of the
acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the
n to follow Wong. Undue influence cannot stand as well
given that the contract was signed in the presence of
Justina’s close friend and maid, who could have testified
against it. Further, Justina’s consent was given freely
and voluntarily as shown by her recited in the Deed of
Conditional Option and emphatic avowal gratitude in the
lease contract that Wong saved her and her sister from
the fire that destroyed their house during the liberation
of Manila. All told, the lease contract stands to be valid.
However, despite validity of the lease contract, it also
gives the clue to a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition against transfer of land to aliens. Taken
singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily
illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an
insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an
alient for a reasonable period is valid. So is the option
giving an alien the right to buy the property on condition
that he is granted Philippine Citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease, but also an
option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this is to last for 50 years, is a virtual transfer
of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in
stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also
the right to dispose of it – rights the sum total of which
makes up ownership.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Contracts in question were ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Subject land ordered to be RETURNED to the estate of
Justina Santos.
Republic v. Quasha
Facts:
William R. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by
purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with the
permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave
Place, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of
Rizal. Quasha averred the acquisition of the real estate
aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through
its officials, claimed that upon expiration of the Parity
Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens
of the United States of America shall cease and be of no
further force and effect; that such claims necessarily
affect the rights and interest of the plaintiff, and that
continued uncertainty as to the status of plaintiff's
property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof,
and precludes further improvements being introduced
thereon, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a
declaration of his rights under the Parity Amendment,
said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties
during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues
notwithstanding the termination and effectivity of the
Amendment.
Then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on
his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q.
Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff
constituted private agricultural land and that the
Constitution of the Philippines, which prohibits the
transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos,
except by hereditary succession; and assuming, without
conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and
all rights by him so acquired "will expire ipso
facto  and ipso jure  at the end of the day on 3 July 1974,
if he continued to hold the property until then, and will
be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by the
Republic.
CFI of Rizal declared that acquisition by the plaintiff on
26 November 1954 of, the private agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not under or by virtue of the so-called Parity
Amendment to the Philippine Constitution respondent
Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private
residential land in Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, which is
concededly classified private agricultural land.
Held:
As originally drafted by the framers of the Constitution,
the privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved
to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them:
but the "Parity Amendment" expressly extended the
privilege to citizens of the United States of America
and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by
them.No other provision of our Constitution was referred
to by the "Parity Amendment"; not Section 2 of Article
XIII limiting the maximum area of public agricultural
lands that could be held by individuals or corporations or
associations; nor Section 5 restricting the transfer or
assignment of private agricultural lands to those
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
(which under the original Section 1 of Article XIII meant
Filipinos exclusively), save in cases of hereditary
succession.
As ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA
181, per Justice Enrique M. Fernando:
"'While good faith, no less than adherence to the
categorical wording of the Ordinance, requires that all
the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and
business enterprises owned and controlled by them be
respected, anything further would not be warranted.
Nothing less would suffice but anything more is not
justified.'"
The basis for the strict interpretation was given by
former President of the University of the Philippines,
Hon. Vicente G. Sinco (Congressional Record, House of
Representatives, Volume 1, No. 26, page 561):
"'It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of
our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights to
develop the natural resources and to operate the public
utilities of the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our
national integrity. The Filipino people decided to include
it in our Constitution in order that it may have the
stability and permanency that its importance requires. It
is written in our Constitution so that it may neither be
the subject of barter nor be impaired in the give and
take of politics. With our natural resources, our sources
of power and energy, our public lands, and our public
utilities, the material basis of the nation's existence, in
the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine
Government does not have complete control, the
Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their
patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no
longer belongs to them.'"
The true extent of the Parity Amendment, as understood
by its proponents in the Philippine Congress, was clearly
expressed by one of its advocates, Senator Lorenzo
Sumulong:
'It is a misconception  to believe that under this
amendment Americans will be able to acquire all kinds of
natural resources of this country, and even after the
expiration of 28 years their acquired rights cannot be
divested from them. If we read carefully the language of
thisamendment which is taken verbatim from the
provisions of the Bell Act, and, which in turn, is taken
also verbatim from certain sections of theConstitution,
you will find out that the equality of rights granted
under this amendment refers only to two subjects.
Firstly, it refers to exploitation of natural resources, and
secondly, it refers to the operation of public utilities .
Now, when it comes to exploitation of natural resources,
it must be pointed out here that under our Constitution
and under this amendment, only public agricultural land
may be acquired, may be bought, so that on the
supposition that we give way to this amendment and on
the further supposition that it is approved by our people,
let not the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds
of natural resources may be acquired by Americans
because under our Constitution forest lands cannot be
bought, mineral lands cannot be bought, because by
explicit provision of the Constitution they belong to the
State, they belong to our Government, they belong to
our people. That is why we call them rightly the
patrimony of our race. Even if the Americans should so
desire, they can have no further privilege than to ask for
a lease of concession of forest lands and mineral lands
because it is so commanded in the Constitution. And
under the Constitution, such a concession is given only
for a limited period. It can be extended only for 25
years, renewable for another 25. So that with respect to
mineral or forest lands, all they can do is to lease it for
25 years, and after the expiration of the original 25years
they will have to extend it, and I believe it can be
extended provided that it does not exceed 28 years
because this agreement is to be effected only as an
ordinance and for the express period of 28 years . So
that it is my humble belief that there is nothing to worry
about insofar as our forest and mineral lands are
concerned.
Now, coming to the operation of public utilities, as every
member of the Congress knows, it is also for a limited
period, under our Constitution, for a period not
exceeding 50 years. And since this amendment is
intended to endure only for 28 years, it is my humble
opinion that when Americans try to operate public
utilities they cannot take advantage of the maximum
provided in the Constitution but only the 28 years which
is expressly provided to be the life of this amendment.
There remains for us to consider the case of our public
agricultural lands. To be sure, they may be bought, and
if we pass this amendment, Americans may buy our
public agricultural lands, but the very same Constitution
applying even to Filipinos, provides that the sale of
public agricultural lands to a corporation can never
exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares. That is
to say, if an American corporation, and American
enterprise, should decide to invest its money in public
agricultural lands, it will be limited to the amount of
1,024 hectares, no more than 1,024 hectares' (Italics
supplied)."
Thus, whether from the Philippine or the American side,
the intention was to secure parity for United States
citizens only in two matters: (1) exploitation,
development and utilization of public lands, and other
natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the
operation of public utilities. That and nothing else.
Under the "Parity Amendment" to our Constitution,
citizens of the United States and corporations and
business enterprises owned or controlled by them can
not acquire and own, save in cases of hereditary
succession, private agricultural lands in the Philippines
and that all other rights acquired by them under said
Amendment will expire on 3 July 1974.
Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds, City of Manila
G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant,
vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA,
respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in
December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by
war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration
but was denied by the register of deed on ground that,
being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the
jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may
acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to
acquire residential lot that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is
applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the
Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited
to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. This means to say that, under the
provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to
acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in
the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions
made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per
se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public
Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted
aliens the right to acquire private only by way of
reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no
land" used in this section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise,
there being practically no private land which had not
been acquired by any of the means provided in said two
sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these
two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could
be transferred to aliens except "upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words,
aliens were granted the right to acquire private land
merely by way of reciprocity.
G.R. No. L-6776             May 21, 1955
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-
appellee,  associations.
vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal
refused to accept for record a deed of donation
executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy,
a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land,
in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-
4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the
unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”,
operating through three trustees all of Chinese
nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan,
of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the
Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the
latter and its trustees.
CFI upheld the action of the Rizal Register of
Deeds. Basis: sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of
land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after
the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the
Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in
question should not be admitted for admitted for
registration.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First
Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si TempDADAAle
has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the
acquisition of the land in question, for religious
purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of
the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious
associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether
incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of
other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in
the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches,
parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated,
shall hold the land in the name of three Trustees for the
use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates
the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution [Art.
III, Sec. 1(7)].
ISSUE: whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land
executed in favor of a religious organization whose
founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens
should be registered or not.
HELD:
The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine
Commission must be deemed repealed since the
Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible
therewith. In providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no
capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its
members are of foreign nationality. To permit religious
associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire
agricultural lands would be to drive the opening wedge
to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant.
TOPIC: Nationality of a corporation
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao,
Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission and the
Register of Deeds of Davao City, G.R. No. L-8451,
December 20,1957
Facts:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen
and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of
sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered
by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is
corporation sole organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Registry of Deeds
Davao (RD) required RCADI to submit affidavit declaring
that 60% of its members were Filipino Citizens. As the
RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of
the deed of sale, the matter was referred to the Land
Registration Commissioner (LRC) en consulta for
resolution. LRC hold that pursuant to provisions of
sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine
Constitution, RCADI is not qualified to acquire land in
the Philippines in the absence of proof that at leat 60%
of the capital, properties or assets of the RCADI is
actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. LRC also
denied the registration of the Deed of Sale in the
absence of proof of compliance with such requisite.
RCADI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for mandamus.
Issue:  
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the Philippines, or better still, the corporation
sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural
lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of
Article XIII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
RCADI is qualified.
While it is true and We have to concede that in the
profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the
supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the
exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the
faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and
direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities
resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the political
and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under
the laws of their country, are affected by that
relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman
Catholic Church in almost every country springs from
that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the
fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities
and receive orders from the Holy See do not give or
bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches.
Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired
by a sort of “radiation”. We have to realize that although
there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and
the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality
that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize
their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the
interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their
belief, but certainly they are separate and independent
from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different
laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely
independent on the others in the management and
ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory that
the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow
the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical
Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the
citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and
become members of that religious society, likewise
citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if
We consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or
national of any other country of the world. The same
thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship
of the corporation sole created under the laws of the
Philippines, which is not altered by the change of
citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said
corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of
the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every
Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it
exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the country where it is
located, is considered an entity or person with all the
rights and privileges granted to such artificial being
under the laws of that country, separate and distinct
from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy
See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the
latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their
rules and regulations.
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole,
unlike the ordinary corporations which are formed by no
less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one
persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a
unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the
corporation sole is only the administrator and not the
owner of the temporalities located in the territory
comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such
temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the
faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the
corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no
nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary
has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the
citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective
dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it
would seem obvious that when the specific provision of
the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner
(section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the
framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked
this particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the
facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove
it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be
that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino
capital was never intended to apply to corporations sole,
and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.
 
EPIFANIA SARSOSA VDA. DE BARSOBIA sine5istent and void from the "eginning, "ecause it was
andPACITA W. VALLAR acontract e5ecuted against the mandatory provision of
the1236 Constitution, which is an e5pression of pu"licpol
vs
icy to conserve lands for the &ilipinos!7ad this "een
VICTORIANO T. CUENCO,G.R. No. L-33048. Ap!" a suit "etween %pifania and ng ing $o,she could
#$, #%8&FACTS' have "een declared entitled to the litigatedland!
But the factual set-up has changed! The litigatedpropert
• y is now in the hands of a naturali'ed &ilipino! t isno
longer owned "y a dis+ualified vendee! 8espondent,as a
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (onthe
naturali'ed citi'en, was constitutionally +ualified toown
northern side) of two adjoining parcels
the su"ject property! There would "e no more
of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao,Sagay, Ca
pu"licpolicy to "e served in allowing petitioner %pifania t
miguin, Misamis riental (nowCamiguin province)!
orecover the land as it is already in the hands
• of a+ualified
person!/hile, strictly speaing, ng ing $o, privateres
The entire land was owned previously "y acertain pondent9s vendor, had no rights of ownership totransmi
#eocadia Balisado, who had sold it to thespouses t, it is liewise inescapa"le that petitioner %pifania had
$atricio Barso"ia (now deceased) and%pifania Sarsosa, slept on her rights for :4 years from 1234to 124:! By her
who were &ilipino citi'ens! long inaction or ine5cusa"le neglect, sheshould "e held
• "arred from asserting her claim to thelitigated property!
8espondent, therefore, must "e declared to "e therightful
%pifania who was then a widow, sold the land owner of the property!
incontroversy to a Chinese,
ng ing $o wholater too actual possession and enjo
yed thefruits of the property!

ng ing $o later litigated the property to*ictoriano Cu
enco, a naturali'ed &ilipino whoimmediately too
possession of the property!

%pifania later usurped the controverted propertywho

later sold one-half of the property to $acita*allar!

%pifania claimed that it was not her intention tosell the

property as it was only to evidence her inde"tedness to
ng ing $o!

Cuenco then filed a case for &orci"le %ntryagainst
%pifania "efore the MTC which was
later dismissed since the +uestion of possessioncould
not "e properly determined without firstsettling the issue
on ownership!

Cuenco later filed a case in the C& for recoveryof

possession and ownership of the said land!The C&
rendered a decision in favor of %pifaniaand *allar!

The C later reversed the .ecision

decreeinginstead that Cuenco was the owner of thelitiga
ted property!

ISSUE'

/ho is the rightful owner of the property0

CUENCO.(ELD'No p!)a*+ "and a"" +

*an/++d o on)+1+d *oa"!+n.

There should "e no +uestion that the sale of the

land in+uestion in 1234 "y %pifania to ng ing $o wa