Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CA (1999)
G.R. No. 116320 November 29, 1999
FACTS:
June 23, 1977: Adalia Francisco (Francisco) president of A. Francisco Realty & Development Corporation (AFRDC) and Jaime C.
Ong (Ong) President and General Manager of Herby Commercial & Construction Corporation (HCCC), entered into a contract where
HCCC agreed to undertake the construction of 35 housing units and the development of 35 hectares of land.
HCCC was to be paid on turn-key basis (basis of the completed houses and developed lands delivered to and accepted by AFRDC and
the GSIS)
To facilitate payment, AFRDC executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of HCCC to enable the it to collect payments directly from the
GSIS.
Furthermore, the GSIS and AFRDC put up an Executive Committee Account with the Insular Bank of Asia & America (IBAA) of P4M
from which checks would be issued and co-signed by petitioner Francisco and the GSIS Vice-President Armando Diaz (Diaz).
February 10, 1978: HCCC filed a complaint w/ the RTC against Francisco, AFRDC and the GSIS for the collection of the unpaid balance
under the Land Development and Construction Contract in the amount of P515,493.89 for completed and delivered housing units
and land development.
Sometime in 1979: Ong discovered that Diaz and Francisco had executed and signed 7 checks drawn against the IBAA and payable to
HCCC but were never delivered to HCCC
Francisco forged the signature of Ong, without his knowledge or consent, at the dorsal portion of the said checks to make it appear
that HCCC had indorsed the checks; Francisco then indorsed the checks for a second time by signing her name at the back of the
checks and deposited the checks in her IBAA savings account
June 7, 1979: Ong filed complaints charging Francisco with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents - dismissed by the
Assistant City Fiscal
According to Francisco, she agreed to grant HCCC the loans in the total amount of P585K and covered by 18 promissory notes in
order to obviate the risk of the non-completion of the project.
As a means of repayment, Ong allegedly issued a Certification authorizing Francisco to collect HCCCs receivables from the GSIS
November 21, 1989: IBAA and HCCC entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the trial court, wherein HCCC
acknowledged receipt of the amount of P370,475.00 in full satisfaction of its claims against IBAA, without prejudice to the right of
IBAA to pursue its claims against Francisco.
CA affirmed RTC
ISSUE: W/N Francisco can sign Ong’s name on the checks and it was not forgery
HELD: NO.
Francisco had custody of the checks, as proven by the check vouchers bearing her uncontested signature. Francisco forged the
signature of Ong on the checks to make it appear as if Ong had indorsed said checks
The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where any person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may
indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability
An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing in behalf of the principal and must disclose the name of his
principal; otherwise, he shall be held personally liable
Instead of signing Ong’s name, Francisco should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing as an agent
of HCCC. Instead of signing Ong's name, Francisco should have signed her own name and expressly indicated that she was signing as
an agent of HCCC. Thus, the Certification cannot be used by Francisco to validate her act of forgery.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the respondent court's decision promulgated on June 29, 1992, upholding the February 16, 1988 decision
of the trial court in favor of private respondents, with the modification that the interest upon the actual damages awarded shall be
at six percent (6%) per annum, which interest rate shall be computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on November 19,
1979. However, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time the judgment in this case becomes final
and executory and until such amount is fully paid. The basis for computation of the six percent and twelve percent rates of interest
shall be the amount of P370,475.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO, ORDERED.
FACTS:
San Carlos Milling Co. Ltd. (San Carlos) was in the hands of Alfred D. Cooper, its agent under general power of attorney with
authority of substitution
The principal employee in the Manila office was Joseph L. Wilson, to whom had been given a general power of attorney but without
power of substitution.
1926: Cooper, desiring to go on vacation, gave a general power of attorney to Newland Baldwin and at the same time revoked the
power of Wilson relative to the dealings with BPI
Wilson, conspiring together with Alfredo Dolores, a messenger-clerk in San Carlos' Manila office, sent a cable gram in code to the
company in Honolulu requesting a telegraphic transfer to the China Banking Corporation (China Bank) of Manila of $100,00.
The money was transferred by cable, and upon its receipt China Bank sent an exchange contract to San Carlos offering the sum of
P201K, which was then the current rate of exchange.
September 28, 1927: A manager's check on the China Banking Corporation for P201K payable to San Carlos Milling Company or
order was receipted for by Dolores deposited with the BPI having a fake endorsement (Baldwin forged as drawer)
For deposit only with Bank of the Philippine Islands, to credit of account of San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.
San Carlos had frequently withdrawn currency for shipment to its mill but never in so large an amount, and never under the sole
supervision of Dolores
Before delivering the money, the bank asked Dolores for P1 to cover the cost of packing the money, and he left the bank and shortly
afterwards returned with another check for P1, purporting to be signed by Newland Baldwin
Thereafter, the crime was discovered and San Carlos filed against the BPI and China Bank (after amendment complaint)
China Bank: as the prior endorsement had in law been guaranteed by the BPI, they are absolved even if the endorsement of
Newland Baldwin on the check was a forgery
BPI: guilty of no negligence, loss was due to the dishonesty of San Carlos employees and the negligence of San Carlos general agent
ISSUE:
W/N BPI was bound to inspect the checks and shall therefore be liable in case of forgery
HELD:
A bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making the payment
out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was forged.
There is no act of the plaintiff that led the bank astray. If it was in fact lulled into the false sense of security, it was by the effrontery
of Dolores, the messenger to whom it entrusted this large sum of money.
The proximate cause of the loss must therefore be due to the negligence of the bank in honoring and cashing the two forged checks.
Under section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law they are not a charge against San Carlos nor are the checks of any value to the
BPI.
The proximate cause of loss was due to the negligence of the Bank of the Philippine Islands in honoring and cashing the two forged
checks
The judgment absolving the Bank of the Philippine Islands must therefore be reversed, and a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff-
appellant and against the Bank of the Philippine Islands, defendant- appellee, for the sum of P200,001, with legal interest thereon
from December 23, 1928, until payment, together with costs in both instances. So, ordered.
FACTS:
CASA Montessori International opened a current account with BPI with CASAs President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of its
authorized signatories. In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been encashed
by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of P782,000.00. It turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at BPIs
Greenbelt Branch [was] a fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA.
Third party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks.
The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9) checks and concluded that the handwritings thereon
compared to the standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by the latter.
On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for Collection with Damages against defendant bank.
ISSUE 1:
Was there forgery under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL)?
HELD:
YES.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Under the best evidence rule
as applied to documentary evidence like the checks in question, no secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively be
introduced, as the original writing itself must be produced in court. But when, without bad faith on the part of the offeror, the
original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be produced in court, secondary evidence may be produced. Without bad
faith on its part, CASA proved the loss or destruction of the original checks through the Affidavit of the one person who knew of that
ISSUE 2:
Is BPI liable as the drawee bank for allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee?
HELD:
YES. BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes liable to its depositor-drawer for allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and
fictitious payee. Since the encashing bank is one of its branches, BPI can easily go after it and hold it liable for reimbursement. It
may not debit the drawers account and is not entitled to indemnification from the drawer. In both law and equity, when one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the loss or who put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the wrong.
A bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making the
payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was
forged.
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 149454 is hereby DENIED, and that in GR No. 149507 PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification: BPI is held liable for ₱547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the
amount already recovered by CASA from Leonardo T. Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum --
compounded annually, from the filing of the complaint until paid in full; and attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to
reimbursement from Respondent Yabut for the entire amount, excepting attorney’s fees. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulation Commission for such action as it may deem appropriate against Respondent
Yabut. No costs.
SO, ORDERED.
Facts:
Narciso L. Kho (Kho) purchased a manager’s check from Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) worth Php 25,000,000.00 paid
using the money from his savings account in the same bank. The check was purchased in order to negotiate a deal with Red Orange.
LBP gave Kho the check and a photocopy of the check. The photocopy was given to Red Orange. The deal between Kho and Red
Orange did not push through. Rudy Medel (representing Red Orange) went to LBP to negotiate the check, LBP cleared the check and
notified Kho of the transaction. Kho was surprised as the original check was still with him. It turns out that the check negotiated by
Medel with LBP is spurious. Kho tried to recover the Php 25,000,000.00 from LBP, but the latter claims that the former was negligent
for giving Medel the photocopy of the check which was used to make the spurious check and thus they cannot be held liable for the
lost amount.
Issue:
Whether or not LBP should pay for the Php 25,000,000.00
Held:
The genuine check No. 07410 remained in Kho’s possession the entire time and Land Bank admits that the check it cleared
was a fake. When Land Bank’s CCD forwarded the deposited check to its Araneta branch for inspection, its officers had every
opportunity to recognize the forgery of their signatures or the falsity of the check. Whether by error or neglect, the bank failed to do
so, which led to the withdrawal and eventual loss of the Php 25,000,000.00. This is the proximate cause of the loss. Land Bank
breached its duty of diligence and assumed the risk of incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit check. Hence, it should
suffer the resulting damage.
The business of banking is imbued with public interest; it is an industry where the general public’s trust and confidence in the system
is of paramount importance. Consequently, banks are expected to exert the highest degree of, if not the utmost, diligence. They are
obligated to treat their depositors’ accounts with meticulous care, always keeping in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petitions. The Court of Appeals' August 30, 2012 decision and February 14, 2013 resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 93881 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's April 30, 2009 decision in Civil Case No. Q-06-57154 is REVERSED.
(1) to PAY Narciso Kho the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), plus interest at the legal rate reckoned from the
filing of the complaint; and
(2) to ALLOW Narciso Kho to withdraw his remaining funds from Savings Account No. 0681-0681-80.
SO, ORDERED.
FACTS:
A certain Roberto Gonzaga presented for payment FEBTC Check No. 432100 to the bank’s branch in Bel-Air, Makati. The
check, payable to cash and drawn against Samsung Construction’s current account, was in the amount of P999,500.00. The bank
teller, Cleofe Justiani, checked the balance of the account. After ascertaining there were enough funds, and after comparing the
signature in the check and that of the specimen on record, Justiani was satisfied as to the authenticity of the signature on the check.
Gonzaga presented 3 identification cards to the bank officers.
Justiani forwarded the check to the branch Senior Assistant Cashier Gemma Velez for approval. Velez too concluded that the check
was indeed signed by the company’s Project Manager Jong Kyu Lee.
The check was also forwarded to Shirley Syfu, another bank officer for approval. Syfu then noticed that Jose Sempio III (Sempio), the
assistant accountant of Samsung Construction, was also in the bank. Syfu showed the check to Sempio, who vouched for the
genuineness of Jong’s signature.
Satisfied with the genuineness of the signature of Jong, Syfu authorized the banks encashment of the check to Gonzaga.
The following day, the company’s accountant, Kyu Yong Lee discovered that a check had been encashed. Aware that he had not
prepared such a check for Jong’s signature, Kyu found that the last blank check was missing.
Jong learned of the encashment of the check, and realized that his signature had been forged.
Samsung Construction filed a Complaint for violation of Section 23 of the NIL, and prayed for the payment of the amount debited as
a result of the questioned check plus interest, and attorney’s fees.
The RTC held that Jong’s signature on the check was forged and accordingly directed the bank to pay or credit back to Samsung
Constructions account the said amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FEBTC is liable to Samsung Construction in paying the forged check. Yes.
RULING:
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states:
When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative,
and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefore, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can
be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority.
The general rule is to the effect that a forged signature is wholly inoperative, and payment made through or under such signature is
ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument. If payment is made, the drawee cannot charge it to the drawers’ account. The
traditional justification for the result is that the drawee is in a superior position to detect a forgery because he has the makers
signature and is expected to know and compare it. The rule has a healthy cautionary effect on banks by encouraging care in the
comparison of the signatures against those on the signature cards they have on file.
Quite palpably, the general rule remains that the drawee who has paid upon the forged signature bears the loss. The exception to
this rule arises only when negligence can be traced on the part of the drawer whose signature was forged, and the need arises to
weigh the comparative negligence between the drawer and the drawee to determine who should bear the burden of loss.
We recognize that Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law bars a party from setting up the defense of forgery if it is guilty of
negligence. Yet, we are unable to conclude that Samsung Construction was guilty of negligence in this case.
Still, even if the bank performed with utmost diligence, the drawer whose signature was forged may still recover from the bank as
long as he or she is not precluded from setting up the defense of forgery. After all, Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
plainly states that no right to enforce the payment of a check can arise out of a forged signature. Since the drawer, Samsung
Construction, is not precluded by negligence from setting up the forgery, the general rule should apply. Consequently, if a bank pays
a forged check, it must be considered as paying out of its funds and cannot charge the amount so paid to the account of the
depositor. A bank is liable, irrespective of its good faith, in paying a forged check.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 1996 is REVERSED, and the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, dated 25 April 1994 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO, ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, and MOTOR SERVICE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. L-43596
October 31, 1936
FACTS:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the payment of the checks in question made by the drawee bank constitutes an
"acceptance"? and
2. Whether PNB (Drawee Bank) can recover reimbursements from Motor Service. Co.?
HELD:
1. No.
Payment of the check does not automatically constitute an acceptance to preclude the drawee bank from setting up
forgery. Acceptance implies subsequent negotiation of the instrument, which is not true in case of payment of a check
because from the moment a check is paid it is withdrawn from circulation. When a drawee bank cashes or pays a check,
the cycle of negotiation is terminated, and is illogical to speak of subsequent holder who can invoke the warranty of
acceptor. Hence, the drawee bank is not precluded from setting up forgery.
2.
Yes.
PNB V. CA (1968)
G.R. No. L-26001 October 29, 1968
FACTS:
January 15, 1962: Augusto Lim deposited in his current account with the PCIB branch at Padre Faura, Manila a GSIS Check of
P57,415.00 drawn against the PNB
Then, payee Mariano D. Pulido indorsed it to Manuel Go and then indorsed by Manuel Go to Augusto Lim, which was paid and
debited to the account of GSIS.
February 2, 1962: PNB demanded from the PCIB the refund. PNB then filed against the PCIB. The CFI dismissed the case, which
prompted an appeal before the Court of Appeals, to which the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
ISSUE:
1. W/N PCIB acquired the warranties of an indorser?
2. W/N PNB can obtain a refund from PCIB?
HELD:
1. NO. Affirmed
PCIB guaranteed not the authenticity of the signatures of the officers of the GSIS who signed because the GSIS is not
an indorser of the check, but as a drawer and therefore the warranty is irrelevant to the PNB's alleged right to recover
from the PCIB. In general, "acceptance" is not required for checks since they are payable on demand, accepted promise
to perform an act the acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer
2. No.
PNB cannot obtain a refund. PNB had been guilty of a greater degree of negligence, because it had a previous and
formal notice from the GSIS that the check had been lost, with the request that payment thereof be stopped PNB's
negligence was the main or proximate cause for the corresponding loss PNB did not return the check when 1 of 2
innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss or who put it into the power of the third person to perpetrate the wrong where the
collecting (PCIB) and the drawee (PNB) banks are equally at fault, the court will leave the parties where it finds them
applies in the case of a drawee who pays a bill without having previously accepted it. In this case, PNB was the proximate
cause of the loss, and hence may not recover from PCIB
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Philippine National Bank. It is so
ordered.
FACTS:
The plaintiff Ford drew and issued its Citibank check in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payment of plaintiff’s
percentage or manufacturer’s sales taxes. The aforesaid check was deposited with the defendant IBAA (now PCIBank) and was
subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. Upon presentment with the defendant Citibank, the proceeds of the check were paid to
IBAA as collecting or depository bank. The proceeds of the same Citibank check of the plaintiff were never paid to or received by the
payee thereof, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
In a letter by the acting CIR, Ford was informed that its check was not paid to the government or its authorized agent but was
encashed by unauthorized persons. An investigation revealed that Ford’s general ledger accountant had recalled the check
purportedly because of an error in the computation of tax due. With his instruction, PCIBank replaced the check with two of its own
Manager’s Checks which were subsequently deposited with another bank.
ISSUE:
Whether PCIB is liable to reimburse Ford for the payment of the crossed check.
RULING:
Yes. Indeed, the crossing of the check with the phrase “Payee’s Account Only,” is a warning that the check should be
deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited
in payee’s account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scruninize the check and to know its
depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement “all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed”.
In this case, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a general
rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the
course and scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the
course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of
which malice is an essential element. In this case, we find a situation where the PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme
hatched by a syndicate in which its own management employees had participated.
A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or
agents were enabled to perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its responsibility for
such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable for the fraudulent
acts or representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of his employment or authority. And if an
officer or employee of a bank, in his official capacity, receives money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged with his bank for
collection, the bank is liable for his misappropriation of such sum.
Lastly, banking business requires that the one who first cashes and negotiates the check must take some precautions to learn
whether or not it is genuine. And if the one cashing the check through indifference or other circumstance assists the forger in
committing the fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it
did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument before paying the check. For this
reason, a bank which cashes a check drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or
making inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were
afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. In such cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the
collecting bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one
The Great Eastern Life Insurance Co. vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.
[GR 18657, 23 August 1922]
Facts:
The Great Eastern Life Insurance Co. (GELIC) is an insurance corporation, while Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. (HSBC)
and Philippine National Bank (PNB) are banking corporations, and each is duly licensed to do its respective business in the Philippine
Islands.
On 3 May 1920, GELIC drew its check payable to the order of Lazaro Melicor for P2,000 on HSBC with whom it had an account.
E.M. Maasim fraudulently obtained possession of the check, forged Melicor's signature, as an endorser, and then personally
endorsed and presented it to PNB. The latter bank placed the said amount on Maasim’s account.
PNB endorsed the check to HSBC, which paid it, and charged the amount of the check to the account of GELIC.
In the ordinary course of business, HSBC rendered a bank statement to GELIC showing that the amount of the check was charged to
its account
About 4 months after the check was charged to the account of GELIC, it was discovered that Melicor, to whom the check was made
payable, had never received it, and that his signature, as an endorser, was forged by Maasim. With this knowledge, GELIC promptly
made a demand upon HSBC that it should be given credit for the amount of the forged check, which the bank refused to do, and
GELIC commenced the action to recover the P2,000 which was paid on the forged check.
Issue:
Whether or not GELIC can recover inasmuch as Melicor’s indorsement was forged.
Ruling:
Plaintiff's check was drawn on Shanghai Bank payable to the order of Melicor. In other words, the plaintiff authorized and
directed the Shanghai Bank to pay Melicor, or his order, P2,000. It did not authorize or direct the bank to pay the check to any other
person than Melicor, or his order, and the testimony is undisputed that Melicor never did part with his title or endorse the check,
and never received any of its proceeds.
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is square in point.
“When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative,
and no right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can
be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from
setting up the forgery or want of authority.”
The money was on deposit in HSBC, and it had no legal right to pay it out to anyone except GELIC or its order. Here, GELIC ordered
HSBC to pay the P2,000 to Melicor, and the money was actually paid to Maasim and was never paid to Melicor, and he never
personally endorsed the check, or authorized any one to endorse it for him, and the alleged endorsement was a forgery.
Hence, HSBC has no defense to the present action.
Facts:
Natividad Gempesaw issued checks, prepared by her bookkeeper, a total of 82 checks in favor of several supplies. Most of
the checks for amounts in excess of actual obligations as shown in their corresponding invoices. It was only after the lapse of more
than 2 years did, she discovered the fraudulent manipulations of her bookkeeper. It was also learned that the indorsements of the
payee were forged, and the checks were brought to the chief accountant of Philippine Bank of Commerce (the Drawee Bank,
Buendia Branch) who deposited them in the accounts of Alfredo Romero and Benito Lam. Gempesaw made demand upon the bank
to credit the amount charged due the checks. The bank refused. Hence, the present action.
Issue:
W/N Gempesaw has a right to recover the amount attributable to the forgeries?
FACTS:
Petitioner deposited 10 checks in its current account with BPI. The checks which were acquired by petitioner from Ramirez, a
sales agent of the Inter-Island Gas was all payable to Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. or order. After the checks had been submitted to
Inter-bank clearing, Inter-Island Gas discovered that all the indorsements made on the checks purportedly by its cashiers were
forgeries. BPI thus debited the value of the checks against petitioner's current account and forwarded to the latter the checks
containing the forged indorsements which petitioner refused to accept.
ISSUE:
Whether BPI had the right to debit from petitioner's current account the value of the checks with the forged indorsements.
RULING:
YES.
Having indorsed the checks to BPI, Jai-Alai is deemed to have given the warranty prescribed in Section 66 of the NIL that
every single one of those checks "is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be."
The depositor of a check as indorser warrants that it is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be.
Jai Alai Corporation negligent in accepting the checks without question from Antonio Ramirez notwithstanding that the payee was
the Inter-Island Gas Services, Inc. and it did not appear that he was authorized to indorse it.
BPI acted within legal bounds when it debited the petitioner's account. Having indorsed the checks to respondent bank, petitioner is
deemed to have given the warranty prescribed in Section 66 of the NIL that every single one of those checks "is genuine and in all
respects what it purports to be." Respondent which relied upon the petitioner's warranty should not be held liable for the resulting
loss. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
Reyes sued in the RTC for the recovery of the checks plus damages.
ISSUE:
W/N Reyes has the right for recovery of the cross checks
HELD:
YES. petition DENIED.
There is no doubt that the checks were crossed checks and for payee’s account only. Reyes was able to show that she has never
authorized Sayson to deposit the checks nor to encash the same; that the bank had allowed all checks to be deposited, cleared and
paid to one Sayson in
violation of the instructions in the said crossed checks that the same were for payee’s account only; and that Reyes maintained a
savings account with the bank which never cleared the said checks.
Under accepted banking practice, crossing a check is done by writing two parallel lines diagonally on the top left portion of the
checks. The crossing is special where the name of a bank or a business institution is written between the two parallel lines, which
means that the drawee should pay
only with the intervention of the company. The crossing is general where the words written in between are “And Co.” and “for
payee’s account only”, as in the case at bar. This means that the drawee bank should not encash the check but merely accept it for
deposit.
When the bank paid the checks so indorsed notwithstanding that title has not passed to the endorser, it did so at its peril and
became liable to the payee for the value of the checks.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Facts:
Mauricio Ebrada encashed a back pay check for P1246.08 at Republic Bank (Escolta Branch). The Bureau of Treasury, which
issued the check advised the bank that the alleged indorsement of the check by one “Martin Lorenzo” was a forgery as the latter has
been dead since 14 July 1952; and requested that it be refunded he sum deducted from its account. The bank refunded the amount
to the Bureau and demanded upon Ebrada the sum in question, who refused. Hence, the present action.
Issue:
Whether or not the bank can recover from the last indorser.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto with costs against defendant-appellant.
SO, ORDERED.