NOTES ON POLITICAL LAW

Excerpts from the 2021 Decisions of the Supreme Court

Compiled by

CARLO L. CRUZ

STATE IMMUNITY

It is well-entrenched that the State cannot be sued without its consent. However, it
cannot hide behind its cloak of immunity to perform acts detrimental and disadvantageous to
its citizens.

In the landmark case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, this Court ruled that
the Public Highway Commissioner is not protected by sovereign state immunity from a just
compensation suit for privately-owned property used in a road widening project without the
benefit of expropriation. (Republic v. Sps. Nocom, G.R. No. 233988, November 15, 2021)

Execution of Judgments
against the State

To recapitulate, the computation of the government's liability to VCPCI, except for the interest due on the
sum of P24,841,847.82 which the RTC directed to be submitted to arbitration, had been settled in the RTC Decision
dated January 30, 2004. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision in its Decision dated October 29, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 18, 2005. The Court denied DPWH's petition in its Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and
its motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated October 17, 2005. The Court Resolution became final and
executory on November 18, 2005.

Therefore, the COA, in denying VCPCI's money claim and in ruling that VCPCI is liable to refund an
overpayment amounting to P33,795,346.43, in effect reviewed and modified the final and executory Decision of the
RTC. In doing so, the COA invokes its primary jurisdiction over all money claims against the government.

The issue in this case is not novel. In Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Commission on Audit (Tasei), the
Court settled COA's exclusive jurisdiction over money claims due from or owing to the government. In Taisei, the
Court ruled that other tribunals or administrative bodies "may have concurrent jurisdiction with the COA over
money claims against the government or in the audit of the funds of government agencies and
instrumentalities," citing as examples the "Central Bank's jurisdiction to examine or audit, or cause the
examination or audit, of government banks;" the Civil Service Commission's (CSC) determination of a government
employee's terminal leave benefits; the CSC's jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of the legality and regularity of the
grant of allowances and benefits to members of tl1e boards of water districts designated by the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) in relation to an administrative case against LWUA officers for violation of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; and where the parties validly agreed to submit
their dispute to arbitration.

Further the Court distinguished the two (2) main types of money claims which the COA
may be confronted with: (1) money claims originally filed with the COA; and (2) money claims
which arise from a final and executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. xxx:

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 xxx.

The first type covers money claims originally filed with the COA. Jurisprudence specifies
the nature of the money claims which may be brought to the COA at first instance. In Euro-Med
Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, we explicitly ordained that these cases are limited to
liquidated claims, viz.:

xxx or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other
papers within reach of accounting officers. Petitioner's claim was for a fixed amount and
although respondent took issue with the accuracy of petitioner's summation of its
accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and
other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COA's jurisdiction under the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines. xxx.

xxx the second type of money claims refers to those which arise from a final and
executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. xxx final judgments may no longer be reviewed
or, in any way be modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the Supreme
Court, much less, by any other official, branch or department of government. (V.C. Ponce
Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213821, January 26, 2021)

On this score, we lay down a conceptual framework for the guidance of the COA, the
Bench, and the Bar pertaining to the COA's audit power vis-a-vis the second type of money
claims which may be brought before it during the execution stage. Thus, the Court ruled that
the "COA's audit power over money claims already confirmed by final judgment of a court or
other adjudicative body is necessarily limited," 0 and laid down the guidelines, as follows:

(1) Once a court or other adjudicative body validly acquires jurisdiction over a money
claim against the government, it exercises and retains jurisdiction over the subject matter to the
exclusion of all others, including the COA;

(2) The COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or
tribunal;

(3) The COA is devoid of power to disregard the principle of immutability of final
judgments; and

(4) The COA's exercise of discretion in approving or disapproving money claims that
have been determined by final judgment is akin to the power of an execution court.

[Note: Applying herein the ruling in the Taisei case, the money claim of VCPCI before the COA
undoubtedly falls under the second type of money claim, i.e., money claims which arise from a final and
executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. The money claim stemmed from the Decision dated
January 30, 2004 of the RTC, affirmed by the CA and the Court, that had long become final and executory.
The COA gravely abused its discretion in denying VCPCI's money claim that was based on a final and
executory judgment; and when it substituted the RTC's findings and computations with its own. (V.C.
Ponce Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213821, January 26, 2021)]

In the MIAA case, the Court also elucidated that properties of government

instrumentalities are of public dominion and are thus outside the commerce of men. They are
not subject to levy, encumbrance, or disposition through public or private sale since they are

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intended for public use. This is necessarily so because essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures, and auction sale. (City
of Iloilo v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 233861, January 12, 2021)

The Court, in Spouses Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, invalidated the lower court's
action in subjecting PPA funds to execution pending appeal as payment for just compensation.
Citing the ruling in MIAA, this Court declared that PPA is a government instrumentality, whose
properties may not be subjected to any form of execution, xxx. (City of Iloilo v. Philippine Ports
Authority, G.R. No. 233861, January 12, 2021)

[Note: Considering these aforesaid court decisions, PPA's funds cannot be a subject of execution.
(City of Iloilo v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 233861, January 12, 2021)]

In a last attempt to convince the Court deny backwages to Maneja, the DepEd contends that she
failed to file a money claim for backwages first with the COA thereby amounting to non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This argument holds no water. xxx.

At any rate, we did not require the filing of money claim with the COA when backwages were
granted to reinstated government employees in Cruz, Bangalisan, Jacinto, and Dela Cruz. It follows that
Maneja need not be required to go through that procedure. More importantly, Maneja's claim for
backwages is not yet final — she has no claim against the government during the pendency of this case.
(Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)

[Note: In sum, CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 does not contradict EO No. 292 and is a valid exercise
of the CSC's rule-making powers. Further, Maneja's dismissal was unjustified due to the premature
execution of CSCRO No. X's decision. Accordingly, Maneja is entitled to backwages. (Republic v. Maneja,
G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

By virtue of the principle of separation of powers, it is the judicial policy of this Court to
refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the prosecutor
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.  Consequently, courts do not
reverse the Secretary of Justice's, or in this case, the Ombudsman's findings and conclusions on
the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. (Rodriguez v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 254856, January 25, 2021)

The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in "the doctrine of separation of powers

which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments."  For the judiciary to justify the nullification of any legislative or executive act, it
must be shown that the statute or issuance clearly violates the Constitution. (Province of
Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

The Philippines announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 15, 2018, and formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de
Cabinet on March 16, 2018. The Secretary-General received the notification on March 17, 2018. For all intents
and purposes, and in keeping with what the Rome Statute plainly requires, the Philippines had, by then,

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completed all the requisite acts of withdrawal. The Philippines has done all that were needed to facilitate the
withdrawal. Any subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.

On March 20, 2018, the International Criminal Court issued a statement on the Philippines' Notice of
Withdrawal. The United Nations certified that the Philippines deposited the written notification on March 17,
2018. It stressed that while withdrawal from the Rome Statute is a sovereign decision, it has no impact on any
pending proceedings. In any case, the International Criminal Court expressed no reservation on the efficacy of the
withdrawal.

At that point, this Court's interference and ruling on what course of action to take
would mean an imposition of its will not only on the executive, but also on the International
Criminal Court itself. That is not the function of this Court, which takes on a passive role in
resolving actual controversies when proper parties raise them at an opportune time. In the
international arena, it is the president that has the authority to conduct foreign relations and
represent the country. This Court cannot encroach on matters beyond its jurisdiction.

Moreover, while its text provides a mechanism on how to withdraw from it, the Rome
Statute does not have any proviso on the reversal of a state party's withdrawal. We fail to see
how this Court can revoke — as what petitioners are in effect asking us to do — the country's
withdrawal from the Rome Statute, without writing new terms into the Rome Statute.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: Legislative and executive powers impel the concerned branches of government into
assuming a more proactive role in our constitutional order. Judicial power, on the other hand, limits this
Court into taking a passive stance. Such is the consequence of separation of powers. Until an actual case is
brought before us by the proper parties at the opportune time, where the constitutional question is the
very lis mota, we cannot act on an issue, no matter how much it agonizes us. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R.
Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

This observation notwithstanding, the Court is impelled to point out that the argument
of petitioners on separation of powers appears will not affect the declared constitutionality of
the first mode because, as exhaustively discussed above, in this mode, the ATC will be merely
adopting the UNSC Consolidated List. Thus, the ATC does not exercise any form of legislative
or judicial power in such instance as the determination of designated persons or groups will be
done by the UNSC, a premier international body, itself, in conjunction with the Philippines' own
international commitments. In contrast, designation under the second and third modes, are to
be determined purely by the ATC, a national executive agency. As petitioners posit, the
consequences of designation overlap with proscription, which for its part must be based on a
judicial determination of probable cause in accordance with the Constitution. Hence, petitioners'
claim of separation of powers are only relevant to the second and third modes, which, to be
properly resolved, must be threshed out in the proper case. Practically speaking, however, it is
discerned that petitioners need not wait for this proper case to achieve the result they desire
since the second and third modes should already be struck down for its abridgement of free
speech rights due to its impermissible chilling effect. As such, the issue on the constitutionality
of these second and third modes under a separation of powers argument would have been
rendered moot and academic by the time that the actual case concerning separation of powers is
elevated. xxx. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613,
252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765,

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252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018,
253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

DELEGATION OF POWER

Administrative Bodies

Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas

But Annex B of Memorandum Circular No. 2012-01 recognizes the BSP as a GOCC
under the jurisdiction of DBM, together with research institutions, economic zone
authorities, and local water districts. It bears stressing, however, that the BSP enjoys fiscal and
administrative autonomy under its charter. xxx.

The fiscal autonomy of the BSP accentuates its role as the country's independent central
authority. The MB then is granted the authority to adopt an annual budget for and authorize
such expenditures by the BSP as are in the interest of its effective administration and operations
in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations.  Since the MB adopts an annual budget
for the BSP and, as a matter of course, the PICCI, it is incongruous, if not absurd, to place the
BSP under the jurisdiction of the DBM and subject its budget to the DBM's review and approval.
(Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)

[Note: "The power to appropriate belongs to Congress, while the responsibility of releasing
appropriations belongs to the DBM."  But this does not hold true for the BSP. The BSP does not receive its
budget from the national government through the GAA. In stark contrast with other government
agencies, the BSP is not reliant on Congress for budgetary appropriation. It is the MB which crafts the
BSP's annual budget to ensure the effective administration and operations of the BSP and its subsidiaries.
(Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)]

Equally telling (is) that in Memorandum Order No. 2012-09  issued by the Governance
Commission for GOCCs (GCG), the PICCI is classified as a GOCC excluded from the coverage
of R.A. No. 10149 and, ultimately, from the jurisdiction of the GCG. Hence, while generally,
GOCCs, including government instrumentalities exercising corporate powers and government
financial institutions, fall under the jurisdiction of the GCG, the BSP and its subsidiary PICCI
are unequivocally excluded from the GCG's authority. But this is not to say that the BSP and its
subsidiary PICCI necessarily come under the jurisdiction of the DBM. To the mind of the Court,
we would be trampling on the BSP's fiscal and administrative autonomy if we go by such logic.

Offices vested with fiscal autonomy such as the BSP cannot be compelled to observe and
adhere to the guidelines and principles governing the PBB scheme under E.O. No. 80. Even
Section 8 of E.O. No. 80 cites that they are merely encouraged to adopt the provisions of the E.O.
in determining the employees' eligibility to the PBB. We see no reason why this ratiocination
should not be applied to PICCI which obtains its budget from the BSP for capital expenditures
and operational expenses.

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 It is well to clarify that the autonomy and independence granted to the BSP by its charter
do not, in any way, advocate the exercise of unbridled discretion in the adoption of its budget.
In the same vein, the PICCI, as BSP's subsidiary, cannot seek refuge behind the shield of fiscal
autonomy of its parent company to justify the grant of a bonus or incentive sans eligibility
standard and criteria. Settled is the rule that the PICCI is subject to the review and audit of the
COA.  Even though the PICCI does not receive its budget from the national government funds
through the GAA, the PICCI's approved budget is still public in character which should be
properly accounted for in accordance with the existing auditing rules and regulations.  (Padilla v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)

Authority

Clearly, both R.A. No. 7227 and its IRR expressly grant the SBMA with authority to fix
reasonable service and utility fees necessary for the establishment, operation, maintenance of
utilities, other services, and infrastructure of the SBFZ. Necessarily, these fees would include the
charges collected by SBMA from its tenants to cover expenses for security services or law
enforcement, fire protection and prevention, street cleaning, and street lighting, which comprise
the CUSA Fee.

Furthermore, Administrative Order No. 31 dated October 1, 2012, directed GOCCs, such
as SBMA, not only to rationalize existing fees but also to impose additional charges "to enable
the government to effectively provide services without straining the National Government's
sources." The said issuance also based the imposition of fees on the principle of equity whereby
persons who receive or benefit from the services rendered should share the cost for such
services. Accordingly, Administrative Order No. 31 fully supports and sustains the CUSA Fee to
cover the four municipal services which were previously rendered without charge by SBMA
within the SBFZ. (Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc. v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,
G.R. No. 232797 (Notice), June 14, 2021)

The status of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone as a separate customs territory has long been
settled in Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. (Southwing), where then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Executive Order (EO) No. 156 prohibiting the importation of
used motor vehicles into the country, inclusive of the freeport zone, to prevent the further
decline of sales in the local motor vehicle industry. The ban on importation of used motor
vehicles was also designed to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor manufacturing
firms as globally competitive producers. Despite its laudable objectives, the Court ruled that EO
No. 156 is void for being ultra vires and for being unreasonable, and, especially, took note of the
intention of the lawmakers in RA No. 7227 to carve out the Subic Bay Freeport Zone from the
State's territory and treat it as foreign territory for purposes of customs laws. This means that
the goods received at the freeport area are not subject to the customs jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines. Of course, this is until the goods are brought inside our domestic commerce,
in which case, they are subject to prevailing customs laws. (Bureau of Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4
Export Corp., G.R. No. 227542 (Notice), May 12, 2021)

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is apparent that "the authority and supervision over
all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in

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all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED."  (Saint
Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19, 2021, citing Republic Act No. 7722)

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an

officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.  Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
the power real and effective.  The grant of autonomous status in favor of SLU does not negate
the power supervision conferred by law upon CHED. The legal maxim that "when the law does
not distinguish, neither should the court" applies in this case. Since SLU failed and refused
outright to confer respondents' degrees notwithstanding their fulfillment of all the requirements
for the attainment thereof, CHED validly stepped in after its jurisdiction was invoked by said
respondents. CHED acted well within its power when it recognized respondent's completion of
all the requisites necessary for the conferment of their Doctor of Medicine degrees. (Saint Louis
University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19, 2021)

After a corporation faithfully complies with the requirements laid down in Section 38,
the SEC has nothing more to do other than approve the same. Pursuant to Section 38, the scope
of the SEC's determination of the legality of the decrease in authorized capital stock is confined
only to the determination of whether the corporation submitted the requisite authentic
documents to support the diminution. Simply, the SEC's function here is purely administrative
in nature. (Metroplex Berhad v. Sinophil Corp., G.R. No. 208281, June 28, 2021)

The ancillary power of the HLURB to impose administrative fines as a necessary tool to
carry out its mandate and objectives was recognized in the case of Spouses Chua v. Ang xxx.
(Francisco v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 236726, September 14, 2021)

[Note: Indeed, the HLURB has the exclusive authority to hear and determine cases involving
violations of the provisions of R.A. No. 9904 and this quasi-adjudicatory function of the HLURB is
reinforced by its authority to impose fine. The imposition of fine by the HLURB against the erring parties
must be understood to be in the concept of an administrative sanction, not a fine in the nature of criminal
penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code. The fine is imposed not so much on exacting penalty
for the violation committed, but more on the need to stress upon the parties concerned, to desist from
wanton disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 9904 or rules and regulations issued thereunder. In other
words, it is an administrative penalty which an administrative agency is empowered to impose upon
erring parties without need of criminal prosecution. (Francisco v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 236726, September
14, 2021)]

Whether the final sentence of Section 10(ff) gave the FDA unbridled authority to
determine what constitutes a health product, hence, void, is wholly immaterial here. Just the
same, petitioner's Artex Fine Water Colors would still be classified as "health products" within
the regulatory jurisdiction of the FDA. To be sure, petitioner's Artex Fine Water Colors squarely
falls under "household/urban hazardous substances" as defined in Section 10(gg) of RA 3720 as
amended xxx. Hence, We rule that there is no undue delegation of legislative power in this case.
(Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of Health, G.R. No. 240764, November 18, 2021)

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 True, there is no express provision in RA 3720, as amended, authorizing the FDA
Director-General to padlock a production facility pending hearing before the FDA. This
authority, however, is deemed subsumed in the statutory powers of the FDA Director-General
"(to) issue orders of seizure, to seize and hold in custody any article or articles of food, device,
cosmetics, household hazardous substances and health products that are adulterated,
counterfeited, misbranded, or unregistered; or any drug, in-vitro diagnostic reagents,
biologicals, and vaccine that is adulterated or misbranded." In other words, the grant of such
authority to the FDA Director-General necessarily includes all such powers, even those not
expressly stated, that are necessary to effectuate such authority. This is the doctrine of necessary
implication. (Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of Health, G.R. No. 240764, November
18, 2021)

[Note: Another, Section 30(6) of RA 3720, as amended by RA 9711, 112 specifically allows the
Director-General to "exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of this Act." This catch-all provision clearly grants the Director-General all necessary and
incidental powers that are reasonably germane to his or her functions under the law. This is
supplemented by Section 22113 of the law which mandates the DOH to promulgate, in consultation with
the FDA, IRR of the law within 120 days after its passage. This is precisely why Article VII, Section 3,
paragraph (b)(2)114 of the IRR was enacted by the DOH. It specifically provided that the Director-General
can order the padlocking of establishments suspected to have violated the FDA Act for the purpose of
preventing the disposition or tampering of evidence, the continuance of acts being complained of, and the
flight of the respondent, as the case may be. Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of Health, G.R.
No. 240764, November 18, 2021)]

Quasi-Legislation

Tests for a Valid Delegation

The power to enact laws is primarily lodged with the legislature, which is generally
prohibited from delegating its legislative functions and duties and relieving itself from its
mandate under the Constitution.

However, the rule is not absolute. Legislative power may be validly delegated to the
president, which power is not actual lawmaking, but is only limited "to fill[ing] in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law."  To be a valid delegated legislative
power, it must not supplant or modify existing laws, including the Constitution, as the power
to create, change, or abolish laws is exclusive to the legislature and any usurpation of such
power renders the issuance invalid. 

Pelaez v. Auditor General  teaches that in exercising the delegated legislative power, the
executive must be guided by the standards established in the law set to be enforced to prevent
the executive from making or unmaking the law, the very danger sought to be prevented by
the principle of separation of powers xxx.

Thus, the president's delegated legislative power, or quasi-legislative power, is not

absolute. The president can only adopt rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of law
and implement legislative policy, with the further limitation that the administrative or

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executive acts must not be contrary to laws or the Constitution. (Province of Pampanga v.
Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

Requisites for the

Validity of Rules

In Southwing, the Court likewise declared that EO No. 156 was issued as an exercise of
police power to protect the domestic motor vehicle industry. Police power is the inherent
authority of a government to enact laws to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general
welfare of the people. While this power primarily belongs to the legislature, this may be
exercised by the President by virtue of a valid delegation of quasi-legislative power, provided
that the following requisites are present: (1) its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature; (2) it must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) it must
be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and (4) it must be reasonable. The
Court held that although EO No. 156 satisfied the first and second requisites, the third and
fourth requisites are missing because the administrative issuance went beyond the scope of
authority given by the legislature and was unreasonable. (Bureau of Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4
Export Corp., G.R. No. 227542, May 12, 2021; see also Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No.
195987, January 12, 2021)

Authority to Promulgate Rules

While the power to enact laws is lodged with the legislature under the principle of
separation of powers, this power may be delegated to the executive to fill in the details of the
law. To be a valid delegation, however, the executive issuance must remain within the scope of
authority given by the legislature. In contrast, the president's inherent ordinance-making
power is not a delegated authority from the legislature, but is a consequence of executive
control over officials of the executive branch. In the exercise of executive control, the president
has the inherent power to adopt rules and regulations and delegate this power to subordinate
executive officials. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

As for the substantive issue, the Court, in COURAGE had upheld the DBM's authority to
prescribe rules insofar as CNA Incentives is concerned.  Specifically, applicable laws such as EO
No. 180 and AO No. 135, as well as relevant jurisprudence, all highlighted the DBM's power to
regulate the payment of compensation to employees of the government. (DENR Employees
Union v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

Clearly, then, respondent Department of Energy, with its mandate of supervising the
restructuring of the electricity industry, is the agency tasked with formulating rules and
regulations to give life to EPIRA's policy objectives. Respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission, for its part, is tasked with implementing the rules and regulations formulated and
issued by respondent Department of Energy. It cannot supplant respondent Department of
Energy's policies, rules, and regulations with its own issuances. (Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry v. Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 228588, 229143 & 229453, March 2, 2021)

[Note: Finally, with the promulgation of Department Circular Nos. DC2017-12-0013 and
DC2017-12-0014, which abolished the assailed issuances, respondent Energy Regulatory Commission is
duty bound to provide regulatory support by issuing the appropriate guidelines pursuant to its mandate
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under the EPIRA to "'[e]nforce the implementing rules and regulations' of the EPIRA as formulated and
adopted by [respondent Department of Energy]." (Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry v.
Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 228588, 229143 & 229453, March 2, 2021)]

Rules Must Not be Ultra Vires

Nonetheless, the president also exercises an inherent ordinance-making prerogative,

which forms part of the power of executive control. xxx. As shown below, in no way is
Executive Order No. 224 an ultra vires act. It is a valid exercise of the president's
ordinance-making power. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

The laws make it clear that State control over the local government units' compliance
with and enforcement of quarrying-related activities is valid. In any case, Executive Order No.
224 simply reinforces the Philippine Mining Act, and is in no way an ultra vires act. (Province of
Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

To be valid, an administrative issuance must not go beyond the limits of the authority
conferred. If the issuance supplants or modifies the Constitution, its enabling statute, or other
existing laws, it is considered ultra vires, hence, void. (Bureau of Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4 Export
Corp., G.R. No. 227542, May 12, 2021)

[Note: In Southwing, EO No. 156 was considered ultra vires because it altered the provisions of an
existing law, specifically, RA No. 7227. The issuance exceeded the scope of its application when it
extended the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, which, under
RA No. 7227, is considered a foreign territory. In the same manner, EO No. 156 is considered
unreasonable because the domestic industry which it sought to protect is not present in foreign territories
such as the Subic Bay Freeport Zone xxx. (Bureau of Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4 Export Corp., G.R. No. 227542,
May 12, 2021)]

[Note: Our pronouncement in Southwing was later underscored in Hon. Executive Secretary v.
Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc., where we again held that EO No. 156 can only apply in the customs
territory of the Philippines but cannot extend to the secured and fenced-in Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The
ban on importation of used vehicles does not cover the importation of used motor vehicles into the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone, for as long as they are stored, used, and traded within the zone, or exported to other
countries, and are not brought out of the freeport area into the country's customs territory. (Bureau of
Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4 Export Corp., G.R. No. 227542 (Notice), May 12, 2021)]

Applying the principles in Southwing and Northeast to this case, the Court now rules that
CMO No. 16-2005 is ultra vires because it altered the provisions of an existing law, RA No. 7227,
by extending the importation ban of right-hand drive vehicles into the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
which is considered as a foreign territory. The implementation of CMO No. 16-2005 inside the
freeport area is akin to imposing an additional condition or amendment in the contract entered
into by Japanese 4 x 4 as a registered Subic Bay Freeport Zone Enterprise authorized by the
SBMA. This act is an intrusion upon the powers granted to the SBMA under Section 13 (6) (2) of
RA No. 7227, which allows it to accept any local or foreign investment, business or enterprise,
subject only to such rules and regulations to be promulgated by the SBMA. (Bureau of Customs v.
Japanese 4 x 4 Export Corp., G.R. No. 227542, May 12, 2021)

10
 PHILRACOM argues that it has the power to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the "catch-all
provision" contained in Section 8 of P.D. 420. In essence, the said provision provides that PHILRACOM shall have
jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of
races, the construction and safety of race tracks, the allocation of prizes, and the security of racing. Additionally,
Section 9 provides for the specific powers of the commission. PHILRACOM alleges that because of the foregoing
provisions, it has the power to issue rules and regulations. Consequently, it enacted PR 58-D, which was later on
amended by Resolution No. 38-12, Series of 2012 to control the disposition of the unclaimed dividends.

R.A. 8407 is precise in terms of the monetary sums that petitioner is allowed by law to
remit to different government agencies. As such, R.A. 8407 cannot be amended or its scope be
enlarged to cover unclaimed dividends via promulgation of rules and regulations. (Philippine
Racing Commission v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 228505, June 16, 2021)

[Note: It is also established that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. (Philippine Racing Commission v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.,
G.R. No. 228505, June 16, 2021)]

The EPIRA champions customer choice and allows contestable customers to choose from
either franchise holders who have unbundled their business or non-regulated electricity
suppliers. Clearly, as respondent Department of Energy itself admits, the mandatory migration
of qualified end-users to the contestable market required in the assailed issuances finds no basis
in the law they seek to implement. (Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Department of
Energy, G.R. Nos. 228588, 229143 & 229453, March 2, 2021)

To be sure, RR 4-2011 is anchored on Section 244 of the Tax Code which empowers the
SOF, upon recommendation of the CIR, to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the Tax Code. As discussed by Associate Justice Japar B.
Dimaampao, since RRs are mandated by the Tax Code itself, they are in the nature of a
subordinate legislation that is as of the Tax Code it implements. Being products of a delegated
power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, RRs should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
that it be not in contravention to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

Here, the BIR expanded or modified the law when it curtailed the income tax deductions
of respondents and when it sanctioned the method of accounting the respondents should use,
without any basis found in the Tax Code. In fact, in its petition, the DOF and BIR did not even
pinpoint the exact provisions of the Tax Code which they seek to apply and implement. Without
a doubt, the RR did not simply provide details for the enforcement of the provisions in the Tax
Code. Neither did it interpret the provisions of the Tax Code. Instead, RR 4-2011 modified what
was explicitly provided therein. This amounts to tax legislation which is a matter within the
authority of the legislative department only. (Department of Finance v. Asia United Bank, G.R. Nos.
240163 & 240168-69, December 1, 2021)

The Court need not belabor that administrative agencies, which are tasked to
promulgate IRR, cannot supplant, modify, or amend the law by altering, enlarging, or restricting
11
the provisions of the law its seeks to implement. And in case there is a discrepancy between the
law and its IRR, it is the law that must prevail because the IRR cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the law. Thus, as between Section 8(e) of RA 9480, and Section 5.5 of the IRR of RA
9480, it is the former that must prevail. Accordingly, under Section 8(e) of RA 9480, only those
with pending criminal cases in court for tax evasion and other criminal offenses under the
NIRC, and the felonies of frauds, illegal exactions and transactions, and malversation of public
funds and property, under Chapters III and IV of Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, are
excluded. (People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206579, December 1, 2021)

The ATC and the DOJ's Power to

Promulgate Implementing Rules and
Regulations under Section 54

Accordingly, the DOJ and ATC must ensure that the implementing rules and regulations
conform with the spirit of the law, as herein divined by the Court through its judicial
construction. To reiterate, administrative agencies "may not make rules and regulations which
are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and [the IRR], the former must prevail."

Ultimately, however, it should be pointed out that the facial challenge in this case was
directed against the ATA's statutory provisions, and not the rules found in the IRR itself. As
such, the Court deems it prudent to refrain from passing judgment on the issue of undue
delegation that may be appropriately addressed through an actual case or controversy sharply
demonstrating how the ATC and DOJ have broadly construed the provisions of the ATA so as to
showcase the alleged incompleteness of the law and its lack of sufficient standards. (Calleja v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646,
252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663,
252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124,
253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Publication

In differentiating the delegated legislative power from the ordinance-making

power, ABAKADA Guro Party List is enlightening. It explains that under the delegated
legislative authority, the power to issue implementing rules creates rights and obligations that
affect the public at large, while the ordinance-making power is the authority to issue
"intrabranch orders and instructions or internal rules for the executive branch," which do not
bind the public. This is why implementing rules and regulations are subject to the rule of
publication for their effectivity, while internal rules or instructions in the executive
department are not.  (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

It is settled in law and jurisprudence that publication is imperative as a condition

precedent to the effectivity of a law to fully and categorically inform the public of its contents
before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R.
No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

12
 There may have been instances in the past, however, where the Court recognized
exceptions to the rules on prior publication and filing with the U.P. Law Center - ONAR.
Accordingly, interpretative regulations, which need nothing further than their bare issuance for
they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed, and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (DENR Employees Union and
Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

[Note: Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cordial, Jr., the Court held that Resolution No. 13-2013 which
provides for the rules of procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against municipal officials
need not be published because it was merely interpretative of the Local Government Code. (DENR
Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January
19, 2021)]

[Note: In Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, We ruled that
Revenue Regulation No. 15-2013 need not be published nor registered with the U.P. Law Center to be
effective as it is merely an internal issuance for the guidance of "all internal revenue officers and others
concerned" which purports to do no more than interpret the statute. (DENR Employees Union and
Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: Also, in Cawad, et. al. v. Sec. Abad, et. al., We upheld the validity of DBM circulars providing
for certain conditions on the grant of Magna Carta benefits to public health workers (PWH) in spite of the
circulars' delayed publication and non-filing with U.P. Law Center - ONAR for the conditions were mere
reiterations of those already embodied in the Magna Carta and its IRR. (DENR Employees Union and
Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: Similarly, in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, when several orders issued by the
Energy Regulatory Commission were sought to be invalidated for lack of publication and non-submission
of copies thereof to the U.P. Law Center - ONAR, it has been held that since they merely interpret R.A.
No. 7832 and its IRR, without modifying, amending or supplanting the same, they cannot be rendered
ineffective for they did not actually create a new obligation or impose a new duty, nor did they attach a
new disability. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad,
G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: In Republic of the Philippines v. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., et. al., the Court likewise
upheld the validity of circulars issued by the Food and Drug Administration despite non-compliance
with the publication requirement for they did not affect substantive rights of the parties they sought to
govern. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No.
204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: Furthermore, We upheld the validity of administrative issuances in Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco for pertaining only to internal rules meant to regulate the
personnel of the GSIS or to a mere directive issued by the National Power Corporation President to his
subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap
ACSR wires, as in National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial, that does not affect the rights of the
public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. (DENR Employees Union and
Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

13
 Accordingly, an administrative regulation can be construed as simply interpretative or
internal in nature, dispensing with the requirement of publication, when its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, however, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter, to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. (DENR Employees Union
and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19,
2021)

[Note: In this case, while the assailed DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5 dated December 26, 2011
was, in fact, published in the Philippine Star, it was done only on February 25, 2012, or two months after
the issuance of the same on December 29, 2011, and two months after the DENR's grant of the CNA
incentive on December 28, 2011. In addition, as certified by the U.P. Law Center-ONAR, the circular was
not filed therewith as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987.

As previously discussed, this would not have mattered had the said circular been merely
interpretative or internal in nature. Unfortunately, however, DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5 cannot be
said to give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed nor can it be said
that it does not affect substantial rights of any person. Prior issuances on the matter of the CNA incentive
merely require that the CNA Incentive shall be derived from savings generated by an agency which are
no longer intended for any specific purpose after all its planned targets, programs, and services for the
year have been accomplished. They do not, however, impose any maximum allowable amount which
government agencies must limit the incentive to. Otherwise put, without the disputed circular, there
would be no maximum allowable amount of P25,000.00 for the CNA incentive per qualified employee. As
such, the circular was issued not to simply interpret the law. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng
mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: Neither was it issued to regulate only the personnel of an administrative agency, nor
issued by an administrative superior concerning guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. The subject circular actually increases the burden of those governed,
encompassing not merely the personnel of a particular administrative agency, such as the DENR in this
case, but employees of all NGAs, SUCs, LGUs, GOCCs, and GFIs in the county. Its publication, therefore,
cannot be dispensed with. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan
v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: In Manila Public School Teachers' Association v. Garcia, the Court invalidated certain
resolutions of the GSIS due to lack of publication. While the GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions
with the U.P. Law Center-ONAR, it only did so after the claims of the retirees and beneficiaries had
already been lodged. More importantly, We rejected the GSIS' claim that said resolutions were simply
interpretative of the statute it sought to implement because they actually increase the burden of GSIS
members. The resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency
includes the GS in the budget, deducts the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and
that the GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga
Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

In like manner, We ruled in Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. that the failure to comply
with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances rendered MOF Circular No.
1-85, as amended, ineffective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as

14
safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

[Note: In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC), We nullified the assailed ERC Order approving the increase of respondent MERALCO's generation
charge from P3.1886 to P3.3213 per kwh effective immediately for having been issued without the
requisite publication. The fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their
respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan
ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: Also, in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, We declared DBM-Corporate Compensation

Circular (CCC) No. 10 to be ineffective due to its non-publication. The circular, which completely
disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and
employees, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. De Jesus taught us that said circular would
have been effective and enforceable had it gone through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran
ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: In National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga, We nullified the Electric Cooperative

Election Code (ECEC) for it was, again, issued without compliance with the publication requirement.
Since said code applies to all electric cooperatives in the country, it cannot be deemed a mere internal
memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should have
complied with the requirements on publication. (DENR Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa
Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

Here, while the subject circular was, indeed, published, the publication came months
after its effectivity. Settled is the rule that a belated publication cannot have retroactive effect of
curing the infirmity attendant in the passage of the administrative regulation. Time and again,
the Court has held that the publication requirement on laws is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of due process. Its omission is tantamount to denying the public of
knowledge and information of the laws that govern it; hence, a violation of due process.
Effectivity of laws, therefore, depends on their publication. Without such notice and publication,
the conclusive presumption cannot apply for laws and rules are to be binding only when their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication. What is required by law, therefore,
is prior publication. The fact that the assailed circular herein was published in the Philippine
Star on February 25, 2012, or two months after the issuance of the same cannot be permitted to
have any curative effect, especially in light of the fact that it aims to impose restrictions on the
grant of the CNA Incentive for the previous fiscal year 2011. (DENR Employees Union and
Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

[Note: On this point, Secretary Abad insists that in any case, the DENR admittedly received a
copy of the assailed circular before the end of FY 2011 or on December 29, 2011. As such, they cannot now
challenge the validity of DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5 for they were given due notice of the same.
Such contention cannot be given credence for as distinctly ruled in Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, the fact that the affected parties were notified of the administrative circular does not
constitute as an exemption from compliance with the publication requirement, xxx. (DENR Employees
Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)]

[Note: All told, while Secretary Abad was duly authorized to issue policy guidelines in the form
of Budget Circular No. 2011-5 that set a P25,000.00 CNA Incentive ceiling, due process dictates that the
same cannot be permitted to retroactively apply to incentives granted before its publication. (DENR
15
Employees Union and Kalipunan ng mga Kawani sa Kagawaran ng Kalikasan v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January
19, 2021)]

Rules Must be Reasonable

Finally, going back to the requisites for the validity of an administrative issuance, the
fourth requisite demands that the administrative issuance must be reasonable.

Executive Order No. 224 is a valid and reasonable exercise of the president's inherent
ordinance-making power.  It provided the necessary rules for the concerned agency to execute
the Philippine Mining Act in relation to the quarry industry of the provinces affected by Mt.
Pinatubo's eruption, without going beyond the bounds of the law it meant to implement.
(Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

Subordinate legislation from specialized administrative agencies must "be germane to

the objects and purposes of the law and . . . in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law” to be held as a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. (Philippine Chamber of
Commerce and Industry v. Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 228588, 229143 & 229453, March 2,
2021)

Interpretation

Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency which is tasked to

implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. (Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432, March 23,
2021)

Quasi-Judicial Power

Jurisdiction

In Unduran v. Aberasturi, the Court held that the NCIP may acquire jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving lands of ancestral domain only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICCs or IPs. If the dispute includes parties who are
non-ICCs or IPs, the regular courts shall have jurisdiction. (Sama y Hinupas v. People, G.R. No.
224469, January 5, 2021)

The CIAC is an arbitral machinery created by Executive Order No. 1008. Disputes within
its jurisdiction are resolved by arbitrators who are chosen on the basis of their competence and
reputation. These arbitrators are not permanently employed by the CIAC and render services
only when called to arbitrate for each dispute. The resolution of controversies which fall under
the CIAC's jurisdiction are done by these arbitrators nominated and/or chosen in according
with the CIAC rules. Upon their appointment and while in the performance of their functions in
accordance with the CIAC's authority under the law, they are, in essence, the embodiment and
16
representation of CIAC, as they are the ones which exercise the latter's quasi-judicial powers.
Necessarily therefore, it is their ruling that is elevated and brought on appeal and are accorded
respect and finality by the court. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's assignment of error
that "the Court cannot review the award of these private individuals," albeit craftly worded, is
misguided and misleading. (Maxim Philippines Operating Corp. v. First Orient Development and
Construction Corp., G.R. No. 240179, February 3, 2021)

Since the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's (CIAC) jurisdiction is

conferred by law, it cannot be subjected to any condition; nor can it be waived or diminished by
the stipulation, act or omission of the parties, as long as the parties agreed to submit their
construction contract dispute to arbitration, or if there is an arbitration clause in the construction
contract. (Datem, Inc. v. Alphaland Makati Place, Inc., G.R. Nos. 242904-05, February 10, 2021)

A dispute between a homeowners association and a non-member homeowner is an

intra-association dispute; thus, jurisdiction belongs to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board. (Garin v. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 216492, January 20, 2021)

Intra-corporate controversies within a corporation registered with the SEC fall within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, pursuant to R.A. No. 8799.
Intra-association disputes within a homeowner's association registered with the HLURB fall
within the latter's jurisdiction, now with HSAC, pursuant to E.O. No. 535, R.A. No. 8763, and
R.A. No. 11201. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court does not have the jurisdiction to proceed
with the prosecution of the Information filed against Melanio Del Castillo and Sandra Bernales,
which was properly quashed by the Court of Appeals. (Francisco v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 236726,
September 14, 2021)

The law and jurisprudence have delineated the powers of the DARAB and the regular
courts, by limiting the former's jurisdiction to the resolution of agrarian disputes. Specifically, an
agrarian dispute is any controversy that relates to tenurial arrangements, be it a leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, involving lands devoted to agriculture. It also includes cases
relating to farm workers' associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
Likewise, it also involves disputes relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee. . (Almazan v. Bacolod, G.R. No. 227529, June 16, 2021)

[Note: Verily, an essential requisite for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case is the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. In turn, a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. Rather, there must be proof that (i) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (ii) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (iii) the parties consented to the
relationship; (iv) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (v) the tenant
or agricultural lessee personally cultivates the land; and (vi) the parties share the harvest. (Almazan v.
Bacolod, G.R. No. 227529, June 16, 2021)]

In other words, the DARAB's lack of authority over special civil actions for
certiorari is not merely attributed to the absence of a statutory grant thereof. Zoleta, in
consonance with Lubrica, clarified further that the power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident
17
of judicial review. DARAB, not being a court of law exercising judicial power, is, therefore,
inherently powerless and incapable by constitutional fiat of acquiring jurisdiction over special
civil actions for certiorari, and issuing writs of certiorari to annul acts of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) or RARAD even when it exercises supervisory powers over
them. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021)

In cases involving the implementation of agrarian laws, the determination of the land's
classification as agricultural or non-agricultural (e.g., industrial, residential, commercial, etc.)
and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption, must be
preliminarily threshed out before the DAR, particularly, the ·DAR .Secretary, pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994. (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Manalang,
G.R. No. 213499, October 13, 2021)

[Note: Applying this to the present case, it cannot be said that the DARAB encroached on the
authority of the DAR Secretary in the latter's determination of which lands fall under the coverage of the
CARP. As correctly explained by the CA, the DARAB, in its Resolution dated December 16, 2011, merely
relied on and adopted the Order of the DAR Secretary which granted SVHFI's previous Application for
Exemption of Lot No. 554-D-3 from the coverage of the CARP. (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v.
Manalang, G.R. No. 213499, October 13, 2021)]

While ordinary courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples in some matters in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, the Commission is
in the best position to decide disputes on ancestral domain between members of the same
indigenous cultural community, being the "primary government agency responsible ... to
promote and protect the rights and well-being of the [indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples] and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights
thereto.” (Daco v. Cabajar, G.R. No. 222611, November 15, 2021)

Proceedings

In Civil Service Commission v. Colanggo, the Court ruled that the CSC, in investigating
complaints against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable in judicial proceedings. In the said case, the Court held that the CSC correctly
appreciated the photocopies of the Philippine Board Examination for Teachers application form,
PSP and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient
evidence to substantiate the charges against respondent. Respondent never objected to the
veracity of their contents, but merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were
not authenticated. (Panarigan v. Civil Service Commission-Regional Office (CSCRO) No. III, G.R. No.
238077, March 17, 2021)

[Note: Thus, just like in this case, the CSC validly considered the photocopies of the PSP and the
examination application receipt in resolving the formal charge against Panarigan, even if not duly
authenticated. (Panarigan v. Civil Service Commission-Regional Office (CSCRO) No. III, G.R. No. 238077,
March 17, 2021)]

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact, factual findings

of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are
accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. The rationale behind this doctrine is that

18
administrative bodies are considered as specialists in their respective fields and can thus resolve
the cases before them with dispatch. (Navotas Industrial Corporation v. Guanzon, G.R. No. 230931,
November 15, 2021)

[Note: Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies. It has been defined as "such amount of relevant evidence [that] a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion." This quantum of evidence "is satisfied
where there is reasonable ground to believe that [a person] is guilty of the act or omission complained of,
even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.” (Navotas Industrial Corporation v. Guanzon, G.R. No.
230931, November 15, 2021)]

Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies

The trial court and the appellate court also correctly considered USHH's Complaint as
an exception to the application of the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies on
the basis of strong public interest.  Alternatively, the instant case may also fall under the
following exceptions: (a) "when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable" and (b) "when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention." (Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, G.R. No.
214485, January 11, 2021)

[Note: USHH's filing of the complaint with the RTC without first exhausting available
administrative remedies is justifiable in light of the denial of its claims by the PHIC's Board itself, the
body superior to the RO or the PARD where USHH was supposed to file an MR or appeal.  To put it
into perspective, "[PHIC's] President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the
President of the Republic while its Board of Directors (the Board) is composed of several cabinet
secretaries (or their permanent representatives) and representatives of different stakeholders."  Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude that the PHIC Board exercises a higher authority than the ROs or the PARD,
and that to file an MR or appeal to it would be futile since the PHIC Board already directed its denial.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, G.R. No. 214485, January 11, 2021)]

Anent the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is well-settled that the filing

of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil
action for certiorari, subject to well-recognized exceptions.  Petitioners failed to show that this
case falls under any of these exceptions. In fact, they not only failed to file a motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, they also failed to show sufficient justification for such
failure. It was only in their motion for reconsideration before the CA that petitioners explained
that they did not move for reconsideration because "to have waited further would have
rendered [their] rights futile and inutile." (Alpha Metal Works v. T&H Gin Queen Labor Union,
T&H Shopfitters Corp. & Gin Queen Corp., G.R. No. 210137, January 12, 2021)

In the oft-cited case of Ty v. Hon. Trampe, the Court held that the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the controversy does not involve questions of
fact but only of law. (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, G.R. No. 215955, January 13, 2021)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, admits of certain

exceptions. With respect to challenges against tax issuances, Banco De Oro recognized the
19
following exceptions: "[the] question involved is purely legal; the urgency of judicial
intervention xxx; and the futility of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance as the latter appeared
to have adopted the challenged Bureau of Internal Revenue rulings." This was reiterated more
recently by the Court in Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, when it
allowed a direct challenge to the tax issuance assailed therein on the ground that "the issue
involved is purely a legal question xxx, or when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention." (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division),
G.R. Nos. 210501, 211294 & 212490, March 15, 2021)

[Note: Indeed, the validity of Document No. M-059-2012 is clearly a legal question that is best left
for the courts to resolve. Furthermore, the necessity of judicial intervention was shown when the CTA
granted the Suspension Orders through its October 22, 2012 and July 15, 2013 Resolutions. In fact, this
Court itself recognized the urgency of judicial intervention when it issued its July 7, 2014 TRO. As such,
the above-exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine similarly attend in this case. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division), G.R. Nos. 210501, 211294 & 212490, March 15, 2021)]

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Treaties

Treaties may effectively implement the constitutional imperative to protect human rights
and consider social justice in all phases of development — but so can a statute, as Republic Act
No. 9851, the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity, does. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)

Within the hierarchy of the Philippine legal system — that is, as instruments akin to
statutes — treaties cannot contravene the Constitution. Moreover, when repugnant to statutes
enacted by Congress, treaties and international agreements must give way. xxx. Thus, a valid
treaty or international agreement may be effective just as a statute is effective. It has the force
and effect of law. Still, statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case of
conflict between a law and a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,
G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that
is inconsistent with a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the
prior statute is amended to be consistent with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty.
It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and is ultimately signed into
law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and legislative
participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the
sovereign's democratically elected representatives in the enactment of statutes. (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines treaties as
"international agreement[s] concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation."
20
 In our jurisdiction, we characterize treaties as "international agreements entered into by
the Philippines which require legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may
include compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts."

Treaties under the Vienna Convention include all written international agreements,
regardless of their nomenclature. In international law, no difference exists in the agreements'
binding effect on states, notwithstanding how nations opt to designate the document.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

However, Philippine law distinguishes treaties from executive agreements.

Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding on the Philippines. However, an
executive agreement: "(a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal;
and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters." Executive agreements dispense with
Senate concurrence "because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded." They
simply implement existing policies, and are thus entered into:

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d'être of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative

authorizations. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: However, this Court had previously stated that this difference in form is immaterial in
international law: The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in
international agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of
international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty — which connotes a formal,
solemn instrument — to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification. An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement,
concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact,
charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form. Consequently,
under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an
executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: This Court also cautioned that this local affectation does not mean that the constitutionally
required Senate concurrence may be conveniently disregarded:

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties,
international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive.
There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and
translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under
the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of
executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
21
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not
expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties
are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely
executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being
on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are
inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this
discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the
Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws[.] (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos.
238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

Though both are sources of international law, treaties must be distinguished from
generally accepted principles of international law.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the

sources of international law:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules

expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.

Two constitutional provisions incorporate or transform portions of international law into

the domestic sphere, namely: (1) Article II, Section 2, which embodies the incorporation method;
and (2) Article VII, Section 21, which covers the transformation method. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,
G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution declares that international custom and general
principles of law are adopted as part of the law of the land. No further act is necessary to
facilitate this xxx. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: Thus, generally accepted principles of international law include international customs and
general principles of law. Under the incorporation clause, these principles form part of the law of the
land. And, "by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law."(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: [G]enerally accepted principles of international law form part of Philippine laws even if
they do not derive from treaty obligations of the Philippines. xxx

Some customary international laws have been affirmed and embodied in treaties and
conventions. A treaty constitutes evidence of customary law if it is declaratory of customary law, or if it is
intended to codify customary law. In such a case, even a State not party to the treaty would be bound
22
thereby. A treaty which is merely a formal expression of customary international law is enforceable on all
States because of their membership in the family of nations. For instance, the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations is binding even on non-party States because the provisions of the Convention are
mostly codified rules of customary international law binding on all States even before their codification
into the Vienna Convention. Another example is the Law of the Sea, which consists mostly of codified
rules of customary international law, which have been universally observed even before the Law of the
Sea was ratified by participating States.

Corollarily, treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States which are
not parties to treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely
accepted for years by many States, may transform into customary international laws, in which case, they
bind even non-signatory States. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16,
2021)]

[Note: In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that even in the absence of the Constitution,
generally accepted principles of international law remain part of the laws of the Philippines. During the
interregnum, or the period after the actual takeover of power by the revolutionary government in the
Philippines, following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution), the 1973 Philippine Constitution was abrogated and
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.
Nevertheless, this Court ruled that even during this period, the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, remained in effect in the country. The Covenant and Declaration are based on generally
accepted principles of international law which are applicable in the Philippines even in the absence of a
constitution, as during the interregnum. Consequently, applying the provisions of the Covenant and the
Declaration, the Filipino people continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights
despite the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by 120 members of the
United Nations (UN) on 17 July 1998. It entered into force on 1 July 2002, after 60 States became party to
the Statute through ratification or accession. The adoption of the Rome Statute fulfilled the international
community's long-time dream of creating a permanent international tribunal to try serious international
crimes. The Rome Statute, which established an international criminal court and formally declared
genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity as serious international crimes, codified
generally accepted principles of international law, including customary international laws. The principles
of law embodied in the Rome Statute were already generally accepted principles of international law
even prior to the adoption of the Statute. Subsequently, the Rome Statute itself has been widely accepted
and, as of November 2010, it has been ratified by 114 states, 113 of which are members of the UN.

There are at present 192 members of the UN. Since 113 member states have already ratified the
Rome Statute, more than a majority of all the UN members have now adopted the Rome Statute as part of
their municipal laws. Thus, the Rome Statute itself is generally accepted by the community of nations as
constituting a body of generally accepted principles of international law. The principles of law found in
the Rome Statute constitute generally accepted principles of international law enforceable in the
Philippines under the Philippine Constitution. The principles of law embodied in the Rome Statute are
binding on the Philippines even if the Statute has yet to be ratified by the Philippine Senate. In short, the
principles of law enunciated in the Rome Statute are now part of Philippine domestic law pursuant to
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. (J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion in Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 325-329 (2011) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc], cited in Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos.
238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

23
 Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, treaties become "valid and
effective" upon the Senate's concurrence xxx. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)

Article VII, Section 21 provides for legislative involvement in making treaties and
international agreements valid and effective, that is, by making Senate concurrence a necessary
condition. From this, two points are discernible: ( 1) that there is a difference in the extent of
legislative participation in enacting laws as against rendering a treaty or international
agreement valid and effective; and ,(2) that Senate concurrence, while a necessary condition, is
not in itself a sufficient condition for the validity and effectivity of treaties. xxx. The second
point proceeds from the first. The validity and effectivity of a treaty rests on its being in
harmony with the Constitution and statutes. The Constitution was ratified through a direct act
of the sovereign Filipino people voting in a plebiscite; statutes are adopted through concerted
action by their elected representatives. Senate concurrence is the formal act that renders a treaty
or international agreement effective, but it is not, in substance, the sole criterion for validity and
effectivity. Ultimately, a treaty must conform to the Constitution and statutes. (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Napoles likewise argues that the worldwide call for the temporary release of PDLs due to the threats posed
by COVID-19,  and Rule 24 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
provide a legal ground for her release. 

Notably, neither the Nelson Mandela Rules, the Bureau of Corrections Act of 2013, nor
the worldwide trend to decongest jail facilities due to COVID-19, support the release of PDLs
pending the appeal of their conviction of a capital offense. Thus, Napoles failed to allege, much
less prove, any source of right under the international or domestic laws, to warrant her
temporary release. (People v. Napoles, G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)

[Note: On the other hand, the release of PDLs in foreign jurisdictions as a response to COVID-19
is restricted and unavailing to high-risk inmates or those who are considered a danger to the society.
While it is true that several countries have implemented release programs for prisoners to prevent the
spread of COVID-19 virus, these initiatives are subject to exceptions. In Afghanistan, the members of
Islamist Militant Group are not included. In Indonesia, those released were mostly juvenile offenders and
those who already served at least two-thirds of their sentences. In Iran, only low-risk and non-violent
offenders serving short sentences are released. In Morocco, the prisoners were selected based on their
health, age, conduct, and length of detention, and were granted pardon. In United Kingdom, high-risk
inmates convicted of violent or sexual offenses, or of national security concern, or a danger to children
were excluded. It must be stressed that the release of prisoners in other jurisdictions was made upon the
orders of their Chief Executives.  (People v. Napoles, G.R. No. 247611, January 13, 2021)]

The first mode of designation is but an implementation of the country's standing

obligation under international law to enforce anti-terrorism and related measures, and the Court
is not convinced that the automatic adoption by the ATC of the designation or listing made by
the UNSC is violative of the due process clause or an encroachment of judicial power. Further,
the adoption of the Consolidated List is in accord with the doctrine of incorporation, as
expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, whereby the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. In
this regard, it is important to remember that UNSCR No. 1373 was issued by the UNSC as an act
24
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in response to "threats to international peace and
security caused by terrorist acts." Under the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has
committed to the preservation of international peace. As such, the adoption of the UNSCR No.
1373 finds basis in the Constitution. xxx

While the Court is not prepared to state here that the practice and process of designation
as a counterterrorism measure has ripened to the status of customary international law, it is very
obvious from the foregoing and from other issuances emanating from the UN and its organs
that there is an underlying acknowledgment, first, of the need to prevent, and the duty of
member States to prevent, terrorism; second, that cooperation between States is necessary to
suppress terrorism; and third, that member States should adopt effective and practical measures
to prevent its commission. It is not lost on the Court that UNSCR No. 1373 uses such language
to the effect that the UNSC has decided that all States shall carry out the actions and implement
the policies enumerated therein, which is highly indicative of the generally binding nature of
the issuance.

The Court would also venture to say here that the automatic adoption by the ATC of the
UNSC Consolidated List is surely not an exercise of either judicial or quasi-judicial power, as it
only affirms the applicability of the sanctions under the relevant UNSC resolutions within
Philippine jurisdiction, as existing under Philippine law. In automatically adopting the
designation pursuant to UNSCR No. 1373, the ATC does not exercise any discretion to accept or
deny the listing, and it will not wield any power nor authority to determine the corresponding
rights and obligations of the designee. Instead, it merely confirms a finding already made at the
level of the UNSC, and affirms the applicability of sanctions existing in present laws. It is thus in
this perspective that the Court finds that the Congress, in enacting the first mode of designation
as an acceptable counterterrorism measure, has a compelling state interest to achieve and only
implements the obligations the country has assumed as a member of the international
community. xxx. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613,
252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765,
252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018,
253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Social Justice

Verily, the Court has applied the principles of social justice in COA disallowances.
Specifically, in the 2000 case of Uy v. Commission on Audit (Uy), the Court made the following
pronouncements in overturning the COA's decision:

. . . Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. Rightly, we have stressed that social justice legislation, to be truly
meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by
long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the
least inconvenience. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living
reality. Social justice would be a meaningless term if an element of rigidity would be affixed to
the procedural precepts. Flexibility should not be ruled out. Precisely, what is sought to be
accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is the

25
 effectiveness of the community's effort to assist the economically underprivileged. For under
existing conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able to secure
justice for themselves. To make them suffer, even inadvertently, from the effect of a judicial
ruling, which perhaps they could not have anticipated when such deplorable result could be
avoided, would be to disregard what the social justice concept stands for.

The pronouncements in Uy illustrate the Court's willingness to consider social justice in

disallowance cases. These considerations may be utilized in assessing whether there may be an
exception to the rule on solutio indebiti so that the return may be excused altogether. As Justice
Inting correctly pointed out, "each disallowance case is unique, inasmuch as the facts behind,
nature of the amounts involved, and individuals so charged in one notice of disallowance are
hardly ever the same with any other." (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
224182, March 2, 2021)

Youth

As for the rights of a child, Article 3, paragraph 8 of PD 603 states that a child has the
right to be protected against circumstances prejudicial to his or her physical, mental, emotional,
social, and moral well-being. Article 8 thereof enunciates that a child's welfare shall be
the paramount consideration in his or her education, xxx.

Likewise, Article 13 of PD 603 specifies that a child's social and emotional growth shall
be ensured in the school, among other agencies, to promote the child's welfare, xxx.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) to which the
Philippines is a signatory likewise recognizes a child's fundamental right to dignity and
self-worth and that disciplinary measures in the school should conform with this right. (St.
Benedict Childhood Education Centre, Inc. v. San Jose, G.R. No. 225991, January 13, 2021)

Women

In a foreign divorce between a Filipino and an alien, it is immaterial which spouse

initiated the divorce proceedings abroad in light of the fundamental equality of women and
men before the law. Once a divorce decree is issued by a competent foreign court, the alien
spouse is deemed to have obtained the divorce as required in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
(Abel v. Rule, G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021)

Writ of Kalikasan

A petition for writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy classified as a special civil

action under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC). Under Section 1, Rule 7 of
the RPEC:

Section 1. Nature of the Writ. — The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any
public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of
persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
26
 threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

The essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan are: (1) there is an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual
or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to
an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. As a rule, the party claiming the privilege bears
the onus of proving the requisites listed above. (Villar v. Alltech Contractors, Inc., G.R. No. 208702,
May 11, 2021)

[Note: Therefore, as a rule, any of the perceived irregularities in the issuance of the proposed
project's ECC should be the subject of an appeal to the proper reviewing authority instead of a petition for
writ of kalikasan. Any alleged irregularity in the process undertaken to obtain the ECC should be
threshed out in the proper forum before the appropriate reviewing authorities. (Villar v. Alltech
Contractors, Inc., G.R. No. 208702, May 11, 2021)]

[Note: Nevertheless, in Paje v. Casiño, the Court already recognized that the validity of an ECC
may be challenged via a writ of kalikasan. The Court, speaking through the ponencia of former Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, explained that:

The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the

constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of
a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes
the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege
and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of
the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed
outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable purposes of
the writ against those who seek to abuse it.

Unfortunately, while petitioners raised alleged irregularities in the issuance of the ECC
(i.e., the use of an improper form of assessment study, lack of public hearing and consultation,
and absence of a project alternative), these are not material and necessary due to the nature of the
proposed project. Therefore, no compelling reason was presented to warrant the intervention of
the Court. (Villar v. Alltech Contractors, Inc., G.R. No. 208702, May 11, 2021)]

The writ of kalikasan is not a remedy that may be availed when there is no actual threat
or when the imminence of danger is not apparent to justify judicial intervention. To Our mind,
the writ of kalikasan should only be availed in extraordinary circumstances that require the
immediate attention of the Court and cannot be arbitrarily invoked when remedies are available
in administrative agencies to properly address and resolve concerns involving protection of
ecological rights. (Villar v. Alltech Contractors, Inc., G.R. No. 208702, May 11, 2021)

27
 The precautionary principle is one of the key features introduced in the RPEC wherein
the burden of proof is shifted to the proponent of a project to dispel concerns regarding
potential harmful impacts of a project to the environment. Section 1, Rule 20 of the RPEC states:

Section 1. Applicability. — When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a

causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given
the benefit of the doubt.

It is not meant to apply to all environmental cases. Essential to the application of the
precautionary principle is the presence of scientific uncertainty. (Villar v. Alltech Contractors, Inc.,
G.R. No. 208702, May 11, 2021)

[Note: In the present case, We find no reason to apply the precautionary principle to favor Villar
as the proponent had sought the assistance of experts to allay the concerns of stakeholders who will be
affected by the implementation of the proposed project. As explained by the CA, the threat was not
established and the volumes of data generated by objective and expert analyses ruled out the scientific
uncertainty of the nature and scope of the anticipated threat. (Villar v. Alltech Contractors, Inc., G.R. No.
208702, May 11, 2021)]

Anent the substantive requirements, the petition failed to identify the environmental
laws violated or threatened to be violated, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as
to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces to
warrant the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. Likewise, the petition did not demonstrate the
public officers' unlawful neglect to perform an act enjoined explicitly by environmental laws to
support his request for the issuance of a Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Nepomuceno's
invocation of the State's responsibilities to protect and advance the people's right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and preserve and protect the environment, without identifying the
respondents' unlawful act or omission, is insufficient to justify the issuance of the writs prayed
for. Notably, the petition is not supported by any material evidence other than online articles
discussing the proposed vaccination center. Verily, unverified news articles on the internet are
hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value. All told, the
petition is insufficient both in form and substance. (Nepomuceno v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256207, June
15, 202)

It is settled that magnitude of environmental damage is a condition sine qua non in a

petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition. So
extraordinary is the nature of the remedy of a writ of kalikasan that this Court, in promulgating
the RPEC, has expressly reserved its issuance only for cases which are sufficiently grave in
terms of territorial scope. (Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin, Sulog, Inc. v. King Energy
Generation, Inc., G.R. No. 213426 (Resolution), June 29, 2021)

[Note: Here, after listing the allegedly "innumerable" safety, health and environmental hazards
posed by the diesel power plant, petitioners failed to allege how its construction would cause damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. They instead rely on the application of the precautionary principle to cure this defect in their
petitions. The precautionary principle, however, finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence and
28
bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. It does not and
should not be made to supply allegations where there are none. The defect in petitioners' pleading
becomes even more apparent when they went on to argue that it would be unfair to deny the benefit of
the writ of kalikasan to the inhabitants of Camiguin solely on account of the island's "unique" location
("far from the nearest cities or provinces"). (Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin, Sulog, Inc. v. King
Energy Generation, Inc., G.R. No. 213426 (Resolution), June 29, 2021)]

[Note: Moreover, parties that seek the issuance of the writ of kalikasan, whether on their own or
on others' behalf, carry the burden of substantiating the writ's elements. Before they proceed with the
case, they must be ready with the evidence necessary for the determination of the writ's issuance. Here,
an examination of the petition filed before the CA readily shows that petitioners were unable to meet the
burden of proving their entitlement to the writ of kalikasan prayed for. Apart from citing a purported
Press Release issued by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) on the association
between cancer and diesel exposure, as well as a Wikipedia article on the advantages and disadvantages
of diesel engines vis-á-vis spark ignition engines, they offered no other evidence to substantiate the
alleged safety, health and environmental damage caused (or to be caused) by the construction of the
diesel power plant to the residents of Camiguin. Petitioners are also reminded of this Court's ruling in
Paje v. Casiño that lack of approval of the concerned sanggunians over the subject project (pursuant to
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC) "would not lead to or is not reasonably connected with environmental
damage but, rather, it is an affront to the local autonomy of LGUs."

Neither have petitioners made a case sufficient to warrant the issuance of a writ of continuing
mandamus. (Citizens for a Green and Peaceful Camiguin, Sulog, Inc. v. King Energy Generation, Inc., G.R. No.
213426 (Resolution), June 29, 2021)]

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Laws

Once enacted into law, a bill is not rendered inoperative by the absence of its own
implementing rules. Every law carries in its favor a presumption of validity. So long as the law
is susceptible of reasonable construction as to what it is and how it is applied, the law, for all
intents and purposes, is binding and enforceable. (Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. v. International
Copra Export Corp., G.R. Nos. 218485-86, 218493-97, 218487, 218498-503, 218488-90, 218504-07,
218491, 218508-13 & 218523-29 , April 28, 2021)

Notwithstanding the belated enactment of R.A. No. 11223 in 2019, the Court regarded
the law as a curative statute which should be retroactively applied to this case and to all
pending cases. As a curative statute, it is intended to correct defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws and curb certain evils. Further, curative statutes "enable persons to carry into effect
that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that
which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid." Stated differently, R.A. No. 11223
serves as a curative statute that remedies the deficiency of R.A. No. 7305 with respect to
erroneously classifying petitioner's personnel as public health workers. (Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)

29
 In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the determination of the President that
terrorism is an emergency, in order to certify a bill as urgent, which Congress has not seen fit to
controvert and has, in fact, accepted such certification as valid similar to the finding in Tolentino,
is something which the Court should not disturb. Additionally, the Court recognizes the
pressing need for the country to enact more effective counter-measures against terrorism and
terrorism financing, the lack of which has been repeatedly flagged by international evaluation
groups to which the Philippines belongs. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579,
252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747,
252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916,
252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420,
December 7, 2021)

Qualifications

The 1987 Constitution requires Members of the House to be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, the Local Government Code (LGC) requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for an elective local official. Hence, Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed, not only at the time of election or assumption of office, but
during the officer's entire tenure. (Piccio v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
248985, October 5, 2021)

[Note: Hence, in order that a natural-born Filipino citizen, who has lost his or her Filipino
citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad, may qualify to run for elective public office in the
Philippines, must 1) re-acquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. It is beyond
dispute that Vergara, a natural-born Filipino citizen who was later naturalized as an American citizen,
had complied with the second requisite. The contest lies as to whether she had observed the first. The
HRET found that the pieces of evidence adduced in the case unmistakably show that Vergara had duly
filed a petition for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 and sufficiently
complied with the requirements of the law, and that this resulted in the granting of such petition by the
BI and the corresponding issuance in her favor of an IC. In short, the HRET found that Vergara had duly
re-acquired her Philippine citizenship by observing the requirements of the law, foremost of which is the
taking of the Oath of Allegiance. The Court agrees. (Piccio v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 248985, October 5, 2021)]

Term Limits

Petitioners assert that respondent Commission on Elections failed to enforce these provisions
when it allowed senators and members of the House of Representatives to run for the same office after
exceeding the two-and three-term limits. They conclude that respondent tolerated this scheme by allowing
the elective officials to run for reelection. Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Mandamus before this
Court, citing the Commission on Elections' ministerial duty under Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the
Constitution to "[ e ]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."

Petitioners argue that senators and members of the House of Representatives should not be
permitted to run for office after maxing out the term limit. They assert that the Constitution does not

30
allow termed out officials to run for office again after having respite or "hiatus." The Constitution does
not permit a third and fourth term for Senators and Representatives, respectively.

Clearly, the prohibition and term limit refers to consecutive terms. While the provisions
do not textually provide the terms "hibernation, hiatus, or rest period," the usage of the word
"consecutive" indicates that the term limit and prohibition only applies to reelection for an
immediately subsequent term. The interpretation of petitioners is an extra-textual reading of the
Constitution. What the Constitution clearly prohibits is the reelection for more than two or three
consecutive terms of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. (Cabigao v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247806, November 9, 2021)

Party-Lists

At any rate, we have already discussed in the assailed Decision that the Constitution
does not prescribe absolute proportionality in distributing seats to party-lists, organizations, or
coalitions. On the contrary, Congress is given wide latitude of discretion in setting the
parameters for determining the actual volume and allocation of party-list representation in the
House of Representatives. (ANGKLA v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246816, December 7,
2021)

The intention behind the proviso is clear - only the two-percenters were supposed to
participate in the second round of seat allocation and with full votes at that. This can be
deduced from the language of the proviso which originally allocated seats only to those
"garnering more than two percent (2 %) of the votes." (ANGKLA v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 246816, December 7, 2021)

Allowing the two-percenters to participate in the second round of seat allocation with
full votes does not result in double-counting of votes. (ANGKLA v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 246816, December 7, 2021)

Electoral Tribunals

A cursory reading of the foregoing unmistakably would show that the SET has no
express, inherent or implied power to declare void or unconstitutional Section 6.9 of the AES
Contracts, which requires the protestant to shoulder the retention costs. The authority of the
SET is limited to matters affecting the validity of the protestant's title. While it may be true that
the SET has the power to control its proceedings, such power cannot, by any means, be
construed as including the power to interpret much less invalidate a contract between third
parties. Thus, any issue concerning the contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM is
beyond the jurisdiction and constitutional mandate of the SET. To rule otherwise is to
overstretch if not to go astray from the interpretation of the SET's constitutional grant of
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the Senate, as laid down in Javier. (Tolentino v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 248005, May 11, 2021)

[Note: Indeed, to properly assail the disputed provision, petitioner should have instituted a direct
action for its nullity before the regular courts, instead of collaterally attacking the same in his election

31
protest before the SET. Had the SET passed upon this issue, it would have acted beyond its authority as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Tolentino v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 248005, May 11, 2021)]

Firstly, the jurisdiction of the SET to take cognizance over the instant petition, to the
exclusion of other tribunals, is clear. It is the SET which has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all matters relating to the alleged irregularities in the canvassing of election returns
and nullity of the proclamation of the 12 winning senatorial candidates. To delve on these
matters would be to usurp on the clear, complete and categorical authority bestowed upon the
SET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the Senate. As succinctly held in Barbers, any pursuit by the Court to assume
jurisdiction would be tantamount to an encroachment of the constitutional functions of the SET.
(Penson v. Commission on Elections Constituted as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators and
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211636, September 28, 2021)

Secondly, it cannot be overemphasized that a special civil action for certiorari is a limited
form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. xxx.

Here, petitioners should have timely filed an election protest before the SET, which We
stress is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, before invoking the Court's discretionary power
of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners failed to prove that the
election protest before the SET is an inadequate remedy that would not promptly relieve them
from the effects of the assailed COMELEC-NBOC's issuances. Thus, the existence and
availability of such remedy precludes them from resorting directly to this Court via a petition
for certiorari. (Penson v. Commission on Elections Constituted as the National Board of Canvassers for
Senators and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211636, September 28, 2021)

[Note: Petitioners, however, contend that the jurisdiction of the SET in election "contests" is
limited only to disputes between two contending parties whereby one challenges the validity of the
other's election or qualification with the intention of replacing the former in his/her position. Since they
do not seek to replace the winning senatorial candidates, they claim that the jurisdiction over the case
rests with this Court and not with the SET.

We do not agree. xxx.

Thus, in the leading case of Javier v. COMELEC (Javier), the Court expounded on the phrase
"election, returns and qualifications" in relation to the quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC conferred
upon it under the 1973 Constitution:

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

In the same case, the Court, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, has shed light on the meaning
of the term "contests" in relation to the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions. He clarified that "contests"
32
should not be confined to its restrictive meaning but should be given a wide possible scope of
construction as to encompass contentions involving a claim or title to the office without due regard to the
contestant's claim to such office:

[T]he term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C, section 2(2) was incorporated
in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the
same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into consideration when the
1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contest included the quo warranto petition that could be
filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was
himself not claiming the office involved.

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the 1973 Constitution should be
interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to
any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of
the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute.

The interpretation laid down in Javier is actually a departure from the traditional concept of
election "contests" which used to be confined to "statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only
to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office."

Notably, while the pronouncements in Javier was (sic) decided under the auspices of the 1973
Constitution, the same remains instructive on the extent of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction
bestowed upon the electoral tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. In fact, the constitutional language
has not changed. The jurisdiction vested to (sic) the SET and HRET was similar to that of the COMELEC
under the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "contests" in Javier, pertaining to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC still applies in interpreting SET's jurisdiction under the 1987
Constitution. Accordingly, petitioners attempt to narrowly define election contests as disputes between
two contending parties whereby one intends to replace the other is bereft of merit. (Penson v. Commission
on Elections Constituted as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators and Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
211636, September 28, 2021)]

[Note: All told, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain much less resolve, the matters raised in
the main petition and petition-in-intervention. The issues advanced therein are matters best addressed to
the sound judgment and discretion of the SET, which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on it. At the risk of
being repetitive, the power of the SET is full, clear and complete. It excludes the exercise of any authority
on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. This is in
recognition and faithful adherence to the constitutional mandate that the Electoral Tribunal of each House
of Congress shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members." (Penson v. Commission on Elections Constituted as the National Board of Canvassers
for Senators and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 211636, September 28, 2021)]

… the HRET is made by no less than the Constitution to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the members of the House. The use of the
word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. The authority
conferred upon it is full, clear and complete and its jurisdiction is original and exclusive. (Piccio
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 248985, October 5, 2021)

[Note: …the only vehicle to challenge a decision of the HRET by a finding of it having gravely
abused its discretion in so deciding -may not be used to correct mere errors in the HRET's evidence and
factual findings. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative body like the

33
HRET over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such
matters. Thus, its findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the
courts. (Piccio v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 248985, October 5, 2021)]

Appropriations

"The power to appropriate belongs to Congress, while the responsibility of releasing

appropriations belongs to the DBM."  But this does not hold true for the BSP. The BSP does not
receive its budget from the national government through the GAA. In stark contrast with other
government agencies, the BSP is not reliant on Congress for budgetary appropriation. It is the
MB which crafts the BSP's annual budget to ensure the effective administration and operations
of the BSP and its subsidiaries. (Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2,
2021)

Transfer of Savings

We focus on the third element, i.e., whether there exists an item in the NCIP's budget for
2012 which was deficient, thus, may be augmented by savings from its 2011 budget.

By Letter dated September 16, 2013 addressed to State Auditor Helenita R. Aguilar,
NCIP admitted that its scholarship program under its Human Resource Development Plan
(HRDP), albeit initially proposed by the agency for its FY 2012 budget, was disapproved by the
DBM because it was not a priority project of the agency. Consequently, the HRDP project and
the corresponding funds therefor were not among the items approved under the 2012 General
Appropriations Act, specifically with respect to the budget of the NCIP. In other words, the
proposed HRDP is just that: a mere proposal, sans any funding. Hence, there can be no
augmentation from the savings for an item or project that was not included in the approved
budget of the agency. xxx. In sum, the so called augmentation of the NCIP's scholarship
program is utterly devoid of legal basis. Consequently, the COA Proper did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it sustained the Notice of Disallowance No. 2013-001 issued by the
COA Audit Team corresponding to P1,462,358.04, 33 the amount paid by NCIP to the ADMU.
(Bilibli v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 231871, July 6, 2021)

[Note: Sanchez v. Commission on Audit is in point: As regards the requirement that there be an item
to be augmented, which is also a sine qua non like the first requirement on the existence of savings, there
was no item for augmentation in the appropriation for the Office of the President at the time of the
transfers in question. Augmentation denotes that an appropriation was determined to be deficient after
the implementation of the project or activity for which an appropriation was made, or after an evaluation
of the needed resources. To say that the existing items in the appropriation for the Office of the President
already needed augmentation as early as 31 January 1992 is putting the cart before the horse. xxx The
absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the
profligate spending thereof. With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the
Fund to the Office of the President could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor
proof that the amount transferred was savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which the transfer was made. (Bilibli v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 231871, July 6, 2021)]

Section 30

34
 Contrary to Spouses Figueroa's stance, the Fabian ruling does not render void all items in
Section 27 of RA No. 6770. The only provision affected is the last paragraph which provides that
"in all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court." This portion was rendered invalid
because it violated Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution proscribing the enactment of a
statute which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and
concurrence. In other words, the only effect of the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court
of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal from
Ombudsman's decisions in administrative disciplinary cases, which are not final and
unappealable. All other matters in Section 27 of RA No. 6770 remain binding, such as the
reglementary period of five days from notice for filing a motion for reconsideration. (Figueroa v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215695 (Notice), March 3, 2021)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Presidential Immunity

Settled is the rule that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
during his/her tenure. This immunity from suit applies to President Rodrigo Duterte (President
Duterte) regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him for as long as he sits as the
President of the Republic of the Philippines. In the case of De Lima v. President Duterte, Senator
Leila De Lima (Senator De Lima) sued President Rodrigo Roa Duterte in a petition for a writ of
habeas data seeking to enjoin the latter from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to
life, liberty and security. In her petition, Senator De Lima argued that President Duterte is not
entitled to immunity from suit, especially from a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data, because his actions and statements were unlawful or made outside of his official conduct.
The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the immunity of the sitting President is
absolute, and it extends to all suits, including petitions for the writ of amparo and writ of habeas
data, and that the present suit is the distraction that the immunity seeks to prevent because it
will surely distract the President from discharging his duties as the Chief Executive. In resolving
the petition, this Court pronounced that presidential immunity applies regardless of the nature
of the suit brought against an incumbent President. (Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838
(Resolution), May 11, 2021)

Our ruling in De Lima v. Duterte is clear: the President is immune from suit during his
incumbency, regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him. Petitioner named President
Duterte as the sole respondent in this case. For this reason, this suit should be dismissed
outright. Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court was inclined to overlook this fatal flaw
and consider the case filed against the Executive Secretary, as the representative of the
President, if only to save the petition from perfunctory dismissal, a writ of mandamus would
still not lie in petitioner's favor. (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288 (Resolution), July 29, 2021)

Power of Control

…the president's inherent ordinance-making power is not a delegated authority from the
legislature, but is a consequence of executive control over officials of the executive branch. In
35
the exercise of executive control, the president has the inherent power to adopt rules and
regulations and delegate this power to subordinate executive officials. (Province of Pampanga v.
Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

Nonetheless, the president also exercises an inherent ordinance-making prerogative,

which forms part of the power of executive control. ABAKADA Guro Party List v.
Purisima  expounds: 

Apart from whatever rule-making power that Congress may delegate to the President,
the latter has inherent ordinance powers covering the executive branch as part of the power of
executive control ("The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices . . . " Section 17, Article VII, Constitution). By its nature, this ordinance power does not
require or entail delegation from Congress. Such faculty must be distinguished from the authority
to issue implementing rules to legislation which does not inhere in the presidency but instead, as
explained earlier, is delegated by Congress. 

In differentiating the delegated legislative power from the ordinance-making

power, ABAKADA Guro Party List is enlightening. It explains that under the delegated
legislative authority, the power to issue implementing rules creates rights and obligations that
affect the public at large, while the ordinance-making power is the authority to issue
"intrabranch orders and instructions or internal rules for the executive branch," which do not
bind the public. This is why implementing rules and regulations are subject to the rule of
publication for their effectivity, while internal rules or instructions in the executive department
are not.  (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

[Note: As shown below, in no way is Executive Order No. 224 an ultra vires act. It is a valid
exercise of the president's ordinance-snaking power. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987,
January 12, 2021)]

Petitioners then advanced the argument that the grant of the PIB through Board
Resolution No. 2009-72 was deemed authorized by the President considering that the NPC
Board is comprised of cabinet secretaries who are alter egos of the President. They are mistaken.
When the cabinet secretaries approved Board Resolution No. 2009-72, they did not act as
alter egos of the President, but as members of the NPC Board in their ex officio capacity under
the EPIRA.  Hence, their assent to the grant of the PIB cannot be deemed as the required
approval of the President. (National Power Corp. Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
218052, January 26, 2021)
[Note: In the recent case of National Power Corporation Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, the
Court distinguished the department secretaries' functions as cabinet members and those performed in ex
officio capacity, in relation to the alter ego doctrine or the doctrine of qualified political agency:
[T]he doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to
the Cabinet. xxx Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason
of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as
36
the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine that already delegates an
enormous amount of power. Also, it is settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly
inferred. (National Power Corp. Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218052, January 26,
2021)]

As a matter of course, GOCCs are always subject to the supervision and control of the
President. The Revised Administrative Code further elaborates that GOCCs are part of the
executive department for they are attached to the appropriate department with which they have
allied functions. In Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) v. Commission on Audit, this Court
has aptly emphasized that under our system of government, all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. Such principle is
embodied in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution xxx. (Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)

[Note: Invariably, its very nature as a GOCC dictates that while it may have the mandate to fix
the compensation of its personnel, the President may nevertheless exercise the powers of supervision and
control over it by approving its grant of allowances and other benefits, pursuant to P.D. No. 1597.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)]

Notably, the Bureau of Immigration is an office which forms part of the executive branch
of the government. As part of the executive department, the Commissioner of Immigration is
subject to the presidential power of control. xxx. Corollary to this power of presidential control
is the doctrine of qualified political agency. xxx.

In this case, pursuant to then President Aquino's directive, the alter egos of the
President, particularly the economic managers' cabinet cluster, held a meeting to discuss the
employees' overtime issue at airports. During their meeting, it was recognized that the practice
of airline companies paying for government employees' overtime services was viewed as an
irregular activity deterrent to the tourism industry. They then adopted the 24/7 shifting policy
and issued the assailed Memorandum and Letter of Instruction.

Thus, the 24/7 shifting policy adopted by the alter egos of the President remains valid
until and unless reversed by the Chief Executive. (Tendenilla v. Purisima, G.R. No. 210904,
November 24, 2021)

Execution of Laws

Ultimately, the decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily,
diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government. While we are loath to give
a "blank check" especially where the risk of grave abuse of discretion may be high, we cannot
have an "entrammeled executive" who will be ill-equipped to face the "amorphous threat[s] and
perpetrators whose malign intent may be impossible to know until they strike." The
Constitution vests executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect the
Philippines, and conduct foreign affairs, in the President- not this Court. Barring violations of
the limits provided by law and the Constitution, we should take care not to substitute our
exercise of discretion for his. As "the branch that knows least about the national security
concerns that the subject entails," we cannot, in the words of Justice Scalia, just simply "blunder
in." (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288 (Resolution), July 29, 2021)

37
 [Note: Petitioner submits that it is the ministerial duty of the President, as part of his mandate to
enforce the laws and see to their faithful execution, to "defend" the national territory by going before the
United Nations (UN) to ask the latter to send "UN Patrol Boats xxx to protect our fishermen." It is also
petitioner's view that the Philippines should "sue China with (sic) the International Court of Justice [(ICJ)]
and demand that China should pay for the Kalayaan Islands which it took from us for trillions of Dollars
in damages."

For all his posturing, however, petitioner has failed to point to any law that specifically requires
the President to go to the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). Neither has he shown a clear and unmistakable constitutional or statutory provision which
prescribes how the President is to respond to any threat (actual or imminent) from another State to our
sovereignty or exercise of our sovereign rights.

Petitioner himself noted that a case had in fact been filed by the Philippines to vindicate its rights
in the West Philippine Sea. In 2013, after years of unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement through
political and diplomatic channels and amid rising tensions in the region, Former President Benigno S.
Aquino decided to avail of the legal mechanism under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). He was under no obligation, certainly not one coercible via a writ of mandamus, to file a
case against China. Taking China to binding arbitration was risky, as it could potentially damage relations
with a major trading partner. On 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal issued an Award overwhelmingly in
favor of claims by the Philippines and ultimately bringing some clarity to the overlapping claims in the
area.

If President Duterte now sees fit to take a different approach with China despite said ruling, this
does not by itself mean that he has, as petitioner suggests, unlawfully abdicated his duty to protect and
defend our national territory, correctible with the issuance by this Court of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus. Being the Head of State, he is free to use his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to
his country in his political character and to his own conscience. (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288
(Resolution), July 29, 2021)]

Diplomatic Power
The president, as primary architect of our foreign policy and as head of state, is allowed
by the Constitution to make preliminary determinations on what, at any given moment, might
urgently be required in order that our foreign policy may manifest our national interest.

Absent a clear and convincing showing of a breach of the Constitution or a law, brought
through an actual, live controversy and by a party that presents direct, material, and substantial
injury as a result of such breach, this Court will stay its hand in declaring a diplomatic act as
unconstitutional. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Indeed, the President is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the
islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or
jurisdiction. By constitutional fiat and the intrinsic nature of his office, the President is also the
sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.

In Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., this Court had occasion to discuss the President's foreign affairs
power:

38
 As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect
of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the
country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the
Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and
develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into
international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations;
and settles international disputes with other states.

xxx xxx xxx

This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this
discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the
Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws.

The Court thereafter proceeded to list the following constitutional restrictions to the
President's foreign affairs powers:

a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory;

b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress;
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a
majority of all the Members of Congress;
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that
must be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board;
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate; and
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is
required, should the form of the government chosen be a treaty.

In addition to treaty-making, the President also has the power to appoint ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls; receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly
accredited to the Philippines; and deport aliens. (Esmero v. Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, July 29,
2021)

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On
March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations
Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March
17, 2018.

Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent
and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable
withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines'
action soon after it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of affairs correctible by this Court's finite
jurisdiction. The Petitions were, therefore, moot when they were filed. The International Criminal Court's
subsequent consummate acceptance of the withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of this Court's insisting on a
reversal of completed actions.

Moreover, the Senate never sought to enforce what would have been its prerogative to require its
concurrence for withdrawal. To date, Resolution No. 249, which seeks to express the chamber's position on the need
for concurrence, has yet to be tabled and voted on. Individual senators have standing to question the
39
constitutionality of the actions of their chamber. Yet, in this case, as shown by the Resolution which petitioners
co-authored, they acknowledged that an action by the Senate was necessary before coming to this Court. Thus, no
actual conflict or constitutional impasse has yet arisen even as implied by their actions.

This Court cannot compel or annul actions where the relevant incidents are moot. Neither can this Court,
without due deference to the actions of a co-equal constitutional branch, act before the Senate has acted.

Nonetheless, the President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or

international agreement is not absolute. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)]

As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to

withdraw from treaties. However, this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under
the Constitution and the laws. In appropriate cases, legislative involvement is imperative. The
president cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if there is subsequent legislation which
affirms and implements it. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16,
2021)

Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that
is inconsistent with a prior statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the
prior statute is amended to be consistent with the treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty.
It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and is ultimately signed into
law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and legislative
participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the
sovereign's democratically elected representatives in the enactment of statutes. (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined

by circumstances attendant to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where
legislative imprimatur impelled the president's action to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot
be effected without concomitant legislative sanction. Similarly, where the Senate's concurrence
imposes as a condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the president enjoys no unilateral
authority to withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R.
Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our
legal system, if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute.
However, the president may not unilaterally withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate
conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the
withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter
into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos.
238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: Through Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, the Rome Statute, an international
instrument, was transformed and made part of the law of the land. Entry into the Rome Statute
represented the Philippines' commitment to the international community to prosecute individuals
accused of international crimes. Its validity and effectivity hinged on the passage of Senate Resolution

40
No. 546, which embodied the Senate's concurrence to the Philippines' accession to the Rome Statute.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

Treaties follow a different process to become part of the law of the land. Their
delineation from generally accepted principles of international law was deliberate. So was the
use of different terminologies and mechanisms in rendering them valid and effective.

In consonance with the Constitution and existing laws, presidents act within their
competence when they enter into treaties. However, for treaties to be effective in this
jurisdiction, Senate concurrence must be obtained. The president may not engage in foreign
relations in direct contravention of the Constitution and our laws xxx. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,
G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: In sum, treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the
president. Nevertheless, a treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordance with the
Constitution's system of checks and balances. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954,
March 16, 2021)]

[Note: Article VII, Section 21 does not limit the requirement of senate concurrence to treaties
alone. It may cover other international agreements, including those classified as executive agreements, if :
(1) they are more permanent in nature; (2) their purposes go beyond the executive function of carrying
out national policies and traditions; and (3) they amend existing treaties or statutes. As long as the subject
matter of the agreement covers political issues and national policies of a more permanent character, the
international agreement must be concurred in by the Senate. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875,
239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021, citing J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Intellectual Property Association
of the Philippines v. Ochoa, 790 Phil. 276 (2016)]

[Note: The Senate's ratification (sic) of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by
transformation. It then has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,
G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by (sic) this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. (Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303 (2005), cited in Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 &
240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: As discussed in Bayan v. Zamora, concurring in a treaty or international agreement is: ...
essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind,
has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the
exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no
similar express mechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is

41
provided in the Constitution or any statute. Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision
grants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the
controversy around which the present consolidated Petitions revolve. xxx.

All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into
international agreements. However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by the
Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the
executive, and is balanced by the legislative branch. The textual configuration of the
Constitution hearkens both to the basic separation of powers and to a system of checks and
balances. Presidential discretion is recognized, but it is not absolute. While no constitutional
mechanism exists on how the Philippines withdraws from an international agreement, the
president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis treaty abrogation may run counter to the basic
prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic operation of treaties.
(Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts,
and considering our own historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts
the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's
withdrawal from international agreements.

First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or
she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It mandates the president to
''ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Both in negotiating and enforcing treaties, the
president must ensure that all actions are in keeping with the Constitution and statutes.
Accordingly, during negotiations, the president can insist on terms that are consistent with the
Constitution and statutes, or refuse to pursue negotiations if those negotiations' direction is such
that the treaty will turn out to be repugnant to the Constitution and our statutes. Moreover, the
president should not be bound to abide by a treaty previously entered into, should it be
established that such treaty runs afoul of the Constitution and our statutes.

There are treaties that implement mandates provided in the Constitution, such as human
rights. Considering the circumstances of each historical period our nation encounters, there will
be many means to acknowledge and strengthen existing constitutional mandates. Participating
in and adhering to the creation of a body such as the International Criminal Court by becoming
a party to the Rome Statute is one such means, but so is passing a law that, regardless of
international relations, replicates many of the Rome Statute's provisions and even expands its
protections. In such instances, it is not for this Court — absent concrete facts creating an actual
controversy — to make policy judgments as to which between a treaty and a statute is more
effective, and thus, preferable. xxx.

Article VII, Section 21 provides for legislative involvement in making treaties and
international agreements valid and effective, that is, by making Senate concurrence a necessary
condition. From this, two points are discernible: (1) that there is a difference in the extent of
legislative participation in enacting laws as against rendering a treaty or international

42
agreement valid and effective; and (2) that Senate concurrence, while a necessary condition, is
not in itself a sufficient condition for the validity and effectivity of treaties.

In enacting laws, both houses of Congress participate. A bill undergoes three readings in
each chamber. A bill passed by either chamber is scrutinized by the other, and both chambers
consolidate their respective versions through a bicameral conference. Only after extensive
participation by the people's elected representatives — members of the Senate who are elected
at large, and, those in the House of Representatives who represent districts or national, regional,
or sectoral party-list organizations — is a bill presented to the president for signature.

In contrast, in the case of a treaty or international agreement, the president, or those

acting under their authority, negotiates its terms. It is merely the finalized instrument that is
presented to the Senate alone, and only for its concurrence. Following the president's signature,
the Senate may either agree or disagree to the entirety of the treaty or international agreement. It
cannot refine or modify the terms. It cannot improve what it deems deficient, or tame
apparently excessive stipulations.

The legislature's highly limited participation means that a treaty or international

agreement did not weather the rigors that attend regular lawmaking. It is true that an effective
treaty underwent a special process involving one of our two legislative chambers, but this also
means that it bypassed the conventional republican mill. xxx.

The second point proceeds from the first. The validity and effectivity of a treaty rests on
its being in harmony with the Constitution and statutes. The Constitution was ratified through a
direct act of the sovereign Filipino people voting in a plebiscite; statutes are adopted through
concerted action by their elected representatives. Senate concurrence is the formal act that
renders a treaty or international agreement effective, but it is not, in substance, the sole criterion
for validity and effectivity. Ultimately, a treaty must conform to the Constitution and statutes.

These premises give the president leeway in withdrawing from treaties that he or she
determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes.

In the event that courts determine the unconstitutionality of a treaty, the president may
unilaterally withdraw from it.

Owing to the preeminence of statutes enacted by elected representatives and hurdling

the rigorous legislative process, the subsequent enactment of a law that is inconsistent with a
treaty likewise allows the president to withdraw from that treaty.

As the chief executive, the president swore to preserve and defend the Constitution, and
faithfully execute laws. This includes the duty of appraising executive action, and ensuring that
treaties and international agreements are not inimical to public interest. The abrogation of
treaties that are inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes is in keeping with the president's
duty to uphold the Constitution and our laws.

Thus, even sans a judicial determination that a treaty is unconstitutional, the president
also enjoys much leeway in withdrawing from an agreement which, in his or her judgment,

43
runs afoul of prior existing law or the Constitution. In ensuring compliance with the
Constitution and laws, the president performs his or her sworn duty in abrogating a treaty that,
per his or her bona fide judgment, is not in accord with the Constitution or a law. Between this
and withdrawal owing to a prior judicial determination of unconstitutionality or repugnance to
statute however, withdrawal under this basis may be relatively more susceptible of judicial
challenge. This may be the subject of judicial review, on whether there was grave abuse of
discretion concerning the president's arbitrary, baseless, or whimsical determination of
unconstitutionality or repugnance to statute. xxx.

Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were
entered into pursuant to congressional imprimatur.

The Constitution devised a system of checks and balances in the exercise of powers
among the branches of government. For instance, as a legislative check on executive power,
Congress may authorize the president to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts subject to limitations and restrictions it may impose.
The president can likewise grant amnesty, but with the concurrence of a majority of all members
of Congress.

Considering that effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the
legislative branches, Congress may expressly authorize the president to enter into a treaty with
conditions or limitations as to negotiating prerogatives.

Similarly, a statute subsequently passed to implement a prior treaty signifies legislative

approbation of prior executive action. This lends greater weight to what would otherwise have
been a course of action pursued through executive discretion. When such a statute is adopted,
the president cannot withdraw from the treaty being implemented unless the statute itself is
repealed.

When a treaty was entered into upon Congress's express will, the president may not
unilaterally abrogate that treaty. In such an instance, the president who signed the treaty simply
implemented the law enacted by Congress. While the president performed his or her function as
primary architect of international policy, it was in keeping with a statute. The president had no
sole authority, and the treaty negotiations were premised not only upon his or her own
diplomatic powers, but on the specific investiture made by Congress. This means that the
president negotiated not entirely out of his or her own volition, but with the express mandate of
Congress, and more important, within the parameters that Congress has set.

While this distinction is immaterial in international law, jurisprudence has treated this as
a class of executive agreements. To recall, an executive agreement implements an existing policy,
and is entered "to adjust the details of a treaty . . . pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of
the Legislature; executive agreements [hinge] on prior constitutional or legislative
authorizations." Executive agreements "inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective."

44
 Consistent with the mirror principle, any withdrawal from an international agreement
must reflect how it was entered into. As the agreement was entered pursuant to congressional
imprimatur, withdrawal from it must likewise be authorized by a law.

Here, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9851 well ahead of the Senate's concurrence to
the Rome Statute. Republic Act No. 9851 is broader than the Rome Statute itself. This reveals not
only an independent, but even a more encompassing legislative will — even overtaking the
course — of international relations. Our elected representatives have seen it fit to enact a
municipal law that safeguards a broader scope of rights, regardless of whether the Philippines
formally joins the International Criminal Court through accession to the Rome Statute.

Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements

where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made
with its concurrence.

The Senate may concur with a treaty or international agreement expressly indicating a
condition that withdrawal from it must likewise be with its concurrence. It may be embodied in
the same resolution in which it expressed its concurrence. It may also be that the Senate
eventually indicated such a condition in a subsequent resolution. Encompassing legislative
action may also make it a general requirement for Senate concurrence to be obtained in any
treaty abrogation. This may mean the Senate invoking its prerogative through legislative action
taken in tandem with the House of Representatives — through a statute or joint resolution — or
by adopting, on its own, a comprehensive resolution. Regardless of the manner by which it is
invoked, what controls is the Senate's exercise of its prerogative to impose concurrence as a
condition.

As effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative
branches, the Senate's power to concur with treaties necessarily includes the power to impose
conditions for its concurrence. The requirement of Senate concurrence may then be rendered
meaningless if it is curtailed. xxx.

In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled
authority to withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be
anchored on a determination that they run afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such
determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or
capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances
attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's
specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president
and may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R.
Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of foreign
policy, the President enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are bona fide
deemed contrary to the Constitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with the national
policy adopted pursuant to the Constitution and our laws.

45
 However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative
involvement on the manner by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The
President cannot unilaterally withdraw from treaties that were entered into pursuant to the
legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed by succeeding laws.
Treaties where Senate concurrence for accession is expressly premised on the same concurrence
for withdrawal likewise cannot be the subject of unilateral withdrawal. The imposition of Senate
concurrence as a condition may be made piecemeal, through individual Senate resolutions
pertaining to specific treaties, or through encompassing legislative action, such as a law, a joint
resolution by Congress, or a comprehensive Senate resolution. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos.
238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Judicial Power

It must be remembered, though, that no question involving the constitutionality or

validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites
for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.  Here, Secretary Abad does not raise any objection as to the presence or absence of these
requisites. In any case, as We have held above, We find it imperative to consider the merits of
the present petition in the interest of judicial economy and prevention of further delay. (DENR
Employees Union v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

It is true that under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari and prohibition

corrects errors of jurisdiction committed by any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. It is also true that the subject Budget
Circular No. 2011-5 was issued in the DBM Secretary's rule-making or quasi-legislative
functions. But We have had several occasions where We found the Court's judicial power under
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution  to be broad enough to include the determination
of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government even in their
exercise of legislative and quasi-legislative functions. (DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R. No.
204152, January 19, 2021)

In cases, therefore, where proper, interested parties seek to assail alleged

unconstitutional acts of legislative and executive officials committed with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court shall not refrain from
performing its judicial duty to determine the validity of the assailed action. In this case, the
issue set forth by petitioners is precisely whether Secretary Abad gravely abused his discretion
in issuing the assailed DBM Budget Circular No. 2011-5. (DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R.
No. 204152, January 19, 2021)

46
 [Note: But while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, the
Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari despite the existence of or prior availability of an
appeal, such as: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy; (2) where the
orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction; (3) for certain special considerations, as
public welfare or public policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent nullity; and
(6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations. 

We find the present case to fall under the exception rather than the general rule. As will be
discussed below, there exists urgent, meritorious considerations which the Court must pass upon lest
there be an unwarranted denial of justice. (DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19,
2021)]

It is wrong to state that matters of foreign relations are political questions, and thus,
beyond the judiciary's reach.

The Constitution expressly states that this Court, through its power of judicial review,
may declare any treaty or international agreement unconstitutional:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. xxx. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March
16, 2021)

Courts, in which judicial power is vested, may void executive and legislative acts when
they violate the Constitution. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March
16, 2021)

[Note: Accordingly, in fulfilling his or her functions as primary architect of foreign policy, and in
negotiating and enforcing treaties, all of the president's actions must always be within the bounds of the
Constitution and our laws. This mandate is exceeded when acting outside what the Constitution or our
laws allow. When any such excess is so grave, whimsical, arbitrary, or attended by bad faith, it can be
invalidated through judicial review. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16,
2021)]

[Note: Between the executive and this Court, it is the executive that represents the Philippines
in the international sphere. This Court interprets laws, but its determinations are effective only within
the bounds of Philippine jurisdiction. Even within these bounds, this Court must caution itself in
interpreting the Constitution and our laws, for it can undermine the discretion of the political agencies.
This Court's mandate is clear: it is the presence of grave abuse of discretion that sanctions us to act. It is
not merely discretion, but abuse of that discretion; and it is not only abuse of discretion, but grave
abuse of discretion.

47
 The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism
provided in the treaty. The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A
state party and its agents cannot be faulted for merely acting within what the Rome Statute expressly
allows.

As far as established facts go, all there is for this Court to rely on are the manifest actions of the
executive, which have nonetheless all been consistent with the letter of the Rome Statute. Suggestions
have been made about supposed political motivations, but they remain just that: suggestions and
suppositions.

Were the situation different — where it is shown that the President's exercise of discretion ran
afoul of established procedure; or was done in manifest disregard of previously declared periods for
rectification, terms, guidelines, or injunctions, belying any rhyme or reason in the course of action hastily
and haphazardly taken; or was borne out of vindictiveness, as retaliation, merely out of personal motives,
to please personal tastes or to placate personal perceived injuries — whimsical and arbitrary exercise of
discretion may be appreciated, impelling this Court to rule on the substance of petitions and grant the
reliefs sought. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

[Note: The Philippines' withdrawal was submitted in accordance with relevant provisions of
the Rome Statute. The President complied with the provisions of the treaty from which the country
withdrew. There cannot be a violation of pacta sunt servanda when the executive acted precisely in
accordance with the procedure laid out by that treaty. Article 127 (1) of the Rome Statute states:

1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt
of the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

From its text, the Rome Statute provides no room to reverse the accepted withdrawal from it.
While there is a one-year period before the withdrawal takes effect, it is unclear whether we can read
into that proviso a permission for a state party to rethink its position, and retreat from its withdrawal.

In any case, this Court has no competence to interpret with finality — let alone bind the
International Criminal Court, the Assembly of States Parties, individual state parties, and the entire
international community — what this provision means, and conclude that undoing a withdrawal is
viable. In the face of how the Rome Statute enables withdrawal but does not contemplate the undoing
of a withdrawal, this Court cannot compel external recognition of any prospective undoing which it
shall order. To do so could even mean courting international embarrassment.

Just the same, any such potential embarrassment or other unpalatable consequences are risks that
we, as a country, are willing to take is better left to those tasked with crafting foreign policy. (Pangilinan v.
Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

Ultimately, the exercise of discretion to withdraw from treaties and international

agreements is susceptible to judicial review in cases attended by grave abuse of discretion, as
when there is no clear, definite, or reliable showing of repugnance to the Constitution or our
statutes, or in cases of inordinate unilateral withdrawal violating requisite legislative
involvement. Nevertheless, any attempt to invoke the power of judicial review must conform to
the basic requisites of justiciability. Such attempt can only proceed when attended by incidents
demonstrating a properly justiciable controversy. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875,
239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

48
 The Court finds that this case mainly calls for the exercise of the Court's expanded
judicial power. This is because the primordial issue animating the 37 petitions is the
constitutionality of the ATA, a legislative (and not a judicial/quasi-judicial) act. Moreover, these
37 petitions undoubtedly ascribe grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of Congress in enacting a law that violates fundamental rights. (Calleja v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646,
252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663,
252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124,
253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

The political question doctrine, then, cannot be raised by the government as a defense
against the constitutional challenges to the ATA. This is in light of the Court's expanded power
of judicial review, and more so because the question as to whether any part or instrumentality of
the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
exceeding jurisdiction is not a political question. This is besides the fact that petitioners have
complied with the requisites which call for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review,
whether under the traditional or under the expanded sense. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733,
252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903,
252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254,
254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Jurisdiction

It is the Court of Tax Appeals, and not the regional trial courts, that has the jurisdiction
to rule on the constitutionality and validity of revenue issuances by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. (St. Mary's Academy of Caloocan City, Inc. v. Henares, G.R. No. 230138, January
13, 2021)

[Note: This is now the prevailing rule, as affirmed in COURAGE v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Thus, when petitioner filed its Petition before the Regional Trial Court to question the
constitutionality and validity of RMO No. 20-2013 and RMC No. 52-2013, it brought its case before the
wrong court. The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to pass upon such issues, as it is the
Court of Tax Appeals that can decide on them. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's Resolution
declaring RMO No. 20-2013 as unconstitutional and RMC No. 52-2013 as invalid is void. It was then
incorrect for the Court of Appeals to rule on the propriety of issuing an injunction or a writ of prohibition,
as the case should have been dismissed outright by the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction. (St.
Mary's Academy of Caloocan City, Inc. v. Henares, G.R. No. 230138, January 13, 2021)]

[Note: To recount, in Banco De Oro, the Court held that the CTA's power to issue writs of certiorari
in order to strike down tax issuances is inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as derived
from the CTA Law, which — being the special and later law — should take precedence over the general
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 xxx. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals
(First Division), G.R. Nos. 210501, 211294 & 212490, March 15, 2021)]

[Note: Since the Court, through Banco De Oro, has now recognized that petitions meant to
question the constitutionality or validity of a tax statute or issuance should be filed before the CTA and
not the regular courts, it may thus be possible for the said challenge to be concurrently instituted together
with an appeal from an actual assessment (should there be one) proceeding from the implementation of
49
the same assailed tax statute or issuance also before the tax court. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Tax Appeals (First Division), G.R. Nos. 210501, 211294 & 212490, March 15, 2021)]

At the outset, We underline that a petition for certiorari or prohibition, not declaratory
relief, is the proper remedy to assail the validity or constitutionality of executive issuances.

We recognize, however, our rulings in Department of Trade and Industry v. Steelasia

Manufacturing Corp., Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance, and
Bureau of Internal Revenue v. First E-Bank Tower Condominium Corporation citing Department of
Transportation v. Philippine Petroleum Sea Transport Association and Diaz v. Secretary of Finance,
which declared that although a petition for declaratory relief was improper when assailing
government issuances, yet, when the issues have "far-reaching implications and raises questions
that need to be resolved for the public good; or if the assailed act or acts of executive officials are
alleged -to have usurped legislative authority," then a petition for declaratory relief may be
treated as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.” (Department of Finance v. Asia United Bank, G.R.
Nos. 240163 & 240168-69, December 1, 2021)

[Note: In this case, the validity or invalidity of RR 4-2011 has far-reaching ramifications among
banks and other financial institutions in the Philippines. It has been said that the banking industry is
impressed with great public interest as it affects economies and plays a significant role in businesses and
commerce. Thus, this RR, which affects their method of accounting and the allocation of the costs and
expenses to their income earnings, thereby affecting their income tax liability, is imbued with public
interest. Furthermore, taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, occupy a high place in the hierarchy
of State priorities, hence, all questions pertaining to their validity must be promptly addressed with the
least procedural obstruction. (Department of Finance v. Asia United Bank, G.R. Nos. 240163 & 240168-69,
December 1, 2021)]

We have held in Banco de Oro v. Republic that the CTA has jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance. In the 2021
case of St. Mary's Academy of Caloocan City, Inc. v. Henares, this Court has reiterated that it is the
CTA, and not the RTC, that has the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality and validity of
revenue issuances by the CIR. This is now the prevailing rule, as affirmed in COURAGE v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus, the RTC should not have acted upon the petition and
should have dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the RTC's Order
declaring RR 4-2011 as invalid is void. (Department of Finance v. Asia United Bank, G.R. Nos.
240163 & 240168-69, December 1, 2021)

Actual Case

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness.  Courts will not decide a case unless there is "a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief."  Courts will decline jurisdiction over moot cases because there is no
substantial relief to which petitioner will be entitled and which will anyway be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. The Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case

50
where no legal relief is needed or called for. (Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No.
197126, January 19, 2021)

[Note: We agree with the appellate court's ratiocination that the instant controversy had already
been rendered moot and academic by virtue of respondents' participation in the graduation rites of the
SLU College of Medicine and the conferment of their Doctor of Medicine degrees by CHED, among other
acts. xxx.   Having allowed respondents to participate in its graduation rites, SLU cannot now deny their
entitlement to their medical degrees. At any rate, CHED is empowered to recognize and confer upon
respondents, as it had, the attainment of the said degree, based on their official transcripts of records that
show their completion of all of their academic units. xxx. All told, the CA did not commit any reversible
error when it dismissed petitioners' appeal for being moot and academic. (Saint Louis University, Inc. v.
Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19, 2021)]

A case is rendered moot when there is no longer a conflict of legal rights which would
entail judicial review. This Court is precluded from ruling on moot cases, where no justiciable
controversy exists. However, exceptions do exist. In David v. Arroyo:

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.

Here, while the repealing Department Circulars may have modified or repealed portions
of the assailed Department Circular, respondent Energy Regulatory Commission continues to
assert that distribution utilities should be prohibited from participating in the contestable
market, and that the migration of qualified end-users to the contestable market is mandatory.
Clearly, there remains a continuing controversy which requires judicial resolution. (Philippine
Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 228588, 229143 & 229453,
March 2, 202])

The Philippines announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 15, 2018, and formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de
Cabinet on March 16, 2018. The Secretary-General received the notification on March 17, 2018. For all intents
and purposes, and in keeping with what the Rome Statute plainly requires, the Philippines had, by then,
completed all the requisite acts of withdrawal. The Philippines has done all that were needed to facilitate the
withdrawal. Any subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.

On March 20, 2018, the International Criminal Court issued a statement on the Philippines' Notice of
Withdrawal. The United Nations certified that the Philippines deposited the written notification on March 17,
2018. It stressed that while withdrawal from the Rome Statute is a sovereign decision, it has no impact on any
pending proceedings. 220 In any case, the International Criminal Court expressed no reservation on the efficacy of
the withdrawal.

Petitioners harp on the withdrawal's effectivity, which was one year from the United
Nations Secretary-General's receipt of the notification. However, this one-year period only
pertains to the effectivity, or when exactly the legal consequences of the withdrawal takes
effect. It neither concerns approval nor finality of the withdrawal. Parenthetically, this
one-year period does not undermine or diminish the International Criminal Court's

51
jurisdiction and power to continue a probe that it has commenced while a state was a party to
the Rome Statute.

Here, the withdrawal has been communicated and accepted, and there are no means to
retract it. This Court cannot extend the reliefs that petitioners seek. The Philippines's
withdrawal from the Rome Statute has been properly received and acknowledged by the
United Nations Secretary-General, and has taken effect. These are all that the Rome Statute
entails, and these are all that the international community would require for a valid
withdrawal. Having been consummated, these actions bind the Philippines. xxx.

We reiterate that courts may only rule on an actual case. This Court has no jurisdiction
to rule on matters that are abstract, hypothetical, or merely potential. Petitioners' fear that the
President may unilaterally withdraw from other treaties has not transpired and cannot be
taken cognizance of by this Court in this case. We have the duty to determine when we should
stay our hand, and refuse to rule on cases where the issues are speculative and theoretical, and
consequently, not justiciable. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954,
March 16, 2021)

The Court finds that this requisite is absent as petitioner was not able to show how her
legal rights had been violated by the assailed MC. Petitioner merely alleged in her attached
affidavit that she resigned from her work in order to focus on studying the German language as
she had planned to work in Germany, and that the deployment ban is causing her too much
anxiety and insomnia. She has not shown, or even alleged, that the assailed MC has prevented
her from travelling and working abroad or has prevented her from performing her contractual
obligations, if any. On the other hand, the attached affidavits of the other persons claiming to
have been adversely affected by the deployment ban cannot cure the lack of actual case or
controversy considering that these persons do not appear to be parties in this case, or that
petitioner has proper authority to represent them in this petition. (Felipe v. Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, G.R. No. 254087 (Notice), June 15, 2021)

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate

or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.  In order to be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.  In Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC, the Court elaborated that "the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof
on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely a theoretical question or issue.
There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts."  (Biraogo v. Martires, G.R. No. 254516, February 2, 2021)

[Note: Here, aside from the allegations that respondent has issued Memorandum Circular No. 1,
which created a new manner of disclosure of the SALN that is allegedly repugnant to the Constitution
and existing law, and that he was told over the phone that his request could not be accommodated in
connection therewith, petitioner has miserably failed to demonstrate any actual act committed by
respondent which resulted to a direct and concrete injury or adverse effect against him. It bears emphasis
that the alleged verbal refusal of respondent to accommodate petitioner's request is but a bare,
self-serving, and unsubstantiated allegation. It also would not suffice for the Court to exercise judicial

52
power by the mere existence or effectivity of Memorandum Circular No. 1, absent "acts or events where
concrete rights or duties arise."   (Biraogo v. Martires, G.R. No. 254516, February 2, 2021)]

In this case, the Freeze Order was first issued by the CA on September 3, 2020 and
extended for a period of six months or until March 2, 2021 with respect to the alleged
P3,000,000.00 deposit by Fortuna in Beacon's BDO Account No. 0005700086337. A freeze order is
merely an interim relief and pre-emptive in character, such that the monetary instruments or
property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering are
temporarily preserved by preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the
freeze order. Moreover, Section 10 of R.A. 9160, as amended, provides clearly that the freeze
order shall be ipso facto lifted if there is no case filed against a person whose account was frozen
within the period determined by the CA, but not exceeding 6 months. In other words, the freeze
order is not permanent and it is time-bound. Therefore, the Court no longer has the authority to
act on Beacon's petition praying for the lifting of the Freeze Order. (Beacon Currency Exchange,
Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 255099 (Notice), March 18, 2021)

In the present case, the questioned 90-day preventive suspension lapsed without an
injunctive relief from a court of law. As a result of the expiration of such temporary suspension,
petitioner returned to work as Senior Deputy Administrator for Business and Investment of the
SBMA. From the discussions above, the issue of the propriety of the preventive suspension is
still a justiciable issue despite the supervening fact of petitioner's return to work. This is because
if this Court declares the suspension to be without basis, then petitioner will be entitled to his
back pay. (Saño v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No. 222822, October 13, 2021)

A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a

determination thereof would be without practical use and value. Here, the issue of Vergara's
eligibility to sit as a Member of the House on the ground of her citizenship is not mooted by the
expiration of her 2016 term, nor by the passing of the 2019 elections. There is no dispute that
Vergara was re-elected in 2019 as Representative of Nueva Ecija's Third District, hence,
continues to serve as an incumbent Member of the House to this day. (Piccio v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 248985, October 5, 2021)

[Note: At any rate, the present case is capable of repetition yet evading review, thus exempting it
from the mootness rule, as held in Vilando v. HRET, which bears facts similar to the present case xxx
(Piccio v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 248985, October 5, 2021)]

The rulings issued by this Court are final constructions of law and are binding upon
actual persons, places, and things. Thus, issuance of advisory opinions based on hypothetical
scenarios weakens the exercise of judicial review. (Cabigao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
247806, November 9, 2021)

Here, there is no actual case or controversy because the Petition for Mandamus does not
present any conflict of legal right or adverse legal interest which we can resolve based on a real
and concrete set of facts. It is anchored on a speculation that the mentioned members of both
houses will file their Certificates of Candidacy for the 2022 Elections. Thus, a ruling on this case
will be nothing but an advisory opinion on future elections. (Cabigao v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 247806, November 9, 2021)

53
 …the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception has been applied in limited
cases, that is, in cases where the following requisites have been shown to concur: (1) the
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again. (Madrilejos v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 184389, November 16, 2021)

The Court agrees with petitioners that the requisite of an actual case or controversy has
been complied at least with respect to certain issues falling within the purview of the delimited
facial analysis framework as will be herein discussed. This is because the consolidated petitions,
in challenging the ATA, have sufficiently raised concerns regarding the freedom of speech,
expression, and its cognate rights. As such, the petitions present a permissible facial challenge
on the ATA in the context of the freedom of speech and its cognate rights — and it is only on
these bases that the Court will rule upon the constitutionality of the law. Further, with respect to
certain provisions of the ATA, petitioners have sufficiently shown that there is a credible and
imminent threat of injury, as they may be subjected to the potential destructive consequences of
designation as well as possible detention and prosecution. In fact, the Court is mindful that
several of the petitioners have already come under the operation of the ATA as they have been
designated as terrorists. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585,
252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759,
252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984,
253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Extraterritorial Application of the

ATA under Section 49

Petitioners make much ado about the seeming effect of the extraterritorial application of
the ATA under Section 49 on their right to freely associate under Section 8, Article III of the
Constitution. They maintain that Section 49 makes no distinction and expands the reach of the
ATA to any Filipino who commits acts penalized under the law outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, specifically citing as an example those who may be prosecuted by
mere membership, affiliation, or association with a certain designated group, absent any overt
criminal act and regardless when the act was committed or when the membership commenced.
Petitioners further claim that the extraterritorial application of the ATA punishes people abroad
for acts that may not even be illegal in their respective countries. Relative thereto, petitioners
contend that there is a "chilling effect" on the right to association because it would effectively
deter individuals from joining organizations so as to avoid later being deemed a terrorist if the
organization is designated. xxx.

The Court holds, however, that the constitutional challenge against Section 49 is not ripe
for adjudication. As stated in the beginning of this discourse, a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it
and thus, petitioners must show that they have sustained or are immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In this case, the Court sees that
the only bases for the supposed unconstitutionality of Section 49 are mere theoretical
abstractions of what may happen after a group or organization has been designated or charged
under the ATA. However, none of petitioners claim that their constitutional rights have been
under any credible or imminent threat of being violated because of the extraterritorial

54
application of the ATA. In fact, none of petitioners allege that they are foreigners, permanent
residents abroad, or are in any demonstrable situation that renders them susceptible to any
adverse effects by virtue of the extraterritorial application of the ATA. Also, the Court has not
been made aware of any pending criminal prosecution based on Section 49 in relation to
designation under Section 25.

In any event, the supposed "chilling effect" of Section 49 is more apparent than real. A
plain reading of Section 49 shows that it merely provides rules on how jurisdiction over the
offense of terrorism is acquired. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that the ATA having
extraterritorial application is not peculiar. Section 49 is not the first time the country would
extend the application of a penal law to Filipino citizens, even for acts committed outside the
country. The enumeration in Article 2 of the RPC is a prime example where the application of a
penal law is made to extend outside the territorial limits of the country's jurisdiction. Another
— more closely worded to Section 49 — is Section 21 of R.A. No. 10175 or the Cybercrime
Prevention Act, which extends the jurisdiction of the courts to any violation committed by a
Filipino national regardless of the place of commission. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.
252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736,
252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904,
252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 &
253420, December 7, 2021)

Locus Standi

Similarly, petitioners have no standing as taxpayers. In cases involving expenditure of

public funds, also known as a taxpayer's suit, "there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional[.]" (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos.
238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

[Note: On the other hand, persons invoking their rights as citizens must satisfy the following
requisites to file a suit: (1) they: must have "personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government"'; (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action"; and (3) "the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action." (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R.
Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)]

Here, both petitioners-associations, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court, failed to convince this Court why
they must be heard as associations. Advocating human rights as an institution is insufficient.
No special reason was alleged, let alone proved, why its allegedly injured members may not
file the case themselves. Worse, the members of the Philippine Coalition for the International
Criminal Court joined the case as petitioners, albeit likewise failing to exhibit actual or
imminent injury from which they stand to suffer (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875,
239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Transcendental importance is often invoked in instances when the petitioners fail to

establish standing in accordance with customary requirements. However, its general
invocation cannot negate the requirement of locus standi. Facts must be undisputed, only legal
issues must be present, and proper and sufficient justifications why this Court should not
simply stay its hand must be clear. xxx. Here, all petitioners invoked the supposed
55
transcendental importance of the constitutional issues. However, none of the exceptional
conditions warranting the· exercise of this Court's jurisdiction is present here. This case does
not involve funds or assets. Neither was there any express disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition. Petitioners also failed to show that no other party has a more direct,
personal, and material interest. Petitioners failed to invoke any source of right to bring these
Petitions" (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)

Moreover, the petitioners do not possess the legal standing to file the suit. To support
their claim that they have legal standing, petitioners submit that they are citizens and that this
petition involves a public right; thus, there is no need to prove their specific interest in the case.
This is untenable. (Cabigao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247806, November 9, 2021)

Petitioners failed to show how the acts of the respondent had a direct adverse effect on
them. There is no allegation that they personally suffered an actual injury, or that they were
threatened injury as a result of respondent's actions. Even their claim that this is an exceptional
suit due to transcendental importance fails. Transcendental importance still requires that
petitioners suffered an injury-in-fact.

To reiterate, parties filing on the basis that they are citizens must show that they are
denied some right or privilege to which they are entitled or that they are subject to a form of
burden or penalty. Here, none of the petitioners claimed that they ran as member of either house
and have lost to any of the senators or representatives that they mentioned. There are no
allegations showing that they are denied some right or privilege due to the reelection of the
senators or representatives. (Cabigao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247806, November 9,
2021)

Petitioners' arguments are facial attacks against Ordinance No. 7780 on the ground of
overbreadth. A litigant, however, cannot mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds. The overbreadth doctrine finds special application in
free speech cases; it is not used to test the validity of penal laws. (Madrilejos v. Gatdula, G.R. No.
184389, November 16, 2021)

Ordinance No. 7780 is a law which criminalizes obscenity and pornography. These are
unprotected speech which the State has the right and mandate, as parens patriae, to protect the
public from. Laws regulating such materials cannot be facially invalidated precisely because
there is no "transcendent value to society" that would justify such attack. This is all the more
important especially when one considers that the Manila City Council, arguably an
indispensable party considering that Ordinance No. 7780 was its enactment, was not made
party to the proceedings and therefore was not heard on this specific issue. (Madrilejos v.
Gatdula, G.R. No. 184389, November 16, 2021)

As had already been pointed out earlier in this discussion, petitioner Casambre in G.R.
No. 252767 is among the 19 individuals designated as terrorists under ATC Resolution No. 17
due to his purported ties to the CPP/NPA. In addition, petitioner RMP in G.R. No. 252767
reported that its bank accounts had been frozen upon orders from the AMLC for allegedly being
used to finance terrorism. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580,
252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755,

56
252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921,
252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7,
2021)
Considering the application of the contested provisions of the ATA and the threat of the
imposition of consequences associated with being a terrorist, several petitioners including inter
alia petitioners Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Casambre, RPM, Anakbayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and GABRIELA have personal interests in the outcome of the
consolidated petitions. The Court finds that petitioners have sufficiently alleged the presence of
credible threat of injury for being constant targets of "red-tagging" or "truth-tagging." Therefore,
they satisfy the requisites of the traditional concept of legal standing.

The above notwithstanding, the Court finds that even if Casambre, RPM, Anakbayan,
Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and GABRIELA had not come under the
actual operation of the ATA, there would still have been no legal standing impediments to grant
due course to the petitions because they present actual facts that also partake of a facial
challenge in the context of free speech and its cognate rights. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733,
252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903,
252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254,
254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

As had been observed above, the main part of Section 4 chiefly pertains to conduct. It is
plain and evident from the language used therein that the enumeration refers to punishable
acts, or those pertaining to bodily movements that tend to produce an effect in the external
world, and not speech. The acts constitutive of the crime of terrorism under paragraphs (a) to (e)
are clearly forms of conduct unrelated to speech, in contradistinction with the enumeration in
the proviso, which are forms of speech or expression, or are manifestations thereof.

In light of the foregoing considerations, the perceived vagueness and overbreadth of the
main part of Section 4 may be inconsistent with the delimited facial challenge framework as
herein discussed. Nonetheless, to guide the bench, bar and public, the Court deems it prudent
to clarify some of petitioners' mistaken notions on the same. As shown below, none of
petitioners have amply demonstrated, even prima facie, its facial unconstitutionality. Hence, the
presumption of constitutionality of said main part — being a primarily non-speech provision —
must stand. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613,
252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765,
252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018,
253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Earliest Opportunity

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily, it may not be raised during trial,
and if not raised during trial, it will not be considered on appeal. (Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v.
The Department of Health, G.R. No. 240764, November 18. 2021)

57
 [Note: Here, it is a matter of record that Venus raised the constitutionality of Sections l0(ff) and
30(4) of the amended law, Section 2(b) paragraph (5), Article III of Department Circular No. 2011-0101,
and FDA Personnel Order No. 2014-220 right off via its complaint below. Undeniably, it did so at the
earliest opportunity. But as for Section 12(a), xxx. The same is being raised for the first time only here and
now. While this is so, however, we will not dismiss the petition based thereon since Section 12(a) is so
closely intertwined with, and inseparable from, both Sections l0(ff) and 30(4) of the amended law, Section
2(b) paragraph (5), Article III of Department Circular No. 2011-0101, and FDA Personnel Order No.
2014-220 that our disposition pertaining to them will definitely impact Section 12(a). Hence, we are taking
cognizance of the challenge against Section 12(a) and will resolve it, together with Sections l0(ff) and 30(4)
of the amended law, Section 2(b) paragraph (5), Article III of Department Circular No. 2011-010153 and
FDA Personnel Order No. 2014-220. (Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of Health, G.R. No.
240764, November 18. 2021)

While jurisprudence dictates that the lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time
during the proceedings, even for the first time in appeal, it is not an absolute rule. It admits of
an exception as when the defendant actively participated in the proceedings and invoked the
court's jurisdiction. Therefore, as correctly held by the appellate court, there is no basis for the
argument of lack of jurisdiction considering MMDA's active participation in the proceedings
because it even jointly moved for the trial court's approval of the MOA. (Metro Manila
Development Authority v. High Desert Stop Overs, Inc., G.R. No. 213287, December 6, 2921)

As to the third requisite of "earliest opportunity," this Court held in Arceta v. Mangrobang
that it does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity
means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been
immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Since the present constitutional
challenge against the statute was directly filed with this Court, the third requisite of judicial
review of "earliest opportunity" is complied with because the issue of constitutionality is raised
at the first instance. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585,
252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759,
252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984,
253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Policy of
Constitutional Avoidance

Petitioner's cause of action, therefore, was not the result of the alleged invalidity of
Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047, but the alleged illegality of respondent
Katarungan's clearance requirements. His case can be resolved in the proper proceeding without
passing upon the constitutional question. (Garin v. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 216492, January
20, 2021)

Without doubt, any ruling from this Court with respect to the constitutionality of a
subsisting law would have legal value, this Court being the "final arbiter of the Constiiution."
As some commentators have put it, Supreme Court decisions "change the law and, thus, the
country, by their very publication." This, however, surely does not mean that the Court must
settle all constitutional controversies presented before it under all circumstances; hence, the
constitutional policy of avoidance. To borrow from the words of Justice Kapunan, "[w]here a
controversy can be settled on a platform other than the one involving constitutional

58
adjudication," as in this case; "the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the
constitutional question.” (Madrilejos v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 184389, November 16, 2021)

[Note: Finally, in dismissing this case, we do not mean to give short shrift to the constitutional
freedoms sought to be protected by petitioners when they filed this case. However, it is one thing to strike
down a legislative enactment (albeit in this case, a local ordinance) determined to be violative of
fundamental rights in an actual case after a full-blown hearing, where all pertinent issues are sufficiently
and exhaustively briefed by all indispensable parties, and quite another to cast aspersions on a law based
on seemingly unfounded presumptions and, on that basis, declare said law unconstitutional. We must be
reminded of Justice Stone's admonition: "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and
legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. (Madrilejos v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 184389, November 16,
2021)]

We now go to the fourth requisite for judicial review -The question of constitutionality is
the very lis mota of the case. Lis mota is a Latin term meaning the cause or motivation of a legal
action or lawsuit. The literal translation is "litigation moved." Under the rubric of lis mota, in the
context of judicial review, the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality,
although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the
application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case
cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. (Venus
Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of Health, G.R. No. 240764, November 18, 2021)

[Note: But truly, there is no way the issue of constitutionality can be avoided here. This simply
means that the trial court could not have resolved the validity of FDA Personnel Order No. 2014-220
independent of the provisions of the FDA Law and its IRR. For the lifeline and due process component of
FDA Personnel Order No.2014-220 are actually derived from Sections 1 0(ff), 12(a), and 30(4), as well as
from Section 2(b) paragraph 5 of Article III of the IRR. (Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. The Department of
Health, G.R. No. 240764, November 18, 2021)]

This Court is not in a position to rule on the alleged constitutional infirmities. The Court
observes a policy of constitutional avoidance. Hence, if the controversy can be settled on other
grounds, We will stay Our hand from ruling on the constitutional issue. Here, threshing out' the
constitutional questions presented is not essential to the disposition of the case. The petition
may be resolved by applying the provisions of the 2008 JV Guidelines in relation to prevailing
jurisprudence. (Harbour Centre Port Terminal. Inc. v Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No.
211122, December 6, 2021)

The fourth requisite of lis mota means that this Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other
ground. Thus, petitioners must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless
the constitutional question raised is determined. The lis mota requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.

The Court finds that the lis mota requirement is complied with by the very nature of the
constitutional challenge raised by petitioners against the ATA which deal squarely with the
freedom of speech, expression, and its cognate rights. Evidently, freedom of expression and its
59
cognate rights are legally demandable and enforceable, and any violation or perceived violation
by the law that chills or restricts the exercise of such rights inescapably involve questions
regarding its constitutionality. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580,
252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755,
252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921,
252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7,
2021)

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Furthermore, petitioner has failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. His
rather cursory invocation of transcendental importance cannot cure this defect, especially
considering that the doctrine cannot and does not override the requirements of actual and
justiciable controversy and ripeness for adjudication, which are conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.  The rule is also now well-settled that litigants do not have unfettered
discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction in the issuance of extraordinary writs,
which it concurrently shares with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.  The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts, being a constitutional imperative, dictates that direct recourse to
this Court is allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of
paramount or transcendental importance of the action.  With the status of petitioner's request
before the Office of the Ombudsman being an unsettled and debatable fact, the present Petition
evidently does not involve pure questions of law.

Thus, while petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution," this is, by no means, an indiscriminate license to disregard the requisites of the
Court's judicial review and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. (Biraogo v. Martires, G.R. No.
254516, February 2, 2021)

In Dy v. Bibat-Palamos, We summarized such rule and the exceptions thereto:

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to
satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and
attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its
docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged
orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of strictly respecting this rule. In

Pemberton v. De Lima, We said that the Court may only act when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception:

60
 The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now
affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within
the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.

Further, We have held that such serious and important reasons must be "clearly stated in
the petition." (Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021)

[Note: Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to this Court despite the concurrent jurisdiction
of the appellate court. Significantly, he did not bother to provide any reason or explanation to justify his
noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of courts. Further, when he was required to reply to Sen. Angara's
Comment containing the latter's argument on the violation of hierarchy of courts, he simply manifested
his adoption of his previous arguments in the Petition. This constitutes a clear disregard of the hierarchy
of courts and merits the dismissal of the Petition. (Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15,
2021)]

It should be emphasized, however, that while the Constitution expressly vested this
Court with original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, among
others, such power is shared with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts
(RTC). Such concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant litigants unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court where application for the writ may be filed. There is a hierarchy of courts
determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a general determinant of the
proper forum for the application for the extraordinary writs. (Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation
Commission, G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432, March 23, 2021)

[Note: In Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), this
Court held that if what is being assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, then the RTC has
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative agency contravenes the law or the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts directs the parties to file their petitions for extraordinary writs before
the appropriate court of lower rank. Non-compliance with this requirement is a ground for dismissal of
the petition. (Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432, March 23, 2021)]

As a matter of policy, therefore, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also

within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts that the specific action
for the issuance of the writ must be instituted. Nevertheless, the hierarchy of courts is not an
iron-clad rule. As we stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, this Court has
"full discretionary power to take cognizance [of] and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil
actions for certiorari xxx filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition," such as
when what is raised is a pure question of law. (Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission,
G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432, March 23, 2021)

61
 In the recent case of Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,
We clarified that the existence of "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor in
deciding whether to grant the plea for this Court's exercise of its original jurisdiction, at the first
instance, over the issuance of extraordinary writs. It is rather the nature of the question raised
by the parties in those exceptions that will enable us to allow a direct action. Further, We
declared that strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts serves the purpose of
effectively filtering the cases that reach the Court, which should not only meet the requisites of
judicial review but also should not involve factual questions indispensable to resolving the legal
issue presented. (Yaphockun v. Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. Nos. 213314 & 214432,
March 23, 2021)

It is not amiss to point out that petitioner's direct resort before this Court is improper. A
challenge to the efficacy of the Sinovac vaccine is a question of fact that is beyond the scope of
this Court's jurisdiction. To go into the details of a vaccine's efficacy would require the
presentation of its clinical trial results and a comparative analysis of the various results of the
other vaccines in order to determine the acceptable standard of what an effective COVID-19
vaccine should be. However, it is a settled rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Complementing this rule is the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, which requires a party to file the
appropriate petition in the proper court, especially when the petition calls for an examination of
the factual issues raised in the petition. In the case of a petition for mandamus, Section 21 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 129 grants the regional trial court original jurisdiction in resolving
a petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus xxx. (Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838
(Resolution), May 11, 2021)

Moreover, petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Direct resort from the lower
courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact
and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. (Prohomes Development, Inc. v.
Standard Chartered Bank, G.R. No. 209683 (Notice), May 14, 2021)

In the case of GIOS-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, the Court reiterated and emphasized the
importance of observing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court clarified that the
presence of "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor in determining whether to
permit the direct invocation of its jurisdiction, but rather the nature of the question raised by the
parties. The strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not a mere policy but a
constitutional imperative given the structure of our judicial system and the requirements of due
process. Thus, the Court reiterated that when a question before it "involves [the] determination
of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to
resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as
transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before
the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual
questions." (Angeles-Zapata v. Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 46, G.R.
No. 207139 (Notice), June 23, 2021)

62
 In the case of GIOS-Samar v. Department of Transportation and Communication
(GIOS-Samar), the Court ruled that "although this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked
court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition."

However, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts admits of exceptions. The jurisprudential

exceptions as enumerated in The Diocese of Bacolod, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., are as follows: (1)
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of first
impression; (4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (5) exigency in
certain situations; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7) when
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (8) the petition includes questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. (Rodriguez v. National Bureau of Investigation,
G.R. No. 219781 (Notice), July 28, 2021)

The Court clarified in GIOS-Samar that the common denominator among the foregoing
exceptions is that the issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal. (Rodriguez v. National
Bureau of Investigation, G.R. No. 219781 (Notice), July 28, 2021)

[Note: As in this case, the issue to be resolved before the Court involves petitioner's invocation of
his right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws insofar as he became the subject of an
investigation by the NBI that imputed upon him the commission of certain offenses and/or crimes. More
importantly, the issue in this case is a purely legal one, i.e., whether petitioner has the right to participate
in the investigation proceedings of the NBI considering that the investigation involves his person and that
the NBI ascribes to him participation in the commission of certain offenses/crimes. Thus, the Court may
very well entertain and rule on the petition. (Rodriguez v. National Bureau of Investigation, G.R. No. 219781
(Notice), July 28, 2021)]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file
their petitions, thus:

[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court
with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all,
the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the
extraordinary writs.'

In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any
showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court. (Miguel v.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021)

63
 From the regional trial court, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded
straight to this Court for recourse. This is an open disregard of the hierarchy of courts xxx.
Although this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in petitions for certiorari, a direct
resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify the same xxx.
(Leones v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 304108, November 17, 2021; Province of Bataan v. Escalada, G.R. No.
181311, November 24, 2021)

In the present petitions, there are serious and compelling reasons justifying direct resort
to this Court. Genuine issues involving the constitutionality of the ATA are raised in the
petitions which must be immediately addressed. Various constitutional provisions safeguarding
the right to free speech and its cognate rights have been invoked in challenging the law. The
far-reaching implications, which encompass both present and future generations, if these
constitutional issues remain unresolved, warrant the immediate action of this Court. While the
intention of the legislature in enacting the ATA is noble and laudable, this Court cannot simply
brush aside the perceived threats to fundamental rights that petitioners raised. The necessity of
resolving these pressing issues affecting fundamental rights is clear.(Calleja v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726,
252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809,
252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252,
253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021)

Judicial Courtesy

From the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner acted in accordance with her legal
duty to proceed with the summary proceedings in the infringement case, in due deference and
regard to the existing judgments, orders and issuances of the CA, and without any iota of malice
or bad faith to defy them. Neither can petitioner's actions be considered violative of the
principle of judicial courtesy. Under the principle of judicial courtesy, lower courts are called to
suspend proceedings before it, even without the existence of an injunctive writ, until a final
determination has been made by a higher court if there is a strong probability that the issues or
proceedings before the latter would be rendered moot or moribund because of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court. A case is deemed moot "when it presents no actual
controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist." Going forward in the conduct of
summary proceedings in the infringement case would not have mooted the certiorari case
before the CA. (Fider v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, October 6, 2021)

Presidential Electoral Tribunal

From a mere statutory creation, it then became a constitutional institution under the 1987
Constitution. Atty. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal explained:

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of

authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by
which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
64
 to "promulgate its rules for the purpose." (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February
16, 2021)

To stress, this Tribunal's Rules directs the forthwith dismissal of an election protest if,
upon examining the ballots and proof in the three provinces exemplifying the alleged fraud or
irregularity, this "Tribunal is convinced that . . . the protestant or counter-protestant will most
probably fail to make out [their] case, without further consideration of the other provinces
mentioned in the protest." This is clear and is not susceptible to any other interpretation.
(Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

Judicial Courtesy

The principle of judicial courtesy is applied when the suspension of the proceedings in
the lower court is necessary in order to avoid mooting the matter raised in the higher court. This
principle is the exception rather than the rule. (Ekistics Philippines, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, G.R. No. 250440, May 12, 2021)

[Note: After a careful review of the case, the Court finds that the issues in this case will not render
moot and moribund the issues raised before the Court and before the CA. To reiterate, the petitions
pending before the CA at that time deal with the validity of the BSP Resolutions placing Banco Filipino
under receivership and ordering its liquidation. Regardless of the outcome of these cases, the BSP is not
precluded from enforcing its right as a mortgagee of Banco Filipino. (Ekistics Philippines, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 250440, May 12, 2021)]

From the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner acted in accordance with her legal
duty to proceed with the summary proceedings in the infringement case, in due deference and
regard to the existing judgments, orders and issuances of the CA, and without any iota of malice
or bad faith to defy them. Neither can petitioner's actions be considered violative of the
principle of judicial courtesy. Under the principle of judicial courtesy, lower courts are called to
suspend proceedings before it, even without the existence of an injunctive writ, until a final
determination has been made by a higher court if there is a strong probability that the issues or
proceedings before the latter would be rendered moot or moribund because of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court. A case is deemed moot "when it presents no actual
controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist." Going forward in the conduct of
summary proceedings in the infringement case would not have mooted the certiorari case
before the CA. (Fider v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, October 6, 2021)

Fiscal Autonomy

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that the main thrust of Our foregoing disquisition,
i.e., the need to secure the approval of the President or the DBM before granting new or
additional benefits, shall only apply to government agencies whose power to fix compensation
and allowances of its officers and employees are subject to certain limitations provided by law
and budgetary issuances. It does not cover agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy under the 1987
Constitution such as the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the
Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman. In Bengzon v. Drilon, the Court
ruled that these bodies require fiscal flexibility in the discharge of their constitutional duties:

65
 As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of
the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources
with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized
by law for compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums
as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs
100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty
and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy
and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based. (Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16,
2021)

Decisions/Judgments

In addition, it should be pointed out that Liggayu and Sison were both decided by a
Division of the Court; hence, none of these cases, under Section 4 (3), Article VIII of the
Constitution, has sufficient doctrinal force to modify, much less overturn, the pronouncement in
Samaniego. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Toledo, G.R. No. 234854 (Notice), March 3, 2021)

It must be stressed that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, which petitioner

Borje seems to indirectly invoke, has no application in criminal cases. Neither is the doctrine of
"law of the case" applicable. The doctrine is defined as "that principle under which
determinations of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case through all its
subsequent stages where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court
of last resort." However, the doctrine of "law of the case" relates to questions of law and not of
fact such as the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and is confined in its operation
to subsequent proceedings in the same case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan's findings in
the Planta case are not conclusive now upon this Court or then upon the Sandiganbayan in the
instant cases since these are distinct from the Planta case. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 236807,
January 12, 2021)

In this regard, the doctrine of judicial stability or the doctrine of non-interference states
that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court
of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the concept of jurisdiction —
verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution
and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment. It is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of

66
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. (Re: Francisco T. Duque III, A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC, February 16, 2021)

[Note: Here, if Judge Soriaso had just heeded the information provided by the DOH regarding
the existence of the earlier decision of Judge Enciso, she would have been more circumspect in the
eventual issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction realizing the ruse propagated by JBROS to get a
favorable judgment. Surely, as the OCA correctly pointed out, Judge Soriaso's eventual issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction causes confusion as to which order the parties should follow: the initial
decision of Judge Enciso denying the application of the writ or the subsequent decision of Judge Soriaso?
This could have easily been avoided if only Judge Soriaso observed the aforementioned doctrine. (Re:
Francisco T. Duque III, A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC, February 16, 2021)]

‘Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that

has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the
immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and
prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering:
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.'

Relatedly, while the general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even
on mistakes in the application of procedural rules, this should not apply 'when the reckless or
gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law' or of his liberty or
property, and where the interest of justice so requires. (Nacario y Chu v. People, UDK 16808-09,
June 28, 2021)

While the CA did not err in its legal reasoning in the assailed Resolutions, the Court,
nevertheless, reverses the same in the interest of substantial justice. In Salvacion v. Central Bank of
the Philippines (Salvacion), where the Court refused to apply Republic Act No. 6426, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1246 because the application of the law in the unique factual
circumstances of the case would lead to injustice, the Court stood firm that "the application of
the law depends on the extent of its justice."

If the Court refused to apply substantive law in Salvacion in order to achieve substantial
justice, then all the more can the Court suspend the strict application of procedural rules to
further the interests of substantial justice. It must be emphasized that "[r]ules of procedure are
meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto
must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice."

While the Decision dated October 6, 2015 (Decision) of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court
of Lipa City (RTC) convicting spouses Evangeline Rivera Calingasan and Ferdinand Sevilla
Calingasan (Spouses Calingasan) may be said to have attained finality due to the failure to

67
seasonably file an appeal, it is also true that the immutability of final judgments is not a hard
and fast rule. According to jurisprudence, the Court has:

the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice
considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Spouses Calingasan v. Delos Santos-Rivera, G.R. No. 228270, June 30,
2021)

[Note: In the present case, the Decision of the RTC finding Spouses Calingasan guilty of libel was
in clear violation of established principles in law and jurisprudence. It has long been settled that
"utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged" provided only "that the
statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of injury."
(Spouses Calingasan v. Delos Santos-Rivera, G.R. No. 228270, June 30, 2021)]

Further, jurisprudence dictates that the mandatory character of the doctrine of

immutability of judgment may be relaxed in order to serve substantial justice considering,
among others, matters of life, liberty, or property; the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; and the merits of the case. Thus, while it is true that once a judgment has become
final, such judgment can no longer be re-litigated and must be enforced by execution as a matter
of right. It is likewise true, that where new facts have transpired after the finality of the
judgment, the courts, may suspend or refuse the execution thereof and grant relief as the new
facts and circumstances warrant, keeping in mind that the mandatory character of the doctrine
of immutability of judgment should not be used as a vehicle to perpetuate injustice. (Ricafort v.
Fajardo, G.R. No. 215590, November 10, 2021)

Well settled is the rule that "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or
modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest court of the land, rendered it." On certain recognized exceptions, however, the Court has
suspended the application of this rule based on: "(a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (b) the merits of the case; (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (e) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby." (Atup v. People, G.R. No. 229395 [Formerly UDK-15672], November 10,
2021)

In Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court
explained how a minute resolution should affect the case and the parties involved, as well as
those who, though not parties to the case, invoke it as precedent or res judicata, thus: It is true
that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the
merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being
questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies
or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged
decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions are deemed sustained. But what is its

68
effect on other cases? With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same
parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. (Field Investigation Office
v. Yuzon, G.R. No. 216001, November 11, 2021)

Operative Fact Doctrine

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it

affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. An
exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter
of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an
executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be
ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law.

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law.

Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law; not the unconstitutional law itself.

Moreover, as was pointed out in Araullo v. Aquino, the use of said doctrine "must be
subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play.
It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application."

In fine, We cannot sustain the validity of the acts committed prior to the declaration of
EO 30's unconstitutionality under the operative fact doctrine. It must be stressed that PD 634
and the MOA expressly mandated the PPA to conduct an investigation and to properly show
violations on the part of MIPTI prior to making any recommendation to suspend or revoke
MIPTI's franchise. Thus, PPA's transgressions could not be solely anchored on EO 30.

In any event, the nullification of EO 30 will not result in injustice. There was no showing
that reliance to EO 30 had greatly prejudiced PPA. PPA's unlawful takeover thus entitles MIPTI
to damages, which PPA has to pay as legal consequences of its unlawful act. Moreover, neither
were third parties affected by their reliance on EO 30 revoking MIPTI's franchise. It will be
recalled that both Metrostar and ICTSI had eventually settled the cases filed against them.
(Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December
7, 2021)

Rule-Making Power

As between the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and the PNP New Rules on

Engagement, the former shall prevail. (Estores y Pecardal v. People, G.R. No. 192332, January 11,
2021)

69
 The Court recognizes the importance of pre-trial in the simplification and the speedy
disposition of disputes. Nonetheless, as in all procedural rules, it is a mere tool in ensuring the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Thus, when a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to obstruct rather than
serve the broader interests of substantial justice, the court may relax its application in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction. (People v. Pante, G.R. No. 223166 (Notice), March 3, 2021)

In Sayre (Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020), the Court
ruled that DOJ Circular No. 27 does not infringe upon the Court's rule-making power under the
Constitution, thus: xxx. Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea
bargain for Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No.
27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to
proposed plea bargains. (People v. Majingcar y Yabut, G.R. No. 249629, March 15, 2021; see People v.
Borras y Lascano, G.R. No. 250295, March 15, 2021; People v. Sabater y Ulan, G.R. No. 249459, June
14, 2021)

Time and again, the Court has reiterated that rules of procedure, especially those
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. While
procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. In this case,
petitioner miserably failed to justify why procedural rules prescribing the reglementary period
for the filing of his petition for review before the CA should be set aside in his favor. Hence, the
CA did not err in merely noting without action his belatedly-filed petition for review and
denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 14, 2019 declaring
the case closed and terminated. (Sumiton v. National Commission on Indigenous People, G.R. No.
255446 (Notice), March 15, 2021)

Even after another rumination, the Court still sees no cogent reason to declare the entire
RA 7662 unconstitutional based on the alleged encroachment of the Supreme Court's authority
and violation of academic freedom. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642,
November 9, 2021)

[Note: The above notwithstanding, the Court hastens to clarify that Sections 2 paragraphs 2
[requiring legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education], 3(a)(2) [to increase awareness among members of
the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society] , 7(g) [to establish a law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar] , and 7(h) [to adopt a system of continuing legal education.
For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers. xxx] of RA 7662
remain unconstitutional as declared in the Decision of the Court. xxx. Indeed, the foregoing provisions
unduly infringed on matters which fall within the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. (Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)]

70
 The Court finds no difficulty upholding the purpose of the law to improve legal
education in the country. However, extending the LEB's authority to those who have already
been accepted to the bar is a legislative overreach. As explained in the Decision, in authorizing
the LEB to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems necessary, the legislature encroached upon the Court's power to
promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar. Respondents' tenuous assertion that the
continuing legal education under RA 7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors does
not justify the existence of said provision. It still unlawfully intruded into the power of the
Court to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar, which necessarily includes the
continuing legal education of lawyer-professors, as the term practice of law encompasses the
teaching thereof. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Similarly, the Court declared Section 7(g) unconstitutional because its phraseology
unduly stretched the authority of the LEB by authorizing it “to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar." With Section 7(g), "the LEB is no longer confined
within the parameters of legal education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to
the bar examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar." As underscored in the Decision,
however, "the jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court." Section 7(g) unlawfully encroached into the constitutionally
sanctioned authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

[Note: It is worth noting, as well, that in the Decision, the Court had explained that Section 7(g)
was likewise violative of the academic freedom of law schools. As the Court held, while the clause legal
internship does not immediately strike as being intrusive of the academic freedom of law schools, how
the LEB exercised its authority under Section 7(g) effectively amounted to control. It blatantly
overstepped the authority of law schools to determine what to teach by dictating upon the law schools
how to undertake the legal apprenticeship and requiring law schools to submit their apprenticeship
program for assessment and evaluation prior to endorsement of the same to this Court for approval.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)]

In sum, the Court acknowledges and upholds the authority of the LEB to carry out the
purpose of the law, which is in line with the State's constitutional mandate to promote quality
education. However, the foregoing provisions unduly expand the scope of the LEB's authority
by giving a construction to the term "legal education" inconsistent with the law's clear intent. By
their terms, the provisions no longer just ventured into improving the study of the law in law
schools, but clearly and directly encroached upon the Court's exclusive constitutional authority
to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar, the practice of law, and admissions to the
bar. As such, they cannot be given imprimatur by this Court. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board,
G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Remedial or procedural laws are statutes "designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases." They are made to aid a tribunal or court in its reception and evaluation of evidence and
are aimed for an efficient and effective resolution of a case. Nevertheless, this Court has time
and again discouraged courts from dismissing a case solely on reasons of technicality. (Daco v.
Cabajar, G.R. No. 222611, November 15, 2021)

Supervision/Discipline
71
 As mandated by the Constitution under Section 11 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
the Court exercises the exclusive power and authority to discipline justices of appellate courts
and judges of lower courts. Similarly, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court provides that the administrative functions of this court include disciplinary and
administrative matters involving justices, judges, and court personnel.

The exclusive power of the Court to discipline judges of lower courts is reiterated in
A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, which prescribes new rules of procedure for punishing judicial
misconduct. xxx.

In lodging the power to discipline judges of lower courts exclusively with the Court, it
curtailed in the same breath the inherent power of the CA to punish for contempt. The CA has
no authority to discipline judges or even the court personnel of lower courts. At most, the CA
can only recommend to the Court the necessary disciplinary action.

When this Court acts on complaints against judges or any personnel under its
supervision, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging
justiciable controversies. In this case the issue to be resolved is whether petitioner should be
held liable for indirect contempt for her failure to obey the lawful order of the appellate court.
Clearly, what is involved is not this Court's power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in cases involving only
questions of law. The present case involves the exercise of this Court's exclusive power to
discipline judges. (Fider v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, October 6, 2021)

[Note: Evidently, the CA overstepped the bounds of its authority when it took cognizance of the
case and thereafter imposed a fine of Pl0,000.00 against petitioner. Everglory should have filed an
administrative case before this Court in order to determine whether petitioner disobeyed the lawful order
of the appellate court. (Fider v. Everglory Metal Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 238709, October 6, 2021)]

Judicial Clemency

Forgiveness is a chosen response of an individual harmed by another's wrongdoing. It is

often personal in nature. One needs to deserve to be forgiven. It is different from generally
being excused from a penalty. Clemency, on the other hand, when granted by this Court, is an
extraordinary act based on equity. It must: (1) not transgress existing laws; (2) not override the
choice of those who have been wronged; and (3) should, as much as possible, be based on
established facts and accepted normative or ethical values. Most important, we should be aware
of the precedents we create and the social or cultural impact of the clemencies we grant. In
contrast to forgiveness, the wrongful act involved in clemency caused not merely personal, but
public injury. Thus, clemency should be preceded by an apology not only to the person
wronged, but to the entire society. Apologies of any nature must be preceded by a full and
unconditional acceptance of the wrong committed and the justness of the penalty imposed. (Re:
Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)

Clemency is in the nature of pardon based on mercy. Pardon and mercy translate to the
commutation of the penalty, either wholly or partially. Pardon and mercy are, therefore,
uniquely personal to the wrongdoer. However, the act of granting clemency should not go
72
against a public or moral good. Clemency can only be granted when its conditions are fully,
unequivocally, and unconditionally accepted by the wrongdoer. (Re: Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)

Judicial clemency is neither a right nor a privilege that one can avail of at any time.  Its
grant must be delicately balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts.  (Re:
Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)

Judicial clemency cannot be subjective. The more we have personal connections with one
who pleas for clemency, the more we should seek to distance ourselves. It is also anticipated
that pleas for judicial clemency are largely self-serving. Hence, in such cases, this Court has
considered several factors which, to an extent, provide objective criteria in granting or denying
clemency. Re: Diaz summarized these factors:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges['] associations and prominent members of the community with
proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 

We further refine these guidelines.

Remorse and reformation must reflect how the claimant has redeemed their moral
aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity and consequences of their conduct. There is an
element of reconciliation in clemencies. When there is a private offended party, there should be
an attempt at reconciliation where the offender offers an apology and, in turn, the wronged
gives a full and written forgiveness. Only after this reconciliation can this Court acquire
jurisdiction on the plea for clemency. Where there is no private offended party, the plea for
clemency must contain the public apology. (Re: Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19,
2021)

Again, there must be an acknowledgment of the wrongful actions and subsequent

showing of sincere repentance and correction. This Court must see to it that the long period of
dismissal moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and repentance, and
develop a capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers.  (Re: Gregory
S. Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)

73
 This Court has also considered other factors such as the petitioner's advanced age,
deteriorating health, and economic difficulties. For instance, in Paredes v. Padua, when the
dismissal has already caused a tremendous suffering to the individual and there is a showing of
dire health and financial condition, this Court lifted the penalty. (Re: Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)

[Note: Furthermore, there are degrees of clemency. Generally, unless for extraordinary reasons,
dismissal or disbarment cannot be the subject of any kind of clemency in less than five years. There
should also be no disruption of the service. Moreover, we must be clear which kinds of offenses are
subject to various forms of clemency and the equivalent extraordinary circumstances that should be
considered. This Court lifts and modifies penalties if there are intervening factors that merit mitigation.
Penalties "are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders."  Thus, when an errant officer
"demonstrates [their] sincere repentance and remorse for the wrong [they] committed" and the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose,  judicial clemency is warranted. Prospectively, allegations of
those who apply for clemency must first be evaluated by this Court to find whether prima
facie circumstances exist to grant the relief. Should there appear to be so, a commission must be created to
receive the evidence, with due notice to any offended party and the public. The commission will then
determine if there is substantial evidence supporting the allegations. Considering the circumstances here,
this Court partly grants the plea. (Re: Gregory S. Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, January 19, 2021)]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Government Agencies

PD 242 provides that all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and
offices, including GOCCs, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General, or the Government Corporate Counsel, depending on the issues
and government agencies involved. Its purpose is to provide for a speedy and efficient
administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes between government offices or agencies
under the Executive branch, as well as to filter cases to lessen the clogged dockets of the courts.
(Quezon City v. National Transmission Commission, G.R. No. 246817, May 12, 2021)

As extensively discussed above, the BCDA is a government instrumentality because it

falls under the definition of an instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., "any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter."  It
is vested with corporate powers under Section 3 of RA No. 7227.  Despite having such powers,
however, the BCDA is considered neither a stock corporation because its capital is not divided
into shares of stocks, nor a non-stock corporation because it is not organized for any of the
purposes mentioned under Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Instead, the BCDA is a
government instrumentality organized for the specific purpose of owning, holding and/or
administering the military reservations in the country and implementing their conversion to
other productive uses.   (Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 205466, January 11, 2021)

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 Relative to this, we stress that while IRC was organized under the Corporation Code, it
is a sequestered corporation subject to the fiscal supervision of the PCGG and is a GOCC which
is under the direct supervision of the Office of the President.  (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No.
218530, January 13, 2021)

[Note: Section 2 (13) of the Administrative Code of 1987  defines GOCC as:

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or

non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled
corporations may be further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.  (See also Sec.
3 (o) of the "GOCC Governance Act of 2011")  

In Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,  we broke down the definition of GOCC into three
requisites, namely: (1) any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; (2) vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, (3) owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of
stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock.  Possession of all three attributes is
necessary to consider an entity a GOCC.  (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530, January 13, 2021)]

[Note: The first requisite is present as it is undisputed that IRC is a stock corporation organized

under the Corporation Code. IRC also meets the second requisite. Like BASECO, the income and assets of
IRC as a sequestered corporation are remitted to the PCGG and then turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury. This means that the individual running the affairs of IRC is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, and this
makes Estacio a public officer.  Lastly, we have long recognized in Cuenca v. PCGG, that IRC is among the
several corporations organized, established, and managed for, and on behalf of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, by Mr. Jose Y. Campos. The shares of IRC were later surrendered and turned over to
PCGG, which effectively transferred ownership thereof to the Government. This satisfies
the third requisite on government ownership. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530, January 13, 2021)]

Section 4 of RA No. 6758 provides that its provisions "shall apply to all positions,
appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing and hereafter created in the
government, including [GOCCs] and government financial institutions." SWD is a GOCC with
a special charter, created and organized pursuant to PD No. 198, which took effect in 1973. This
was confirmed in the case of Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission and Commission
on Audit, citing the earlier cases of Baguio Water District v. Hon. Trajano  and Tanjay Water District
v. Gabaton, thus: 

After a fair consideration of the parties' arguments coupled with a careful study of the
applicable laws as well as the constitutional provisions involved, We rule against the petitioners
and reiterate Our ruling in Tanjay case declaring water districts government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter. xxx.

This confirmation was iterated in the recent cases of De Jesus v. Commission on
Audit,  Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,  Mendoza v. Commission on Audit,  and Metropolitan Naga
75
Water District v. Commission on Audit  to cite a few. Thus, it is erroneous for petitioners to insist
that SWD became a GOCC only on March 12, 1992 or after the finality of the Court's decision
in Davao City Water District. The decision of the Court merely interpreted PD No. 198 in
declaring LWDs as GOCCs. The Court's interpretation constitutes part of the law, effective from
the date it was originally passed, because it merely established the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.  Accordingly, upon its creation by PD No. 198,
SWD was already a GOCC covered by RA No. 6758 effective July 1, 1989.  (Ancheta v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 236725, February 2, 2021)

There is no existing law, implementing rules and regulations, or guidelines declaring

that PICCI is covered by E.O. No. 80 or that it falls under the jurisdiction of the DBM. But
Annex B of Memorandum Circular No. 2012-01 recognizes the BSP as a GOCC under the
jurisdiction of DBM, together with research institutions, economic zone authorities, and local
water districts. It bears stressing, however, that the BSP enjoys fiscal and administrative
autonomy under its charter. (Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)

[Note: Section 1 of R.A. No. 7653 reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall maintain a central monetary authority that
shall function and operate as an independent and accountable body corporate in the discharge of
its mandated responsibilities concerning money, banking and credit. In line with this policy, and
considering its unique functions and responsibilities, the central monetary authority established
under this Act, while being a government-owned corporation, shall enjoy fiscal and
administrative autonomy. (Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)]

[Note: The fiscal autonomy of the BSP accentuates its role as the country's independent central
authority. The MB then is granted the authority to adopt an annual budget for and authorize such
expenditures by the BSP as are in the interest of its effective administration and operations in accordance
with the applicable laws and regulations.  Since the MB adopts an annual budget for the BSP and, as a
matter of course, the PICCI, it is incongruous, if not absurd, to place the BSP under the jurisdiction of the
DBM and subject its budget to the DBM's review and approval. (Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
244815, February 2, 2021)]

[Note: "The power to appropriate belongs to Congress, while the responsibility of releasing
appropriations belongs to the DBM."  But this does not hold true for the BSP. The BSP does not receive its
budget from the national government through the GAA. In stark contrast with other government
agencies, the BSP is not reliant on Congress for budgetary appropriation. It is the MB which crafts the
BSP's annual budget to ensure the effective administration and operations of the BSP and its subsidiaries.
(Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)]

Equally telling that in Memorandum Order No. 2012-09  issued by the Governance

Commission for GOCCs (GCG), the PICCI is classified as a GOCC excluded from the coverage
of R.A. No. 10149 and, ultimately, from the jurisdiction of the GCG. Hence, while generally,
GOCCs, including government instrumentalities exercising corporate powers and government
financial institutions, fall under the jurisdiction of the GCG,  the BSP and its subsidiary PICCI
are unequivocally excluded from the GCG's authority. But this is not to say that the BSP and its
subsidiary PICCI necessarily come under the jurisdiction of the DBM. To the mind of the Court,
we would be trampling on the BSP's fiscal and administrative autonomy if we go by such logic.
(Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)

76
 [Note: It is well to clarify that the autonomy and independence granted to the BSP by its charter
do not, in any way, advocate the exercise of unbridled discretion in the adoption of its budget. In the same
vein, the PICCI, as BSP's subsidiary, cannot seek refuge behind the shield of fiscal autonomy of its parent
company to justify the grant of a bonus or incentive sans eligibility standard and criteria. Settled is the
rule that the PICCI is subject to the review and audit of the COA.  Even though the PICCI does not
receive its budget from the national government funds through the GAA, the PICCI's approved budget is
still public in character which should be properly accounted for in accordance with the existing auditing
rules and regulations.  (Padilla v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244815, February 2, 2021)]

Clearly, it is now settled that PICCI is a GOCC that was organized under the
Corporation Code. P.D. No. 520 merely authorized the Central Bank of the Philippines, now,
BSP, to establish PICCI. BSP, thereafter, organized PICCI through the processes mandated by the
Corporation Code. Thus, having been incorporated under the Corporation Code, PICCI is
subjected not only to the provisions of P.D. No. 520, but also to the provisions of the
Corporation Code, one of which is Section 30, a provision covering the Board of Directors of a
Corporation. Notably, Section 6 of P.D. No. 520 recognizes the applicability of the Corporation
Code as follows:

Section 6. The provisions of the Corporation Law, as amended, not inconsistent with the
Decree shall be applicable to the corporation authorized to be created herein on matters not
covered by the latter.

It bears noting that the limitations imposed under Section 30 of the Corporation Code is
a matter that is not covered by the provisions of P.D. No. 520. While the Board of Directors of
PICCI was given the authority to fix compensation of all officers, staff and personnel of PICCI,
upon confirmation of the Monetary Board, nowhere from the provisions of PD No. 520 was it
declared, nor can it be inferred, that they were given an unbridled discretion. Rather, Section 30
of the Corporation Code serves to complement the scope of authority of the members of the
Board of Directors of PICCI, especially that it authorizes a financial grant decided by
themselves, and for themselves. As members of the Board of Directors, they have a fiduciary
duty to safeguard and properly utilize the funds of the corporation. As such, the limitation
imposed by Section 30 of the Corporation Code prevents them from abusing the powers vested
in them by P.D. No. 520. (Gonzaga v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 244816, June 29, 2021)

In Strategic Alliance v. Radstock Securities, the Court pronounced with finality that PNCC
is a GOCC, viz.: The PNCC is not 'just like any other private corporation precisely because it is not a
private corporation' but indisputably a government owned corporation. Neither is PNCC "an
autonomous entity" considering that PNCC is under the Department of Trade and Industry, over which
the President exercises control. To claim that PNCC is an "autonomous entity" is to say that it is a lost
command in the Executive branch, a concept that violates the President's constitutional power or control
over the entire Executive branch of government. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court emphasized that PNCC is 90.3% owned by the government and may not be
considered an autonomous entity just because it got incorporated under the Corporation Code.

Additionally, Executive Order No. 331, series of 2004 has placed the PNCC under the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), thus, confirming its character as a GOCC xxx.

77
(Philippine National Construction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 248401,
June 23, 2021)

[Note: Since PNCC is a non-chartered GOCC, incorporated under the Corporation Code, it is
governed by the Labor Code, not by the Civil Service Law. ln Paloma v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., the Court
pronounced that prior to the privatization of the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), it was a non-chartered
GOCC in the sense that the GSIS owned majority of its stockholdings. Consequently, PAL personnel were
covered by the Labor Code, not by the Civil Service Law. The same rule applies to PNCC employees.
(Philippine National Construction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 248401, June 23,
2021)]

[Note: Although governed by the Labor Code, as a GOCC, PNCC is not exempt from the
coverage of the National Position Classification and Compensation Plan approved by the President.
(Philippine National Construction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 248401, June 23,
2021)]

Preventive Suspension

Second, the rule on non-delegation of the BIR Commissioner's power to discipline BIR
employees under Section 30, Chapter 6, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 does not include
the delegation of the power to issue formal charges and preventive suspension orders, which
are merely part of the investigation process. We stressed this in Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
Gervacio where we held:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive

measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the
suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from
using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of

Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office
but is considered to be a preventive measure.

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:

SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under
preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed
upon the employee found guilty.

78
 Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To
rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of
1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing
preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.

Therefore, we find that BIR Commissioner Henares did not unduly delegate his power
to discipline BIR employees, in particular Leoncio, to Deputy Commissioner Estela V. Sales
under Revenue Administrative Order No. 1-2002. (Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Gan-Lim, Jr., G.R.
No. 254939, March 3, 2021)

[Note: Third, at any rate, we rule against the validity of the Preventive Suspension Order. The CA
observed that while the BIR did not serve the Formal Charge and Preventive Suspension Order to
Leoncio in 2013, it readily admitted that it withheld Leoncio's salaries for 90 days equivalent to the period
of suspension under the Preventive Suspension Order. Indeed, the Preventive Suspension Order was
effectively enforced without the requisite formal charge. In Trade and Investment Development Corp. of the
Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo, we enumerated two conditions before an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation may validly issue, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority
has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either
dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service.
Section 29 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service considers an order of
preventive suspension issued without a formal charge as covered by the phrase "null and void on its face"
in relation to the payment of back salaries to the affected employee. Accordingly, Leoncio is entitled to
back salaries corresponding to the period of 90 days preventive suspension. (Bureau of Internal Revenue v.
Gan-Lim, Jr., G.R. No. 254939, March 3, 2021)]

In the present case, Garcia gravely deviated from the procedure outlined in the
RRACCS. Garcia issued a formal charge and order of preventive suspension charging petitioner
with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the interest
of the ·service without undergoing preliminary investigation. Garcia claimed that he need not
conduct preliminary investigation since he personally witnessed the acts of petitioner; hence,
there is already a prima facie case to support a formal charge. To recapitulate, if it is the
disciplining authority that initiated the administrative process, there is a need to issue a
show-cause order directing the person complained of, to explain the acts complained of. Then
there should be a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is a clear-cut case. (Saño
v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No. 222822, October 13, 2021)

After the determination of a prima facie case, a formal charge will be issued, and the
person charged will be made to submit an answer. These procedural steps are anchored on
protecting the constitutional right of a person charged of an administrative offense, to be heard.
This is because a violation of such process raises a serious jurisdictional issue that cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. The constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings where
he/she stands to lose the same. In the present case, the procedural faux pas committed by Garcia
consists in committing a shortcut on the administrative process by issuing a formal charge and
the order of suspension without issuing a show cause order and subsequently conducting a
preliminary investigation. As a result of violating the constitutional right of petitioner to due
process, the formal charge and the order of preventive suspension has no legal leg to stand on.
Thus, the formal charge and the order of preventive suspension are declared to be invalidly
79
issued and without legal effect. The invalidation of the formal charge and the order of
preventive suspension would likewise result in the payment of back salaries for the period
when petitioner did not receive his salaries and other benefits because of the order of preventive
suspension. This is specifically provided in Section 29 of the RRACC and the updated version
under Section 33 of the RACCS. The RACCS provides that back salaries should be awarded
corresponding to the period of the unwarranted preventive suspension which was based on an
order of preventive suspension issued without a formal charge. (Saño v. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, G.R. No. 222822, October 13, 2021)

[Note: For purposes of the payment of back salaries, the petitioner is given the option to have the
90 days added to his leave credits if he is still in active government service OR have the 90 days
monetized at the current rate of the position he formerly occupied. (Saño v. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, G.R. No. 222822, October 13, 2021)]

Disciplinary Actions

Dismissal from the service imposed by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office
(CSCRO) cannot be executed pending appeal with the Civil Service Commission Proper (CSC).
Premature execution of the decision ordering the employee's dismissal from the service entitles
the employee to the payment of backwages even though the employee is not fully exonerated
on appeal. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)

[Note: The CSC is composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners. Under the CSC's
jurisdiction are the CSCROs. Section 12 (11), Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO No. 292 provides that the
CSC has the power to review decisions and actions of its offices and agencies attached to it. The same
provision states that the CSC's decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Hence, it is the
CSC's decision that becomes executory, not the CSCROs'. This does not mean that the CSCRO's decisions
do not become executory in all instances. The URACCS declare that the CSCROs' decisions are
immediately executory after 15 days from receipt of the decision, unless a motion for reconsideration is
timely filed. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)]

[Note: Clearly, effects of decisions of the CSCROs are different from those of the heads of offices.
Specifically, decisions of Secretaries and heads of agencies imposing removal are executory upon
confirmation of the Secretary concerned while decisions of the CSCROs imposing dismissal from the
service are executory only when no motion for reconsideration or appeal is filed. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R.
No. 209052, June 23, 2021)]

[Note: To be sure, the URACCS distinguishes between the decisions of the CSCROs, and the
decisions of the Secretaries and heads of agencies, thus:

SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. —The Civil Service
Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:

A. Disciplinary

1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;

2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other

instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on appeal[.]
80
 xxx xxx xxx

Further, the URACCS specified that it is the decision of the heads of offices which becomes
executory depending on the penalty imposed and the filing of a motion for reconsideration or appeal, to
wit:

SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. — Heads of Departments, agencies, provinces,

cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with
the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.

A. Disciplinary

1. Complaints involving their respective personnel. Their decisions shall be final in case
the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days salary.

Decisions of Heads of Agencies imposing a penalty of removal shall be executory only

after confirmation by the Department Secretary concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 37. Finality of Decisions. — A decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a

penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final and executory. However, if the penalty imposed
is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary,
the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.

No similar provision, i.e., whether the penalty is removal or otherwise, is found in the URACCS
regarding the instance when the decision of the CSCRO will be executory other than in Section 80, 39
where no motion for reconsideration is filed. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)]

Backwages

In Civil Service Commission v. Cruz (Cruz), we explained the conditions for backwages
to be awarded when dismissal from the service was immediately executed but the employee
was later ordered reinstated by the CSC. The government employee must not only be found
innocent of the charges; his suspension must likewise, be shown to be unjustified. Cruz relied
on the pronouncements in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA (Bangalisan), Jacinto v. CA (Jacinto), and De la
Cruz v. Court of Appeals (De la Cruz) where the Court declared that payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if: (1) he
is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension, and (2) when the suspension is
unjustified. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)

[Note; Nevertheless, we hold that the conditions laid down in Cruz do not apply in this case. In
Cruz, the penalty of dismissal from the service was decreed by the General Manager of the City of
Malolos Water District, with the approval of its Board. In Bangalisan, the dismissal from the service of
petitioners was ordered by then Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. The
subsequent cases of Jacinto and De la Cruz involved similar factual circumstances as Bangalisan. In these
cases, the immediately executed dismissal from the service were decisions of heads of office. Under EO
81
No. 292, decisions of Secretaries and heads of instrumentalities imposing dismissal from the service are
executory when confirmed by the Secretary concerned. This is enforced by the URACCS, the governing
rules when Maneja committed her offense, where the CSC adopted the wordings of EO No. 292.

In this case, the dismissal from the service of Maneja was decided by the CSCRO No. X. There
is a difference in the authority who imposed the dismissal from the service. This distinction is material
because it determines the legality of the immediate execution. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June
23, 2021)]

[Note: Applying this rule here, Maneja timely filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSCRO
No. X's decision penalizing her with dismissal. When the motion was denied, she filed an appeal before
the CSC within the reglementary period. Thus, CSCRO No. X's decision never became executory.
Consequently, its implementation of Maneja's dismissal was illegal and has no basis in law.

To reiterate, in Cruz, Bangalisan, Jacinto, and De la Cruz, the decisions of the disciplining
authority were properly immediately executed. In stark contrast, the decision of the CSCRO No. X here
was prematurely executed pending Maneja's appeal with the CSC. Ultimately, the conditions in Cruz do
not apply here because the decision implemented was not executory. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052,
June 23, 2021)]

[Note: Here, as in Abellera, CSCRO No. X's decision was hastily executed pending Maneja's
appeal resulting in her dismissal despite the decision not being executory. Therefore, her suspension from
December 2003 up to her actual reinstatement, is unjustified and without basis warranting the grant of
backwages covering that period, notwithstanding the fact that she was not fully exonerated from her
offense of Dishonesty. (Republic v. Maneja, G.R. No. 209052, June 23, 2021)]

Appeals

Prefatorily, it must be pointed out that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when she
filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to challenge the resolutions of the CA. The
Resolutions dated April 13, 2016 and November 25, 2016 are final orders or judgments that is
(sic) well within the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It is a settled rule
that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the petitioner had
the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. (Mahinay v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 230355, March 18, 2021)

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Election Actions

The results of an election may be challenged through different legal vehicles: first, failure
of election cases; second, pre-proclamation petitions; and third, election contests. These have

82
substantive and procedural differences, with varying remedies, but what remains consistent
across all modalities is the requirement of specificity. Particularity on one's allegations, grounds,
and bases cuts across all mechanisms for challenging election outcomes and must be present in
all actions, regardless of the mode.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, a failure of election may
be declared if, "on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or . . . such election results
in a failure to elect, [or] in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election[.]" For its declaration, the alleged illegality must have affected more
than 50% of the votes cast.

A pre-proclamation controversy concerns questions affecting the proceedings of the

board of canvassers or "any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 [of the Omnibus
Election Code] in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of
the election returns." Further, only the issues provided in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. The restrictive and exclusive list
includes:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in the authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

Under the Automated Election System, pre-proclamation controversies cover only two
issues, both concerning the Board of Canvassers: (a) its illegal composition; and (b) its illegal
proceedings.

Finally, election contests, which only contemplate post-election scenarios, take the form
of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto. Although distinct, both actions aim
to unseat a winning candidate after proclamation and assumption of office.

An election protest involves "a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on
the grounds of fraud or irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots, or in the preparation
of the returns." It is centered on the issue of who actually and validly obtained the plurality of
votes.

A petition for quo warranto is defined as "an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office." It is appropriate only "for the purpose of

83
questioning the election of a candidate on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility." (Marcos, Jr. v.
Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

The Constitution established distinct electoral tribunals to serve as "the sole judge[s] of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" 200 concerning national elective
positions. The Senate Electoral Tribunal rules on senatorial contests; the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal on representatives; and the Supreme Court, as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, on the president and vice president. (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T.
Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

[Note: Jurisprudence discussing failure of election cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and

election contests reveals that specificity in bases and allegations has always been critical to their appraisal.
(Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)]

As regards failure of elections, the Court emphasized in Pasandalan v. Commission on

Elections:

A petition for a declaration of failure of election must specifically allege the essential
grounds that would justify the exercise of this extraordinary remedy. Otherwise, the COMELEC
can dismiss outright the petition for lack of merit. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to the COMELEC in such a case because the COMELEC must exercise with utmost
circumspection the power to declare a failure of election to prevent disenfranchising voters and
frustrating the electorate's will.

The same is true of pre-proclamation controversies. Any challenge that relates to election
returns must likewise be anchored on specificity. For instance, in Macabago v. Commission on
Elections:

Pre-proclamation controversies are properly limited to challenges directed against the

Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular election returns to
which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections subsequently reduced to
writing[.]

In Macabago, the need to aver a particular controversy at the first instance was
emphasized. As pre-proclamation cases demand the petitioner to raise illegality immediately,
205 there is a need for "specific verbal objections subsequently reduced to writing." (Marcos, Jr. v.
Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

[Note: The Court has underscored that a protest wanting in specific factual footing must be
dismissed; "otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by
petitions of this sort by the losing candidate." To entertain it would be to put no end to divisive and
disruptive electoral contests, and "the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of
crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembark from the water." (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No.
005, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: Failing to forward a "detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of” makes
the protest insufficient in form and substance, warranting its summary dismissal. (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo,
P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)]

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 [Note: To the Court's mind, the HRET had jurisdiction to determine whether there was terrorism
in the contested precincts. In the event that the HRET would conclude that terrorism indeed existed in the
said precincts, then it could annul the election results in the said precincts to the extent of deducting the
votes received by Daza and Abayon in order to remain faithful to its constitutional mandate to determine
who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast. (Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No.
222236, May 3, 2016, cited in Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: It must be remembered that "[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be
exercised with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the
disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to
distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or
that the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercising their franchise." Consequently, a protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has been muted by violence,
intimidation or threats. (Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, May 3, 2016, cited in Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo,
P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)]

In Abayon, the Court never truly hinged on the possibility of entertaining a separate
cause of action of annulment of elections after determining the results of revision of ballots. The
prayer for revision and reappreciation of votes was withdrawn, and the protest was anchored
on the allegations of terrorism. Moreover, the case was decided on the extent of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction on election protests. Abayon set no binding
precedent on whether a separate cause of action may be entertained after revision and
appreciation of ballots in pilot provinces. Thus, in this Protest, protestant is incorrect to invoke
Abayon that his third cause of action survives despite an unfavorable resolution of his second
cause of action. (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

In Abayon, where petitioner Abayon had argued that an annulment of election results is
similar to a declaration of failure of elections, the Court clarified the difference:

Consequently, the difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals

and the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former
is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results
connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the
COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in
annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among the candidates garnered a
majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections
with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended,
or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections,
special elections will have to be conducted.

Thus, the power to annul election results rests within the electoral tribunals. This power
is "an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals," and an indispensable consequence
of the constitutional mandate of electoral tribunals to decide all election contests within their
jurisdiction. Abayon continued that two indispensable requisites must concur to annul an
election:

85
 (1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on the
specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality, more
than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein; and

(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful
ballots.

Abayon also extensively discussed how "no evidence was presented which will directly
point to protestee as the one responsible for the incidents which allegedly happened before and
during the elections." (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

On the other hand, it is the Commission on Elections that can declare a failure of
elections, a power that it had been vested with as early as the passage of the 1971 Election Code.

Republic Act No. 6388, or the 1971 Election Code, provided the following grounds to
proclaim a failure of elections: (1) force majeure; (2) violence; (3) terrorism; or (4) fraud. It
likewise provided the specific instances when a failure of elections shall be declared. The only
power that the Supreme Court has is to confirm the date fixed by the Commission on Elections
to hold a special election:

SECTION 11. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, or
fraud, the election in any precinct or precincts has not been held on the date herein fixed or has
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting and such failure or
suspension of election in any precinct or precincts would alter the result of the election for any
office to be voted in said election, the Commission may, on the basis of a verified petition and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held or suspended: Provided, however, That the
holding or continuation of the election on the date fixed by the Commission shall not be effective
unless confirmed by the Supreme Court. For this purpose the Commission shall immediately
certify to the Supreme Court its resolution for review, transmitting with it the pertinent records of
the proceedings. (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

When the 1978 Election Code was decreed into law, it expanded the grounds to proclaim
the postponement of elections, including "loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, ... and other analogous cause of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible":

SECTION 6. Postponement of election. — When for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous cause of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible in any voting center or political subdivision, the Commission on Elections,
which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, upon a verified petition and after due
notice and hearing, shall postpone the election therein for such time as it may deem necessary.

The 1978 Election Code also differentiated a failure of election from the mere
postponement of election. It then provided more comprehensive guidelines on the Commission
on Elections' exercise of the duty to call for a special election. It stated:

SECTION 7. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, or fraud
the election in any voting center has not been held on the date fixed or has been suspended before
86
 the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting and such failure or suspension of election in
any voting center would affect the result of the election, the Commission may, on the basis of a
verified petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held or suspended.

SECTION 8. Call of special election. — Special election shall be called by the Commission by
proclamation on a date to be fixed by it, which shall specify the offices to be voted for, that it is for
the purpose of filling a vacancy or a newly created elective position, as the case may be. The
Commission shall send copies of the proclamation, in numbers sufficient for due distribution and
publication, to the provincial election supervisor or city election registrar concerned, who in turn
shall publish it in their respective localities, by posting copies thereof in at least three conspicuous
places in the city or in each municipality in the building, the public market, and his office, and
one copy each in every voting center in the city or province.

Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the interim Batasang Pambansa,
the vacancy shall be filled by majority vote of the Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa on
nomination of the President.

The law then expanded and clarified the powers of the Commission on Elections by
instituting it as the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions,
orders or rulings shall be final and executory." (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005,
February 16, 2021)

The rules were reiterated in the law governing the election of local government officials:

SECTION 5. Failure of Election. — Whenever for any serious cause such as violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible, the election for a local office fails to take place on the date fixed by law, or is
suspended, or such election results in a failure to elect, the Commission on Elections shall, on the
basis of a verified petition and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election as soon as practicable.

Thereafter, the rules were also applied to the election of barangay officials in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982:

SECTION 16. Postponement or Failure of Election. — When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and
other analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any barangay, the Commission on Elections, upon a verified
petition, and after due notice and hearing, shall postpone the election therein for such time as it
may deem necessary.

If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, or other analogous causes or fraud,
the election in any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting therein and such failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission on Elections, on the basis of a
verified petition and after due notice and hearing, shall call for the holding or continuation of the
election on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held or suspended.

87
 In such case, the Minister of Local Government shall designate the persons who shall
temporarily act as Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and Members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Council).

When the conditions in these areas warrant, upon verification by the Commission on
Elections, or upon petition of at least thirty per centum of the registered voters in the barangay
concerned, it shall order the holding of the barangay election.

Upon the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code, the Commission on Elections can
now motu proprio proclaim a failure of election. The Code also provided for special elections
regarding vacancy in the Batasang Pambansa 388 and at the barangay level. (Marcos, Jr. v.
Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

At bottom, the power to declare a failure of elections, and consequently conduct special
elections, is lodged exclusively with the Commission on Elections. Meanwhile, an electoral
tribunal, after determining "who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes
cast," is empowered to annul election results for the contested position before it. (Marcos, Jr. v.
Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

The differences between the two remedies are clear and there is no overlap in their
functions. Nonetheless, declarations of failure of elections and annulment of election results
hinge on the same grounds and quantum of evidence.

The Commission on Elections, upon petition or motu proprio, may declare a failure of
elections and call for special elections if it is shown with strong and convincing evidence that
"force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes" made it impossible to hold
the scheduled elections.

Electoral tribunals may, in turn, annul election results if they are strongly convinced that
the conduct of elections was tainted with "fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities
existed to warrant the annulment." However, being drastic and extraordinary, the remedy of
annulment of elections must "be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in
exceptional circumstances." (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021)

Section 78

As correctly held by the COMELEC, since the petition is anchored on the alleged
ineligibility of private respondent, the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course or
to cancel the latter's COC which falls under Section 78 of the OEC. (Guro v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)

Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.

9523, provides the following reglementary period for filing such a petition:

Rule 23
88
 Section 1. Grounds. — A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate
of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly registered
political party, organization or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any
material representation contained therein as required by law is false.

A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy invoking grounds

other than those stated above or grounds for disqualification, or combining grounds for a
separate remedy, shall be summarily dismissed.

Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the
time of filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute
candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.

It bears noting that private respondent filed his COC on October 16, 2015 while
petitioner filed his petition before the COMELEC on April 29, 2016, or after the lapse of a
whopping one hundred ninety-six (196) days. (Guro v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 234345,
June 22, 2021)

[Note: In Aznar v. Commission on Elections (Aznar), although the petitioner therein also filed his
petition for disqualification more than two months after the filing by the private respondent therein of the
questioned COC, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of twenty-five (25) days under Section 78 of the
OEC, We ruled on the merits of the case as a matter of public interest because the issue therein involved
the private respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he had been
proclaimed elected. (Guro v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note: In Loong v. Commission on Elections, where the ground for the disqualification sought was
misrepresentation as to the required age of the candidate, We held that such ground is not on the same
level as that in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections (Frivaldo) and in Aznar which involved lack of Philippine
citizenship — "an overriding and fundamental desideratum matched perhaps only by disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines." xxx. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, the reglementary period provided by law should be applied strictly. (Guro
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note: On the ground that herein private respondent allegedly misrepresented himself as being a
registered voter, We see no reason to depart from settled jurisprudence and accordingly rule that the
reglementary period provided by law should likewise be strictly applied to such a disqualification. (Guro
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note: True, in Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, We favored a liberal construction of the

COMELEC Rules of Procedure despite the fact that therein respondent Omar filed his petition to deny
due course or cancel therein petitioner Hayudini's COC one hundred seventy-two (172) days after the
filing of said COC, but only because of a supervening event in said case. Omar had already previously
filed a petition to deny due course or cancel Hayudini's COC but the COMELEC dismissed the same on
the same day that the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition to be included in the list of voters. However, the
RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and the deletion of Hayudini's name from the list of voters became final
and executory. We treated the RTC ruling as a supervening event which affected the substance of the
COMELEC decision and rendered the execution thereof inequitable since the ruling adequately equipped

89
Omar with the necessary ground to successfully challenge Hayudini's COC. (Guro v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note; Likewise, in Caballero v. Commission on Elections, We found the COMELEC's suspension of

its own rules in order because the issue therein raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident in the
place where he seeks to be elected at least one (1) year before the elections as he represented in his COC,
pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office and, therefore, imbued with public
interest, and also because of the peculiar circumstances in said case. Despite therein petitioner's failure to
serve a copy of the petition to therein respondent prior to its filing, We adopted the COMELEC's
ratiocination to the effect that petitioner exerted efforts in serving a copy of his petition to respondent
after being made aware that such service is necessary, and that it was impossible for petitioner to
personally serve a copy since he was in Canada at the time of its filing. (Guro v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note: In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, We took a liberal stance in treating therein respondent's
one-day filing delay because he exerted due diligence in filing his election protest within the period
provided by law and only failed to do so on account of a typhoon as there were no court employees to
receive and docket his pleading. (Guro v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

[Note: We find no circumstance in the case at bench analogous to those in the above cases to
warrant a relaxation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, no grave abuse of discretion can
be attributed to the COMELEC in denying petitioner's petition on technical grounds. (Guro v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021)]

Here, respondent cannot be compelled through a writ of mandamus to deny due course
to certificates of candidacy precisely because the duty of respondent is to give due course to the
certificates if they are filled out in due form. The petitioners' prayer to motu proprio deny due
course to the certificates of candidates is contrary to the mandate of the respondent. (Cabigao v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247806, November 9, 2021)

[Note: The eligibility of the candidates based on the term limits is based on a constitutional
provision which is not apparent on the face of the certificate of candidacy. The number of terms and the
corresponding period already served by the candidate are not contents of a certificate of candidacy. If the
petitioners believe that there are candidates in the next elections who are ineligible based on the
constitutional term limits, their recourse is to file a petition under Section 78. (Cabigao v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 247806, November 9, 2021)]

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Jurisdiction

It is settled that the COA Proper has "exclusive jurisdiction to settle all debts and claims
of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and
instrumentalities." (Theo-Pam Trading Corporation v. Bureau of Plant Industry and the Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 242764, January 19, 2021)

[Note: Notably, the money claims are original actions. They are litigated for the very first time before
the COA Proper. The Court can only interpret the COA's multi-level review process as an institutional

90
safeguard for a money claim's proper and thorough evaluation, considering that these actions have not
been tried previously.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the COA's decision or resolution showing that the case was
assigned to the appropriate Central or Regional Office Director and/or subsequently referred to the LSS
prior to the COA Proper's deliberation. That the Director and/or the LSS were not even furnished a
copy of the assailed issuances strongly suggests that they did not participate in the case, much less review
the money claim at all. (Theo-Pam Trading Corporation v. Bureau of Plant Industry and the Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 242764, January 19, 2021)]

On this score, we lay down a conceptual framework for the guidance of the COA, the
Bench, and the Bar pertaining to the COA's audit power vis-a-vis the second type of money
claims which may be brought before it during the execution stage. Thus, the Court ruled that
the "COA's audit power over money claims already confirmed by final judgment of a court or
other adjudicative body is necessarily limited,” and laid down the guidelines, as follows:

(1) Once a court or other adjudicative body validly acquires jurisdiction over a money claim
against the government, it exercises and retains jurisdiction over the subject matter to the
exclusion of all others, including the COA;

(2) The COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or tribunal;

(3) The COA is devoid of power to disregard the principle of immutability of final judgments;
and

(4) The COA's exercise of discretion in approving or disapproving money claims that have been
determined by final judgment is akin to the power of an execution court.

Applying herein the ruling in the Taisei case, the money claim of VCPCI before the COA
undoubtedly falls under the second type of money claim, i.e., money claims which arise from a
final and executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. The money claim stemmed from the
Decision dated January 30, 2004 of the RTC, affirmed by the CA and the Court, that had long
become final and executory. The COA gravely abused its discretion in denying VCPCI's money
claim that was based on a final and executory judgment; and when it substituted the RTC's
findings and computations with its own. (V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 213821, January 26, 2021)

Under Article IX-D, Section 2 (2) of the Constitution, the Commission on Audit shall
have exclusive authority to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties."

"'Irregular expenditure' signifies an expenditure incurred without adhering to

established rules, regulations, procedural guidelines, policies, principles or practices that have
gained recognition in laws." (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182,
March 2, 2021)

[Note: Here, petitioner's grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement incentives was an irregular
expenditure, as it was granted without full compliance with Budget Circular No. 2006-1, Administrative

91
Order No. 135, and Public Sector Labor-Management Council Resolution No. 2, series of 2003. Thus, there
is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent's CGS-Cluster 2 in disallowing the incentives
paid to petitioner's rank-and-file employees in the Central Visayas Division from 2005 to 2009. (Social
Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2, 2021)]

In affirming ND No. 2011 -002 (08), the COA ruled that the PAGCOR Board of Directors
exceeded its authority and committed an ultra vires act by approving the disbursement of the
subject amount of P26,700,000.00. In so doing, the COA went beyond the bounds of its powers.

A corporation has: (1) express powers, which are bestowed upon by law or its articles of
incorporation; and (2) necessary or incidental powers to the exercise of those expressly
conferred. An act which cannot fall under a corporation's express or necessary or incidental
powers is an ultra vires act. In the instant case, the determination of whether the PAGCOR Board
of Directors acted within the powers of the corporation lies with the provisions of the PAGCOR
Charter. It bears stressing, however, that such determination is beyond the jurisdiction of the
COA. xxx. Neither the 1987 Constitution nor P.D. No. 1445, also known as the Auditing Code of
the Philippines, or any other related statute grants the COA the power to strike down as void or
declare ultra vires the acts of the Board of Directors of PAGCOR or any other GOCC. xxx.
(Figueroa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 213212, 213497 & 213655, April 27, 2021)

[Note: All told, the subject disallowance which found liability against the petitioners is bereft of
any factual and legal basis. In decreeing such disallowance, the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
which "pertains to acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's granted authority and, thus,
abusing the power granted to it." The same must, perforce, be struck down in the greater interest of
justice. (Figueroa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 213212, 213497 & 213655, April 27, 2021)]

[Note: PAGCOR is tasked with a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos and clubs
as a means to promote tourism and generate sources of revenue for the government. Under Title IV,
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869, PAGCOR's franchise includes the "rights, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools,
i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines." Likewise, it is legally empowered to "do and perform such other acts
directly related to the efficient and successful operation and conduct of games of chance in accordance
with existing laws and decrees." It also has regulatory powers over "[a]ll persons primarily engaged in
gambling, together with their allied business."

Prescinding from its dual governmental and proprietary functions, PAGCOR is a sui generis
GOCC. On one hand, it exercises a sovereign function by regulating gambling casinos and clubs. On the
other, it generates income for the Government by operating said gambling establishments.

Consistent with PAGCOR's unique corporate and fiscal features, the PAGCOR Charter, as
amended, provides a mechanism which effectively segregates PAGCOR's earnings owed to the
Government from the rest of its corporate revenue or funds. xxx.

In this regard, Section 15 of the PAGCOR Charter limits the COA's audit jurisdiction over
PAGCOR's funds as follows:

SEC. 15. Auditor. — The Commission of Audit or any government agency that the Office
of the President may designate shall appoint a representative who shall be the Auditor of the
Corporation and such personnel as may be necessary to assist said representative in the
performance of his duties. The salaries of the Auditor or representative and his staff shall be fixed
92
 by the Chairman of the Commission on Audit or designated government agency, with the advice
of the Board, and said salaries and other expenses shall be paid by the Corporation. The funds of
the Corporation to be covered by the audit shall be limited to the 5% franchise tax and the 50% of
the gross earnings pertaining to the Government as its share.

Cognizant of the above-stated principle of statutory construction, Section 15 must not be read in
isolation, but as part of the entire PAGCOR Charter. Indeed, it bears stressing that P.D. No. 1869 was
enacted to increase the participation of the private sector in the subscription of the authorized capital
stock of PAGCOR. To this end, the share of the Government in the gross earnings was adjusted to fifty
percent (50%). Likewise, to provide for greater flexibility in PAGCOR's operations, governmental audit
was limited to the five percent (5%) franchise tax and the Government's fifty percent (50%) share of the
gross earnings. This allows PAGCOR greater flexibility in generating revenues. Towards this end, the
relevant provisions of P.D. No. 1869 were decreed.

Here, the COA asserts that Section 15 of the PAGCOR Charter is no longer tenable because it runs
afoul of its audit jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution. The COA is, in effect, collaterally attacking the
constitutionality of the said provision.

The Court cannot sustain the COA's position. (Figueroa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 213212,
213497 & 213655, April 27, 2021)]

Despite COA's general mandate to ensure that "all resources of the government shall be
managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguard against
loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, xxx" the same cannot prevail over a
special law such as P.D. No. 1869 or the "PAGCOR Charter." In granting a special charter to
PAGCOR, legislature is presumed to have specially considered all the relevant factors and
circumstances in granting the same, being mindful of PAGCOR's dual role: first, to operate and
to regulate gambling casinos and second, to generate sources of additional revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-civic projects, and other essential public services. (Genuino v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230818, June 15, 2021)

[Note: PAGCOR was created pursuant to a special law and is, thus, governed primarily by its
provisions. As a legislative act, P.D. No. 1869 and in particular, Section 15, enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the Judiciary, in the
determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government.
Hence, unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this Court, a law
will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. As it
stands, since Section 15 of P.D. No. 1869 has yet to be amended, repealed, or declared unconstitutional,
the Court is left with no recourse except as to apply the law as presently written, that is, any government
audit over PAGCOR should be limited to its 5% franchise tax and 50% of its gross earnings pertaining to
the Government as its share. Resultantly, any audit conducted by COA beyond the aforementioned is
accomplished beyond the scope of its authority and functions. (Genuino v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
230818, June 15, 2021)]

The Court, in Taisei Shimizu Joint Venture v. Commission on Audit, extensively discussed
the limited power of the COA for audit review over money claims already confirmed by final
judgment of a court or other adjudicative body. Accordingly, when a court or tribunal having
jurisdiction over a money claim against the government renders judgment and the same

93
becomes final and executory, the COA cannot alter the same and disregard the principle of
immutability of final judgments. (Spouses Ting v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 254142, July 17,
2021)

[Note: The COA therefore erred in determining another reckoning point of the legal interest as it
violated the principle of immutability of final judgments. As such, the Decision No. 2019-129 dated 21
May 2019 and Resolution No. 2020-042 dated 21 January 2020 should be modified to reflect the ruling in
the final and executory judgment in G.R. No. 212842. (Spouses Ting v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
254142, July 17, 2021)]

Petitioners aver that the subject allowances and benefits, having been paid by entities
(Subsidiaries) incorporated under the Corporation Code, were not sourced from government
funds. The Court rejects this attempt to remove the subject matter of the controversy from the
COA's jurisdiction.

The Subsidiaries fall squarely within the COA's jurisdiction, in view of the 1987
Constitution's provision extending its authority to "government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries." On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject
allowances and benefits were paid to LBP officials, who are civil servants. Thus, the amounts
are cloaked with the character of public funds, inasmuch as "all moneys and property officially
received by a public officer in any capacity or upon any occasion must be accounted for as
government funds and government property.” (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on
Audit, G .R. No. 213409, October 5, 2021)

[Note: Disbursement of public funds that is contrary to law, unauthorized, or without statutory
basis shall be disallowed for being illegal or irregular, as the case may be. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Commission on Audit, G .R. No. 213409, October 5, 2021)]

The payees or the LBP officials who received the disallowed allowances and benefits
from the Subsidiaries are liable to refund these amounts. Petitioners' proposition that the payees
received the amounts in good faith is not an effective defense against their liability for the
disallowance. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G .R. No. 213409, October 5,
2021)

Allowances and benefits paid in contravention of the law are payments through error or
mistake. Thus, the prevailing rule prevents the recipients of these illegal disbursements from
unjustly enriching themselves and requires them to return to the government the amounts
mistakenly received. By exception, they may be excused from the liability to refund if: (a) they
establish that the amounts they received were "genuinely given in consideration of services
rendered" or (b) the Court decides to do so "based on undue prejudice, social justice
considerations, and other bona fide exceptions" as the factual circumstances in this case may
warrant.

None of the exceptions are present in the case. First, as discussed above, the payment
lacks legal basis. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a consideration genuinely given as
compensation for services rendered. Second, the subject payment was borne out of the
Subsidiaries' Board's self-determination of the entitlement to additional compensation of its

94
own members. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G .R. No. 213409, October 5,
2021)

[Note: Significantly, these officials were payees (they received the additional benefits) and, at the
same time, approving officers (they approved the Board resolutions granting the benefits) in the
transactions in question. They passed resolutions to grant themselves additional compensation. It is clear
that these are ultra vires and executed in disregard of patent conflict of interest. The Court cannot ignore
their direct participation in the illegal disbursements. Thus, these officials must answer for the
disallowance in both capacities: first, as payees who are liable for the individual amounts they received
by mistake, and second, erring approving officer; who are solidarily liable for the total disallowance.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G .R. No. 213409, October 5, 2021)]

At the onset, this Court is well aware of its previous ruling that the COA’s general audit
power is "among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government." It is fundamental that the COA is vested with a wide
latitude in discharging its role as the guardian of public funds and properties. This authority to
rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds finds force in Section 2, Article
IX-D of the 1987 Constitution xxx. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)

Accordingly, the indiscriminate grant of personnel benefits sans executive imprimatur

necessitates the disallowance. After all, to sustain petitioner's claim that it alone would ensure
that its compensation system would conform with applicable law will result in an invalid
delegation of legislative power, granting the PHIC [petitioner] unlimited authority to
unilaterally fix its compensation structure. Certainly, such effect could not have been the intent
of the legislature. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
250089, November 9, 2021)

[Note: Invariably, its very nature as a GOCC dictates that while it may have the mandate to fix
the compensation of its personnel, the President may nevertheless exercise the powers of supervision and
control over it by approving its grant of allowances and other benefits, pursuant to P.D. No. 1597.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)]

As guardians of public funds, COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.
In recognition of its expertise in audit matters, the findings of the COA are generally accorded
not only respect but at times finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.

But while the COA exercises broad powers in audit matters, it could not pass upon the
issue of validity of contracts. As the Court ruled in Asaphil Construction and Development Corp. v.
Tuason Jr., et al., and Felix Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. COA, the validity of contracts remains a
judicial question requiring the exercise of the judicial function. (Cagayan de Oro City Water
District v. Pasal, G.R. No. 202305, November 11, 2021)

Nonetheless, whether a written concurrence amounts to a pre-audit, which we say it is,

COA has the mandate to determine whether to require pre-audit or post-audit. This is a
constitutional mandate. (Power Sector Assets and Liability Management Corporation v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 247924, November 16, 2021)

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 As COA has consistently maintained, however, whenever circumstances warrant, such
as where internal control system of a government agency is inadequate, it may reinstitute
pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as are necessary and appropriate to protect the
funds and property of the government.

Justice Caguioa posits that “... whenever COA believed it necessary to reinstate the
pre-audit system, what it did was to issue another circular amending or revoking the
withdrawal of pre-audit." From this, he concludes that since COA has not issued a circular
amending or revoking the withdrawal of pre-audit, then pre-audit and all its forms including
the prior written concurrence is still disallowed.

The argument seems sensible but we have to appreciate this issue from COA's exclusive
mandate as the government's only auditing firm that draws its power no less from the
Constitution. The best interpreter of what its issuances mean as regards the most efficient and
effective methods it will be using for auditing government transactions will of course have to be
COA itself. This jurisdiction exclusively belongs to COA. (Power Sector Assets and Liability
Management Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247924, November 16, 2021)

[Note: This policy determination on how to accomplish its mandate is beyond the control of this
Court, especially when it is exercised in a reasonable manner. The requirement of a prior written
concurrence per se is not an unreasonable audit measure. The latter becomes unreasonable and therefore
gravely abusive of discretion when, as in this case, COA unreasonably delayed its action on requests for
such concurrences and when COA intruded on aspects of the private legal representation that the
government agency has the expertise and mandate to solicit such as the necessity for such hiring. (Power
Sector Assets and Liability Management Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247924, November 16,
2021)]

Rule-Making Authority

Verily, the Court recognizes the COA's power to install its own rules of procedure, as
well as its discretion to relax them in certain cases. Furthermore, the COA Proper is not bound
by the results of the Director or LSS' review and is expected to conduct its own independent
evaluation. However, by no means is its discretion unbridled. COA's evasion of its internal rules,
at the expense of the parties involved who may have relied on the rules' application, amounts to a denial of
Theo-Pam s fundamental right to due process—a grave abuse of its discretion. (Theo-Pam Trading
Corporation v. Bureau of Plant Industry and the Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 242764, January 19,
2021)]

Solutio Indebiti

In the ultimate analysis, the Court, through these new precedents, has returned to the
basic premise that the responsibility to return is a civil obligation to which fundamental civil
law principles, such as unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti apply regardless of the good faith
of passive recipients. This, as well, is the foundation of the rules of return that the Court now
promulgates. Moreover, solutio indebiti is an equitable principle applicable to cases involving
disallowed benefits which prevents undue fiscal leakage that may take place if the government

96
is unable to recover from passive recipients amounts corresponding to a properly disallowed
transaction. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2, 2021)

Nevertheless, while the principle of solutio indebiti is henceforth to be consistently

applied in determining the liability of payees to return, the Court, as earlier intimated, is not
foreclosing the possibility of situations which may constitute bona fide exceptions to the
application of solutio indebiti. xxx the jurisprudential standard for the exception to apply is that
the amounts received by the payees constitute disallowed benefits that were genuinely given in
consideration of services rendered (or to be rendered) negating the application of unjust
enrichment and the solutio indebiti principle). As examples, xxx these disallowed benefits may be
in the nature of performance incentives, productivity pay, or merit increases that have not been
authorized by the Department of Budget and Management as an exception to the rule on
standardized salaries. In addition to this proposed exception standard, xxx the Court may also
determine in the proper case bona fide exceptions, depending on the purpose and nature of the
amount disallowed. xxx. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March
2, 2021)

Moreover, the Court may also determine in a proper case other circumstances that
warrant excusing the return despite the application of solutio indebiti, such as when undue
prejudice will result from requiring payees to return or where social justice or humanitarian
considerations are attendant. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2,
2021)

In Dubongco v. Commission on Audit, all recipient employees of the disallowed Collective

Negotiation Agreements incentives were ordered to refund what they received, on the grounds
of unjust enrichment, their participation and knowledge for the release of the incentives, and
their liability as trustees, thus:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. Unjust enrichment refers to the result or effect of failure to
make remuneration of, or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to
legal or equitable obligation to account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of
reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. Thus,
there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when
a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a
person is benefited without a valid basis or justification; and (2) that such benefit is derived at the
expense of another. Conversely, there is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit
has a valid claim to such benefit. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182,
March 2, 2021)

[Note: In this case, it must be emphasized that the grant of CNA Incentive was financed by the
CARP Fund, contrary to the express mandate of PSLMC Resolution No. 4, Series of 2002, A.O. No. 135
and DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-01. This is not simply a case of a negotiating union lacking the
authority to represent the employees in the CNA negotiations, or lack of knowledge that the CNA
benefits given were not negotiable, or failure to comply with the requirement that payment of the CNA
Incentive should be a one-time benefit after the end of the year. Here, the use of the CARP Fund has no

97
basis as the three issuances governing the grant of CNA Incentive could not have been any clearer in that
the CNA Incentive shall be sourced solely from savings from released MOOE allotments for the year
under review. Consequently, the payees have no valid claim to the benefits they received. (Social Security
System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2, 2021)]

[Note: Thus, this Court categorically held that the approving officers' obligation to return
depends on the circumstances, while the rank-and-file employees, who received the benefit subject of the
Collective Negotiation Agreement negotiations, should return the amount they actually received. In the
recent case of Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, this Court held the certifying and approving
officers jointly and severally liable to return the disallowed amounts received by the individual
employees, upon a finding of the officers' patent disregard of existing rules and lack of legal basis in
granting the Collective Negotiation Agreement incentives. The recipient employees were also ordered to
return the incentives they unduly received, on the grounds of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.
(Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2, 2021)]

As for the recipients, while the disallowed benefit was denominated as a "performance
incentive," there was no showing that the incentive had proper legal basis and was denied
based on a mere procedural infirmity. Neither was it shown that the incentive has a clear, direct,
and reasonable connection to the work performed.  Moreover, their entitlement to the PIB was
not proven, which gave rise to the duty to return the amount that they unduly received in
accordance with the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.  Neither is there any
genuine and bona fide justification that would warrant the application of equitable
considerations to absolve the recipients' civil obligation to the government. Thus, the COA did
not err in holding all the recipients individually liable to return the amounts that they received.
(National Power Corp. Board of Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218052, January 26, 2021)

The SSS 2020 and Madera cases also support Our conclusion that the recipient employees
are liable to return the disallowed payments on ground of solutio indebiti, as a result of the
mistake in payment. The recipient employees are clearly disqualified from receiving the
disallowed CNA incentives and prejudice to the government would result if they do not return
what they unduly received. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217075, June
22, 2021)

In Madera, the Court reverted to the basic standpoint of applying the principles of solutio
indebiti and unjust enrichment, regardless of good faith of passive recipients, in determining
liability for disallowed amounts.  These concepts are based on Article 2154 of the Civil Code,
which provides that if something is received and unduly delivered through mistake when there
is no right to demand it, the obligation to return the thing arises. As aptly put by Associate
Justice Inting in his Concurring Opinion to Madera, "payees are liable to return the amount
simply because it was paid by mistake. No one should ever be unjustly enriched, especially if
public funds are involved. Since their liability is a quasi-contract (solutio indebiti), good faith can
never be an excuse. In other words, payees cannot be absolved from·liability using the same
reasoning to exempt approvers/certifiers, simply because the nature of their liability for the
transaction is not the same. (The Officers and Employees of Iloilo Provincial Government v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218383, January 5, 2021)

The petitioner invokes good faith on the part of its official and employees in determining
liability to return the disallowed amount. However, the defense of good faith is not available to
the recipients of a disallowed amount.
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 It is already settled that the payment of compensation and benefits that are disallowed
subsequently for being unlawful is an erroneous payment. It follows then that the government
employee who received the payment by mistake has the quasi-contractual obligation to return it
to the government. On the other hand, the recipient may be excused from this liability provided
that: (a) he establishes that the amounts they received were "genuinely given in consideration of
services rendered," or (b) the Court decided to do so "based on undue prejudice, social justice
considerations, and other bona fide exceptions" as the factual circumstances in the case may
warrant. (The National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217915, October
12, 2021)

It bears stressing, however, that petitioner's civil liability is not predicated on his
participation in the disallowed transaction alone. Consistent with the aforecited provisions of
the Administrative Code and of the Madera Rules of Return, such liability must be, as it is,
rested on the fact that, under the circumstances, petitioner's participation had been tainted with
gross negligence, if not bad faith. (Bodo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 228607, October 5, 2021)

[Note: Accordingly, petitioner cannot be considered as a total stranger to the disallowed

transaction. The purchase request he signed provided documentary support and impetus-and, to an
extent, 1he appearance of legitimacy-to the sham bidding conducted by Villasin et al., and the eventual
award of contract in favor of Bals Enterprises. Petitioner may not have been involved in the conduct of
such bidding and award, but he partly enabled the personalities who were involved to undertake them.
Given this milieu, petitioner's participation in the disallowed transaction, albeit only contributory, cannot
be doubted. (Bodo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 228607, October 5, 2021)]

The solidary liability of government officials who approved or took part in the illegal
expenditure of public funds, pursuant to Section 43 of Book VI of the 1987 Administrative Code,
does not necessarily equate to the total amount of the expenditure. In Torreta v. COA, we held
that should the disallowed expenditure consist of payments arising from irregular or unlawful
government contracts - such as the case here - the solidary liability of the aforesaid officials may
be reduced based on the principle of quantum meruit. (Bodo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
228607, October 5, 2021)

Quantum Meruit

Indeed, the existence of the appropriation and certification as to the availability of funds
together with the written contract is vital and necessary for the execution of government
contracts. Nevertheless, the mere absence of these documents would not necessarily rule out the
possibility of the contractor receiving payment for the services rendered for the government.
(RG Cabrera Corporation, Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 231015,
January 26, 2021)

In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it did not withhold the grant of
compensation to a contractor notwithstanding the dearth of the necessary documents, provided
the contractor substantially shows performance of the obligation under the contract. (RG Cabrera
Corporation, Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 231015, January 26, 2021)

99
 [Note: In Eslao v. Commission on Audit, on the basis of justice and equity, the Court granted
compensation on the basis of quantum meruit to the contractor for an almost fully completed project even
if there was failure on the part of the contractor to undertake a public bidding. The Court reasoned that
denial of the claim would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.

Similarly, in EPG Construction Co. v. Vigilar, citing Eslao, the Court granted recovery on the basis
of quantum meruit even without a written contract and corresponding appropriations covering the
contract cost xxx. (RG Cabrera Corporation, Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No.
231015, January 26, 2021)]

Disallowances and
Good Faith

In Madera v. Commission on Audit,  we said that the civil liability of approving or

certifying officers provided under Sections 38  and 39,  Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987, and the treatment of such liability as solidary under Section 43,  Chapter 5, Book
VI of the same Code, are grounded upon the manifest bad faith, malice, or gross negligence of
the public officers in the performance of their official duties because of the presumption of good
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty in their favor.  Good faith has been
defined in disallowance cases as:

that state of mind denoting honesty of intention, and freedom from

knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
though technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit
or belief of facts which render transactions unconscientious. 

Whereas, gross negligence refers to:

[N]egligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to

act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It
is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their
own property. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to
perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable. 

We recognized the following badges of good faith and diligence that may be considered
to absolve the approving or certifying officers' liability, viz.:

(1) Certificates of Availability of Funds pursuant to Section 40 of the

Administrative Code, (2) In-house or Department of Justice legal opinion, (3) that there
is no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence, (4) that it is traditionally
practiced within the agency and no prior disallowance has been issued, [or] (5) with
regard the question of law, that there is a reasonable textual interpretation on its
legality.

Gleaned from the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty is negated, not only by evident bad faith, but also

100
by the gross negligence of the approving and certifying officers in the performance of their
duties. 

There are no hard and fast rules to establish good faith or bad faith. Madera reminds us
that the ultimate analysis of good faith or bad faith for purposes of liability determination will
still depend on the unique facts obtaining in every case. (Ancheta v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 236725, February 2, 2021)

Very recently in Madera v. Commission on Audit (Madera), this Court had the opportunity
to provide a concrete set of guidelines in determining the liability to return of government
officials and employees affected by disallowances of benefits and compensation declared valid
by this Court (Madera Rules). The guidelines provide:

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court pronounces:

1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the
persons held liable therein.

2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:

a. Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of
official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly
liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

b. Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of
1987, solidarily liable to return only the net disallowed amount which, as discussed
herein, excludes amounts excused under the following sections 2c and 2d.

c. Recipients — whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients — are

liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively received by them, unless they are
able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of
services rendered.

d. The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue prejudice,
social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions as it may determine on a case
to case basis.

Madera explained that pursuant to Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code,

government officials who approved or certified the grant of disallowed benefits could only be
civilly liable to return the amount thereof when "the public officers performed his official duties
with bad faith, malice, or gross negligence." The rationale behind this rule is that public officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. Good faith and
the observance of the diligence of a good father, therefore, remain as valid mechanisms of
avoidance of liability. (Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16, 2021; see
Hagonoy Water District v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247228, March 2, 2021)

[Note: Meanwhile, this Court accepted the following circumstances as badges of good faith that
may be considered in favor of government officers who, in the performance of their official functions,
approved or certified the disallowed benefit: xxx For one to be absolved of liability the following
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requisites [may be considered]: (1) Certificates of Availability of Funds pursuant to Section 40 of the
Administrative Code, (2) In-house or Department of Justice legal opinion, (3) that there is no precedent
disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence, (4) that it is traditionally practiced within the agency and no
prior disallowance has been issued, [or] (5) with regard the question of law, that there is a reasonable
textual interpretation on its legality. (Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: The Court, nevertheless, recognized exceptions that could excuse payees from returning
what they erroneously received. The exceptions are: (1) those given in consideration of actual services
rendered under Rule 2c of the Madera Rules; (2) undue prejudice; (3) social justice considerations; and (4)
other bona fide exceptions as the Court may determine on a case to case basis pursuant to Rule 2d.
(Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: Based on the foregoing, We find in these cases the existence of badges of good faith on the
part of the certifying/approving officers and hence, they should be exonerated from their civil liability to
return the disallowed amount under Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. The fact that the FGI
had been traditionally given, while it may not justify its legality, propriety, and continued grant, is among
the recognized circumstances showing good faith. Also, the OGCC's opinion indicate that NFA Council
Resolution No. 225-2K6 was issued under the mistaken, yet innocent, belief that the NFA Council had
authority to authorize the FGI's annual grant. Finally, Our ruling in Escarez was only promulgated in
2016. Thus, when the subject FGI was released in 2010 and 2012, there was still no precedent disallowing
a similar case in jurisprudence. (Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: It is clear from the above-mentioned cases that, post-Madera, the Court had been strictly
applying the general rule that passive recipients or payees should return what they received by mistake,
save for very rare instances when it found compelling reason to apply the exceptions. Nevertheless, so as
to give a categorical ruling with regard to the application of Rules 2c and 2d of the Madera Rules, the
Court promulgated its resolution to the motion for reconsideration in Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit. It
was pointed out that these rules should be applied only to truly exceptional cases and they should not be
haphazardly applied or else they would effectively nullify the general rule, which is to return disallowed
public expenditures. Thus, Rule 2c should be limited to benefits that are supported by factual and legal
bases, but were still disallowed due to procedural infirmities. By factual basis, the Court meant "that there
must be actual work performed and that the benefit or incentive bears a clear, direct, and reasonable
relation to the performance of such official work or functions." (Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 &
239036, February 16, 2021)]

[Note: This holds especially true to the officers, who approved and certified the release of the rice
allowance in 2012 merely on the basis of a board resolution, which dates back to 1992. Aside from the
clear provisions in RA No. 6758 and DBM CCC No. 10, the COA issued Resolution No. 2004-006 in 2004,
which categorically states that "those hired after [July 1, 1989,] including those hired to the positions
vacated by said incumbents shall not be entitled to said allowances and benefits" and "[a]llowances and
benefits granted after January 23, 2002 other than those allowed under [RA No. 6758] as implemented by
DBM [CCC] No. 10 shall be disallowed in audit." Corollary, the incumbency requirement for the
continuous grant of rice allowance under sub-paragraph 5.5 of DBM CCC No. 10, which was re-issued on
March 1, 1999, is clear and needs no interpretation. What is more, as correctly observed by the COA
Regional Office, case laws such as Agra, explaining the application of Section 12 of RA No. 6758 and other
relevant issuances, abound long before the release of the 2012 rice allowance to simply be ignored. Thus,
the approving and certifying officers' sheer reliance upon a board resolution issued in 1992 and the
alleged existing policies and practices since 1993, fell short of the standard of good faith and diligence
required in the discharge of their duties to sustain exoneration from solidary liability. (Hagonoy Water
District v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247228, March 2, 2021)]

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 Herein petitioners' defense of good faith in certifying the availability of funds and
approving the disbursements deserves the same treatment extended in Madera. xxx. In the
absence of evidence showing negligence and malice in certifying and approving the disallowed
disbursements, herein petitioners are exempt from civil liability under Sec. 38 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, they should not be liable to return the disallowed
amounts. (Bugna v. Commission on Audit, UDK 16666, January 19, 2021)

Section 43, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that "every

official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or taking part therein, and every
person receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the Government for the
full amount so paid or received." Section 38, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code explains that such civil liability of the officers is grounded upon the showing of bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence in the performance of their official duties. In this case, the COA CGS
aptly observed the NPC Board of Directors' non-compliance with the clear mandate of AO No.
103 and MO No. 198. By jurisprudence, the palpable disregard of laws, prevailing
jurisprudence, and other applicable directives amounts to gross negligence, which betrays the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions enjoyed by
public officers.  Hence, the COA correctly held the NPC Board of Directors liable despite not
being recipients of the disallowed amounts. Accordingly, we find it proper to specify the NPC
Board of Directors' solidary liability to refund the disallowed amounts consistent with the
COA's findings, as well as the established rules and jurisprudence. (National Power Corp. Board of
Directors v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 218052, January 26, 2021)

The civil liability of approving or certifying officers provided under Sections 38  and
39,  Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, and the treatment of such liability
as solidary under Section 43,  Chapter 5, Book VI of the same Code, are grounded upon the
manifest bad faith, malice, or gross negligence of public officers, who have in their favor the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty.  On the other
hand, the payees' obligation in a disallowed transaction is grounded upon the civil law
principles of solutio indebiti  and unjust enrichment.  Thus, while the officers' good faith or bad
faith is determinative of their liability, such state of mind is immaterial with regard to the
recipients' obligation to return in disallowance cases. By way of exception, the recipients do
not incur liability to refund when they can prove their entitlement to what they received as a
matter of fact and law because in such situation, there is no undue payment and the
government incurs no loss. Additionally, certain justifications that may excuse a recipient's
liability to return may be recognized such as undue prejudice, social justice considerations,
and other bona fide exceptions depending on the purpose and nature of the disallowed
amount relative to the attending circumstances. (Ngalob v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
238882, January 5, 2021)

[Note: In this case, no badge of good faith can be appreciated in favor of the approving and
certifying officers considering the blatant disregard of the rules and laws that they themselves invoked
and relied upon. By jurisprudence, the palpable disregard of laws and other applicable directives
amounts to gross negligence which betrays the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official functions enjoyed by public officers.  Hence, the approving and certifying
officers are solidarily liable to refund the disallowed amount. (Ngalob v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
238882, January 5, 2021)]

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 [Note: As for the payees, petitioners cite the case of Silang, et al. v. Commission on
Audit,  wherein the Court considered the payees' good faith to justify the excuse of their liability in the
disallowed transaction. To stress, we have exhaustively elucidated in Madera that such justification is
unwarranted because mere receipt of public funds without valid basis or justification, regardless of
good faith or bad faith, is already undue benefit that gives rise to the obligation to return what was
unduly received. Notably, petitioners failed to proffer evidence of actual service rendered or work
accomplished to rationalize the incentives received. Neither is there any genuine and bona
fide justification that would warrant the application of equitable considerations to absolve the
recipients' civil obligation to the government. Thus, all the recipients are individually liable to return
the amounts that they received. (Ngalob v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 238882, January 5, 2021)]

The grant of incentives to employees should be in accordance with law, not discretion.
More so when the officers entrusted with its disbursement are mere trustees of the funds used.
Failure to abide by the law, compels all the officers and employees to return the amount
unlawfully released. (Social Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2,
2021)

In the present case, none of the requisites as enumerated in Madera exist to absolve the
approving and certifying officers, as well as the recipient employees from liability on the
amounts disbursed. Instead, like in the similar and recent case of Social Security System, the
approving and certifying officers granted the Collective Negotiation Agreement incentives in
patent violation of Public Sector Labor-Management Council Resolution No. 2, series of 2003,
Administrative Order No. 135, and Budget Circular No. 2006-1. Thus, the recipient employees of
the Collective Negotiation Agreement incentives have no valid claim to the benefits they
received, and accordingly, received the benefits at the expense of the government. Applying
Madera, Dubongco, Department of Public Works and Highways, Rotoras and Social Security System,
the approving and certifying officers of the Social Security System Central Visayas Division are
jointly and severally liable for the disallowed amounts received by the individual employees,
while the recipient employees are liable to return the amounts they respectively received. (Social
Security System v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 224182, March 2, 2021)

Indeed, Section 13 authorized the Board of Directors to prescribe additional allowances

to its members. However, the Board of Directors does not have unbridled power to grant
additional allowances for themselves as Section 13 explicitly requires the LWUA's approval for
such grants. On this score, we agree with the COA that the PAGWAD Board of Directors did not
comply with the required LWUA approval. We cannot sympathize with petitioners' argument
that the cited LWUA issuances legitimized the grant of the challenged benefits given to the
PAGWAD Board Members. (Paguio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223547, April 27, 2021)

[Note: In Madera, we cited Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that "every
official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or taking part therein, and every person
receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the Government for the full amount so paid
or received." Section 38, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code explains that such civil liability of
the officers is grounded upon the showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the performance of
their official duties. In this case, the COA auditor aptly observed that the PAGWAD Board of Directors, as
well as its General Manager and Administrative Division Manager, patently violated the clear directives
of its own charter PD No. 198, as amended by RA No. 9286, and AO No. 103. By jurisprudence, the
palpable disregard of laws, prevailing jurisprudence, and other applicable directives amounts to gross
negligence, which betrays the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official

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functions enjoyed by public officers. Hence, the COA Proper correctly held Paguio and Aguilar liable
despite not being recipients of the disallowed benefits. In the same vein, the Board Members who granted
various benefits unto themselves in contravention of the aforecited laws and issuances are solidarily
liable to refund the unauthorized benefits that they received. (Paguio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
223547, April 27, 2021)]

To recall, one of the badges of good faith adopted by the Court in Madera, xxx, is the
existence of a reasonable textual interpretation of the law which the approving or certifying
officers relied upon when they caused the disallowed disbursements. For petitioners in this
case, the language of Item 4 (h) (ii) (aa) explicitly allowing the grant of CNAI to managerial
employees served as a plausible legal basis for the disallowed payments. While petitioners'
interpretation ultimately proved myopic and incomplete, the fact that DBM issuances
subsequently acknowledged Item 4 (h) (ii) (aa) and adopted a policy of allowing the grant of
CNAI to managerial employees suggests that the disallowed amounts herein were not utterly
without legal basis. (Celeste v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 237843, June 15, 2021)

[Note: In sum, the Court finds that Celeste, Buted and De Leon, who were approving/certifying
officers, or otherwise participated in the disbursement, acted in good faith and may be excused from the
solidary liability to return the disallowed amounts, consistent with Rule 2 (a) of the Rules on Return in
Madera. (Celeste v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 237843, June 15, 2021)]

The Court made it plain in Madera that the net disallowed amount shall be solidarily
shared by the approving/authorizing officers who were clearly shown to have acted in bad
faith, with malice, or were grossly negligent, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code.
Hence, xxx in addition to their individual liability for the amounts they respectively received,
the liability of petitioners is also solidary for the entire net disallowed amount, which, in this
situation, pertains to the "total disallowed amount minus the amounts received by the
payee-recipients who were absolved by the COA." The COA may go against any of the
approving/certifying officers named liable in the notice of disallowance, without prejudice to
the latter's claim against the rest of the persons liable. (Pastrana v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos.
242082 & 242083, June 15, 2021)

[Note: All told, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion in disallowing the payment of the
CNA incentive and ordering petitioners Pastrana, Dacanay, Tomas, and Ysmael liable for the return of the
disallowed amount. We shall, however, modify the assailed COA Decision to clarify that petitioners, as
erring approving/certifying officers, shall be liable for the net disallowed amount which would
effectively be the amounts they received in their capacity as payee-recipients. (Pastrana v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. Nos. 242082 & 242083, June 15, 2021)]

Applying the law, and the cases of SSS 2020 and Madera to the instant case, the Court
finds that the approving and certifying officers of SSS who authorized the payment of the
disallowed amounts and the employees who received the same are liable to return them. While
there is a presumption that the approving and certifying officers granted the disallowed benefits
acted in good faith in the performance of their official duties, this presumption of good faith
fails when an explicit law, rule or regulation has been violated. (Social Security System v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217075, June 22, 2021)

The general rule in our jurisdiction is that officers who participated in the approval of
disallowed allowances or benefits are presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance
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of their duties. We have also recognized certain badges of good faith and diligence which may
be considered in absolving officers from liability. Nevertheless, we are reminded that there are
no hard and fast rules to establish good faith or bad faith. In the ultimate analysis, the unique
facts obtaining in every case should be examined in the determination of the existence of good
faith. (National Transmission Corp. (TransCo) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 246173, June 22,
2021)

[Note: Here, we hold that good faith favors these officers to excuse them from the solidary
liability to settle the disallowed amount. Recall that Aguilar and the other TransCo officials merely relied
on the TransCo board resolutions in approving and certifying the release of the separation pay. It was the
BOD that determined the terms of the policy for the separation pay grant. On the other hand, the
approving and certifying officers had the duty to implement the board resolutions just like all the other
plans and policies of the BOD. This holds especially true with Aguilar, who was specifically directed to
implement the board resolutions in accordance with the policy established and approved by the Board.
There being no revocation or invalidation of the board resolutions, it was incumbent upon Aguilar to
implement it in accordance with his mandate under the EPIRA. Moreover, at the time of the
disbursements in 2009 and 2010, there was no controlling jurisprudence or definitive ruling yet on the
issue of applying the rounding-off method, which was an understandably difficult question of law as the
Labor Code and some case laws sanction the application of such method albeit, in private employment. It
was only in the August 2018 TransCo Case that the Court finally declared the illegality of using the
rounding-off method in computing the separation pay of displaced or separated TransCo employees.
(National Transmission Corp. (TransCo) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 246173, June 22, 2021)]

Here, petitioner's failure to observe DBM BC No. 2006-1 before approving payment for
CNA Incentives in 2011 does not rise to the level of gross negligence which would make her
solidary liable to return the entire disallowed amount. (Abejo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
254570, June 29, 2021)

[Note: To be sure, the present case bears striking similarity, if it is not in all fours with Montejo v.
Commission on Audit. There, the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) paid CNA Incentives in
the middle of 2010 and 2011, and again at the end of the same year in 2010. Montejo claimed that there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of DBM BC No. 2006-1. For although said issuance
provides that the CNA Incentives should be granted after the end of the year, it was qualified by a
provision that the grant shall be released only after the planned activities and projects of the concerned
agency have been implemented in accordance with the performance targets for the year. As it was, the
DOST had been submitting documents proving that they had achieved their targets and corresponding
savings were generated. Thus, the grant of CNA Incentives was compliant with the proviso in Section 5.7
of DBM BC No. 2006-1, albeit payments were released twice in the middle of the year. xxx.

Similarly, petitioner here honestly believed that the savings of ICAB from cost-cutting measures
and systems development may already be used as payment for CNA Incentives since the agency had
already completed its programs, projects, and activities in accordance with its performance targets for
2011. As in Montejo, petitioner's interpretation of DBM BC No. 2006-1, though erroneous, was not
characteristic of gross negligence.

Montejo, too, brought to fore the absence of jurisprudence dealing with the application of DBM
BC No. 2006-1 when the disallowed CNA Incentives were granted by the DOST in 2010 and 2011.
Notably, the disallowed CNA Incentives in Montejo and in the present case pertain to the same period, i.e.,
fiscal year of 2011. Thus, just as how Montejo could not be faulted for misinterpreting DBM BC No. 2006-1
in 2011 in the absence of clarificatory jurisprudence at that time, so, too, should petitioner be excused for
the same mistake made in the same period. xxx.
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 All told, there is no cogent reason to nullify the Notice of Disallowance No. 2012-002-101-(11)
dated February 28, 2012, albeit the Rules of Return in Madera operates to excuse petitioner a) from
solidary liability to return the entire disallowed amount; as well as b) from personal liability to return the
excess amount she had received. (Abejo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 254570, June 29, 2021)]

In this case, the disallowed amounts ultimately redounded to the benefit of the NCIP,
more particularly, as payment of its officials and employees/scholars. It is discerned that NCIP
is a sui generis government agency that came about as a result of the promise of the State to
recognize indigeneity with both respect and pride as a fundamental element of nation building
and national consciousness and as a social justice measure to correct past mistakes of prejudice
and discrimination against indigenous peoples. The protection of the rights of indigenous
peoples carries with it significant social justice considerations, which, in turn, necessitates the
development and empowerment of NCIP's officials, at least insofar as the peculiar facts of this
case are concerned. This salutary facet of the unfortunately unauthorized funding is not lost
upon this Court and may fall within Madera's Rule 2d which allows the Court to "excuse the
return of recipients based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide
exceptions as it may determine on a case to case basis." (Bilibli v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
231871, July 6, 2021)

Notwithstanding the lack of malice or bad faith, this Court finds that the approving
officers should be held solidarily liable due to gross negligence. It is well settled that patent
disregard of case law and COA directives, as in this case, is tantamount to gross negligence.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9,
2021)

[Note: In stark contrast, the same cannot be said of petitioner's certifying officers who merely
guaranteed the availability of appropriations and determined the completeness of the supporting
documents for such disbursements. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 250089, November 9, 2021)]

[Note: As decreed by Madera, officers and employees who are recipients are liable to return the
disallowed amounts, regardless of good faith, following the fundamental civil law precepts of unjust
enrichment and solutio indebiti. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the ponente of Madera, has
clarified, however, that this does not foreclose the possibility of situations which may constitute bona fide
exceptions to the application of solutio indebiti. Ergo, the Court may excuse the return of the disallowed
amount received when "(1) it was genuinely given in consideration of services rendered; (2) undue
prejudice will result from requiring the return; (3) social justice comes into play; or ( 4) the case calls for
humanitarian consideration.”

Lamentably, none of the aforementioned exceptional circumstances obtain in this case. Petitioner
offers no justifiable reason to award its officers and employees with such allowances, other than its fiscal
autonomy. There was no showing that the subject benefits and allowances had proper legal basis, nor was
it denied based on a mere procedural infirmity; neither was it amply demonstrated that there was a clear,
direct, and reasonable connection to the work performed by petitioner's officers and employees.
Moreover, this Court is not persuaded that undue prejudice would result in requiring the recipients to
return the disallowed amounts; rather, it would be increasingly prejudicial to the government if its public
coffers would be depleted by reason of disbursements done in contravention to law and jurisprudence.
Lastly, there is no genuine justification to warrant the application of social justice and humanitarian
considerations. As emphasized in De Guzman v. Commission on Audit, "a monetary grant that contravenes
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the unambiguous letter of the law cannot be forgone on social justice considerations. Liability arises and
should be enforced when there is disregard for the basic principle of statutory construction that when the
law was clear, there should be no room for interpretation but only application." xxx.

The officials and employees who have respectively received such amounts shall also return the
same based on the grounds of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti. (Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)]

The approving and implementing PSALM officers should not be held personally liable
for payment of the professional fees owing to the legal advisors. The latter's expertise and
services substantially contributed to boosting the government's privatization of 70% of our
generation assets with the end in view of improving the quality of power supply in the entire
country.

We have ruled that a public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of
his authority or jurisdiction. Given the situation obtaining here, however, no bad faith or malice
could be attributed to the concerned PSALM officers who prioritized the best interest of the
government when they pursued the engagement of the legal advisors. They were solely
motivated by the desire to accomplish the EPIRA mandate and achieve the greater good for the
government. Thus, personal liability should not attach to them. (Power Sector Assets and Liability
Management Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 247924, November 16, 2021)

Judicial Review

Clearly, the remedy of a party aggrieved by an ND issued by a COA Auditor is to file an

appeal to the COA Director having jurisdiction over the agency under audit. Thereafter, the
aggrieved party can elevate the matter before the Commission Proper by filing a petition for
review, and it is only after a decision is rendered by the Commission Proper when the
jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked through the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule
64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, within a period of 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. (Disuanco v. Villafuerte, G.R. No.
247391, July 13, 2021)

[Note: As outlined, nowhere in the process of appeal and review of COA decisions was the RTC
clothed with jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari. As astutely pointed out by Senior Associate
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, the RTC is without subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions,
rulings and orders of the COA. It is well-established that only the Supreme Court has certiorari
jurisdiction over a COA decision. The procedure of appeal outlined under P.D. No. 1445 and the COA
Rules finds their anchor under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution xxx. (Disuanco v. Villafuerte, G.R.
No. 247391, July 13, 2021)]

[Note: In either case, respondent cannot immediately assail an ND in court via a petition for
certiorari because of the criterion of pure question of law, alone. The procedural framework established
under the COA Rules in assailing an ND, and the specific court to which COA decisions may be elevated,
must also be taken into consideration. As mentioned above, the RTC has general jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for certiorari. The specific rule designed for a particular case, as laid down by Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of
the Constitution and Sec. 50 of P.D. No. 1445, which states that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over

108
any decision, ruling, or order of the COA, should prevail. (Disuanco v. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 247391, July 13,
2021)]

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the power to review COA decisions via Rule 64
petitions is limited to jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion. (The National Tobacco
Administration v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 217915, October 12, 2021)

The necessarily broad powers granted to the COA indubitably temper this Court's
power of review. Such limitation merely complements the COA's nature as an independent
constitutional body tasked to safeguard the proper use of the government and, ultimately, the
people's property, by vesting it with power to determine whether the government entities
comply with the law and the rules in disbursing public funds and to disallow legal
disbursements of these funds. (Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 250089, November 9, 2021)

COA's inordinate delay on PSALM's request for concurrence amounted to grave abuse
of discretion as it violates PSALM's right to a speedy disposition of its case under Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution xxx. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature,
as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice. (Power Sector Assets and Liability Management Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
247924, November 16, 2021)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Autonomy

The Local Government Code's enactment in 1991 embodied the basic policy of local
autonomy. A crucial part of local autonomy is fiscal autonomy, which refers to the local
government units' power to "create [their] own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges" that shall then accrue exclusively to them. Fiscal autonomy also includes their power to
allocate resources to align with their own priorities. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No.
195987, January 12, 2021)

General Supervision

Similarly, nothing in the entirety of Executive Order No. 224 suggests that it disrespected
the local government units' constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy. Respondents are correct
that the task force's role is only as a supervisory mechanism, a function that would even inure to
the benefit of the local government units concerned. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No.
195987, January 12, 2021)

Section 4 empowered the task force to perform the following: (1) collect applicable
quarry taxes, fees, and charges; (2) ensure that proper taxes and fees are paid before any
delivery receipt is issued; (3) ensure that the appropriate shares of the concerned local

109
government units are fully and timely remitted; and (4) render an accounting with the
Environment Secretary.

Nothing in the wording of Section 4 suggests that the task force exercises control over
the provincial government. Executive Order No. 224 also does not authorize the task force to
impose its own set of rules or regulations over the local government unit when it comes to the
collection of quarry taxes, fees, and charges. Section 4 is merely a supervisory mechanism, as
seen in how it directs the task force to oversee the collection and ensure that the appropriate
shares are remitted to the local government units concerned. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

The task force's oversight function is in line with the president's power of general
supervision over local governments, to ensure that local programs are aligned with national
goals. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)

 [Note: Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit differentiated

between general supervision and executive control as follows:

The President's power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see
to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the
President's power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President
over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the power to revise
or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion. 

This general supervision over local government units likewise cannot be said to infringe on the
local governments' constitutionally protected right of fiscal autonomy.

The task force's mandate of overseeing the collection of taxes does not violate local fiscal
autonomy. The power to impose quarry fees and taxes remains with the local government units.
Likewise, the full income due from those sources will ultimately find its way to the coffers of the
concerned local government units. (Province of Pampanga v. Romulo, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021)]

Sangguniang
Panlalawigan

Under Section 49 of RA 7160, the vice-governor, as presiding officer, is a member of the

SP and is mandated to vote only to break a tie, thus:

Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the, municipal
vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay.
The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.

In the case of Javier v. Cadiao, the Court ruled that the vice-governor, as the presiding
officer, shall be considered a part of the SP for purposes of ascertaining if a quorum exists. In
determining the number which constitutes as the majority vote, the vice-governor is excluded.
The vice-governor's right to vote is merely contingent and arises only when there is a tie to
break. (Cadio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 251995, January 26, 2021)

110
 [Note: The Vice Governor, however, does not represent any particular group. As a Presiding
Officer, his or her mandate is to ensure that the SP effectively conducts its business for the general welfare
of the entire province. Logically then, the Vice Governor should be the embodiment of impartiality. As the
Presiding Officer of the SP, he or she is without liberty to readily take sides, or to cast a vote to every
question put upon the body. It follows then that the law cannot reasonably require that the Vice Governor
be included in the determination of the required number of votes necessary to resolve a matter every time
the SP votes on an issue. It bears stressing though that while the Vice Governor does not enjoy full rights
of participation in the floors of the SP, as the holder of the body politic 's general mandate, the power to
render conclusion to an issue when there is a deadlock, pertains to him or her. Thus, Section 49 of the
LGC is explicit that "the presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie." (Cadio v. Commission on Audit, G.R.
No. 251995, January 26, 2021)]

[Note: In this case, however, there was no tie to break. The subject resolution received the
required number of affirmative votes. Consequently, petitioner had no hand and cannot therefore be held
liable for passage of the resolution. (Cadio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 251995, January 26, 2021)]

Ordinances

Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista enumerates the requirements for an ordinance to be valid, legally
binding, and enforceable, to wit:

For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also
conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not
unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.

Legaspi v. City of Cebu explains the two tests in determining the validity of an ordinance,
i.e., the Formal Test and the Substantive Test. The Formal Test requires the determination of
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether the
same was passed pursuant to the procedure laid down by law. Meanwhile, the Substantive Test
primarily assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the ordinance and significantly its
compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes. (Manila Electric Co. v. City of Muntinlupa,
G.R. No. 198529, February 9, 2021)

[Note: As correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, MO 93-35, particularly Section 25 thereof, has
failed to meet the requirements of a valid ordinance. Applying the Formal Test, the passage of the subject
ordinance was beyond the corporate powers of the then Municipality of Muntinlupa, hence, ultra vires.

Based on the Substantive Test, Section 25 of MO 93-35 deviated from the express provision of RA
7160. While ordinances, just like other laws and statutes, enjoy the presumption of validity, they may be
struck down and set aside when their invalidity or unreasonableness is evident on the face or has been
established in evidence. In this case, Section 25 of MO 93-35 was evidently passed beyond the powers of
a municipality in clear contravention of RA 7160.

MO 93-35 was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Muntinlupa and took
effect on January 1, 1994. This is plainly ultra vires considering the clear and categorical provisions of
Section 142 in relation to Sections 134, 137 and 151 of RA 7160 vesting to the provinces and cities the
power to impose, levy, and collect a franchise tax. Muntinlupa being then a municipality definitely had

111
no power or authority to enact the subject franchise tax ordinance. (Manila Electric Co. v. City of
Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529, February 9, 2021)]

[Note: To stress, an ordinance which is incompatible with any existing law or statute is ultra vires,
hence, null and void. In City of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation, this Court ruled that the City of
Manila cannot legally impose a local business tax based on Ordinance Nos. 7988 and 8011 which were
void and had no legal existence.

In the same vein, Muntinlupa City cannot hinge its imposition and collection of a franchise tax on
the null and void provision of Section 25 of MO 93-35. Moreover, Section 56 of the Charter of Muntinlupa
City cannot breathe life into the invalid Section 25 of MO 93-35. Section 56 of the transitory provisions of
the Charter of Muntinlupa City contemplates only those ordinances that are valid and legally existing at
the time of its enactment. Consequently, Section 56 did not cure the infirmity of Section 25 of MO 93-35
since an ultra vires ordinance is null and void and produces no legal effect from its inception. (Manila
Electric Co. v. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529, February 9, 2021)]

Term Limits
(and Permanent Vacancies)

"Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of
the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to
render service. In this regard, Aldovino is instructive, as follows:

From all the above, we conclude that the "interruption" of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title
to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8,
Article X and its [strict] intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's
continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation"
as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the function[s] of his office for a reason
provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder's term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the [term] "failure to serve" cannot be used once the
right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered
so that none is really lost. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March
2, 2021 [Citation from the Court’s Decision in this case dated September 10, 2019)

The COMELEC relies on the OMB's Rules to support its view that the execution of the
orders of dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary,

112
vacancy. A review reveals that the OMB's Rules did not justify the COMELEC's reliance. (Tallado
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)

[Note: Based on the foregoing, the OMB's Rules (Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003, Rule III, Sections 7 and 10) mandated that
decisions handed down in administrative cases should be immediately executory despite being timely
appealed. Thus, it was clear that what were to be executed were the decisions of the Ombudsman without
consideration as to their finality. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2,
2021)]

[Note: Without doubt, the execution of the OMB's dismissals in that manner resulted in the
petitioner's loss of title to the office of Governor. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679
(Resolution), March 2, 2021)]

[Note: Neither did the non-finality of the decisions render any less the petitioner's loss of his title
to the office. It would be unwarranted to differentiate the dismissals enforced against him from the
dismissal based on and pursuant to a decision that was already final. Both dismissals would produce the
same effect — the ouster of the official from his title to the office. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)]

[Note: Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing the dismissal of the
petitioner included no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In
fact, the decisions did not state any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents and
purposes of the law in the periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In that
status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)]

The length of time of the involuntary interruption of the term of office was also
immaterial. The Court adopts with approval the following excerpt from the dissent of
COMELEC Commissioner Parreño, which dealt with such issue, viz.: It matters not that the
duration of such loss of title to office appears to be brief and short. In fact, in Aldovino, it was held that the
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur, thus: From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title
to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution),
March 2, 2021)

In Our September 10, 2019 Decision, this Court ruled that the dismissal orders of the
OMB against petitioner serves as permanent removal from office and was not merely
temporary. From his dismissal until the Court of Appeals' modification of his penalty to
suspension, petitioner neither had title nor powers to wield as governor of Camarines Norte.
(Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)

Further, the OMB Rules placing petitioner in preventive suspension upon modification
of his penalty cannot be applied, considering the constitutional consequences of his prior
authorized removal, as compared to other public officers subject to the OMB's administrative
jurisdiction. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)

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 To begin with, the Court's conclusion is but an application of established jurisprudential
concepts and was never intended to reward corrupt politicians who escape dismissal. The
OMB's dismissal order is immediately executory and, once executed, the public officer ceases to
have title for the time being. Hence, it should be considered as an interruption of his term. The
fact that the public official is not an ideal one, considering his administrative baggage, does not
deprive him of the law's application. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679
(Resolution), March 2, 2021)

[Note: Moreover, our laws never required our elective public officials to be immaculately free
from a troubled past. As a matter of fact, the mere imposition of an administrative penalty does not
automatically disqualify a public officer from running for public office. Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code does not disqualify a person from running even if he was previously administratively sanctioned.
The same observation can be made in Secs. 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Tallado v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)]

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Duty

"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred

upon them by law or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the
judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a
discretionary act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
(Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838 (Resolution), May 11, 2021)

[Note: Applying the foregoing standards, the petition must fail. Petitioner failed to point out the
existence of a ministerial duty, which the law compels the respondents to perform with regard to the
conduct of trial and procurement of vaccines for COVID-19, as prayed for in the petition. During the time
when the national government planned to procure and enter into contracts for the procurement of the
Sinovac vaccine, there was no law in effect that required the mandatory conduct of clinical trial for the
procurement of any COVID-19 vaccine, including that produced by Sinovac. On the contrary, the
requirement for the completion of clinical trials before a vaccine may be used in the Philippines as
required by the Universal Healthcare Act was suspended for a period of three months. Further, discretion
was given to the government officials in addressing the spread of COVID-19, giving them enough leeway
to decide the interventions they may see as proper by adopting, as a basis, guidelines issued and the best
practices adopted by the World Health Organization and the United States Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. (Nepomuceno v. Duterte, UDK No. 16838 (Resolution), May 11, 2021)]

Liability

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 Respondent Arias cannot seek refuge in the oft-cited case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan in
their bid for absolution. For the Arias doctrine to apply, there must be no reason for the head of
offices to go beyond the recommendations of their subordinate, which does not obtain in this
case. On the contrary, the attendant circumstances herein ought to have prompted respondent
Arias to go beyond the recommendations of his subordinates, barring the application of the
Arias doctrine. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Fronda, G.R. No. 211239, April 26, 2021)

In Abubakar v. People of the Philippines, We held that the doctrine allowing heads of offices
to rely in good faith on the acts of their subordinates is inapplicable in a situation where there
are circumstances that should have prompted the government officials to make further
inquiries.

As municipal mayor, Section 444(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 commands
appellant not only to exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided
by said Code, but also such duties as may be imposed upon him by other laws, which certainly
includes his responsibility under the GSIS Act of 1997. Further, Section 444(b)(l)(x) of said Code
obligates him to ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully
discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and said Code, and to cause the
institution of administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the
municipality who may have committed an offense in the performance of his official duties.
(People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021)

[Note: In Matalam v. People of the Philippines therein petitioner was informed of the underpayment
or non-remittance of premium contributions to the GSIS for a period of one (1) year and six (6) months yet
he failed to heed the letters and billing statements, which asked him, as head of DAR-ARMM, to pay the
deficiencies. Despite sending four (4) memoranda directing the DAR-ARMM cashier and accountant to
respond to the complaints regarding non-remittance to the GSIS, We affirmed his conviction and even
increased his prison sentence, considering his position and his actions of trying to pass the blame to his
co-accused. The actions of appellant in this case are no different and merit the same treatment. (People v.
Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021)]

The Ombudsman assumed jurisdiction over Estacio's case based on its finding that IRC
is a GOCC since 481,181 out of the company's 481,184 subscribed shares are State-owned. Being
a director in a GOCC, the Ombudsman concluded that Estacio is a public officer. Yet, who are
considered public officers? Section 2 (b) of RA No. 3019 states that the term public officer
includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in
the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. Meanwhile, Article (Art.) 203 of the Revised Penal Code, defines a public officer as
any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government, or in any of its branches, public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a
public officer. Thus, to be a public officer, one must be:

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing in

said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class; and

115
 (2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority. 

In Javier v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), we held that persons from the private sector
who are invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by them for the benefit of the public, are public officers.  In that case, the petitioner
was appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit as member of the National Book
Development Board (NBDB). The NBDB was created pursuant to RA No. 8047  or the "Book
Publishing Industry Development Act." Though she came from the private sector, the Court
held that petitioner's appointment to the Board made her a "public officer" as she was invested
with some of the sovereign functions to achieve the government objective of cultivating the
book publishing industry. The same is true in the case of Estacio. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No.
218530, January 13, 2021)

[Note: As in Javier, Estacio was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a public officer.
Then President Macapagal-Arroyo wrote a letter addressed to former PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio
expressing her desire for Estacio to be elected as member of the IRC board of directors.  In Maligalig v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court probed into the nature of such "Desire Letter," and ruled against petitioner's
contention that he is not a public officer. The Court quoted with approval the PCGG's position that
members of the board of directors of sequestered companies, like BASECO, were elected by virtue of
"Desire Letters" issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The petitioner in that case sat
as President and Director of BASECO by virtue of the appointing power of the President, and as such, he
is considered a public officer exercising functions for public benefit, namely, management of sequestered
corporation and earning income for the government. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530, January 13,
2021)]

[Note: Relative to this, we stress that while IRC was organized under the Corporation Code, it is a
sequestered corporation subject to the fiscal supervision of the PCGG and is a GOCC which is under the
direct supervision of the Office of the President.  (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530, January 13,
2021)]

The same rule applies to the present case. In view of Judge Batingana's demise, it is no
longer appropriate to impose any administrative liability of a punitive character. The
administrative complaint against him, therefore, should be dismissed. (Delagua v. Batingana,
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2588, February 2, 2021)

[Note: As a point of clarification, this ruling shall apply only to cases which have not yet attained
finality when the respondent's demise occurs. This is consistent with the doctrine of immutability of
judgment which states that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court
of the land.  (Delagua v. Batingana, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2588, February 2, 2021)]

Thus, in order to successfully prosecute the accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 based on a violation of procurement laws, the prosecution cannot solely rely on the fact that
a violation of procurement laws has been committed. The prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that: (1) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party,
116
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross
inexcusable negligence. This the prosecution failed to do. Specifically, the prosecution miserably
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners acted with evident bad faith, manifest
partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence in relation to the subject procurements. (Martel v.
People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021)

Length of service is an alternative circumstance that can either be considered as

mitigating or aggravating depending on the factual milieu of each case. (Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas v. Bool, G.R. No. 207522, April 28, 2021)

[Note: The above-cited cases, as applied to the case at bar, show that length of service cannot be
considered as a mitigating circumstance when the length of respondent's service itself helped facilitate the
commission of the offense, which is found to be grave or serious.

In this case, the Court agrees with the BSP that it was precisely because of Bool's length of service
and experience that he was chosen as BSP's representative to France. It was in consideration of his
extensive experience, special skills, and relevant expertise that he acquired by reason of his long years of
service with the BSP that Bool was chosen for the highly technical work abroad. The CSC correctly held
that the fact that Bool had been in the service for 33 years should have made him "more meticulous and
prudent in discharging his responsibility."

Moreover, the offense committed is so gross, grave, and serious in character as to endanger or
threaten the public welfare. The CSC is correct in holding that the repercussions and the impact resulting
from Bool's negligence in not detecting the error in former President Arroyo's surname are so great.
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Bool, G.R. No. 207522, April 28, 2021)]

As clearly illustrated by the foregoing passage, Andutan upholds the general rule that
the separation of a public officer from the government service forecloses the filing of
administrative charges against such public officer. The continuing validity and binding effect of
administrative proceedings after the resignation or voluntary separation of the respondent
public officer is based not on the availability of accessory penalties but on the bad faith
attendant to such resignation or voluntary separation. Contrary to the BSP's assertion, Pagano
and Baquerfo do not depart from these principles. In Pagano and Baquerfo, the administrative
charges were filed before the erring public officers resigned, and this Court held that their
resignation did not serve as a bar to the continuation of administrative proceedings against
them, since the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal had already attached even before the
respondents were separated from the service. In Andutan, the administrative case against
Andutan was filed more than one year after his separation from the service; hence, the Court
ruled that he can no longer be administratively charged.

However, the holding in Andutan is premised on the finding that Andutan was
involuntarily separated from the service by virtue of a directive from the Executive Secretary.
Based on the aforequoted passage in Andutan, separation from the service is not an absolute bar
to the filing of an administrative charge if the public officer voluntarily separated from the
service to "pre-empt the imminent filing" thereof. That is precisely what happened in Office of the
Court Administrator v. Juan, where the public officer tendered his resignation a day after
confessing to the commission of an administrative offense. The administrative proceedings were

117
formally initiated two months after he tendered his resignation, which this Court did not accept
xxx. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 201069, June 16, 2021)

[Note: In the present case, it is undisputed that Jamorabo voluntarily retired from government
service effective December 31, 2008, or a mere four (4) months before RBKSI's next regular examination on
April 2009. Having failed to fulfill his personal promise to RBKSI president Falgui that the loan would be
settled prior to the next regular examination of RBKSI, Jamorabo suddenly separated himself from
government service before the said examination. Having been a bank examiner for 21 years, it is
reasonable to presume that Jamorabo knew of RBKSI's upcoming regular examination, and that he was
wise to the possibility of RBKSI reporting the still unpaid loan to the BSP in the course thereof. This is
bolstered by the report of the BSP's Investigation and Intelligence Division finding that Jamorabo had
started applying for a Canadian Permanent Resident Visa as early as June 2008. Given the suspicious
timing and the circumstances surrounding his voluntary retirement from the service, coupled with his
actual departure from the Philippines in April 2010, barely four months after the loan was finally settled
by his wife and sister-in-law, this Court finds that Jamorabo's voluntary separation from government
service was calculated to pre-empt the charges that will inevitably result from the discovery of the illicit
loan he entered into. As it turned out, RBKSI did report the loan to the BSP in the very next examination
period; and the complaint against Jamorabo was filed shortly thereafter. All told, the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Jamorabo could no longer be held administratively
liable. Likewise, the Ombudsman also committed grave abuse of discretion when it docketed Jamorabo's
case as a purely criminal investigation, without pursuing the administrative aspect thereof. The
Ombudsman must therefore proceed with the determination of Jamorabo's administrative liability for
violation of the Central Bank Act and other pertinent government regulations in connection with the loan
he contracted with RBKSI. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 201069, June 16,
2021)]

Suffice to say, however, that the dismissal of the criminal case does not necessarily
warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. Considering
the difference in quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Millado, G.R. No.
221506 (Notice), June 16, 2021)

It is settled that the invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences: (a) the failure to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused, if timely raised by the accused; (b) criminal
liability of law enforcers for arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired
as constitutionally inadmissible. In addition to this, the arresting officers who conducted a
warrantless arrest without strictly complying with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court can be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and for
other administrative sanctions. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others. (Alaska v. Garcia, G.R. No. 228298, June 23, 2021)

[Note: The criminal case previously pending before the RTC against Alaska and Montesa, on the
one hand, was separate and distinct from the criminal case for Arbitrary Detention and the administrative
case for Misconduct against herein respondents, on the other hand. In the former, what the RTC was
tasked to resolve was whether Alaska and Montesa were guilty of committing the crime of Robbery with
Homicide corresponding to the incident at the Petron Gasoline Station in Poblacion District II, Brooke's
118
Point, Palawan. In the latter, the Ombudsman was tasked to determine whether there was probable cause
to file an Information for Arbitrary Detention against respondents, or substantial evidence to penalize
them for Misconduct, due to the arrest and detention of Alaska and Montesa purportedly without legal
ground.

Admittedly, since Alaska and Montesa assailed the validity of their arrest before the RTC, both
tribunals would then have to contend with the question of whether there was legal ground for
respondents to effect said arrest. Indeed, the issue of the validity of Alaska and Montesa's arrest is akin to
a prejudicial question from the perspective of the Ombudsman, considering that it was first raised before
the RTC through Alaska and Montesa's Omnibus Motion. However, the RTC and the Ombudsman are
called to resolve this same question for entirely different purposes. As earlier mentioned, for the
Ombudsman, the purpose is determination of probable cause to file an Information or to penalize for
Misconduct. For the RTC, the purpose is to determine whether it had properly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of Alaska and Montesa as therein accused, and whether it was proper to quash the
Information filed against them. The proper course of action for the Ombudsman, therefore, was not to
wash its hands clean of the cases for Misconduct and Arbitrary Detention by dismissing the same, but to
suspend the proceedings before it pending the RTC's resolution of the Omnibus Motion (Alaska v. Garcia,
G.R. No. 228298, June 23, 2021)]

In order for a superior public officer to be made civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, there must be a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. For negligence to be considered gross, there must be an act or omission to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a
conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons or the government may be
affected. (Crisol, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 235764, September 14, 2021)

Considering, however, that respondent is no longer connected with the National Power
Corporation, the imposition of the principal penalty of dismissal is no longer tenable.
Nonetheless, this Court has held that where a respondent is found guilty of a grave offense but
the penalty of dismissal is no longer possible, the just and appropriate disciplinary measures
and sanctions may still be imposed. Among others, this can be done "by decreeing the forfeiture
of all benefits to which [they] may be entitled, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the Government, including
Government-owned and Government-controlled corporations." (Navotas Industrial Corporation v.
Guanzon, G.R. No. 230931, November 15, 2021)

Condonation Doctrine

Through the years, the condonation doctrine has served as a major obstacle against
exacting public accountability from a number of elective local officials, whose subsequent
reelections effectively rendered the administrative cases against them moot and academic.

Then came the Court's Decision in Carpio-Morales which, in no uncertain terms, declared
the condonation doctrine as obsolete and more importantly, bereft of legal bases in this
jurisdiction. The Court found the concept of public accountability to be "plainly inconsistent
119
with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or
even to another elective post."

Stated differently, the Court ruled that the reelection of a public official is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense as "there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term."

Corollarily, the Court clarified that the abandonment of the condonation doctrine would
not, in any way, deprive the electorate of their right to elect their officers, as Pascual postulated.
There is simply no legal basis to conclude that reelection automatically implies condonation.
Neither is there any existing presumption in any statute or procedural rule that the electorate
are assumed to have reelected a local official with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.

Nevertheless, the Court stressed that the abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should only be applied prospectively xxx. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 &
228325, February 9, 2021)

The Court later explained in the 2019 case of Crebello v. Office of the Ombudsman that the
prospective application of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales
should be reckoned from April 12, 2016, or the date on which the Court had acted upon and
denied with finality the Ombudsman's Motion for Clarification/Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in said case. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9,
2021)

Still, the questions remained: What exactly determines whether the condonation
doctrine still applies to an administrative case against an elected official? Is it based on the date
of filing of the case? Is the condonation doctrine no longer applicable to all open and pending
administrative cases as of April 12, 2016, as the Ombudsman posits?

In the 2020 consolidated cases of Madreo v. Bayron (Madreo), the Court finally clarified
the prospective application of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales in
simple and direct terms, viz.:

xxx [T]he Court is of the view that when Carpio-Morales ruled that the abandonment of
the doctrine of condonation is applied prospectively, it meant that the said doctrine does not
apply to public officials reelected after its abandonment. Stated differently, the doctrine applies to
those officials who have been reelected prior to its abandonment. That is because when a public
official has been reelected prior to the promulgation and finality of Carpio-Morales, he or she has
every right to rely on the old doctrine that his re-election has already served as a condonation of
his [or her] previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him [or her] from office, and
a new doctrine decreeing otherwise would not be applicable against him or her. More telling,
once reelected, the public official already had the vested right not to be removed from office by
reason of the condonation doctrine, which cannot be divested or impaired by a new law or a new
doctrine without violating the Constitution. xxx

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 To reiterate, the condonation doctrine is no longer an available defense to a public
official who is reelected on or after April 12, 2016. In other words, the reelection of a public
official on or after April 12, 2016 would no longer absolve him or her from any administrative
liability arising from a previous misconduct that he or she had committed during a prior term.
(Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)

Based on these considerations, the Court deems it proper to declare the Ombudsman's
Office Circular No. 17 dated May 11, 2016 null and void, pursuant to the above-discussed ruling
in Madreo. As it stands, the condonation doctrine is still considered as "good law" in all
administrative cases involving public officials whose reelections occurred before April 12, 2016,
regardless of the dates of filing of the administrative cases against them or the status of said
cases when the Carpio-Morales ruling attained finality. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935,
228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)

[Note: To recall, Degamo won a seat as Provincial Board Member of the Province in the May 2010
elections. He then assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession following the sudden deaths
of Governor-elect Emilio C. Macias II and Vice Governor-elect Agustin Perdices not long after the
elections were concluded. Three years later, Degamo ran and won as Governor of the Province in the May
2013 elections.

In line with the Madreo ruling, the Court rules that the condonation doctrine is applicable in
Degamo's case by reason of his reelection in 2013, or before the Carpio-Morales ruling attained finality on
April 12, 2016. Thus, Degamo cannot be precluded from relying on said doctrine as a defense against the
present administrative charges against him. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325,
February 9, 2021]

Contrary to Gaudan's assertion, the fact that Degamo was elected as a Provincial Board
Member and not as Governor of the Province in the May 2010 elections is of no consequence.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara, the Court explained that a public official
need not be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election for the
condonation doctrine to be an available defense for him or her in an administrative proceeding.
Otherwise stated, "the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to a different
position, provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another office is
the same." (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)

[Note: In this case, Degamo was elected as Governor in 2013 by the same electorate that voted for
him as Provincial Board Member in 2010. Thus, the CA correctly applied the condonation doctrine in
Degamo's case, in accordance with the Vergara ruling.

Given the fact of his election as Governor of the Province in 2013, Degamo acquired the vested
right, by virtue of the condonation doctrine, not to be removed from office on account of his alleged
administrative misconduct committed in 2012, notwithstanding the subsequent abandonment of the
doctrine in Carpio-Morales.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses the administrative complaint filed against Degamo with the
Ombudsman for being moot and academic. Furthermore, with the dismissal of the administrative
complaint, the Court finds it unnecessary to pass upon the issue regarding the Degamo's administrative
liabilities. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)]

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 The CA correctly ruled that the condonation doctrine may be applied to De Castro's case
as it was instituted prior to the ruling of the Court in Carpio-Morales. (Valeriano v. De Castro, G.R.
Nos. 247689-90, April 26, 2021)

The abandonment of the condonation doctrine is prospective in application. Hence, the

doctrine may still be applied to cases that were initiated prior to the promulgation of the
Carpio-Morales ruling such as the present case which stemmed from a complaint filed on
December 17, 2012. (Valeriano v. De Castro, G.R. Nos. 247689-90, April 26, 2021)

Based on the foregoing, the Court applied the condonation doctrine to a public official
re-elected through recall election prior to the finality of Carpio-Morales. This gives the Court
more reason to apply the condonation doctrine to De Castro who was re-elected during the 2010
presidential elections. (Valeriano v. De Castro, G.R. Nos. 247689-90, April 26, 2021)

[Note: In the present case, the administrative case originated from Valeriano's letter dated
January 17, 2008 requesting for the audit of the two subject projects of the Municipality of Bulan,
Sorsogon headed by De Castro. She was re-elected for a third term to the same position from 2010 to 2013
by the very same electorate who voted for her when the alleged violations were committed and even
served for another term from 2016 to 2019. Thus, the constituents of Bulan, Sorsogon had already forgiven
her for any administrative liability she may have incurred during her incumbency as Mayor. Her
re-election to the same position from 2010 to 2013 exonerated her from the misconduct imputed on her in
2007-2008 while she was on her second term as Mayor of Bulan, Sorsogon. (Valeriano v. De Castro, G.R.
Nos. 247689-90, April 26, 2021)]

The condonation doctrine was abandoned on April 12, 2016, when Carpio-Morales v.
Court of Appeals attained finality. Nonetheless, despite its abandonment, the condonation
doctrine can still apply to pending administrative cases provided that the reelection is also
before the abandonment. As for cases filed after April 12, 2016, the impleaded public official can
no longer resort to the condonation doctrine. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Malapitan, G.R. No.
229811, April 28, 2021)

[Note: Here, the amended administrative complaint was admitted on February 22, 2016; hence,
the condonation doctrine was not yet abandoned. The alleged acts imputed to respondent were
supposedly committed in 2009. He was reelected as member of the House of Representatives in 2010. This
immediately succeeding victory is what the condonation doctrine looks at. That respondent was later
reelected in 2013, 2016, and 2019 would be irrelevant, (Office of the Ombudsman v. Malapitan, G.R. No.
229811, April 28, 2021)]

[Note: In Herrera v. Mago, where the public official was reelected in May 2016, after the
abandonment of the condonation doctrine had taken effect, this Court ruled that the doctrine could not be
invoked. xxx. Nonetheless, that is not the case here. Although the administrative complaint was filed
against respondent after the 2010 elections, it would not change the fact that the alleged act was
committed in 2009, and the electorate reelected him in 2010, the immediately succeeding election. xxx.
This Court also takes the opportunity to clarify the effect of Carpio-Morales. In Crebello, we upheld the
Office of the Ombudsman's argument that since the abandonment became effective only on April 12,
2016, "it would no longer apply the defense of condonation starting on April 12, 2016 except for open and
pending administrative cases." Thus, after Carpio-Morales became final, the condonation doctrine's
applicability now depends on the date of the filing of the complaint, not the date of the commission of the
offense. Had the case been filed against respondent on April 13, 2016, for instance, he could no longer rely
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on the condonation doctrine. However, since the case was filed in January 2016, and was admitted in
February 2016, it was already an open case by the time the condonation doctrine was abandoned. (Office
of the Ombudsman v. Malapitan, G.R. No. 229811, April 28, 2021)]

[Note: At the time the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed before the Court of
Appeals, the condonation doctrine has (sic) been abandoned. Nevertheless, since respondent can invoke
the condonation doctrine, the Court of Appeals did not encroach on the Office of the Ombudsman's
powers when it enjoined the Office of the Ombudsman from proceeding with the administrative
complaint against respondent. xxx. For clarity, respondent is absolved only of administrative liability
based on the condonation doctrine. This Court makes no pronouncement on the criminal complaint
against him. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Malapitan, G.R. No. 229811, April 28, 2021)]

Thus, with the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales, any

re-elections of public officials from April 12, 2016, when Carpio-Morales became final and
executory onward no longer have the effect of condoning the previous misconduct of the
re-elected official. Verily, petitioner here can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine because
although the complaint below was instituted on May 19, 2015, he got re-elected only on May 9,
2016, well within the prospective application of Carpio-Morales. (Gaite v. Bismonte, G.R. No.
250344 (Notice), April 28, 2021)

Here, petitioner's infraction was committed in 2015 and he got charged before the OMB
two (2) years later in 2017. By then, the condonation doctrine in Morales had already been
abandoned with finality on April 12, 2016. Meantime, petitioner got elected as Mayor of Paoay,
Ilocos Norte in the May 2016 elections and re-elected to the same position in 2019. But
petitioner's election and re-election in 2016 and 2019, respectively, could not have condoned his
past infractions. For the prospective application of Morales, as explained in Madreo, effectively
precluded all regular elections beginning May 2016 from condoning prior administrative
offenses. (Galano v. Marites, G.R. No. 246397 (Notice), July 7, 2021)

Verily, it is incorrect for the OMB to argue that the condonation doctrine merely erases
the penalty and not the offense. To repeat, the condonation doctrine obliterates the offense and,
consequently, the liability as well. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Garcia, G.R. No. 215221 (Notice),
September 14, 2021)

[Note: Here, the three complaints for grave misconduct were filed against respondent and other
individuals prior to her reelection as Governor of the Province of Cebu in 2010. Since the events that
transpired here occurred prior to the finality of Carpio-Morales on April 12, 2016, respondent can still avail
of the benefits of the condonation doctrine as a consequence of her reelection in 2010. In fine, respondent's
administrative liability — both the offense and penalty — are deemed completely erased. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Garcia, G.R. No. 215221 (Notice), September 14, 2021)]

Indeed, in Carpio-Morales, the Court struck down as unconstitutional the second

paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770. However, it is settled that the doctrine laid down in
Carpio-Morales has no application in criminal cases before the OMB. In Gatchalian v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Gatchalian),the Court examined previous case law and clarified that
Carpio-Morales has limited application to administrative cases before the OMB. 124 The
antecedents of Gatchalian are similar with the instant case. (Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No.
230171, September 27, 2021)

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Impeachment

Impeachment is a constitutional process that takes place within the political departments of our
government. The House of Representatives accuses and the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, decides. Public
opinion, as well as the facts established by the evidence and the grounds and processes prescribed by the basic law,
steer and weigh heavily in the formulation of its outcome. Nevertheless, the pervasive realm of the courts that is
judicial review is retained as to any act within the limits of discretion provided by the Constitution.

Upon a judgment of ouster by the impeachment court, however, some of its ramifications spring from a
gray area in law. One such vagueness lies in the monetary entitlements of the public officer, who reached the legal
age of retirement after his removal but died shortly thereafter without the separate charges filed against him having
been resolved with finality. While retirement laws are interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree, the rare
peculiarities of certain cases smoke out a legal gap that only legislature can address. The law beckons construction
and construction becomes unnecessary without a law. Justice, nonetheless, shall not be denied by the courts to the
deserving. Equity is the ink that writes the law and not its inverse.

Before the Court is the supplication for the grant of post-employment and survivorship benefits of Ma.
Cristina Roco Corona (Mrs. Corona), as the spouse of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

By sharply distinguishing a criminal prosecution from an impeachment, the Framers

had made it clear that impeachment is not the means intended to redress and punish offenses
against the state, but rather a mere political safeguard designed to preserve the state and its
system of laws from internal harm.  Precisely, it was not crafted to mete out punishment. In
the same vein, impeachment does not imply immunity from court processes, nor does it
preclude other forms of discipline. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the
Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim
for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12,
2021)

Impeachment is, thus, designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not
punish him. It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in
nature. No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of
impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for
charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.

The nature and effect of impeachment proceedings is so limiting that forum shopping or
alleged violation of the right against double jeopardy could not even be successfully invoked
upon the institution of the separate complaints or Information. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina
Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946,
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

Impeachment being sui generis, its final culmination, whether a dismissal or a conviction,

would not constitute res judicata for the basic reason that the principle of res judicata does not
find application in purely political processes. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona
Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No.
20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

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 The criminal law principle of double jeopardy also finds no application against an
impeached public officer. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of
Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for
Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12,
2021)

[Note: The right against a second conviction for the same offense shall not be imperiled upon a
mere judgment of impeachment. Suffice it to state that a first jeopardy finds no opportunity to arise at
that point, as the essence of impeachment is not criminal in nature. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco
Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January
12, 2021)]

An action for quo warranto will likewise proceed independently of the impeachment

proceedings. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and
other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension
as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

[Note: It has been already elaborated in Republic v. Sereno that while both impeachment and quo
warranto seek the ultimate removal of an incumbent government officer, the two differ as to nature,
jurisdiction, grounds, the applicable procedural rules, and limitations. Impeachment is political; quo
warranto is judicial. In impeachment, the Congress is the prosecutor, the trier, and the judge, whereas quo
warranto petitions are instituted either by the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
or by an individual claiming the public office in issue, both of which petitions are cognizable only by the
Supreme Court. Impeachment proceedings seek to confirm and vindicate the breach of the trust reposed
by the Filipino people upon the impeachable official, but quo warranto determines the legal right, title,
eligibility, or qualifications of the incumbent to the contested public office. The 1987 Constitution, as
supplemented by the internal rules of procedure of the Congress, directs the course of impeachment
proceedings. Quo warranto cases, on the other hand, are dictated by the Rules of Court. The end result of
an impeachment proceeding is the removal of the public officer, and his or her perpetual political
disqualification from holding public office. On the other hand, when a quo warranto petition is granted,
ouster from office is likewise meted, but the Court can likewise impose upon the public officer additional
penalties such as reimbursement of costs pertaining to the rightful holder of the public office and such
further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position, or franchise of all
the parties to the action as justice requires. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant
of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship
Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)]

In fine, a judgment of impeachment per se connotes mere removal from the post. Since
our Constitution expressly limited the nature of impeachment, its effects must consequently and
necessarily be confined within the constitutional limits. Impeachment proceedings are entirely
separate, distinct, and independent from any other actionable wrong or cause of action a party
may have against the impeached officer, even if such wrong or cause of action may have a
colorable connection to the grounds for which the officer have been impeached. (Re: Letter of
Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late
Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

However, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, no court imposed any such liability
upon the late Chief Justice. Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by
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impeachment does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a consequence thereof, as opposed to
a criminal conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification, an
impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his retirement
benefits on the sole ground of his removal. Such forfeiture could have been imposed upon
criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death. Viewing it from another
angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory condition after a
verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains all
the post-employment privileges already earned unless otherwise declared by the competent
tribunals. Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement
eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by
impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement
thereto subsisted. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement
and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship
Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

Sandiganbayan

In 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7975 in order for the Sandiganbayan to concentrate
on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts, the larger fish referring to
public officials whose salary grades were at grade "27" or higher and over certain public officials
holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade as specifically
enumerated in Section 4, and the small fry referring to public officials whose salary grades were
at grade "26" or lower and not falling under the aforementioned enumeration.

Hence, Congress limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases involving public
officials occupying positions classified as salary grade "27" and higher as well as those
specifically enumerated in Section 4. In cases where none of the principal accused were
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, or PNP officers occupying the
rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, Congress conferred exclusive original
jurisdiction in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blig. 129. The word "principal" was later removed by R.A. No.
8249. In 2014, Congress enacted R.A. No. 10660 which granted the Regional Trial Court
exclusive original jurisdiction where the information (a) does not allege any damage to the
government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the
same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00).

While R.A. No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over so-called small fry
and transferred the same to regular courts, the special court was given exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of said regular courts. Further amending
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, R.A. No. 8249 provided that "[t]he Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided." (People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021)

126
 While the smaller fry may seek appellate review before the Sandiganbayan of the factual
findings of the regular courts via ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court raising
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or via petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court raising questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, the larger
fish were limited to raising pure questions of law via petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, while appeal by notice of appeal
under Rule 41 is a matter or right, review under Rule 45 may be disallowed by this Court in its
discretion. In other words, while lower-ranking public officials had the statutory right to appeal
the findings of fact of the regular courts, higher-ranking public officials had no right to question
the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan which are generally conclusive upon this Court and
which rule admits of only a few exceptions.

To correct this disparity, this Court, in 2018, pursuant to its exclusive power under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, promulgated the 2018 Revised Internal Rides of the
Sandiganbayan ("2018 Revised Rules"), the pertinent portion of which reads:

RULE XI
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

Section 1. Methods of Review. –

(a) In General. - The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal filed
with the Sandiganbayan and by service a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases shall be by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In promulgating said Rules, this Court merely distinguished between the modes of
review of the judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction and in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In the former, the facts are tried by
the Sandiganbayan in the first instance and the accused is entitled to appeal the factual findings
of said court via notice of appeal. In the latter, the facts had already been tried by the lower
courts. Therefore, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, just like those of the Court of Appeals when it affirms the factual findings of the
lower courts, are given great weight and are generally conclusive upon this Court. That being
the case, only questions of law may be raised in appeals to this Court in criminal cases decided
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases, via petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Considering that the 2018 Revised Rules specifically provide for the modes of review of
judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court can only apply in a
suppletory manner and cannot supplant the procedure set forth in the 2018 Revised Rules
which were promulgated specifically to govern actions and proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Neither can the procedure provided in P.D. No. 1606 nor in any of its
amendatory laws prevail over that provided by this Court upon which no less than the

127
fundamental law has bestowed exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts.

The reliance of the Office of the Special Prosecutor on Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, which
ruled that the remedy from a judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan is appeal pursuant
to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is misplaced since said Decision was promulgated prior to the
2018 Revised Rules. It is worth observing that Miranda also quoted the pertinent portion of the
then 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan which have since been repealed by the
2018 Revised Rules.

Accordingly, petitioner availed of the correct mode of appeal when he filed his notice of
appeal with the Sandiganbayan. (People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021)

Under the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan (2018 Rules), an appeal to
the Supreme Court from criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of original
jurisdiction shall be made by filing a notice of appeal. Rule XI Sec. 1 of the 2018 Rules provides:

SECTION 1. Methods of Review. —

(a) In General. — The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal filed
with the Sandiganbayan and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases shall be by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Automatic appeal. — Whenever the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction imposes the death penalty, the records of the case, together with the
transcript of stenographic notes, shall be forwarded within five (5) days after the fifteenth
(15th) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a Motion for
New Trial or Reconsideration to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment.

Since the assailed Decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, accused-appellant's mode of appeal was correct. Pursuant to its 2018 Rules,
the Sandiganbayan aptly gave due course to the notice of appeal in the Resolution dated 10
December 2018. Consequently, the Court in its Resolution dated 18 February 2019, acted on a
proper appeal and directed both parties to file their respective briefs. (People v. Palaña, G.R. Nos.
243547-48 (Notice), June 16, 2021)

It is noteworthy that petitioner did not assail the validity of such Information. In fact, in
her Manifestation and Compliance before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner begged exception to
the suspension pendente lite that she admitted should be imposed on her under a "valid
information."

In Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), the Court underscored the mandatory nature
of preventive suspension when a public officer is charged with a valid information involving
violation of R.A. 3019, Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or offenses involving fraud upon government,
public funds, or property:
128
 xxx [S]ec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to
suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, Book
II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office.
The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does
not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade the
jurisdiction of the court.

Since the petitioner is charged with an offense that clearly falls under Section 13 of R.A.
3019, her suspension pendente lite is justified. The Sandiganbayan has no other option but to
order the suspension of the petitioner when it is convinced that the information charges her
with acts of fraud involving government funds. (Amurao v. People, G.R. No. 249168, April 26,
2021)

Ombudsman

The OMB's Rules, promulgated in Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003, stated in Section 7 of its Rule III as
follows:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. — Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision
shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of
the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a

matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Section 10 of Rule III of the OMB's Rules also stated:

129
 Section 10. Penalties. — (a) For administrative charges under Executive Order No. 292 or
such other executive orders, laws or rules under which the respondent is charged, the penalties
provided thereat shall be imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman; (b) in administrative
proceedings conducted under these Rules, the Office of the Ombudsman may impose the penalty
of reprimand, suspension without pay for a minimum period of one (1) month up to a maximum
period of one (1) year, demotion, dismissal from the service, or a fine equivalent to his salary for
one (1) month up to one (1) year, or from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount
malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both, at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking into
consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee
found guilty of the complaint or charge.

The penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment
in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

Based on the foregoing, the OMB's Rules mandated that decisions handed down in
administrative cases should be immediately executory despite being timely appealed. Thus, it
was clear that what were to be executed were the decisions of the Ombudsman without
consideration as to their finality. (Tallado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution),
March 2, 2021)

To start with, the administrative jurisdiction of the OMB is all-encompassing. Rule III,
Sec. 2 of Administrative Order No. 07 provides:

Section 2. Public officers covered; exceptions. — All elective and appointive officials of
the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local governments, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Excepted from the foregoing are Members of Congress, the Judiciary, and officials
removable only by impeachment; provided, however, that the Office of the Ombudsman may
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable only by
impeachment for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

Thus, when an appointive official is initially dismissed by the OMB and his penalty
eventually judicially modified and reduced, the rules of the OMB declare his period of
dismissal, by fiction of law, as a period of preventive suspension with payment of backwages
and other emoluments. This means that for the appointive official, it is as if he was never
removed and all the vestiges of his removal were reversed. There is nothing wrong with this
conversion because his removal only affected his wages which are eventually given to him. But
this is not the same for elective local government officials, like petitioner, because dismissal of
an elective local government official does not only affect receipt of salaries but also affects his
term, which would effectively be interrupted — an interruption which has constitutional
consequences.

When an elective local public officer is administratively dismissed by the OMB and his
penalty subsequently modified to another penalty, like herein petitioner, the period of dismissal
cannot just be nonchalantly dismissed as a period for preventive suspension considering that, in
fact, his term is effectively interrupted. During said period, petitioner cannot claim to be

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Governor as his title is stripped of him by the OMB despite the pendency of his appeal. Neither
does he exercise the power of the office. Said title and power are already passed to the Vice
Governor. He also cannot claim that the exercise of his power is merely suspended since it is
not. Hence, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on the interruption of his term despite the ex post
facto redemption of his title following the OMB rule.

Considering the constitutional consequences of the application of OMB Rules to local

elective officials compared to other officials under the administrative jurisdiction of the OMB,
there is reason to excuse the former from the preventive suspension rule. (Tallado v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 246679 (Resolution), March 2, 2021)

Jurisprudence is settled that appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in

administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Section 4, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, which provides for the reglementary period of 'fifteen (15) days from notice of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution, xxx or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration duly filed xxx.' In this case, the Ombudsman found
petitioner administratively guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
meted upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay.  Clearly, petitioner's
recourse was to file an appeal to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. (Tolentino, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 254044 (Notice), January 25, 2021)

This issue, however, is not a novel one. After all, the Court in Carpio-Morales has
unequivocally ruled that the CA has the authority to issue injunctive writs against the
Ombudsman's decisions and/or orders. Although the CA, in Carpio-Morales, did, in fact, issue
injunctive relief to enjoin a preventive suspension, it bears stressing that the Court did not, in
any way, limit the CA's authority to issue a TRO and other provisional injunctive writs against
the Ombudsman to such cases.

As the Court explained in Carpio-Morales, the CA's authority to issue injunctive relief
enjoining orders of the Ombudsman is merely ancillary to the exercise of its certiorari
jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or "The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended xxx.

In other words, the CA's power to issue provisional injunctive reliefs "coincides with its
inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its
acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court." To be sure,
these ancillary remedies, i.e., a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, are mere incidents in
the main action and are issued solely to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard. "In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by
the interim acts of the parties." (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February
9, 2021)

[Note: Here, the CA, in its Resolution dated June 23, 2016, granted Degamo's prayer for the
issuance of a TRO to enjoin the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Order dated May 16, 2016
which had ordered the dismissal of Degamo from the service. The CA, citing the grounds of extreme
urgency and grave and irreparable damage, ruled that the execution of the Joint Order against Degamo
would "undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously
chosen and voted into office."
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 While it is true that the assailed CA Resolution was issued after the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales, the Court finds that the CA did not commit an error when it
considered the doctrine's application in the case of Degamo as sufficient basis to issue provisional
injunctive relief in the latter's favor. As will be later discussed at length, the abandonment of the
condonation doctrine is applied prospectively. This means that the condonation doctrine is still
recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment and Degamo's reliance thereupon cannot simply be
disregarded. (Gaudan v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021)]

To sum it up, what can be enjoined by the CA via a petition for certiorari are
interlocutory orders, and not final orders. In a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules on
the other hand, the CA cannot enjoin the Ombudsman from implementing its final decision,
although still subject to appeal. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gatchalian, G.R. Nos. 230679 &
232228-30, February 10, 2021)

The jurisprudence is clear: a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate
implementation of a dismissal order (or any decision in an administrative case for that matter)
issued by the Ombudsman. There is no difference between an appeal and a motion for
reconsideration insofar as their effect on the immediate implementation of the assailed order is
concerned. The Ombudsman Act and the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure expressly allow the
filing of a motion for reconsideration from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
What the Ombudsman Rules proscribe, however, is the stay of the execution of such decisions
pending reconsideration and appeal. Rule III, Section 7 of the Ombudsman Rules states in part
that "[a] decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course." The operative phrase in this sentence is "matter of course," which has been
defined as "[s]omething done as a part of a routine process or procedure." Stated differently, the
execution of decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be made part and parcel
of standard procedure, regardless of the availment of remedies therefrom. Memorandum
Circular No. 01, series of 2006 merely serves to clarify this rule. (Quisumbing v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
214407, March 3, 2021)

[Note: In the case at bar, the assailed memoranda are based on the Ombudsman's August 28, 2014
Joint Resolution which imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service on Quisumbing. Moreover,
Quisumbing does not dispute the Ombudsman's jurisdiction over her position as CHR Commissioner. As
demonstrated above, the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution is immediately executory, despite the pendency
of Quisumbing's motion for reconsideration. Contrary to Quisumbing's assertion, the Ombudsman need
not issue a separate order for the implementation of its August 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, precisely
because the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure already ordain the immediate implementation thereof. Since
the Joint Resolution is immediately executory, respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when they issued the assailed memoranda. In fact, they were simply following the law and giving due
respect to the orders of the Ombudsman. (Quisumbing v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 214407, March 3, 2021)]

In light of the clarification made in Gutierrez, it should now be considered as settled

doctrine that the Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene in appeals from its rulings in
administrative cases, provided that the Ombudsman moves for intervention before rendition of
judgment — otherwise, the Court may deny its motion, as in Sison and Liggayu. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Toledo, G.R. No. 234854 (Notice), March 3, 2021)

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 [Note: In the present case, while the CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman is not the
appropriate party to intervene in the case, it nevertheless correctly denied the Ombudsman's intervention
for having been filed out of time. As the CA noted, the Omnibus Motion to Intervene was filed on April
24, 2017 or after the CA had already rendered the assailed Decision on March 15, 2017, despite the
Ombudsman being served a copy of the petition pursuant to Rule 43. Consequently, the present petition
must be denied, and since intervention has been disallowed, there is no longer any need to delve into the
merits of the substantive arguments raised by the Ombudsman. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Toledo, G.R.
No. 234854 (Notice), March 3, 2021)]

[Note: In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez (Gutierrez), it has been settled that the
Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has resolved.
Therein, this Court has cemented the rule that part of the Ombudsman's broad powers is to defend its
decisions on appeal with the CA. xxx. In so doing, this Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the cases of
Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison, and Office of the Ombudsman v.
Liggayu. In these cases, intervention by the Ombudsman was denied on the ground that it has no legal
interest to intervene. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Cerna, G.R. No. 195134 (Notice), March 24, 2021)]

While a COA report may aid the OMB, it is not a prerequisite in investigations it
initiates. In Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court declared that:

Although the Commission on Audit (COA) report may aid the Office of the Ombudsman
in conducting its preliminary investigation, such report is not a prerequisite. Both the
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state that the Office of the Ombudsman may
undertake an investigation on complaint or on its own initiative. Therefore, with or without the
report from COA, the Ombudsman can conduct a preliminary investigation. This Court has
declared that the findings in a COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is
irrelevant to the investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable
cause.

Therefore, an investigation conducted by the OMB on the alleged transgressions of the

BAC and the HoPE allegedly committed may proceed regardless of the existence of a COA
report supporting it. (Grageda v. Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau, G.R. Nos. 244042, 244043 &
243644, March 18, 2021)

This Court generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman's findings as to whether
probable cause exists, 1 except: (a) to afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; and (i) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance. 2 None of these instances exist in this case. (Guiani-Sayadi v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 239930 (Notice), May 10, 2021)

In Barata v. Abalos, Jr. (Barata) the OMB dismissed the administrative complaint against
therein respondent "for insufficiency of evidence." The Court noted that where a respondent is
absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and unappealable, in accordance with Sec. 7.

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 More recently in Tolosa, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (Tolosa, Jr.), the OMB found that the
complainant therein failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove the allegations against the
respondent. The pertinent portion of the OMB's decision reads: "For want of substantial
evidence to warrant the conduct of further proceedings, the administrative case is likewise
DISMISSED." The Court again treated the decision as one absolving the respondent of the
administrative charge as contemplated by Sec. 7, and was thus final and unappealable.

To emphasize, the June 15, 2009 Joint Resolution of the OMB found that there was "no
substantial evidence to show that [petitioners'] actions transgressed some established and
definite rule of action or constitute unlawful behavior or gross negligence." We find no
substantial difference between the manner in which the subject joint resolution was couched,
and the pronouncement of "insufficiency of evidence" and "want of substantial evidence" in
Barata and Tolosa, Jr. respectively. As such, We rule that the June 15, 2009 Joint Resolution of the
OMB effectively absolved petitioners of the charges against them, and had become final,
executory, and unappealable, insofar as the administrative case is concerned. (Ordoñez v. Spouses
Pestaño, G.R. No. 212704 (Notice), May 14, 2021)

At the outset, the Court notes that, as correctly found by the CA, Alaska and Montesa
availed themselves of the wrong remedy in assailing the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution and
Joint Order. Decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, where the respondent is
absolved of the charges, are final, executory, and unappealable, but if issued with grave abuse of
discretion, may be assailed by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. On the
other hand, the remedy against the Ombudsman's decisions in criminal cases is to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court. In this case, the Ombudsman's decisions in both
the criminal and administrative cases were assailed through a petition for review under Rule 43
filed with the CA, clearly in contravention of the aforementioned rules. (Alaska v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 228298, June 23, 2021)

[Note: The Court emphasizes that rules of procedure are accorded utmost respect and must be
constantly adhered to. However, if a strict and rigid application thereof would tend to obstruct and
frustrate rather than promote substantive justice, the Court may relax the same, in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case. Here, the Court finds that there are incidents which merit a relaxation of the
rules. Among these are: (a) the CA, despite acknowledging the erroneous remedy availed of by Alaska
and Montesa, proceeded to decide the case on the merits; (b) in its appreciation of the merits of the case,
the CA made conclusions which had no basis whatsoever in the facts and antecedents of the case; and (c)
there are serious indications, not only of unlawful arrest but also of fabrication of evidence by
respondents, which the CA and the Ombudsman refused to tackle without proper legal basis. For these
reasons, the Court resolves to take cognizance of this case, lest a miscarriage of justice be allowed to occur.
(Alaska v. Garcia, G.R. No. 228298, June 23, 2021)]

Pursuant to the foregoing provision of law, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 07, 30 or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, 31 of the same
office, provides that:

Section 3. How initiated. — An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint under
oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support of the charge. Such
complaint shall be accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping duly subscribed and
sworn to by the complainant or his counsel. An administrative proceeding may also be ordered

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 by the Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of a
complaint originally filed as a criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.

Section 4. Evaluation. — Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to determine
whether the same may be:

a) dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of [R.A. No.] 6770, provided,
however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of the
Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;

b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance
Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules;

c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, [R.A. No.] 6770 for the
taking of appropriate administrative proceedings;

d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation; or

e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the Office
of the Ombudsman.

Contrary to the Ombudsman's stance, neither the foregoing provisions, nor the fact that
Alaska and Montesa may assail the legality of their arrest before the RTC, precludes them from
filing administrative and criminal charges against the apprehending officers. Having the
opportunity to raise objections against the legality of one's arrest is not the "adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body" adverted to in Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770. This is so
because the supposed relief afforded by one recourse is not the same as that afforded by the
other. (Alaska v. Garcia, G.R. No. 228298, June 23, 2021)

Therefore, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan is correct in holding that the OMB
was only exercising its investigative and prosecutorial power when the FIO filed another
complaint. Notably, the OMB may refer the case for further fact-finding investigation to the
appropriate office or official pursuant to Section 2, Rule II of OMB AO No. 07. For emphasis, the
OMB is not bound by the complaint or findings of the NBI because the latter may still subject it
for further fact-finding investigation. (Baterina v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, G.R. Nos.
236408 & 236531-36, July 7, 2021)

We dismiss the administrative case against SACP Salomon and SACP Abila for lack of
jurisdiction. The administrative complaint must be filed with and resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, enumerates
the powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman. In particular, Section 15,
paragraph 1 of the said law states:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:

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 (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.

Moreover, Section 16 provides that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or
employee during his or her tenure. Additionally, Section 19 imposes upon the Ombudsman the
duty to act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or discriminatory.

Thus, acts or omissions of public officials which are related to the performance of their
functions as government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is the government agency that is responsible for enforcing
administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people."
(Echavez v. Salomon, A.C. No. 12856 (Notice), October 11, 2021)

[Note: In the case at bar, Gloria seeks to hold respondents liable for acts committed in their
capacity as Senior Assistant City Prosecutors. She posits that their denial of her motion for
reconsideration and the subsequent dismissal of the perjury case are unreasonable, unjust, and unfair.
Considering that these are acts connected with SACP Salomon and SACP Abila's duties as government
lawyers who are exercising their official functions as prosecutors, the present case ought to be resolved by
the Office of the Ombudsman which has the disciplinary authority over such persons. (Echavez v. Salomon,
A.C. No. 12856 (Notice), October 11, 2021)]

Retirement

The Court deems Chief Justice Corona to have been involuntarily retired from public service due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding his removal by impeachment, without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and
other allowances.

Retirement is the termination of one's own employment or career, especially upon

reaching a certain age or for health reasons. To retire is to withdraw from one's position or
occupation, or to conclude one's active working life or professional career. Old age is the usual
ground that retires one from work. It is not, however, the sole reason therefor. Other reasons
may permanently bar a person from returning to the workforce like serious physical
impediments, personal choice, dissolution of the office or position, or exercise of the employer's
prerogative. The term may even refer to judges and justices who "retire" due to permanent
disability, whether total or partial, or who died or were killed while in actual service. Retirement
then may be voluntary or involuntary. Retirement is voluntary when one decides upon one's
own unilateral and independent volition to permanently cease the exercise of one's occupation.
Retirement is deemed involuntary when one's profession is terminated for reasons outside the
control and discretion of the worker. Impeachment resulting in removal from holding office falls
under the column on involuntary retirement.

The working tenets of this case bear tireless repetition. A respondent in impeachment
proceedings does not risk forfeiture of the constitutional rights to life, liberty, or property. A
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separate determination of liability under the courts of law is necessary to withhold such
rights. Sans judicial conviction, the impeached official shall only be removed from office, with
the Senate being empowered with the discretion to impose the additional penalty of permanent
disqualification from holding any and all further public office.

Having been removed by the Congress from office with a lifetime ban from occupying
any and all future public posts, but without a proper determination of or even a basis for any
recoverable liability under the law due to causes beyond his control, Chief Justice Corona
may be considered involuntarily retired from public service. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco
Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No.
20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

Indeed, the administrative penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the inherent
disabilities of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual
disqualifications for re-employment in the government service. The following accessory
penalties of disqualifications from exercise of political rights, civil interdiction, indemnification,
forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense, and payment of costs also
flow from the criminal convictions of public officers. Article 30(4) of the Revised Penal Code is
clear on this: "loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held" is
expressly mentioned as one of the effects of the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification.
The disparities between the salaries received and the declarations made in a SALN may be
considered evidence of ill-gotten wealth during the declarant's incumbency if properly proven
in a civil case for forfeiture.

However, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, no court imposed any such liability
upon the late Chief Justice. Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by
impeachment does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a consequence thereof, as opposed to
a criminal conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification, an
impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his retirement
benefits on the sole ground of his removal. Such forfeiture could have been imposed upon
criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death. Viewing it from another
angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory condition after a
verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains all
the post-employment privileges already earned unless otherwise declared by the competent
tribunals. Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement
eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by
impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement
thereto subsisted.

Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their
humanitarian purpose. One such humanitarian purpose is to provide financial means once life
continues on but without a salary to support the retiree and his/her family. (Re: Letter of Mrs.
Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act
No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

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 Having determined the entitlement of Chief Justice Corona to retirement benefits, it
naturally follows that his widow is likewise entitled to survivorship benefits reckoned from the
time of the demise of the late Chief Justice until the widow's death or remarriage. (Re: Letter of
Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late
Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship Pension as his Wife Under
Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

Foremost, it can readily be seen that the provision specifically pertains to retirement pay,
not separation pay. We cannot equate the benefits of retirement pay from that of separation pay
since they serve distinct purposes. Moreover, we reiterate that GOCCs, like TransCo, are
government entities created by special law. The terms and conditions of employment of its
employees are different from the rules of employment in private practice. As we have held in
the 2016 TransCo Case, the Labor Code recognizes that the terms and conditions of employment
of all government employees, including those of GOCCs, are governed by the Civil Service Law,
rules and regulations, as well as the specific charters for those GOCCs created by virtue of a
special law. (National Transmission Corp. (TransCo) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 246173, June
22, 2021)

SALNs

A final note. Ouster by impeachment is a stunning penalty for it ruins a life, as the late Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago had exclaimed before casting her vote against its imposition upon then Chief Justice Corona. A
staunch supporter against the removal of Chief Justice Corona, Senator Defensor-Santiago phrased the unanswered
question as a seeming rhetoric: "[d]oes omission in the SALN belong to the same class, as for example, treason,
bribery...?"

Whether this would be finally addressed by a compelling authority in the proper forum, the late Chief
Justice Corona has already been removed by impeachment. What was done is fait accompli and now a final,
unalterable reality. For the future's worth, it is herein stressed that the SALN is a tool for public transparency, never
a weapon for political vendetta. The Filipino people live, toil, and thrive in a democracy, but the rule of law should
not stand parallel to the rule of the mob. Toe this line, and the nation may eventually behold the laws that the Courts
have forever sworn to uphold battered and bent. (Re: Letter of Mrs. Ma. Cristina Roco Corona Requesting the Grant
of Retirement and other Benefits to the Late Former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and her Claim for Survivorship
Pension as his Wife Under Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021)

Here, while the right of access and information to a public official's SALN is provided
under the Constitution and RA 6713, the same is not an absolute vested right. The Court has
declared in the past that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records such
as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.  The power to regulate the access
by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of the custodian to control its
very office to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees
may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be
insured. 

Thus, a custodian such as the Office of the Ombudsman is not bound

under every circumstance to allow or to grant the request of disclosure of a public official's
SALN to the public. A custodian is not prohibited by the Constitution to regulate such
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disclosure. Its duty therefore, under the Constitution and applicable laws, is far from being
merely ministerial. The Court, in fact, as custodian of the SALNs of justices and judges, has
itself laid down some guidelines to be observed for requests made to gain access to these
SALNs.  It has likewise, on occasions, denied requests due to a "'plainly discernible' improper
motive" or one that "smack[ed] of a fishing expedition." (Biraogo v. Martires, G.R. No. 254516,
February 2, 2021)

The duty to submit a SALN can be found in R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the
submission of the sworn SALNs by all public officials and employees, stating therein all the
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests of their spouses, and of their
unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households.

The purpose of the law on SALN disclosure is to suppress any questionable

accumulation of wealth that usually results from the non-disclosure of such matters. Thus, it
should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained wealth."
Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is "explained
wealth" which the law does not penalize.

Navarro vs. Ombudsman is at all fours with this case. As with Navarro, the charges against
petitioner therein were also based on surmises and conjectures, and not supported by
substantial evidence. Hence, the following pronouncement of the Court finds relevance in this
case, thus:

The Court has once emphasized that a mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not
automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly
disproportionate to the income or other sources of income of the public officer/employee and he
fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to
dishonesty. Although there appeared to have a prima facie evidence giving rise to the
presumption of accumulation of wealth disproportionate to his income, Navarro was able to
overcome such presumption by coming out with documentary evidence to prove his financial
capacity to make the subject acquisitions and to prove that the amounts he stated in his SALNs
were true. It should be understood that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of
unexplained wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted for,
then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize.

Here, respondent unequivocally affirmed knowledge and ownership, save for the La
Buena Vida lot, of the properties in question. The properties, albeit labeled erroneously, were, in
fact, declared as assets which contradicts the intent to conceal.

Consistent with our ruling in Navarro, the Court finds that respondent should not be
held administratively liable as the intent to commit a wrong is wanting on her part. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Braña, G.R. No. 238903, March 24, 2021)

[Note: In Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court stated that a public officer should have
been given the opportunity to correct any possible errors in his SALNs in accordance with the guidelines
at the time of their submission. This corrective action was not accorded to Perez. (People v. Perez, G.R. No.
198303 (Notice), May 3, 2021)]

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 The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law," is the general rule. We have declared in this regard that the fact that any
aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of
which his right arises does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. The second mode
is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as the discovery rule or the "blameless
ignorance doctrine." The "blameless ignorance doctrine was elucidated in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, thus —

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue
or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive
period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2
of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the
fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts
would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action."

Based on the facts of this case, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be
counted from the date of commission, i.e., that date of filing of the SALN. (Department of
Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Enerio, G.R. No. 238630, May 12, 2021)

[Note: Section 7 of RA 3019 provides —

SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. — Every public officer, within thirty days
after assuming office, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of
every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of
the President, a true, detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first
statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of the said calendar year.

In Del Rosario v. People, the Court held that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the
time of filing, or non-filing, of the SALN since the Ombudsman and the Civil Service Commission have
the reasonable means of ferreting out violations pertaining to the filing of SALNs being the agencies
tasked with the primary responsibility of monitoring full compliance with RA 6713. Moreover, RA 6713
specifically provides for the accessibility of SALNs to the public and the availability of the documents for
inspection at reasonable hours, or for copying or reproduction, from the time they are filed as required by
law. Thus, the DOF-RIPS' assertion that the running of the prescriptive period should be reckoned from
the time of their discovery of the violations claiming that it could not have known or could not have had
reasonable means of knowing respondent's omissions in the subject SALNs, which information was
readily available to the public, is simply implausible.

Accordingly, in this case, considering that 10 years had lapsed since the submission of
respondent's 2005 SALN, and 18 years had lapsed after the submission of the 1997 SALN, when the
complaint against respondent was filed on July 13, 2016, the Ombudsman correctly held that the offenses
have already prescribed, pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3326. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Service v. Enerio, G.R. No. 238630, May 12, 2021)]

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 In Daplas v. Department of Finance, the Court explained:

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in
order to promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against
government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law,
i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit a
sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and
business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of
wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.

On the other hand, Section 7 of RA 3019, which directs full disclosure of wealth in the
SALN, is a means of preventing unlawful acquisition of wealth and is aimed particularly at
minimizing if not altogether curtailing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining
a standard of honesty in the public service. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance mechanism to
verify undisclosed properties and wealth. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
Service v. Enerio, G.R. No. 238630, May 12, 2021)

The Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho:

Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired money or property manifestly
disproportionate to his salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have
illegally acquired it.

It should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained
wealth." Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is
"explained wealth" which the law does not penalize.

In this case, the DOF-RIPS has not even alleged, much less presented, evidence of a
manifest disproportion of respondent's legal income vis-à-vis his assets. What the DOF-RIPS
mainly argues is that malice or criminal intent is irrelevant in offenses classified as mala
prohibita. Without question, the violations imputed against respondent pertain to special laws, as
such, these belong to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita. Unlike in acts mala in se where
intent governs, in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. Nonetheless, as aptly ratiocinated out by the
Ombudsman, respondent's failure to disclose his GSIS loans does not necessarily amount to
concealment since they were contracted from a government institution. Documents evidencing
loans granted by the GSIS are official records, therefore, these are accessible by the public for
full disclosure, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured.
Hence, given the nature of the documents evidencing respondent's GSIS loans to be public,
respondent's failure to disclose the said liability is not tantamount to the non-disclosure that is

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contemplated in the laws on SALN. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v.
Enerio, G.R. No. 238630, May 12, 2021)

It is clear that Section 10 of R.A. No. 6713 and its IRR allow for corrective measures. The
head of office has the authority to establish compliance procedures and review whether SALNs
have been submitted on time, complete, and in the proper form. If it is determined that an
employee did not file his or her SALN, or that the SALN has not been properly accomplished or
has incomplete data, the head of office or compliance committee should inform the employee
concerned and require him or her to file, correct, or supply the essential information, and make
the necessary corrections. (Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Salig, G.R. No. 215877,
June 16, 2021)

[Note: In the case of Atty. Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, where Navarro claimed that (1) he
filled out and accomplished the annual SALN in accordance with the prescribed format by the Civil
Service Commission, the details of which to the best of his knowledge and belief, were generally accepted
in the government service and were in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law, and (2) he
was never informed by the applicable office of any incompleteness or any impropriety in the
accomplishment of his SALNs, we emphasized the importance of informing the public official or
employee of any defect in his SALN and to take the necessary corrective action before being held
administratively liable, in accordance with the review and compliance procedure under R.A. No. 6713
and its IRR. The review and compliance procedure serves as a mechanism that affords the public official
or employee a final opportunity to comply with the requirements before any sanction is meted out. It
seeks a fuller and more accurate disclosure of the necessary information. While the SALN is an
instrument that ensures accountability, the review and compliance procedure works as a buffer that
prevents the haphazard filing of actions against public officials and employees. (Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon v. Salig, G.R. No. 215877, June 16, 2021)]

[Note: Here, Salig's failure to correct entries, supply missing information, or give proper attention
to the filling out of his SALNs, without first calling his attention on the matter, could not be considered as
indicative of untruthful declaration of assets, absent any concrete proof. The appropriate office or
committee should have given Salig the opportunity to correct the entries in his SALNs to conform to the
prescribed requirements at that time. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6713 and its IRR are clear that in the event the
authorities determine that a statement is not properly filed, they shall inform the reporting individual and
direct him or her to take the necessary corrective action. Thus, We disagree with the CA in finding Salig
guilty of Simple Negligence and imposing on him the penalty of suspension for six months without pay.
(Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Salig, G.R. No. 215877, June 16, 2021)]

Applying the foregoing doctrine, the discovery of falsification and perjury should be
reckoned from the time of filing of the SALN. Therefore, the false assertions made by Gomez in
his SALNs, which were submitted beyond the ten (l0)-year prescription period before the filing
of the Complaint on September 1, 2015, are now barred by prescription. (Department of Finance v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 236956, November 24, 2021)

Ill-Gotten Wealth

Sequestration ends when the sequestered properties are judicially determined as

ill-gotten or not. The sequestration order is rendered functus officio when the properties'
ownership has been conclusively determined. (ECJ and Sons Agricultural Enterprises v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 207619, April 26, 2021)

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 A sequestration order is premised on a prima facie case that the properties sought to be
sequestered were ill-gotten wealth, based on evidence presented when the writ of sequestration
was issued. Sequestration does not entitle the party on whose behalf the writ is granted — the
conservator — to exercise ownership over the sequestered properties. (ECJ and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 207619, April 26, 2021)

[Note: In Bataan Shipyard:

One thing is certain, and should be stated at the outset: the PCGG cannot exercise acts of
dominion over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over. As already earlier stressed with
no little insistence, the act of sequestration; freezing or provisional takeover of property does not import
or bring about a divestment of title over said property; does not make the PCGG the owner thereof. In
relation to the property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over, the PCGG is a conservator, not an
owner. Therefore, it can not perform acts of strict ownership; and this is specially true in the situations
contemplated by the sequestration rules where, unlike cases of receivership, for example, no court
exercises effective supervision or can upon due application and hearing, grant authority for the
performance of acts of dominion.

Where the properties sequestered are stock shares, acts of ownership, among which is the right to
vote those shares, may only be exercised by the conservator if it is proved that: first, there is prima facie
evidence that the shares are ill-gotten; and second, if there is an imminent danger of their dissipation (ECJ
and Sons Agricultural Enterprises v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 207619, April 26,
2021)]

If a sequestration order is lifted, it does not mean that the sequestered properties are not
ill-gotten, but only that the government may not act as the properties' conservator.
Sequestration ends when a final disposition has been made on the sequestered properties. The
final disposition involves a determination of whether the sequestered properties were ill-gotten
in the appropriate judicial proceedings. "Upon the final disposition of the sequestered
properties, the sequestration is rendered functus officio." (ECJ and Sons Agricultural Enterprises v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 207619, April 26, 2021)

[Note: Restoring the writs over the sequestered properties unduly diminishes the true and
beneficial owner into a mere conservator, unable to exercise acts of strict ownership. The Sandiganbayan
should have lifted the writs — not for the reasons petitioners stated, but because the shares' sequestration
has ended when this Court ruled with finality on their true ownership. (ECJ and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 207619, April 26, 2021)]

Verily, the Freedom Constitution and EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A confirm the authority
and duty given to the PCGG to file the instant action against Disini for recovery of his alleged
ill-gotten wealth relative to the BNPP project. Thus, contrary to Disini's contention, the
Republic, through the PCGG, has a valid cause of action against him. EO No. 1, founded on the
Freedom Constitution, explicitly tasked the PCGG to assist in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
EO Nos. 2, 14 and 14-A further defined and bolstered the duties of the PCGG in the exercise of
its mandate. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Republic, through the PCGG, has a clear-cut
cause to file the present suit against Disini in view of his alleged involvement in the BNPP
project through receipt of substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for influencing
President Marcos in their favor. (Disini v. Republic, G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021)

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 In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
and Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Tan, We defined ill-gotten wealth as those
"acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave
damage and prejudice to the State."

Furthermore, in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, ill-gotten wealth is

defined as those "assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of
their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influence or relationships, resulting in
their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines."

In sum, in order to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, they must have: (a) originated
from the government; and (b) been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates by illegal means. (Disini v. Republic, G.R. No. 205172, June 15,
2021)

[Note: Evidently, the BNPP is a government project the construction of which was awarded to
Westinghouse as the main contractor and B&R as the architect-engineer, allegedly through undue
advantage of Disini's influence and close association with President Marcos. In exchange, Disini allegedly
received substantial commissions based on 3% and 10% of the total contract price from Westinghouse and
B&R, respectively. Obviously, the payment of the alleged commissions would be coming from
Westinghouse and B&R, which are private corporations, and not directly from the government.

However, contrary to the contention of Disini, ill-gotten wealth also encompasses those that are
derived indirectly from government funds or properties through the use of power, influence, or
relationship resulting in unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino
people and the Republic. The alleged subject commissions may not have been sourced directly from the
public funds but it is beyond cavil that Disini would not have amassed these commissions had he not
exerted undue influence on President Marcos.

Disini indirectly and unjustly enriched himself through his influence and close association with
President Marcos by ensuring that the BNPP project would be awarded to Westinghouse and B&R.
Besides, his alleged receipt of commissions from Westinghouse and B&R is clearly within the definition of
ill-gotten wealth under the PCGG Rules and Regulations, that is, the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any
commission from an entity in connection with any government contract or project.

Disini's argument that he may not be held liable since he was not a public officer, or that there
was no finding of conspiracy between him and President Marcos, deserves scant consideration. Suffice it
to say that EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986) clearly provide that ill-gotten wealth may be recovered from
President Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, notwithstanding their
private status. Undoubtedly, the Republic may recover ill-gotten wealth not only from President Marcos,
Imelda and his immediate family but also from his dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates whether or not President Marcos is also found liable together with them.

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 In light of the above issuances authorizing the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, there is no doubt that
the Republic has a valid cause of action founded in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (1986). (Disini v. Republic,
G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021)]

In cases involving ill-gotten wealth, EO No. 14-A clearly requires preponderance of

evidence. (Disini v. Republic, G.R. No. 205172,[June 15, 2021)

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources has confirmed the public trust doctrine that permeates the State's
obligation vis-à-vis all natural resources such as water, and by logical extension, timber and
other forest products xxx. (Sama y Hinupas v. People, G.R. No. 224469, January 5, 2021)

However, during the pendency of the OSG's appeal with the appellate court and during
the promulgation of its August 16, 2011 Decision, the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. (T.A.N. Properties), which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, was the prevailing
rule. T.A.N. Properties requires that "an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or [Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO)] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records."

The general rule of strict compliance enunciated in T.A.N. Properties is subject to the
exception subsequently pronounced in Republic v. Vega (Vega), wherein this Court allowed the
registration of land titles despite the absence of the twin certifications on the ground that T.A.N.
Properties was promulgated only after the trial court's and appellate court's rendition of their
respective rulings in Vega. (Republic v. Philippine National Police, G.R. No. 198277, February 8,
2021)

[Note: In the instant case, the PNP did not submit a DENR Certification to the effect that the
subject lots are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was the prevailing
requirement when its application for land registration was pending with the RTC. 34 The PNP merely
submitted a subdivision plan 35 of Lot No. 713, Cad. 191, Iba Cadastre, which indicated that the subject
lots are alienable and disposable. (Republic v. Philippine National Police, G.R. No. 198277, February 8, 2021)]

Furthermore, in Gamboa, this Court held that the "capital" referred to in Article XII,
Section 11 consists of stock shares entitled to vote in the election of directors, which, in
respondent's case, are the common shares xxx.

Gamboa cannot be made basis to claim that respondent already violated Article XII,
Section 11 of the Constitution. Notably, this Court in Gamboa refused to rule on the petitioner's
factual claim that foreigners effectively controlled PLDT's capital. Instead, this Court focused on
the legal issue of whether or not "capital" in Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution refers to
total common shares or total outstanding capital stock, including voting and non-voting shares.
In other words, there was no factual finding that PLDT actually violated Article XII, Section 11
of the Constitution. (De Leon v. Philippine Long Distance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 211389, October
6, 2021)
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 In Republic v. Cosalan, citing Cruz, this Court enunciated that ancestral lands are covered
by the concept of native title and considered owned by the indigenous peoples since time
immemorial. Consequently, ancestral lands are incapable of private ownership. (Daco v. Cabajar,
G.R. No. 222611, November 15, 2021)

Franchises

A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative,
subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone,
and accepted by every authority since. Further, "a franchise is defined to be a special privilege
to, do certain things conferred by government on an individual or corporation, and which does
not belong to citizens generally of common right." Insofar as the great powers of government
are concerned, "[a] franchise is basically a legislative grant of a special privilege to a person."
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution further states that "xxx for the operation of a
public utility," no "such franchise or right [shall] be granted except under the condition that it
shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. xxx" (MORE Electric and Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 248061 &
249406 (Resolution), March 9, 2021)

The power of Congress to award the franchise to MORE is broad and plenary, subject
only to limitations given by the Constitution and the fundamental principle of due process. It is
beyond the power of the Court to question the wisdom of Congress in granting the franchise to
MORE. The Court cannot venture into this because that would mean violating the deep-rooted
principle of separation of powers. Thus, Sections 10 and 17 of R.A. No. 11212, giving MORE the
power to expropriate the distribution system of PECO, are but integral parts of the grant of the
franchise by Congress. Since the exercise of eminent domain is necessary to carry out the
franchise, it is prudent that the Court accords respect to the legislative will. (MORE Electric and
Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 248061 & 249406 (Resolution), March 9, 2021)

[Note: It is erroneous for PECO to argue that only the State and its subdivisions or the local
government units may exercise the power of eminent domain. Noticeably, these franchise holders are
cooperatives and private corporations. Therefore, it cannot simply be concluded that the Congress, in
enacting R.A. No. 11212, extended favorable concessions to MORE to the exclusion of all other
distribution utilities because other private entities such as the cooperatives and private corporations
mentioned enjoy similar privileges. (MORE Electric and Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., G.R. Nos.
248061 & 249406 (Resolution), March 9, 2021)]

The power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be

delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and
even to private enterprises performing public services.

The exercise of the right to expropriate given to MORE under its franchise is a delegated
authority granted by Congress. The restrictive view that expropriation may be exercised by the
State alone, without any consideration for the State's authority to delegate its powers, cannot be
upheld. Being a private enterprise allowed by the Congress to operate a public utility for public
interest, the delegation by Congress of the power to expropriate PECO's distribution system is

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valid. (MORE Electric and Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 248061 & 249406
(Resolution), March 9, 2021)

[Note: It must be emphasized that a legislative franchise is merely a privilege and not a right that
may be demanded by any individual or entity. The Court cannot substitute the judgment of the Congress
with its own with respect to the determination of which entity it deems most qualified to carry out the
distribution of electricity in Iloilo City. It must be remembered that the Constitution has delineated
separate and quite distinct roles that each branch of government must fill. In the exercise of judicial
review, the Court is limited to the determination of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 11212. The Court does
not possess the technical knowledge required in the field of power distribution to competently evaluate
the capacity of MORE to carry out its functions under R.A. No. 11212. Resolving whether PECO deserves
to be granted an extension or renewal of its franchise and whether MORE is qualified as a new franchisee
are matters clearly beyond the ambit of the Court's authority to review as these are purely matters left to
the wisdom of Congress. (MORE Electric and Power Corp. v. Panay Electric Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 248061 &
249406 (Resolution), March 9, 2021)]
Franchises

First, there is no doubt that President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) had the
power to repeal or revoke MIPTI’s franchise. As head of the revolutionary government, she was
empowered by the 1986 Freedom Constitution to exercise legislative powers, including the
power to amend, alter, or repeal the franchise of a public utility. This legislative prerogative is
broad and plenary, stemming from the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of government
powers - police power. Thus, courts are generally reluctant to interfere with it. Second, while
the power to repeal a franchise is broad and plenary, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or at
whim. The Constitution expressly limits such power in that its exercise must be necessitated by
"common good" or "public interest." Third, as will be the focus of this Decision, the exercise of
this power is further limited by the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, a franchise
cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. (Manila International Ports Terminal,
Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7, 2021)

[Note: In our jurisdiction, a franchise is broadly defined as a special privilege that is not
demandable as a matter of right, and when granted, is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by
Congress xxx. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199,
December 7, 2021)]

[Note: Thus, while a franchise is still characterized as a special privilege in the sense that the
grant thereof is not a demandable right, and that when granted, is subject to the amendment, alteration or
repeal by Congress, We have come to recognize franchise as a property right that cannot be revoked or
forfeited without due process of law. xxx. Thus, in Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,
while We acknowledged the power of Congress to impose restrictions on franchises, We also noted that
"no enactment of Congress may contravene the Constitution and its Bill of Rights xxx.” (Manila
International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7, 2021)]

[Note: As cited above, the basis for the recall of MIPTI’s franchise is the "Constitution," together
with the "law." The 1973 Constitution granted the Legislature the power to repeal a franchise; the
prevailing law (PD 1284) granted PPA the power to recommend the said revocation. From this, it can be
seen that President Aquino's revocation of MIPTI's franchise upon PPA's recommendation was an
exercise of the legislative power to repeal a franchise, in accordance with PP A's exercise of its own power
to recommend the revocation under PD 1284. Second, having established that EO 30 is a legislative act, it

147
is required to be published to satisfy the requirement of notice as part of procedural due process xxx.
(Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7, 2021)]

[Note: Here, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that there was no proper notice to MIPTI
considering that EO 30 was not published. However, a review of the Official Gazette shows that EO 30
was actually published. This was done on July 21, 1986, the same day that PPA implemented the order.
Considering that EO 30 expressly provides for immediate effectivity, and considering further that
jurisprudence recognizes the effectivity of laws that provide for immediate effectivity upon publication,
91 the publication requirement was deemed satisfied when EO 30 was enforced on July 21, 1986. Thus,
the appellate court erred in ruling that EO 30 is unconstitutional for not being published. Nevertheless,
even though EO 30 was published, the revocation of MIPTI’s franchise was still unconstitutional as it was
done without regard to the rudiments of fair play and the standard of freedom from arbitrariness. (Manila
International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7, 2021)]

[Note: Here, there is absolutely no doubt that the minimum standards of fair play and freedom
from arbitrariness required by due process have been disregarded. The manner in which MIPTI’s
franchise was revoked was so arbitrary and so despotic that it evinces an obvious lack of regard or respect
to the fundamental principle of due process and to the Constitution that guarantees it. One day, it was
business as usual for MIPTI. The following day, it was informed of its violations. The next day, it no
longer has a business. The lack of respect is so flagrant that no person can possibly think that it is
justified, or at the very least, acceptable, even if it was done in the aftermath of martial law. Indeed, the
appellate court correctly called it an "injustice:" xxx. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine
Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7, 2021)]

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to

qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition
by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Corollary thereto is Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which reads:

Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall
vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. xXx
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 To implement R.A. No. 6657, petitioner issued, among others, DAR A.O. No. 2, series of
2003. Section 3, Article II of DAR A.O. No. 2, series of 2003 enumerates who may apply for
retention, to wit:

SECTION 3. Who May Apply for Retention. —

3.1. Any person, natural or juridical, who owns agricultural lands with an
aggregate area of more than five (5) hectares may apply for retention area. However, a
landowner who exercised his right of retention under PD 27 may no longer exercise the
same right under RA 6657. Should he opt to retain five (5) hectares in his other
agricultural lands, the seven (7) hectares previously retained by him shall be immediately
placed under CARP coverage.

3.2. A landowner who owns five (5) hectares or less, of land which are not yet
subject of coverage based on the schedule of implementation provided in Section 7 of RA
6657, may also file an application for retention and a Certification of Retention shall be
issued in his favor.

3.3. The right of retention of a deceased landowner may be exercised by his heirs
provided that the heirs must first show proof that the decedent landowner had
manifested during his lifetime his intention to exercise his right of retention prior to 23
August 1990 (finality of the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Incorporated versus The Honorable Secretary of
Agrarian Reform).

In the present case, a perusal of respondent's application for retention shows that the
basis for such application is unclear. Notably, respondent filed the application in her name,
stating that she is the owner of the subject lands. (Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 204905, July 14, 2021)

EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTRE, SPORTS

Academic freedom is both a right and an obligation.  It thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also on
autonomous decision-making by the academy itself. 

From the medieval times, academic freedom has meant the freedom of the professor to
teach without external control in his or her area of expertise, and it has implied the freedom of
the student to learn.  The concept of academic freedom first gained institutional recognition
with the creation, in 1810, of the University of Berlin, considered by many to be the first modern
research university.  Emerging prominently in late nineteenth century German concepts
of Lernfreiheit (the freedom to learn) and Lehrfreiheit (the freedom to teach), academic freedom
has been inextricably linked to the free exchange of ideas and self-governance so fundamental
to the academic ethos.  In the United States, Justice Felix Frankfurter, concurring in the case
of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,  summarized the four essential freedoms that constitute academic
freedom:

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 It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.

Generally speaking, the state may not take action that "cast[s] a pall of orthodoxy over
the classroom," which is traditionally the "marketplace of ideas."  The administration of the
university rests not with the courts, but with the administrators of the institution. 

In this jurisdiction, academic freedom is enshrined in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) of the
Constitution:

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

Academic freedom, as worded in our Constitution, is granted to institutions of higher

learning. It is different from the academic freedom granted to individuals such as students and
professors, who have the right "to seek and express truth" in their academic work. This type of
academic freedom is separate and distinct from academic freedom which refers to the autonomy
of academic institutions as a corporate body. 

As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed

with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external
controls or pressure.  Academic freedom accords an institution of higher learning the right to
decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. 

In the leading case of Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the
Court resolved whether or not an academic institution may be compelled to admit petitioner to
study. Petitioner in Garcia filed a petition for mandamus, seeking to compel respondent to admit
her in the Loyola School of Theology. In denying the petition, the Court held that there is no
clear duty on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner to study. Academic freedom
gives discretion to the respondent to create its own admission policies which must be met by
those who wish to enter their institution. More importantly, petitioner failed to show a clear
legal right which entitles her to admission. Thus:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion
appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of
petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed
on the Loyola School of Theology. . . While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to
demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ. 

Similarly, in the subsequent case of Tangonan v. Judge Paño, this Court reiterated the
primacy of academic freedom with respect to an institution's admission policy. In Tangonan,
petitioner similarly filed a mandamus case to compel the respondent school to admit her to study
nursing. Respondent alleged that it denied her admission due to academic delinquency. In
affirming the denial of petitioner's re-admission to the university, this Court held that
compelling the re-admission despite petitioner's failure to meet the school's standard policies
and qualifications will violate academic freedom. Thus:

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 The foregoing notwithstanding, still petitioner would want Us to compel respondent
school to enroll her despite her failure to meet the standard policies and qualifications set by the
school. To grant such relief would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the
respondent school enshrined under Article XV, Section 8, Par. 2 of our Constitution which
mandates "that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This institutional
academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,
discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no
control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are sought and
established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them — the grant being to institutions of higher
learning — free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or
in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent. 

An institution's determination of who may be admitted to its study is not only limited to
its admission policies but it is necessarily extends to the supervision of its students while they
are enrolled. Academic institutions are free to establish and impose academic standards and
rules on conduct upon its students. These policies are not only essential for the institution's
survival but are imperative if academic quality is sought to be maintained or elevated.

Students who are admitted to study are consequently subject to the school's supervision
and should there be a finding of infractions, it is within the right of the school to mete out
penalties, including dismissal.

In a number of cases, this Court has ruled that dismissal of erring students is within the
ambit of academic freedom.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, the Court upheld the decision of

petitioner to dismiss its students who violated university rules by participating in hazing
activities. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that admission, as well as continuing study, is
discretionary upon a school and these pursuits are mere privileges rather than a student's right.
An academic institution, in exercise of its academic freedom, may establish for itself rules and
regulations regarding the admission, discipline, and promotion of its students. Thus:

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline."
Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the
smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. 

Corollarily, students are under obligation to comply with the institution's standards to
be admitted and to subsequently retain its standing and continue studying in the institution. If a
student is found to have violated or failed to meet this standard, the institution has the
prerogative to impose sanctions or to expel the student. 

In Licup v. University of San Carlos (USC): 

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 While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the
USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the
process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a
serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. 

The prerogative of an academic institution covers not only actions concerning

disciplinary measures but more so with respect to its academic policies.

It is fundamental to an academic institution that it is able to identity and establish the

standards to achieve and to maintain its academic quality. To attain certain academic standards,
schools and universities put in place rigorous curricula and scholastic rules to determine which
students may be granted degrees and academic distinctions.

In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, private respondent sought to compel

petitioner to confer her degree with honors. According to petitioner's evaluation, respondent's
general average did not qualify for honors. On the other hand, respondent claimed that her
average grade qualifies for the distinction of cum laude if petitioner will exclude her failing
grades in her previous course. However, petitioner rejected respondent's claim because it is an
established policy that all grades obtained by a student will be taken into consideration in the
evaluation of his or her overall academic performance. This includes grades in all subjects and
courses she took in the university.

In upholding the petitioner's decision, the Court held that the petitioner's rules on
granting academic distinction is part of its academic freedom. Failing to obtain the required
average, respondent cannot compel petitioner to award the distinction. Absent any abuse on the
part of the petitioner, this decision may not be disturbed by the Court. Thus:

It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of
academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the
graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. 

This ruling was reiterated in the similar case of Morales v. Board of

Regents.  Morales likewise involved the school's decision to grant an academic distinction to its
student. In upholding the school's refusal to award honors to petitioner, the Court held that
academic freedom accords the academic institution the liberty to establish standards for the
grant of academic recognition. Absent abuse of this discretion, the Court cannot interfere with
the school's decision. Thus:

xxx [T]he discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such
discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of

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 discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts
may not disturb the University's decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." Academic freedom accords an institution of higher
learning the right to decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
Certainly, the wide sphere of autonomy given to universities in the exercise of academic freedom
extends to the right to confer academic honors. Thus, exercise of academic freedom grants the
University the exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its graduates it shall confer
academic recognition, based on its established standards. And the courts may not interfere with
such exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and
capriciously exercised its judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the competence and
expertise in granting honors to graduating students of the University, courts do not have the
competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee and substitute their judgment for
that of the University officials.

Therefore, for failure to establish that the respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in not conferring cum laude honors to petitioner, the lower court erred in mandating
that petitioner's grades be re-computed including her marks in German 10 and 11 and to confer
upon petitioner academic honors. 

By the same token, academic institutions have the liberty to establish course
requirements and see to it that these requirements are complied before they grant and confer
degrees.

In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the decision of petitioner to
drop its student from the roll of students due to the latter's failure to satisfy academic
requirements. In that case, under petitioner's rules, a student who fails in subjects equivalent to
three units will be disqualified for re-admission unless the student repeats the whole year.
Private respondent was refused re-admission after he failed in three subjects.

Ruling in favor of the petitioner, the Court explained that respondent cannot insist on his
readmission when he clearly failed the academic standards set by the school. The Court held
that it will not interfere with respect to academic decisions and policies of the schools unless
they were enacted with arbitrariness or malice. Thus:

Moreover, the dropping of the private respondent from the petitioner's roll of students
was not done precipitately. Private respondent's grades were of his own making. He failed in
Practical Arts because he did not submit a required project. His teacher saw fit to fail him for his
non-compliance. At the end of the last grading period, the Committee on Admission deliberated
on the school standing of students who incurred failures in three academic subjects and among
them was the private Respondent. With regard to the latter, the Committee resolved that he be
made to transfer to another school in line with the petitioner's policy. This recommendation was
adopted by petitioner. We fail to see any irregularity involved herein. In the absence of substantial
evidence showing arbitrariness or malice on the part of the petitioner, We will not disturb its
decision. In his concurring opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., the late

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 Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee supplied the rationale underlying Our attitude towards
academic decisions or policies, to wit:

Only . . . when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the
academic judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence
and fitness of an applicant for enrollment . . . The courts simply do not have the
competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as Admission Committees of the
universities and institutions of higher learning and to substitute their judgment for that
of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of such educational institutions. Were
the courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with petitions for admission
from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands who flunked
and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their
grades. 

While academic institutions have a contractual obligation to provide its students a fair
opportunity to finish their course, the students bear a reciprocal obligation to study and to
comply with the rules and regulations of the school, including its academic standards and
methods.  Failing to attain these standards, the student forfeits his or her contractual right to
study.  In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 

While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its
students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue, since a contract creates
reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a
corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of
the school. When a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the
required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this Court
recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning. Thus, they are
afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of
students, including setting of academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are
competent to determine who are entitled to admission and readmission. 

By virtue of academic freedom, schools have a wide discretion in determining its own
set of academic policies and this Court has recognized that this matter is within the expertise of
educational institutions. The academic institutions are competent to determine whatever
parameters, examinations, minimum average grade, or failing limit it will impose on its
students and courts will not step in and review decisions which are done in exercise of
academic freedom unless there was grave abuse of discretion.

Nevertheless, an educational institution's discretion on the exercise of academic freedom

is not absolute. Like other constitutional rights, it must on occasion be balanced against
important competing interests.  In his concurring opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,  the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee supplied the
rationale underlying Our attitude towards academic decisions or policies,  to wit:

Only . . . when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic
judgment of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an
applicant for enrollment. . . . The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to
constitute themselves as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher
learning and to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission
Committees of such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be
154
 swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and
next the thousands who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a
judicial review of their grades. 

Indeed, "academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a

privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly."  Where the decision of the
academic institution runs afoul overriding constitutional rights such as right to peaceable
assembly and free speech, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the institution's actions.
In Villar, et al. v. Technological Institute of the Phil. (TIP), et al.: 

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate
grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being
disregarded. 

Moreover, when the institution acted with grave abuse of discretion or patent
arbitrariness, its actions may be nullified by the courts. Thus:

The rule in this jurisdiction since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, reiterated in Tangonan
v. Paño, has been to uphold the rule that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right,
on the part of the student. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong this Court cited with
approval the formulation made by Justice Felix Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed
in the term "academic freedom" encompassing not only "the freedom to determine . . . on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught," but likewise
"who may be admitted to study." We have thus sanctioned its valid invocation by a school in
rejecting students who are academically delinquent, or a laywoman seeking admission to a
seminary, or students violating "School Rules on Discipline."

Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An
equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well expressed in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, that every "person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

Another observation. In Non v. Dames II, we have already abandoned our earlier ruling
in Alcuaz v. PSBA (that enrollment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract, and that the
school may not be compelled to renew the contract) by recognizing instead the right of a student
to be enrolled for the entire period required in order to complete his course. We have also stressed
that the contract between the school and the student, imbued, as it is, with public interest, is not
an ordinary contract.   (Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19,
2021)

[Note: In the case at bar, the Court cannot allow academic freedom to be weaponized by a
newly-appointed college dean for the sake of making a first impression on her superiors. While SLU may
rightfully exercise its discretion on who may be conferred the degree of Doctor of Medicine, such exercise
must not contravene the rights of its students in accordance with Article 19 of the Civil Code which
provides that every "person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
155
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." In his dissenting opinion in Tan
v. Court of Appeals, Justice Isagani Cruz opined:

I have reservations about the ponencia insofar as it suggests that if the parents are not
satisfied with the policies of the school, they are free to enroll their children elsewhere. It is not as
simple as that. The school is not a strictly private business or an exclusive club admission to
which is entirely discretionary in its officials or membership. It is an enterprise affected with
public interest and as such does not have full freedom in defining its policies. The school has a
missionary and visionary purpose. That purpose transcends personal animosities and
idiosyncrasies like those involved in the case before us. 

Indeed, SLU's sudden imposition of harsher and more punitive requirements to its graduating
students in the middle of what was supposed to be their final school year is not as simple and telling
respondents and their parents to bear with them. The records clearly show that when respondents were
admitted as fourth year students, one of the requisites for graduation entailed the passing of a COWE
which merely contemplated one written examination and, in case of failure thereof, remedial examination
which is limited to the subject areas that the students concerned had failed. However, on September 3,
2001, or more or less in the middle of the school year, SLU revised the COWE and introduced substantial
changes including the conduct of oral examinations and severe repercussions for failure that would
unduly delay the graduation of its fourth year students.

It bears stressing that when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to
comply with.  In this case, the relationship between SLU and respondents was encapsulated in the 2001
Student Handbook which clearly defined the parameters for respondents to obtain their Doctor of
Medicine degrees which, as far as their respective official transcripts of records  are concerned, they did.
SLU's immediate imposition of the Revised COWE is capricious and inconsistent with an institution of
higher learning's contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course
they seek to pursue. (Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez, G.R. No. 197126, January 19, 2021)]

In Lacuesta v. Ateneo de Manila University, We held that the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools and not the Labor Code determines whether or not a faculty member in a
private educational institution has attained a permanent or regular status, to wit:

The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, determines
whether or not a faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent
status. In University of Santo Tomas v. National Labor Relations Commission the Court en banc
said that under Policy Instructions No. 11 issued by the Department of Labor and Employment,
"the probationary employment of professors, instructors and teachers shall be subject to the
standards established by the Department of Education and Culture." Said standards are
embodied in paragraph 75 (now Section 93) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
(Palgan v. Holy Name University, G.R. No. 219916, February 10, 2021)

Institutional academic freedom encompasses the essential freedoms of a university to

determine for itself on academic grounds (i) who may teach, (ii) what may be taught, (iii) how it
shall be taught, and (iv) who may be admitted to study. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R.
No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Corollarily, while enshrined in the Constitution, academic freedom and police power
cannot be exercised without any restraint. A delineation on these rights is inherently imposed as
it has been said that absolute power corrupts absolutely while absolute freedom often leads to
156
anarchy and chaos. Thus, a law school and the people comprising it must exercise academic
freedom responsibly. The State, on the other hand, can wield its police power on the condition
that the same must be done reasonably and proportionately, at the very least. Though
presumably done lawfully pursuant to academic freedom or police power, any act cannot be
stamped with validity by this Court when it fails to comply with such parameters. (Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Given the foregoing, the Court reiterates that "Section 7( e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it
gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is faithful to the
reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe
minimum requirements not amounting to control." However, the LEB will do well to remember
to exercise its discretion soundly, consistent only with its authority under the statute and the
Constitution. It should not gravely abuse its discretion as this Court shall not shirk from its
sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. In clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the
supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. The Court shall exercise the power
of judicial review by the mere enactment of a law or approval of a challenged action when such
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution. This includes violation of the
fundamental rights of institutions of higher learning under their academic freedom. (Pimentel v.
Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

In this respect, the Court is of the considered view that the requirement of the LEB for
prospective students to take the PhiLSAT does not per se render it unconstitutional for as long as
the results will only be recommendatory, with the law schools retaining the discretion to accept
the applicant based on their policies and standards. As an eligibility requirement, though, the
current PhiLSAT is not a lawful method to attain the lawful subject of the State. Requiring the
schools to accept only those who took and passed the exam amounts to a dictatorial control of
the State, through LEB, and runs afoul of the intent of the Constitution. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

As explained at length by the Court in its Decision, LEBMO No. 7-2016, which gave birth
to the PhiLSAT, suffers from several constitutional infirmities. The two (2)-year limitation for
prospective students to take the PhiLSAT, together with the additional requirement to pass the
same, or have an unexpired certificate of exemption, as set forth under Sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of
LEBMO No. 7-2016, are arbitrary and ultra vires in nature; hence, unconstitutional. Although the
State has a compelling interest to uplift the standards of legal education in the country, Section
9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is unconstitutional for unreasonably encroaching into the sphere of
academic freedom of law schools to determine for themselves who to admit as students.
(Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Similar to the requirement of passing, the act of mandating the taking of PhiLSAT as an
admission requirement to any basic law course under Section 1 is an unreasonable imposition
which unduly limits the choice of law schools on who to admit. It impairs the law schools' de
facto control over the admission and examination of their students. Law schools are left with no
other recourse but to refuse the admission of those who failed to take the compulsory exam,
regardless of the merit of the student's reason for such failure. This is an absurdity that is
difficult to justify even by the noble aspirations of the State, more so when one considers LEB
Chairperson Emerson B. Aquende's revelation that "there is no statistical basis to show the

157
propensity of the PhiLSAT to improve the quality of legal education.” (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

The requirement regarding admission of international students is legally impermissible

as the students' eligibility is strictly left for the LEB to decide. This unduly takes away the right
of the academic institution to exercise its discretion whether to accept the student or not,
thereby transgressing its academic freedom to determine who to admit.

This notwithstanding, the Court agrees with respondents that the entirety of Section 15
should not be invalidated. Notably, the first paragraph pertains to the requirement for a
certification from the Secretary of Education that the applicant completed the required four
(4)-year pre-law course. Far from being arbitrary, Section 15(1) is a reasonable requirement to
ensure that the applicant is qualified to take the course. The Court even similarly requires it for
admission to the Bar examination. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November
9, 2021)

On Section 16 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which additionally requires a prescribed number of

units in Mathematics, Science, and English for admission, respondents argue anew that the said
requirement is a valid exercise of the State's supervisory regulatory power. Corollarily,
respondents assert that the existence of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is of no moment as said
rule concerns only admission to the Bar examinations, not to law school.

Indeed, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court pertains only to the requirement of the Court
anent the Bar examinations, thus, irrelevant to the determination of the validity of the
questioned provision. Nevertheless, Section 16 is still void as it is couched in a language that
effectively denies the academic institution's autonomy to, at the very least, conditionally accept
the student with deficient units in Mathematics, English, and Social Science subjects. Trite to
point out, the LEB, in the exercise of the delegated police power of the State, may impose
reasonable and minimum qualifications of prospective law students for as long as it does not
suppress the autonomy of the academic institution to choose its students. (Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Finally, the Court sustains its ruling that the prohibition against accepting applicants for
the Master of Laws without a Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree under Section 17 of
LEBMO No. 1-2011 is void for infringing the right of the school to determine who to admit to
their graduate degree programs. xxx. To recall, the Court held that such requirement "effectively
nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional
experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have
considered.” (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

There is no question that the master's degree requirement for tertiary education teachers
is permissible. This is settled. Here, what is unacceptable for being unreasonable is how the LEB
exercised its authority to impose such requirement as discussed at length in the assailed
Decision. The issuances under consideration violate the law schools' right to set their own
faculty standards and evaluate the qualifications of their teachers. In so doing, the LEB
issuances infringe on the academic freedom of the schools to choose who may teach their
students. While the State may act in furtherance of its role as parens patriae, it should not act like

158
an overbearing parent who makes life choices for its adult child without regard to the latter's
own choices or opinion. (Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, November 9, 2021)

Participating "in the xxx training xxx

in the commission of terrorism"
under Section 6 is neither
unconstitutionally vague nor
overbroad.

Accordingly, as construed under the lens of Brandenburg, Section 6 in relation to Section 3

(k) only pertains to "training" which is directed to produce the commission of terrorism and is
likely to produce such action. In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court said that "the mere
abstract teaching xxx of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."
On this understanding of Section 6, the Court does not find Section 6 impermissibly vague or
overbroad so as to violate petitioners' academic freedom. (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos.
252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736,
252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904,
252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 &
253420, December 7, 2021)

CARLO L. CRUZ

159