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State-Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe's "Second Republic"

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DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2021.1949361

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 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies -
Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity

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State–Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe’s

“Second Republic”

Itai Kabonga & Kwashirai Zvokuomba

To cite this article: Itai Kabonga & Kwashirai Zvokuomba (2021): State–Civil Society Relations in
Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic”, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter-
and Transdisciplinarity, DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2021.1949361

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 Article

State–Civil Society Relations in Zimbabwe’s

“Second Republic”
Itai Kabonga Kwashirai Zvokuomba
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6533-996X https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8152-9621
Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University University of Johannesburg,
vakabonga@gmail.com South Africa
Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University
zvokuombak@gmail.com

Abstract
The greater part of Robert Mugabe’s reign was characterised by attempts to
silence and curtail civil activism. His rule crystallised in the banning of civil
society organisations (CSOs) and wanton arrests of CSO representatives. The
fall of Mugabe marked the genesis of the “Second Republic”, led by President
Emmerson Mnangagwa. Euphoria gripped Zimbabweans as the new president
promised a significant break with the old regime through re-engaging with the
international community and opening up the democratic space. However, an
analysis of relations between civil society and the state in the Second Republic
reveals continuous threats against CSOs, the maintenance of restrictive laws,
and superficial reforms. The Second Republic seems to be sympathetic to
development- and welfare-oriented CSOs, considering those focusing on
advocacy and governance as enemies bent on destabilising the state.

Keywords: state–civil society relations; civil society organisations; Second Republic;

First Republic; Zimbabwe

International Journal of African Renaissance Studies https://doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2021.1949361

www.tandfonline.com/rars20 ISSN 1753-7274 (Online), ISSN 1818-6874 (Print)
© Unisa Press 2021
 Kabonga and Zvokuomba

Introduction and Background of the Study

Civil society organisations (CSOs) are important role players in the socio-economic
development of Zimbabwe. Their importance has also been observed in the sphere of
strengthening democracy and deepening good governance (Rahmato 2010). However,
the ability of CSOs to contribute to development depends on the nature and character of
their relations with the state (Moyo 2010). The relations between CSOs and the state in
Zimbabwe are not static but are in a constant state of flux, swinging from collegiality to
the attempt at reformation to confrontation.

After the attainment of independence in 1980, a plethora of CSOs worked to

complement the state in its development agenda. This was largely observed in the area
of the provision of public goods, mainly because of the benevolence the state showed
in this area, according to the framework by Hadenius and Uggla (1996), which we
adopted for this study. The failure of neoliberal policies in the mid-1990s awakened
civil activism, as various civil groups criticised the deterioration in living conditions.
This marked a turning point in the history of CSOs in Zimbabwe, as CSOs shrugged off
the attempt by the state to co-opt associational life “based on an ideological framework
of an all-encompassing, one-party state that embraced all pre-independence African
protest movements, including independent civil society organisations” (Moyo 1993, 3).
Since then, the CSO sector has grown by leaps and bounds. The sector in Zimbabwe is
now diverse, composed of trade unions, women’s groups, trust unions, non-govermental
organisations (NGOs) focused on development, welfare-oriented NGOs, advocacy
groups, governance organisations, and human rights organisations. In Zimbabwe, the
nature of the relations between CSOs and the state depends on context and politics
(Dorman 2002; Moyo 2010).

November 2017 marked a defining moment in the history of Zimbabwe: the end of the
“era or error” of the late Robert Mugabe. Toppled by a “soft coup”, Mugabe resigned,
claiming his “decision to resign [was] voluntary and [arose] from [his] concern for the
welfare of the people of Zimbabwe and [his] desire to ensure a smooth, peaceful and
non-violent transfer of power that underpins national security, peace and stability”
(Nhapi 2019, 156). The former strongman was deserted by his generals, his cabinet,
former colleagues and, poignantly, by almost all Zimbabweans (Nhapi 2019). Mugabe’s
rule during the “First Republic” was characterised, amongst other things, by attempts to
curtail civil activism. His rule involved the maintenance and promulgation of laws that
restricted CSOs, such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA), the Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), and the Private Voluntary
Organisations (PVO) Act. During the reign of the First Republic, CSOs were closed
down for supposedly interfering in politics. Moreover, CSO leaders were brutalised and
arrested for fronting regime change agendas. Against this background, this article
unpacks the relations between civil society and the state in the “Second Republic”.

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Problem Statement
Whereas there is abundant literature that discusses civil society–state relations in the
First Republic (from 1980 to 2017) (see Dorman 2001; Kagoro 2005; Magure 2009;
Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010), there is little, if anything, in terms of academic
literature that discusses civil society–state relations in the Second Republic (from
November 2017 onwards). The discussion of civil society–state relations in the
Second Republic has been prevalent in the private media, but has received little
academic attention.

Various scholars have argued that the First Republic was characterised by the state’s
attempt to stifle CSOs. The time has come to interrogate the existent civil society–state
relations in the Second Republic. This necessity is further heightened by the fact that
the president of the Second Republic promised to open up the democratic space. In fact,
the new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, promised a significant break from the
practices of the First Republic. The extent to which the Second Republic has managed
to achieve that is the focus of this study.

Debating the Conceptual Issues

Civil Society
As a “Janus-faced” concept, the understanding of civil society varies across place, time,
theoretical perspective, and political persuasion (Cowen and Arato 1992). Till the end
of the eighteenth century, civil society was perceived as a substitute for the state and
political society. George Hegel was the first to differentiate between the state and civil
society, firmly placing civil society between the family and the state (Muzondidya and
Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). More importantly, Hegel viewed civil society as the “arena where
disconnected and insulated individuals interacted on the basis of utility and recognition”
(Gutsa and Mandizadza 2014, 28). For Karl Marx, civil society was an arena where
individuals related and interacted as independent agents rather than as people who filled
prescribed social roles (Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). Muzondidya and
Nyathi-Ndlovu (2010, 26) provide a current view of civil society, arguing that

today, civil society is an all-encompassing term often used to refer to social structures
and interests beyond the household and outside state institutions, including voluntary
associations and non-profit organisations where people from both private and public
spheres, including those from communities, neighbourhoods, workplaces, religious
groups, and other interest groups, come together to advance their collective interests or
those of other associated groups.

In other parts of the world, particularly in Europe, the concept of civil society has been
taken to refer to collective citizen interests outside the operation of the government
(Woldring 1998). For Abdelrahman (2001), civil society includes the market economy,
social classes, corporations, and institutions concerned with the administration of

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“welfare” and civil law. Civil society is a mosaic of private individuals, classes, groups,
and institutions whose transactions are regulated by civil law and, as such, are not
directly dependent upon the political state itself. For Gutsa and Mandizadza (2014) and
Posner (2004), civil society is the public sphere, excluding behaviour imposed and
coerced by the state.

Civil Society Organisations

Having conceptualised civil society, it is important to unpack the concept of CSOs. This
concept is one of the most contested (Tjombe 2010), as different writers present
differing definitions. In summary, the concept of CSOs defies easy conceptualisation.
But what is clear is that society voluntarily organises itself, mainly through community-
based organisations (CBOs), people’s movements, and NGOs (Moyo 2010). In many
instances, CSOs encompass social movements and various CBOs (Edwards 2009).
Tjombe (2010) observes that the term “CSOs” is used interchangeably with other terms,
like “NGOs” and “non-profit organisations” (NPOs). Furthermore, Tjombe (2010)
provides the following useful features that can be used to identify CSOs:
• They are non-profit-distributing.
• They operate in the public interest.
• They adhere to democratic structures.
• Involvement is voluntary.
• They portray high levels of participation.
• Emphasis is on the empowerment of beneficiaries.
• They operate independently (both financially and administratively) from the state.

These features may be useful, but some of them also characterise NPOs and NGOs. In
the main, CSOs can be viewed as (Tjombe 2010, 101)

a wide range of organizations found at all levels of civil society between the individual
or family and the state, and which become involved in activities that pursue the interests
of their members, sponsors and/or beneficiaries. These include NGOs, community-
based organizations (CBOs), various clubs (such as service clubs and sporting
clubs) and interest-groups (such as trusts, foundations, women’s groups, trade
unions, chambers of commerce, hawkers’ organizations, and faith organizations).
Individual businesses, which are part of society’s economic structure, are excluded from
this definition.

It is clear that there are ambiguities in the use of the term “CSOs”, particularly the
inherent conflation with “NGOs”. Mohasi and Shale (2010) note that NGOs are often
equated with CSOs, perhaps because together with trade unions they are the most
influential actors in development policy agendas. Mohasi and Shale (2010) warn against
viewing CSOs as NGOs, arguing that the two are not the same. In fact, NGOs are just
one part of CSOs. This view is supported by Rahmato (2010). CSOs resemble a portfolio
of large and heterogeneous non-state actors, which includes NGOs, student
organisations, faith-based organisations (FBOs), media, trade unions, private sector

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 Kabonga and Zvokuomba

business associations, professional bodies of academia, youth organisations, cultural

associations, and kinship networks (Ataman 2003).

The above narratives equally apply to the Zimbabwean context. In Zimbabwe, CSOs
form a heterogeneous community that encompasses CBOs, humanitarian organisations,
various types of NGOs, human rights organisations, governance organisations, and
advocacy-oriented associations. According to Moyo (1993), the roles, functions, and
classification of CSOs in Zimbabwe have been contested since the emergence of civil
society in the 1940s and 1950s. This article adopts the definition of CSOs provided by
Moyo (2010), namely that of groups with many formations and configurations, aided
and unaided, local and international. Thus the term “CSOs”, according to Moyo (2010),
refers to both international and local groups, whether they be development- or
advocacy-oriented, that exist between the individual or family and the state.

The State
The state can be defined a as a set of political institutions that governs within a delimited
territory. The state is not a coherent whole, but rather consists of many institutions, such
as the armed forces, police, state bureaucracy, and courts. Examples of states include
Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.

The state relates with CSOs at many levels (Maseng 2011). CSO–state relations can be
construed from the nature of laws put in place to regulate CSOs: Are the laws favourable
or restrictive? Indeed, the introduction of legislation such as AIIPA, POSA, and the
Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) affected the Zimbabwean government’s relationship
with civil society. Furthermore, how the police and the courts enforce the laws gives an
indication of the character of CSO–state relations. In Zimbabwe the police and the army
have been accused of brutality against CSOs when enforcing the law (see
Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014), for instance in the rounding up and beating of
women by the Zimbabwe Republic Police for loitering as “prostitutes” during Operation
Chinyavada. This incensed women, and women activists formed the Women’s Action
Group (WAG) to challenge the “state’s paternalistic and patriarchal treatment of
women” (Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014, 74).

Relations between Civil Society and the State: An Analytical Framework

Our analytical framework reflects on the various ways in which civil society relates to
the state. Civil society–state relations are diverse and complex, and are in a constant
state of flux. Banks and Hulme (2012) opine that CSOs are polarised with national
governments. Such a view belies the nature of these relationships. At times these can
involve anything from hidden tensions to open hostility, whereas at other times the
relationships are characterised by cooperation and mutual understanding.

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 Kabonga and Zvokuomba

There are various factors that determine civil society–state relations. These factors
include government dispositions, CSO strategies, and interventions (Rose 2011;
Rosenberg, Hartwig, and Merson 2008). Gutsa and Mandizadza (2014) have identified
three ways in which CSOs are most likely to relate with the state: complementing the
government, opposing the government, and attempting to reform the government. CSOs
complement the government in the provision of services, given the typical constraints
of African governments. The relationship between CSOs and the state is not always
characterised by positivity; at times CSOs oppose the state through advocating policy
change and the upholding of human rights (see Gutsa and Mandizadza 2014).
Reformation of the state by CSOs occurs when NGOs stand for interest groups working
at the grassroots level and negotiate with the government to improve their policies.

Hadenius and Uggla (1996) have provided an insightful framework to explain how
CSOs relate to the state. This five-stage framework shows that relations between the
state and CSOs vary, from a stance where the state is hostile towards CSOs to a position
of benevolence and acceptance of CSOs. The first stage is characterised by the state
being unfriendly and punitive towards CSOs, while in the last stage the state actively
promotes the work of CSOs. This framework to a greater extent broadens the three ways
in which CSOs relate with the state as argued by De Beer and Swanepoel (2000). In
Zimbabwe, CSOs operate under stage 1 and stage 2, because the government has been
decisive in frustrating CSOs through restrictive laws, policies, and bureaucracies (also
see Dorman 2001; Kagoro 2005; McCandless 2005).

Table 1: An analytical framework for CSO–state relations (Hadenius and Uggla 1996,
1625)

Stage State treatment Type of state

1. The state does not tolerate independent civil activity.
Hostile state
Threshold: De facto right to form autonomous organisations.
2. The state accepts autonomous organisations, but does not
provide a space for them.
Threshold: State withdrawal, opening up a space for
independent activity.
3. A space for independent activity exists, but the practice of
governance does not promote autonomous organisations. Benevolent state
Threshold: Favourable institutional structures.
4. The state provides favourable structures, but no active support.
Threshold: Active state programmes in support of civil
society.
5. The state actively promotes autonomous organisations.

Banks and Hulme (2012) observe that when CSOs focus on welfare and service
provision there is usually a positive relationship. However, this changes when CSOs
focus on governance and human rights. These CSOs are usually attacked and face
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criticism from the state, especially when they appear to be challenging and attacking the
government openly. This view resonates with the findings of Dorman (2001), which
show that CSOs like the National Constitutional Assembly, ZimRights, and the
Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) were often viewed by the Zimbabwean
government with suspicion and incredulity. Similarly, Nair (2011), in Pakistan,
observed cooperation when CSOs confined themselves to welfare provision; however,
this changed when CSOs questioned and attacked government policies.

Prevailing institutional arrangements shape the nature, structure, and organisation of the
CSO sector in different countries. Consequently, in every country and region, there are
diverse, distinctive, and complex civil society–state relations (Banks and Hulme 2012).
In Africa, there was a growth of NGOs in the 1990s owing to the dynamics in the donor
world. In countries like Uganda, besides for their function of ensuring the provision of
public goods, CSOs are viewed as harbouring other motives, namely pursuing donor
interests. In countries like Zimbabwe, the political, economic, and social context has
shaped the relations between the state and CSOs.

Civil Society–State Relations in the First Republic, 1980–2017

Between 1980 and 1990 most CSOs reported that they interacted constantly with
various government ministries and civil servants (Chakawarika 2011; Dorman 2001;
Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). Dorman (2001) describes the relationship
between the state and CSOs as positive in the early years of independence. In our
analytical framework, in these early years the state was benevolent towards CSOs. Not
only Dorman (2001) but a number of other scholars support the view that the
relationship between CSOs and the state was positive in the early years of independence
(see Chakawarika 2011; Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010).

CSOs themselves described their relationship with the government as “positive”, “co-
operative”, and “good”. Often, CSOs submitted that they were complementing the
government (Dorman 2001). In the early days of independence, CSOs were not trying
to be the government; instead, their duty was to complement the government’s efforts
of developing the newly independent state. The then Minister of Social Welfare was
clear regarding the relationship that should exist between the government and NGOs:
“NGOs must keep in step with government … It’s completely counter-productive to
contradict government thinking” (The Herald 1984). Even the president during this
period articulated CSO–state relations as follows: “Many NGOs … accepted our
prescriptions [of socialism]—should I say, joined us … we became partners in
development” (in Banana 1995).

The following are some of the comments made by CSO leaders to explain CSO–state
relations in the first decade of independence (drawn from Dorman 2001, 133):

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 Kabonga and Zvokuomba

We are not trying to be the government … in many ways, our efforts are complementing
a lot, to a large extent to the social uplifting of the lives of people … If we can find the
ground to work together, that is the best we can do.

We are supplementing and complementing [social welfare’s] efforts.

It is undoubtable that many CSOs in the post-independence period saw themselves as

partners of government, with the aim of bringing about much-needed socio-economic
development of the newly independent Zimbabwe. A study of civil society–state
relations in 1990 revealed that though various leaders of CSOs wanted to make demands
on the state, 60 per cent of the leaders viewed the state as being cooperative. Almost 27
per cent viewed the state as being both cooperative and interfering. Furthermore, 43 per
cent of the respondents viewed their relations with the state as generally positive,
whereas 18 per cent reported a mixture of both negative and positive relations. Twenty-
five per cent of the CSOs encountered isolated problems, and 14 per cent reported
negative relations (Dorman 2002).

The early years of independence were marked by the co-option of civil society by the
state. Consequently, for example, for the greater part of the 1980s labour unions under
the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) were largely co-opted and lacked
space to carry out independent programmes (Raftopolous and Sachikonye 2001).
Various women’s groups, student groups, and other independent movements were very
much subordinated by the state (Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010).

It is a misconception to view the first decade of independence as characterised only by

positive civil society–state cooperation. There were also some instances where the state
and CSOs clashed. From being a benevolent state, the state turned hostile. This is true
for organisations that were perceived as not sufficiently working with the state. The
ZCC was criticised for adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards the government policy
of reconciliation and reconstruction (The Herald 1981). The ZCC was viewed as a
political irritant because of the continued involvement of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in the
organisation and the Ndau ethnicity of the secretary-general, which was associated with
Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU-Ndonga (Dorman 2001). In a bid to restore relations with
the state and its funders, the World Council of Churches (WCC), which was pro-
reconciliation and reconstruction, replaced the ZCC’s secretary-general.

Besides the ZCC, Self Help Development (SHD) is another organisation that clashed
with the state in the first decade of independence. The organisation was created by a
white Catholic missionary with the help of two other white persons, with the objective
of helping small-scale farmers to establish savings clubs. By 1980, the organisation had
grown to over 150 savings clubs, with an estimated 4 000 members throughout the
country. The government threatened to seize SHD assets and absorb the movement
because they were running savings groups outside the department remit (Dorman 2001).
The leader of SHD argued that they were not aware that savings groups had to be
registered under cooperatives. In order to restore positive relations with the state, the
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 Kabonga and Zvokuomba

founding white members were removed from the board of directors, and the
organisation’s name was changed. Since then, relations have improved, as the
organisation now works closely with Agritex.

The history of student activism tends to show that the early years of independence was
not characterised by positive CSO–state relations only. There are many instances in
which the government clashed with student bodies, particularly at the then sole
institution of higher learning in Zimbabwe, the University of Zimbabwe (Makunike
2015). The most important post-independent student activism event was the
demonstration by students in 1981 against racism at the University of Zimbabwe,
leading to the resignation of Professor Lewis and the ascendancy of Walter Kamba as
the first black vice-chancellor of the university. Again in the late 1980s there were
divergent views between the state and the student movement on academic freedom,
government corruption, financial assistance to students, and decision making at the
university (Makunike 2015). Overall, in the 1980s student civil action was pro-
government, up to the 1988 anti-corruption demonstrations (Zeilig 2008). The pro-
government orientation was to be expected, as described by Zvobgo (1999), as students
were receiving full grants which were, until the mid-1990s, adequate to live on. In fact,
money allocated for grants increased by almost Z$10 000 000 between 1993 and 1995.

The end of the 1990s was characterised by a shift in civil society–state relations. The
government became suspicious of CSOs, as they were no longer cooperative in terms
of the development agenda. Because of the economic challenges that emerged around
1997, CSOs became vocal against the mismanagement of the economy and the overtly
authoritarian tendencies of the Mugabe regime. This is why the state became hardened
towards CSOs from 2000 onwards (Magure 2009).

Overtly, the student movement became dissatisfied by the ideology of a one-party state,
arguing that it contributed to a cult of personality, a politics of domination, inefficiency,
corruption, and primitive accumulation (Chibango and Kajau 2010). The one-party-state
system was anti-democracy. The students began questioning the responsibility of the
state towards its citizens and the propensity of the state to not tolerate criticism. As the
students moved into alliance with the opposition, mainly the newly formed Zimbabwe
Unity Movement (ZUM), relations with the state soured. Relations with the state were
further weakened when the government introduced the Economic Structural Adjustment
Programme (ESAP), which the students viewed as an anti-poor policy. Led by Arthur
Mutambara, the then secretary-general of the Student Representative Council, the
students turned to demonstrations, against not only the neoliberal ESAP policy but also
the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill of October 1998, which, among other
things, curtailed academic freedom and vested more powers in the vice-chancellor to
discipline students (Makunike 2015; Zeilig 2008). The prominent role played by the
Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU) in the formation of the opposition party
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led to it being viewed as the enemy of

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the state, whereas student unions aligned to the state, such as the Zimbabwe Congress
of Students’ Unions (ZICOSU), were viewed as progressive.

The new millennium witnessed a significant change in the Zimbabwean political

landscape. Economic challenges and the despotic tendencies of the head of the First
Republic, Robert Mugabe, created fertile ground for the emergence of the worker-
aligned MDC party. Various civil organisations played an important role in the
formation of the MDC and the struggle for democracy (Gutsa and Mandizadza 2014).
The period 2000–2008, characterised by unemployment, corruption, poverty, economic
meltdown, and the erosion of constitutionalism, created fertile ground for the emergence
of not only a stronger opposition party but also a vibrant civil society. Organisations
such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) framed the crisis affecting
Zimbabwe as emanating from bad governance, escalated by a “bad constitution”. They
suggested that the solution that was needed was a new democratic constitution
(Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014).

CSOs bemoaned the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and blamed the state for
the post-2000 crisis. Resultantly, there was a shift from the politics of inclusion that had
characterised the pre-1997 era to a politics of exclusion (Chakawarika 2011; Dorman
2001; Moyo 2010). Furthermore, the state resorted to the use of visible power, invisible
power, and hidden power to destroy and limit CSOs through the enactment and
enforcement of restrictive laws. These restrictive laws, as explained below, limited the
registration and operation of many CSOs in the post-2000 period. For instance, under
POSA and AIPPA, civil activism was significantly curtailed. Organisations such as
ZimRights, Transparency International Zimbabwe, the NCA, the Crisis in Zimbabwe
Coalition, and many others were negatively impacted by POSA and AIPPA through the
arbitrary arrest of their leaders and the ransacking of their offices in search of evidence.
Fear gripped several CSOs as the NGO Bill awaited the assent of the president.
Describing this fear, Ziso (2007, 5) argued, “Like a ‘sword of Damocles’, fear hangs
over the heads of civil society organizations.” Such classic examples of legislation that
was enacted to narrow the democratic space clearly show how CSOs in Zimbabwe have
succumbed to challenges in the quest and pursuit of paving a new democratic pathway
in the democratisation process. If we refer back to the analytical framework proposed by
Hadenius and Uggla (1996), we see that in around 2004 the state intensified its hostility.

The post-2000 period witnessed a split within the CSO sector. While Morgan Tsvangirai
was forming the MDC party on the back of solid support from various civil groups, civil
society split, as the indigenisation lobby groups, war veterans’ movement, rural
associations, and landless people movement were captured by the state, thus
undermining the unity and coherence of civil society and its ability to put pressure on
the state (Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014; Ncube 2010). As the state was
embarking on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), various CSOs
criticised the move as a mere political gimmick to retain a stranglehold on power
(Kabonga and Marime 2017) and as deliberately targeting white farmers. The

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government relied on state power to organise what some have called the “uncivil
society”, mainly comprising members of the Zimbabwe National War Veterans’
Association (see Chirimambowa and Chimedza 2014; Ncube 2010). On the whole, from
2000 to 2008, civil society discourse was focused on promoting civil and political rights;
challenging the government’s neglect of the economy, which manifested in a crisis of
great proportions; and criticising the growing authoritarianism of the state, led by
Mugabe. In the post-2000 period, various CSOs, including the media, trade unions,
human rights groups, women’s groups, and student unions, forcefully challenged the
hegemony represented by the authoritarian state (Maseng 2011).

Mugabe once remarked: “We have now a phenomenon of NGOs, or shall I call them
phenomena, for they really are a type of government in the background of a formal
government. I don’t know whether this creature is for the better or for the worse, but in
our country, we have seen a situation where they have exceeded their terms of reference,
and perhaps we might have to reconsider the advisability of having NGOs” (in
Chakawarika 2011, 5). The indifference shown by Mugabe towards CSOs had severe
consequences. In mid-2008 the then minister of Public Service, Labour, and Social
Welfare banned all humanitarian NGOs involved in the distribution of food aid, despite
the fact that almost four million Zimbabweans were in need of food aid at that time.
These NGOs were accused of meddling in politics and fronting the regime change
agenda. In 2012, a few months before the harmonised elections, the governor of
Masvingo province banned at least twenty-nine NGOs. The reason provided was their
failure to renew the annual registration requirements. The Zimbabwe Peace Project,
Zimbabwe Community Development, and a leading provider of food aid in the
province, CARE International, were some of the NGOs that were banned (Chinaka
2012). This was a reflection of the state’s growing resentment towards CSOs,
particularly those in “sensitive” sectors like human rights.

Civil society–state relations remained unchanged during the period of the Government
of National Unity (GNU) of 2009–2013, because of the “continued existence of
legislation which had been in existence before the Global Political Agreement (GPA)
and was viewed as restricting space for individuals and civil society organizations”
(Gutsa and Mandizadza 2014, 33). For instance, POSA, which required CSOs to provide
a letter of intent before holding meetings, continued in force. During the GNU, CSOs
continued to face several restrictions despite the changed political context (Gutsa and
Mandizadza 2014; Moyo 2010). This was despite the optimism that the GNU was going
to open up the democratic space for CSOs and individuals (Masunungure 2009; Moyo
2010; Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). During the period of the GNU, there was
a lack of credible opposition, particularly in Parliament. The only form of credible
opposition was to be found in CSOs. As the major opposition parties were part of the
GNU, and some of the leaders had borne the brunt of state brutality during their civil
society activism days, the euphoria at the prospect of the reform of restrictive laws was
to be expected (Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). The hope was that the state was

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going to gravitate towards stage 5 of Hadenius and Uggla’s (1996) framework, where
the state promotes associational life.

According to Gutsa and Mandizadza (2014), the freedoms of assembly and of

association were restricted during the GNU period, despite the guarantees provided in
Article 12 of the Government of National Unity (GNU) of 2009–2013. In fact, key
benchmarks for the GPA legislature agenda, which included a review of laws that
restricted civil liberties, remained unimplemented because POSA, AIPPA, and the PVO
Act remained intact (Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). For the greater part of the
GNU period, the victimisation of CSO leaders continued unabated in the form of
arbitrary arrests and detention. This was reflected by the arrest of members of Women
of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) in April 2010 during a peaceful demonstration against
spiralling electricity prices and continuous load shedding by the power utility,
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA).

For Dziva, Dube, and Manatsa (2013), NGO–state relations swung from a partial respect
of freedom of association and assembly in the early years of the GNU to the abuse of
legislation to victimise CSO leaders in the run-up to the March 2013 constitutional
referendum and the July 2013 harmonised elections. It is no wonder that the
victimisation of CSO leaders intensified in the later days of the GNU period. A plethora
of examples illustrates the renewed drive to constrict CSOs. In December 2012 police
raided the office of ZimRights and arrested four people. The national director of
ZimRights, Okay Machisa, was arrested on January 14, 2013 and spent two weeks in
jail without trial, though he was released two weeks later on bail. Moreover, the police
arrested over forty members of the National Youths for Democracy Trust (NYDT)
because of a campaign to encourage citizens to register. Police in Harare and Bulawayo
disrupted the annual Valentine’s Day “love” protests by WOZA. One hundred and
ninety members of WOZA were arrested and later released without charges following
the intervention of lawyers (Gutsa and Mandizadza 2014). Informed by Hadenius and
Uggla’s (1996) framework, during the GNU period the state operated at stage 2, where
it accepts autonomous organisations but does not provide a space for them.

A year or so before the fall of former strongman Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe witnessed
the intensification of citizen movements organised under the #This Flag and #ThisGown
movements. #ThisFlag was triggered by a youthful pastor, Evan Mawarire, who on
April 22, 2016 posted a Facebook video raising symbolic questions about the meanings
attached to the Zimbabwean flag in light of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and
increasing governance issues (Gukurume 2017). The video went viral and this marked
the start of the use of online media as a rallying platform to mobilise citizens to voice
concerns about pertinent social, economic, and governance issues like unemployment,
corruption, human rights violations, and neglect of the economy (Mutanana 2016).
During the following months, the movement and Pastor Mawarire posted numerous
videos imploring President Mugabe to be accountable and the state to deliver on the
promise of jobs for the youth. This inspired many other Zimbabweans to record and

12
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share their own videos voicing complaints against bad governance and deteriorating
economic conditions.

In a similar manner, unemployed graduates launched the #ThisGown movement.

Together with #ThisFlag, on numerous occasions this movement called for Mugabe and
the state to account for the diamonds worth US$15 billion that went missing in
Chiyadzwa in a heist involving Chinese corporates (see Maringira and Masiya 2016).
What started as a single protest by the youthful pastor gained traction and transcended
geopolitical borders to spread to countries like South Africa, Botswana, the USA, and
the UK, countries to which many Zimbabweans had migrated. Draped in the
Zimbabwean flag, Zimbabweans in the diaspora posted videos in solidarity with
#ThisFlag. With time, #ThisFlag morphed from an online protest movement to a
physical movement (Gukurume 2017) expressed in the form of street protest actions.
For instance, the movement demanded and gained an audience with the governor of the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) on the proposal to introduce a surrogate currency
called bond notes, which the movement viewed as an attempt to introduce the unstable
Zimbabwean dollar (Gukurume 2017). The epitome of the movement’s activity was the
national shutdown dubbed “Shutdown Zimbabwe” on July 6, 2016, which resulted in
the shutdown of urban spaces in the country.

In response to the political threat posed by #ThisFlag, the state responded in multifarious
ways, but mainly through arrests, intimidation, threats, and brutality. Initially, the leader
of #ThisFlag received several telephonic threats such as “Do you know that the flag you
move around with on your neck can be used to strangle you?” This was followed
by arrest and charges for inciting public violence (Gukurume 2017). Similarly,
#Tajamuka members Linda Masarira and Promise Mkwananzi were also arrested. Linda
Masarira endured several months of detention without trial, in blatant violation of her
human rights.

Materials and Methods

We adopted a qualitative approach to interrogate civil society–state relations during the
Second Republic. Qualitative research is a form of social inquiry that relies on non-
numeric data in the form of words, including textual analysis such as content,
conservation, discourse, and narrative analysis (Jackson, Darlene, and Camara 2007).
Qualitative research methods allowed us to capture CSO representatives’ experiences,
lived realities, and perspectives regarding civil society–state relations (Hammerberg,
Kirkman, and De Lacey 2015; Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin 2009). This is because
qualitative research allows for an understanding of human beings’ textured experiences
and their reflections about those experiences (Jackson, Darlene, and Camara 2007).

By nature, a qualitative research approach involves the use of various data collection
methods. In this study, data were collected using in-depth interviews and a review of
documents. Adhabi and Anozie (2017) posit that in-depth interviews are used to gather
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information, beliefs, and perspectives regarding a specific phenomenon. In-depth

interviews were held with representatives of CSOs. A total of twenty CSO
representatives were interviewed to ascertain whether the Second Republic had
improved civil society–state relations. These representatives were drawn from various
subcategories of CSOs, including governance CSOs, human rights CSOs, advocacy
CSOs, welfare NGOs, CBOs, and development NGOs. These representatives were
asked to explain the current civil society–state relations in juxtaposition with relations
during the First Republic. The advantage of using in-depth interviews is that they
allowed the researchers to clarify comments made by the respondents. In other words,
the in-depth interviews allowed probing. To complement the primary data obtained
through in-depth interviews, we analysed various documents: journals, books, and
newspaper articles. These articles were important in showing that the First Republic
stifled CSOs. It is also through this literature that the conceptual and theoretical
frameworks were debated and applied to the Zimbabwean context.

The researchers used purposive sampling to recruit the study’s participants. Purposive
sampling is a qualitative sampling method in which the researcher has direct control
over elements included in the study. The interviewed respondents were CSO
representatives involved in human rights, governance, welfare and development, and
advocacy functions. The reviewed documents were also purposively sampled. Only
books, journals, conference papers, book chapters, and newspaper articles focusing on
conceptualising CSOs and civil society–state relations in the First Republic and Second
Republic were reviewed. Purposive sampling was important because it allowed for the
selection of information-rich respondents and documents.

Presentation of Findings
The results are presented based on four overarching themes that emerged from the
research: threats against CSOs, maintenance of restrictive laws, cosmetic reforms, and
cooperation during the crisis. The themes also guide the discussion of the findings.

Threats against CSOs

The results of the study reveal that the Second Republic, led by Emmerson Mnangagwa,
has continued with Mugabe’s style of threatening CSOs for criticising both government
policies and the person of the president. A review of documents, particularly newspaper
articles, shows that the president himself and his ministers have been at the forefront of
threatening CSOs. CSOs have been accused of working with the opposition to cause
disturbances in the country and of trying to remove the government unconstitutionally.

Since the outbreak of violence after the delay by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
(ZEC) to announce the July 2018 presidential election results, the state (Second
Republic) has been consistently attacking CSOs. In December 2018, the acting Minister
of Public Service issued a public statement warning that CSOs that meddle in politics

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will be expelled. The minister explicitly warned: “Should these organizations continue
with this behaviour, the government will not hesitate to withdraw their registration
certificates” (Ncube 2018).

The same warning was repeated by the head of state during a rally in Masvingo to thank
his supporters for voting him into office. The president accused CSOs of being
responsible for the violence that rocked the country in January 2019. The protests were
against unjustified price increases, particularly of fuel. Specifically, the president
accused CSOs of working with the opposition MDC Alliance to cause disturbances in
the country and promised to decisively deal with CSOs. A leader in the CSO sector who
was interviewed for this study highlighted that the promise made by the head of state
took effect in Masvingo province through the banning of an advocacy CSO called the
Community Tolerance Reconciliation and Development Trust (COTRAD). The
interviewed leader said: “There has been a systematic and consistent attack on CSOs in
Zimbabwe in the new government under Emmerson Mnangagwa. Every opportunity
that the president gets he always attacks CSOs. In my view, these attacks should not be
taken lightly. Look what is happening in Masvingo, the government has banned
COTRAD. The civil society is under threat in this Second Republic. There is a need for
vigilance” (in Chitagu 2019).

In March 2018, the state showed disdain for CSOs involved in governance and elections.
At the Africa CEO Forum, the head of the Second Republic demonstrated resentment
towards CSOs that are involved in governance, preferring NGOs that focus on welfare
provision. This shows that there is a particular kind of CSO that is acceptable and to the
Second Republic (Kaitano 2018):

Civil society, who come with an agenda, especially in the area of elections, they
assemble a team of what they call experts coming from various countries and come and
say we want to teach your people about voter education, they then come with gifts like
beans and when you open the beans [sic] you find a paper inside which tells you whom
to vote for. Such type of civil society is not necessary; we don’t need it. If they interfere
in the politics of a country, that’s not acceptable and also the issue comes in on who is
funding them has an agenda. If one has a funder who wants to address issues of poverty,
provision of clean water, that is acceptable.

In April 2019, the Second Republic continued with its attempts to silence CSOs. The
Minister of Home Affairs claimed that the government had got wind of a workshop that
was to be held in Bulawayo by CSOs. The workshop objective was to train CSOs on
how to overthrow the Zimbabwean government. The CSOs denied such training ever
happened and highlighted that the government was operating in panic mode. One
interviewee stated:

Ever since this government came into power, it has been consistently attacking us CSOs.
The view that CSOs want to overthrow the government is far-fetched. The government
should provide such evidence. Up to now, no such evidence has been produced. In my

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view, the government wants to divert attention from spiralling price increases and the
general decline of the standard of living. Each time CSOs voice concerns against
mismanagement of the country, the government responds by increasing threats to CSOs.

Maintenance of the Restrictive PVO Act

The Second Republic’s legacy has been tainted by the same restrictive laws that blighted
the First Republic. In the Second Republic CSOs are guided by the PVO Act. This is
the same law that affected CSOs during the First Republic era. In fact, this law is a
colonial relic. Although the head of the Second Republic promised to open up the
democratic space and improve civil society–state relations, the era of the Second
Republic has been characterised by worsening civil society–state relations because of
the effects of the PVO Act on CSOs. One of the respondents explained this as follows:

As CSOs we are existing in a very difficult situation. One hoped that the promise by the
president to open the democratic space was going to culminate in [the] repealing of the
PVO Act. This Act is a draconian piece of legislation that makes [it] mandatory for all
CSOs to register and [it provides] for the interference of the minister into the affairs of
CSOs. In order to improve civil society–state relations, the first thing that needs to be
done is the total repeal of the PVO Act and [the] enactment of a favourable law.

Cosmetic Reforms
One of the most ambitious and daring moves by the Second Republic has been to repeal
POSA. This piece of legislation was used during the First Republic to silence CSOs and
to arrest CSO leaders for violating various provisions of the Act. The government
repealed POSA and enacted the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA). The
new Act is viewed by the state as critical in opening up the democratic space and
improving civil society–state relations. However, critics argue that MOPA is a cosmetic
reform or a euphemism for POSA. Others view MOPA as old wine in new bottles. The
public consultations engaged in show the public’s dissatisfaction with the new law: “It
fails to take into account that if people protest, it is because something is wrong
pertaining to their rights. If possible, the whole Bill must be returned to the Home
Affairs minister—and we are not saying amend it, we are saying we do not want the
whole Bill because why should we continue applying to be allowed to demonstrate,
which is enshrined in the constitution?” (Langa 2019).

Working Together to Avert the Crisis

Zimbabwe and other southern Africa countries were affected by Cyclone Idai in 2019.
The disaster led to the destruction of infrastructure and loss of human life. Because of
bureaucratic challenges and state inflexibility, the government of Zimbabwe failed to
adequately address the crisis on its own. CSOs complemented the state’s efforts to assist
the victims of the crisis. CSOs, particularly welfare NGOs, played a critical role in
helping those who were affected by Cyclone Idai. Coordinated by the state, welfare
NGOs were largely involved in the provision of food, clean water, clothes, medicine,
and psycho-social support. The polarity that normally characterises civil society–state
16
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relations was absent, as the state and CSOs worked together in the aftermath of Cyclone
Idai. The time of crisis forced the state to be benevolent towards CSOs, a reflection of
stages 4 and 5 of the framework by Hadenius and Uggla (1996). One government
official interviewed for this study said: “The government on its own could not have
responded adequately to the destruction caused by Cyclone Idai. Almost all CSOs in
Zimbabwe played a part in responding to the effects of Cyclone Idai. The government
on its own could not have addressed the crisis without the complementary role of CSOs.
All in all, the crisis brought the state and CSOs together.”

Discussion of Findings
The findings of this study confirm that the Second Republic has continued with the First
Republic’s stance of stifling CSOs. In many cases, as shown above, the Second Republic
has intensified threats against CSOs and CSO leaders. Thus far, the reign of the Second
Republic has not only pursued a stance of threatening CSOs; in extreme cases, the state
has also arrested CSO leaders in a bid to silence CSOs for criticising government
mismanagement of the economy. The Second Republic seems to prefer a situation
where there are only a few CSOs focusing on advocacy, “an area considered to be an
exclusive domain for political parties by most African governments” (Muzondidya and
Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010, 32). The head of the Second Republic was quoted at the Africa
CEO Forum as saying he prefers development-oriented CSOs, as CSOs involved in
governance issues have ulterior motives of regime change. In June 2019, the Second
Republic arrested about seven CSO representatives coming from Serbia. They were
accused of undergoing training to unseat the constitutionally elected government.

In line with the approach of the First Republic, the Second Republic seems to be
increasing threats against CSOs whenever it becomes apparent that the government is
unable to arrest the free-fall of the economy. In the mid-1990s, the First Republic failed
to meet its social obligations to the population, largely because of the neoliberal ESAP.
Consequently, civil society became more critical of the government. This was followed
by the government’s intensification of the crackdown on civil activism (Muzondidya
and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). Similarly, the Second Republic’s Transitional Stabilisation
Plan (TSP), anchored on austerity and heavy citizen taxation, failed (see Bond 2019),
resulting in robust civil criticism and activism. This has been met by the state issuing
threats against CSOs, for instance accusing them of protesting against fuel increases and
the violence of January 2019.

It is abundantly clear that the Second Republic has taken a leaf from the book of the
First Republic on how to treat CSOs. Besides the use of threats and arresting civil
society leaders, CSOs are criticised for being sell-outs, regime change agents, and
proxies for opposition politics. The trend of abductions, torture, the use of the military
to quell civil action, and treason charges summarises the response of the Second
Republic to collective civil action (ZPP 2019). Using the military instead of the police
to deal with unrest has sent the very clear but extremely restrictive message that
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Zimbabwe has become a de facto military state. This curtails civil society activities due
to fear. The author agrees with the ZPP’s observation that “the Government of
Zimbabwe has reverted to its systematic and coordinated Civil Society Organisations
(CSOs) and human rights activists attack modus operandi, a path they always take when
under pressure” (2019, 3).

In the early years of independence, it was clear that relations between the state and civil
society were positive (see Chakawarika 2011). The state was operating at stage 1 of
Hadenius and Uggla’s (1996) framework. Poor relations between the state and civil
society emerged overtly in the late 1980s with student demonstrations against
government corruption, and relations worsened in the 1990s. While the Second
Republic promised to open up the democratic space, in practice the Second Republic
has been suspicious of civil society. This was to be expected, because there was never
a general feeling of approval of the way the Second Republic was ushered in through a
coup. In fact, the major movements in civil society criticised the role of the military in
the coming to power of the Second Republic, led by Mnangagwa (Beardsworth,
Cheeseman, and Tinhu 2019).

It is not surprising that the Second Republic has maintained laws that restrict civil
liberties. The reason for the maintenance of the restrictive laws in Zimbabwe, as well as
in the rest of Africa, is the need to clamp down on support for organisations deemed to
be conduits for terrorist funding (Edwards 2009). Despite claims of CSOs working to
overthrow governments, there have been no successful prosecutions up to now, either
in Zimbabwe or elsewhere in Africa (Moyo 2010). CSOs continue to suffer under the
PVO Act in Zimbabwe. The general impact of restrictive laws like the PVO Act has
been to curtail the activities of civil society and, in the extreme, to render citizens’ action
for the public good a dangerous activity (Moyo 2010), as shown by the arrests of CSO
representatives in July 2019 and the emotional abuse of their families as the state went
on a rampage in search of evidence while the representatives were in Serbia.

Relations between the state and CSOs will remain polarised given the existence of the
PVO Act. This is because the state has continued to use the PVO Act to punish vocal
CSOs. The state used the PVO Act to ban COTRAD, one of the popular CSOs in
Masvingo, citing registration irregularities (Chitagu 2019). The ban was, however, set
aside by the High Court, as the district administrator who had enforced the ban was not
empowered by law to enforce the ban. CSOs face several challenges under the PVO
Act, ruining the possibility of positive civil society–state relations. The PVO Board
established under the PVO Act has sweeping powers, giving the Minister of Public
Service, Labour, and Social Welfare power to inspect the operations of CSOs even on
an impromptu basis (Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu 2010). Several vocal and critical
CSOs have suffered under this provision, as they are often caught off guard. On many
occasions, just like in the First Republic era (see Dorman 2001), CSOs continue to
receive visits by “men in black suits” who are security agents claiming to be
representatives of the Minister of Public Service sent to monitor the operations of the

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CSOs. This is the worst form of hostility according to the analytical framework adopted
by Hadenius and Uggla (1996). The Second Republic continues to see CSOs as a
contender in the public space, hence the attempts by the state to neutralise civil
activism (Moyo 2010).

At public forums, Second Republic officials claim to be breaking with the practices of
the First Republic fronted by Robert Mugabe; however, in practice, the Second Republic
seems to be relentlessly pursuing the discourse and praxis of the First Republic. Indeed,
the Second Republic government has acknowledged that POSA was a restrictive and
draconian law, inconsistent with not only the provisions of the constitution but also a
modern state (Murwira 2019). Despite government pronouncements that one of its most
urgent tasks was repealing POSA and replacing it with a piece of legislation that
guarantees civil liberties, the replacement of POSA with MOPA has been described as
mere cosmetic change, or old wine in new bottles. This is because there are few
differences between POSA and MOPA. Some critics argue that MOPA is POSA
renamed. This because under MOPA, police still require political parties to produce
“lists of members or office-bearers who attend meetings of the parties’ committees or
other structures [clause 5(8) of the Bill]” (Veritas 2019, 2). Similar to POSA, under
MOPA, people are still required to notify the police before public meetings,
demonstrations, and processions. In line with section 25 of POSA, MOPA requires
specification of the exact and complete route of the procession and the number and type
of vehicles that will take part in the procession. If the police are not given notice of a
gathering, then, as under POSA, the conveners will be civilly liable for any damage or
injury occasioned by any public disorder or breach of the peace occurring at the
gathering (clause 12 of the Bill) (Veritas 2019). This will be so even if the damage or
injury was caused by counter-demonstrators or people who were not under the
conveners’ control. It is then not surprising that MOPA has been dubbed a reincarnation
of POSA, albeit renamed. With such a repressive piece of legislation, the Second
Republic is operating at stage 1 of Hadenius and Uggla’s (1996) framework, a stage
characterised by intolerance of civil activity.

Moyo (2010) clearly states that civil society–state relations are not static; they change
periodically and contextually. In Zimbabwe, it has been mostly politics that has
determined the nature and character of these relations. In most cases, as also observed
by Moyo (2010), states tend to see CSOs as enemies rather than as partners. According
to a contextual argument advanced by Moyo (2010), the crisis of Cyclone Idai altered
civil society–state relations in Zimbabwe, albeit for a short period of time. The state
worked hand in hand with CSOs, particularly welfare- and development-oriented
NGOs. The CSOs were at the forefront of assisting victims with food, clothes, medicine,
and many other requirements. This is not surprising, because when CSOs confine
themselves to service provision and welfare assistance, the relationship with the state is
characterised by positivity (Banks and Hulme 2012; Moyo 2010). In Pakistan, Nair
(2011) observed the potential for collaboration when CSOs remain in predefined roles
of service provision, but the generation of conflict when CSOs step outside these to

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question government policies. Using Hadenius and Uggla’s (1996) framework, we

conclude that the state turns benevolent when CSOs are engaged in welfare provision
and hostile when they venture into governance and human rights activities.

In terms of the deterioration of civil society–state relations, the state should not be solely
blamed for being heavy-handed. CSOs have in many instances irked the state. In many
cases, CSOs have displayed the “un-civic face of intolerance, exclusion, and resolution
of differences through the use of violence” (Moyo 2010, 6). In protest against
deteriorating economic conditions, the labour union ZCTU, together with other civil
groups, have organised mass demonstrations and protests against the state. These
demonstrations have led to wanton destruction of property. Worsening the situation was
the response of the state, namely deploying the state security apparatus, which went on
the rampage in search of CSO leaders. As Bond argues, “once again, a formidable burst
of state brutality against Zimbabwe’s citizenry has left at least a dozen corpses, scores
of serious injuries, mass arrests, internet suspension, and a furious citizenry. The
January 14–17 nationwide protests were called by trade unions against an
unprecedented fuel price hike, leading to repression reminiscent of former leader Robert
Mugabe’s iron fist” (2019). This shows that the nature and character of civil society–
state relations are dependent on both the state’s and civil society’s approaches to the
particular situation. Civil society leaders or representatives are also culpable, because
they have continued with the same language they used during the First Republic era. In
the main, they have demonstrated the “uncivil” nature of CSOs, namely one of
intolerance, violence, and irking the government (see Moyo 2010). The language used
by CSOs, besides being derogatory, is also provocative. Government officials have been
branded as tyrants, corrupt, and looters. The head of the Second Republic has himself
on many instances been projected as a usurper.

In light of the continued onslaught by the state, CSOs have called upon their agency to
survive the difficult situation. Fully aware of the propensity of the government to use
military action against protesters, CSOs are increasingly relying on online social media
mobilisation. Online media platforms have become a useful platform for discussion of
challenges affecting the country and how best to respond to the challenges. Other civil
society leaders have used social media to denigrate the mismanagement of the economy
and to call upon the masses to rise up and demonstrate. The transboundary nature of
online media has allowed the leaders of social movements who fled the country to
continue with their protest action. The #Tajamuka/Sijikile movement, led by exiled
Promise Mkwananzi, is one of the prominent movements that continues to rely on social
media. Even #ThisFlag, albeit on a reduced scale, continues to use online media
platforms to show solidarity with the millions of suffering Zimbabweans. Characteristic
of the first stage of Hadenius and Uggla’s (1996) analytical framework, online-based
movements are branded online mercenaries in the Second Republic. Aware of the
increased onslaught against CSOs, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Lawyers’ Association
(ZHRLA) has scaled up free legal representation for civil leaders facing trumped-up

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charges. Other organisations are providing safe houses to civil leaders at risk of
abduction by the dreaded Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO).

Conclusion
This article interrogated civil society–state relations in the era of the Second Republic.
The analysis started with a clarification of the conceptual and theoretical framework
that was used in unpacking civil society–state relations in Zimbabwe. There is ample
evidence showing that the First Republic treated CSOs as enemies rather than partners.
This article shows that the Second Republic is obsessed with curtailing civil activism,
and this is achieved by threats against CSOs, restrictive laws, and cosmetic reforms. It
is in the arena of welfare provision where the state treats CSOs as partners.

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