ARTICLES OF THE DAY

May 24th, 2022

DMITRY TRENIN, RUSSIA TODAY .................................................................................................................. 2

RACHEL MARSDEN, RUSSIA TODAY .............................................................................................................. 6

HAL BRANDS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ................................................................................................................... 8

DOMINIC TIERNEY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS .........................................................................................................13

KHANG VU, THE DIPLOMAT .........................................................................................................................17

KRZYSZTOF IWANEK, THE DIPLOMAT ..........................................................................................................20

ZUHAL AHAD AND RUCHI KUMAR, ALJAZEERA ............................................................................................22

 Dmitry Trenin: How Russia must reinvent itself to defeat the
West's 'hybrid war'
Russia's very existence is under threat. The country has to take serious measures to ensure it survives
Dmitry Trenin, Russia Today
T he stand-off between
Russia
Western
and the
nations,
which has been developing
since 2014, escalated into an
active confrontation with the
start of the Russian military
operation in Ukraine, back in
late February. In other words,
the Great Game has ceased to
be a game. It has become total
war, though a hybrid one so
far, since the armed conflict in
Ukraine is not of a full-scale
nature at present.
However, the danger of it
intensifying towards a direct
collision not only exists, but is
increasing.
The challenge Russia is facing
has no equivalents in our
history. It’s not just that we
have neither allies nor even
potential partners left in the
West. Frequent comparisons
with the Cold War of the mid
and late 20th century are
inaccurate and rather
disorienting. In terms of
globalization and new
technology, the modern form
of confrontation is not only of
a larger scale than the
previous one, it is also much
more intense. Ultimately, the
main field of the ongoing
battle is located inside the
country.
The asymmetry between the
opponents is huge,
particularly the imbalance
between the forces and
capabilities available to them.
Based on this, the US and its
allies have set much more
radical goals than the
relatively conservative
containment and deterrence
strategies used toward the
Soviet Union. They are in fact
striving to exclude Russia
from world politics as an
independent factor, and to
completely destroy the
Russian economy.
The success of this strategy
would allow the US-led West
to finally resolve the "Russia
question" and create favorable
prospects for victory in the
confrontation with China.
Such an attitude on the part of
the adversary does not imply
room for any serious dialogue,
since there is practically no
prospect of a compromise,
primarily between the United
States and Russia, based on a
balance of interests. The new
dynamic of Russian-Western
relations involves a dramatic
severance of all ties, and
increased Western pressure on
Russia (the state, society,
economy, science and
technology, culture, and so
on) on all fronts. This is no
longer a source of discord
between the opponents of the
Cold War period, who then
became (unequal) partners. It
looks more like the drawing of
a clearer dividing line
between them, with the West
refusing to accept even the
perfunctory neutrality of
individual countries.
Moreover, the shared anti-
Russian agenda has already
become an important
structural element of unity
within the European Union,
while strengthening American
leadership in the Western
world.
In these circumstances, it’s an
illusory hope that Russia’s
opponents will listen to reason
or be represented by more
moderate political figures as a
result of internal upheavals in
their countries. There has been
a fundamental shift towards
disengagement and
confrontation even in the
political classes of countries
where the attitude towards
Moscow had until now been
determined primarily by
important economic interests
(Germany, Italy, France,
Austria, Finland). Thus, the
systemic confrontation
between the West and Russia
is likely to be protracted.
This circumstance almost
completely nullifies Russia’s
previous foreign policy
strategy towards the US and
EU, which was aimed at the
West recognizing Russian
security interests, ensuring
cooperation on issues of
global strategic stability and
European security, non-
interference in each other’s
internal affairs, and building
mutually beneficial economic
and other ties with
Washington and Brussels.
However, recognizing that the
previous agenda is now
irrelevant does not mean we
should abandon active politics
and completely submit to the
circumstances.
t
It is Russia itself that should
be at the center of Moscow's
foreign policy strategy during
this period of confrontation
with the West and
rapprochement with non-
Western states. The country
will have to be increasingly on
its own. The outcome of the
confrontation is not
predetermined though.
Circumstances affect Russia,
but Russian politics can also
change the world around it.
The main thing to keep in
mind is that no strategy can be
developed without a clear set
of goals. We need to start with
ourselves, with an awareness
of who we are, where we
come from and what we strive
for, based on our values and
interests.
Foreign policy has always
been closely linked with
domestic policy, in the loose
meaning of the word,
including economics, social
relations, science, technology,
culture, etc. Facing a new type
of warfare which Russia is
forced to wage, the line is
erased between what was
called the “front line” and the
“rear” in previous eras. In
such a fight, it's not just
impossible to win, it is
impossible to survive, if the
elites remain fixated on
further personal enrichment
and society is left in a
depressed and overly relaxed
state.
"Re-establishing" the Russian
Federation on a politically
more sustainable,
economically efficient,
socially just and morally
sound basis becomes urgently
necessary. We have to
understand that the strategic
defeat that the West, led by the
United States, is preparing for
Russia will not bring peace
and a subsequent restoration
of relations. It is highly
probable that the theatre of the
"hybrid war" will simply
move from Ukraine further to
the east, into the borders of
Russia, and its existence in its
current form will be contested.
This enemy's strategy should
be actively countered.
In the field of foreign policy,
the most pressing objective is
clearly to strengthen the
independence of Russia as a
civilization, as a major
independent global player, to
provide an acceptable level of
security and to create
favorable conditions for all-
round development. In order
to achieve this objective in the
current conditions – which are
more complex and difficult
than even recently – there is a
need for an effective
integrated strategy – general
political, military, economic,
technological, informational
and so on.
The immediate and most
important task of this strategy
is to achieve strategic success
in Ukraine within the
parameters that have been set
and explained to the public. It
is necessary to clarify the
stated objectives of the
operation and use all
opportunities to achieve them.
The continuation of what
many now call a "phoney war"
leads to a prolongation of
military activities, increased
losses and a decrease in the
global stature of Russia. The
solution to most of the
country’s other strategic
objectives now depends
directly on whether and when
it succeeds in achieving
strategic success in Ukraine.
The most important of these
broader foreign policy tasks is
not the overthrow of the US-
centric world order by any
means and at any price (its
erosion is due to independent
factors, but a Russian success
in Ukraine would be a painful
blow to US global hegemony)
and of course, not a return to
the fold of this set-up on more
favorable terms, but the
consistent building of a new
system of international
relations together with non-
Western countries, and the
formation, in cooperation with
them, of a new world order
and its consequent promotion.
We need to work on this task
now, but it will only be
possible to act fully after a
strategic success in Ukraine.
The framing of new
geopolitical, geo-economic
and military-strategic realities
in the western part of the
former Soviet Union, in the
Donbass and Novorossiya,
becomes extremely important
and relevant in this context. A
long-term priority here is the
further development of allied
relations and integration ties
with Belarus. This category
also includes strengthening
Russia’s security in Central
Asia and the South Caucasus.
In the context of rebuilding
foreign economic relations
and creating a new model of
the global order, the most
important directions are
cooperation with world
powers – China and India as
well as Brazil – and with
leading regional players –
Turkey, ASEAN countries,
the Gulf states, Iran, Egypt,
Algeria, Israel, South Africa,
Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico
and others.
t
It is in these areas, rather than
in traditional Euro-Atlantic
arenas, that the main resources
of diplomacy, foreign
economic relations, and the
information and cultural
spheres should be deployed.
Whereas in the military sphere
the main focus for Russia now
is the West, in other areas it is
the rest of the world – the
larger and more dynamic part.
Alongside the development of
bilateral relations, a new
priority should be given to the
multilateral interaction
between states in the non-
Western part of the world.
There should be a greater
focus on building
international institutions. The
Eurasian Economic Union,
the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the
Russia-India-China grouping,
BRICS, and the mechanisms
for dialogue and partnership
between the Russian
Federation and ASEAN,
Africa and Latin America
need a boost for further
development. Russia is
capable of playing a leading
role in developing a confrontation between the
framework ideology for these
organizations, harmonizing
the interests of partner
countries and coordinating on
common agendas.
In relations with the West, the
strategy of Russia will
continue to address the
containment of the nuclear,
conventional and cyber
abilities of the US, and
deterring it from exerting
military pressure on Russia
and its allies, or even attacking
them. Never since the end of
the Soviet-American
confrontation has the
prevention of nuclear war
been more relevant than now.
The new challenge after
achieving strategic success in
Ukraine will be to force
NATO countries to actually
recognize Russian interests
and to secure the new borders
of Russia.
Moscow needs to assess
carefully the reasonableness,
possibilities and limits of
situational cooperation with
various political and social
groups in the West, as well as
with other temporary potential
allies outside the bloc whose
interests coincide in some
respects with those of Russia.
The task is not to inflict
damage on the enemy
anywhere, but to use various
irritants to divert the
opponent’s attention and
resources from the Russian
focus, as well as to influence
the domestic political
situation in the US and EU in
a direction favorable to
Moscow.
The most important objective
in this regard is developing a
strategy for an emerging
United States and China. The
partnership nature of Russian-
Chinese relations is the main
thing that positively
distinguishes the current
“hybrid war” against the West
from the previous cold one.
Although Beijing is not a
formal military ally of
Moscow, the strategic
partnership between the two
countries has been officially
characterized as more than a
formal alliance. Russia's
largest economic partner has
not joined the anti-Russian
sanctions, but Chinese
companies and banks are
deeply integrated into the
global economy and are wary
of US and EU sanctions, thus
limiting the possibility of
interaction. There is mutual
understanding between the
leaders of Russia and China,
and the people of the two
countries are friendly towards
each other. Finally, the United
States views both countries as
its adversaries — China as its
main competitor and Russia as
the main current threat.
US policy brings Russia and
China even closer. Under a
“hybrid war,” political and
diplomatic support from
China, and even limited
economic and technological
cooperation with it, are very
important for Russia. Moscow
does not currently have the
opportunity to force even
closer rapprochement with
Beijing, but there is no
necessity in too close an
alliance.
If US-Chinese contradictions
aggravate, Russia should be
ready to support Beijing
politically, as well as provide
on a limited scale and under
certain conditions, military-
technical assistance to it,
while avoiding direct
participation in the conflict
with Washington. Opening a
“second front” in Asia is
unlikely to significantly ease
the pressure of the West on
Russia, but it will dramatically
increase tension in relations
between Russia and India.
The transition from a
confrontational, but still
conditionally peaceful, state
of economic relations between
Russia and the West to a
situation of economic war
requires Russia’s deep
revision of its foreign
economic policy. This policy
t
can no longer be implemented
primarily on the basis of
economic or technological
expediency.
Measures aimed at de-
dollarizing and repatriating
offshore finances are under
implementation. Business
elites (often incorrectly
described as "oligarchs") who
previously took profits outside
the country are forcibly
"nationalized". Import
substitution is underway. The
Russian economy is shifting
focus from the policy of raw
materials export to the
development of closed-cycle
production processes. So far,
however, the country has
mostly been defensive and
reactive.
Now it is necessary to move
from retaliatory steps to
initiatives that will strengthen
Russia’s position in the total
economic war declared by the
West, allowing it inflict
significant damage on the
enemy. In this regard, a closer
alignment of efforts of the
state and the business
community’s activities is
required, as well as
implementation of a War is always the most severe
coordinated policy in such
sectors as finance, energy,
metallurgy, agriculture,
modern technology
(especially related to
information and
communications), transport,
logistics, military exports and
economic integration — both
within the framework of the
Eurasion Economic Union
and the Union State of Russia
and Belarus and taking into
account the new realities in
the Donbass and the northern
Black Sea region.
A separate task is to revise the
Russian approach and policy
position on climate change
issues under the changed
conditions. It is also important
to determine the permissible
limits of Russia's financial,
economic and technological
dependence on neutral
countries (primarily China),
and launch a technological
partnership with India.
and cruel test of durability,
endurance and inner strength.
Today, and for the foreseeable
future, Russia is a country at
war. It will be able to continue
its trajectory only if the
authorities and society unite
on the basis of solidarity and
mutual obligations, mobilize
all available resources and at
the same time expand
opportunities for enterprising
citizens, remove obvious
obstacles that weaken the
country from within, and
develop a realistic strategy to
deal with external adversaries.
Up to now, we have merely
celebrated the Victory won by
previous generations in 1945.
The current challenge is
whether we are able to save
and develop the country. To
do this, Russia's strategy must
overcome the circumstances
surrounding and constraining
it.
t
Global Sheriff Washington wants its courts to unilaterally define
who’s a war criminal
Washington lawmakers want US courts to become the new Hague
Rachel Marsden, Russia Today
N ew evidence
emerging that the US
establishment
continuing to exploit the
is
is
window of opportunity
provided by the emotional
public reaction to the conflict
in Ukraine to further subvert
the multilateral world order.
Members of the US Senate
have revived an old draft bill
from 1996 that would give
American justice jurisdiction
over foreigners who American
officials decide to accuse of
war crimes in foreign
jurisdictions, according to a
New York Times report.
The problem for Washington
in dealing with war crimes is
that in order to ascertain
whether someone has indeed
violated the international laws
of war, the due process of an
actual trial at The Hague is
required. But not only has
Washington previously
passed a law (The Hague
Invasion Act) that would
authorize the Pentagon to take
any action necessary to rescue
any American citizens on trial
for – or convicted of – alleged
atrocities, it doesn’t even
officially recognize the
authority of the court.
When court officials moved to
investigate the actions of
American troops in
Afghanistan in 2020, then-
President Donald Trump
slapped sanctions on court
officials. And while those
sanctions have since been
lifted under President Joe
Biden, there’s still no
evidence that
demanding that the ICC hold
Americans to the same
his
administration is interested in
standard to which they
demand the rest of the world
be held. In the latest example
of such hypocrisy,
Washington officials have
been calling for Russian
President Vladimir Putin to
answer to The Hague over the
conflict in Ukraine.
No one at this point really has
any clue where the line is
between ‘conventional’
wartime atrocities and those
deemed to be exceptional and
punishable. Nor should
conclusions be drawn on the
basis of trial-by-propaganda.
The wheels of justice tend to
turn slowly.
But who has time for that?
Certainly not Washington!
Who needs slow and messy
international law when you
can just wake up one day and
decide that you’re the new
Hague?
What the US senators are
proposing is a kangaroo court
of questionable evidentiary
legitimacy, given the
complexities that time,
distance, and the fog of war
would introduce into the chain
of evidence. Such a process
would be imposed on a
foreigner targeted with war
crime suspicions by the US
authorities in the event that
they wind up on US soil,
according to the NYT report.
If you’re wondering what that
might look like, just ask
French citizen Frédéric
Pierucci, a former senior
manager of France’s
multinational Alstom, who
was arrested by the FBI at
New York’s JFK Airport in
2013, accused by the US of
business-related bribery in
Indonesia, and sentenced to
two years and a half in jail, in
the US. Pierucci was a
foreigner, working for a
foreign company, convicted in
2017 in a Connecticut court
over an Indonesian matter.
But the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act allows for the
long arm of American justice
to claim global jurisdiction if
any aspect whatsoever of the
US financial or monetary
system is touched in any way,
however minor.
The case of Huawei executive
Meng Wanzhou, daughter of
the Chinese
telecommunications
multinational’s founder, also
highlights the lengths to
which the US will go
judicially to defend its
competitive advantage.
Arrested by the Canadian
authorities on the demand of
their American counterparts
while in transit at the
Vancouver International
Airport, the executive – who
wasn’t even on American soil
– was accused of violating US
sanctions against Iran that had
nothing to do with Canada.
After dragging Canada into a
four-year diplomatic
t
quagmire with China while
Meng sat under house arrest at
her Vancouver home, a deal
was struck to release her back
to China in exchange for a
deferred agreement to
prosecute her in the US. It’s
not difficult to imagine that,
like Pierucci, who was
released after Alstom was
acquired by General Electric
amid record-breaking
corruption fines, which
ultimately amounted to $772
million, Meng may also have
served as a convenient
economic hostage to
America’s ultimate
competitive benefit.
Athletic competition isn’t according to the New York
immune from judicial Times.
exploitation, either. In
December 2020, US
lawmakers passed the Washington has unilaterally
‘Rodchenkov Anti-Doping tasked itself with globally
Act’, which allows the defining who can do business
authorities to arrest or even with whom through its
extradite foreign athletes to sanctions regimes, who gets
America to face charges of convicted of doping, who gets
suspected doping – even if the selectively pursued for
affected competitions didn’t corruption on the world
occur on US soil. “To justify business stage – and now the
the United States’ broader US wants to single-handedly
jurisdiction over global define who gets to be labeled
competitions, the House bill a war criminal.
invokes the United States’
Is everyone else on Earth
contribution to the World
really alright with this? And if
Anti-Doping Agency,”
not, then where’s the outrage?
t
How to Make Biden’s Free World Strategy Work
It’s Not as Simple as Pitting Democracy Against Autocracy
Hal Brands, Foreign Affairs
C
rises illuminate the
contours of world
affairs, and the war in
Ukraine has had a clarifying
effect on the Biden
administration’s approach to
the world. Since taking office,
U.S. President Joe Biden has
argued that the struggle
between democracy and
autocracy is the defining clash
of our time, even as critics and
some members of his
administration haven’t always
agreed. For Biden, at least, the
Russian invasion and the
world’s response to it has
proved that he was right all
along.
In his State of Union address
in early March, Biden
described the war in Ukraine
as a battle between freedom
and tyranny. In Warsaw a few
weeks later, in another speech
replete with Cold War echoes,
the president announced that
Washington would lead the
free world to victory in a great
struggle “between democracy
and autocracy, between
liberty and repression,
between a rules-based order
and one governed by brute
force.”
Biden has good reason to be
hitting these themes hard. The
Russian invasion has shown
how deeply the struggle to
shape global order is rooted in
opposing conceptions of
domestic order. It has clarified
and intensified the struggle
between advanced
democracies and Eurasian
autocracies. And it has given
Biden’s foreign policy, which
seemed headed for frustration
if not outright failure just a
few months ago, a new lease
on life. Yet critics of the
democracy-autocracy thesis
aren’t wrong to argue that the
world isn’t quite so simple.
Winning this contest of
systems will require crafting a
strategy that takes these
complexities into account.
Biden must first specify what
Washington opposes—not the
existence of autocracy but that
combination of tyranny,
power, and hostility that so
threatens the United States
and the international order it
has built. He must then flesh
out his concept of the “free
world,” a familiar term that
can be more flexible than it
sounds. Finally, his
administration must address
four key problems that this
framing implies. A free-world
strategy can help Washington
prevent this century from
becoming an age of autocratic
advantage—but it raises
pointed questions about who’s
in, who’s out, and how to
navigate a world that is
increasingly divided and
stubbornly interdependent at
the same time.
SECOND CHANCES
Biden’s foreign policy has
unfolded in three stages. The
first six months of the
administration showcased
bold ideas and big plans.
Biden came into office
stressing the ideological roots
of great-power rivalry and the
need to strengthen the
cohesion and resilience of the
democratic world. His
administration soothed
alliances that had been
strained during the Trump era;
it cultivated democratic
cooperation on issues from
semiconductor supply chains
to stability in the western
Pacific. Biden focused NATO
and the Group of 7 on the
China challenge; he raised the
ambitions and expanded the
activities of the Quad, a group
that comprises Australia,
India, Japan, and the United
States; he pursued new
schemes, such as the AUKUS
security pact between
Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United
States, that connected
democratic allies in creative
ways. “America is back,”
Biden claimed: a confident
superpower was reasserting
principled international
leadership.
Then the next six months got
very ugly. The ill-managed
U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan delivered the
citizens of that country to a
brutal tyranny. Biden’s China
agenda stagnated in the
absence of any compelling
trade policy for the Indo-
Pacific; his “Asia first”
approach foundered amid
worsening tensions with Iran
and Russia. The major
democracy-themed
initiative—the Summit for
Democracy—was a glitchy,
underwhelming Zoom
meeting. Meanwhile, much of
Biden’s domestic agenda—
meant to build a “situation of
strength” at home through
ambitious reform—stalled in
Congress while galloping
inflation created domestic
weakness instead.
t
Stage three initially looked
even worse. By early 2022,
U.S. officials were warning
that Russian President
Vladimir Putin would soon
invade Ukraine and that he
could easily conquer most of
the country. In the run-up to
the conflict, Washington
adeptly revealed Russia’s
plans through the rapid
dissemination of sensitive
intelligence. Yet it
nonetheless struggled to deter
Putin or secure transatlantic
agreement on a punishing
sanctions package, in part
because of residual European
skepticism that the assault
would indeed occur. The
administration was
confronting the possibility
that a frontline democratic
state would be destroyed by an
imperialist autocracy, creating
cascading global insecurity
and a pervasive sense that the
dictators were on the march.
Yet Ukrainian resistance,
Russian blunders, timely
American support, and
surprising European unity
have saved that country—and
with it, Biden’s foreign
policy. Shocked by the
brazenness of the attack, a
transregional coalition of
democracies slapped harsh
sanctions on Putin. The
United States and European
allies turned the tables on
Moscow, providing money,
guns, and intelligence that
helped Ukraine defend itself
and take a terrible toll on the
invaders. The world’s premier
alliance of democracies,
NATO, is strengthening its
military capabilities and
preparing to take on new
members; countries in the
Indo-Pacific are moving
faster, if not fast enough, to
meet the parallel challenge
from China. Putin’s invasion type of global order a great
produced greater unity and power pursues is the outward
urgency among the advanced projection of its political order
democracies than at any time at home.
in decades. It also has largely,
but not wholly, vindicated
Biden’s democracy-versus- The war, then, has both
autocracy framing. highlighted and deepened the
fundamental global cleavage
today—the clash between
A WORLD (MOSTLY) advanced democracies that are
DIVIDED committed to the existing
international order and the
The war in Ukraine has
Eurasian autocracies trying to
certainly confirmed that
overturn it. Regional
regime type is a crucial driver
aggression is starting to elicit
of international behavior.
global democratic responses.
Russia’s policies flow from a
The coalition that has
witch’s brew of history,
sanctioned Russia includes
geopolitics, personality, and
not just the United States and
ideology, but autocracy and
Europe but also Australia,
aggression undoubtedly go
Japan, South Korea, and
together in Putin’s regime. A
Taiwan—just as European
democratic Russia would not
powers are asserting their
feel so threatened by a
interest in preventing China
democratic, Western-facing
from dominating the western
Ukraine. A consolidated,
Pacific.
modern democracy would not
systematically commit war
crimes as an act of policy,
At the same time, the world’s
seize and annex a neighbor’s
two great autocracies are
territory, and lie, shamelessly
joining hands. A war that
and continuously, to its
began weeks after Russia and
population and the world.
China touted a relationship
with “no limits” will surely
produce an even tighter axis,
The war has also reminded us,
since neither country, having
therefore, how profoundly the
alienated much of the
world would change if it were
democratic world, has
run by revisionist autocracies.
anywhere else to go for now.
Yes, the hypocrisies of the
And that, in turn, will further
liberal international order are
encourage democracies at
legion; dictators have no
both ends of Eurasia and
monopoly on deception and
beyond to cooperate in
coercion. Yet in a system that
confronting an emerging
was not led by Washington or
illiberal coalition. Biden may
another democratic
say that Washington wishes to
superpower, the aggressive,
avoid a world of opposing
flagrantly acquisitive action
blocs, but that is precisely the
Putin has taken in Ukraine,
thrust of global events and
and that Beijing has taken in
U.S. policy.
the South China Sea, would be
far more common. Great-
power predation—economic,
Critics of the democracy-
diplomatic, military—would
autocracy thesis aren’t wrong
be the norm the world endures
to argue that the world isn’t
rather than the exception it has
quite so simple.
the luxury of criticizing. The
t
Yet the “clash of systems”
model doesn’t explain
everything. If most advanced
democracies have rallied,
many developing democracies
have not. India and Brazil
have adopted a position of
neutrality. Countries in
Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia have sought a
middle ground. There are
always specific reasons, such
as India’s dependence on
Russian arms or Brazil’s
reliance on Russian fertilizer.
Yet this new nonaligned
movement is a reminder that
many of the United States’
democratic brethren are
choosing not to choose.
Moreover, the Biden
administration is
rediscovering its reliance on
nondemocracies. Perhaps one
day a green energy revolution
will make the petrostates
irrelevant, but for now
Washington needs Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf
monarchies to offset the
energy shock the war has
caused. Containing Russia
and China will require the
cooperation of countries—
including Singapore, Turkey,
and Vietnam—that are
governed in illiberal ways.
The United States isn’t
opposed to all autocracies, and
not all democracies are fully
on its side.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has
shown the perils of
interdependence with hostile
regimes—but that
interdependence isn’t going
away. The advanced
democracies can brutalize
Russia economically, but they
can’t—at a tolerable cost—
totally sever it from the world.
They can’t, and shouldn’t,
come anywhere close to a
complete decoupling from
China. Freedom-versus-
tyranny rhetoric brings to
mind a global landscape fully
split in two. But we live in a
world where two increasingly
hostile camps cannot fully
escape each other’s economic
and technological embrace.
THE PYRAMID
If Biden intends to pursue a
free-world strategy, his first
task is to clarify what, exactly,
the United States opposes.
The answer is not autocracy
per se, given that Washington
must work with some illiberal
regimes to check others. What
the United States opposes is
the marriage of tyranny,
power, and hostility: those
authoritarian regimes that
have the intent and the ability
to fundamentally challenge
the existing international
system, by exporting the
violence and illiberalism they
practice at home to the world.
This behavior can take the
form of outright territorial
aggression, whether blatant or
subtle; it can involve
economic and political
coercion meant to distort the
foreign policies and domestic
politics of other nations. It can
involve meddling and
subversion that impairs the
functioning of democratic
societies, transnational
repression that can chill basic
liberties globally, or efforts to
weaponize new technologies
in ways that could drastically
shift the balance of power or
the balance of freedom and
oppression. Different
behaviors will, of course,
merit different responses. But
it is this combination of
autocracy, capability, and
aggressive conduct that the
free world must organize itself
to meet.
Which means that Biden must
also better articulate the
coalition he aims to rally. The
free world is a Cold War–era
concept making a comeback.
The original phrase, though,
was more malleable than we
often remember. It included
liberal democracies, friendly
authoritarians, and states of
various shades in between.
Today, the free world is best
thought of as a three-tiered
coalition.
The United States will need
different rhetoric for different
audiences.
The first tier features the
United States’ democratic
treaty allies—the (mostly)
liberal democracies that make
up the Anglosphere, the
transatlantic community, and
the strongest links in the chain
of U.S. alliances in the Indo-
Pacific. This group features
deep, institutionalized
cooperation based on shared
values as well as shared
interests; it constitutes the
core of any coalition to resist
aggression, maintain
democratic technological
dominance, and otherwise
thwart the autocratic
challenge. And although U.S.
alliances are organized
regionally or bilaterally, they
create preponderant global
strength: including the United
States, this group commands a
majority of world GDP and
military spending. The key,
then, will be not simply
enhancing capabilities and
collaboration within existing
alliances but also forging
greater connections across
them, as AUKUS has done.
t
The second tier includes
democratic partners. These
countries are often
imperfectly or inconsistently
aligned with the United States.
They are far from wholly
comfortable with American
power. Yet they would surely
be far less comfortable still in
a world where expansionist
autocracies had the advantage,
so they will lend critical
assistance on select matters.
India may be hesitant to break
with Russia, but it is already a
vital part of the geopolitical
and technological balancing
effort vis-à-vis China.
Indonesia will increasingly
cooperate with Washington on
security issues, even as it
maintains close commercial
ties to Beijing. Ukraine and
Taiwan are non-allies that
constitute geopolitical
bulwarks in crucial regions.
Biden’s goal should be to
further develop institutions
and arrangements, such as the
Quad or various tech
alliances, that enhance the
overall power of the free
world by thickening the
connective tissue between its
first and second tiers.
The third tier consists of
comparatively benign
autocracies—illiberal
countries that still support an
international system led by a
democratic superpower.
Admittedly, efforts to draw
distinctions between good and
bad dictators have a sordid
lineage. But certain
autocracies do depend on an
open, U.S.-led global
economy; occupy strategic
geography that leaves them
vulnerable to Beijing or
Moscow and thus dependent
on Washington; or are
otherwise deeply wired into
the existing system. These economic pressure, in
countries, such as Vietnam recognition that the terms of
and Singapore, will work with interdependence may
the United States on a determine the balance of
transactional basis, to thwart leverage in a crisis.
more extreme forms of
autocratic aggression. But
their dealings with A separate challenge is
democracies will be more engaging ambivalent,
attenuated when it comes to democratic partners, countries
human rights, the future of the that cooperate with
Internet, and other governance Washington on concrete
issues. issues but don’t particularly
like the free-world model. The
United States will need
ROCKY ROAD TO … different rhetoric for different
WHERE? audiences: self-determination
and freedom of geopolitical
A free-world strategy can thus
choice may sell better than
be principled without being
democracy-versus-tyranny in
absolutist or self-defeating. It
Africa or Southeast Asia.
offers a plausible rationale for
Washington should carefully
working with some autocrats
prioritize what it needs from
against others. And it packs a
these partners, whose choice
strategic punch: a free-world
of 5G telecommunications
coalition can allow the United
provider may be more
States and its friends to
important than their position
marshal a decisive superiority
on Ukraine. Yet Biden must
on critical issues.
also exploit opportunities the
Nonetheless, challenges
war has provided.
abound.
India’s strategy of using
The first involves managing
Russian arms to protect itself
interdependence in a
against China is now
fragmenting world. The goal
bankrupt: if Moscow is
here should be not to fully
crippled by conflict and
unwind those ties but to
sanctions, and ever more
ensure that the terms of
dependent on Beijing, then it
interdependence favor the free
can’t or won’t provide Delhi
world. This will require
with the military equipment it
selective decoupling—
might need in a crisis. By
denying Chinese firms access
helping India reduce its
to investment and high-tech
reliance on Russian military
inputs, for instance, or
gear, the United States and
increasing Europe’s freedom
other democratic countries
of action by weaning it off
can also reduce India’s
Russian energy supplies.
incentives for hedging over
More important will be
time.
increasing the commercial,
financial, and technological
cohesion of the free world, to
A free-world strategy can be
accelerate its growth and
principled without being
innovation and decrease its
absolutist or self-defeating.
vulnerability to autocratic
coercion. This is urgent: A free-world strategy also has
China is racing to reduce its awkward implications for
susceptibility to international estranged autocratic partners.
t
After all, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates do
engage in transnational
repression, weaponize
surveillance technologies, and
coerce their neighbors. Both
have pulled closer to Russia
and China, in part for
economic reasons, in part
because of a declining U.S.
interest in Persian Gulf
security, and in part because
strongmen have an ideological
affinity for other strongmen.
Both countries still have long-
standing, extensive ties to the
United States, with whom
they share an interest in
containing Iran; their
relationships with
Washington are valuable
enough that they won’t
crumble overnight. But one
possible upshot of a more
starkly divided world is that
the most important Gulf
monarchies could end up on libbed comments about Putin
the other side. haven’t clarified the issue.
Democracies can moderate
tensions with hostile
Even if a green revolution autocracies, as détente
eventually turns Riyadh and showed during the Cold War.
Abu Dhabi into has-beens—a But if this is really a contest
big “if”—in the medium term between countries with
this could lead to nasty fundamentally different
strategic consequences in a worldviews based on
region that still matters very fundamentally different
much. For the time being, domestic orders, then such a
then, a free-world strategy détente will, once again, be
can’t liberate the United temporary. The United States
States from ongoing spent decades trying to draw
engagement, and perhaps Moscow and Beijing into the
ticklish compromises, with international system; now it
key autocracies that have a must strengthen the free world
foot in both camps. around them, and reduce their
ability to do harm, until their
internal politics shift or their
Finally, Biden should answer power fades. A free-world
a question he has avoided so strategy can eventually
far: How does this end? A produce a happy ending. But
free-world strategy doesn’t “eventually” may be a very
require a goal of regime long time.
change, although Biden’s ad-
t
How to Build Putin a Gilded Bridge Out of Ukraine
The Lessons of the Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan
Dominic Tierney, Foreign Affairs
O
n February 15, 1989,
Soviet General Boris
Gromov walked
across the Friendship Bridge
from Afghanistan into the
Soviet Union, where he was
greeted by Soviet television
cameras and given a bouquet
of red carnations. After a
decade-long war in
Afghanistan, Gromov was
officially the last Soviet
soldier to leave the country.
Moscow used his
choreographed walk to signal
that the mission had been
successful and to highlight its
orderly departure, one that
stood in stark contrast to the
final days of the Vietnam War,
when Americans desperately
clambered onto helicopters to
escape Saigon.
But it was a charade. Gromov
had spent the previous night at
a hotel in the Soviet Union and
traveled to Afghanistan only
to stage the exit. In the end,
the theatrics fooled hardly
anyone, including within the
Soviet Union itself. The
country’s war in Afghanistan
was supposed to be rapid:
Moscow had planned to
quickly install a new regime
more friendly to its interests
and then depart. Instead, the
long intervention provoked a
brutal counterinsurgency
campaign that led to 14,000
official Soviet fatalities (the
true figure is probably much
higher). Moscow did install a
new government in Kabul, but
it was deeply unstable.
Ultimately, this failure
discredited the entire Soviet
system and encouraged
domestic reforms that helped
collapse the state. The war
helped drive a wedge between
the Soviet military and the
people, spurring anti-military
and anti-draft protests in
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and elsewhere. In 1992,
Edward Shevardnadze, the
former Soviet minister of
foreign affairs and a key
architect of perestroika and
glasnost, described the
decision to leave Afghanistan
as “the first and most difficult
step” in the reform process.
“Everything else flowed from
that.”
Thirty-three years after the
Soviet Union withdrew from
Afghanistan, Russia finds
itself in another destructive
and unwinnable conflict. It is
now clear that Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s
original objective in
Ukraine—overthrowing the
country’s government and
replacing it with a pliant proxy
regime—is unattainable.
Ukraine will continue to exist
as an independent state, and it
will be more pro-Western than
ever. Rather than weakening
NATO, Russia’s war has
reinvigorated the alliance
while isolating its own
economy. Tens of thousands
of Russian soldiers have
already been slain and injured
in the invasion, which is
becoming a grinding war of
attrition.
Ukraine, however, is also
suffering from the war, as
thousands of its residents are
killed while its economy
collapses. Other parts of the
world are struggling with the
ripple effects of the conflict,
including influxes of refugees
and grain shortages. The
ongoing catastrophe has led
some Western commentators
to call for a negotiated
solution to the war that could
grant Putin significant
material concessions in
exchange for a Russian
withdrawal, such as expanded
and formalized Russian
control of the Donbas
region—offering Moscow
what the military theorist Sun
Tzu called a “golden bridge”
out of the conflict. Critics,
meanwhile, decry any talk of
an off-ramp for Putin as an act
of appeasement and a reward
for Russia’s brutal atrocities
that will only embolden the
autocrat to engage in further
aggression. As they see it,
there is no substitute for a total
Ukrainian victory.
The story of how the Soviet
Union left Afghanistan
suggests that both pathways
are possible—the West can
craft a negotiated settlement
and give Ukraine a decisive
win. In the late 1980s, the
United States agreed to let
Moscow have face-saving
concessions to get Soviet
troops out of Afghanistan. But
these were deliberately hollow
and did little to mask what was
a clear defeat. Today, the
West and Ukraine can offer
Moscow superficial gains as
an incentive to withdraw
while working to entrench the
image of Russian failure and
weaken Putin’s political
position. The West should, in
other words, build Putin not a
golden bridge but a gilded
bridge: a path out of the war
t
that is attractive enough for
Kremlin to end the fighting
but in time comes to be seen as
cheap and tawdry. The result
might not be the climatic win
that hawks envision:
Ukrainian soldiers may not
chase bedraggled Russian
troops out of the Donbas. But
it will nonetheless be a
substantive victory for Kyiv.
THE STORY OF SUCCESS
Since the beginning of
Russia’s invasion, every party
in the conflict has tried to
shape perceptions about who
is winning and losing. As
Kyiv resisted Russian
advances, Ukraine and its
Western allies have crafted a
narrative of Ukraine as a
plucky and surprisingly
triumphant underdog. U.S.
President Joe Biden recently
said that “the battle of Kyiv
was a historic victory for the
Ukrainians” and “a victory for
freedom.” Meanwhile,
Moscow has claimed that the
war is going according to plan
and highlighted the supposed
valor of its forces in the
Donbas. After meeting with
Putin in April, Austrian
Chancellor Karl Nehammer
said that the Russian leader
“believes he is winning the
war.”
It’s easy to see why both sides
are aggressively promoting
their storylines. Narratives of
victory and defeat—whether
true or false—can affect
soldiers’ morale and public
backing for war, shape
battlefield outcomes, and
determine the fate of leaders.
In the coming years, it will be
far easier to sustain NATO’s
newfound cohesion if the
alliance is seen as having
succeeded in Ukraine. The
political careers of Ukrainian
President Volodymyr
Zelensky and perhaps some
Western leaders may be tied to
perceptions of whether
Ukraine wins or loses.
Crucially, Putin’s future may
hinge on the outcome of his
war, which is his biggest and
riskiest political decision. In
1962, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev was widely seen
as the loser in the Cuban
missile crisis. Partially as a
result, he was toppled from
power two years later.
The most obvious Western
strategy might then be to
single-mindedly focus on
portraying Russia as the loser
in Ukraine. But this approach
risks needlessly prolonging
the war. Putin cannot tolerate
humiliation, and his
overarching aim—more than
capturing Ukrainian territory
or even toppling the regime in
Kyiv—is to restore a sense of
Russian glory and pride and
preserve his personal brand as
a winner. He is not the first
leader to fight with this
motivation; great powers
often prosecute wars to avoid
the appearance of losing. In
1965, for example, a U.S.
government memo said the
United States fought in
Vietnam “70%—to avoid a
humiliating US defeat.” The
West may therefore need a
more dexterous approach to
end the war.
The Kremlin’s failed war in
Afghanistan imposed massive
costs on a struggling empire.
History shows that it’s
possible to craft peace terms
that allow powerful countries
to end failing wars with a
modicum of dignity, but
nevertheless in clear defeat.
The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan is perhaps the
foremost example. The 1988
Geneva Accords created a
timetable for Soviet
withdrawal in which the
signatories and guarantors
agreed to let Afghanistan’s
communist regime stay in
power—so there was, as one
Soviet official put it, a “decent
interval” between Moscow’s
departure and the final
collapse in Kabul. This
enabled Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev to claim that
Soviet troops had succeeded
in their mission to stabilize
Afghanistan and produce
national “reconciliation.”
Widespread international
involvement in the accords
also allowed Moscow to
emphasize the role of the
United Nations in its exit
strategy and cast the Soviet
departure as an attempt to
renew the international
organization. The Red Army
then left in good order: the
withdrawal took only nine
months and ended ahead of
schedule. Soviet officials
made it look like they were in
control.
They weren’t. The Afghan
regime temporarily survived,
but it was clear to everyone
that it wouldn’t stay in power
forever. (The government in
Kabul eventually collapsed in
1992.) The United States, one
of the guarantors of the
accords, conceded little of
substance and retained the
right to arm the Afghan rebels.
Hardliners in Washington,
who wanted to see Moscow
indefinitely bogged down in
Afghanistan, opposed even a
face-saving agreement. But
they were ultimately defeated
by U.S. “dealers,” who were
willing to offer symbolic
concessions to get Moscow
t
out and knew that the war
would still be widely seen as a
Soviet debacle. Their
assessment proved correct.
There was no peace and
reconciliation in Afghanistan.
Thousands of Soviet troops
had died for nothing. In 1988,
Gorbachev bluntly told the
Politburo that the Soviet
Union had “lost in
Afghanistan.”
The Kremlin’s failed war
imposed massive material and
psychological costs on a
struggling empire. The
campaign undermined morale
and cohesion in the Soviet
military—the country’s most
important institution. Soviet
troops had entered
Afghanistan as supposedly
worthy successors to the
World War II generation, only
to play, as one soldier put it,
“the role of the Germans.”
Veterans (the Afgantsy) grew
embittered by the lack of
postwar care they received
and their neglect in official
media, and they organized to
spread narratives about how
brutal the war really was. The
defeat also undermined the
Soviet system more broadly.
In Moscow, the war
discredited the use of force as
a tool to hold the Soviet bloc
together, and outside
Moscow, the campaign
showed that the Soviet Army
was beatable and emboldened
non-Russian republics to
pursue independence. As the
political economist Rafael
Reuveny and political
scientist Aseem Prakash
wrote, Afghanistan was “one
of the key causes” of the
disintegration of the Soviet
Union.
THE ILLUSION OF
VICTORY
Afghanistan and Ukraine are,
of course, different wars, and
they are taking place in
different political contexts.
Gorbachev was a reformer
who sought to improve
relations with the West and
liberalize his country. Putin is
almost the complete opposite:
a revanchist authoritarian
determined to concentrate
power and remake the world
through force.
But there are important
parallels. In both cases, a
sclerotic and overconfident
Kremlin invaded a neighbor,
fought a war that officially did
not exist (the Afghan invasion
was named the “Limited
Contingent of Soviet Forces in
Afghanistan”), faced a Kyiv could pledge to shelve
resolute adversary backed by
Western arms, and had to
improvise a larger and costlier
campaign than expected.
Eventually, in the 1980s, the
Soviet Union was forced to
negotiate. As the casualties
and other costs in Ukraine
rise, Putin may also have to
come to the table. Meanwhile,
unless the Russian military
completely collapses, Kyiv
will need to concede some of
its maximal goals—
Moscow’s withdrawal from
Crimea and the Donbas and
massive Russian
reparations—if it wants the
war to end.
The terms of peace in Ukraine
will, of course, primarily be
up to Kyiv. But the West
should also think about how it
can help craft an agreement
that will facilitate Putin’s exit
while ensuring both a real and
perceived Ukrainian win. This
means distinguishing between
meaningful and superficial
concessions while considering
how gains and losses could
shape future narratives of
victory and defeat. Western
leaders cannot, for instance,
pressure Ukraine to cede its
territorial integrity and the
right to strong armed forces,
nor should it deprive the
country of a road to
membership in the European
Union. But the West can
encourage Kyiv to acquiesce
on symbolic issues that will
create a gilded bridge to get
Russia out.
As the casualties and other
costs in Ukraine rise, Putin
may have to come to the table.
NATO, for example, has no
plans to admit Ukraine, and so
its aspirations to join the
alliance—something it has
suggested it is open to doing.
This would allow Putin to
declare that he has, in some
sense, stopped NATO (even
as the alliance likely expands
elsewhere). Similarly, Kyiv
could “demilitarize” by
promising not to host foreign
bases, which it already has no
intention of accommodating.
Moscow has made far-fetched
claims that it launched its
special military operation to
prevent an attack on Russia
from Ukraine, and Kyiv may
agree to mutual security
guarantees to prevent attacks
on both Ukraine and Russia as
part of a broader deal.
The Russian president has
declared that his invasion was
necessary to stop Ukraine
from committing a “genocide”
against its Russian-speaking
residents. In response,
Ukraine could enact new
measures that safeguard the
rights of Russian speakers or
other minorities. This
t
shouldn’t be hard for Kyiv.
Most Russian-speaking
Ukrainians back the Ukrainian
war effort, and such measures
would be consistent with the
European Union’s
commitment to protecting
minorities—and therefore
worthwhile if Ukraine wants
to join the institution.
International actors such as
the European Union, as well
as non-Western powers like
China, could play an
important role in making a
Ukrainian settlement
palatable to Moscow.
Historically, the Kremlin has
been more willing to make
deals when they are crafted in
forums that highlight Russia’s
great-power status, such as the
1975 Helsinki Final Act,
which helped stabilize
European security, or the 1988
Geneva Accords.
The West might consider a
peace deal that leaves Russian
proxies in charge of parts of
the Donbas while preserving
the right of Western states to
continue supplying Kyiv with
weapons, much as the United
States allowed the communist
regime in Afghanistan to
temporarily stay in charge
even after the Soviets
withdrew. The Ukrainian
government may eventually
retake all or part of its eastern
territories. But like in
Afghanistan, this will come
after a decent interval,
allowing Moscow to blame
local separatists for defeat.
controls the Russian media,
and he will declare victory no
matter what happens. But
The West doesn’t need to Russians cannot forever be
humiliate Russians to achieve blinded to the stark costs of
its aims. the invasion, and they will
slowly come to realize that
Even light concessions to
they have lost thousands of
Putin may be tough to
soldiers for no real gains.
swallow, given the brutality of
Russians will feel the massive
Russia’s war. Building a
economic damage wrought by
gilded bridge in Ukraine may
global isolation, and they will
lack the emotional satisfaction
be aware that the war pushed
of trying to rout Russian
Finland and Sweden to join
troops, much as letting the
NATO. Indeed, there are
Soviet Union calmly walk
already signs of mistrust
away from Afghanistan did
within Russia about official
not appeal to hardliners in the
narratives. After Ukraine sank
United States. But humiliating
the Russia Black Sea flagship
Russia is likely to backfire.
Moskva, Moscow claimed
Nations that feel disrespected
that no Russians (or at most
often choose aggression to
one) had died. The parents of
redress an emotional loss. The
missing sailors nonetheless
punitive Treaty of Versailles,
expressed anger and grief.
for example, fueled the rise of
Adolf Hitler. Ukraine should
avoid shaming the Russian
If Ukraine ultimately emerges
nation for the sake of it, such
as a stable democracy, rebuilt
as by marching Russian
with billions of dollars in
prisoners before cameras or
foreign funds and frozen
burning the Russian flag. It
Russian assets, bonded
should allow Russian troops
together by narratives of a
to leave Ukraine in good order
great patriotic war, then the
as part of a peace deal. The
country will stand as a living
defeat should be seen as a
testament to Putin’s
failure of Putin and his system
recklessness. Ukraine will be
rather than the Russian people
a beacon of freedom, and its
at large.
heroic resistance may
dissuade other countries from
acts of aggression. And
The West, after all, doesn’t
memories of a failed war in
need to humiliate Russians to
Russia could spur doubts
achieve its aims. Symbolic
about the Kremlin’s judgment
concessions will not stop the
that, in time, undermine
war from being widely seen as
Putin’s regime—just as
a defeat for Putin—including
Afghanistan helped bring
within Russia itself. Putin
down the Soviet system.
t
Why Vietnam Holds the Trump Card in the US-Vietnam
Partnership
Hanoi enjoys considerable leverage as a frontline state in Washington’s strategic competition with
Khang Vu, The Diplomat
S
hortly after assuming
his post as the new U.S.
ambassador to Vietnam,
Marc Knapper gave an
extended interview with the
local media. In the interview,
Knapper affirmed the U.S.
priority to elevate U.S.-
Vietnam relations from a
comprehensive partnership to
a “strategic partnership”
during his tenure. Just six
months earlier, in August
2021, Vice President Kamala
Harris also proposed
upgrading the bilateral
relationship to a strategic
partnership when she visited
Hanoi. The Trump
administration, despite its
anti-alliance rhetoric, also
committed to elevating ties
with Vietnam. Former
Secretary of Defense James
Mattis once referred to the
United States and Vietnam as
“like-minded partners,”
regardless of the differences
in political systems. Former
U.S. Ambassador Daniel
Kritenbrink, now the assistant
secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific affairs, said
Washington considered Hanoi
to be “one of the most
important partners in the
world.”
However, Vietnam’s
responses to the U.S. proposal
have been lackluster. While
welcoming the U.S. outreach,
it did not agree to improve the
relationship to a strategic
partnership. Harris failed to
persuade Hanoi to change its
mind during her visit. The
newly appointed Vietnamese
Beijing.
ambassador to the U.S.,
Nguyen Quoc Dung, also left
out cementing a “strategic
partnership” as a goal of his
tenure. Some Vietnamese
officials have described the
partnership as strategic in all
but name, but officially, the
U.S. is not one of Vietnam’s
17 strategic partners, putting it
behind Australia, Japan, and
India, the three other countries
in the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (Quad).
Certainly, one of the reasons
behind Vietnam’s refusal is
the pressure from China.
However, such an explanation
needs to take the unique
dynamics of U.S.-Vietnam
relations into consideration.
The fact that it is the U.S., not
Vietnam, that keeps pushing
for an upgrade is puzzling in
two aspects. First, Vietnam, as
a weaker state adjacent to
China, needs the U.S. for its
security more than the U.S.
needs Vietnam. If Vietnam
does not want to confront
China alone and desires more
U.S. presence in the South
China Sea, it should not have
waited for Harris’ offer of a
strategic partnership.
Washington could have
waited for Vietnam to reach
out first instead of making the
first move, as it has been
doing.
Second, the U.S. has been the
party that has conceded to
Vietnam on major issues in
order to improve the overall
bilateral relationship,
including breaking its
diplomatic protocol to host
Vietnamese Communist Party
(VCP) General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong in the
White House in 2015 and
staying silent as Vietnam
continued to purchase Russian
arms in technical violation of
the Countering America’s
Adversaries through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It
is worth noting that the U.S.
sanctioned its treaty ally
Turkey for buying Russia’s S-
400 missile system. In short,
Vietnam seems to hold the
trump card in the bilateral
relationship despite the huge
power imbalance vis-à-vis the
United States. This defies the
conventional expectation that
the relatively stronger partner
has more bargaining leverage
over the weaker partner.
The answer to this puzzle lies
in the nature of Vietnam being
an “ally of convenience.” The
essence of any improvements
in U.S.-Vietnam relations is to
check the rise of China, which
allows the two ideological
enemies to conveniently
cooperate against the most
immediate common security
threat. Such convenient
cooperation, however, is not
built on the mutual political
trust seen in other U.S. Asian
allies, which reflects the
convenient feature of the
partnership. In major aspects,
the convenient U.S.-Vietnam
partnership is similar to the
U.S.-China “quasi alliance” in
the 1970s and 1980s, during
which Washington and
t
Beijing worked together to
check the Soviet Union. Hanoi
still perceives Western
influence as posing challenges
to its regime security. And to
complicate matters further,
under the pressure of the anti-
communist Vietnamese
American community, the
U.S. condemns Vietnam’s
poor human rights practices
and may sanction Vietnamese
officials under the Global
Magnitsky Act.
However, it is exactly these
weak spots in U.S.-Vietnam
relations that afford Vietnam a
strong bargaining leverage in
the bilateral relationship.
Although Vietnam is an
autocratic state like China, the
United States perceives
Vietnam to be too important to
its Indo-Pacific strategy to let
issues concerning human
rights or political differences
derail the upward trajectory of
the partnership. This creates a
contradiction in U.S. foreign
policy: It wants to condemn
China as an autocratic rival
and to mobilize an alliance of
democracies to check its rise,
but it cannot alienate Vietnam
at the same time.
Consequently, Washington is
actively trying to improve its
ties with Hanoi, even to the
point of overselling Vietnam’s
importance like Mattis did, to
be able to protect it from U.S.
condemnations of other
“different-minded” autocratic
states. The U.S. wants to send
a signal that Vietnam is not
just another communist
autocratic state; it is a close
friend of Washington.
The U.S. effort to improve the
relationship to a strategic
partnership is one of many
concessions that it has made to
Hanoi to solve the
contradiction, as Washington
can create legitimate
exemptions to autocratic
Vietnam when Vietnam is not
treated as a U.S. adversary.
For example, the U.S. has not
sanctioned Vietnamese
officials the way it has
sanctioned Chinese officials
for alleged human rights
violations under the
Magnitsky Act. It does not
denounce the VCP the same
way it has denounced the
Chinese Communist Party or
communism as a whole. The
U.S. official motto is to build
a “strong, independent, and
prosperous Vietnam,” not a
democratic one.
The U.S. remarkably has not
sanctioned Vietnam under
CAATSA even though
Vietnam was among the top
five Russian arms buyers from
2015 to 2019. On the contrary,
Washington seems to be fine
with its important partners
using Russian arms, as in the
case of its transfers of Soviet-
made arms to Ukraine, if the
partners use those arms to
balance against U.S.
adversaries. The U.S. wants
Vietnam to buy more of its
arms, but if Hanoi can better
use Russian equipment than
American due to the legacy of
relying on Soviet-made arms,
the U.S. will not put great
pressure on it to switch.
Where conflicts arise, the U.S.
tended to quietly work with
Vietnam or to turn a blind eye
rather than publicly challenge
it. In January 2021, the Trump
administration labeled
Vietnam a currency
manipulator, risking tensions.
However, the U.S. Trade
Representative shortly
announced it would not take
any punitive actions such as
raising tariffs on imports from
Vietnam. Six months later, the
U.S. and Vietnam released a
statement claiming that the
two countries had solved the
issue after “enhanced
engagement.” In December
last year, Vietnam along with
Taiwan again exceeded the
U.S. Treasury’s thresholds for
possible currency
manipulation, but Washington
did not label it as a
manipulator this time. The
U.S. also largely overlooked
the increasingly huge trade
deficit with Vietnam while it
was publicly upset with the
deficit with China. Again,
these special treatments are
possible only when the U.S.
actively tries to single out
Vietnam as an important
security partner despite its
avowed hatred for autocratic
states.
Vietnam seems to well
understand its strong
bargaining leverage and thus
its refusal to raise the
relationship to the level of a
strategic partnership is based
on the confidence of its
importance in the U.S. Indo-
Pacific strategy. In other
words, Vietnam’s reluctance
does not hurt the positive
outlook of U.S.-Vietnam
relations. As U.S. State
Department Counselor Derek
Chollet put it in his recent visit
to Vietnam, bilateral
exchanges show “the ever
growing strength of the
United States-Vietnam
relationship.” This explains
why some Vietnamese
officials claimed the
partnership is already strategic
in practice thanks to the
current level of cooperation.
Vietnam needs such leverage
since it does not want to be
t
perceived by China to be
aligning with the U.S., while
still wanting to keep its
options open with the United
States. It also wants to hedge
against U.S. abandonment.
The U.S. has maintained its
neutrality in the South China
Sea, and Vietnam does not
expect Washington to risk a
naval confrontation with
China over islands not vital to
the survival of Vietnam or its
other allies such as the
Philippines. It is worth noting
that South Vietnam did not
receive U.S. military support
when China occupied the
Saigon-controlled Paracel
Islands in 1974.
All in all, the U.S. special
treatment to Vietnam fits its
long tradition of prioritizing
security interests over
ideology in foreign policy, as
the U.S. is willing to embrace
autocratic regimes if it
perceives those regimes to be
sharing its security interests. If
the U.S.-Vietnam partnership
is important enough, the
seemingly weak points in
U.S.-Vietnam relations are
counterintuitively beneficial
to Hanoi because Washington
will have to concede on those
points as a part of its broader
efforts to shield Hanoi from its
attacks on other autocratic
regimes. It is highly likely that
the U.S. and Vietnam will
address their differences
quietly while publicly
emphasize the progress made
in the past three decades.
t
Indian Filmmakers Liked Ukraine. What Now?
Ukraine was fast becoming a popular destination for Indian movie producers.
Krzysztof Iwanek, The Diplomat
B eyond the numbing
number of atrocities
and war crimes that
the invading Russian army has
already committed in Ukraine,
a little-noticed effect of the
aggression is that it may, at
least temporarily, stop Indian
movie producers from
choosing the country as a
filming location.
Europe is a popular
destination for the Indian
movie industry – not only
Bollywood, but also
Tollywood and Kollywood
(which refer to the Hindi-,
Telugu-, and Tamil-language
film industries, respectively),
and even some lower-budget
productions, such as TV
series. The specific countries
chosen for filming have
constantly changed over the
years, in the search of new,
beautiful locales. A few years
ago, for example, a number of
movies were shot in Poland
but that phase seems to have
passed.
In the last four years, a new
European country has
attracted attention: Ukraine.
The draw of Ukraine was not
only its wealth of beautiful
sites but also comparatively
low costs when compared to
much of Europe.
A number of Indian movies
and TV series have been shot
in Ukraine in recent years,
including “Winner,” a 2017
Telegu film; “2.0” and “Dev,”
a pair of Tamil movies in 2018
and 2019; the 2021 Hindi spy
series “Special Ops 1.5: The
Himmat Story,” and the same
year “99 Songs,” a Hindi film.
In 2022, the recently released
Telegu movie “RRR” was
filmed, in part, in Ukraine and
an upcoming Tamil movie,
“Legend,” was also filmed in
the country.
“Tiger 3,” an upcoming Hindi
movie featuring well-known
Bollywood stars, was
reportedly partially shot in
Ukraine last year, but it is
difficult to confirm at the
moment.
Of the above, “2.0” and
“RRR” have been huge hits
among Indian audiences.
However, none of the
abovementioned movies
actually presented the
Ukrainian landscape as itself;
rather they made use of
Ukraine in lieu of other
locales. “99 Songs” is a love
story involving an Indian
musician in Paris. The role of
the French capital was played
by Lviv and Kyiv. “RRR”
featured the Maryinskyi
Palace in Kyiv but, as the
movie was set in colonial
India, the building represented
a palace in Hyderabad for the
sake of the story.
In “Winner,” the Ukrainian
scenery in the background
appeared with no relevance to
the plot – this included the
famous tree-lined Tunnel of
Love, but the dancing heroes
were simply edited into the
scenery (in a very clumsy
way). “2.0” was one of the
costliest Indian movies made
to date. One of its songs was
also shot in the Tunnel of
Love, as in the case of
“Winner,” only this time the
actors really visited the
location. Yet while the actors
made it to the Tunnel of Love,
the song apparently did not
make it to the in the final score
(the Ukrainian embassy in
New Delhi confirmed that a
part of the movie was shot in
the country, however).
Similarly, the Karpathian
scenery in the Tamil movie
“Dev” did not represent
Ukraine in the plot. The
shooting of “Legend” in
Ukraine reportedly ended in
December 2021, but, as the
movie is forthcoming, it is
hard to establish what the
relevance of the scenery is, or
is not, to the plot. Only the
case of “Special Ops 1.5: The
Himmat Story” was different.
As a spy story, the series’ plot
played out in Ukraine.
The fact that Ukraine did not
“play itself” in these movies is
not uncommon for Indian
cinema, and did not mean that
the country would not have
featured in future films. From
the perspective of tourism
promotion, it’s of course
preferable for sites to
represent themselves – and be
clearly identified so fans can
plan to visit. But this would
require an adjustment on the
part of Indian filmmakers and
their preferred plots.
The best-known story of this
kind involves the immense
popularity of an Indian love
story, “Dilwale Dulhaniya Le
t

Jayenge,” a Bollywood movie Indian moviemakers was not

that promoted an image of necessarily going to lead to
The specific aesthetics of
Switzerland as a romantic the country becoming a hit
Indian movies mean that not
country for Indian viewers, among Indian travelers. This
all of the background must be
and attracted thousands of will not happen until a film
coherent with the story. Dance
Indian tourists to the clearly presents Ukraine as
sequences, in particular, may
mountainous country. A much Ukraine, and until such a film
serve as something akin to
more recent Hindi film, becomes a huge hit (it is also
dream scenery: The
“Zindagi na Milegi Dobara,” best if it is a love story, to
background reflects the mood
reportedly led to an uptick of attract target groups like
and the theme of the song, not
Indian tourist arrivals in couples on honeymoon). But
necessarily the place where
Spain, where it was partially Ukraine was drawing movie
the protagonists should be in
shot. producers and accruing the
terms of the story. Big-budget
economic benefits of being a
Indian moviemakers thus tour
filming location. This
the world in search of new,
But the movie “Fanaa,” which development, however, has
exotic spots. It is not
was partially shot in Poland, been brutally halted by the
uncommon for such
did not translate into rising Russian invasion.
productions to move a large
Indian interest in the country,
team to another country just to
despite being a huge
shoot a few minutes-long
Bollywood production with One is left to hope that the
song. For instance, “Enthiran”
shining stars of the cinematic Indian cinema industry will
had one song set in Machu
world. In the story, the Tatra return to Ukraine once the war
Picchu in Peru (the already-
mountains played the role of is over, as every economic
mentioned film “2.0” is a
Kashmir. Conversely, a gain, big or small, will be
stand-alone sequel to
couple of years ago the Polish needed to reconstruct the
“Enthiran”).
Tourism Agency convinced country.
the producers of the Indian
film “Kick” to come and shoot
Thus, admittedly, the recent
in Warsaw; as a result the city
popularity of Ukraine among
played itself in the movie.
t
Afghan female journalists defiant as Taliban restrictions grow
Taliban decree ordering female news anchors to cover their faces on air is the latest in a series of
Zuhal Ahad and Ruchi Kumar, Aljazeera
M ahira* has become
a familiar face on
Afghan television,
as viewers tune in every night
to watch her present the news.
Even during the most
turbulent recent events, the
27-year-old journalist
remained calm and composed
as she reported on the
Taliban’s takeover of
Afghanistan.
On Saturday, Mahira
appeared on screen, but her
face was covered with a black
mask following a Taliban
decree ordering female news
anchors to cover their faces
while on air.
“[Saturday] was one of the
hardest days of my life. They
made us feel as if we had been
buried alive,” Mahira told Al
Jazeera. “I felt like I am not a
human. I feel like I have
committed a big crime which
is why God made me a woman
in Afghanistan,” she told Al
Jazeera, choking back tears.
“Which law in the world
requires women to cover their
faces on TV? Even in [other]
Islamic countries, female
news anchors or presenters do
not wear masks,” she said, the
anger evident in her voice.
Sosan*, a 23-year-old TV
presenter, shared Mahira’s
anger. She began working in
the media in 2019 with hopes
of following in the footsteps
of the brave Afghan women
reporters she’d watched
escalating restrictions.
reporting from the length and
breadth of the country.
“We had achieved so much,
and had a robust free media,
with growing presence of
women in every sector. But
look where we are now… in a
country where I cannot even
choose what to wear or what
topics to report on,” she told
Al Jazeera, referring to an
earlier decree of “11 rules for
journalists” that required
journalists to seek Taliban
approval before broadcasting
reports.
The Taliban’s edict,
announced on Thursday, is
seen by many as the latest sign
of escalating restrictions on
women’s freedoms and a
return to the repressive rule of
the Taliban’s previous time in
power in Afghanistan from
1996 to 2001.
Earlier this month, the Taliban
passed a decree making the
wearing of face veils
mandatory in public spaces.
They have also banned
women from travelling more
than 72km (45 miles) without
a mahram (male guardian),
and have prevented girls from
attending school after the
sixth grade.
Human rights activists say the
Taliban’s growing restrictions
aim to remove women from
public life and that it is clear
they intend to enforce the
latest decree
coverings.
“Women
on
journalists
face
on
television are highly visible.
Their continued presence gave
girls and women some small
shred of reassurance, amid
deepening Taliban attacks on
women’s rights, that some
women were still able to do
their jobs, to hold important
roles, to appear in public,”
Heather Barr, associate
director of the Women’s
Rights Division at Human
Rights Watch, told Al Jazeera.
“By literally blocking these
women from being fully seen
in public the Taliban has taken
another major step towards
their apparent goal of erasing
Afghan women entirely from
public life.”
The Ministry of Propagation
of Virtue and the Prevention
of Vice did not respond to a
request for comment by Al
Jazeera.
‘I can’t quit’
A rise in gender-based
discrimination under the
Taliban has already forced
many women out of the
Afghan media, according to
recent reports.
A survey by the Afghan
National Journalists’ Union,
released in March, found that
79 percent of Afghan women
journalists said they had been
insulted and threatened under
Taliban rule, including
physical and verbal threats
and abuse by Taliban officials.
Meanwhile, 60 percent of
Afghan women journalists
t
surveyed said they lost their
jobs since the Taliban
takeover in August.
A survey by Reporters
Without Borders, done
immediately after the Taliban
takeover, found that fewer
than 100 women remained
working in the media in
Kabul.
“Of the 510 women who used
to work for eight of the biggest
media outlets and press
groups, only 76 (including 39
journalists) are still currently
working,” it noted, warning
that “women journalists are in
the process of disappearing
from the capital”.
Female journalists in
Afghanistan have also
reported increased challenges
in doing their jobs due to the
Taliban’s restrictions. On
Thursday, female journalists
from Herat province said
Naeem al-Haq Haqqani, the
Taliban’s provincial director
of information and culture,
barred them from entering a
press conference.
Sosan, who had aspired to
become a documentary
filmmaker, said the
restrictions have prevented
her from going into the field.
“Earlier, we could go far
distances for news coverage,
but it is very hard to even go
out of the city centres. If we
get stopped by officials of the
Taliban’s vice and virtue
ministry, they question us
about why we don’t have a
mahram,” she said.
Mahira shared similar
discriminatory experiences.
“About a month ago, we
invited one of the Taliban’s
officials to appear on my
programme. The interview
was arranged by our producer,
who is a man. But when the
official entered the studio and
saw me, he turned around and
refused to join the discussion,
because I was a woman,” she
said.
When Mahira inquired with
the Taliban official what the
problem was, he told her that
he would “never sit in front of
a girl for an interview”, she
said.
Afghan female journalists
have also reported being
“blacklisted” by Taliban
officials.
“The ministry officials don’t
share any interviews or
information. When we
approach them with questions,
they respond by asking us,
why we don’t wear the hijab
or why have we worn heels, or
where are our socks. Would
you call this media freedom?”
Mahira said.
“When I talk to them, they
don’t even respond to me and
pretend as if no one is talking.
They do not value women as
humans, let alone allowing
them to be a presenter or news
anchor who sits at the same
table with them and have
discussions,” she added.
Despite the ban on showing
their faces, Afghan women
journalists continue to report.
“When I cover my face, my
identity is lost, but yet I
decided to continue appearing
on TV even with face masks
because I do not want them to
think that by putting pressure
on us, they can eliminate us,”
Sosan said.
Mahira also refused to give in
to the pressure, even though
the temptation to resign arises
every day. “But I can’t quit.
Because we are the voices of
those who are not allowed to
go to schools, universities and
work. If we leave, who will
speak for them?” she said.
In acts of solidarity with their
female colleagues, male
journalists have also appeared
on screen wearing face masks
in recent days.
“We stand beside our female
colleagues and protest this
order because we know how
difficult it is to present on TV
with your face covered,”
Idrees Farooqi, chief editor
and head of news at 1TV, told
Al Jazeera.
Journalists and activists in
Afghanistan and across the
globe have also taken to social
media to protest against the
move by sharing pictures of
themselves wearing masks
alongside the hashtag
#FreeHerFace.
For Afghan women though,
reporting is resistance, Mahira
said.
“Although this order was very
heartbreaking, but I will say to
them that even if you make me
wear a burqa I will still present
on TV. There is no force or
pressure that you can apply
that will make me leave my
job” she said.
“I will continue reporting on
women because this is
resistance. I will continue to
resist until the situation
improves.”