ARTICLES OF THE DAY

May 28th, 2022

RACHEL MARSDEN, RUSSIA TODAY .............................................................................................................. 2

RICHARD HAASS AND DAVID SACKS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................ 4

THE DIPLOMAT ............................................................................................................................................ 8

RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN, THE DIPLOMAT ......................................................................................17

PRASHANTH PARAMESWARAN, THE DIPLOMAT ..........................................................................................19

ADITI MALHOTRA, SOUTH ASIAN VOICES ....................................................................................................21

 When Henry Kissinger gives advice on ending the Ukraine
conflict, the West should listen
The realpolitik veteran schools today’s ideologues, but they won’t like the lesson
Rachel Marsden, Russia Today
T he ideologues who
dominate today's
Western foreign policy
establishment are largely
responsible for escalating
tensions with Russia to the
point of military conflict in
Ukraine. And now the
grandmaster of realpolitik —
that is, foreign relations
shaped by pragmatism and on-
the-ground truth rather than
wishful thinking — has just
delivered a rhetorical blow to
NATO’s ambitions over
Ukraine.
Henry Kissinger, the Nixon-
era US secretary of state and a
living legend of international
politics, celebrates his 99th
birthday this week. On
Monday, he took to the stage
via videoconference at the
annual World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
to offer his advice for
resolving the Ukraine conflict.
“Parties should be brought to
peace talks within the next
two months. Ukraine
should've been a bridge
between Europe and Russia,
but now, as the relationships
are reshaped, we may enter a
space where the dividing line
is redrawn and Russia is
entirely isolated,” Kissinger
said in a conversation with
WEF founder and executive
chairman Klaus Schwab.
Isolating Russia from Europe
seems to be the goal of
engaging Moscow in a war of
attrition by arming and
backing Ukrainian fighters to
effectively serve as NATO
proxies. This would also
explain why Washington is so
highly invested in the conflict,
both financially and
ideologically.
An EU-Ukraine-Russia axis
would be competitive with
Beijing and Washington on
the global playing field. But
the Atlantist leaders in
Brussels and their assorted
Russophobic allies have
privileged dated Cold War
ideology over the long-term
political and economic
interests of their own citizens,
who would be best served by a
normalization of relations and
increased cooperation right
across the European
continent.
“We are facing a situation
now where Russia could
alienate itself completely from
Europe and seek a permanent
alliance elsewhere,” Kissinger
said. “This may lead to Cold
War-like diplomatic
distances, which will set us
back decades. We should
strive for long-term peace."
By far, the most likely
scenario is even greater
Russian rapprochement with
China.
The end result could be a
stronger military-industrial
bloc in competition with the
US for economic and political
influence worldwide and a
loss of clout for the EU, which
would simply be reduced to a
less influential partner of
Washington’s, with
autonomy than it would have
enjoyed had it
less
not
subordinated all of its interests
to Washington and had
instead maintained a more
independent and balanced
position.
Kissinger’s decades of
experience in global affairs at
the highest level as an advisor
to heads of state,
governments, and
multinational corporations,
and as an advocate of
pragmatic solutions to sticky
global problems, all give
weight to his advice for any
global crisis.
Recipient of the Nobel Peace
Prize for his role in
negotiating an end to the
bloody Vietnam War with the
North Vietnamese during the
administration of Republican
President Richard Nixon,
Kissinger served as both
secretary of state and national
security advisor to the former
US leader. Prior to that, he
served as an advisor to
Democratic President John F.
Kennedy. If he’s urging a
rapid resolution to the conflict
in Ukraine, it’s informed by
his professional experience.
Perhaps he sees shades of
Vietnam in Ukraine?
Kissinger’s solution for
ending the territorial disputes
between Russia and Ukraine
is unlikely to please the
current American foreign
policy establishment.
“Ideally, the dividing line
should be a return to the status
quo ante. Pursuing the war
beyond that point will not be
about the freedom of Ukraine,
but a new war against Russia
itself,” Kissinger said, with
the “status quo ante” referring
to leaving Crimea, Lugansk,
and Donetsk under Russia’s
control.
Once the “most admired man
in America”, according to
Gallup polls from 1973, 1974,
and 1975, in the wake of peace
in Vietnam, Kissinger has
often wandered off
Washington’s beaten foreign
policy path. He laid out the
first blueprint for cooperation
between the US and China. He
also opposed NATO’s
bombing of Yugoslavia under
former President Bill Clinton.
“The rejection of long-range
strategy explains how it was
possible to slide into the
Kosovo conflict without
adequate consideration of all
its implications—especially
the visceral reaction of almost
all nations of the world against
the new NATO doctrine of
humanitarian intervention,”
Kissinger wrote in a outweigh whatever short-term
Newsweek article in 1999.
Kissinger’s remarks
accurately foreshadowed the
military interventions of
NATO member nations
elsewhere under humanitarian
pretexts — such as Syria,
Libya, and now against Russia
via Ukraine — for the ultimate
purpose of regime change. He
equally predicted why, despite
rampant promotion and
spinning of these Western
wars, so much opposition to
them nonetheless exists.
Although attention spans and
news cycles may have
shortened since Kissinger’s
diplomatic heyday, some
people can still grasp that
ideologically driven conflicts
can engender long-term
negative systemic
repercussions that more than
satisfaction may be derived
from sparking an
ideologically driven conflict.
The sooner those who are
feeding the current chaos can
clue into Kissinger’s advice,
the better off we’ll all be in
mitigating the inevitable
subsequent diplomatic,
economic, and political
hangover.
 American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous
To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand
Richard Haass and David Sacks, Foreign Affairs
F or
and
administrations
four decades,
successive Republican
Democratic
resisted
answering the question of
whether the United States
would come to Taiwan’s
defense if China mounted an
armed attack. Washington’s
deliberate ambiguity on the
matter helped dissuade China
from attempting to “reunify”
Taiwan with the mainland, as
it could not be sure that the
United States would remain
on the sidelines. At the same
time, the policy discouraged
Taiwan from declaring
independence—a step that
would have precipitated a
cross-strait crisis—because its
leaders could not be sure of
unequivocal U.S. support.
The policy known as strategic
ambiguity has, however, run
its course. Ambiguity is
unlikely to deter an
increasingly assertive China
with growing military
capabilities. The time has
come for the United States to
introduce a policy of strategic
clarity: one that makes
explicit that the United States
would respond to any Chinese
use of force against Taiwan.
Washington can make this
change in a manner that is
consistent with its one-China
policy and that minimizes the
risk to U.S.-Chinese relations.
Indeed, such a change should
strengthen U.S.-Chinese
relations in the long term by
improving deterrence and
reducing the chances of war in
the Taiwan Strait, the likeliest
site for a clash between the
United States and China.
AMBIGUITY SERVED ITS
PURPOSE
When the United States
severed relations with Taiwan
(more accurately, the
Republic of China) in 1979
and discarded its mutual
defense treaty with the island,
Congress passed the Taiwan
Relations Act, which made
clear that the United States
maintained special
commitments to Taiwan. The
TRA asserted that the United
States would “consider any
effort to determine the future
of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by
boycotts or embargoes, a
threat to the peace and
security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States.”
It also stated that the United
States would both maintain
the capacity to come to
Taiwan’s defense and make
available to the island the
arms necessary for its
security. Importantly,
however, the TRA did not
declare that the United States
would in fact come to
Taiwan’s defense.
American ambiguity worked
to deter China from attacking
Taiwan, as Beijing could
never be sure what the U.S.
response would be. China
wanted above all to maintain a
peaceful external environment
so that it could focus on its
economic development.
Moreover, even if the United
States chose not to engage
directly, it had provided
Taiwan’s military with
enough
equipment
sophisticated
that China’s
military would be ill equipped
to defeat it. A miscalculation
would have imperiled China’s
economic development and
Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) rule.
Ambiguity had an equally
important but often
underappreciated effect on
Taiwan, which could not be
assured of U.S. assistance if it
provoked a Chinese assault by
declaring independence.
When Taiwan tested the limits
of what the United States
would accept—as it did in the
early 2000s, under the
administration of Chen Shui-
bian—the United States made
clear that Taiwan did not
enjoy a blank check and could
not act with impunity.
Ambiguity kept this powder
keg from exploding.
AMBIGUITY’S FADING
BENEFITS
Maintaining this policy of
ambiguity, however, will not
keep the peace in the Taiwan
Strait for the next four
decades. Too many of the
variables that made it a wise
course have fundamentally
shifted. China now has the
capability to threaten U.S.
interests and Taiwan’s future.
China’s defense spending is
15 times that of Taiwan’s, and
much of it has been devoted to
a Taiwan contingency.
Chinese planning has focused
on impeding the United States
from intervening successfully
on Taiwan’s behalf.
 that Xi will marry his States. In its world-leading
ambitions with the new means response to COVID-19,
Gone are the days when
at his disposal to realize his Taiwan demonstrated its
Taiwan’s dollars went further
“China Dream” and force enormous capacity in global
than China’s, as China now
“reunification” with Taiwan, health and its generosity in
fields equipment on a par with
potentially as soon as 2021. lending a hand to countries
anything the United States
No one should dismiss the that needed it. Taiwan is a
makes available to Taiwan.
possibility that Taiwan could vital partner of the United
Whether the United States
be the next Hong Kong. States on a host of global
could prevail in a Taiwan
issues, and it is in the United
conflict is no longer certain,
States’ interests to defend
and the trend lines continue to
Furthermore, deterring Taiwan’s hard-won gains.
move in China’s favor. Unless
Taiwan from declaring
the United States devotes
independence is no longer a
significant resources to
primary concern. Taiwan One thing, however, has not
preparing for a conflict in the
understands that the United changed over these four
Taiwan Strait, it stands little
States does not support its decades: an imposed Chinese
chance of preventing a fait
independence. President Tsai takeover of Taiwan remains
accompli. Waiting for China
Ing-wen, a member of the antithetical to U.S. interests. If
to make a move on Taiwan
“pro-independence” the United States fails to
before deciding whether to
Democratic Progressive Party respond to such a Chinese use
intervene is a recipe for
(DPP), has adopted cautious of force, regional U.S. allies,
disaster.
and prudent policies to such as Japan and South
manage relations with China Korea, will conclude that the
(in close consultation with the United States cannot be relied
Under President Xi Jinping,
United States) and has upon and that it is pulling back
China has become ever more
carefully avoided moves that from the region. These Asian
assertive in advancing its
might cross Beijing’s redlines. allies would then either
interests. Xi once pledged to
The Taiwanese are pragmatic accommodate China, leading
U.S. President Barack Obama
and understand that pursuing to the dissolution of U.S.
that China would not
independence, which would alliances and the crumbling of
militarize the South China
provoke China, is not in the the balance of power, or they
Sea, but in recent years, it has
island’s interest. Accordingly, would seek nuclear weapons
done so. The country has
fewer than ten percent support in a bid to become
imprisoned at least one
pursuing independence as strategically self-reliant.
million of its Uighur minority.
soon as possible, and a Either scenario would greatly
It has openly clashed with
majority prefer to maintain the increase the chance of war in a
India along the two countries’
status quo rather than risk a region that is central to the
disputed border. It has ramped
war. world’s economy and home to
up military exercises in the
most of its people.
Taiwan Strait and intensified
efforts to isolate Taiwan
Finally, while some may have
internationally. Equally
questioned whether the Meanwhile, the 24 million
worrisome for Taiwan, China
authoritarian Taiwan of 1979, people of Taiwan would see
has over the past year stripped
ruled under martial law, was their democracy and freedoms
Hong Kong of nearly all its
worth defending, the island crushed. China would
autonomy.
has since blossomed into a subsume the island’s vibrant,
robust democracy with high-tech economy. And
regular, peaceful transfers of China’s military would no
The time has come for the
power. Taiwan became the longer be bottled up within the
United States to introduce a
first place in Asia to legalize first island chain: its navy
policy of strategic clarity.
same-sex marriage and has would instead have the ability
In light of these trends, one of the freest presses in the to project Chinese power
China’s aim to gain control of region. It has the highest throughout the western
Taiwan, through force if proportion of female Pacific.
necessary, needs to be taken legislators in Asia, nearly
seriously. There is speculation double that of the United
TIME TO BE
UNAMBIGUOUS
The fact that the United States,
China, and Taiwan have kept
the peace in the Taiwan Strait
for 40 years by finessing the
issue is one of the great
postwar foreign policy
achievements of the United
States. It is a testament to the
skillful statecraft of Henry
Kissinger and many of his
successors, who understood
that settling this issue on terms
acceptable to all sides was out
of reach. But ambiguity is now
unlikely to preserve the status
quo.
To defend its achievement and
continue to deter Chinese
adventurism, the United
States should adopt a position
of strategic clarity, making
explicit that it would respond
to any Chinese use of force
against Taiwan. Such a policy
would lower the chances of
Chinese miscalculation,
which is the likeliest catalyst
for war in the Taiwan Strait.
A change in U.S. policy is
especially necessary given
that President Donald Trump
has sown seeds of doubt as to
whether the United States
would come to the aid of its
friends and allies. He has
questioned the value of
NATO and abandoned the
United States’ Kurdish
partners. He is reducing the
U.S. troop presence in
Germany, threatening to do
the same in South Korea, and
has signed an agreement with
the Taliban that is nothing so
much as a cover for U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Xi Jinping can easily have
concluded that the United
States will not come to
Taiwan’s defense. As a result,
the United States must restore
deterrence: announcing a what would change would be
policy of strategic clarity is the means.
the best way to do so.
The White House could
By itself, a statement is not
articulate this new policy
enough. The United States
through a presidential
must pair it with steps that
statement and accompanying
bolster deterrence. It should
executive order that reiterates
station additional air and
U.S. support for its one-China
naval forces in the region,
policy but also unequivocally
redouble efforts to disperse
states that the United States
these forces in order to
would respond should Taiwan
complicate Chinese planning,
come under Chinese armed
and make preparing for a
attack. The statement would
Taiwan contingency a top
make clear that the United
priority for Department of
States does not support
Defense planners. The United
Taiwan independence, thus
States should consult with
deterring Taiwan from
Japan and South Korea to see
attempting to capitalize on the
what types of assistance these
new U.S. policy. Importantly,
allies would offer during a
the TRA, which is a critical
Taiwan contingency.
element of the United States’
one-China policy, premises
normalization with China on
The CCP derives much of its
“the expectation that the
legitimacy from its ability to
future of Taiwan will be
provide sustained economic
determined by peaceful
growth. Therefore, the United
means.” A statement that the
States should make clear that
United States would not
using force against Taiwan
tolerate a Chinese attack
would put China’s continued
against Taiwan is thus
growth at risk. Congress
consistent with the one-China
should pass a law that would
policy.
impose severe sanctions on
China should it attack Taiwan.
The United States should
Strategic clarity would not
coordinate with its Asian and
entail that the United States
European allies so they send
recognize Taipei or upgrade
similar signals.
its relationship with Taiwan,
nor would it involve a mutual
defense treaty or any signed
At the same time, the United
document with Taiwan. Such
States should work with
steps would force Xi’s hand.
Taiwan to help it maintain the
Rather, the statement would
integrity of its democracy in
be a unilateral U.S. pledge,
the face of Chinese coercion.
and it would make clear that
It should assist Taiwan with
the basics of U.S. policy
election security and
remain unchanged: the United
cyberdefense and explore a
States would continue to
free trade agreement with the
avoid taking a position on the
island to help ensure its
final contours of a resolution
economic vitality.
of cross-strait differences and
insist only that any such
resolution come about
Waiting for China to make a
peacefully and consensually.
move on Taiwan is a recipe for
In short, the ends of American
disaster.
policy would stay the same—
Some will no doubt oppose
this change, arguing that it
would risk a crisis, lead to a
rupture in U.S. relations with
China, or both. But the United
States can reduce the
likelihood of a breakdown by
maintaining the one-China
policy and reiterating that the
United States does not take a
position on the substance of
any arrangement between
China and Taiwan so long as
it is arrived at peacefully and
with the consent of the people.
The policy change
recommended here would not
foreclose any potential
resolution of cross-strait
differences.
Xi moved swiftly against
Hong Kong, but if the United
States issues a clear statement
that it would respond to an
armed attack on Taiwan—and
takes steps to make this
credible—he will think twice
before forcing the Taiwan
issue and bringing about a
confrontation with the United
States. Above all, Xi is
motivated by a desire to
maintain the CCP’s
dominance of China’s
political system. A failed bid
to “reunify” Taiwan with
China would put that
dominance in peril, and that is
a risk Xi is unlikely to take.
Strengthened deterrence will
thus help prevent a cross-strait
crisis and put Sino-U.S.
relations on firmer ground by
lowering the chances of war.
Those who argue that this new
policy extends an additional
U.S. commitment at a time
when the country is already
overextended should not
delude themselves: U.S. allies
in Asia already assume that
the United States will come to
Taiwan’s defense. Deciding
not to do so would jeopardize
these alliances. The problem
is that currently, a chasm
separates what is expected of
the United States from its
declaratory policy and its
ability to intervene on
Taiwan’s behalf. Strategic
clarity aligns U.S. policy with
what U.S. allies already
expect and sets a course for
narrowing the gap between
commitments and capabilities.
The current administration has
chosen instead to
symbolically upgrade the
U.S.-Taiwanese relationship
and call into question the one-
China policy—both stances
that court conflict, because
China’s greatest concern is
that Taiwan will move toward
seeking recognition as an
independent country.
Strategic clarity, by contrast,
would eschew such symbolic
moves in favor of a policy that
focuses narrowly on restoring
deterrence. The best way to
ensure that the United States
does not need to come to
Taiwan’s defense is to signal
to China that it is prepared to
do so. What happens or
doesn’t happen in the Taiwan
Strait may well decide Asia’s
future.
 Asia After the Soviet Union
Five experts explore the legacy of the USSR and the impact of its collapse on China, India, Japan, the
A
lthough the writing
had been on the
(literal) wall since the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
the collapse of the Soviet
Union was only made official
in December 1991 though the
Belavezha Accords, which
announced that “the USSR, as
a subject of international law
and a geopolitical reality, is
ceasing its existence.” With
that, the Soviet Union was no
more and the Cold War was
over, removing the single
largest impetus driving
foreign policy decisions
around the world.
To mark the 30th anniversary
of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, The Diplomat has
gathered five experts to
explore the legacy of the
USSR and the impact of its
collapse on China, India,
Japan, the Koreas, and
Vietnam. Whether allies or
enemies of the Soviet Union,
each of these states underwent
their own major economic,
political, and diplomatic
transformations in the years
after the USSR was dissolved.
In ways both obvious and
subtle, the Soviet legacy
remains relevant across Asia.
China
— Kawashima Shin
The disintegration of the
Soviet Union in 1991 had a
profound impact on China’s
internal and foreign policies,
Koreas, and Vietnam.
The Diplomat
forcing a shift in its national
strategy. From the standpoint
of China, however, the formal
end of the Soviet Union was
not the only event in this
period that created an
opportunity to shift its
strategy. The Tiananmen
Square incident in June 1989
and the subsequent economic
sanctions imposed by the
West, as well as the end of the
Cold War in the same year,
must also be understood to
have played a part. In the
course of these events, it
became clear that China’s
approach toward nation-
building aimed to achieve
economic development
without Western
democratization.
First, China was confronted
with international isolation
not only because the Cold War
had ended, but also because of
the collapse of the socialist
bloc. The impending sense of
crisis was strong, given that
the Tiananmen Square
incident had resulted in the
imposition of economic
sanctions on China by
Western countries. It was in
the face of this crisis that the
guiding principle of foreign
policy that would later
become known as “keep a low
profile, accomplish
something” is said to have
been formed. This guiding
principle advocated that in the
midst of a crisis, China should
avoid engaging in coercion
and conflict with the West,
while at the same time striving
to achieve results. The
expression “keep a low
profile, accomplish
something” was used under
Jiang Zemin and at least the
first half of the Hu Jintao
administration. It became the
principle underpinning a
foreign policy that pursued
economic development as its
main goal.
China’s conflict with the
Soviet Union had been
brought to an end with the
visit of President Mikhail
Gorbachev in May 1989. Even
after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, however, China
continued to attach great
importance to its relationship
with Russia, not only because
relations with Russia and the
newly independent Central
Asian countries adjoining its
long borders were critical for
national security, but also
because China needed Russia
in order to take a stand against
the West.
Second, China succeeded in
realizing the second half of the
“keep a low profile,
accomplish something”
guiding principle of foreign
policy by immediately
establishing diplomatic
relations with the countries
that emerged in Central Asia
following the disintegration of
the Soviet Union. This was
accomplished through the
formation of the Shanghai
Five, including Russia,
continuing with the Central
Asian countries the diplomatic
negotiations that had already
been underway with the
Soviet Union.
 terms of domestic simultaneous promotion of
governance. Up to that point, economic and political
China also normalized
the foundation of the CCP’s reforms, which is why China
diplomatic relations with
domestic legitimacy had been has promoted economic
neighboring countries such as
revolution. The CCP is a reform but not political
Singapore and South Korea.
revolutionary party that reform. However, speaking at
These policies became the
gained legitimacy through the Central Commission for
basis for the peripheral
successful leadership of the Discipline Inspection on
diplomacy that would follow,
Chinese revolution and the February 27, 2013, Xi Jinping
including the Belt and Road
creation of a socialist society. is said to have cited “negative
Initiative. In terms of its
Despite the rejection of class and corrupt phenomena and
relationships with developed
struggle following the injustice” as the reason behind
countries, China prioritized
Cultural Revolution, the fall of the Soviet
the improvement of relations
revolution was nonetheless an Communist Party. While this
with Japan, hosting a visit by
important resource to is little more than anti-
the Japanese emperor in 1992.
maintain legitimacy. With the corruption campaign rhetoric
At the same time, China
end of the Cold War and the by Xi, it nevertheless indicates
improved relations with other
virtual collapse of the socialist an awareness on the part of the
developed countries by
faction, however, the CCP CCP of the need to learn the
accepting investment from
government needed a new “Lessons from the Soviet
them in order to grow the
source of legitimacy. Union.”
country into “the world’s
factory.”
The new sources of legitimacy
envisaged were nationalism
Third, the disintegration of the India
and the realization of wealth.
Soviet Union altered the
Following the Tiananmen — Swapna Kona Nayudu
balance of military security in
Square incident, the Chinese
the area around China, putting
government took measures to
pressure on Beijing to
curb economic activity, such Was India ever an ally of the
respond. The end of the Cold
as implementing a tight Soviet Union? Which way one
War and the dismantling of
monetary policy, but after tackles that question holds key
the Soviet Union had
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern insights into what Soviet
drastically reduced the
Tour talks in early 1992 a socialism meant for India
military capability of the
policy shift occurred and the before and after 1991.
Soviet Union’s Pacific Fleet
reform and opening up
(Red Banner Pacific Fleet),
process started up again. At
which had been based in
the same time, the Jiang There is a wide sense of what
Vladivostok. This shifted the
Zemin administration Soviet socialist diplomacy
military balance in the Far
promoted Patriotic Education meant for the Indian economy
East, leading China to engage
to inspire nationalism, – military cooperation, food
in its own military
promote national unity, and aid, steel plants, trade
confrontation with the United
legitimize CCP rule. delegations, and agricultural
States. China’s national
expertise made their way from
defense strategy and
Moscow to India from the
strengthened military force
The fifth aspect concerns the mid-1950s right up to the
were manifested in the
lessons that the disintegration dissolution of the USSR in
enactment of the Law on the
of the Soviet Union has December 1991.
Territorial Sea in 1992 and its
offered China. In general,
missile tests conducted in the
China blames the
area around Taiwan in 1996.
disintegration of the Soviet There is also some
Union on the weakening of the understanding of the influence
regime, corruption, and the of Soviet socialist ideas on the
Fourth, with the end of the
sluggish economy. Some also Indian mixed economy model,
Cold War and the collapse of
argue that the main reason for often blamed for the Hindu
the socialist bloc, the Chinese
the disintegration of the rate of growth – a term
Communist Party (CCP) had
Soviet Union was the referring to the pre-1991 low
to rebuild its legitimacy in
annual growth rate of the
Indian economy. In that sense,
India and Russia share the
memorialization of 1991 as a
year of radical change. India
went through its own glasnost
when a balance of payments
crisis forced the Narasimha
Rao government to undertake
liberalization of the economy.
Taking stock of the effect on
India of the fall of the Soviet
Union and with it, its socialist
credo, a piece in the New
York Times in 2009 claimed
that in less than two decades,
India had turned into “one of
the world’s most unabashedly
capitalist places.”
What does this say about
Indian politics? It is
uncontroversial that 1991
matters to India, mostly due to
the collapse of its own
economic scenery. But that
historical moment in the
Indian story acquired a further
global dimension when it
coincided with the end of the
Cold War, an event so
monumental that no sphere
remained untouched by its
force. This new era
inaugurated the idea that
India, famously non-aligned
during the Cold War, would
rid itself of this stale approach
to world politics – no blocs
meant no positions to not align
with.
Yet, the myth and burnish of
the relentless march of Soviet
socialist thought in India was
very much a Western Cold
War construct; hence the idea
that this was taken care of in
1991 was also a Western,
primarily American,
assessment. There is an
attempt to eulogize 1991 as
the defining moment when
India became estranged from
its socialist past, which was
supposedly buried along with
the ruins of the Soviet Union.
If 1991 offered, in the
philosopher Raymond Aron’s
phrase “the end of the
ideological age,” that legacy
acquired starkly different
dimensions in India. Indeed,
exactly a year later with the
fall of the Babri Masjid in
Ayodhya in December 1992, a
deeply conservative
ideological politics began a
long march that culminated
with the election of the
Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)
government in 2014, now in
its second term, and the
definitive rejection of and
triumph over socialist
policies, most remarkably
visible in the dissolution of the
Planning Commission and the
end of the Soviet-style five-
year plans.
If in the post-Cold War era,
India has turned away from
the welfare state and market
socialism, then what has the
fragmentation of international
socialism meant for India’s
external affairs? This year
also marks 50 years since the
1971 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between India
and the Soviet Union, at the
time considered an apostasy
by New Delhi – a decisive
farewell on Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi’s part to her
father and first Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s
non-aligned policy. It was the
popular understanding that
India had courted the Soviets
over two decades –
Khrushchev’s post-Stalinist
socialism had brought Nehru
close to him, founding a
bilateral relationship that
found full form in the Indira-
Brezhnev era. Moreover, in
the aftermath of the 1962
India-China War, the road
from New Delhi to Beijing
often ran through Moscow,
cementing the notion that
India was loyal to the Soviet
Union. In fact, these accounts
obscure India’s own early
anti-communism, particularly
among government officials.
The West burdened India with
an image that Nehru sought to
overthrow but that has
persisted.
Successive Indian
governments have cultivated
closer ties with the United
States since 1991. In the age
of Hindutva right-wing
nationalism, this perceived
Soviet-era closeness with
Moscow has steered New
Delhi even more firmly
toward the U.S., not least due
to the overlapping period
when Modi and Trump were
both in power, espousing
similar political ideas. This
shift is rooted in an endemic
belief significant to Indian
conservative politics – the
belief that socialism in all its
forms is anti-national because
it weakens the nation-state.
The conservative assessment
of Indian socialism is even
more critical of its perceived
inefficacy because of Indian
socialism’s Gandhian
allegiances, especially in the
politics of early socialist
leaders such as Ram Manohar
Lohia and Jayaprakash
Narayan, who along with
Gandhi, are simultaneously
appropriated and criticized by
the ruling BJP.
This narrative of Indian
socialism is held against the
landscape of socialist
internationalism, of which the
Soviet Union was seen as the
highest, most idealized form.
It follows that the dissolution
of that ideal is now seen as
evidence that the socialist
system simply cannot be
successful in advancing
national interests, or even
nationalism of the kind that
India needs.
The collapse of the Soviet
Union irrevocably impaired
the socialist idea in India. The
effects came to the economy
first, and Indian politics soon
after, and have altered Indian
public life ever since.
Socialists, whether organized
within political parties or as
solidarity movements, have
struggled to undo the effects
of 1991 even as Indian
socialism remains a This positive mood continued
palimpsest of Soviet
influences. The consequences
are most evident in the
devolution of the idea of
nationalism in India today.
Without a socialist contender,
the democratic debate has
been reduced to one winning
argument: the notion that the
market will save the nation.
Japan
— James D. Brown
The collapse of the Soviet
Union in December 1991 was
a moment of great optimism
for Japan. The glowering
threat on Japan’s northern
frontier had lifted, and there
were rays of hope that the
countries’ territorial dispute
would soon be resolved. Yet,
30 years on, surprisingly little
has changed between Tokyo
and Moscow.
For a Japanese audience in
1991, perhaps even more
memorable than the lowering
of the Soviet flag above the
Kremlin on December 25 was
the visit by Mikhail
Gorbachev to Tokyo in April.
This was the first ever visit by
a Soviet leader to Japan, and,
as Gorbachev and his wife
smiled in the spring sunshine,
there was a strong feeling that
the Cold War was truly over.
This sense of historical
transition was reinforced by
the fact that it literally was a
new era in Japan. Emperor
Hirohito had died in 1989 and,
with the enthronement of his
son, Akihito, the Heisei era
had been proclaimed,
meaning “peace everywhere.”
following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. When Boris
Yeltsin, as president of the
new Russian Federation,
visited Tokyo in October
1993, the joint declaration
spoke of “a new world
political and economic order”
and trumpeted that “Japan and
the Russian Federation share
the universal values of
freedom, democracy, the rule
of law and the respect for
fundamental human rights.”
The sides also conducted
“serious negotiations on the
issue of where Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan and the
Habomai Islands belong.”
This was a reference to the
islands off the coast of
Hokkaido – known as the
South Kurils in Russia and the
Northern Territories in Japan
– which had been seized by
Soviet forces at the end of
World War II, and whose
unresolved status prevented
the signing of a peace treaty.
This cordial language in the
early 1990s was a welcome
contrast to the chill of the Cold
War, when Soviet leaders
would not even acknowledge
the existence of a territorial
dispute with Japan. More
importantly, the Soviet Union
had been the leading threat to
Japanese security. For this
reason, during the Cold War,
Japan had concentrated units
of the Ground Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) on Hokkaido in
order to hold off a potential
Soviet invasion. Japan was
also kept busy monitoring
Soviet aircraft and
submarines, as well as
tracking Soviet spies within
the country.
There was also the recognition
of Japan’s function as a
power-projection hub for U.S.
forces in East Asia. This was
famously articulated by Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro,
who urged the United States in
1983 to use Japan as “an
unsinkable aircraft carrier” to
combat the Soviet Backfire
bomber. Moscow’s response
was to threaten Japan with a
nuclear attack “more serious
than the one that befell it 37
years ago.”
With the Soviet Union now
buried, all of this was
supposed to become a thing of
the past. Friendship was
supposed to replace suspicion,
trade and investment was
supposed to flourish, and the
border was supposed to be
transformed from a zone of
confrontation to one of
cooperation. In reality, after
30 years, little of this has been
achieved.
True, Russia is no longer the
main security threat to Japan;
both China and North Korea
are now listed ahead of Russia
in Japan’s annual defense
white paper. For this reason,
in 2010, Japan reoriented SDF
deployments away from the
north and toward the
southwest.
Yet, Russia still presents a
serious security challenge.
Russian military forces in the
vicinity of Japan continue to
be modernized. A recent
example is Moscow’s
announcement in 2020 of the
full deployment of the S-300
surface-to-air missile system
to the disputed islands. Russia
also regularly sends its
strategic bombers on training
runs toward Japan. In
response, Japan’s Air Self-
Defense Force scrambled its
fighter jets 258 times in fiscal
2020. Only China provoked
more.
An added concern is tighter
military cooperation between
Russia and China. In July
2019, Russian and Chinese
strategic bombers conducted
their first joint air patrol over
the Sea of Japan. This
included an incursion by a
Russian aircraft into Japanese-
claimed airspace over
Takeshima. Additionally, in
October 2021, five warships
apiece from the Russian and
Chinese navies conducted an
unprecedented joint circuit
around the Japanese
archipelago. For Japan, this is
a worse situation than during
the Soviet era, since at least
then Moscow and Beijing
were embroiled in their own
Cold War.
As for the territorial dispute, it
is now further from resolution
than it was three decades ago.
This owes much to the
amendment of the Russian
constitution in 2020 to add the
line that “Actions … directed
towards the alienation of part
of the territory of the Russian
Federation, and also calls for
such actions, are not allowed.”
Rather than the anticipated
joint projects, development of
the contested islands is also
proceeding under Russia’s
exclusive jurisdiction.
The post-Cold War era did
bring some economic
progress, not least Japanese
investment in major energy
projects on Sakhalin.
However, overall, Japan-
Russia economic cooperation
remained disappointing, even
before the pandemic. In 2018,
bilateral trade turnover
constituted $23.1 billion, a
mere 27 percent of the figure
between Japan and South
Korea, whose economy is
only slightly larger than that
of Russia.
Lastly, the hoped-for
friendship that was spoken of
in 1991 has not been achieved.
In fact, according to a
Japanese Cabinet Office
survey in 2020, 85.7 percent
of Japanese do not feel
affection for Russia, a figure
notably higher than at the
beginning of the 1990s.
In short, while the Soviet
Union ended, the contours of
Japanese thinking about
Moscow did not. It remains a
relationship defined by the
territorial dispute and, above
all, by the geopolitical divide
between Russia and the
United States. So long as
Japan remains the leading
U.S. ally in Asia and relations
between Washington and
Moscow remain frayed,
Japan-Russia relations will
struggle to throw off the
shackles of the past.
It may be 30 years since the
collapse of the Soviet Union,
but, across the Japan-Russia
frontier, the political scenery
looks drearily familiar.
Koreas
— Se Young Jang
On October 26, former
President of South Korea Roh
Tae-woo died at the age of 88.
Roh’s time in power, from
1988 to early 1993, coincided
with a critical moment in
world history when the
communist bloc in Europe,
including the Soviet Union,
faced drastic winds of change.
Roh is a controversial figure
in Korean history. First of all,
he participated in a 1979
military coup led by his friend,
Chun Doo-hwan, who died
less than a month after Roh
this year. Chun became
president in 1981 after
brutally squashing democratic
protests in Gwangju and
killing innocent civilians. Roh
held key positions under
Chun’s dictatorship and
became a presidential
candidate of Chun’s ruling
party.
Unlike his predecessor,
however, Roh was
democratically selected by
South Koreans in a direct
election held soon after a
nation-wide democratic
uprising in 1987. Roh’s dual
identity – a democratically
elected president but also a
former army general who was
an active member of both the
1979 coup and its subsequent
dictatorial regime – makes it
somewhat difficult to
objectively assess his
achievements as president
among his many other
wrongdoings.
One of the undervalued
achievements of Roh’s
presidency, however, was the
establishment of South
Korea’s Nordpolitik
(Northern Policy), which was
developed against the
backdrop of changing
dynamics between East and
West. His Northern Policy, a
conciliatory approach to
communist countries, was an
epoch-making turning point in
South Korea’s diplomatic
history, which had been
deeply intertwined with the
development of East-West
confrontations since the
Korean War.
The Korean War was an
exemplary case of hot war
during the Cold War era. The
war consolidated the division
of Korea – between the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and
the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) –
which had been separately
occupied by the United States
and the Soviet Union soon
after the surrender of Japan,
which had colonized the
peninsula for 35 years. The
two Koreas fought each other
with the strong support of
their allies, which naturally
resulted in adversarial
relations with the other
Korea’s backers. In the eyes of
South Korea, the Soviet Union
was the mastermind behind
the communist North, while
Moscow viewed the South as
an American imperialist
colony.
The possibility for some
changes in bilateral relations
between Moscow and Seoul
emerged with the leadership
of Mikhail Gorbachev in
1985. His pragmatic and
diplomatic approach to
international relations led the
Soviet Union to strengthen its
relations with East Asia. As
part of that process, Moscow
started to reevaluate South
Korea’s position and potential
power in the region.
At the same time, South Korea
pursued a forward-looking
policy instead of staying
frozen in a Cold War
mentality. In his inauguration
speech in February 1988, Roh
said, “Improving relations
with countries of different
ideologies and systems will
contribute to security, peace
and co-prosperity in East
Asia,” signaling his departure
from South Korea’s
confrontational policy toward
communist and socialist
countries during the Cold
War.
Roh’s July 7 Declaration that
same year demonstrated his
serious intention to normalize
South Korea’s relations with
the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries, which set
the basic direction for Seoul’s
Northern Policy. Such a bold
switch of position in Seoul
was well received by
Moscow, and the new
rapprochement was further
boosted by the latter’s
participation in the 1988
Seoul Olympics, after its
boycott of the previous Los
Angeles Olympics in 1984.
These developments
culminated in a summit
between Roh and Gorbachev
in August 1990.
The Soviet Union and South
Korea established full
diplomatic relations in
September 1990, which
enabled the simultaneous
membership of both Koreas to
the United Nations in the
following year. The Soviet
Union was officially dissolved
in December 1991; however,
bilateral relations between
Moscow and Seoul have not
fundamentally changed since
the breakthrough made under
Roh, despite some ups and
downs from time to time.
Today, the new diplomatic
space created by Roh’s
Northern Policy has been built
upon, strengthened, and
diversified into the New
Northern Policy of the current
South Korean administration
under President Moon Jae-in.
One might argue that Roh’s
Northern Policy simply
represented Seoul’s passive
acceptance of the change of
world order, which was
steered by the two great
powers, Washington and
Moscow. However, recently
declassified documents from
South Korea’s Foreign
Ministry reveal that
Washington was concerned
about the possibility that
South Korea’s rapprochement
toward the Soviet Union and
China would lead to a
weakening of Seoul’s
commitment to ROK-U.S.
relations. Moscow, on its part,
had to deal with anger and
resistance from Pyongyang.
The normalization of relations
between the USSR and South
Korea in 1990 was a result of
active diplomatic efforts on
both sides to prepare for a new
post-Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War
unfolded over several years,
beginning with the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and
ending with the breakdown of
the Soviet Union in 1991.
During that process, South
Korea proactively changed its
position toward communist
countries and successfully
improved its relations with the
Soviet Union and others. The
new diplomatic space created
by Roh’s Northern Policy also
helped Seoul revise its
confrontational policy toward
North Korea. However,
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons
program complicated inter-
Korean relations, and as a
result the Korean Peninsula is
arguably the only place in the
world where the Cold War
continues today.
Vietnam
— Khang Vu
Considering the long history
and great significance of
Hanoi-Moscow ties, no
analysis on Vietnam’s foreign
relations can afford to ignore
the impact of Russia and the
former Soviet Union. While
the contemporary spotlight is
largely on Beijing and
Washington, Moscow is the
most important factor in
defining Hanoi’s post-Cold
War foreign policy, and it will
continue to shape how
Vietnam deals with the major
powers as the China-U.S.
rivalry intensifies.
As single-party states led by
hegemonic communist
parties, the Soviet Union and
Vietnam adopted similar
criteria when it comes to
choosing allies: the
prospective ally must share
both security interests and
ideological values. Security
interests ensure the survival
and benefits of the state in
international politics, while
ideological values guarantee
the survival and dominance of
the communist party in
domestic politics.
Consequently, the Soviet and
Vietnamese party-states were
military allies from 1965 to
1991 for two major reasons.
They not only shared common
security interests in opposing
the United States and China,
but also held similar beliefs in
socialist internationalism.
Indeed, the Soviet Union-
Vietnam 1978 Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation put
socialist fraternalism at the
core of a mutual commitment
to assist one another in case of
any threat. Soviet security and
economic assistance gave
Vietnam much needed support
when it invaded Cambodia in
late 1978 to end the genocidal
Pol Pot regime and when
Hanoi had to maintain a large
military presence along the
China-Vietnam border to
prepare for and deter Chinese
invasions from the late 1970s
to the late 1980s. The alliance
with the Soviet Union became
a bedrock on which Vietnam
based its foreign policy in this
period.
However, the cohesion of the
Soviet-Vietnamese alliance
largely depended on the
strength of the Soviet
economy, because the
Vietnamese economy could
not support high military costs
and domestic production
simultaneously. As a result,
the alliance began to weaken
in the mid-1980s as the Soviet
Union entered a state of
economic stagnation. To
revitalize the economy,
General Secretary of the
Soviet Union Mikhail
Gorbachev launched a series
of domestic reforms and
improved relations with China
to cut defense spending under
the Vladivostok initiative.
With Vietnam seen as more of
a liability than an asset,
costing Moscow more than $1
billion a year, the Soviet
Union thus encouraged Hanoi
to wind down military
activities in Cambodia to save
resources and remove one of
the three obstacles to the
normalization of Sino-Soviet
relations as well as China-
Vietnam relations.
When China attacked
Vietnam-controlled Johnson
South Reef in March 1988, the
Soviet Union turned a blind
eye even though its navy was
stationed in Cam Ranh Bay
because Moscow did not want
to harm the ongoing Sino-
Soviet normalization process.
This lack of support
disappointed Hanoi, for it
went against Moscow’s earlier
assurance that it would not let
developing relations with
China come at Vietnam’s
expenses. Later that year,
Vietnam was alarmed that the
Soviet Union proposed to end
its military presence in Cam
Ranh Bay in exchange for
U.S. withdrawal from its
Clark and Subic bases in the
Philippines. The growing
prospect of Soviet
abandonment eventually
forced Vietnam to begin its
own normalization talks with
China starting in 1989 on the
latter’s terms. In 1991, the
Soviet Union withdrew more
than 6,000 experts from
Vietnam and significantly
reduced the size of its forces in
Cam Ranh Bay.
In addition to diminishing
Soviet material support,
Vietnam was also upset over
the Tiananmen Square
Incident and the collapse of
communist regimes in Eastern
Europe. Within the Politburo,
talks of protecting
communism from Western
imperialism clashed with
ideas of reform (“doi moi”)
laid out at the 1986 National
Congress of the Communist
Party. Seeing that the Soviet
Union was no longer able to
lead the international
communist movement,
Vietnamese top leaders had a
major debate over whether
China was an expansionist
power or a fellow communist
regime. It was a difficult
debate, given that China
attacked Vietnamese troops
on the Johnson South Reef a
year prior. Vietnam allegedly
supported the failed August
coup by Soviet communist
hardliners against Gorbachev,
and by the end of 1991, many
were shocked and felt a sense
of betrayal by the
transformation occurring
within the Soviet Union.
Vietnam now saw Gorbachev
as a “traitor to the socialist
cause.”
Hanoi thus decided to forge a
new Vietnam-China
relationship based on
ideological solidarity while
downplaying aspects of
Chinese expansionism with a
belief that Beijing would be
able to help protect the
remaining socialist states in
the face of a growing Western
threat. However, the new
relationship lacked the
security interest component
necessary to constitute an
alliance, which made Vietnam
and China into “comrades but
not allies” since 1991. Such
comradeship, however, has
encouraged China to weaken
Hanoi’s ties with the United
States in the context of
growing China-Vietnam
territorial tension in the South
China Sea by stressing
ideological differences in the
U.S.-Vietnam partnership.
Beijing seeks to remind Hanoi
that the United States is an
ideological enemy with a
history of stoking color
revolutions. If Hanoi wants to
preserve its political stability
and regime security, it should
not trust the anti-communist
United States.
In the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union,
the Russian Federation began
to revise Moscow’s alliance
relationship with Vietnam.
President Boris Yeltsin
embraced liberal ideas as
opposed to communist
ideology, and Russian elites
felt little ideological
connection with Vietnam. In
turn, Hanoi did not trust the
new liberal Russian
government. The Russian
naval presence in Cam Ranh
Bay was more symbolic than
strategic compared to the
1980s, as Moscow was more
occupied with solving its
domestic problems than
maintaining a far-flung
military presence. In 1992, a
Russian spokesman said that
the Russia-Vietnam
relationship remained
friendly, but it had been
“depoliticized and de-
ideologized.”
Consequently, Russia and
Vietnam put a formal end to
their alliance by terminating
the 1978 treaty and replacing
it with the new Treaty on the
Basic Principles of the
Vietnam-Russia Relationship
in 1994. References to
“socialist internationalism”
and “Marxism-Leninism”
were removed to make way
for a normal state-to-state
relationship based on “mutual
benefits.” Hanoi and Moscow
got rid of the military
assistance clause that
characterized a military
alliance, too. Both sides
pledged to refrain from
signing treaties with other
countries or undertaking
actions that would hurt the
interests of the other side in
the 1994 treaty, which
essentially functions as a
neutrality pact. Interestingly,
around the same time, Russia
also ended its alliance
relationship with North
Korea. In 2000, Russia and
North Korea signed a Treaty
of Friendship, Good
Neighborliness, and
Cooperation along the lines of
the 1994 Vietnam-Russia
treaty to suit the post-Cold
War context.
The 1994 Vietnam-Russia
treaty complements Hanoi’s
post-Cold War policy of non-
alignment and provides an
important third option amid
the China-U.S. rivalry. Russia
does not have major territorial
conflicts with Vietnam, unlike
China, and it does not pose an
ideological threat to
Vietnam’s regime security,
unlike the United States. This
explains why Russia has long
been Vietnam’s most trusted
arms supplier and Hanoi is
willing to grant it special
access to Cam Ranh Bay, even
at the risk of triggering U.S.
anger.
Nevertheless, contemporary
Russia-Vietnam relations are
unlikely to reach the level of
cohesion seen during the Cold
War. As Russia and China
converge to challenge U.S.
primacy and Russia-U.S.
relations remain sour,
Vietnam’s need for closer
security relations with the
United States may damage the
potential of Russia-Vietnam
relations. A case in point is the
U.S. Countering America’s
Adversaries through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA),
which will punish Vietnam for
its defense cooperation with
the Russian defense and
intelligence sector. Hanoi will
have to carefully balance
between Russian and U.S.
arms suppliers when it comes
to buying weapons to check
Chinese ambitions in the
South China Sea.
Moscow has been and will
continue to be one of the main
actors shaping Hanoi’s
foreign policy. Soviet security
and ideological support
significantly drove Hanoi’s
hostile policies toward China
in the 1970s and ‘80s. In the
1990s, the collapse of the
Soviet state deprived Hanoi of
a senior ally and pushed it
toward neutrality and the
adoption of a multivector
foreign policy. Indeed,
Vietnam’s current neutral
“cooperation and struggle”
strategy reflects its seven-
decade-old alliance policies.
Except for Laos, no countries
can satisfy both Hanoi’s
security interests and
ideological values enough for
it to wholeheartedly cooperate
as a full-fledged ally. Russia’s
stance on the South China Sea
dispute will determine
whether Vietnam will
cooperate with or struggle
against it more in the future.
 Quad Summit Indicates Growing Strength
The latest Quad meeting underscored continued growth, but when will the four countries seriously
confront the matter of direct security cooperation?

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, The Diplomat

T he leaders of the Quad

just completed their
fourth meeting, and the
second in-person gathering, in
Tokyo. That the Quad leaders
international rules-based
order where countries are free
from all forms of military,
economic
coercion,”
and
which
political
is
promote stability
prosperity in our seas and
and

oceans.” This is truly bringing

have managed to hold four
summits in the last year
speaks clearly to the strong
commitment shown by the
four countries to the grouping.
Remarkably, new Australian
Prime Minister Anthony
Albanese had barely taken his
oath of office before traveling
to Japan for the Quad Summit,
demonstrating the continued
Australian commitment to the
Quad despite the Labor Party
coming to power in Canberra
after nearly a decade of
Coalition rule.
The resulting joint statement
after the meeting highlighted
the importance of the Quad as
a “force for good,” with a
positive agenda to make the
Indo-Pacific region more
resilient in the face of myriad
challenges.
The Ukraine conflict figured
prominently in the Quad
leaders’ discussions despite
the fact that India stands out
among them in not calling out
Russia by name or joining the
Quad countries in sanctioning
Moscow. Nevertheless, the
joint statement emphasized
the importance of rule of law,
sovereignty, and territorial
integrity; peaceful settlement
of disputes without threat or
use of force; and freedom of
navigation and overflight. The
leaders reaffirmed their
determination to “uphold the
particularly applicable in the
Indo-Pacific. The leaders also
noted that what happened in
Ukraine should not be allowed
to happen in the Indo-Pacific.
Thus, indirectly at least, New
Delhi did demonstrate its
unhappiness with Moscow’s
war.
The connection between what
was happening in Europe and
the emerging confrontation in
the Indo-Pacific was also
made abundantly clear when a
joint Russian-Chinese force of
bombers decided to do a fly-
past near Japanese territory
during the summit.
The Quad countries also
recognized the important role
of maritime domain
awareness (MDA) in order to
be able to respond to a number
of challenges, including
natural disasters and illegal
fishing. The new Indo-Pacific
Partnership for Maritime
Domain Awareness (IPMDA)
is useful in this regard, but its
relevance to monitoring
China’s naval activities is
especially significant. The
joint statement noted that the
IPMDA will “support and
work in consultation with
Indo-Pacific nations and
regional information fusion
centers in the Indian Ocean,
Southeast Asia, and the
Pacific Islands by providing
technology and training to
support enhanced, shared
maritime domain awareness to
the varied capabilities of the
Quad together to help the
entire region deal with a
particularly insidious form of
Chinese aggression: Beijing’s
strategy of sending seemingly
civilian fishing vessels to act
as an extension of the PLA
Navy in the maritime domains
of various countries. This
Quad initiative was much
needed and should help the
region recognize China’s
covert aggression.
Maritime security and
compliance with international
law, especially the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), plus
maintenance of freedom of
navigation and overflight in
order to maintain a maritime
rules-based order, including in
the East and South China
Seas, were big on the Quad
agenda. The leaders
reaffirmed their opposition to
“any coercive, provocative or
unilateral actions that seek to
change the status quo and
increase tensions in the area,
such as the militarization of
disputed features, the
dangerous use of coast guard
vessels and maritime militia,
and efforts to disrupt other
countries’ offshore resource
exploitation activities.” It
would definitely help if the
United States, the key Quad
power, also joined UNCLOS,
of course.
The Quad leaders also
emphasized the importance of
Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR),
which is demonstrated in the
establishment of the “Quad
Partnership on Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief
(HADR) in the Indo-Pacific.”
This is particularly important
given that the region is prone
to natural disasters of
increasing severity. The Quad,
in its first iteration, took shape
in the aftermath of the 2004
tsunami that struck the Indian
Ocean region. Working with
the Pacific Island nations in
strengthening their economic
well-being, health
infrastructure, environmental
resilience, and maritime
security capabilities also
figured prominently in the
Quad joint statement.
Critical and emerging
technologies, as well as space,
featured prominently in the
joint statement too, with the
four countries agreeing to
explore ways to share space-
based Earth observation data,
along with a “Quad Satellite
Data Portal” that would
aggregate links between the
national satellite data
generated by the Quad
partners.
Despite the advances that the
Quad is making in working
together, their recent focus on
non-traditional security issues
— presumably at New Delhi’s
insistence, considering the
other three are already deeply
intertwined security partners
— is potentially troublesome.
Admittedly, some of these are
thinly-veiled security
cooperation, or could quickly
be escalated to security
cooperation, but the
reluctance to move further on
direct security cooperation is
difficult to understand.
Hopefully, that will be next
step for the Quad.
 Old Challenges Loom Over Southern Thailand’s New Peace
Talks
Building on the recent successes of fresh negotiations will depend on both sides overcoming decades-old
Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat
n April, Thailand’s
I government
south agreed to a pause in
and
insurgents in the country’s
violence tied to the month of
Ramadan in the latest
development in the decades-
long southern Thailand
insurgency. While the
confidence-building measure
spotlighted a ray of hope amid
continued peace talks,
whether or not such moves
can get past the challenge of
sustaining peace remains to be
seen.
The rise of a new wave of
violence in Thailand’s Malay-
Muslim majority
southernmost provinces since
2004 has left over 7,000 dead
in what is one of Asia’s
deadliest ongoing conflicts.
Yet despite multiple rounds of
talks between the government
and insurgents – at times with
the facilitation of neighboring
Malaysia – both sides have
been unable to find a political
resolution to what continues
to be one of Thailand’s top
internal security challenges.
This year saw renewed efforts
at peace talks between the two
sides, after face-to-face talks
had been suspended with the
outbreak of the pandemic.
From January 11-12,
Malaysia brokered the first
peace talks since the
pandemic between the Thai
government and Barisan
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), the
leading separatist insurgency
group. Following a second
difficulties.
round of talks from March 31-
April 1, both sides agreed to a
40-day pause in violence
covering the month of
Ramadan and began a process
of reaching alignment on three
key areas: violence reduction,
public consultation, and
political solution.
The incremental gains within
the peace process, fragile and
modest though they may be,
ought not to be dismissed
entirely. Though such pauses
in violence have occurred
before and have a mixed
record of success, they serve
as basic confidence-building
measures when levels of trust
between the two sides are
quite low. The latest iteration
included an unprecedented
provision to allow unarmed
rebels to visit their families
during Ramadan and
accompanying efforts to
reduce tensions. Similarly,
aligning on key areas can at
least begin to identify and then
bridge remaining divides
between both sides, even if, as
Malaysia’s peace broker
Abdul Rahim Noor has said,
this is still at the early stage of
the formation of joint working
groups to flesh out these
topics.
Yet at the same time, the
pause in violence should not
distract from the core
challenge of forging
sustainable peace in Southern
Thailand, which is rooted in
the political differences that
remain between the two sides
and within their camps.
Episodic attacks that have
taken place since January
continue to raise concerns
about divisions among the
BRN and with other groups,
such as PULO, which are left
out of the talks and could
serve as spoilers further down
the line.
More broadly, there are also
lingering concerns about
whether both sides will be
able to arrive at some sort of
middle ground between the
independence sought by the
insurgents in the south and the
Thai state’s hard line on
preserving its power. Any
compromise with the
separatists to the south has
been seen as having effects for
governance in the country
more broadly. Some version
of decentralization or
devolution has long been
touted as a potential solution,
but fashioning a mutually
acceptable compromise that
allows both sides to claim they
are operating from a position
of strength is a difficulty that
has bedeviled many previous
peace processes.
To be sure, these challenges
should not detract from the
possibility of all sides
continuing to pursue dialogue,
which holds out the slim
chance of at least breathing
fresh life into efforts to
manage the insurgency.
Indeed, even some on the Thai
government side have
conceded that they see
promise in this latest round of
talks, noting the direct
presence of a core member of
the BRN’s fighting wing at
talks. The new Ramadan
peace initiative could function
as a trial period to assess how
the easing of tensions will
play out. Nonetheless, given
countless rounds of previously
dashed hopes, careful scrutiny
should be placed not just on
individual developments, but
also the management of
structural issues that have
frustrated peace efforts in the
past.
 Russia-Ukraine War: Military Modernization and Operational
Challenges for India
Aditi Malhotra, South Asian Voices
I t has been over two
months since the Russia-
Ukraine War began, and
the conflict shows little signs
of slowing. Beyond the
immediate devastation of the
war, the fighting in Europe has
once again highlighted the
strategic dilemma of foreign
dependence for military
preparedness. The ongoing
strategic and diplomatic
conundrum faced by Indian
decision-makers perhaps best
illustrates this case. This also
in part explains the Indian
government’s relatively
muted criticism of Russian
actions and India’s abstention
from all United Nations votes
condemning Moscow.
For Indian military
modernization, the ongoing
crisis has short- and long-term
implications. Immediately
pivoting away from Russia
will considerably impact
India’s near-term military
preparedness vis-à-vis
Pakistan and China, especially
as the ongoing border standoff
with China continues. Despite
the necessity of Russian
military equipment in the
near-term, the war is also
likely to add further incentives
for a gradual shift away from
Russia, focus on
indigenization, and increasing
military cooperation with the
West.
Dependence on Russia
India’s strategic relationship
with Russia and defense ties
date back to the Cold War era.
India’s partnership with the
Soviet Union deepened,
especially after the Sino-
Soviet split and resulted in
robust security cooperation
that acted as a counter to
Pakistan’s ties with both the
United States and China in the
1970s. The benefits of
affordable pricing, supply of
advanced technological
systems, requisite training,
opportunities for co-
production and technology
transfers made the Soviet
Union—and later Russia—an
ideal defense partner. It may
also be recalled that save a
brief period in the immediate
aftermath of the 1962 India-
China War, American
technology and defense
equipment were long denied
to India, as it was not a
member of any American-led
alliance. This further pushed
India into the Soviet fold. This
perpetuating dependency on
Russia led to nearly 70 percent
of Indian defense equipment
today being Soviet origin.
Despite the necessity of
Russian military equipment in
the near-term, the war is also
likely to add further incentives
for a gradual shift away from
Russia, focus on
indigenization, and increasing
military cooperation with the
West.
India sought to diversify its
defense procurement only at
the turn of the century.
Despite inching closer
towards the West and its allies
(the United States, France,
Italy, and Israel), New Delhi
remains dependent on Russia
for arms and advanced
weapon systems as well as for
spares and upgrades. Between
2017 and 2021, India
considerably lowered its
dependence on Moscow (by
almost 23 percent) and
focused on domestically
produced arms. Yet, Russia
enjoyed a share of over 46
percent of India’s arms
imports and was India’s
largest supplier of a variety of
weapons during the past five
years. There is cognizance in
New Delhi that although the
quality of Russian imports
pales in comparison to
western systems, the West is
unlikely to provide India with
the advanced defense
technologies that Russia
readily offers.
Military Preparedness in the
Near-Term
India’s core security priorities
are focused on its land-border
disputes with China and
Pakistan and maritime
competition with China in the
Indo-Pacific—the war in
Ukraine stands to impact both
these security priorities in the
near- to medium-term (the
next five years).
India has been in a border
standoff with China along the
disputed Line of Actual
Control (LAC) since 2020.
While the disputed Line of
Control with Pakistan remains
relatively stable, India-
Pakistan bilateral ties remain
precarious amid a political
crisis in Pakistan and
downgraded diplomatic
relations and suspended trade
ties. Apart from the land
border disputes, the attention
of Indian military planners is
consumed by Chinese
activities in Indian Ocean
Region, where India positions
itself as a dominant maritime
actor. These security priorities
will continue to dictate the
trajectory of Indian defense
capabilities and preparedness.
In the near term, the most
salient Russian weapons deals
include the S-400 missile
system, Talwar class frigates
(Project 1135.6), Akula class
nuclear submarines, T-90
main battle tanks (which
involves technology transfer),
the jointly manufactured
BrahMos missile system and
AK-203 Rifles (which
includes a contract to
manufacture most weapons in
India). While these deals are
already underway and
unlikely to be cancelled, the
new developments will make
the processes complex, time-
consuming, and complicated.
India has several essential
defense imports from
Ukraine, including upgrades
for the AN-32, R-27 air-to-air-
missiles, and propulsion
systems for frigates, which
will also face disruption.
The war in Ukraine has
created pressing concerns for
India about Russia’s ability to
fulfil its medium and long-
term defense requirements.
Considering the massive
personnel and asset losses
faced by the Russian military,
Moscow is likely to direct its
attention towards its own
rearmament first. This will
likely delay or disrupt the
timely supply of already
contracted items from Russia.
Reports have surfaced
claiming that India has
already cancelled contracts to
procure MiG-29, Su-30
The supply of Talwar-class
fighter jets, and Ka-226T
(Project 1135.6) frigates is
helicopters from Russia.
likely to be impacted as a
Ukrainian firm, Zorya–
Mashproekt, manufactures the
A separate area of concern is
gas turbine engines for the
the transfer of the four
Russia-built ship. The Indian
remaining units of the S-
Navy procured the frigates to
400—an advanced surface-to-
bolster its capability in the air,
air defense system- that is
surface, and sub-surface naval
seen as a reliable shield for
warfare, and any considerable
India from varied types of
delays may impact its
aerial attacks from China or
maritime potential in the Indo-
Pakistan. The Indian Air
Pacific region. After the 2014
Force has already deployed
Crimea conflict, New Delhi
the first squadron of the S-400
had to convince Kyiv to
system after receiving the first
provide the propulsion system
batch in December 2021.
for the construction of two
Although Moscow has
frigates. With Russian strikes
continued to supply the
on defense industry sites in
simulators and training
Ukraine, the war is expected
equipment amid the war, there
to severely hamper Ukraine’s
are concerns over the timely
export capacity in the near
transfer of the remaining
term. In the medium-term,
units. The war may also
India’s “neutral” stance may
impact Washington’s
hinder India-Ukraine ties
willingness to issue a waiver
leading Kyiv to potentially
for India to avoid sanctions
deny India the engines for the
under the Countering
remaining frigates, thereby
America’s Adversaries
impacting the supplies of the
Through Sanctions Act
Indian Navy or relevant
(CAATSA). Given the
spares. Even the Indian Army
banking restrictions, even if
is likely to get affected by the
India is exempted, it will need
ongoing crisis. The Future
to find an alternative payment
Infantry Soldier as a System
method such as a rupee-ruble
(F-INSAS) project has shown
deal. Such a mechanism will
limited progress in equipping
complicate matters when
the soldiers with modern
deciding the rate of interest
weaponry, including assault
against the volatile ruble or
rifles, which remains a
dealing with the trade deficit
pressing need. Any significant
and balancing finances, given
delay in the production of the
that India imports more from
planned 6,71,000 AK-203
Russia than it exports. It is
rifles, set to replace the
also likely to spark tension
indigenously developed
with the United States. The
INSAS rifles, will infect its
delay in deploying and
infantry modernization
operationalizing the S-400
program.
squadrons weakens India’s air
defense capabilities,
particularly against China,
The war may also impact
which has already deployed
India’s credibility as an arms
the same system along the
supplier. In early 2022, India
LAC.
finalized an agreement with
the Philippines to sell three
batteries of BrahMos cruise
missiles. This deal aligns with
New Delhi’s Act East policy
and its aim to position itself as
an arms exporter. India hopes
to boost arms exports, which
will provide revenue to
strengthen its defense
manufacturing and increase
domestic production. The
weapon is also of interest to
countries, including Vietnam
and Indonesia, but Russia’s
degraded ability to supply
critical parts may hinder
future exports.
Long Term Implications
In the long-term—between
five to ten years—the
Ukraine-Russian war is likely
to be unfavorable for India-
Russia defense ties. First,
Russia’s primary priority
would be to replenish its
losses, which is expected to
take years. Second, regardless
of the outcome of the war,
Russia will be worse off as an
arms exporter. Its ability to
provide a constant supply of
critical defense equipment,
spares or meaningful support
in joint production will be
impacted by sanctions,
banking restrictions and a ban
on semiconductors, which are
likely to remain in place for
some time to come. This will
make it increasingly difficult
for New Delhi to sustain a
fruitful long-term association
with Russia for arms
purchases. Third, the quality
of Russia’s defense equipment
has been questioned, given
their dismal performance and
heavy losses incurred in
Ukraine. Russian equipment
Regardless of the outcome of
has not witnessed this scale of
the war, Russia will be worse
kinetic operations in some
off as an arms exporter.
time and reports of the
decimation of many Russian
T-90 main battle tanks with
Under the backdrop of
MANPADs, and the downing
growing unpredictability in
of Su-30 fighter aircraft,
the global order and Prime
which are a part of the Indian
Minister Modi’s persistent
military, have raised concerns
push for self-reliance
in New Delhi. The subpar
(Atmanirbhar Bharat), a
performance of Russian
greater thrust on
systems will be a factor of
indigenization seems to be the
consideration in future
way ahead. India would look
acquisition plans.
at co-production and
technology transfers while
selling itself as a global
The Way Ahead
destination for third-country
exports by projecting cheap
labor and infrastructure costs.
The developments from the
Despite divergent positions on
Russia-Ukraine front may
Ukraine, the West,
serve as a wake-up call for
particularly the United States,
Indian defense planners and
is mindful of India’s growing
political leadership. Several
salience in keeping a check on
structural, procedural, and
China in the Indo-Pacific.
material bottlenecks arising
There is an increasing
from the Russia-Ukraine
Western understanding of
conflict will make defense
India’s legacy issues and
procurement from Russia and
Russian dependency and the
Ukraine prohibitive or even
need to provide alternatives,
impossible in the coming
including state of the art
years. The strengthening
technology. In the long-term,
geopolitical alignment
therefore, an accelerated push
between China and Russia
on domestic manufacturing
may further limit India’s
coupled with co-production,
ability to effectively practice a
technology and knowledge
multi-alignment foreign
transfers from the West may
policy. Given the support
be a blessing in disguise for
Beijing has provided Moscow
New Delhi. However, in the
in the conflict—which pales
short- to medium-term,
in comparison to New Delhi’s
obsolescence in defense
position—India may be faced
equipment sourced from
with a Russia that is far more
Soviet Russia will continue to
beholden to China and less
mar India’s defense
likely to support India on
preparedness.
issues of strategic importance
like the LAC.