Legal Research Case Digests Homework

Bryan Angelo Mui

191070

OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

vs. PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION

FACTS:

 Olympic was granted "Mining Lease Contracts" by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) covering mining areas located in Palawan.
 Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum for a royalty free of
percentage of the gross revenues.
 This gave Platinum Group Metals Corp. the exclusive right to control, possess,
manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining
products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra, with an area of 768
hectares, and the Pulot Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Espanola, covering an area of
1,408 hectares for a period of 25 years.
 After 3 years, Olympic informed Platinum of the immediate termination of the Operating
Agreement because of Platinum’s gross violations of its terms, and directed Platinum to
immediately surrender possession of the subject mining areas under the Operating
Agreement.
 Olympic filed administrative cases against Platinum intent with the intent to terminate the
Operating Agreement and to revoke Platinum9s Small Scale Mining Permits.
 And During the pendency of these cases, Olympic transferred its MPSA applications to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment without notice to or the consent of Platinum, which
was approved by the Regional Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau.
 This led to Platinum filing a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract,
and specific performance against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan.
  However, Olympic filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in the complaint, as these involved a mining
dispute requiring the technical expertise of the Panel of Arbitrators (POA)

ISSUE + RATIO

 W/N the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan has jurisdiction over these issues raised in the
complaint as it involved a mining dispute?
 The court ruled that the RTC of Puerto Prinsesa has jurisdiction. The resolution of the
validity or voidness of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question as it requires the
exercise of judicial function. The court also stated that this is not anymore, a mining
dispute but it became judicial because of the complaint was not merely for the
determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of those
contracts is put in issue.

LIM V. PACQUING

FACTS:

 Judge Pacquing issued an order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue a
permit/license to operate a jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation
(ADC).
 Due to the mayor’s noncompliance, the judge issued an order directing mayor Lim to
explain why he should not be cited in contempt. Another order was then sent afterwards
reiterating the order to grant license/permit to ADC.
 Mayor Lim filed petition in GR No. 115044 but the same was dismissed. An order to
immediately release the permit/license was then passed
 Executive Secretary Guingona issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB), Francisco R. Sumulong, Jr. to hold the grant of the license.
This prompted ADC to file a case for prohibition, mandamus, and injunction with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which were granted by the
 RTC Judge Reyes. Thus, Guingona and Sumulong filed a petition assailing the orders of
the judge.The Court analyzed the pertinent laws on the subject:
 In 1951, Executive Order No. 392 transferred the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
 In 1953, Republic Act No. 954 was passed, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse
Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai) " The law stated that for a person to operate a
basque pelota(jai-alai) game, he must have been granted a legislative franchise.
 In 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 7065entitled
"An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of
Manila…."In 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued entitled "Revoking All
Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit
And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On…Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota,…", and
Section 3thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments. Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The
Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And
Maintain A Fronton For Basque…" was promulgated.
 However, in 1987, then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly
repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation.

ISSUE + RATIO

 W/N PD No. 771 was in violation of the equal protection clause and non-impairment
clause.
 No. A franchise is a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the
government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power
for the public welfare
 No. There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the
decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or
exception.” “ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked.”
CABUAY JR. V. MALVAR

FACTS:

 In 1936, Hermogenes Lopez filed his homestead application docketed as Homestead

application No. 138612 for the land in Barrio De La Paz, Antipolo City that he inherited
from his father, Fermin Lopez, upon knowing that the said application was not acted
upon.
 Hermogenes continued to occupy the land until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio
Aguilar. Records show though that the said land was registered in the name of Fernando
Gorospe under Original Certificate of Title 537.
 Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario De Tagle. Tagle sold the
land to Antonio Zuzuarregui Sr., who issued TCT 7357. When Antonio died, the property
was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz. Beatriz Zuzuarregui sold the land to Eduardo
Santos. Lopez filed a complaint for annulment of Oct 537.
 However, this was dismissed on the complaint that Lopez was not the real party-in-
interest since he sold the property to Aguilar. Aguilar was then prompted to file similar
action against the defendants.
 The courts rendered judgment in favor of Aguilar, declaring him the true and lawful
owner of the land. Lopez heirs on July, 16, 1984 filed a complaint of cancellation of the
deed of sale between Hermogenes and Aguilar over the land, alleging that Hemrogenes
was “insufficiently educated” when he made the sale. Court rendered its decision
declaring void ab initio the Lopez-Aguilar deed of sale and restoring the Lopezheirs’
possession. Adia heris filed a separate action for partial quashal of the writ of execution
with application for preliminary injuction against the Lopez heirs’.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Adia heirs then filed filed a protest with the
Land Management Bureau hoping that the property be titled to their names. LMB
disregarded the final decision of SC and ordered the reconstruction of the homestead
 application of Adia. Lopez heirs together with Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who bought a
portion of the land, filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the
decision.
 This caused Col. Pedro Cabuay Jr. to file with the SC petition for clarification as to the
validity and forceful effect the final and executoy but conflicting decisions. Malvar then
filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer for referral to the court en banc

ISSUE + RATIO

 W/N the Lopez heirs are legitimate owners of the subject property?
 Yes. The Court ruled that the weight of evidence and jurisprudence shows that the
Lopez heirs are the lawful owners of the land in controversy. The First Division,
through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, recognizes the right of ownership of
Hermogenes Lopez over the property by reason of his continuous possession since
1920 and his full compliance with the requirements by the Public Land Act for the
issuance of a homestead patent. Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements
of the Public Land Act.

AGOY V. ARANETA CENTER, INC.

FACTS:

 This case reiterates the Court’s ruling that the adjudication of a case by minute resolution
is an exercise of judicial discretion and constitutes sound and valid judicial practice.
 On June 15, 2011 the Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s petition for review through a
minute resolution that reads:
 “G.R. No. 196358 (  Jandy J. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc. ).- The Court resolves to
GRANT petitioner’s motion for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
 The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated 19 October 2010 and Resolution dated 29 March 2011 of the Court of
 Appeals (CA), Manila, in CA-G.R. SP No. 108234 for failure to show that the CA
committed reversible error when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy.
 Petitioner’s repeated delays in remitting the excess cash advances and admission that he
spent them for other purposes constitute serious misconduct and dishonesty which rendered
him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by respondent Araneta Center, Inc.” 
 Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the above minute
resolution that he received through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the
same and to have his case resolved on its merits via a regular resolution or decision signed
by the Justices who took part in the deliberation. In a related development, someone
claiming to be Agoy’s attorney-in-fact requested an
investigation of the issuance of the resolution of June 15, 2011.
 On September 21, 2011 the Court denied Agoy’s motion to rescind the subject minute
resolution and confirmed the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011
resolution.
 Upon receipt of the Court’s September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to rescind
the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation
to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court
cannot decide his petition by a minute resolution. He thus prayed that it rescinds its June 15
and September 21, 2011 resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the Court to
resolve his petition through a minute resolution, and submit the case to the Court en banc for
proper disposition through a signed resolution or decision.

ISSUE + RATIO
 Whether or not it was proper for the Court to deny his petition through a minute
Resolution
 Yes its proper. While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and
distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in
denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis for such denial.

 
 The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it
constitute actual adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation
among the members of the Court. When the Court does not find any reversible error in the
decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its
denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of
the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It would be an exercise
in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the
petition the conclusions that the CA reached.