Case Digest

Philippine Education Co. Inc. v. Soriano

G.R. No. L-22405. June 30, 1971

FACTS:
On April 18, 1958, Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office ten (10)
money orders payable to E.P. Montinola. After the postal teller had made out money orders,
Montinola offered to pay for them with a private checks were not generally accepted in payment
of money orders, the teller advised him to see the Chief of the Money Order Division, but
instead of doing so, Montinola managed to leave building with his own check and the ten(10)
money orders without the knowledge of the teller. On the same date, upon discovery of the
disappearance of the unpaid money orders, an urgent message was sent to all postmasters,
and the following day notice was likewise served upon all banks, instructing them not to pay
anyone of the money orders aforesaid if presented for payment. The Bank of America received
a copy of said notice three days later.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument.

RULING:
NO. Postal Money orders are not negotiable instruments. Our postal statutes are generally
construed in accordance with the construction given in the United States to their own postal
statutes, in the absence of any special reason justifying a departure from this policy or practice.
The weight of authority in the United States is that postal money orders are not negotiable
instruments, the reason behind this rule being that, in establishing and operating a postal money
order system, the government is not engaging in commercial transactions but merely exercises
governmental power for the public benefit. It is to be noted in this connection that some of the
restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the
character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws and regulations usually provide for
not more than one endorsement; payment of money orders may be withheld under a variety of
circumstances.
 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-49188, January 30, 1990

Facts:
Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by PAL. She filed her complaint in 1967. After ten
(10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms.
Tan won her case. It is now 1990. Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a
centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely no
fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid
from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all
because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name.

Issue:
Whether or not the payment to the sheriff by check extinguished the judgment debt.

Ruling:
NO. The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was in check and not in cash
or legal tender. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's checks, in the
case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. Since a negotiable
instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager's check or ordinary cheek,
is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment
and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not
discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains
suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized
 Metropolitan Bank v. Court of Appeals
G.R No. 88866, February 18, 1991

Facts:
32 treasury warrants were all drawn by the Philippine Fish Marketing Authority. All these
warrants were subsequently indorsed by Gloria Castillo as Cashier of Golden Savings and
deposited to its Savings Account in the Metrobank branch in Calapan, Mindoro. They were then
sent for clearing by the branch office to the principal office of Metrobank, which forwarded them
to the Bureau of Treasury for special clearing. Petitioner "exasperated" over Gloria's repeated
inquiries and also as an accommodation for a "valued client," finally decided to allow Golden
Savings to withdraw from the proceeds of the warrants. Metrobank informed Golden Savings
that 32 of the warrants had been dishonored by the Bureau of Treasury, and demanded the
refund by Golden Savings of the amount it had previously withdrawn, to make up the deficit in
its account.

Issue:
(a) Whether or not treasury warrants are negotiable instruments.
(b) Whether or not petitioner’s negligence would bar them from recovery.

Ruling
(a) NO. The treasury warrants in question are not negotiable instruments. Clearly stamped on
their face is the word "non-negotiable." Moreover, and this is of equal significance, it is
indicated that they are payable from a particular fund, to wit, Fund 501. The indication of
Fund 501 as the source of the payment to be made on the treasury warrants makes the
order or promise to pay "not unconditional" and the warrants themselves non-negotiable.
(b) YES. Metrobank was indeed negligent in giving Golden Savings the impression that the
treasury warrants had been cleared and that, consequently, it was safe to allow Gomez to
withdraw the proceeds thereof from his account with it. Without such assurance, Golden
Savings would not have allowed the withdrawals; with such assurance, there was no reason
not to allow the withdrawal. It was only when Metrobank gave the go-signal that Gomez was
finally allowed by Golden Savings to withdraw them from his own account.
 Caltex v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992

Facts:
On various dates, Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC), through its Sucat Branch issued
280 certificates of time deposit (CTD) in favor of one Angel dela Cruz who later lost them.

Date of Maturity FEB. 23, 1984 FEB 22, 1982, 19____

This is to Certify that B E A R E R has deposited in this Bank the sum of PESOS: FOUR
THOUSAND ONLY, SECURITY BANK SUCAT OFFICE P4,000& 00 CTS Pesos, Philippine
Currency, repayable to said depositor 731 days. after date, upon presentation and surrender of
this certificate, with interest at the rate of 16% per cent per annum.

(Sgd. Illegible)

Caltex (Phils.) Inc. went to the SBTCSucat branch and presented for verification the CTDs
declared lost by Angel dela Cruz alleging that the same were delivered to herein plaintiff “as
security for purchases made with Caltex Philippines, Inc.” by said depositor. SBTC rejected
Caltex’s demand and claim. Caltex sued SBTC but case was dismissed rationalizing that CTD’s
are non-negotiable instruments.

Issue:
Whether or not Certificate of Time Deposit (CTD) is a negotiable instrument.

Ruling:
YES. The CTDs in question undoubtedly meet the requirements of the law for negotiability
under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The accepted rule is that the negotiability or
non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the writing, that is, from the face of the
instrument itself. In the construction of a bill or note, the intention of the parties is to control, if it
can be legally ascertained. Here, if it was really the intention of respondent bank to pay the
amount to Angel de la Cruz only, it could have with facility so expressed that fact in clear and
categorical terms in the documents, instead of having the word “BEARER” stamped on the
space provided for the name of the depositor in each CTD.

While the writing may be read in the light of surrounding circumstances in order to more
perfectly understand the intent and meaning of the parties, yet as they have constituted the
writing to be the only outward and visible expression of their meaning, no other words are to be
added to it or substituted in its stead.
 Ang Tek LIan v. CA
G.R. No. L-2516, September 25, 1950

Facts:
Knowing he had no funds therefore, Ang Tek Lian drew a check payable to the order of "cash".
He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money. The next business day, the check was
presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds. Ang Tek Lian was found guilty of estafa. It is argued, however, that as
the check had been made payable to "cash" and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, the
defendant is not guilty of the offense charged.

Issue:
Whether or not indorsement is necessary to negotiate a check payable to the order of “cash”.

Ruling:
No. Indorsement is not necessary. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check
drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to
the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement. Where the Bank is
satisfied of the identity and /or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for
collection, it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the
drawer in thus acting.
 Republic Planters Bank v CA
G.R. No. 93073, December 21, 1992

Facts:
Republic Planters Bank issued 9 promissory notes signed by Defendant Shozo Yamaguchi,
President/Chief Operating Officer, and private respondent Fermin Canlas, Treasurer, of
Worldwide Garment Manufacturing, Inc.. They were authorized to apply for credit facilities with
the petitioner Republic Planters Bank in the forms of export advances and letters of credit/trust
receipts accommodations. February 5, 1982, the bank filed an action to recover the sums of
money covered by the promissory notes. In the same year, Worldwide Garment Manufacturing,
Inc. noted to change its corporate name to Pinch Manufacturing Corporation. Private
respondent Fermin Canlas denied having issued the promissory notes in question since he was
not an officer of Pinch Manufacturing Corporation, but instead of Worldwide Garment
Manufacturing, Inc., and that when he issued said promissory notes in behalf of Worldwide
Garment Manufacturing, Inc., the same were in blank.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Fermin Canlas is solidarily liable with the other defendants,
namely Pinch Manufacturing Corporation and Shozo Yamaguchi, on the nine promissory notes.

Ruling:
YES. Private respondent Fermin Canlas is solidarily liable on each of the promissory notes
bearing his signature for the following reasons:
(1) The promissory notes are negotiable instruments and must be governed by the
Negotiable Instruments Law.
(2) Under the Negotiable instruments Law, persons who write their names on the face of
promissory notes are makers and are liable as such. By signing the notes, the maker
promises to pay to the order of the payee or any holder according to the tenor thereof.
Based on the above provisions of law, there is no denying that private respondent
Fermin Canlas is one of the co-makers of the promissory notes. As such, he cannot
escape liability arising therefrom.
(3) Where an instrument containing the words "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more
persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. An instrument which
begins with "I", “We", or "Either of us" promise to pay, when signed by two or more
persons, makes them solidarily liable.
 Sps. Evangelista v. Mercator Corporation
G.R. No. 148864, August 21, 2003

Facts:
The petitioners Spouses Evangelista executed a mortgage in favor of defendant Mercator
Finance Corporation (MFC) for and in consideration of certain loans and/or other forms of credit
accommodation obtained from the mortgagee-defendant MFC to secure the payment of the
same and those others that the mortgagee might extend to the mortgagor.It contended that
since petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the promissory note as co-makers, aside from the
Continuing Suretyship Agreement subsequently executed to guarantee the indebtedness of
Embassy Farms, and the succeeding promissory note 8 restructuring the loan. Due to their
failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgaged properties
are valid. After 10 years, however, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of titles of the
properties sold

Issue:
Whether or not there is an ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note and how should it be
interpreted?

Ruling:
NO. Courts can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter. But, an examination of the
promissory note shows no such ambiguity even when petitioners insist that it does not convey
their true intent in executing the document. Besides, assuming that there is an ambiguity,
Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law states, ‘Where the language of the instrument is
ambiguous or there are omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Where an instrument containing the word "I promise to pay" is signed by two or more
persons, they are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon.