RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Prof. Dr. Konstantin Kurylev1
Assoc. Prof. PhD. Darija Stanis
ABSTRACT
The article considers the problems and prospects of foreign policy of Russia in the
CIS. This region has traditionally been of high priority for Russia's foreign policy after the
collapse of the USSR. At the same time, it is noted that for one and half decade after the
collapse of the Soviet system, Russia's cooperation with the CIS countries was weak, and
the integration initiatives were not convert into practice. The situation began to change in
the mid-2000s. During the years 2009-2013 the integration processes in the CIS space re-
ceived a new impetus. More active regional cooperation in the CIS space became possible
due to the new "different speeds" development model and the formation of an "integration
core" of the states, ready to reach a higher level of cooperation. The authors emphasize the
following priority areas of the Russian foreign policy in the CIS: development of bilateral
and multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth member states, and the further
strengthening of the CIS-organization, as it is the basis for strengthening the regional inter-
action of the states, which have not only a common historical heritage, but also a vast po-
tential for integration in various spheres.
Keywords: Russia, Commonwealth of Independent States, post-Soviet space, сco-
operation, integration.
INTRODUCTION
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an interstate association, which was
established in the post-Soviet space in December 1991 by 12 sovereign republics (Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine). For more than 20 years the CIS states have faced
a serious transformation process, which caused the radical reconstruction of their political,
economic, military, ideological systems and social structures. These states passed through
the alteration of territorial-political status, regimes, elites, the reappraisal of values, inter-
ests, the revision of geopolitical orientations, unions, allocation of resources and power.
The CIS has proved itself as a universal multilateral platform for negotiations be-
tween the former Soviet republics, though it is fair to say that the expert community gives
also pessimistic estimation of the Organization’s effectiveness [8]. However, within the
frameworks of this structure the CIS-states have a range of spheres for cooperation, includ-
ing economic, military-political, humanitarian areas. Having arisen in a unique historical
specification after the collapse of the USSR, the Commonwealth has been searching for the
optimum integration model during the all its history. The modern processes in the post-So-
viet space indicate the continued evolution of the CIS in the context of global integration
trends. A number of countries of this structure, which are aimed at closer relations, estab-

1
RUDN University.
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lished some “inner-integration” associations: they interact in the framework of the Eurasian
economic community (EurAsEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the
Customs Union (CU), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Implementation of the inte-
gration projects is Russia’s way to strengthen its military-political and economic security,
increase its resource potential through the access to the mineral resources base of the coun-
tries-participants of such integration [10].
On the geopolitical map of Eurasia CIS possesses a special position: it is located at
the crossing of civilizations and forms a kind of «bridge» between Europe, Asia and the
Middle East. This is a unique cross-border space; for centuries, there were processes of dif-
fusion of various values of many peoples of the world. This is the arena of interaction (at-
traction as well as repulsion) of various civilizations and cultures; it is a place of an unend-
ing dispute between the value orientations. Geopolitical, cultural, civilizational and social
characteristics of this territory result in the fact, that the configurations of the region a pri-
ori have an impact on the basic contours of the world order of the XXI century [11]. For
Russia, which is a key actor of the post-Soviet space, they are obviously of existential im-
portance.
One cannot understate the strategic importance of the CIS space, its unique institu-
tional communication capability (it connects North and South, East and West), its geoeco-
nomic factors – substantial developed industrial and scientific potential, professional staff
density (for example, in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan). All this allows some of the
CIS-states to take rightful place in the world economy.
The post-Soviet space possesses as well great reserves of mineral resources. In ad-
dition, it appears to be the new potential trade and business areas, which are still not inte-
grated in the world economic system, but promise to be very profitable [13]. Due to their
unique position and natural resources, Caucasia, the Caspian and Central Asia are consid-
ered in the world geo-economics as the most important reserve of diversification of raw hy-
drocarbons and transport routes. These regions gain strategic value in the context of meet-
ing the growing energy needs of at least two leading industrial world areas (Europe and
Asia). Unequal distribution of energy resources and the growing significance of the energy
factor in the world economy and international relations cause complicated alliances be-
tween exporters, importers and transit states. As for Russia, its oil and gas exports’ security
is directly connected with the situation in the neighboring states, because they are the tran-
sit-countries for the most part of Russian energy resources exported to the non-CIS states.
Processes in the CIS space are not just one of the central aspects of modern interna-
tional relations. They are one of the most dynamic, intense and actual international direc-
tions, which are characterized by the number of different vectors, complex interconnection
of various actors and factors, the instability and inconsistency of trends. The role of the
CIS-states in the system of modern international relations has considerably increased and
sometimes the events of this region turn out to be in the epicenter of the world's prob-
lems (for example, the zone of the Georgian-Ossetia and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts). It
would be no exaggeration to say that today the post-Soviet space is a zone of high political
risk, which is determined by the high potential for conflict (the inner conflicts along with

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external conflict zones with the trouble spots in the middle East, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan) as
well as the increasing terrorist threat; the threat of uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), including the possibility of their falling into the hands of radical
groups; the problem of migration, drug trafficking and environmental issues.
One should note a tendency of growing presence of out-of-area forces in the post-
Soviet space, such as the US, NATO and the EU; China promotes its influence being inter-
ested not only in the supply of energy and economic expansion, but also concerned with
the issues of internal security (situation in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region); inter-
est of India in the Central Asian is increasing; Turkey, Iran, Pakistan are playing the card
of confessional proximity with the Muslims of the region. In the years following the disso-
lution of the USSR out-of-area players were increasingly active on the post-Soviet direc-
tion. Their actions (especially the USA) have turned into extensive multi-purposed strat-
egy, aimed at the staged development of the region, its geopolitical and historical conver-
sion.
Cooperation between Russia and international actors in the sphere of counterterror-
ism and in some other areas in the post-Soviet space does not mean perfect harmony of
their aspirations. There is a number of converging interests, such as the achievement of po-
litical stability, prevention of large-scale conflicts, counternarcotic actions, defense of hu-
man rights and control over WMD. However, there are some issues of tough competition:
economic and energy sphere, transportation of energy to world markets.
In this context Moscow's concern for stability and security (economic, military-po-
litical, energy) of its borders, as well as at a regional and global level is quite feasible.
Strategically the provision of global, regional and national security in this region can be
only systematic and Eurasian-wide. The most important segment of the Eurasian security –
Mediterranean–Black and Caspian Sea region – a kind of «solar plexus» of Eurasia. A spe-
cial role in the process of development of new Eurasian security architecture doubtless be-
longs to Russia (Russia is an independent civilization complex and at the same time a
framework element of European culture and periphery of the Islamic world), that makes it
a leading member of any regional projects.
Thus, one of the main challenges of the CIS-states is the unification of efforts in or-
der to create favorable arrangements for progressive development, remove the adverse ef-
fect of globalization and neutralize destructive impact of local and foreign origin.
Russia’s foreign policy in the CIS: Realities and Prospects.
The policy regarding the neighboring countries has traditionally been the most im-
portant direction of the Russian foreign policy. This thesis is especially relevant given the
fact of the moral responsibility of Russia for the rights of the nearly 17 million Russian
compatriots (in 1991 there were nearly 25 million) living in the former Soviet republics.
Besides, the recent policy documents and political statements highlight the necessity of the
development of the Eurasian integration processes as a condition of a real revival of the
economy and the strengthening the foreign policy positions of Russia.

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 At the same time for more than a decade after the collapse of the USSR, Russia's
positions in the post-Soviet Eurasia has been declined, and the integration initiatives could
not be practically realized. Such situation began to change in the mid-2000s; during the
2009-2013 the integration processes in the post-Soviet Eurasia has received a new impulse.
The agreements of the Eurasian economic community, the progress in the work of the Cus-
toms Union, the creation of a Common economic space, the functioning of the Eurasian
economic Commission as a supranational body are the achieved results of the Russian pol-
icy. Finally, in October 2013 at the Minsk summit of the Supreme Eurasian economic
Council, there were signed the agreements, which started the Armenia's accession to the
Customs Union and the Common economic space and opens up a similar prospect for Kyr-
gyzstan. The year 2015 started a new integration project – the Eurasian economic Union.
Russia has a dominant position in the EEA, while being the economic giant in comparison
with the other states. It accounts for more than 70% of the total regional GDP, 76-77% of
oil and gas production, more than 2/3 of total export of the goods and services [3].
However, some key issues related to the future integration structures, are still the
points of argue between the political elites of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; the same
point at issue is the prospects for the further gaining of the State-numbers of the integration
process. In this connection, the question of Russia’s possibility to increase its influence on
the neighboring states becomes of significance; in particular, does the Russian Federation
have the non-used mechanisms of influence on the economic, political and intellectual
elites of the CIS countries, which are able to move them towards a change their positions
regarding the participation in the economic integration projects within the post-Soviet
Eurasia.
There were different points of view on the periodization of the transformation of the
post-Soviet space in the scientific literature of the recent years. We consider it is possible
(using both economic and political criteria) to outline the following stages of Russian pol-
icy towards the post-Soviet states of Eurasia.
1) December 1991 – 1994/95, the period of statehood’s formation of the former
USSR republics. It was taking place against the background of the profound socio-eco-
nomic crisis and the political instability in the new independent states. The period was
marked by many inter-state and intra-state ethnic conflicts. Despite the hopes of a part of
the Russian elite that the reintegration processes would develop, there was not any elabo-
rated integration program; and even if it were, it could hardly been realized in the terms of
the strengthening of the national elites. After the collapse of the ruble zone in 1993 and the
refusal of the Russian authorities to incur serious costs in the case of the revival of the ru-
ble zone on the basis of the new Russian ruble (that was discussed in 1994) the disintegra-
tion (the rupture of the economic ties and the reorientation of the CIS economic actors on
the relationship with the external countries) significantly accelerated [1].
2) The years 1995 – 1999 – against the relative stabilization of the Russian state-
hood, which occurred after the overcoming a tough conflict between the power branches
and the adoption of the Constitution in 1993, as well as under the influence of the renewed
relations with the Euro-Atlantic states, Russia took the concentrated efforts to keep the CIS

4
as the Russian sphere of geopolitical influence and started to oppose the obvious geopoliti-
cal expansion of the West. There were the concepts of the different-speed integration
within the CIS formulated [1]. So, there were the Union state of Russia and Belarus, the
Eurasian economic community established. The protection of the rights of the compatriots
(i.e. the Russian-speaking people) in the neighboring countries was proclaimed one of the
most important targets of Moscow.
At the same time, there were some CIS-states, opposing the integration initiatives
of Russia; while having the support of the US and the EU they consolidated into the block
GUAM /GUUAM, but any attempt to establish a kind of sustainable economic interaction
proved to be fruitless. Russian system economic crisis was the main factor that made its se-
rious success of the integration initiatives impossible.
3) The 2000-2004’s. Despite a significant replacement in the political elite, during
this period Russia as a whole maintained its political course towards the post-Soviet space
that had been developed in the previous period [10]. However, due to the rapid economic
recovery (which became possible mainly due to a favorable foreign economic situation) the
Russian economy in many ways became the driving force for the economies of the most
CIS countries; the attractiveness of the idea of integration with Russia was rising. The main
integration project of Russia was the idea of formation the Customs Union and involve-
ment Ukraine into that organization; however, this plan was failed because of the “orange
revolution” in Ukraine.
4) The 2005-2008’s. The crisis of the “post-Soviet” regimes in a number of CIS
states, as well as a powerful geopolitical expansion of the West in the post-Soviet space re-
sulted in a series of the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. These
events were regarded by the Russian elite as a threat both to the foreign policy interests of
Russia and the internal political stability. All these resulted into the harder political line of
Russia and the escalation of geopolitical tension in the post-Soviet space. The high point
was the Russian-Georgian war in the August, 2008. In this period the Russian economy
moved from a phase of recovery growth to the investment growth, which was based on the
influx of foreign capital. At the same time, it continued to be the growth driver for the
economies of neighboring countries.
5) The 2008-2013’s. Against the global crisis, the inflow of the investments to Rus-
sia was replaced by a large-scale capital outflow; this process has been going on up to the
present time [12]. Thus, there are no prospects for the resumption of the investment growth
in the Russian economy in the foreseeable future. As a result, the Russian economy has
largely lost its previous positive impact on the economies of neighbouring states. However,
the practical realization of such projects as the EurAsEC, the EEA and – especially – the
Customs Union certainly had a positive impact on the economies of Belarus and Kaza-
khstan. The impact of the regional integration on the Russian economy is not so definite,
but, according to most experts, it was positive as a whole.
This period was marked by the defeat of the political forces, which came to power
in Ukraine and Georgia in the period of the “colored revolutions”. However, the geopoliti-
cal orientation of these countries did not change in general, despite some warming of the
5
Russian-Ukrainian relations in the 2010-2012. After the events of the August 2008 (espe-
cially after Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the independent states)
the confrontation between Russia and the states of the Euro-Atlantic community signifi-
cantly reduced, mostly because of the Western capitals’ understanding that the growing of
the confrontation with Russia was capable to lead to the global catastrophe.
The Obama’s Administration’s coming to power in the USA in 2009 changed the
situation, because, unlike his predecessor, Obama did not consider the post-Soviet space as
a priority of the American foreign policy. Despite that, the geopolitical competition contin-
ued, though (until the end of the 2013) it was not so severe. The key direction of each party
was the Western region of the CIS, particularly Ukraine. In order to increase its influence
in the region in 2009 the EU started the implementation of the “Eastern partnership” pro-
gram; the US focused on the support of both the loyal representatives of the Ukrainian elite
and the non-governmental organizations. The strategic orientation of the Ukrainian elite to
the rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic community remained unchanged despite Rus-
sia’s offer of the substantial economic incentives in the case of Ukraine’s joining to the CU
[4].
6) Late 2013 – present time. The Ukrainian authorities’ awakening in the late 2013
of the inevitable negative economic consequences in the case of the signing of the Associa-
tion Agreement with the EU in the form proposed by the EU and previously supported by
the Ukrainian elite, as well as the failure of signing and attempt to refuse the Ukrainian
unilateral foreign policy orientation resulted into the events that led to the deepening of the
political crisis. The President V. Yanukovych’s removal from power in February 2014
caused the further destabilization of the internal situation in Ukraine and the unprecedented
antagonism between the states of the Euro-Atlantic community, which supported the
Ukrainian opposition, and Russia, which did not recognize the legitimacy of the new
Ukrainian authorities and supported the pro-Russian forces in the South-Eastern regions of
Ukraine, especially in Crimea, which came out of Kiev’s control and soon became the part
of the Russian Federation [4]. At the same time, despite some fears, the Ukrainian crisis
had no significant impact on the development of the integration processes within the CU
and the EEA, what was proved by the results of the summit in Minsk in April 2014 [6].
CONCLUSION.
Finally, we should note that, having recognized the common tradition, the shared
historical experience, which was accumulated for the decades or even centuries of the
shared living within a united states and still remains an important (though declining) re-
source of the Russian politics, Russia should position itself as a state, which is able to pro-
vide the "services" (financial, informational, educational, etc.) to its neighbors, which they
need and try to receive from the other centers of world politics. The rapprochement with
Russia and the participation in the Eurasian integration will further the successful adapta-
tion of the post-Soviet countries of Eurasia to the globalizing world. Moreover, while hav-
ing the support of Russia, which does not seek (in the contrast to its geopolitical rivals) to
the complete unification of the political space in the post-Soviet Eurasia, this adaptation
can be realized with the least costs for these countries.

6
 Experts predict different variants of the future development of the CIS [2]. Among
them are the following scenarios: 1) full scale reintegration; 2) tiered integration; 3) an
“umbrella organization”; 4) further disintegration.
The first scenario seems to be hardly probable as it can be only between politically
and economically strong states. Obviously that majority of the CIS-states do not fall into
this category. Furthermore, from this plan it is expected, that the partners should overcome
the problem of credibility gap. The practice of development of integration processes in
post-Soviet space demonstrates that regional states still overreact on any possible limitation
of their sovereignty. Exactly Russia is suspected of being the main object aimed at under-
mining the independence of the new republics.
The second scenario seems to be more realistic. Integration at different speeds pro-
vides closer cooperation and allows gradual overcoming of barriers on the way of unifica-
tion. This integration model allows each participant to take a vantage ground within the
Commonwealth and pursue its own interests. As a result, those who intend to stay at the
current level of interaction, retain such possibility. The states which are ready for higher
levels of integration can create respective formats of cooperation. Viability of this scenario
is evidenced by the events of the last years.
So, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin advanced the creation of a Common
Free Market Zone on the basis of the Customs Union, and in prospect - the organization of
Eurasian Union. According to V. Putin, the purpose of the Eurasian Union is in becoming
one of the poles of the modern world and getting the role of an effective “link” between
Europe and Asian-Pacific Region [7].
The third scenario describes the development of the CIS as an «umbrella organiza-
tion», which involves cooperation mainly on a bilateral basis at the expense of multilateral
cooperation. This scenario was dominant in the CIS in the 1990s, when some leaders of the
CIS-states showed their desire to restrict the integration processes in the region by such
variant of cooperation, which significantly weakened integration and to some extent pro-
moted disintegration trends. Today such format is unproductive.
The fourth scenario describes the disintegration of the CIS and seems to be unlikely
in short- and mid-term prospects. Twenty years of development experience of the CIS
shows that the integration cooperation within this organization is vital for all its partici-
pants. The regional states need effective mechanism that would allow solving of the shared
problems in the context of mutually beneficial cooperation. Evidently, that high interde-
pendency and complementarity between the CIS-states create opportunities for retaining of
the CIS.
All the scenarios are determined by the changing circumstances at the national, re-
gional and global levels.
Thus, the CIS space is a rapidly changing region and all occurring processes need to
be promptly and comprehensively analyzed. Objectively major political and social trans-
formations involve not only old or new threats, but also new forms of constructive cooper-
ation, new impulses for development. The choice between a positive or negative scenario

7
of development is determined by a complex interaction of various factors, including such
important as the will and ability of the actors to take and assess the situation realistically, to
predict the far-reaching consequence of their current policy and also the ability to effec-
tively control the resource base.
The relations between the Russian Federation and the CIS-states determine Russia’s
ability to the successive historical development, strategic role in the world, security, inter-
nal consolidation and national and historical identity of the Russian nation [5].
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