RULE 112

Preliminary Investigation

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing
of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. (1a)

Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. —

The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

Section 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no
ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to
specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination
or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or
photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents,
the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied
upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph
(a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to
file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)
day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness.
The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however,
submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from
the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (3a)

Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct
any other assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the
parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman. (4a)

Section 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10) days after the preliminary
investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to
the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action,
together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused
and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the
order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy,
as the case may be, shall review the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence of probable cause. Their
ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based and the parties shall be furnished
with copies thereof. They shall order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against
him. (5a)

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the
prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge
shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he
shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and recommendations are affirmed by the
provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a
warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. — A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under
detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or
if the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only.
The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. (6a)

Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace office directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)

Section 8. Records. — (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. — An information or complaint filed in
court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.

(b) Record of preliminary investigation. — The record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge
or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any
party, may order the production of the record or any its part when necessary in the resolution of the case or any
incident therein, or when it is to be introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party. (8a)

Section 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. —

(a) If filed with the prosecutor. — If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable
by imprisonment of less four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this
Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial
Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule
shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable
cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He may,
however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine further the
existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall,
within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold
him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he
may issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest. (9a)

CARIAGA VS SAPIGAO June 28, 2017

G.R. No. 223844

DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA, Petitioner

vs.
EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated June 17, 20152 and March 17, 20163 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140206 dismissing petitioner Danilo Calivo Cariaga's (Cariaga) petition for
review4 before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint Affidavit 5 filed by Cariaga before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(OPP) - Urdaneta City, Pangasinan accusing respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta
(Acosta; collectively, respondents) of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and
Slander by Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the
said complaint, Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and
Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the barangay blotter, i.e.,
(a) Entry No. 000546 dated August 3, 20127 stating that an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a gun
inside Cariaga's compound, and that when Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the gunfire came from
inside the compound and was directed towards the adjacent ricefields; and (b) Entry No. 000578 dated September
26, 2012 stating that a concerned but unnamed resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions
attended the funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their
waists (blotter entries). According to Cariaga, the police authorities used the blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the
search and seizure operation made inside his residence and cattle farm on December 18, 2012. While such
operation resulted in the confiscation of a firearm and several ammunitions, the criminal case for illegal possession
of firearms consequently filed against him was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City. 9 Claiming
that the statements in the blotter entries were completely false and were made to dishonor and discredit him,
Cariaga filed the said complaint, docketed as NPS-I-Ole-INV-14B-00084. 10

In his defense, 11 Sapigao denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the blotter entries were true, as he
personally witnessed their details. In this regard, he presented the Joint Affidavit 12 executed by
Barangay Kagawads Elpidio Cariaga, Metrinio Dela Cruz, Greg Turalba, and Ex-Barangay Kagawad Jaime Aguida
attesting that: (a) during the funeral march of Calivo, Sr., they observed that Cariaga and his employees had
handguns tucked into their waists; and (b) the firing of guns was a common occurrence in Cariaga's farm. 13 For her
part, 14 Acosta averred that she was merely performing her duties as Barangay Secretary when she certified as true
copies the photocopies of the aforesaid blotter entries requested by the police authorities. 15

The OPP's Ruling

In a Resolution 16 dated April 10, 2014, the OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found that the
questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith and merely for recording purposes; done in the performance of
respondents' official duties; and based on personal knowledge of what actually transpired. In this relation, the OPP
pointed out that Cariaga's complaint and supporting affidavits, which mainly consist of a general and blanket denial
of the incidents described in the blotter entries, could not prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of
Sapigao and his witnesses. 17

Cariaga moved for reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in a Resolution19 dated July 28, 2014. Aggrieved,
he filed a petition for review20 before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) - Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan.21

The ORSP's Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated January 5, 2015, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's ruling. The ORSP found that absent any
showing of ill-motive on respondents' part in making the blotter entries, there can be no basis to charge them of
Falsification of Private Documents. This is especially so as the statements therein were supported by testimonies of
several witnesses, and there is colorable truth to the same, since the search conducted by the police authorities in
Cariaga's home and cattle farm resulted in the seizure of a firearm and several ammunitions and the eventual filing
of a criminal case against Cariaga for illegal possession of firearms. 23 Further, the ORSP ruled that the blotter
entries were not intended to malign, dishonor, nor defame Cariaga; as such, respondents could not be said to have
committed the crime of Slander by Deed.24 Finally, the ORSP pointed out that Acosta's mere authentication of the
photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated to issuing a false certification so as to indict her of such
crime.25 Undaunted, Cariaga moved for reconsideration, 26 but the same was denied in a Resolution27 dated March
14, 2015. Thus, he filed a petition for review28 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 140206.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution29 dated June 17, 2015, the CA dismissed Cariaga's petition before it.1âwphi1 It held that the ORSP is
not the final authority in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service, as one could still appeal an unfavorable
ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As such, Cariaga's direct and immediate recourse to the CA to assail
the ORSP ruling without first filing a petition for review before the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Thus, the dismissal of Cariaga's petition for review is warranted. 30

Unperturbed, Cariaga filed a motion for reconsideration,31 but it was denied in a Resolution32 dated March 1 7, 2016;
hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before
it on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies.

The Court's Ruling

The petition must be denied.

I.

To recapitulate, Cariaga's petition for review before the CA was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as he did not elevate the adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial
remedies.

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70 33 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions
of, inter alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a
verified petition for review before the SOJ. 34 However, this procedure was immediately amended by the DOJ's
Department Circular No. 70-A35 dated July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors
to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases," pertinent portions of which read:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain

Cases

In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by Department Circular No. 70
dated July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of
Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with
the Regional State Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance
with the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.

The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his
power of supervision and control over the entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest of
justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned above, Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to
rule with finality cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it,
provided that: (a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should
it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only violations of
city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years, irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties attached thereto. 36 This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the
ORSP ruling should the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing
amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, i.e., Department Circular No. 018-1437 dated
June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases," pertinent portions of
which read:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14

SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases

In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws with the objective of
institutionalizing the Department's Zero Backlog Program on appealed cases, the following
guidelines shall be observed and implemented in the resolution of appealed cases on Petition for
Review and Motions for Reconsideration:

1. Consistent with Department Circular No. 70-A, all appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City
Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital Region, in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, shall be by way of a petition
for review to the concerned province or city. The Regional Prosecutor shall resolve the petition for
review with finality, in accordance with the rules prescribed in pertinent rules and circulars of this
Department. Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the power of control
and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the
resolutions of the Regional Prosecutor in these appealed cases.

2. Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital
Region, in all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of Secretary of
Justice.

3. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in cases
cognizable by Metropolitan Trial Courts shall be by way of a petition for review to the Prosecutor
General who shall decide the same with finality. Provided, however that the Secretary of Justice
may, pursuant to the power of control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service,
review, modify or reverse, the resolutions of the Prosecutor General in these appealed cases.
 4. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in all other cases
shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of the Secretary.

xxxx

This Circular supersedes all inconsistent issuances, takes effect on 01 July 2014 and shall remain in
force until further orders.

For guidance and compliance.

A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints
subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the complaint was
filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original jurisdiction over the
case, i.e., whether or not it is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:

(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling
shall be with finality;

(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be
with finality;

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling
of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose
ruling shall be with finality;

(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the
ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling
shall be with finality;

(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c ), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control
and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of
the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.

In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR) accusing
respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed,
defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the RPC. Of the crimes charged, only False Certification
and Slander by Deed are cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, 38 while Falsification of Public Documents is
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts. 39 Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling
of the ORSP as regards Falsification of Public Documents may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to the
courts may be availed of. On the other hand, the ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and Slander by
Deed should already be deemed final - at least insofar as the NPS is concerned - and thus, may already be elevated
to the courts.

Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of Public Documents may be
referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may
already be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as
the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates
that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits.1âwphi1 "However, when there is already
enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had - as in this case - the Court may dispense with
the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to
better serve the ends of justice."40 In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution
on the merits - the Court finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.

II.
In the recent case of Hilbero v. Morales, Jr., 41 the Court reiterated the guiding principles in determining whether or
not the courts may overturn the findings of the public prosecutor in a preliminary investigation proceedings on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his/her functions, viz. :

A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause- that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court - is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is
fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. To note, the underlying principle behind the courts' power to review a public
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible
bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a
constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system of
government. xxx

xxxx

In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutor's resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable
cause.1âwphi1 In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pear/bank Securities, Inc. [(582 Phil.
505, 591 [2008])]: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined
is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. 42 (Emphases in
the original.)

In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the ORSP correctly ruled that there is no probable
cause to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and False Certification. As aptly found by the ORSP,
there was no improper motive on the part of respondents in making the blotter entries as they were made in good
faith; in the performance of their official duties as barangay officials; and without any intention to malign, dishonor, or
defame Cariaga. Moreover, the statements contained in the blotter entries were confirmed by disinterested parties
who likewise witnessed the incidents recorded therein. On the other hand, Cariaga's insistence that the blotter
entries were completely false essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in law. 43 Thus,
respondents cannot be said to have committed the crime of Slander by Deed.

Furthermore, suffice it to say that the mere act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated
to committing the crime of False Certification under the law. In sum, the ORSP correctly found no probable cause to
indict respondents of the said crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
UY VS SB

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 105965-70 August 9, 1999

GEORGE UY, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of
the Special Prosecutor, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner's motion to quash the six (6) informations charging him with violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, and to permanently enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the criminal cases insofar as petitioner is
involved.

At times material hereto, petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was designated by his
immediate supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership, to act on the
latter's behalf, during his absence, on matters relating to the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This
included the authority to sign disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the
Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documents and one (1) information for
violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and
nineteen (19) co-accused, namely: (Ret.) Bgen. Mario S. Espina (then Assistant Secretary for Installations and
Logistics, Department of National Defense), (Ret.) Rear Admiral Simeon M. Alejandro (then Flag Officer in
Command, Philippine Navy), CDR Rodolfo Guanzon, CDR Erlindo A. Erolin, CAPT. Manual Ison (then Commander
of the Naval Supply Center, Philippine Navy), CAPT. Andres Andres, LCDR Gilmer B. Batestil, LCDR Jose Alberto I.
Velasco, Jr., LTSG Edgar L. Abogado, LT. Teddy O. Pan, LT. Ronald O. Sison, Reynaldo Paderna (Chief
Accountant), Antonio Guda (Supply Accountable Officer, Fort San Felipe, Cavite, Philippine Navy), Loida T. Del
Rosario (Typist), Marissa Bantigue (owner of MAR GEN Enterprise), Avelina Avila (owner of Avelina Avila General
Merchandise), Jenis B. Bantigue (owner of JAB GEN Merchandise), Maria M. Capule (owner of MM Capule
Enterprise) and Andrea C. Antonio (owner of AC Antonio Enterprise).

On September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 2 directing a comprehensive re-investigation of the
cases against all the twenty (20) accused.

After conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order3 dated November 14, 1991
recommending that the informations for estafa through falsification of official documents be withdrawn and in lieu
thereof, informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, be filed against eleven (11)
accused,4 which included the petitioner.

In a Memorandum5 dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto reduced the number of those to
be charged under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to five (5),6 including petitioner.

Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the Special Prosecutor issued
an Order7 dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more names8 from the five (5) officers recommended for
prosecution, and recommending that six (6) separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, as
amended, be filed against the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in
the Purchase Order numbers involved and the Payees,9 the six (6) amended informations10 filed by Special
Prosecutor Officer III Roger C. Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations, viz:

That on or about November 1985, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, CDR. Rodolfo Guanzon, being then the
Procurement Officer, Philippine Navy, LCDR. George Uy, being then the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
Comptrollership, Philippine Navy and Lt. Teddy O. Pan, being then the Naval Group Inspector, Philippine Navy, all
public officials, and committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to the Government, and in
the exercise of their separate official functions, to wit: accused Guanzon initiated/prepared the Abstract of Canvass
and Recommendation of Awards, Certificate of Emergency Purchase and Reasonableness of Price, signed the PO,
DV, validated PO No. . . ., accused Uy signed the DV in behalf of the Assistant Chief of Naval Comptrollership,
accused Pan as N6 conducted the pre-audit and affixed his signature on the same P.O., the Sales Invoice and
Technical Inspection Report — which documents said accused had the duty to check/verify/examined, thereby
"acting or omitting to act" in a situation where there is a duty to act, in that only 100 seal rings were ordered at a unit
price of P98.70, yet 1,000 pieces appear to have been sold with total price of P98,700.00, hence there was gross
error in multiplication as shown on the face of the aforesaid PO and other supporting documents, resulting to an
overpayment of P88,930.00 to . . ., thereby depriving the Government/Philippine Navy of the use thereof until its
remittance/return to the Government/Philippine Navy by . . . in December, 1991.

On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash11 the informations on the following
grounds:

1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.

2. The officer who has filed the informations had no authority to do so.

3. The facts charged do not constitute an offense.

4. More than one (1) offense is charged.

On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash for
lack of merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth by petitioner in this wise:

On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not inclined to rule that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
person of accused-movant or over the offenses charged herewith. As intimated by the prosecution, this Court has
several cases pending before it involving crimes committed by military officers in relation to their office. Unless and
until the Highest Tribunal rules otherwise, this Court has no judicious recourse but to entertain and try the various
criminal cases filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor involving military officers and men accused of committing
crimes "in relation to their office," and those involving violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Be that as it may, being prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, as
amended, accused-movant axiomatically is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

We cannot likewise sustain accused-movant's stance that the officer who has filed the informations in the cases at
bar had no authority to do so. Both the offense charged and the person of accused-movant being within the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, it stands to reason that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the instant
criminal charges belong to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the Office of the Ombudsman, as provided for in
Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.

Neither are we impressed with the asseveration that the acts charged in the amended informations at bar do not
constitute an offense. Such a claim cannot stand in the face of unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, thus:

The fundamental rule in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the averments of the information are not
sufficient to constitute the offense charged is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the
essential elements of the offense, as defined in the law. (People v. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162).

As a general proposition, too, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the information do not
constitute the offense charged, or of any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said
allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516).

The general rule is that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or information, the facts alleged therein
should be taken as they are. This is especially so if the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute offense, but he court may consider additional facts which the fiscal admits to be true.
(People v. Navarro, supra).
In consonance with the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements, the quashal of the informations at bar cannot be
sustained since they are sufficient in form and substance to charge indictable offenses. Parenthetically, some of the
arguments relied upon by accused-movant refer more to evidentiary matters, the determination of which are not yet
legally feasible at this juncture and should only be raised during the trial on the merits.

Finally, We find no merit in the argument that more than one offense is charged in the criminal informations at bar.
Precisely, the prosecution split the original information into six (6) distinct amended informations pertaining to six (6)
criminal violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended. Such is but proper under the premises considering
that the acts subject of the criminal cases at bar were allegedly committed on six (6) different purchase orders and
there is no showing that they were committed on similar dates or singular occasion.

In the instant petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the person of the petitioner;

2) Whether or not the respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the authority to file the questioned
amended information;

3) Whether or not the act or omission charged constitutes an offense.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the court-martial, not the
Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner. Emphasizing the fundamental doctrine that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, they claim that at the
time the amended informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the controlling law on the jurisdiction over members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines is P.D. 1850, "Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated
National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines" (which took effect on October 4, 1982), as amended by P. D. 1952 (which took effect in September of
1984), more particularly Section 1(b) thereof provides:

Sec. 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who
commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial
pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of
War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided,
that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial
authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated
National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without
jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided, further, that the President
may, in the interest of Justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the
appropriate civil court.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen, and jail guards. (emphasis ours).

Since petitioner is a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he falls squarely under Article 2 of the
Articles of War (C.A. 408, as amended) mentioned in the aforecited Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850. Article 2 reads:

Art. 2: Persons subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to these Articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "person subject to military law; whenever
used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all
reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instruction; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service,
from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same; . . . .
Petitioner and the Solicitor General concede the subsequent passage of Republic Act No. 7055, "An Act
Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the military by returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain
offenses involving members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law, and the
members of the Philippine National Police, repealing for the purpose certain presidential decrees" (which took effect
on July 13, 1991) which expressly repealed P.D. 1850. Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 reads:

Sec. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law, including
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal law, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians
are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or judicial persons, shall be tried by the proper
civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in
which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil courts.

As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70,
Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.

In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the penalty
prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

They nonetheless argue that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in said Section 1 of R. A. No.
7055, and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the alleged commission of the offense for which
petitioner is charged with is "service-connected ."

We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the filing of the informations, and as
now prescribed by law.

Republic Act No. 8249,12 the latest amendment to P. D. 160613 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise known as the
"Sandiganbayan Law"), provides the prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

xxx xxx xxx

It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the
accused are conditions sine qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case.

In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, which is
an offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, his position as Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the
Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains and all officer of higher rank" as prescribed under sub-
paragraph (d) of Section 4. Under the Promotions System in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the hierarchy in
the position/rank of the officers of the Philippine Navy is as follows:

1. Admiral

2. Vice-Admiral
3. Rear Admiral

4. Commodore

5. Captain

6. Commander

7. Lieutenant Commander

8. Lieutenant Senior Grade

9. Lieutenant Junior Grade

10. Ensign

Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in
the regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
which states that "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27"
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. Under Section 9 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, the commission of any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than SIX YEARS AND ONE MONTH or FIFTEEN YEARS.
The indictment against petitioner cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts because under Republic Act No. 7691 which amended certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by expanding the jurisdiction of said inferior courts, they "exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof . . . ." This draws the case into
the domain of the regional trial courts which, under Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter."

It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain jurisdiction over petitioner's case since the
offense for which he is charged is "service-connected." The second paragraph of Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 limits
the nature of "service-connected crimes or offenses" to those defined only in Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and 95 to 97
of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended,14 to wit: Fraudulent enlistment, making Unlawful Enlistment, False
Muster, False Returns, Desertion, Advising or Aiding Another to Desert, Entertaining a Deserter, Absence Without
Leave, Disrespect towards the President, Vice-President and National Assembly, Disrespect towards Superior
Officer, Mutiny or Sedition, Failure to Suppress Mutiny of Sedition, Quarrels; Frays; Disorders, Breaking an Arrest or
Escaping from Confinement, Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners, Failure to make a Report of Prisoners
Received, Releasing prisoners without proper authority, Failure to Deliver offenders to Civil Authorities, Misbehavior
Before the Enemy, Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender, Improper Use of Countersign, Forcing a
Safeguard, Neglect or Wrongful Appropriation of Captured Property, Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property,
Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the Enemy, Spies, Damage/Wrongful Disposition of Military Property,
Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property, Drunk on Duty, Misbehavior of Sentinel, Personal Interest in Sale
of Provisions, Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions, Good Order to be Maintained and Wrong Redressed,
Provoking Speeches or Gestures, Dueling, Fraud against the Government Affecting Matters and Equipment,
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman, and All Disorders and Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and
Military Discipline and All Conduct of a Nature of Bring Discredit Upon the Military Services. None of these offenses
relates to acts or omissions constituting a violation of Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, as amended which reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding
information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.15

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 10, 1992 in Criminal Cases Nos. 16905-16910, is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan is ordered to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
16905-16910, and to inform this Court of the action taken hereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of this
decision.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 RULE 111

Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause
of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (cir. 57-97)

Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate
civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot
be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)

Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
(3a)

Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these
rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)

Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant
from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the
civil action. (4a)

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)
 Title Five
CIVIL LIABILITY
Chapter One
PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

ARTICLE 100-104

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part.chanrobles virtual law library

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond
with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.chanrobles virtual law library

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.chanrobles virtual law library

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.chanrobles virtual law library

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.chanrobles
virtual law library

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing
the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of

establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any
other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.chanrobles virtual law library

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.chanrobles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law
library

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties.chanrobles virtual law library

Chapter Two
WHAT CIVIL LIABILITY INCLUDES

Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101,
102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.chanrobles virtual law library

JARANTILLA VS CA

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.

Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.

Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7,
1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that
the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar
Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained
physical injuries as a consequence. 2

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through
a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject
matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as
special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's
cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal
case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect
and actively participated in the criminal case. 8

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of
denial, with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this
ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of the court". 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was
docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack
of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same
reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering
herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for
other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. 12

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the
award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied
by respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14

The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private respondent, who was the
complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the
prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the
criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for refusing to resolve an
assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed upon
by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions
of the Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do
not constitute the "law of the case' which would control the subsequent proceed ings in this controversy.

1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.

The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the two
resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues
which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the proceedings involved there
was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its
order denying therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation
as to the legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil
action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution was premised on the fact that the
Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a
quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been
expounded on the merits of that action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992
to justify the respondent court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate
action.

'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis
supplied). 16

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case . . .
(Emphasis supplied). 17

It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the points
presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no
question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in
the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first question rested
and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits . . . 18

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of
private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil
liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177
of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. 19

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it was held that where the offended party
elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same
cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
constitutes only a penal omen and cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine
in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence as
to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is
misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano.
The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil
actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for
another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal developments on this issue.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable
doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could file
a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article
29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et
al. 25 that:

In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages
from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'.
(Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29,
1987; Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on
Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence ... 26

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right
to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails
to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. 27

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no
longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such
circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested
of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a
civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already
stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act
or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-
delict committed by the petitioner, thus:

3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant
situated at 220 lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street,
Iloilo City and while he was standing on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming from the Provincial
Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-
2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being
driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the
provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as
well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act
with due negligence and by failing to take into consideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric
conditions of the place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil
case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to
recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c)
of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused . . .

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The
Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from
filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action,
the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for
damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was
not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil
Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues
decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED.
PP VS BAYOTAS

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged
with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E.
Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish
his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case
of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
1

conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that
the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
2

therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue
posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and
his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is
final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando
a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under
the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las
partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is
such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words
of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die,
according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna
clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory,
"there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action
might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd
ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78
of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings
to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
"after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to
be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let
the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp
civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases
3

of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
4

al. and People of the Philippines v. Satorre by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
5 6

pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet
no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-
appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev.
Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him
should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals ruled differently. In the former, the issue
7 8

decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final
judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was
the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised
Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said
principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa
could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the
first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil
liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the
extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the dismissal of all money claims against the
9

defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be
inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name
of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative
or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it
were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. departed from this long-established principle of
10

law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his
criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for
the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly
liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him
of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-
40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as
his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining
his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court
within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for
the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).

Succeeding cases raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in
11

other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely
anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the
demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels
us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in
the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is
there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex
delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate
civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,
the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil
liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect
merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to
death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This
had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to
an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be
12

borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of
the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia
Solvi. Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by
the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil
liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is
an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which
refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it
allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a
separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of
the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.
13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as
the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the
inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which
may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the
Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken
in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the
civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate
jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can
hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable
before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, are contractual
14

money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or
real property." Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the
15

estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from
contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this
exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an
ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 16

Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil
action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an
injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
17

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to
18

persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against
the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule
86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict
or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must
be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
19

sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
21

prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal
is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
PHIL RABBIT VS HEIRS OF MANGAWANG

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160355 May 16, 2005

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149 affirming
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 743-C(’93) convicting the accused
Ernesto Ancheta of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The Antecedents

Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one of its
passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,
charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The inculpatory portion of the Information
reads:

That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 o’clock (sic) in the morning, at Brgy. Dolores, Municipality of
Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR
No. 63044987, registered in the name of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with reckless imprudence and managed the said Philippine
Rabbit Bus at Brgy. Dolores, Capas, Tarlac, in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard
to laws, regulations, ordinances and traffic code and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to persons and damage to property and in violation of the Land Transportation Laws, said bus driven
by the accused while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left rear side of
a Toyota jeep with Plate No. TAB 929 with MVRR No. 64284647 owned by Zenaida B. Dizon of 193 M. Santos
St., Pasay City, Metro Manila, and driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a result
thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving sustained damages of an
undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased and the owner thereof.

Contrary to law.3

The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI assigned as counsel de parte.
Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance as private prosecutor.

The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the accused of the crime charged.
The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ERNESTO ANCHETA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
Accordingly, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional in its minimum period as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional in its maximum period as maximum.

For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Eduardo
Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory damages and P1,436,466.30 representing
loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnification for the death of Eduardo Mangawang and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.4

The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the appellate court issued a Resolution
dismissing the appeal due to Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as accused-appellant.5 The resolution of the CA
dismissing the appeal became final and executory, thus, entry of judgment was made of record on December
7, 2000. After the transmission of the records to the RTC, it issued an Order on June 5, 2001 for the arrest of
the accused.6

On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Ancheta’s employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision of the RTC. On
July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal, on its finding that the
notice was filed long after the judgment of the RTC had become final and executory.7 The PRBLI filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was not served with a copy of the decision of the RTC
convicting the accused of the crime charged; hence, could not have appealed the same. On August 1, 2001,
the trial court issued an Order denying the said motion. The PRBLI filed an urgent motion, this time for
clarification of the said order, which the trial court denied in an Order dated August 31, 2001. Undaunted, the
PRBLI filed a manifestation with motion, citing the ruling of this Court in Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula.8 On October
17, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, this time, granting the motion and giving due course to the appeal of
the PRBLI. The trial court, likewise, ordered the records to be transmitted to the CA for the consideration of the
appeal, where the latter made the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING SUPPOSED NEGLIGENCE AND LACK OF
FORESIGHT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED ANCHETA.

III

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SO GENEROUSLY AWARDING UNCONSCIONABLE

AMOUNTS IN SUPPOSED DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG.9

On October 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC.
The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 743-C(’93) is hereby AFFIRMED with the correction that the
actual damages to be awarded should only be P5,000.00. All other respects remain. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.10

The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC had long become final
and executory when the PRBLI appealed the decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was bound by the said decision
against the accused therein.11 Nevertheless, the appellate court resolved the appeal on its merits and affirmed
the decision of the RTC, but with modification.12

The PRBLI forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of the CA on the
following grounds:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED HAS
ATTAINED FINALITY AS AGAINST PETITIONER.

B.

PETITIONER MUST BE AFFORDED THE STANDING AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION THE
ACCUSED’S CONVICTION.13

The petitioner submits the ruling of this Court in Pajarito v. Seneris14 and Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab,
Inc.,15 that "the decision of the trial court convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer
not only with regard to the civil liability but also, with regard to its amount," should not apply to it. It avers that
unlike in Pajarito and Miranda, the counsel of the accused therein was given ample opportunity to defend the
accused during the trial and on appeal in the CA. The petitioner laments that in this case, the counsel it
provided to defend the accused was remiss in the performance of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC
decision, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA, as well as the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC;
consequently, it was not apprised of its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, thus depriving the petitioner of
its right to due process. It avers that it was only on account of its own diligence that it discovered the decision
of the RTC, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA and the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC.

The petitioner further avers that it was not furnished with a copy of the said CA Resolution, and of the Arrest
Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. The petitioner posits that until it is furnished with such copies, the period
within which to assail the decision of the RTC on its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased had not
commenced to run.

The petitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it of its right to question its civil
liability to the heirs of the deceased, considering the gross negligence of the counsel that it had provided the
accused.

By way of comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the decision of the
RTC convicting Ancheta of the crime charged had become final and executory, following the dismissal of his
appeal before the CA. The decision of the RTC was conclusive on the petitioner, not only with regard to its civil
liability but also as to the amount thereof, absent any collusion between the accused-employee and the private
complainant. The petitioner was not a direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy of the
decision of the RTC or to appeal therefrom; it was, likewise, not entitled to be furnished a copy of the CA
Resolution dated November 10, 2000 and the Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. Hence, according to the
OSG, it cannot complain of denial of its right to due process. The OSG further asserts that the petition at bar is
premature, considering that no writ of execution has yet been issued by the RTC, and cites the ruling of this
Court in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People16 to buttress its stance.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The ruling of the CA dismissing the petitioner’s appeal of the RTC decision convicting Ancheta of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is correct. However, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of
the RTC.

The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said decision because, in
the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this
reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the
CA.

Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the defense of its
employee, Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his
failure is its failure.17 The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be apprised of the progress
of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to
apprise the petitioner of the progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The
pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. 18 is instructive on this score:

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee
but in substance and, in effect, he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is his
concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded
against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary
liability, that he was not given his day in court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following
stern warning:

"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep
interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of
the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and, consequently,
doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice
on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied." (Martinez v. Barredo, supra.)19

In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula,20 the Court explained the effect of a judgment of conviction against the employee
on the subsidiary liability of the employer, as follows:

To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be gainsaid. A person
criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a
separate action therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex
delicto of his employee in the event of the latter’s insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action
pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of
that liability but also as to its amount.21

Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee (Ancheta), the
petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process. As explained by this Court
in Martinez v. Barredo:22

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not
one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which
enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver’s criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver’s conviction and upon proof of the latter’s
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but also his
employer’s subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in
218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil.
327; Province of Ilocos Sur v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. II, p. 403.)23

Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149, it sought
the reversal of the decision of the RTC and the acquittal of its employee. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
People,24 this Court held that such an appeal would be impermissible for the following reasons:
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk
involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the
power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.

If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to
review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be
meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification without his consent.25

Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from the decision of
the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.26

The Court cannot second guess whether Ancheta’s failure to file his brief as appellant in the CA was through
the negligence of his counsel or because of the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crime charged and it
was purposeless and futile for him to still file such brief.

We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as the employer of the accused to due
process occurs during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of
the sheriff’s return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its decision on the civil
liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the latter’s insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate
any property in the name of the accused. Such return is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the
accused.27

During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the prosecution must prove that
(a) the petitioner PRBLI was the employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in some kind of industry; (c) the
crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties; and (d) execution against the employee is
unsatisfied.28 The prosecution may offer in evidence the sheriff’s return as prima facie evidence of the
insolvency of the accused.

The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on questions which may be involved in
the execution since the trial court which rendered the decision has a general supervisory control over the
process of execution.29

From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on questions of facts, or mixed questions
of facts and of law, or by certiorari on questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the trial court,
thus:

It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the employer’s subsidiary civil liability is not
conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable by higher judicial authority. It may be appealed to a higher
court at the instance of the aggrieved party – either the offended party or the employer – by writ of error
seeking review of questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or through a petition for review
on certiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. Or review may be sought by the institution of a
special civil action of certiorari, upon the theory that the determination was made by the trial court without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.30

Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC which had long become final and
executory. A final and executory decision, even if erroneous, can no longer be modified.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. However, that portion of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated November 12, 1999, is SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
SAN MIGUEL VS PEREZ

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166836 September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD,
JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN,
ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal
prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.

Antecedents

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the real
estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented
by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes
Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of ₱106,248,000.00. The
transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first
and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of
land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993
and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of ₱39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel
Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased under
the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the
transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989
pursuant to an order from the SEC.4

BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties
filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging
respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to
Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB (HLURB
Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors and officers of BF Homes
refuted San Miguel Properties’ assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel Properties’ claim was not legally
demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his
having been replaced as BF Homes’ rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale
conveying the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to
the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to suspend all
claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free
from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and
(e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily
stripping the OCP Las Piñas of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.

On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las
Piñas,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes’ receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF Homes
opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the SEC terminated BF Homes’ receivership on
September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes’
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership.9

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel Properties’ criminal
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no action could be filed by or against
a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a
prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents
for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.

On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Piñas denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration filed on
November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes’ directors and officers could not be held liable for the non-delivery
of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957 without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendain’s
actions; and that the criminal liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the
HLURB directing it to deliver the titles.11

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but
the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken by the City Prosecutor
concerned.

There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still pending with the
Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for specific performance where the
HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in
question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.

As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had ruled that the
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices under PD 957. This
is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June
29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving
the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said
transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles.
In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall
have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration.13

Ruling of the CA

Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and mandamus (C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted with grave abuse in denying their
appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-
11183 presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957.

In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA dismissed San
Miguel Properties’ petition, holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question generally applies
to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In this case,
an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which,
consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.

Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application of the rule on
prejudicial question.

In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on prejudicial
question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation should the demolition of
private respondents’ building proved to be illegal as a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.

City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary dispute was
considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative proceeding for the holding
of a plebiscite on the affected areas.

In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good order, courts can
suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he applied the rule
on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on the validity of the sale
transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported
criminal culpability of private respondents, as officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to
deliver the titles of the parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.

All told, to sustain the petitioner’s theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not determinative of the
criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume
that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and
contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of
certificates of title which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the government as
represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the discretion of a public prosecutor in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under
no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient
evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The CA denied San Miguel Properties’ motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005.16

Issues

Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and resolution, to
wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS

WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO
ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:

THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE

TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION
DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES,
INC.".

A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO

PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS
25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT
SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO
THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE
HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL
CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.

IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM

THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID
PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE HLURB’S RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.

NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONER’S CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS

PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17

It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and damages that
San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the complaint for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to
suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into the
transactions in BF Homes’ behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiter’s
decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and
the other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of
the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order.18

Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), arguing that
the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the OP reversed the HLURB Board’s
ruling, holding thusly:

The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the Presidential Decree
(PD) 957 – "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective."

As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as successor
agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in relation to PD 1344, the
real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases "involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of subdivision lots … against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman," the HLURB, in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and
apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever
appropriate."

Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURB’s decision to await for some forum to decide – if ever one is
forthcoming – the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before it peremptorily resolves
the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been joined and the respective position papers
and the evidence of the parties having been submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the
usual dispatch, the right and obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and
applicable law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on the
finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions.19

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631),
raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of Atty.
Orendain’s authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel Properties in BF Homes’ behalf, and rule on
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended
the proceedings until the SEC resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.

The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not the SEC, had
jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties’ complaint. It affirmed the OP’s decision and ordered the remand of the
case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that the case involved matters within the HLURB’s
competence and expertise pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:

[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising
from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint because it pertains to matters within
the HLURB’s competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB should not be suspended.

While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is in recognition
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is
to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of evidence.21

Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San Miguel
Properties’ criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for
reason of a prejudicial question?

The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs
could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
 Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

1.

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial
question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties’ submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the
prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section
2524 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the
action was exclusive and original.25

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested
on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with
the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the
resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An
examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific
form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill
it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the
contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should
not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should
become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with damages. As
presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of
Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to
reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that
entitled the injured party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative
remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or
the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case.28
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of
swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators,29 such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential
Decree No. 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the
procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.

Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or
not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the
HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did
not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the
SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of
evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-
criminal suit.30

2.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of in a
court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific performance, although
civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is
in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort
to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the
interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely
judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.31

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of the
courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief
must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not
call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the
competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined.32

To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the controversy having been so placed
within the special competence of the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative
body prior to the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential
to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or dismissal of the action is
proper.33

3.

Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted

It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF Homes’ directors and officers
by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an
act or omission was malum prohibitum did not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an
absurd result by means of rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed,
the procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be eschewed if
such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable consequences.

San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a
reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not themselves initiated either the
action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the defense of a prejudicial question
1âwphi1

arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.

The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to
raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
ought not to distinguish.36

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
PAJARITO VS SENERIS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44627 December 14, 1978

LUCIA S. PAJARITO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALBERTO V. SEÑERIS, Presiding Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga;
JOSELITO AIZON, and FELIPE AIZON, respondents.

Geronimo Pajarito for petitioner.

Dominador L. Natividad for private respondents,

ANTONIO, J.:

Original special civil action for certiorari.

Private respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch
11 (respondent Judge Alberto V. Seneris, presiding), with Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence or a
violation of Section 48 of Republic Act No. 4136. The pertinent portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about May 9, 1975, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver of an Isuzu Passenger Bus bearing Plate
No. SB-511 owned and operated by FELIPE AIZON, operating on the public road, and without taking the
necessary precautions, considering the width, traffic, visibility, grades, crossing, curvatures, and other
conditions of the road, so as to avoid accident to persons or damage to properties, did then and there, through
reckless and fast driving, caused the said Isuzu Passenger Bus to turn turtle, as a result of which, the persons
of MYRNA PAJARITO DE SAN LUIS and MUSA BARING, both passengers on board the said Isuzu passenger
bus sustained injuries on their persons which caused their death. (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon arraignment, said respondent entered a plea of guilty. In view of said plea, the court rendered judgment
convicting him of the offense charged and sentencing him "to indemnify the heirs of the late Myrna Pajarito de
San Luis the amount of P12,000.00 ... ."

After the judgment had become final and executory, a Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon for
the indemnity of P12,000.00, but the same was returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency. Whereupon,
petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of the late Myrna Pajarito de San Luis, filed with the court a quo a motion
for the issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy thereof to private respondent Felipe Aizon,
employer of Joselito Aizon as alleged in the Information. Felipe Aizon opposed the motion on the grounds, to
wit: (1) that he is not the employer of Joselito Aizon, the vehicle in question having been sold already to Isaac
Aizon, father of Joselito, but that the deed of transfer has not been executed because the full price has not yet
been paid; and (2) that in case of insolvency, Joselito has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the
judgment insofar as the indemnity is concerned.

The court denied petitioner's motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe Aizon, alleged
employer of Joselito, was not a party in the aforesaid criminal case. Said the court:

It is therefore, the well considered opinion of this Court that a separate civil action must be filed by movant
Lucia S. Pajarito against Felipe Aizon in order to enforce the subsidiary liability of the latter under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the enforcement of tile subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be filled under the same criminal case, under which the subsidiary liability was granted; that respondent
Felipe Aizon, alleged employer of Joselito Aizon, was given his day in court, as he was furnished a copy of the
motion for issuance of the Subsidiary Writ of Execution, to which he filed his opposition; and that, although not
made a party in the criminal case, the employer, Felipe Aizon, should have taken active participation in the
defense of his employee, Joselito Aizon.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment to the petition which We consider their Answer, maintain
that to enforce the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a separate
civil action must be filed against the employer because under our present judicial system, before one could be
held subsidiary liable, he should be made a party defendant to the action, which in this case is not legally
feasible because respondent Felipe Aizon was not accused together with Joselito Aizon in Criminal Case No.
512 (1313) for Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence.

Obviously, the question to be considered here is whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Articles 102
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or
in a separate civil action. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. As a consequence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil
action arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the part of
the complainant. As explained in Ramcar, Incorporated v. De Leon: "When no civil action is expressly
1

instituted, according to subsection (a) of section 1 of Rule 107, it shall be impliedly jointly instituted with the
criminal action.' That means as if two actions are joined in one as twins, each one complete with the same
completeness as any of the two normal persons composing a twin. It means that the civil action may be tried
and prosecuted, with all the ancillary processes provided by law."

Pursuant to Article 103, in relation to Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, an employer may be subsidiary
liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of
industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has
not satisfied his civil liability. The subsidiary civil liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction
2

of the employee in the criminal case. In Martinez v. Barredo, this Court ruled that a judgment of conviction
3

sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the defendant
and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability.

... The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense
dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should
not be nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment,
unless those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to
automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least,
to suppose that the driver, excelling 'Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as
his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could be free from any blame when said
indemnity is sought to be collected mom his employer, although the right to the indemnity arose from and was
based on one and the same act of the driver.
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not
one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which
enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal
negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's
insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his
employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almelda et al. vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in
218 U.S., 476, 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco us. Onrubia, 46 Phil.,
327; Province of Ilocos Sur us. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. II, p. 403)

It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep
interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of
the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and consequently doing
away with the practice of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the
part of the employer shall have been satisfied. (At pp. 3-4)

In Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., this Court further amplified the rule that the decision convicting
4

the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer, "not only with regard to (the latter's) civil liability but
also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his
employee. That is why the law says that his liability is subsidiary (Article 103, Revised Penal Code). To allow
an employer to dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court." And this Court, in Miranda, further explained that the employer is in
substance and in effect a party to the criminal case, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law.

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee, but in substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is
his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded
against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court, for the enforcement of his subsidiary
liability, that he was not given his day in court . (At p. 675. Emphasis supplied.)

The conclusiveness upon the employer of the judgment of conviction sentencing the employee to pay civil
indemnity, for the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 was again reiterated
in Manalo and Salvador v. Robles Transportation Company, Inc., where the Court ruled that the sheriff's
5

return submitted in evidence in the action against the employer, Robles Transportation Company, Inc., showing
that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of the driver, is a prima
facie evidence of the employee's insolvency. Similarly, this Court ruled that the defendant's insolvency may be
proven by the certificate of the Director of Prisons that the employee is serving subsidiary imprisonment; or by
6

the certificate of the sheriff that the employee has not satisfied his pecuniary liability and that no properties
have been found registered in his name. 7

Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the
latter's civil liability but also with regard to its amount, this Court stated in Rotea, that in the action to enforce
8

the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the
indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error
has been committed in the decision.

In view of the foregoing principles, and considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered
operator of the bus but only claims now that he sold the bus to the father of the accused, it would serve no
important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the
enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. Under the circumstances, it would not only prolong the
litigation but would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. At any rate, the
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for
the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so
that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which
9

rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries
with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.

The validity of the claim of Felipe Aizon that he is no longer the owner and operator of the in fated bus as he
sold it already to Isaac Aizon, father of the accused Joselito Aizon, is a matter that could be litigated and
resolved in the same criminal case. In support of his opposition to the motion of the complainant, served upon
him, for the purpose of the enforcement of his subsidiary liability Felipe Aizon may adduce all the evidence
necessary for that purpose. Indeed, the enforcement of the employer's subsidiary civil liability may be
conveniently litigated within the same proceeding because the execution of the judgment is a logical and
integral part of the case itself. This would certainly facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of the
contending parties. "The purpose of procedure", observed this Court in Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney
General, "is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
10

the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice." In proceedings to apply justice, it is the duty of the courts "to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination" of their rival claims. Thus, the Rules require that they should be
liberally construed "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 11

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Court in Criminal Case No. 512 (1313) dated July 27, 1976 and
August 14, 1976 are hereby set aside. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding
the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. Costs against private
respondents.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at the hearing to be held by the
court a quo are: (1) whether or not Felipe Aizon was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused,
Joselito Aizon, or, whether or not he was the employer of said accused at the time of the commission of the
offense on May 9, 1975, and (2) whether or not said Joselito Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion,
the judgment in the criminal case is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to his civil liability but
also with regard to its amount which is that found in the judgment of conviction. In other words, what is to be
decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the subsidiary liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the
judgment in the criminal case is deemed to include that liability, but only the two issues related to it that I have
mentioned.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur, but to make matters clearer, I must add that the only issues open at the hearing to be held by the
court a quo are: (1) whether or not Felipe Aizon was the owner of the vehicle driven by the convicted accused,
Joselito Aizon, or, whether or not he was the employer of said accused at the time of the commission of the
offense on May 9, 1975, and (2) whether or not said Joselito Aizon is insolvent. As stated in the main opinion,
the judgment in the criminal case is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to his civil liability but
also with regard to its amount which is that found in the judgment of conviction. In other words, what is to be
decided by the trial court is not strictly speaking the subsidiary liability of the employer, Felipe Aizon, for the
judgment in the criminal case is deemed to include that liability, but only the two issues related to it that I have
mentioned.
JUGUETA VS CA

EN BANC

April 5, 2016

G.R. No. 202124

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R.
1

CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder
in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm,
with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a
minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."

and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
 Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation
for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.

Contrary to law. 2

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with
the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of
the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that
is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina,
both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings, one
Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the
other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not
present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found
no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the
4

case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded
only as to appellant. 5

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod
who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace
and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed
that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were
used.6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as
his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was
suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone,
the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot
was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them
from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled
together in their hut.7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young daughters
were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older daughter
carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital,
while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.
8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he
had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony,
along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years,
at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was
a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene. 10

Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial
court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to
shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs
in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and
accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he
is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for
the costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as
maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA rendered
a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court issued
a Resolution notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties
14

manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their
positions before the CA.15

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such
as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that
had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that appellant
acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at
Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with
their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you have light in
your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?

A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?

A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?

A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?

A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to line (sic)
down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?

A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to them?

A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

xxx 17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters because,
as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior
meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18
Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his
own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from
appellant's firearm that killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence
19

of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as
murder. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing
20

of Norberto’s two children, thus:

x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by
side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their
wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and
Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he
 refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters.
The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary
Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old
respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed
assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made
suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night.
xxx 21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v.
Fallorina, the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
22

the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to
put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states
that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People, the Court held:
23

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the
victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on
the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender
at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the
use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court
24

thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first
by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended
victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there
were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely
all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of
Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina,
Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was
the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. 25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that
killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination
of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v.
Cabtalan, "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of
26

witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." Both the trial
27

court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court
sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People that:
28

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings
and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing
the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty
and candor x x x. 29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional
circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the
trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying
appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any
reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the
crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms
"Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which
nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and
four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that
appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also
guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division,
Mindanao Station, et al., thus:
30

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing
the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of
the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides
that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall
be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. 31

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-
G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article
32

4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is
imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
 Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not
only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of
shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not
only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as
held in People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming
35

each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
complex crime." 36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. 37

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby
commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused x x x 38

In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
39

aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter
has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
40

violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation
on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However,
41

pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility
for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count
is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards criminal
cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal cases,
there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC
42

which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the
Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
43

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount
for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the
minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. 44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
45

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries
such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of
grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the
court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and
(2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article
46

2220 of the Civil Code. x x x.

47

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for
mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." They may also be considered and
48

allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as
result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force
used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." 49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."
50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that
51

can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the
private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as
it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.52

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of
an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always,
used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is
to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of
an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation
53

for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such circumstances
as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross
fraud – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
54

species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.55

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings,
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores
the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages,
however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the
civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 56

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires aggravating
57

circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or
she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper
penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would
entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award.
Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
58

tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
59

wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada, People v. 60

Neverio and People v. Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve
61 62

as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, despite the lack of any
63

aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter
similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
64

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the penalty
imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending
for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special
penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. Under the same law, the
65

following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general, mutiny on the high seas, and simple
66 67

rape. For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified
68

piracy; qualified bribery under certain circumstances; parricide; murder; infanticide, except when committed
69 70 71 72

by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for
the same purpose; kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; robbery with
73 74

violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; destructive arson, except when death
75

results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the article; attempted or 76

frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; and carnapping,
77

when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following
78

crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Article
320, death results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is committed;
(ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is
under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the
husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the
victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or single
indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall
be observed in the application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.

2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose
of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the duty
to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death,
depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the RPC. 79

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua.
Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome and People v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
80 81

heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender." 82

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it not for
RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor, that the award of civil indemnity for
83

the crime of rape when punishable by death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also
an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." Such 84

reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to
₱100,000.00. 85

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa, ₱50,000.00 was awarded
86

as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's
injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of
moral damages. Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People v. Soriano and
87 88

P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao. 89

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable
penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for
awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed. 1avvphi1
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating
circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 as
90

moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances
present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall
be fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes x x x."91

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several
crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly
compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying
aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
92

₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC, the
following doctrines are noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a
93

composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice
Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros, explained that composite crimes are
94

"neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime
proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of
firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or
more offenses." 95

In People v. De Leon, we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
96

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.97
 In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
98

superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales: 99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms
were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales,
as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when
alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the
Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the
actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder
but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. 100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due
to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral
damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime,
101

the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however,
only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died
were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be
committed even if one of the robbers dies. This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more
102

than one victim of rape.

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime
was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as

those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will
each be ₱100,000.00 and another ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the
crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is
in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00,
and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its
attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the
outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the
crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated
or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages is ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the
robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex
crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the
intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the
said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other
victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the
injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is
understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of
103

violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the
victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered
mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage,
and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary
damages being awarded. However, an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall
be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the
information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may
104

be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate
105

damages to ₱50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made
atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and
the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the
Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.

In summary:

I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
106 107 108 109 110

involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

111

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted: 112

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual abuse
results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex crimes
where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary
damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape, Robbery with Intentional
113 114

Mutilation, Robbery with

115
Arson, Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or Carnapping with
116 117 118 119

Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape,
120 121 122 123

Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where
124

the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
125

intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity
126

of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are
themselves killed or injured in the incident. 1âwphi1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional rape
committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages
unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless 127

Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no stages, i.e.,
Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00

If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, in addition to
128

the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary
damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in the
course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following:
129

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 130

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if not for
a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in
court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is
P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it.131

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1)
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for
each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4)
temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against Gilberto
Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on
the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of
Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as
noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime
scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial
Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that
on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was
only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the
shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and
San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.

After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same
only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In
turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In this case, the case
133

against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double
jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and
San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary
Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248
in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four
(4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto
Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral
damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this
Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the
possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
PILIPINAS SHELL VS DUQUE

SECOND DIVISION

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 216467

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Petitioner

vs.
CARLOS DUQUE & TERESA DUQUE, Respondents
*

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision and
1

Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 18, 2014 and January 14, 2015, respectively, in CA-
2

G.R. SP No. 124925. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the March 23, 2012 Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, which revived its March 16, 2011 Decision in Criminal Case No. 10-1757,
while the questioned CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

The instant petition arose from an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (BP 22) filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City against herein respondents. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of November 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
being then the authorized signatories of FITNESS CONSULTANTS INC. did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORP., to apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No. : 6000012386

Drawn Against : International Exchange Bank

In the amount of : ₱105,518.55

Postdated/Dated : November 16, 2001

 Payable to : Pilipinas Shell Corporation

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check
upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within reasonable time from
date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "ACCOUNT
CLOSED" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said
payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

It appears from the records at hand that herein petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a
lessee of a building known as Shell House at 156 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On August 23,
2000, PSPC subleased a 500-meter portion of the 2nct Floor of the Shell Building to the The Fitness
Center (TFC). Thereafter, TFC encountered problems in its business operations. Thus, with the conformity of
4

PSPC, TFC assigned to Fitness Consultants, Inc, (FCI) all its rights and obligations under the contract of
sublease executed by PSPC in its favor. Respondent Carlos Duque is the proprietor, while respondent Teresa
5

Duque is the corporate secretary of FCI. Subsequently, FCI failed to pay its rentals to PSPC. FCI subsequently
issued a check, with respondents as signatories, which would supposedly cover FCI's obligations to PSPC.
However, the check was dishonored, thus, leading to the filing of a criminal complaint against respondents for
their alleged violation of BP 22.

The parties then went to trial, which subsequently resulted in a verdict finding herein respondents guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 66, dated May 17, 2010,
reads thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court renders judgment finding accused Carlo
Duque and Teresa Duque GUILTY of the offense of Violation of B.P. 22 and hereby sentences
them to pay a FINE of ₱105,516.55 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Both
accused are further ordered to civilly indemnify the private complainant Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) the amount of ₱105,516.55 with interest of 12% per
annum from the time the complaint was filed on October 4, 2002 until the amount is fully paid,
attorney's fees of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 6

Respondents appealed the above MeTC Decision with the RTC of Makati.

On March 16, 2011, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered judgment acquitting respondents and
disposing the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premised considered, the [MeTC] Decision dated May 17, 2010 is modified as
follows:

The Court hereby renders judgment ACQUITTING the accused CARLO DUQUE and TERESA
DUQUE of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. However, the Court maintains the court a quo 's finding in
ordering the accused to pay the complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSC) the
amount of One Hundred Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Fifty Five Centavos
(Php105,516.55) as civil indemnity with interest of 12% per annum from the time the complaint
was filed on 04 October 2002 until the amount is fully paid, attorney's fees of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 7
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the RTC Decision contending that they could not be
8

held civilly liable because their acquittal was due to the failure of the prosecution to establish the elements of
the offense charged. In addition, they assert that they, being corporate officers, may not be held personally and
civilly liable for the debts of the corporation they represent, considering that they had been acquitted of criminal
liability.

In an Order dated September 2, 2011, the RTC found merit in respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
9

The RTC ruled, in essence, that respondents may not be held civilly liable for the value of the subject check
because they have not been convicted of the offense with which they had been charged. In addition, the RTC
found that the check was drawn against the current account of FCI and the obligations sought to be paid were
corporate debts and, as such, FCI, not respondents, should be held civilly liable. The RTC likewise held that
the veil of corporate fiction was not used as cloak for fraud as there was no evidence that respondents agreed
to be personally liable for the corporation's obligations.

PSPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing the rule that the extinction of the penal action does not carry
10

with it the extinction of the civil action and alleging that the RTC erred in ruling that respondents may not be
held liable for the obligations of FCI on the ground that there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil.

On March 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order granting PSPC's motion for reconsideration, thus, reviving the
11

RTC Decision of March 16, 2011. The RTC ruled that respondents' acquittal, the same having been based on
the prosecution's failure to prove all the elements of the offense charged, did not include the extinguishment of
their civil liability. Citing Section 1 of BP 22, the RTC held that the person who actually signed the corporate
check shall be held liable, without any condition, qualification or limitation. The RTC also found that the records
show that FCI, through respondents, was civilly liable to PSPC.

Aggrieved by the March 23, 2012 Order of the RTC, respondents filed a petition for review with the CA
contending that the RTC erred in holding them liable for the civil liability of FCI even if they were acquitted of
the crime of violating BP 22.12

In its assailed Decision, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed 23 March 2012 RTC decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 2 September 2011 is REINSTATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

The CA basically held that, upon acquittal, the civil liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished
with the criminal liability, without prejudice to an independent civil action which may be pursued against the
corporation.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2015.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following arguments:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ABSOLVING RESPONDENTS FROM CIVIL

LIABILITY ARISING FROM THEIR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 DUE TO
THEIR ACQUITTAL FROM THE SAID CRIME, SINCE THE ORDER THAT DECREED THEIR
ACQUITTAL DID NOT MAKE AN EXPRESS MENTION THAT THE FACTS FROM WHICH
THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY MAY ARISE DID NOT EXIST.

B.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON GOSIACO V. CHING IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ABSOLVED FROM CIVIL LIABILITY

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL OBLIGATION
COVERED BY THE DISHONORED CHECKS WERE CORPORATE DEBTS FOR WHICH
ONLY FCI SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE. 14

The petition lacks merit.

The only issue in the present case is whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may still be held civilly
liable despite their acquittal from the criminal charge of violation of BP 22.

The Court rules in the negative, as this matter has already been settled by jurisprudence. In the case
of Gosiaco v. Ching, this Court enunciated the rule that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate
15

check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the said case, the Court ruled that:
1âwphi1

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held
personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone
1avvphi1

who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank
with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment.
Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he
cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act
and not his personal act. 16

The Court, citing the case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders, Incorporated, et. al., nonetheless categorically
17

held that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability."
18

The above rule is reiterated in the recent case of Navarra v. People, et al., where the petitioner, the Chief
19

Finance Officer of a corporation, who was the signatory of the dishonored corporate checks, was convicted of
the offense of violation of BP 22 and was ordered to pay the private complainant civil indemnity in an amount
equivalent to the value of the checks which bounced. The Court held thus:

The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can
be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The criminal liability of the person who issued the
bouncing checks in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the
corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this
criminal liability with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the
complainant to recover such civil liability, not from the corporation, but from the person who
signed the check in its behalf.20

As held above, it is clear that the civil liability of the corporate officer for the issuance of a bouncing corporate
check attaches only if he is convicted. Conversely, therefore, it will follow that once acquitted of the offense of
violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged from any civil liability arising from the issuance of the
worthless check in the name of the corporation he represents. This is without regard as to whether his acquittal
was based on reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Moreover, in the present case, nothing in the records at hand would show that respondents made themselves
personally nor solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as accommodation parties or sureties. On the
contrary, there is no dispute that respondents signed the subject check in their capacity as corporate officers
and that the check was drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the obligation of the corporation and not for
the personal indebtedness of respondents. Neither is there allegation nor proof that the veil of corporate fiction
is being used by respondents for fraudulent purposes. The rule is that juridical entities have personalities
separate and distinct from its officers and the persons composing it. Generally, the stockholders and officers
21
are not personally liable for the obligations of the corporation except only when the veil of corporate fiction is
being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, which is not the case here. Hence,
22

respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the checks issued in payment for FCI's obligation.

The cases of Mitra v. People, et al. and Llamado v. Court of Appeals, et. al., which were cited by petitioner,
23 24

may not be made as bases to rule against respondents because the accused in the said cases were found
guilty of violating BP 22. Thus, the general rule that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check
can be held civilly liable when convicted, applies to them. In the present case, however, respondents were
acquitted of the offense charged. As such, consistent with the rule established
in Bautista and Gosiaco, respondents' civil liability was extinguished with their criminal liability. In the same
manner, the Court agrees with the CA that the case of Alferez v. People, et al. is neither applicable to the
25

present case on the ground that, while Alferez was acquitted from the charge of violation of BP 22, the checks
which bounced were issued by Alferez in his personal capacity and in payment of his personal obligations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 18, 2014 and January 14, 2015, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 124925 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PULIDO CASE

[ G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 ]

LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

May an accused indicted for Bigamy be exculpated on the basis of the judicial declaration of nullity of his first or
second marriage?

Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the March 17, 2015 Decision and the August 18, 2015
1 2

Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33008 which, affirmed with modification the June
3

22, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas City in Criminal Case No. 08-
4

0166 which found petitioner Luisito G. Pulido (Pulido) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.

The Antecedents:

Pulido and Rowena U. Baleda (Baleda) were charged before the RTC with Bigamy in an Information that 5

reads:

That on or about the 31st day of July 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, being then legally married to the
complainant NORA A. PULIDO, which marriage is still existing and has not been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with one ROWENA U. BALEDA, who knowingly consented thereto, which second marriage has
all the requisites for validity.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Records show that on September 5, 1983, then 16-year old petitioner married his teacher, then 22-year old
private complainant Nora S. Arcon (Arcon) in a civil ceremony at the Municipal Hall of Rosario, Cavite
solemnized by then Mayor Calixto D. Enriquez. Their marriage was blessed with a child born in 1984.
7 8

The couple lived together until 2007 when Pulido stopped going home to their conjugal dwelling. When
confronted by Arcon, Pulido admitted to his affair with Baleda. Arcon likewise learned that Pulido and Baleda
entered into marriage on July 31, 1995 which was solemnized by Reverend Conrado P. Ramos. Their Marriage
Certificate indicated Pulido's civil status as single.
9

Hurt by the betrayal, Arcon charged Pulido and Baleda with Bigamy on December 4, 2007. In his defense,
10

Pulido insisted that he could not be held criminally liable for bigamy because both his marriages were null and
void. He claimed that his marriage with Arcon in 1983 is null and void for lack of a valid marriage license while
his marriage with Baleda is null and void for lack of a marriage ceremony.

Baleda, on the other hand, claimed that she only knew of Pulido's prior marriage with Arcon sometime in April
2007. She alleged that even prior to the filing of the bigamy case, she already filed a Petition to Annul her
marriage with Pulido before the RTC of Imus, Cavite docketed as Civil Case No. 1586-07. In a Decision dated 11

October 25, 2007, the RTC declared her marriage with Pulido as null and void for being bigamous in nature.
This ruling attained finality, there being no appeal filed thereto.
12

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In its June 22, 2009 Decision, the trial court convicted petitioner of Bigamy and acquitted Baleda.
13

In so ruling, the RTC dismissed Pulido's claim that both his marriages are void. As to the first marriage, the trial
court noted that the certifications issued by the Civil Registrar merely proved that the marriage license and
marriage application could not be found, not that they never existed, or were never issued. It held that the
marriage certificate which reflected on its face the marriage license number of Pulido and Arcon's marriage has
a higher probative value than the certifications issued by the Civil Registrar.

Moreover, the trial court noted that the testimony of Pulido's witness shows only irregularities in the formal
requisites of Pulido's second marriage which did not affect its validity. Thus, the RTC upheld the validity of
Pulido's marriage with Arcon.

The fallo of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused Rowena M. Baleda. In

turn, accused LUISITO G. PULIDO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED. 14

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

Pulido appealed his conviction to the appellate court on the ground that the first element of the crime, i.e., the
subsistence of a valid marriage, was absent. Pulido maintained that his first marriage to Arcon is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license while his marriage with Baleda is also void since there was no marriage
ceremony performed. In any case, his marriage with Baleda has already been judicially declared as void ab
initio even before the filing of the Information for Bigamy against him and Baleda with the trial court.
The appellate court, in its assailed March 17, 2015 Decision, sustained petitioner's conviction but modified the
15

penalty. The CA also found that all the elements of bigamy were present since Pulido entered into a second
marriage with Baleda while his prior marriage with Arcon was subsisting, and without first having obtained a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the prior marriage with Arcon.

The CA was not convinced of Pulido's contention that the first marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
It noted that their Marriage Contract dated September 5, 1983 indicated Marriage License No. 7240107. To be
16

considered void due to lack of marriage license, it must be apparent on the marriage contract and supported by
a certification from the Civil Registrar that no such marriage license was issued, which are not obtaining in the
case at bar.

The Certification dated November 22, 2007 issued by the Civil Registrar did not specifically attest that no
marriage license was issued to Pulido and Arcon. Instead, the document merely stated that there was no
record of a marriage license and application of Pulido and Arcon on account of a probable termite infestation of
the documents from 1979-1983. Also, that the marriage license was obtained only on the day of the marriage
itself did not render the marriage void ab initio since it is merely an irregularity which does not affect the validity
of marriage.

The appellate court further ruled that even assuming that the first marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license, one may still be held liable for bigamy if he/she enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. Bigamy was consummated the moment Pulido
entered into the second marriage without his marriage with Arcon being first judicially declared null and void.

The appellate court anchored its ruling on Article 40 of the Family Code which requires one to first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage. It held that pursuant
to Jarillo v. People (Jarillo), Article 40 applies even if the marriage of Pulido with Arcon was governed by the
17

Civil Code. Rules of procedure should be given retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights. The bigamist cannot obtain and use the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
his or her prior marriage to avoid his or her prosecution for bigamy.

Likewise, the subsequent declaration of nullity of his second marriage with Baleda would not exonerate him
from criminal liability. Their Certificate of Marriage dated. July 31, 1995 signed by both Pulido and Baleda
clearly indicated that they appeared before Reverend Conrado P. Ramos on their own free will to take each
other as husband and wife. As a public document, the marriage contract is presumed to be prima facie correct
pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not
bar the prosecution of Pulido for the crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence dictates that one may still be charged with
bigamy even if the second marriage is subsequently declared as null and void so long as the first marriage was
still subsisting during the celebration of the second marriage. This is to deter parties from, deliberately and
consciously entering into a flawed marital contract and thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages.

The CA ultimately affirmed, the June 22, 2009 Decision of the RTC but with modification as to the penalty
imposed, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Piñas, dated June 22, 2009, which adjudged accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the indeterminate
penalty imposed on appellant. Accordingly, Luisito G. Pulido is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED. 18
Pulido filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in its August 18, 2015
Resolution. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Meanwhile, in its November 27, 2015 judgment, the RTC, Branch 22 of Imus, Cavite, declared Pulido's
19

marriage to Arcon void from the beginning. The said Decision became final and executory as per Certificate of
Finality dated May 11, 2016. Thereafter, on June 29, 2016, the RTC issued, the Decree of Absolute Nullity of
20

Marriage confirming the absolute nullity of marriage between Pulido and Arcon.
21

Issues

For adjudication by the Court are the following issues:

(a) Whether Article 40 of the Family Code applies to the instant case, considering that Pulido's first marriage
was contracted during the Civil Code and his second marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the
Family Code;

(b) Whether a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage as provided under Article 40 of the Family
Code may be invoked as a defense in Bigamy cases; and

(c) In the affirmative, whether a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage secured after the celebration of the
second marriage should be considered a valid defense in Bigamy cases.

Petitioner's Arguments:

In the main, Pulido contends that the appellate court should have overturned his conviction in view of the
absence of an element of bigamy, i.e., that the offender's first marriage be legally subsisting at the time he
contracts the second marriage, since the first marriage is void due to the absence of a marriage license. He
asserts that the retroactive application by the trial court and the appellate court of Article 40 of the Family Code
to his case, when the governing law at the time of his first marriage was the Civil Code, ran afoul of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation.

Arguments of the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG):

In its Comment, the OSG stresses that Article 40 of the Family Code applies to the instant case since Pulido's
22

subsequent and bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when the Family Code was already in full effect.
Thus, unlike the cases cited by petitioner wherein both marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, Pulido is required to obtain a prior judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arcon as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage with Baleda. Hence, the fact that Pulido secured a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage is immaterial since the crime of Bigamy has already been
consummated.

The OSG maintains that the appellate court correctly ruled that the certificate of marriage was the best
evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony took place, and that the subsequent judicial declaration of Pulido
and Baleda's marriage may not be used to exonerate himself from criminal liability.

Our Ruling

This case provides us the opportune occasion to revisit and examine our earlier pronouncements that a judicial
declaration of the absolute nullity of a prior void ab initio marriage secured prior to remarriage is required
before a prior void ab initio marriage may be considered a valid defense in the prosecution of bigamy. For
resolution of this Court is the subsequent judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of Pulido's first marriage
with Arcon which he presented as a defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy against him.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and rigorous reexamination of the applicable law and jurisprudence, we
find that there is enough basis to abandon our earlier pronouncement and now hold that a void ab
initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first and second
marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.

In consonance with this, we find the petition meritorious. Hence, Pulido's acquittal from the crime of Bigamy is
warranted.

Bigamy - Definition and Elements:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and penalizes Bigamy, viz.:

Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The above provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legÃtimamenie disuelto el anterior,
será castigado con la pena de prision mayor..... 23

The rationale for prosecuting an individual who contracted a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead, is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. For one to be held guilty of bigamy, the
24

prosecution must prove the following: (a) that the offender has been legally married; (b) that the first marriage
has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) that the second or subsequent marriage has all die essential requisites for validity. It is vital in the
25

prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
26

It is undisputed that Pulido married Arcon on September 5, 1983. Thereafter, he contracted a second marriage
with Baleda on July 31, 1995 without having his first marriage with Arcon legally dissolved. Pulido and Baleda's
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity had it not for the existing first marriage.

Thereafter, Pulido's first marriage with Arcon and second marriage with Baleda were judicially declared void for
lack of a valid marriage license and for being bigamous, respectively. Pulido interposed the defense that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage should exculpate him from criminal liability for
bigamy.

Thus, the main issue for consideration of this Court is the necessity of securing a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity as a valid defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

Is a judicial declaration of nullity of

marriage necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void ab initio marriage
in a bigamy prosecution?

a. Prior to the effectivity of the

Family Code, a void ab initio
marriage can be raised as a defense in
a bigamy case even without a judicial
declaration of its nullity.
The validity of the second marriage is
a prejudicial question to the criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court has inconsistent pronouncements concerning the necessity
of a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior void marriage as a defense in a bigamy case.

In People v. Mendoza (Mendoza) and in People v. Aragon (Aragon), this Court ruled that no judicial decree
27 28

is necessary to establish the invalidity of a prior void marriage as a defense in the case of Bigamy, as
distinguished from mere annullable or voidable marriages.

In both Mendoza and Aragon, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first
marriage. Thereafter, the accused entered into a third marriage after the death of his first wife but during the
subsistence of the second marriage. The Court ruled that the second marriage is void for having been
contracted during the existence of the first marriage. Hence, there is no need for a judicial declaration that said
second marriage is void. Consequently, with the second marriage being void and the first marriage terminated
due to the death of the first wife, the accused did not commit bigamy when he contracted a third marriage. 29

However, in Gomez v. Lipana (Gomez) and Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
30

System (Consuegra), the Court deviated from its previous pronouncements in Mendoza and Aragon when it
31

declared that a judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage is necessary even though it is presumed to
be null and void for it was contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage. Subsequently, in Odayat v.
Amante (Odayat) and Tolentino v. Paras the Court again reverted to the doctrine laid down
32 33

in Mendoza and Aragon.

Nonetheless, in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (Wiegel), the Court ruled that there is a need for a judicial declaration of
34

nullity of a void marriage before one can enter into another marriage. Then, in Yap v. Court of Appeals the 35

Court again held otherwise.

However, in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified that the requirement of a judicial
36 37

decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family
Code, which continue to be governed by Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat wherein a void ab initio marriage can
be raised as a defense in a bigamy case even without a judicial declaration of its nullity.

As to the nullity of the second marriage, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)
pointed out that in People v. Mora Dumpo (Dumpo) and People v. Lara (Lara) the Court decided on the issue
38 39

of the validity of the second marriage in the same criminal proceeding for bigamy to determine the guilt of the
accused, i.e. if he contracted a valid second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Patently, the
Court allowed the accused in Dumpo and Lara to Interpose the defense of a void ab initio second marriage
other than it being bigamous in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

However, in Merced v. Diez (Merced), the Court recognized the action to annul the second marriage as a
40

prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy, to wit:

One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting
parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would
be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the
question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but
in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the
action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for
bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second, marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains
all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which
must he determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We
 have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or
must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question, because determination of the validity of the second, marriage is determinable,
in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy. (Emphasis supplied.)
41

In Zapanta v. Montesa (Zapanta) the Court suspended the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
42

because of a subsequent civil action filed by the accused to annul his second marriage on the ground of
vitiated consent. The Court held that:

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The
prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra).
These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the
second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground
that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged, in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage
is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other
hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco
on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is
within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for
bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is
vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the
contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation. (Emphasis supplied.)
43

However, in Landicho v. Relova (Landicho) and reiterated in Donato v. Luna the Court clarified that it must be
44 45

shown that the accused's consent must be the one whose consent was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation to show that the act in the second marriage is involuntary before he or she can raise the action
for nullity of second marriage as a prejudicial question in the prosecution for bigamy. 46

Then, in De la Cruz v. Judge Ejercito (De la Cruz), the Court again dismissed the bigamy case as "moot and
47

untenable" in view of the final judgment obtained by the accused annulling the second marriage. The finding in
the annulment case that the second marriage was a nullity is determinative of the accused's innocence in the
bigamy case. 48

Thus, when both the prior and subsequent marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, a void ab initio marriage can be raised as a defense in a bigamy case even without a
judicial declaration of its nullity. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that an action for nullity of the
second marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

b. Article 40 of the Family Code

applies retroactively on marriages
celebrated before the Family Code
insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights.

Thus, a judicial declaration of nullity

is required for prior marriages
contracted before the effectivity of
the Family Code but only for
purposes of remarriage.

Upon the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the doctrine laid down in Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior "void" marriage was
encapsulated in Article 40, which reads:

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The prevailing rule, therefore, is that even if the marriage is void, a final judgment declaring it void for purposes
of remarriage is required. The Commission, in drafting Article 40, considered the Court's ruling
in Landicho that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity; only
49

competent courts have such authority. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (Domingo), the Court elucidated on
50 51

the intent behind the provision, thus:

"Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether
or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. xxx

xxxx

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial
declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members
concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action
is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so,
then the phrase 'absolute nullity' can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the
phrase to 'invalidity' if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the
marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare
for himself whether or not the marriage is void, which the other members affirmed.
Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral, attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he
has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot
say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be
taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void marriage.
Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked

only on the basis of final judgment ...

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

 For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a
previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio. xxx

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of
the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41." (Emphasis supplied.)
52

To repeat, Pulido's first marriage with Arcon was contracted in 1983 or before the effectivity of the Family Code
while his second marriage with Baleda was celebrated in 1995, during the effectivity of the said law. Pulido
assails the retroactive application of Article 40 of the Family Code on his case which requires him to obtain a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity before he can contract another marriage.

When the prior marriage was contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code while the subsequent
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the said law, we recognize the retroactive application of Article
40 of the Family Code but only insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights. In Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., and reiterated in Jarillo and in Montañez v. Cipriano (Montañez), we
53 54 55

declared thus:

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court
went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. The reason Is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. (Emphasis56

supplied.)

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence and keeping in mind its purpose, we hold that Article 40 has retroactive
application on marriages contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code but only for the purpose of
remarriage, as the parties are not permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage. In other
words, in order to remarry, a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage
having been obtained, the second marriage is rendered void ab initio even though the first marriage is also
considered void ab initio. The only basis for establishing the validity of the second marriage is the judicial
decree of nullity of the first marriage.
However, in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, the parties may still raise the defense of a void ab
initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity if the first marriage was
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code. Such is still governed by the rulings
in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat which are more in line with the rule that procedural rules are only given
retroactive effect insofar as they do not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.

In this case, Pulido's marriage with Arcon was celebrated when the Civil Code was in effect while his
subsequent marriage with Baleda was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, Pulido is
required to obtain a judicial decree of absolute nullity of his prior void ab initio marriage but only for purposes of
remarriage. As regards the bigamy case, however, Pulido may raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage
even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity.

c. Does the subsequent declaration of

the nullity of the first and second
marriages constitute a valid defense
in bigamy?

We rule in the affirmative.

Notably, during the pendency of the bigamy case, Pulido obtained a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage with Arcon which he presented as his defense. However, the courts a quo, relying on settled
jurisprudence, denied the same and convicted him of bigamy.

We are not unmindful of the fact that we have consistently ruled in a long line of jurisprudence that a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity obtained prior to the celebration of the second marriage is required as a valid
defense in bigamy. Upon the enactment of the Family Code, specifically the requirement laid down in Article
40, we overturned our earlier rulings in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat and declared that a subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage could not be considered as a valid defense in the prosecution for
bigamy. Corollary, a judicial declaration obtained subsequent to the celebration of the second marriage is
considered immaterial in the criminal prosecution for bigamy as relied upon by the courts a quo in the case at
bar.

With regard to the second marriage, our earlier rulings in Dumpo and Lara were likewise overturned. In
effect, Merced, Zapanta and De la Cruz declaring that an action for nullity of the second marriage is a
prejudicial question to the prosecution for bigamy is abandoned. The existing rule, therefore, is that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a valid defense in bigamy nor a prejudicial question to a
criminal action for bigamy.

Now, this Court has the timely opportunity to review and revisit the rationale of our earlier pronouncements,
and therefore, adopt a more liberal view in favor of the accused. To start, a brief examination of our earlier
rulings is in order.

In Domingo, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage was explicitly required either as a cause of
57

action or a defense in view of the pronouncement in Article 40 of the Family Code. "[T]he requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or
her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy." The policy behind the requirement
58

for a judicial declaration is explained thus:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared, by the Constitution as an "inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the
State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability
and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a
 marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the
basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution
would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And
the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official stajte
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity, of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone. (Emphasis supplied.)
59

Mercado v. Tan (Mercado) reiterated

60
the ruling in Domingo and abandoned the rulings
in Mendoza and Aragon as the latter were already set aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Mercado held
that to allow the accused to subsequently obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage would encourage
delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases as the accused could simply file a petition to declare the previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of the action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. As ruled by
61

the Court in Mercado, the subsequently acquired judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage is
immaterial as the crime of bigamy had already been consummated:

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover,
his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. (Emphasis 62

supplied.)

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (Marbella-Bobis) held that without a judicial declaration of nullity, the first marriage is
63

presumed to be subsisting and for all legal intents and purposes, the parties are considered as married at the
time the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
64

declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, Thus, the Court
65

declared that:

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry, again; otherwise the second
marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondeat entered into a second marriage during
the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the, criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As
stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the
criminal action against him. (Emphasis supplied.)
66

Abunado v. People (Abunado) again ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
67

marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Hence, under the law, a marriage, whether void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. 68

Jarillo maintained the earlier pronouncements in Marbella-Bobis and Abunado and further declared that the
69

subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage could not be considered as a valid defense in the
prosecution for bigamy. It declared that Article 349 of the RPC penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or. subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 70

Montañez held that the annulment of the first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
71

justify the dismissal of the bigamy case. The parties to a marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity. So long as there is no such declaration of nullity, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Thus, a
party who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 72

In Teves v. People, the Court held that the filing of the petition for the declaration of nullity of the earlier
73

marriage prior to the filing of information for bigamy cannot be allowed as a defense for the bigamy case.
Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, thus, liability instantly
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. The finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. 74

Antone v. Beronilla (Antone) held that the declaration of nullity of the marriage obtained after the celebration of
75

the subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information
for bigamy do not constitute an offense. Neither may such be inteiposed as a defense by the accused in his
motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the
information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence. People v.
76

Odtuhan reiterated the ruling in Antone that the time of the filing of the criminal complaint or information is
77

material only for determining prescription and that obtaining a declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing
of the complaint for bigamy is not a valid defense in the prosecution. 78

In Vitangcol v. People, the Court again ruled that even assuming that the first marriage was solemnized
79

without a marriage license, the accused remains liable for bigamy as his first marriage was not judicially
declared void nor his first wife judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. To remove the
80

requirement of judicial declaration of nullity would render Article 349 of the RPC useless as the bigamist would
simply claim that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
81

Interestingly however, in Morigo v. People (Morigo), the Court held that the marriage of Lucio and. Lucia was
82

considered a void and inexistent marriage, meaning there was no marriage to begin with, in view of the
absence of an actual marriage ceremony performed by a solemnizing officer between the contracting parties.
The Court declared that such declaration of nul lity retroacts to the date of the first marriage.

Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio retroactive to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was considered never married
under the eyes of the law. Consequently, with the declaration of nullity of the first marriage, the first element of
bigamy, that is, that the accused must have been legally married, was lacking. Thus, the accused was
acquitted based on the subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage as there was no first marriage to
speak of. 83

Morigo was distinguished from Mercado where, in the latter case, the first marriage was declared void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license but the marriage was actually solemnized twice. Thus, in Mercado, the
subsequent decree of absolute nullity of the first marriage was not considered a valid defense in the bigamy
case. The main reason was that in Mercado, the first marriage appeared to have transpired although later
declared void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license while in Morigo no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Although both first marriages were subsequently declared
84

void ab initio, the rulings in Morigo and Mercado are at variance as to the effects and consequences of a
void ab initio marriage.
With regard to a void ab initio second marriage, the Court declared in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals (Tenebro) that the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is immaterial in the
85

prosecution for bigamy, to wit:

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails
to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are
concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner's valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former maniage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
86

Jarillo reiterated the ruling in Tenebro that a judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage will not
absolve the accused from the bigamy charge, thus:

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner's conviction of the
crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's
two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the
time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and
subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy
make any difference. As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage
is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy . ... A plain
reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage daring the subsistence
of a valid marriage". (Emphasis supplied.)
87

Also, in Nollora, Jr. v. People and Lasanas v. People, the Court retold its ruling in Tenebro by declaring that a
88 89

subsequently acquired judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage cannot exculpate the accused from
the criminal liability for bigamy. Tenebro and the succeeding cases, in effect, abandoned our rulings
in Dumpo and Lara, which allowed the accused to interpose the defense of a void ab initio second marriage In
the same criminal proceeding; and Merced, Zapanta and De la Cruz which recognized that the action for nullity
of the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal action for bigamy.

A thorough review of the foregoing rulings shows that the judicial declarations of absolute nullity of the first and
second marriages obtained subsequent to the celebration of the second marriage are not valid defenses in the
criminal prosecution for bigamy. The only valid defense recognized by the Court in the above-mentioned cases
is a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage obtained by the accused prior to the celebration
of the second marriage.

After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by
the accused in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity
is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented
by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which
they are secured.

The aforesaid conclusion is anchored on and justified by the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the
legislative intent of Article 40 of the Family Code and the fundamental, rules of construction governing penal
laws.

Retroactive effects of a void ab initio

marriage in criminal prosecutions for
bigamy

The Family Code specifically provides that certain marriages are considered void ab initio namely, Articles 35,
36, 37, 38, 44 and 53. These marriages are void from the beginning due to the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites, for being incestuous, or by reason of public policy. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. To all legal intents and purposes, the void ab initio marriage does not exist
90

and the parties thereto, under the lens of the law, were never married. 91

Thus, we ruled in Niñal v. Bayadog (Niñal) that under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
92

far as concerns the conferment of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
A void marriage produces no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children
born to void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Articles 43 and 44 as well as Articles 51, 53, and
54 of the Family Code

And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife. Jurisprudence under the Civil
Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage; the exception to
this is Article 40 of the Family Code, which expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. However, it must be borne in mind that the requirement of Article 40 is merely for purposes of
93

remarriage and does not affect the accused's right to collaterally attack the validity of the' void ab
initio marriage in criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In contrast, voidable marriages under Article 45 of the Family Code are considered valid and produces all its
civil effects until it is set aside by a competent court in an action for annulment. It is capable of ratification, and
cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding. It is considered valid during its subsistence and
94

only ceases upon the finality of the decree of annulment of a competent court, "Indeed, the terms "annul" and
"null and void" have different legal connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate;
obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with whereas null and void is something
that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases
to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply
declares a status or condition which already exists from the very beginning." In this respect, the effects of a
95

declaration of the nullity of a void marriage by a competent court retroacts to the date of the celebration thereof,
since the spouses were considered never married under the lens of the law.

In Castillo v. Castillo, we distinguished void and voidable marriages, thus:

96

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1)
a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in
a voidable, marriage, the, marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a
void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no
 conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a
judicial decree. (Emphasis supplied.)
97

Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at
any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void
98

without need of any judicial declaration of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40
of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence
necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.

Clearly, when the first marriage is void ab initio, one of the essential elements of bigamy is absent, i.e. a prior
valid marriage. There can be no crime when the very act which was penalized by the law, i.e. contracting
another marriage during the subsistence of a prior legal or valid marriage, is not present. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction
for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to begin with. Thus, an accused in a
99

bigamy case should be allowed to raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage through competent
evidence other than the judicial decree of nullity.

Apropos, with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the
judicial declaration of nullity merely confirms the inexistence of such marriage. Thus, the second element of
bigamy, i.e. that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled, is wanting in case of void ab
initio prior marriage. What Article 349 of the RPC contemplates is contracting a subsequent marriage when a
voidable or valid first marriage is still subsisting. As expounded by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe,
Article 349 of the RPC was patterned after the Codigo Penal, which was enacted when the law governing
marriages was the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which provides that marriages may be dissolved either through
annulment or divorce. The term "former marriage", therefore, in the second element of bigamy refers to
voidable or valid marriages which may be dissolved by annulment or divorce, respectively. Hence, Article 349
should be construed to pertain only to valid and voidable marriages.

In effect, when the accused contracts a second marriage without having the first marriage dissolved or
annulled, the crime of bigamy is consummated as the valid or voidable first marriage still subsists without a
decree of annulment by a competent court, In contrast, when the first marriage is void ab initio, the accused
cannot be held liable for bigamy as the judicial declaration of its nullity is not tantamount to annulment nor
dissolution but merely a declaration of a status or condition that no such marriage exists.

In the same manner, when the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage that is void ab initio, other
than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy as the effect of a void marriage signifies that
the accused has not entered into a second or subsequent marriage, being inexistent from the beginning. Thus,
the element, "that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage" is lacking. A subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the second marriage merely confirms its inexistence and shall not render the accused
liable for bigamy for entering such void marriage while the first marriage still subsists. Consequently, the
accused in bigamy may validly raise a void ab initio second or subsequent marriage even without a judicial
declaration of nullity.

True, a marriage is presumed to be valid even if the same is void ab initio without a judicial declaration of its
absolute nullity in view of Article 40 of the Family Code. However, the accused in a bigamy case should not be
denied the right to interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage, which effectively retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage.

Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, we find that our ruling in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat is more
consistent with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage. However, the Court has since extended the
application of Article 40 of the Family Code to criminal prosecutions for bigamy and overturned the principle
laid down in Mendoza, Aragon and Odayat as well as in Dumpo and Lara. This restriction imposed on the
accused wholly disregards the inexistent nature and retroactive effects of a void marriage. In view thereof, a
revisit of the application of Article 40 of the Family Code to criminal prosecutions for bigamy is imperative.

Article 40 of the Family Code

requires a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity for purposes of
remarriage but not as a defense in
bigamy. Article 40 did not amend or
repeal Article 349 of the RPC.

The Minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees discussed that the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a previous marriage was required for the purpose of establishing the
validity of the subsequent marriage and to ensure that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, as only competent courts have such authority. Domingo, citing the minutes of the
152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, elucidated on how the provisions of Article
40 of the Family Code were framed and the intent behind the requirement laid down therein, to wit:

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

"B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void
but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be
modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only ...

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only ...

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only ...

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to
read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have
to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final

judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is
void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some
judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it Is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void maniage and not annullable marriages, with which
the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are
presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase 'absolute
nullity' can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to
'invalidity' if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the
marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the
idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not
the marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving
one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that
there will be judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because
it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral
declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of
Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked

only on the basis of final judgment ...

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the

absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof Bautista. He proposed that they say:
 For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring
the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation. Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41." (Emphasis supplied.)
100

It is worth noting that Domingo is originally a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage and separation
of property filed by the wife against the husband to recover certain real and personal properties. The main
issue therein is whether the petition for declaration of absolute nullity is necessary in order for the wife to
recover her allegedly exclusive real and personal properties. Hence, the Court clarifies that the requirement
under Article 40, i.e. final judgment declaring the previous marriage void, need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. The word "solely" qualifies the "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void"
and not "for purposes of remarriage." 101

In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in action for liquidation, partition, distribution, and separation of property, custody and
support of common children and delivery of presumptive legitimes. Nonetheless, Domingo declares that other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, may also prove the absolute nullity of the previous marriage in the said
instances. Hence, such previous void marriage need not be proved solely by an earlier final judgment of court
declaring it void. In other words, for purposes of remarriage, the only evidence to prove a void marriage is the
final judgment declaring its absolute nullity. In other cases, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be proved by
evidence other than such judicial declaration. Thus, when one so desires to enter into another marriage when
his or her previous marriage is still subsisting, he is required by law to prove that the previous one is an
absolute nullity. In fact, the Family Code requires the parties to a marriage to declare in the application for a
102

marriage license if they were previously married; and how, when and where the such previous marriage was
dissolved and annulled. 103

Domingo did not specifically include criminal prosecutions for bigamy in the enumeration of instances where
the absolute nullity of a marriage may be proved by evidence other than the judicial declaration of its nullity.
However, the enumeration in Domingo did not purport to be an exhaustive list. Moreover, the discussion in the
minutes plainly shows that the Civil Law and Family Committees did not: intend to deprive the accused or
defendant to raise the defense of the absolute nullity of a void ab initio marriage in the same criminal
proceeding. The Joint Committees, In formulating Article 40, primarily aimed to ensure the validity of the
subsequent marriage sought to be contracted by one of the parties by requiring him or her to first obtain a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his or her previous marriage.

Moreover, as aptly pointed out by Justice Caguioa, the Court, reading together the provisions of the Civil Code
and Article 40 of the Family Code, held in Niñal and reiterated in Cariño v. Cariño that a void ab
104 105

initio marriage can be subject of a collateral attack even in a criminal case:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore
the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
 upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral in any civil court between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. (Emphasis
106

supplied.)

Well-settled is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored by the law. A statute must be so construed as to
107

harmonize all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. Interpretare et
108

concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The purpose of Article 40 of the Family Code is
109

not at all inconsistent nor irreconcilable with the criminal prosecutions for bigamy defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the RPC. Neither does Article 40 explicitly or impliedly repeal Article 349 of the RPC.

Plainly, Article 40 of the Family Code does not categorically withhold from the accused the right to invoke the
defense of a void ab initio marriage even without a judicial decree of absolute nullity in criminal prosecution for
bigamy. To adopt a contrary stringent application would defy the principle that penal laws are strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Granted, the State has the right to preserve and protect
the sanctity of marriage; this should not, however, be done at the expense of the presumption of innocence of
the accused. What is penalized under Article 349 of the RPC is the act of contracting a subsequent marriage
while the prior marriage was valid and subsisting. This simply connotes that this provision penalizes contracting
of a voidable or valid marriage and not a void ab initio marriage.

Nothing in Article 40 mentions the effect thereof on the criminal liability of the accused in bigamy cases. It
would indeed be unfair to withhold from the accused in a bigamy case the right and the opportunity to raise the
defense of nullity of a void ab initio marriage when the law does not explicitly say so. Thus, to borrow Justice
Caguioa5 s opinion, even with the enactment of Article 40, a void ab initio marriage remains a valid defense in
bigamy, and a prior and separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not indispensable to establish the
same.

We cannot simply disregard the effects of a void, ab initio marriage and penalize the accused, for bigamy
despite the clear absence of a valid prior marriage on the mere speculation that this interpretation may be
subject to abuse by those parties who deliberately and consciously enter into multiple marriages knowing them
to be void and thereafter, evade prosecution on the pretext of a void ab initio marriage. It must be pointed out
and emphasized that these deliberate acts are already penalized under Article 350 of the RPC which reads:
 ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person
who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall
contract, marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not, been complied
with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence,
intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided, in
the next preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the dilemma sought to be prevented as reflected in several cases is nothing more but a mere speculation
and should not be considered sufficient ground to sustain the erroneous conclusion that to allow the accused to
collaterally attack a void ab initio marriage in bigamy cases would render nugatory Article 349 of the RPC. To
reiterate, Article 349 of the RPC penalizes parties who contracted a valid or voidable second marriage when
the first marriage, which may be valid or voidable, is still subsisting. In contrast, Article 350 of the RPC
penalizes those who without being included in Article 349, contract a marriage knowing that the requirements
of the law have not been complied with or in disregard of a legal impediment.

Thus, an accused who contracts a void ab initio marriage may escape liability under Article 349 as it strictly
encompasses valid or voidable first and second marriages. However, the accused in contracting a marriage
knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or in disregard of a legal impediment
may be covered and penalized under Article 350 which addresses the predicament that to permit the accused
to use the defense of a void ab initio marriage or to present a judicial declaration of nullity in criminal
prosecution for bigamy would make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage by entering into multiple marriages
knowing it to be void and thereafter escape punishment under Article 349.

Furthermore, it bears noting that in Tenebro, it was held that void ab initio marriages retroact to the date of the
110

celebration of marriage but also produce legal effects and consequences as expressly provided under the
111

statute such as on property relations, inheritance, donations, insurance beneficiary, legitimacy of children,
custody of children, and support of common children. Tenebro included the incurring of criminal liability for
bigamy as one of the legal effects and consequences despite the fact that there is no express, mention thereof
in the Family Code or, any statute. It is, thus, supercilious to hold that these legal effects and consequences
include incurring criminal liability for bigamy without violating a fundamental principle in criminal law, that is,
penal statues are strictly construed against the State and in favor of the accused. To hold otherwise would
amount to judicial legislation which is obviously proscribed.

Penal laws are strictly construed

against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.

It is a time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. Criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a law specifically calls for its
punishment. Thus, courts must not bring cases within the provision of law that are not clearly embraced by it.
The terms of the statute must clearly encompass the act committed by an accused for the latter to be held
liable under the provision. Any ambiguity in the law will always be construed strictly against the state and in
favor of the accused. 112

The fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention,
113

implication, or even equity consideration. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included,
114

beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered, within the statute's operation. 115

When the Court is confronted with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him, the rule of lenity calls for the adoption of an interpretation which
is more lenient to the accused. In the instant case, to hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is a
116

necessity before an accused in criminal prosecution for bigamy may invoke his void ab initio marriage as a
valid defense interprets Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the accused, in
violation of the rule of lenity and the rule on strict construction of penal laws. As quoted from the Dissent of
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Tenebro:

The principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the
accused and strictly against the State is deeply rooted in the need to protect constitutional
guarantees. This principle serves notice to the public that only those acts clearly, and
plainly prohibited in penal laws are subject to criminal sanctions. To expand penal laws
beyond their clear and plain meaning is no longer fair notice to the public. Thus, the
principle insures observance of due process of law. The principle also prevents
discriminatory application of penal laws. State prosecutors have no power to broaden arbitrarily
the application of penal laws beyond the plain and common understanding of the people who
are subject to their penalties. Hence, the principle insures equal protection of the law.

The principle is also rooted in the need to maintain the separation of powers by insuring
that the legislature, and not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes their
penalties. As aptly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice John
Marshall, in United States v. Wiltberger:

The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less
old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is
vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not
the Court, whichis to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment. (Emphasis supplied.)
117

Nevertheless, we reiterate that the phrase "for purposes of remarriage" in Article 40 does not restrict the
accused in a criminal case for bigamy, or parties in cases brought for purposes other than remarriage, from
presenting a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage in evidence. The framers of the Family Code
included the qualifying phrase "for purposes of remarriage" in drafting Article 40 of the Family Code merely in
recognition of the fact that there are actions other than for purposes of remarriage that are brought under the
assumption that the marriage is valid, and to allow the defendants in the said actions to present evidence that
the marriage is void to absolve themselves of liability. Thus, the tenor of Article 40 of the Family Code is that
118

for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes other than remarriage
such as an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile
spouses, other evidence is also acceptable to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity.

Accordingly, Article 349 of the RPC and Article 40 of the Family Code should be harmonized and liberally
construed towards the protection of the sanctity of marriage and the presumption of innocence of the accused.
With the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the marriage is considered non-existent from the time of
the celebration of marriage. Therefore, to penalize and impose suffering on an individual on the basis of a non-
existent marriage renders our penal laws sorely vindictive and resentful.

All told, we hold that in criminal prosecutions for bigamy, the accused can validly interpose the
defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial declaration of absolute nullity .
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent marriages
obtained by the accused in a separate proceeding, irrespective of the time within which they are
secured, is a valid defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

Conclusion
Applying the foregoing, Pulido may validly raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage in the bigamy charge
against him. In fact, he assails the validity of his marriage with Arcon on the absence of a valid marriage
license as per the Certification dated December 8, 2008 issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
119

(Registrar) of Rosario, Cavite which states:

This is to certify that no marriage license # 7240107 issued on September 5, 1983 based on
the availability of record book for marriage application found in this office.

This is to further certify that from the same available record book, an inclusion of name of
certain Luisito Pulido and Nora Arcon as male and female, contracting party have applied for a
marriage license on the date of August 8, 1983 under registry # 198 (1).

No corresponding entry on the date of issuance of marriage license and marriage license
number respectively have appeared on the said record book, as noted.

However, no original document, of the Marriage License and Marriage Application of Luisito
Pulido could be presented. Possibilities that the said documents were one of among
unnumbered marriage application and marriage license that were eaten by termites.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) 120

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, Pulido and Arcon applied for a marriage license on August 8, 1983 with
Registry No. 198 (1). However, the Registrar noted that there was no record of entry of: (a) the date of
issuance of a marriage license; and (b) the marriage license number in the record book for marriage
application. The original documents of the marriage license and marriage application cannot be retrieved nor
found in their custody. However, the Registrar states that these documents could possibly be among those
unnumbered marriage application and marriage license that were destroyed due to termite infestation.

To note, the Registrar did not categorically declare that a marriage license was issued to Pulido and Arcon nor
that it was issued but was destroyed due to termite infestation. It bears stressing that the Registrar found no
entry of its date of issuance and license number in its record book, which will likely explain why the original
document of the marriage license could not be found in its custody. With the absence of a valid marriage
license, a reasonable doubt arises as to existence of a prior valid marriage, i.e. Pulido's first marriage with
Arcon, which is one of the elements of bigamy

Verily, the marriage contract is the prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. "Prima facie is defined as
121

evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish,
a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient." However, while Pulido and Arcon's Marriage Contract bears a marriage
122 123

license number issued on September 5, 1983, there is doubt as to the fact of its existence and issuance as per
Certification dated December 8, 2008, which essentially affects the validity of their marriage. Thus, there exists
a reasonable doubt whether indeed Pulido and Arcon had a marriage license when they entered into marriage
on September 5, 1983.

More importantly, during the pendency of this case, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of Pulido's marriage
with Arcon due to the absence of a valid marriage license was issued and attained finality on May 11,
2016. On June 29, 2016, the RTC issued a Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage which effectively retroacts
124 125

to the date of the celebration of Pulido and Arcon's marriage, i.e. on September 5, 1983, This connotes that
Pulido and Arcon were never married under the eyes of the law.

Where the discrepancies in the evidence are such as to give rise to a reasonable doubt, the accused should be
acquitted. "[T]he overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
126

whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his/[her] guilt." 127

The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133
of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof
as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." To overcome the accused's constitutional
presumption of innocence, the prosecution must prove that a crime was committed and that the accused is the
person responsible. 128

Lacking an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., a prior valid marriage, as per Certification dated
December 8, 2008 and the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of Pulido and Arcon's marriage, the
prosecution failed to prove that the crime of bigamy is committed. Therefore, the acquittal of Pulido from the
bigamy charge is warranted.

Needless to say, as to the absolute nullity of his second marriage with Baleda, it was declared void ab
initio because of being bigamous and not because it lacked any of the essential requisites of a marriage.
Hence, petitioner cannot use the same as a defense in his prosecution for bigamy.

Summary:

To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a
bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family
Code. Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the accused
the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.

However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment decree as a
defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is considered valid and
subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The crime of bigamy, therefore, is consummated when
the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of the voidable first marriage. The same rule
applies if the second marriage is merely considered as voidable.

To our mind, it is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a void ab
initio marriage can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial declaration of absolute
nullity. The accused may present testimonial or documentary evidence such as the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first and/or subsequent void ab initio marriages in the criminal prosecution for bigamy.
The said view is more in accord with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of and
legislative intent behind Article 40 of the Family Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal laws.
Therefore, the absence of a "prior valid marriage" and the subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
his first marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of Bigamy charged against him.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2015 Decision and
August 18, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33008 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Luisito G. Pulido is ACQUITTED.

Let entry of judgment be issued.

SO ORDERED.

AUSTRIA VS AAA

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 205275. June 28, 2022 ]

MAMERTO AUSTRIA, PETITIONER, VS. AAA AND BBB, RESPONDENTS.

CONCURRENCE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

I agree with the disposition to remand the case to the trial court for resolution of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appeals
1

properly struck down the trial court's Joint Orders as a nullity which simply copied Mamerto Austria's
allegations in his motion for reconsideration and memoranda. There was no analysis of the evidence nor a
reference to any legal basis for the conclusion in violation of the Constitution.

The ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Mario V. Lopez takes the opportunity to lay down rules
for the bench and the bar to follow with respect to the legal standing of a private complainant in assailing
judgments or orders in criminal proceedings before the Court and the Court of Appeals.

It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
thereof. The suit is dismissible when the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest.
2 3

Meanwhile, a crime is an offense against the State, hence, it is prosecuted in the name of People of the
Philippines. As the real party in interest, the People have the inherent prerogative to prosecute the offense.
4

This includes the authority to appeal from the accused's acquittal, the dismissal of the case, and other
interlocutory orders relating to the criminal aspect of the case. 5

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
6

Information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor
represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts, and regional trial courts. When such criminal actions are
brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, however, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the
People of the Philippines, not the public prosecutor. 7

Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.: 8

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers x x x shall have the following specific powers
and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the

Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphasis in the
original).

Indeed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines
in all criminal cases. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the
9

Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the State. 10

As a qualification, however, the Court recognizes that the private offended party has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case. Logically, the capability of the private complainant to question the dismissal of the criminal
proceedings is limited only to questions relating to the civil aspect of the case. It should ideally be along this
thin framework that we may entertain questions regarding the dismissals of criminal cases instituted by private
offended parties.11
 The litmus test, therefore, in ascertaining the personality of a private complainant lies in whether or not the
substance of the certiorari action instituted in the Court of Appeals refers to the civil aspect of the case. 12

People v. Santiago is instructive:

13

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role
is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However,
the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the
acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant.

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal. 14

Verily, once the private complainant raises the main issues or matters involving the criminal aspect of the
case such as the existence of probable cause, he or she loses the legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case. Evidently, the principal purpose of his or her appeal is no longer the protection of his or her
pecuniary interest as an offended party but the reinstatement of the criminal action, which amounts to an
encroachment on the People's right to prosecute. 15

The following, however, are instances where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal
without the OSG's intervention:

One. When the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. In this situation, it
16

is assumed that a decision on the merits had already been rendered by the lower court and it is the civil aspect
of the case which the offended party is appealing. The offended party who is not satisfied with the outcome of
the case may question the amount of the grant or denial of damages by the court below even without the
participation of the Solicitor General. 17

Two. When there is a denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to
act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party. It contemplates a situation where
18

the State and the offended party are deprived of due process because the prosecution is remiss in its duty to
protect the interest of the State and the offended party. This Court recognizes the right of the offended party to
appeal an order of the trial court which denied him or her and the State due process of law. 19
 Three. When there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so
requires.20

Four. When the circumstances surrounding the case, such as the absence of support from the OSG, leave
the private complainant with no other suitable recourse but to appeal the case himself or herself. 21

The above points have a common denominator, the private complainant was clothed with personality even
without the OSG's intervention in cases where the decision or order smacks of apparent error that ultimately
resulted in the denial of justice both for the State and the private complainant.

I join the ponencia in maintaining these exceptions. Certainly, in vesting the private complainant with the
requisite legal personality before the Court of Appeals, the Court did so after considering the pieces of
evidence on record vis-à-vis the patent error elevated for review. But we cannot clothe the private complainant
with an all too convenient personality to go to the Court of Appeals and raise questions even beyond the civil
liability. To do so would elevate the private complainant to the level of the OSG, worse, even higher than the
OSG. Surely, the interest of the People, as the real-party-in interest, is paramount and should prevail over the
participation of the private complainant through the private prosecutor. 22

While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, his or her participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he or
she cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be
tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the
provisions of law.
23

In Anlud Metal Recycling Corp. v. Ang, the Court categorically held that enlarging the scope of what a
private complainant may raise in a certiorari action may result in wanton disregard of the OSG's personality, as
well as the clogging of our dockets, which this Court is keen to avoid.24

At any rate, an appeal of the criminal case is dismissible if not filed by the People as represented by
the OSG. Cu v. Ventura is apropos:
25

Again, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by

the trial court, or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that
may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The
rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are
mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People are deemed as the
real parties-in-interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can
represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In
view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an
appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG
is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may,
however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as
the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil
action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the
end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case. 1a⍵⍴h!1

ALL TOLD, I vote in favor of the guidelines governing the participation of a private complainant in appellate
or certiorari proceedings in criminal cases; and the remand of the case to the trial court for resolution of
petitioner's motions for reconsideration.