ESTRADA vs OMBUDSMAN officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
This case is a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for:
1. The issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
the respondents Office of the Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office
(FIO) of the Ombudsman, NBI, and Atty. Levito Baligod, from conducting
further proceedings on criminal cases of Plunder filed against Sen.
Jinggoy Estrada until the present Petition has been resolved with
finality;
2. This Court’s declaration that petitioner Sen. Estrada was denied due
process of law, and that the Order of the Ombudsman dated 27 Mar
2014 and the proceedings in said criminal cases subsequent to and
affected by the issuance of the challenged order are void
LEGEND:
• Plunder Case 1 (PC-1): NBI Complaint of Plunder under RA 7080
• Plunder Case 2 (PC-2): FIO Complaint of Plunder under RA 7080 and
for violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019
• RA No. 7080: An Act Defining and Penalizing the Act of Plunder
• RA No. 3019: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
• RPOO: Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
• RRCP: Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
• ROC: Rules of Court
IMPORTANT LAWS / PROVISIONS:
1. RA No. 7080
• Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of
the State. (As amended by RA 7659, approved Dec. 13, 1993.)
2. RA No. 3019
• Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
3. Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
• Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be
conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before
 a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no
ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been
furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify
those which he intends to present against the respondent,
and these shall be made available for examination or copying
by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall
be made available for examination, copying, or
photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for
his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed,
does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day
period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts
and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The
parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the
investigating officer questions which may be asked to the
party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from
submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or
from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall
be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating
officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial. (3a)
• Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If
the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for
trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record
of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days
from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties
of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of
the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause
 exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the
respondent, or direct any other assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the
Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary
of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without
conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move
for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the
parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations
conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (4a)
4. Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
• Section 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional
Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:
(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official
reports, the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints.
(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating
officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The
complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days
after service of the counter-affidavits.
(c) If the respondents does not file a counter-affidavit, the
investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him,
if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the
respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.
(d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of
jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be
entertained. If respondents desires any matter in the
complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization
thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning
in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
(e) If the respondents cannot be served with the order
mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served,
does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed
submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the
record.
(f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their
supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case
which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on,
he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the
parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness
being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or
witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may
be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced
into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall
be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
(g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall forward the records of the case
together with his resolution to the designated authorities for
their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be
dismissed without the written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman in cases falling within the j
• Section 6. Notice to parties. – The parties shall be served with a copy
of the resolution as finally approved by the Ombudsman or by the
proper Deputy Ombudsman.
• Section 7. Motion for reconsideration –
(a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to
be filled within five (5) days from notice thereof with the
Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of
court in cases where information has already been filed in
court;
(b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in
Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the
resolution subject of the motion. (As amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, dated February 16, 2000)
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required
5. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
• Rule 112
Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required.
— Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.
Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary
investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of
a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (1a)
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days
from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has
already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of information.
pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this
Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be
conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor.
When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure
for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge
shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section.
When the investigation is conducted by the judge
himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in
section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or
city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy,
and the corresponding information is filed, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may
 issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an
examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching question and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice.
(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. — A warrant
of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under
detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the
municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph (b)
of this section, or if the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for an
offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then
proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. (6a)
• Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. —
(a) If filed with the prosecutor. — If the complaint is filed
directly with the prosecutor involving an offense
punishable by imprisonment of less four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure
outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed.
The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on
the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days
from its filing.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the
complaint or information is filed directly with the
Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
for an offense covered by this section, the procedure
in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within
ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge finds no probable cause after
personally evaluating the evidence, or after
personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching question and answers, he shall dismiss the
same. He may, however, require the submission of
additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice,
to determine further the existence of probable cause.
If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the
additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days
from its submission or expiration of said period,
dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused had already been arrested, and hold
him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that
there is no necessity for placing the accused under
custody, he may issue summons instead of a warrant
of arrest. (9a)
• Rule 113
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112. (5a)
• Rule 126
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. (3a)
FACTS:
The Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of complaint PC-1 and PC-
2 which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings be conducted
against herein petitioner. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit for both
cases. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints also
filed their respective counter affidavits.
On 20 Mar 2014, Sen. Estrada filed a Request to be Furnished with Copies of
Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses,
and Other Filings (Request) in PC-1. His request was made “pursuant to the
right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
1
Sec. 3(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
2
Sec. 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
3
Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Sec. 4 of Rule II of the Administrative Order No.
7 issued on 10 Apr 1990):
(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating
officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to
substantiate the complaints
complainant which he may not have been furnished’1 and to ‘have access to
the evidence on record.”2
In response, the Ombudsman issued the Order assailed herein. Said Order
refuted Estrada’s claim that he was entitled to be furnished all the filings of
his co-respondents under the provisions stated in his request3. From the
aforequoted provisions, it can be gleamed that what is required from the
Office is to furnish Estrada a copy of the Complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents; which the same complied with when it furnished
Estrada the foregoing documents attached to the Orders to File Counter-
Affidavit.
It is to be noted that no such provision under the Office’s Rules of Procedure
which entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties.
Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their
counter-affidavits and disputing evidence to the complainant and not the
other respondents. As such, the Ombudsman denied respondent’s motion.
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman directed that he be furnished a copy of the
Reply of complainant NBI as he is entitled thereto under the rules.
On 28 Mar 2014, the Ombudsman issued in a Joint Resolution which found
probable cause to indict Estrada and his co-respondents with 1 count of
plunder and 11 counts of violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. Estrada then filed
a motion for reconsideration, praying for the issuance of a new resolution
dismissing the charges against him. He also filed the present Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the 27 Mar 2014
Order.
(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant
may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.

ISSUES:
1. WON Sen. Estrada’s right to due process was violated when the
Ombudsman denied to furnish him a copy of the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents
2. WON Sen. Estrada has the right to cross-examine witnesses
3. WON Sen. Estrada’s Petition for Certiorari is premature
4. WON Sen. Estrada’s Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum
shopping
RULING:
WON SEN. ESTRADA’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN
THE OMBUDSMAN DENIED TO FURNISH HIM A COPY OF THE COUNTER-
AFFIDAVITS OF HIS CO-RESPONDENTS
NO, Sen. Estrada’s right to due process was not violated.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for
the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and
the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. 4 At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Sec 4(b) refers
to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of
the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents
are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse
of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of
the 27 Mar 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Requet.
4
This is clear from Sec. 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, “[a]fter such affidavits (of the complainant and his witnesses)
have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy
Although Sec 4(c), Rule II of RPOO provides that a respondent “shall have
access to the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in
relation to Sec 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
1. The term “Supporting witnesses” found in Sec 4(a) refers to the
witnesses of the complainant, not the co-respondents
2. The affidavits referred to in Sec 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The
provision in the immediately succeeding Sec 4(c) of the same rule
does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions
of Sec 4 (a and b) of the same Rule requiring the investigating officer
to furnish the respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting
documents” submitted by “the complaint or supporting witnesses.”
Thus, a respondent’s “access to evidence on record” in Sec 4(c) refers
to the affidavits and supporting documents of “the complainant or
supporting witnesses” in Sec 4(a) of the same Rule.
3. Sec 3(b) Rule 112 of RRCP provides that a respondent’s right to
examine refers only to “the evidence submitted by the
complainant”.
Thus, whether under Rule 112 RRCP or under Rule II of RPOO, there is no
requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents
should be furnished to a respondent.
Second. A different set of rules of procedure and standards apply in
administrative cases and criminal cases. Rule III of the RPOO applies in
administrative cases, while Rule II of the RPOO applies in Sen. Estrada’s
petition (which is classified as a criminal case). For both cases, the ROC apply
in a suppletory character or by analogy.
of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit,
within 10 days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavtis.”
Justice Velasco’s dissent lies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman vs
Reyes. In the said case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits
happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted
in Reyes’ dismissal from the service.
In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the
preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of determining whether an information should be
filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the
counter-affidavits of his co-correspondents during the pre-trial or even
during the trial.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
only for the determination of probable cause. It is not a part of the trial, and
it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence. Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.5
In the case at bar, there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s
involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported
by the evidence presented and the facts obtained therein.
WON SEN. ESTRADA HAS THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES AS
PART OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
NO, Sen. Estrada doesn’t have the right to cross-examine witnesses. It is a
fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no
right to cross-examine the witness which the complainant may present.
5
Preliminary investigation — an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the RTC has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well founded belief” as to the fact
Sec 3, Rule 122 of the ROC expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be
waived by the accused, the Court finds no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.
In addition, Sec 8 Rule 112 of the ROC provides that the record of the
preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the
RTC. This rule applies to the petitioner’s argument that the testimonies of
Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him since he was not granted
the opportunity of cross-examination. Said testimonies may not be admitted
byt the trial court if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And
even if the prosecution does present such testimonies, petitioner can always
object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility therof; or the
petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the
presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
Furthermore, admissions made by a person in a sworn statement are only
binding to him. Res inter alias acta lteri nocere non debet. The rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
Hence, the admissions of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents cannot prejudice
him.
of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence;
it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
The Court takes exception to Justice Brion’s assertion6. The Ang Tibay
guidelines for administrative cases cannot apply to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases because it would lead to absurd and
disastrous consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process,
which Ang Tibay described as the “fundamental and essential requirements
of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.”
These requirements are “fundamental and essential” because without
these, there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution. These are:
1. Right to hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof
2. The tribunal, before which the party presents his case, must consider
the evidence present
3. The decision should be supported by evidence
4. Evidence must be substantial7
5. Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing
6. The Court must act on its own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy
7. The Court should render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered
These guidelines were further clarified in GSIS vs CA. The requirement of an
impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called upon to
resolve a dispute may not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may
he review his decision on appeal. It affirms the non-applicability of the Ang
Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The
investigating officer, which is the role that the Office of the Ombudsman
plays in the investigation and prosecution of government personnel, will
never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary
6 7
“the due process standards that at the very least should be considered in the conduct fo
a preliminary investigation are those that this Court first articulated in Ang Tibay vs CIR”
investigation, after conducting its own fact-finding investigation, is to
determine probable cause for filing an information, and not to make a final
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts
are not clogged with weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to
spare a person from the travails of a needless prosecution. The
requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, apply only to the
law enforcement process leading to a trial, part of which is the procedures
undertaken under an executive function.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen Estrada in this
present case, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the
full exercise of the rights of an accused person. Probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner.
Preliminary investigation is not part of trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.
In short, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely
statutory rights, not constitutional due process rights. An investigation to
determine probable cause for the filing of an information does not initiate a
criminal action as to trigger into operation Sex 14(2), Art III of the
Constitution. It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that
initiates the criminal action.
The rights to due process in administrative cases are granted by the
Constitution; hence, these rights cannot be taken away by mere legislation.
On the other hand, the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a
statutory right, not part of the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by
legislation.
It means such a relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion
The application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is not limited to those with
pending preliminary investigations but even to those convicted by final
judgment and already serving their sentences.
WON SEN. ESTRADA’S PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS
PREMATURE
YES, Sen. Estrada’s petition for certiorari is premature.
The Court underscores Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did
not file any pleading, much less a motion for reconsideration, to the 27
March Order. Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file this petition for
certiorari before the Court. Sen. Estrada’s resort to a petition for certiorari
before this Court stands in stark contrast to his filing of his 7 April Motion
for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause. The
Court has reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion for
reconsideration8 is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Sen. Estrada failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition
falls under the exceptions9 to the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari.
The insistence of Justice Velasco that “this Court cannot neglect to
emphasize that, despite the variance in the quanta of evidence required, a
uniform observance of the singular concept of due process in indispensable
in all proceedings” cannot stand. The ruling in Ruivivar vs. Office of the
8
A motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent the opportunity to correct its
factual and legal errors.
9
As enumerated in Tan v. CA, 341 Phil. 570, 576-578 (1997), the exceptions are:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the Court a quo had no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
Ombudsman stated that “the law can no longer help one who had been
given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full advantage of
the proffered chance.” The ruling emphasizes that an exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Other than this legal significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries the
direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted the
opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity. If such
process was ignored, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process.
For a fuller appreciation of our above conclusion, we clarify that although
they are separate and distinct concepts, exhaustion of administrative
remedies and due process embody linked and related principles. The
“exhaustion” principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given
the opportunity to re-examine its findings and conclusions because of
an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court or
the tribunal’s ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of “due process,”
on the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a
party without giving him or her the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the
exhaustion principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or
tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the
litigating party against whom a ruling was made.
Sen. Estrada’s failure cannot in any way be construed as violation of due
process by the Ombudsman, much less of grave abuse of discretion. Sen.
Estrada has not filed any comment, and still chooses not to.
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial Court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved. (Citations omitted)

WON SEN. ESTRADA’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CONSTITUTES FORUM
SHOPPING
YES, Sen. Estrada’s petition constitutes forum shopping and as such, should
be summarily dismissed.
His claim that the finding of probable cause was the “sole issue” he raised
before the Ombudsman in his Motion for Reconsideration dated 7 April
2014 is obviously false.
The rule against forum shopping is not limited to the fulfillment of the
requisites of litis pendentia. To determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.
Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter
and for the same cause of action. The exception from the forum shopping
rule, however, is true only where a petition for certiorari is properly or
regularly invoked in the usual course; the exception does not apply when
the relief sought, through a petition for certiorari, is still pending with or has
as yet to be decided by the respondent court, tribunal or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial body.
The simultaneous remedies the petitioners sought could result in possible
conflicting rulings, or at the very least, to complicated situations. In every
case, our justice system suffers as this kind of sharp practice opens the
system to the possibility of manipulation; to uncertainties when conflict of
rulings arise; and at least to vexation for complications other than conflict
of rulings. What the rule on forum shopping addresses are the possibility
and the actuality of its harmful effects on our judicial system.
SUMMARY OF RULING:
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of
his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents. The right of the respondent is only “to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant,”
Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of
Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish
the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his
supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary
investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules
required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition
fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman.
A law can abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul with the
constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial
evidence for a decision against the respondent in the administrative case. In
preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required.
 ESTRADA vs OMBUDSMAN
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of RA 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
IMPORTANT PROVISIONS:
1. SEC. 4 (a)(1)
Cybercrime Offenses. - The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
a. Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data and systems:
1. Illegal Access. - The access to the whole or any part
of a computer system without right.
2. SEC. 4 (a)(3)
a. Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data and systems:
3. Data Interference. - The intentional or reckless
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
computer data, electronic document, or electronic
data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
3. SEC. 4 (a)(6)
Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
computer data and systems:
6. Cyber-squatting. - The acquisition of domain name over
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if
such a domain name is:
i. Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark
registered with the appropriate government agency at the time of the
domain name registration;
ii. Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than
the registrant, in case of a personal name; and
iii. Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
4. SEC. 4 (b)(3)
b. Computer-related Offenses:
3. Computer-related Identity Theft. – The international
acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or
deletion of identifying information belonging to another,
whatever natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if
no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall
be on (1) degree lower.
5. SEC. 4 (c)(1)
c. Content-related Offenses:
1. Cybersex.- The willful engagement, maintenance control,
or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of
a computer system, for favor or consideration.
6. SEC. 4 (c)(2)
c. Content-related Offenses:
2. Child Pornography. – the unlawful or prohibited acts
defined and punishable by RA No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer
system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in RA No. 9775.
7. SEC. 4 (c)(3)
c. Content-related Offenses:
3. Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The
transmission of commercial electronic communication with
the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the
recipient; or
 (ii) The primary intent of the communication is for
service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or
customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise
the source of electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message
8. SEC. 4 (c)(4)
4. Libel.- the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel is defined in
Art. 355 of the RPC, as amended, committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be
devised in the future
9. Art. 353
Definition of libel.— A libel is public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken
the memory of one who is dead.
10. Art. 354
Requirement of publicity.— Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another
in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
11. Art. 355
Libel means by writings or similar means— A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematograpic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.
12. SEC. 5
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an
offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any
of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person
who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
13. SEC. 6
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the RPC, as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by
the relevant provisions of this communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special
laws, as the case may be.
14. SEC. 7
 Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. – A prosecution under this Act shall
be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
15. SEC. 8
Sec. 8. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any of the punishable
acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least
P200,000 up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Sec. 4(a)(5) shall
be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not
more than P500,000 or both.
If punishable acts in Sec. 4(a) are committed against critical
infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or a fine of at least
P500,000 up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Sec. 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least P200,000 but not exceeding P1,000,000 or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as
enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the “Anti-Child Pornography
Act of 2009:” Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if
committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto
mayor or a fine of at least P50,000 but not exceeding P250,000 or
both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one degree lower
than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos P100,000 but not exceeding Five
hundred thousand pesos P500,000 or both.
16. SEC. 12
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement
authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record
by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated
with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination,
route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but
not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a
court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law
enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-
stated information.
17. SEC. 13
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic
data and subscriber information relating to communication services
provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum
period of 6 months from the date of the transaction. Content data
shall be similarly preserved for 6 months from the date of receipt of
the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for
another 6 months: Provided, That once computer data preserved,
transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a
 case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a
notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of
the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep
confidential the order and its compliance.
18. SEC. 14
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement
authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order
requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit
subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of
the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and
assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and
relevant for the purpose of investigation.
19. SEC. 15
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. —
Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law
enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers
and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct
interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage
medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data
storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the
accessed computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any
person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer
system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data
therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to
enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time
to complete the examination of the computer data storage medium
and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than
thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.
20. SEC. 17
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the
periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law
enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and
completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination.
21. SEC. 19
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. – When a
computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block
access to such computer data
22. SEC. 20
Sec. 20. Noncompliance.– Failure to comply with the provisions of
Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement
authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional its maximum period
or a fine of P100,000 or both, for each and every noncompliance with
an order issued by law enforcement authorities.
23. SEC. 24
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is
hereby created within 30 days from the effectivity of this Act, an
inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of
the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
 24. SEC. 26
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions– The CICC shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate
assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team
ISSUES:
1. WON Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is unconstitutional for failing
to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere
with the fundamental rights of the people
2. WON Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference suffers from overbreadth
in that it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect of these guaranteed
freedoms
3. WON Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting violates the equal
protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a
user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other
literary device
4. WON Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft violates the constitutional
rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and
transgress the freedom of the press

 unreasonable searches and seizures
5. WON Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex violates the freedom of expression
clause of the Constitution
6. WON Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography distinguishes between a
person who merely imagines child pornography and does it on pen
and paper, and a person who formulates such idea on his laptop


7. WON the prohibition of [Section 4(c)(3) on ] Unsolicited Commercial
Communications violates the freedom of expression

 WON SECTION 4(A)(1) ON ILLEGAL ACCESS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
8. WON Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, in connection with Arts. 353, 354, and
355, are unconstitutional for inferring “presumed malice”

 THAT INTERFERE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE
9. WON Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission
of Cybercrimes suffer from overbreadth, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on protected expression
10. WON Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher is valid for
imposing a higher degree of penalty


11. WON Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175 is violative of the prohibition against
double jeopardy


12. WON the fixing of penalties in Section 8 on Penalties is within the
powers of the legislative
13. WON Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data is violative
of the right of every individual to privacy
14. WON Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data constitutes an
undue deprivation of the right to property
15. WON Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data is unconstitutional
for envisioning a process that is similar to the issuance of subpoenas,
which is an exclusive judicial function
16. WON Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer
Data supplant established search and seizure procedures
17. WON Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data the destruction of
computer data subject of previous preservation or examination
violates the user’s right against deprivation of property without due
process of law
18. WON Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data
stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against
19. WON Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice is a bill of attainder


20. WON Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) and Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions
constitutes an invalid delegation of power
RULING:
FAILING TO MEET THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD REQUIRED OF LAWS
NO, Sec. 4(a)(1) is valid and constitutional.
The Court uses the strict scrutiny standard in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed constitutional. The burden
is to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. It
is also used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection.
There is nothing in the said provision that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act. As for the alleged legal risk
to ethical hackers, the Court stated that they are not covered by the
provision because ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent
auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.
Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client,
such permission would insulate him from the coverage of this provision.
WON SECTION 4(A)(3) ON DATA INTERFERENCE SUFFERS FROM
OVERBREADTH IN THAT IT INTRUDES INTO THE AREA OF PROTECTED
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, CREATING A CHILLING AND DETERRENT
EFFECT OF THESE GUARANTEED FREEDOMS
NO, Sec. 4(a)(3) does not suffer from overbreadth.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means
that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms. But the said provision does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what is a form of vandalism. Such act has
no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling
effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs
on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of
what is proper. But to prevent the state from legislating criminal laws
because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in
addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling effect
is merely an illusion because the provision clearly describes the evil it seeks
to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s
constitutional rights. Petitioners also failed to discharge their burden of
proving that under no set of circumstance with the said provision be valid.
WON SECTION 4(A)(6) ON CYBER-SQUATTING VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THAT, NOT BEING NARROWLY TAILORED, IT WILL
CAUSE A USER USING HIS REAL NAME TO SUFFER THE SAME FATE AS
THOSE WHO USE ALIASES OR TAKE THE NAME OF ANOTHER IN SATIRE,
PARODY, OR ANY OTHER LITERARY DEVICE
NO, Sec.4(a)(6) does not violate the equal protection clause.
The law is reasonable in that it penalizes a person who acquires a domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others
who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
The allegations of the petitioners that the law does not recognize the
substantial difference between a person who registers a particular name
because it is his pseudonym, and a person who registers same name
because it is his real name, does not stand. Hence, the constitutional
challenge on this provision is baseless.
WON SECTION 4(B)(3) ON IDENTITY THEFT VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO PRIVACY AND
CORRESPONDENCE, AND TRANSGRESS THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

NO, Sec. 4(b)(3) does not violate constitutional rights to due process and
privacy and correspondence, nor does it transgress the freedom of the
press.

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the
1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right to privacy exists
independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as
the zones of privacy10. Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is
the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.
A Court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion.
The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information
without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show
how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of
law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth
doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not
intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. As for the identity theft that
will allegedly hinder journalists from accessing the unrestricted user account
of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be
punished. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for
an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information
made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
10
Are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
WON SECTION 4(C)(1) ON CYBERSEX VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
NO, Sec 4(c)(1) does not violate the freedom of expression clause of the
Constitution.
The fear of the petitioners that private communications of sexual character
between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done
”for favour” in cyberspace. In common usage, the term “favour” embraces
socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement
agenciet into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
However, the deliberations f the Bicameral Committee of Congress show a
lack of intent to penalize a “private showing x x x between and among two
private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some.”
The element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to constitute the illegal
cybersex. The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave
trade, and pornography for favour and consideration. This includes
interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e. by webcam.
The subject of the provision is not novel. Art. 201 of the RPC and the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 punishes similar actions. The case of
Nogales vs People shows the extent to which the State can regulate
materials that serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence,
lust, or pornography. he Court weighed the property rights of individuals
against the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic
materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts
privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to
be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and
the exploitation of women.
 WON SECTION 4(C)(2) ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY DISTINGUISHES
BETWEEN A PERSON WHO MERELY IMAGINES CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
AND DOES IT ON PEN AND PAPER, AND A PERSON WHO FORMULATES
SUCH IDEA ON HIS LAPTOP

 to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
NO, Sec 4(c)(2) remains unconstitutional.
The provision merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009 to cover identical activities in cyberspace. n theory, nothing
prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting
persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually,
ACPA’s definition of child pornography already embraces the use of
“electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means.”
Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime
is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or
duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for
such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a
particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.
WON THE PROHIBITION OF [SECTION 4(C)(3) ON ] UNSOLICITED
COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION

 libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of
YES, Sec. 4(c)(3) violates the freedom of expression and as such, must be
struck down for being unconstitutional.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications, also known as “spam.” The term “spam” surfaced in early
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games.
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that
unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers,
reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the
owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts
recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded
the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
WON SECTION 4(C)(4) ON LIBEL, IN CONNECTION WITH ARTS. 353, 354,
AND 355, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR INFERRING “PRESUMED
MALICE”


Sec. 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as valid and constitutional with
respect to the original author of the post;but void and unconstitutional with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the
“presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it
with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for
conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the
accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code
infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
They also contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring “actual malice”
could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even
where the offended parties happened to be public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40crallawlibrary
There is “actual malice” or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the
defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless disregard standard
used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual
malice.43crallawlibrary
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice
in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense
of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false,
is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure.
Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement where
the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance
of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. The law
identifies not only the presence of malice in law (the article being malicious
in itself) but also malice in fact.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need
not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence
(malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For
his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime
Prevention Act violate the country’s obligations under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis
v. Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation
laws should include the defense of truth
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory
statement should constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens,
Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the
accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and
for justifiable ends.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a
crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made
against Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge of their official duties.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners
urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be
crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression.
Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be
necessary and as may be provided by law.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print. The internet is
characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes, writing style.
WON SECTION 5 ON AIDING OR ABETTING AND ATTEMPT IN THE
COMMISSION OF CYBERCRIMES SUFFER FROM OVERBREADTH, CREATING
A CHILLING AND DETERRENT EFFECT ON PROTECTED EXPRESSION
Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission
of cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section
4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section
4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related
Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally
liable any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts
to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in
existing laws. When a person aids or abets another his action is essentially
physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.
These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common
sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the
line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of “aiding or abetting”
wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged
dogmas of cyberspace use.
Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for
example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.
The question is: are online postings such as “Liking” an openly defamatory
statement, “Commenting” on it, or “Sharing” it with others, to be regarded
as “aiding or abetting?” In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the
office bulletin board a small poster that says, “Armand is a thief!,” he could
certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, “I
like this!,” that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If
Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, “Correct!,” would
that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on
the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting
libel in the physical world is a crime.
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who
pressed Like, Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of
readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original
posting.
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a
square peg in a round hole when applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the
legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique
circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on
the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech for being overbroad. The
U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled: The vagueness of such a regulation
raises concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. The
severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent
rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.
Xxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents
a great threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute’s
scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason
for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on
protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more
carefully drafted statute.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one
click of the mouse. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with
cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking
from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which
seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to
protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that
will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected
freedoms.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement
officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.63 The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through
cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence, Section 5 of the
cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel on the cyberspace is
a nullity.
When a penal statue encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial
challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,65 “we must view these statements
of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines
are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free
speech.”
In an “as applied” challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his
constitutional right can raise any constitutional ground - absence of due
process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if
he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of
third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a
“facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no
violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free
speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale
for this exception is to counter the “chilling effect” on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged
of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
Of course, if the “comment” does not merely react to the original posting
but creates an altogether new defamatory story then that should be
considered an original posting published on the internet.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious
chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel
are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under
Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices,
Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of
these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
 WON SECTION 6 ON THE PENALTY OF ONE DEGREE HIGHER DEFINES A
CRIME IS VALID FOR IMPOSING A HIGHER DEGREE OF PENALTY

 fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
YES, Sec. 6 is a valid and constitutional provision.
Sec. 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a
qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a
substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology and similar crimes committed
using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often
evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
cybercrimes.
WON SECTION 7 ON THE PROSECUTION UNDER BOTH THE REVISED
PENAL CODE (RPC) AND R.A. 10175 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

 merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in
The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of
Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy;
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
these, is void and unconstitutional.
 at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled
doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted and penalized
simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code.
When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does
not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from the same
element of the other. With the exception of the crimes of online libel and
online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination
of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially
the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the
OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime
but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging
the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2)
cyberspace. Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and
ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
WON THE FIXING OF PENALTIES IN SECTION 8 ON PENALTIES IS WITHIN
THE POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
YES, the manner of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a ruke
a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe
penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine
penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because
offense or might just have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to
modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the law-making body.
 WON SECTION 12 ON REAL-TIME COLLECTION OF TRAFFIC DATA IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL TO PRIVACY
YES, Sec. 12 is violative of the constitution in so far as it authorizes the
collection or recording of traffic data in real time.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to
collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or
provide opportunities for official abuse. Petitioners invoke the right of every
individual to privacy and to be protected from government snooping into
the messages or information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental
purpose since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally
considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has
a rational relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling
State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly drawn.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime
law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in
cyberspace for public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that
the government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability
to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
There are many ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks.
Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data collection or recording and a
subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can
succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Sec. 12 are too broad
and do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and
invading the people’s right to privacy. In Morfe vs Mutuc, the Court
recognized that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create
zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that
there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be
left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe, the United States
Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and
informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence
in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to
the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—
the right to informational privacy—that those who oppose government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private
information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and
intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to
privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test,
where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation
of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his
or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable.
Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general
public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right
to it would have no basis in fact. Transmitting communications is akin to
putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and
sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no
expectations that no one will read the information appearing outside the
envelope. The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at
times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses
(residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded
internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer
system to another where their contents are pieced back together. Section
12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of
the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers
one dials should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate
or exchange data with one another over cyberspace except through some
service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are
needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this
data takes them out of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy
in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize
as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when
seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together,
and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to
create profiles of the persons under surveillance. Such information is likely
beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within
matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the procedure that Section
12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual
rights?
Petitioners point out that the phrase “due cause” has no precedent in law
or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the
discretion of the police.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory
construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to
hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase “due cause.” The Solicitor
General suggests that “due cause” should mean “just reason or motive” and
“adherence to a lawful procedure.” But the Court cannot draw this meaning
since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the
probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, “with due cause,”
thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general
search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too
sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should
not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion.
Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these
data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver
and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to
leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in
these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those “associated
with specified communications.” But this supposed limitation is no
limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that
would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently
threatens the right of individuals to privacy.
But warrantless search is associated with a police officer’s determination of
probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is no
opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately
carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These
preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
Bare assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the
provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to
track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources
and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. These
doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only
to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor
punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
WON SECTION 13 ON PRESERVATION OF COMPUTER DATA CONSTITUTES
AN UNDUE DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY

NO, Sec. 13 does not constitute an undue deprivation of the right to
property.
Petitioners’ claim that there is an undue deprivation of the right to property
is based on their belief that the data preservation order that law
enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users
from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
The contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to
their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation
to indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit
of users. The data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the
issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly
hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
WON SECTION 14 ON DISCLOSURE OF COMPUTER DATA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENVISIONING A PROCESS THAT IS SIMILAR TO
THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS, WHICH IS AN EXCLUSIVE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION
NO, the constitutional challenge to Sec. 14 is unmeritorious.
The process envisioned in Sec. 14 is being likened to the issuance of a
subpoena. Petitioner’s objection is that the issuance of subpoenas is a
judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is
not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to
issue subpoena to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory
power.
What Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable
them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for
disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it
violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
WON SECTION 15 ON SEARCH, SEIZURE AND EXAMINATION OF
COMPUTER DATA SUPPLANT ESTABLISHED SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PROCEDURES
No, Sec. 15 does not supplant established search and seizure procedures
and as such, remains valid and constitutional.
On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by
virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat
on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely
supplements them.
WON SECTION 17 ON DESTRUCTION OF COMPUTER DATA THE
DESTRUCTION OF COMPUTER DATA SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS
PRESERVATION OR EXAMINATION VIOLATES THE USER’S RIGHT AGAINST
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
NO, Sec. 17 is constitutional and valid in that as already stated, it is unclear
that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have
that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he
wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when
he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service
provider for a copy before it is deleted.
WON SECTION 19 ON RESTRICTING OR BLOCKING ACCESS TO COMPUTER
DATA STIFLES FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND VIOLATES THE RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
YES, Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data which stifles freedom of expression and
violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including
malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video
recordings. It is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by
their writers or authors may constitute personal property. Consequently,
they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while
stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be
secure in one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further,
it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect,
seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition
without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case,
Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over
cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may,
within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal.
But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected
without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion
that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge,
jury, and executioner all rolled into one.100crallawlibrary
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also
disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of
restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on
one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine,
the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger
rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be
found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking
Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation
to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three
tests mentioned above.
WON SECTION 20 ON OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE IS A BILL OF
ATTAINDER


NO, Sec. 20 is not a bill of attainder and thus, remains valid and
constitutional.
Petitioners challenge Sec. 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The
argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding
of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be
reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of PD 1829,
Sec. 20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined
therein. If Congress had intended for Sec. 20 to constitute an offense in and
of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or
provision.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done
“knowingly or wilfully.” There must still be a judicial determination of guilt.
WON SECTION 24 ON CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING
CENTER (CICC) AND SECTION 26(A) ON CICC’S POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
CONSTITUTES AN INVALID DELEGATION OF POWER
NO, both sections are valid and constitutional.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power
when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC)
the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative
power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when
it directed the CIC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies
that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s
assets. This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been
considered as sufficient standard. Hence, Secs. 24 and 26(a) are likewise
valid.
PESTILOS vs GENEROSO
The case at bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC
challenging the decision date 21 January 2008 and the resolution dater 17
April 2008 of the Court of Appeals.
The appealed decision affirmed the order of the RTC denying Joey Pestilos
et. Al’s Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
IMPORTANT RULE:
Sec. 5(b), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word “probable cause” as the basis
of the arresting officer’s determination on whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
As presently worded, said rule provides: When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have objectified the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the:
1. Commission of the crime; and
2. Whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based
on mere suspicion or hearsay.
The existence of “probable cause” is now the “objectifier” or the
determination on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and
circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there
was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause
existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to “reasonable cause” and
“reasonable grounds.”
The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the
determinant of reasonableness. Probable cause involves probabilities
similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which
reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
particular offense involved.
Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as
personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information
supplied by a waitress or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances,
the arresting officer need not verify such information.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. Belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he
was prosecuted.
Probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Thus, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must not be satisfied that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilt thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review
in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under
Sec. 5(b), Rule 113 of the RRCP is based on his personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. It is the existence
of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable man,
they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules,
upon which they must determine probable cause.
The arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must
base their determination on the evidence submitted by the parties.
The arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence
or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time
frame.

In Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining
probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect
too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the
subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to
make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent
the escape of the criminal.
In People vs Del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense
has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of
the arrest.
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court’s appreciation of the
elements that “the offense has just been committed” and “personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it” depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of “personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances” under Sec. 5(b), Rule 113 of the RRCP requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts, or in the alternative, circumstances. Circumstances
may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. He
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of
probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
The required element of immediacy within which these facts or
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers have gathered the fact or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the
police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on
facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
As the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the
pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, the police officer’s determination of probable cause would necessarily
be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as
they were within a very limited period of time.
We hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1)
the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer’s
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies
the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest of for purposes of compliance
with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
The questions to be resolved are the following: 1) has the crime just been
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that
the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners’ arrest, would
a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
FACTS:
An altercation ensued between petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The
latter called the Central Police District, to report the incident. The police
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. The victim then
pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station
for investigation.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso
fortunately survived the attack. Petititoners were indicted for attempted
murder allegedly committed.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on
the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no
valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed
that they were just “invited” to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the ROC.
On 16 March 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners’ Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court’s ruling before the CA on Rule 65
petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.
The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless
arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for a consequence. The CA
saw no merit in the petitioners’ argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly
state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16,
Sec 3 of the RRC. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the
grounds for the denial of the motion.
ISSUES:
1. WON the warrantless arrest is not valid
2. WON petitioners were unlawfully arrested
3. WON the RTC’s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued
RULING:
WON THE WARRANTLESS ARREST IS NOT VALID
NO, the warrantless arrest is valid.
From a review of the records, the Court concludes that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had
properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against
the petitioners. The Court notes, however, that the determination of the
facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on
the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
The fact and circumstances show that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, the Court deems it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners’ warrantless arrests. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers’ personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is
incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied
with the requirements set under Sec. S (b), Rule 113 of the RRC Procedure,
specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer’s personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms
of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in the case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
crime. prolog the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.
Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC’s order as it correctly stated the
WON PETITIONERS WERE UNLAWFULLY ARRESTED reason for its denial of the petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.
NO, the arrest was lawful.

This issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person in

custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint
or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be
an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the
intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.

In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative

if the petitioners had exhibited resistance. The arrest of the petitioners as
the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but
was in connection with a particular offense.
WON THE RTC’S ORDER DENYING THE URGENT MOTION FOR REGULAR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PROPERLY
ISSUED

NO, the RTC Order does not exhibit any taint of impropriety or grave abuse
of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required
to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the
case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the

decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
 PEOPLE vs SALANGUIT
This is an an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding the accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit guilty of violation of RA No. 6425.
On 26 Dec 1995, the accused possessed and/or use 11.14 grams of
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) – a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
On the same day, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess
or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,245
grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
IMPORTANT LAW:
Rule 126 of the RRCP
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein
to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
FACTS:
On 26 Dec 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC to search
the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer. The sale took
place in accused-appellant’s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken
by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Español.
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but nobody
opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. A
receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused
to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant
with them to Quezon City along with the items they had seized.
ISSUES:
1. WON the shabu allegedly recovered from the accused’s residence is
inadmissible as evidence because it was obtained using an invalid
warrant
2. WON the marijuana obtained is admissible as evidence pursuant to
the “plain view” doctrine
3. WON the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant
RULING:
WON THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM THE ACCUSED’S
RESIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED
USING AN INVALID WARRANT
NO, t
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of
the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1)
that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that
the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3)
that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause —Accused-appellant contends, however, that
the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented
showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have
been ordered to be seized by the trial court.
The contention has no merit. The intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-
buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant
on anything about drug paraphernalia.
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only
if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the
search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause
as to its existence.
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow
that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure
of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be
condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles.
Specificity of the Offense Charged— Accused-appellant contends that the
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession
or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated"
drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1)
search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Particularity of the Place— Accused-appellant contends that the search
warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
The warrant of arrest contained several documents which identified the
premise to be searched. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-
appellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the
judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
WON THE MARIJUANA OBTAINED IS ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
PURSUANT TO THE “PLAIN VIEW” DOCTRINE
Seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine to
apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence— Once the valid portion
of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no
longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently found.
A prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for
possession of shabu. A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the
person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.
Permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a
weapon to comment violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and
destroy it.
Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in
order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house,
especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that
the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the
agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These
circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house,
founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so.

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence— There was no apparent illegality to

justify their seizure.

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the

process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that
the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance
with the “plain view doctrine,” we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug
must be upheld.

WON THE EMPLOYMENT OF UNNECESSARY FORCE BY THE POLICE IN THE

EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT

Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed

by the searching party in effecting the raid.

Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of

his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is
unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn
statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors,
has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
 PEOPLE vs COMPRADO
This is an appeal from the decision fo the CA which affirmed the decision of
the RTC finding Renante Comprado guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sec.11, Art. II of RA No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The RTC ruled that mere possession of the illegal substance already
consummated the crime and good faith was not even a defense.

In its decision, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined

that accused-appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he
raised no objection as to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
The eized items are admissible in evidence because the search and seizure
of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a moving vehicle.
While it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no
representatives from the media and other personalities required by law
were present during the operation and during the taking of the inventory,
noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and
would not render inadmissible accused-appellant's arrest or the items
seized from him because the prosecution was able to show that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved.

ISSUES:
1. WON the accused-appellant’s arrest was valid
2. WON the seized items are admissible in evidence
3. WON the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged