Phys. 101(5), 497–629 (2011)
33 Scientific and Policy Challenges of Particle Radiations in Medical

Therapy and Space Missions, Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh
Annual Meeting held on March 7–8, 2011, Health Phys. 103(5),
529–684 (2012)
34 Emerging Issues in Radiation Protection in Medicine, Emergency
Response, and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Proceedings of the
Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting held March 12–13, 2012, Health Phys.
105(5), 401–468 (2013)
35 Radiation Dose the Impacts on Exposed Populations, Proceedings of
the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting held March 11–12, 2013, Health
Phys. 106(2), 145–339 (2014)
36 NCRP: Achievements of the Past 50 Years and Addressing the Needs of
the Future, Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting held March
10–11, 2014, Health Phys. 108(2), 97–293 (2015)
37 Changing Regulations and Radiation Guidance: What Does the
Future Hold?, Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Meeting held
March 16–17, 2015, Health Phys. 110(2), 97–237 (2016)
38 Meeting the Needs of the Nation for Radiation Protection, Proceedings
of the Fifty-Second Annual Meeting held April 11–12, 2016, Health
Phys. 112(2), 111–234 (2017)
39 Assessment of National Efforts in Emergency Preparedness for
Nuclear Terrorism Is There a Need for Realignment to Close
Remaining Gaps?, Proceedings of the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting
held March 6–7, 2017, Health Phys. 114(2), 109–260 (2018)
40 Radiation Protection Responsibility in Medicine, Proceedings of the
Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting held March 5–6, 2018, Health Phys.
116(2), 111–294 (2019)
Lauriston S. Taylor Lectures

No. Title
1 The Squares of the Natural Numbers in Radiation Protection by
Herbert M. Parker (1977)
2 Why be Quantitative about Radiation Risk Estimates? by Sir Edward
Pochin (1978)
3 Radiation Protection—Concepts and Trade Offs by Hymer L. Friedell
(1979) [available also in Perceptions of Risk, see above]
4 From “Quantity of Radiation” and “Dose” to “Exposure” and “Absorbed
Dose”—An Historical Review by Harold O. Wyckoff (1980)
5 How Well Can We Assess Genetic Risk? Not Very by James F. Crow
(1981) [available also in Critical Issues in Setting Radiation Dose
Limits, see above]
6 Ethics, Trade-offs and Medical Radiation by Eugene L. Saenger
(1982) [available also in Radiation Protection and New Medical
Diagnostic Approaches, see above]
7 The Human Environment—Past, Present and Future by Merril
Eisenbud (1983) [available in Environmental Radioactivity, see above]
8 Limitation and Assessment in Radiation Protection by Harald H.
Rossi (1984) [available also in Some Issues Important in Developing
Basic Radiation Protection Recommendations, see above]
9 Truth (and Beauty) in Radiation Measurement by John H. Harley

(1985) [available also in Radioactive Waste, see above]
10 Biological Effects of Non-ionizing Radiations: Cellular Properties and
Interactions by Herman P. Schwan (1987) [available also in
Nonionizing Electromagnetic Radiations and Ultrasound, see above]
11 How to be Quantitative about Radiation Risk Estimates by Seymour
Jablon (1988) [available also in New Dosimetry at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and its Implications for Risk Estimates, see above]
12 How Safe is Safe Enough? by Bo Lindell (1988) [available also in
Radon, see above]
13 Radiobiology and Radiation Protection: The Past Century and
Prospects for the Future by Arthur C. Upton (1989) [available also in
Radiation Protection Today, see above]
14 Radiation Protection and the Internal Emitter Saga by J. Newell
Stannard (1990) [available also in Health and Ecological Implications
of Radioactively Contaminated Environments, see above]
15 When is a Dose Not a Dose? by Victor P. Bond (1992) [available also in
Genes, Cancer and Radiation Protection, see above]
16 Dose and Risk in Diagnostic Radiology: How Big? How Little? by
Edward W. Webster (1992) [available also in Radiation Protection in
Medicine, see above]
17 Science, Radiation Protection and the NCRP by Warren K. Sinclair
(1993) [available also in Radiation Science and Societal Decision
Making, see above]
18 Mice, Myths and Men by R.J. Michael Fry (1995)
19 Certainty and Uncertainty in Radiation Research by Albrecht M.
Kellerer. Health Phys. 69, 446–453 (1995)
20 70 Years of Radiation Genetics: Fruit Flies, Mice and Humans by
Seymour Abrahamson. Health Phys. 71, 624–633 (1996)
21 Radionuclides in the Body: Meeting the Challenge by William J. Bair.
Health Phys. 73, 423–432 (1997)
22 From Chimney Sweeps to Astronauts: Cancer Risks in the Work Place
by Eric J. Hall. Health Phys. 75, 357–366 (1998)
23 Back to Background: Natural Radiation and Radioactivity Exposed
by Naomi H. Harley. Health Phys. 79, 121–128 (2000)
24 Administered Radioactivity: Unde Venimus Quoque Imus by S. James
Adelstein. Health Phys. 80, 317–324 (2001)
25 Assuring the Safety of Medical Diagnostic Ultrasound by Wesley L.
Nyborg. Health Phys. 82, 578–587 (2002)
26 Developing Mechanistic Data for Incorporation into Cancer and
Genetic Risk Assessments: Old Problems and New Approaches by
R. Julian Preston. Health Phys. 85, 4–12 (2003)
27 The Evolution of Radiation Protection–From Erythema to Genetic
Risks to Risks of Cancer to ? by Charles B. Meinhold, Health Phys. 87,
240–248 (2004)
28 Radiation Protection in the Aftermath of a Terrorist Attack Involving
Exposure to Ionizing Radiation by Abel J. Gonzalez, Health Phys. 89,
418–446 (2005)
29 Nontargeted Effects of Radiation: Implications for Low Dose
Exposures by John B. Little, Health Phys. 91, 416–426 (2006)
30 Fifty Years of Scientific Research: The Importance of Scholarship and

the Influence of Politics and Controversy by Robert L. Brent, Health
Phys. 93, 348–379 (2007)
31 The Quest for Therapeutic Actinide Chelators by Patricia W. Durbin,
Health Phys. 95, 465–492 (2008)
32 Yucca Mountain Radiation Standards, Dose/Risk Assessments,
Thinking Outside the Box, Evaluations, and Recommendations by
Dade W. Moeller, Health Phys. 97, 376–391 (2009)
33 Radiation Epidemiology-the Golden Age and Future Challenges by
John D. Boice, Jr., Health Phys. 100(1), 59–76 (2011)
34 Radiation Protection and Public Policy in an Uncertain World by
Charles E. Land, Health Phys. 101(5), 499–508 (2011)
35 What Makes Particle Radiation so Effective? by Eleanor A. Blakely,
Health Phys. 103(5), 508–528 (2012)
36 From the Field to the Laboratory and Back: The What Ifs, Wows, and
Who Cares of Radiation Biology, by Antone L. Brooks, Health Phys.
105(5), 407–421 (2013)
37 When Does Risk Assessment Get Fuzzy?, by John E. Till, Health Phys.
106(2), 148-161 (2014)
38 On the Shoulders of Giants—Radiation Protection Over 50 Years, by
Fred A. Mettler, Jr., Health Phys. 108(2), 102–110 (2015)
39 Dosimetry of Internal Emitters: Contributions of Radiation Protection
Bodies and Radiological Events, by Keith F. Eckerman, Health Phys.
110(2), 192–200 (2016)
40 Radiation Protection and Regulatory Science, by John W. Poston, Sr.,
Health Phys. 112(2), 193–198 (2017)
41 Environmental Radiation and Life—A Broad View, by F. Ward
Whicker, Health Phys. 114(2), 192–203 (2018)
42 Radiation Dosimetry Research for Medicine and Protection—A
European Journey, by Hans-Georg Menzel, Health Phys. 116(2),
222–234 (2019)
Warren K. Sinclair Keynote Addresses
No. Title
1 Current Challenges in Countering Radiological Terrorism, John W.
Poston, Sr., Health Phys. 89(5), 450–456 (2005)
2 Contemporary Issues in Risk-Informed Decision Making on Waste
Disposition, B. John Garrick, Health Phys. 91(5), 430–438 (2006)
3 Retrospective Analysis of Impacts of the Chernobyl Accident, Mikhail
Balonov, Health Phys. 93(5), 383–409 (2007)
4 Use and Misuse of Radiation in Medicine, James A. Brink, Health
Phys. 95(5), 495–501 (2008)
5 Issues in Quantifying the Effects of Low-Level Radiation, Dudley T.
Goodhead, Health Phys. 97(5), 394–406 (2009)
6 The Role of a Strong Regulator in Safe and Secure Nuclear Energy,
Peter B. Lyons, Health Phys. 100(1), 5–11 (2011)
7 Effective Risk Communication Before, During and After a

Radiological Emergency: Challenges, Guidelines, Strategies and
Tools. Vincent T. Covello, Health Phys. 101(5), 511–530 (2011)
8 Heavy Ions in Therapy and Space: Benefits and Risks, Marco Durante,
Health Phys. 103(5), 532–539 (2012)
9 Childhood Exposure: An Issue from Computed Tomography Scans to
Fukushima, Fred A. Mettler, Jr., 105(5), 424–429 (2013)
10 Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident and Comprehensive Health
Risk Management, Shunichi Yamashita, Health Phys. 106(2),
166–180 (2014)
11 Science, Radiation Protection, and the NCRP: Building on the Past,
Looking to the Future, Jerrold T. Bushberg, Health Phys. 108(2),
115–123 (2015)
12 Influence of NCRP on Radiation Protection in the United States:
Guidance and Regulation, Kenneth R. Kase, Health Phys. 110(2),
127–145 (2016)
13 Where are the Radiation Professions (WARP)?, by Richard E. Toohey,
Health Phys. 112(2), 121–125 (2017)
14 Aren’t We Ready Yet? Closing the Planning, Response, and Recovery
Gaps for Radiological Terrorism, by Jack Herrmann, Health Phys.
114(2), 122–127 (2018)
15 Jus•ti•fied and Com•men•su•rate, by Marvin Rosenstein, Health
Phys. 116(2), 117–125 (2019)
Thomas S. Tenforde Topical Lectures

No. Title
1 The Ethics of Radiological Protection, Jacques Lochard, Health Phys.
110(2), 201–210 (2016)
2 Recent Epidemiologic Studies and the Linear No-Threshold Model For
Radiation Protection—Considerations Regarding NCRP Commentary
No. 27, by Roy Shore, Health Phys. 116(2) 235–246 (2019)
Symposium Proceedings
No. Title
1 The Control of Exposure of the Public to Ionizing Radiation in the
Event of Accident or Attack, Proceedings of a Symposium held
April 27-29, 1981 (1982)
2 Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classifica-
tion, Proceedings of a Symposium held November 9, 1994 (1995)
3 Acceptability of Risk from Radiation—Application to Human Space
Flight, Proceedings of a Symposium held May 29, 1996 (1997)
4 21st Century Biodosimetry: Quantifying the Past and Predicting the
Future, Proceedings of a Symposium held February 22, 2001, Radiat.
Prot. Dosim. 97(1), (2001)
5 National Conference on Dose Reduction in CT, with an Emphasis on
Pediatric Patients, Summary of a Symposium held November 6-7,
2002, Am. J. Roentgenol. 181(2), 321–339 (2003)
NCRP Statements
No. Title
1 “Blood Counts, Statement of the National Committee on Radiation
Protection,” Radiology 63, 428 (1954)
2 “Statements on Maximum Permissible Dose from Television
Receivers and Maximum Permissible Dose to the Skin of the Whole
Body,” Am. J. Roentgenol., Radium Ther. and Nucl. Med. 84, 152
(1960) and Radiology 75, 122 (1960)
3 X-Ray Protection Standards for Home Television Receivers, Interim
Statement of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (1968)
4 Specification of Units of Natural Uranium and Natural Thorium,
Statement of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (1973)
5 NCRP Statement on Dose Limit for Neutrons (1980)
6 Control of Air Emissions of Radionuclides (1984)
7 The Probability That a Particular Malignancy May Have Been Caused
by a Specified Irradiation (1992)
8 The Application of ALARA for Occupational Exposures (1999)
9 Extension of the Skin Dose Limit for Hot Particles to Other External
Sources of Skin Irradiation (2001)
10 Recent Applications of the NCRP Public Dose Limit Recommendation
for Ionizing Radiation (2004)
11 Outline of Administrative Policies for Quality Assurance and Peer
Review of Tissue Reactions Associated with Fluoroscopically-Guided
Interventions (2014)
12 Where are the Radiation Professionals (WARP)? (2015)
Other Documents
The following documents were published outside of the NCRP report, com-
mentary and statement series:
Somatic Radiation Dose for the General Population, Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements, 6 May 1959, Science 131 (3399), February 19, 482–486
(1960)
Dose Effect Modifying Factors in Radiation Protection, Report of
Subcommittee M-4 (Relative Biological Effectiveness) of the National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Report BNL 50073
(T-471) (1967) Brookhaven National Laboratory (National Technical
Information Service, Springfield, Virginia)
Residential Radon Exposure and Lung Cancer Risk: Commentary on
Cohen's County-Based Study, Health Phys. 87(6), 656–658 (2004)
Where Are the Radiation Professionals (WARP)?, Synopsis of NCRP
Statement No. 12 (2015)

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NCRP REPORT

NCRP REPORT No. 182No. 18

National National Council

Radiation Safety of Sealed

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, issuing

Copyright © National Council on Radiation

The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

James S. Willison James G. Yusko

The Council wishes to express its appreciation to the Committee

John D. Boice, Jr. Kathryn D. Held

2. Definition, Classification and Control of Sealed Sources .2

3. Fabrication and Manufacturing of Sealed Sources . . . . . .14

4. Acquisition and Receipt of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

5. Safety Considerations in the Use of Sealed Sources . . . . .28

5.4 Industrial Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6. Transportation of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

7. Testing and Inspection of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

8. Disposal of Sealed Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

10. Historical Review of Sealed-Source Incidents . . . . . . . . . 64

11. Summary of Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Appendix A. Sealed-Source-Specific License Program

Appendix B. Example Sealed-Source Inventory Procedure . 77

Appendix C. Requirements for Transportation of

Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Scientific Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

The NCRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101

NCRP Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .112

Sealed radioactive sources (also referred to as sealed sources)

This section summarizes federal and state regulations that pro-

• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): Sealed radioactive

Examples of definitions in various national and international

• American National Standards Institute (ANSI): A sealed

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): “Radioactive

A sealed radioactive source is a manufactured item con-

Whereas all sealed sources are designed to remain “sealed”

In addition to traditional sealed sources, radioisotope thermo-

1While commonly referred to as “exempt sealed sources,” the items

listed in 10 CFR Part 30.15 (NRC, 2015a) (and comparable Agreement

license authorizing the distribution to persons “generally

2“Person” is specifically defined in NRC and Agreement State regula-

for risk-informed decision making” which could be “used as an input

temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise

NCRP recommends that the IAEA International Categoriza-

In determining categories for the purpose of regulatory control,

2.3 Regulatory Control and Security of

The IAEA categorization scheme for radioactive sources is incor-

Single user license only, copying and networking prohibited.

Mossbauer spectrometry sources Co-57 5.0E–02 1.9E–03

“D-value” corresponds to a “dangerous source” (as defined by IAEA, 2004).

NRC and Agreement States implement the Code’s recommenda-

Single user license only, copying and networking prohibited.

Single user license only, copying and networking prohibited.

tion level of the parent radionuclide to be considered) are listed here.

• Category 3 sources are more likely to be introduced into the

Sealed sources, and devices that contain sealed sources, are

3.1 General Considerations

consensus standards. Supplemental testing may be necessary for

3.1.3 Custom Sealed Sources

level; and, a prohibition on further commercial distribution by the

3.2 Design and Manufacturing Specifications

3.2.2 Design Considerations