TITLE CASE: Amores vs.

HRET
NATURE: - Via this petition for certiorari, (GRANTED)
- Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-
list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives
- Denied petitioner’s (Milagros Amores) Motion for Reconsideration.
DOCTRINE: A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their
qualifications according to law are a different matter.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect.

Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party
or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Section 13 of RA No. 7941

Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names
submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according
to their ranking in said list.

Section 9 of RA No. 7941

No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until
the expiration of his term

ISSUE: Whether or not Emmanuel Villanueva is ineligible to be the representative of CIBAC

partylist?

(1) Whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably; and
(2) Whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
No formal proclamation from COMELEC proclaimed CIBAC entitled
COMELEC to at least 1 seat.
SC RULED: 1. Private respondent assumed office 1. CIBAC was among the party-list
without a formal proclamation organizations which the
Public respondent committed grave issued by the Commission on COMELEC had partially
abuse of discretion in considering Elections (COMELEC proclaimed as entitled to at least
petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto one seat in the House of
filed out of time Representatives through National
Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Under Sec. 13 of RA 7941 Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9,
Qualifications for public office are 2007
continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.
In favor of petitioner
In RA No. 7941, the Party-List System
Act, it covers ALL youth sector
nominees vying for party-list
representative seats.
Private respondent was not qualified to
be a nominee of either the youth sector
or the overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector in the May, 2007
elections.
He did not change his sectoral
affiliation at least six months before
May, 2007, public respondent itself
having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s
overseas Filipino workers
and their families sector only on March
17, 2007
A nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only
be eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation if the change
has been effected at least six months
before the elections
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House
HELD: of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
Over aged
2. He was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of
CIBAC since, at the time of the
filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, he
was already 31 years old or
beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941
Change of affiliation is not effected
at least six months.
3. His change of affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at
least six months prior to the May
14, 2007 elections so as to be
qualified to represent the new
sector under Section 15 of RA No.
7941
The petition which was filed on October
17, 2007 to be out of time, the
reglementary period being 10 days
from private respondent’s
proclamation.
Age is exclusive to sectoral party,
CIBAC is multi sectoral.
2. it applied only to those nominated
as such during the first three
congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party
is thereafter registered exclusively
as representing the youth sector,
which CIBAC, a multi-sectoral
organization, is not.
Shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s
youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector
has no resultant change in party-
list affiliation.
3. Section 15 of RA No. 7941 did not
apply as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation
TITLE CASE: ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
NATURE: (GRANTED)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing
the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
DOCTRINE:
The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one
for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice.

Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, one- half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-
list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or

lacking in "well- defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

In Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers,
students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups.

In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors
would have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those
reserved seat.

Under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination.
First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that
same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be
represented in the Assembly

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250
seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means
that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15.
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide
gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate
legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
The party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral
parties.
A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professional.
 Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It
declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section
5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.

Thus, the national or regional parties under the party- list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political partieS. This automatically reserves the national and regional
parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the
entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a
voice in law-making.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the
sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or
she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee
one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for
such sector
ISSUE: 1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations; and,
 2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v.Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
The nominees do not belong to the
sectors which the party represents;
and

The COMELEC held that Atong

Paglaum’s nominees do not belong to
the sectors which the party represents,
i.e., the urban poor, consumer, women
and youth. While these include the
women and youth sectors, five of the
party’s
six nominees are all male, and all of its
nominees are above 30 years14 of
age. Further, the COMELEC ruled that
the personal circumstances of the
nominees belie the claim that they
belong to the urban poor sector:
(1) its first nominee served as vice-
president in a multinational
corporation;
(2) its second nominee16 is the owner
of a corporation engaged in the
business of pineapple contract growing
with Del Monte Philippines;
(3) its third nominee is the owner and
manager of two business
establishments; and
(4) its sixth nominee is an electrical
engineer and three-term member of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.
The party failed to file its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections
Finally, the COMELEC cited the party’s
failure to file its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures when
it participated in the 2010 Elections,
despite having been ordered to do so
during the summary evidentiary
hearing.
1. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
2. Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral
parties under the party-list system

The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory
injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall
not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections.

Atong Paglaom is disqualified based on the standards given by the COMELEC.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
TITLE CASE: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
NATURE: A petition for certiorari and mandamus, (PARTIALLY GRANTED) assails the Resolution by
COMELEC which approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being
moot.

BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats

ISSUE: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
FACTS: 1. Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation
of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72.
2. The Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on
the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected
maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one
(1) guaranteed party-list seat each.
3. WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the
party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may
be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veteran.
4.
ARGUMENTS:
The 17 qualified party-list candidates,
or the two-percenters, are the party-list
candidates that are "entitled to one
seat each," or the guaranteed se
The formula in Veterans has flaws in its
mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this
Court is compelled to revisit the
formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.
In computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional.
1. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of
votes, according to the ranking in
PETITIONER RESPONDENT
"The Chairman and the Members of The petition of BANAT is now moot and
the [COMELEC] have recently been academic.
quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
would apply the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats.
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be
awarded under BANAT’s first
interpretation
1. That the full number -- twenty That the total number of seats of each
percent (20%) -- of Party-List winning party, organization or coalition
representatives as mandated by shall be determined pursuant to the
Section 5, Article VI of the Veterans Federation Party versus
Constitution shall be proclaimed. COMELEC formula upon completion of
Since there are 220 District the canvass of the party-list results.
Representatives in the 14th
Congress, there shall be 55 Party-
List Representatives. All seats
shall have to be proclaimed.
The second interpretation presented
by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the
seats for party-list representatives by
following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941
a) shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number
of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system.
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.

First, the percentage is multiplied by

the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds
to a party’s share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed
all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation.
Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Thus:
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA The second clause of Section 11(b) of
Veterans interprets the clause "in 7941 which prescribes the 2% R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
proportion to their total number of threshold votes, should be garnering more than two percent (2%)
votes" to be in proportion to the votes harmonized with Section 5, Article of the votes shall be entitled to
of the first part VI of the Constitution and with additional seats in proportion to their
Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in total number of votes.
that it should be applicable only to
the first party-list representative
seats to be allotted on the basis of
their initial/first ranking.

All party-list groups shall initially be

allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party- list
votes they obtained; provided, that no
party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941)
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA
7941 shall be applied; and
The remaining seats shall, after
deducting the seats obtained by the
party-list groups under the immediately
preceding paragraph and after
deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the
 remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list
groups which have not secured the
maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with
Section 12 of RA 7941

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be

given the number of seats
corresponding to every 2% of the votes
they received and the additional seats
shall be allocated in accordance with
Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in
proportion to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party-list group in
relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after
deducting the corresponding votes of
those which were allotted seats under
the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the
formula/procedure prescribed in the
"ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST
SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are
entitled to representative seats and
how many of their nominees shall seat
[sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in
allocating seats for party-list
representative prescribed by Section
12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
1. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
HELD: allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law.The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
2. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats
that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3. No, it is not constitutional. The continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 5
4. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above
TITLE CASE: Lico v. Comelec, G.R. No. 20550
NATURE: In this case involve the seemingly elementary matter of the Commission on Elections'
(COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the
House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list organization, on the
other.

The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the Adhikaing
Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q.
Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in the House of Representatives,
and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
DOCTRINE: Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office
as member of the House of Representatives

In Abayon v. HRET, it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to the
marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should represent; as such,
they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective party-
list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning
of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned
that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of
all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and
took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of
the House of Representatives

In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting
through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list organization. The
implication, therefore, is that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the
principal contracts entered into by the party- list organization and its members - the
Constitution and By-laws - such that any amendment to these contracts would
constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An
amendment to the by- laws of a party-list organization should become effective only
upon approval by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the disqualifiaction of Atty Lico as the
bonafide member or representative of Ating Koop?

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Rimas as
the legitimate respresentative of Ating Koop?
 Neither of the two groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?
FACTS: 1. Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.

2. It filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarifia as second nominee.

3. COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.

4. Petitioner· Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,7 and thereafter assumed
office.

5. Months before proclamation as one of the winning parties, On 9 June 2010, Ating
Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-
sharing agreement signed by its nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico
was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term.

6. Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it introduced
amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the
composition of the Central Committee, , which would still be composed of 15
representatives but with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-
5 equal representation).

7. The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central

Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention.

8. In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.

9. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office,
the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. 14 Apart
from allegations o f malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term- sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
We find that while the COMELEC The COMELEC En Banc held that it The COMELEC Second Division
correctly· dismissed the Petition to had no jurisdiction to expel upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico
expel petitioner Lico from the House of Congressman Lico from the House of from Ating Koop and declared
Representatives for being beyond its Representatives, considering that his Mascarinia as the duly qualified
jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded expulsion from Ating Koop affected his nominee of the party-list group
to rule upon the validity of his expulsion qualifications as member of the House,
from Ating Koop- a matter beyond its and therefore it was the House of
purview. Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Petition.
Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET,
and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel
case Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
 House of Representatives and to
Sanction the Immediate Succession of
the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP
Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarifia as
its Party Representative, for lack of
jurisdictio
The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to Lico be ordered to vacate the office of
decide which of the feuding groups is Ating Koop in the House of
to be recognized, and that it is the Representatives, and for the
Regional Trial Court which has succession of the second nominee,
jurisdiction over intra-corporate Roberto Mascarifia as Ating Koop's
controversies representative in the House

We find to be without legal basis, UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent The COMELEC nullify the election
however, is the action of the Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP conducted at the Cebu meeting and
COMELEC in upholding the validity of Party-list Group recognize the Parafiaque convention
the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that
the HRET has jurisdiction over the
disqualification issue.

1. The COMELEC justified its

Resolution on the merits of the
expulsion, by relying on the
rule that it can decide intra-
party matters as an incident of
its constitutionally granted
powers and functions.

2. In the present case, the fact

that petitioner Lico was a
member of Congress at the
time of his expulsion from
Ating Koop removes the
matter from the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC.

3. The jurisdiction of the HRET is

exdusive. It is given full
authority to hear and decide
the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the
title of the proclaimed winner.

4. We have ruled that

qualifications for public office,
whether elective or not, are
continuing requirements. They
must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or
election, or of assumption of
office, but during the officer's
entire tenure
 Violating basic principles of the Ating
Koop
UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Ating Koop had expelled Congressman
Group represented by its -President, Lico for acts inimical to the party-list
Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate group , such as malversation, graft and
Party-list Group accredited by the corruption, and that he had "boldly
Commission on Elections, to the displayed his recalcitrance to honor
exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. party commitment to be upright and
Lico consistently honest
HELD: 1. No. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction. failed to recognize that the issue on the
validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of
jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari; the COMELEC should not have
encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.
2. We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring
the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason
that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not
registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu
meeting and the Parafiaque conference pursuant to the said amendments, were
valid.

3. Neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes
into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in
equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly
balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party
succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left with no
other option but to leave them as they are. The .consequence, therefore, is the
dismissal ofthe complaint/petition. We find such legitimate leadership to be the
Interim Central Committee, whose members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.

A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of officers
legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers
prior to the split of Ating Koop
TITLE CASE: GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
NATURE: This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (DISMISSED)

Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an

election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) dismissed Cordora’s complaint in a
Resolution dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006
Resolution as well as the Resolution dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC which
denied Cordora’s motion for reconsideration.

DOCTRINE: Under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship

Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino
citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the
bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v.
COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural- born
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines.

in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective local position

Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers’ country
such children are citizens of that country;
 (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting may run for public office despite his dual citizenship?
FACTS:
ARGUMENTS:
The fact that Tambunting had dual
citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.
1. Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it
was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the
naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship.
2. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before
the 2001 elections.
Requirements for dual citizens from
birth who desire to run for public office.
1. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s
volition.
PETITIONER (Cordora)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was
not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the
required citizenship and residency
requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration which stated
that, in two instances, Tambunting
claimed that he is an American: upon
arrival in the Philippines on 16
December 2000 and upon departure
from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel
dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through
naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000
Cordora’s claim that the number of
years of residency stated in
Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy
is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization
as an American citizen
COMELEC EN BANC
Affirmed the findings and the resolution
of the COMELEC Law Department.
The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to
support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and
convincing evidence.
PETITIONER (Counterclaim)
1. Seeks to prosecute Tambunting for
knowingly making untruthful
RESPONDENT(Tambunting)
He did not make any misrepresentation
in his certificates of candidacy, running
for local public office.
Tambunting presented a copy of his
birth certificate which showed that he
was born of a Filipino mother (jus
sanguini) and an American father.
Tambunting further denied that he was
naturalized as an American citizen.
(Jus soli)
The certificate of citizenship conferred
by the US government after
Tambunting’s father petitioned him
through INS Form I-130 (Petition for
Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting’s citizenship which he
acquired at birth.
Tambunting also took an oath of
allegiance on 18 November 2003
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225
(R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003.
Tambunting contended that the
residency requirement is not the same
as citizenship
COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT
Recommended the dismissal of
Cordora’s complaint against
Tambunting because Cordora failed to
substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the
certification of the Bureau of
Immigration that Tambunting traveled
on an American passport is not
sufficient to prove that Tambunting is
an American citizen
 statements in his certificates of
candidacy.
There was no grave abuse of discretion 2. COMELEC acted with grave abuse
in the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that of discretion amounting to lack or
there is no sufficient and convincing excess of jurisdiction when it
evidence to support a finding of declared that there is no sufficient
probable cause to hold Tambunting for evidence to support probable
trial for violation of Section 74 in cause that may warrant the
relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus prosecution of Tambunting for an
Election Code. election offense
HELD: Yes. Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen
of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him. By
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens.

TITLE CASE: AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO,
respondents.
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age,
able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election

Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not petitioner is ineligible to be the representative of the Second Legislative
District of Makati due to his LACK OF ONE YEAR residence in Makati?
FACTS: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD- UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Agapito A. Aquino2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification
as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995
elections.

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed
another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time,
petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.

the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution in favor of Petitioner.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
May 6, 1995 resolution
with the COMELEC en banc.

In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second
District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as
against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred
ten (35,910) votes

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and
a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's
proclamation.

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the
resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
The electoral tribunal clearly assumes On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a
jurisdiction over all contests relative to "Motion to File Supplemental
the election, returns and qualifications Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
of candidates for either the Senate or Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift
the House only when the latter become Suspension of Proclamation" wherein
members of either the Senate or the he manifested his intention to raise,
House of Representatives. A candidate among others, the issue of whether of
who has not been proclaimed and who not the determination of the
has not taken his oath of office cannot qualifications of petitioner after the
be said to be a member of the House elections is lodged exclusively in the
of Representatives subject to Section. House of Representatives Electoral
17 of the Constitution. Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Even after the elections the COMELEC Petitioner vigorously contends that
is empowered by Section 6 (in relation after the May 8, 1995 elections, the
to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the
to hear and decide questions relating to question of petitioner's qualifications to
qualifications of candidates run for member of the House of
1. Sec. 6. Effect of Representatives. He claims that
Disqualification Case. — Any jurisdiction over the petition for
candidate, who has been disqualification is exclusively lodged
declared by final judgment to with the House of Representatives
be disqualified shall not be Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment
before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning
number of votes in such
election, the Court or
Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and,
upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
The place "where a party actually or In order that petitioner could qualify as
constructively has his permanent a candidate for Representative of the
home," where he, no matter where he Second District of Makati City the latter
may be found at any given time, "must prove that he has established
eventually intends to return and not just residence but domicile of
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to choice.
which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law.
The sole purpose of (petitioner) in The domicile of origin of record up to
transferring his physical residence" is the time of filing of his most recent
not to acquire's new residence or certificate of candidacy for the 1995
domicile "but only to qualify as a elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City."
HELD: The petitioner is ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second
District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year
residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. Aquino’s assertion that he has
transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or
to be voted upon.

TITLE CASE: MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE, Respondents.
NATURE: The petition is GRANTED.

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007 Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-202, which declared private
respondent Arsenio Densing Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections
DOCTRINE: If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15 it was held that the term "residence" is to be

understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather
to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively
 has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)

In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until
a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time
ISSUE: Whether or not Noble is ineligible to hold office as the mayor of Misamis Oriental due to his
chosen domicile?

FACTS: Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran
against Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007
elections.

On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he has
been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.

COMELEC 2ND Division ruled in favor of petitioner, thus Noble filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above resolution.

In the meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning
candidate on May 15, 2007. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation.

On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division
and declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a
petition for disqualification against
Noble docketed as SPA No. 07-202,
alleging that the latter lacks the
residency qualification prescribed by
existing laws for elective local officials;
l; and
Records show that Noble’s domicile of That he never resided nor had any Noble averred that he is a registered
origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro physical presence at a fixed place in voter and resident of Barangay
City. However, he claims to have Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis
chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental Oriental.
as his new domicile. To substantiate
this, he presented before the
COMELEC
1. his voter registration records;
2. a Certification dated April 25,
2007 from Election Officer II
Clavel Z. Tabada;
3. his Marriage Certificate;
4. and affidavits of residents of
Kinoguitan attesting that he
established residence in the
municipality after his
marriage to Bernadith Go.
 5. In addition, he presented
receipts from the Provincial
Treasurer for payment of his
water bills, and
6. Certifications from the
Municipal Treasurer and
Municipal Engineer that he has
been a consumer of the
Municipal Water System since
June 2003.
7. To prove ownership of
property, he also presented a
Deed of Sale over a real
property dated June 3, 1996.
To establish a new domicile of choice, That he does not appear to have the He has been engaged in electoral
personal presence in the place must be intention of residing therein activities since his marriage; and that
coupled with conduct indicative of that permanently. he voted in the said municipality in the
intention. It requires not only such 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections
bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it
one’s fixed and permanent place of
abode.

Noble has not abandoned his original

domicile as shown by the following:
a) Certification dated April 12,
2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of
Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City stating thatNoble is a resident of
the barangay;
b) Affidavit of the Barangay
Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan,
MisamisOriental dated April 14, 2007,
attesting that Noble has not resided in
Barangay Esperanza in Kinoguitan;
c) photos and official receipts
showing that Noble and his wife
maintain their residence and
businesses in Lapasan;
d) tax declarations of real
properties in Cagayan de Oro City
under the name of Noble; and e) the
"Household Record of Barangay
Inhabitants" of Mayor Narciso Go,
which did not include Noble or his wife,
Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble’s
claim that he resides with his father-in-
law
Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in
fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City, where he also maintains a
business called OBERT Construction
Supply
 The COMELEC En Banc held that
when Noble married Bernadith Go on
January 18, 1992, the couple has since
resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental;
The Second Division of the COMELEC
ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and
disqualified Noble from running as
mayor.

That he was a registered voter and that Respondent Noble’s claim that he is a
he participated in the last three registered voter and has actually voted
elections; in the past three (3) elections in the
said municipality does not sufficiently
establish that he has actually elected
residency at Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental. Neither does campaigning in
previous elections sufficiently establish
residence.
And although he is engaged in Respondent Noble failed to show that
business in Cagayan de Oro City, the he has indeed acquired domicile at
fact that he resides in Kinoguitan and is Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He failed
a registered voter and owns property to prove not only his bodily presence in
thereat, sufficiently meet the residency the new locality but has likewise failed
requirement. to show that he intends to remain at
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and
abandon his residency at Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City.
HELD: Yes, Noble was ineligible to hold office as the winning mayor. He failed to prove
not only his bodily presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show
that he intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon his
residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

We find that Noble’s alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the
purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. We find Noble
disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in
the 2007 elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the

COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07- 202 declaring respondent Arsenio Densing
Noble qualified to run as Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to
succeed as Mayor.
TITLE CASE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: The provision granting an exemption to Members of Congress as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication, or equitable considerations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Accused-Appellant must be exempted from penal laws by reason of his
election win.
FACTS: The Accused-Appellant Romeo Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress, convicted of
two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts lasciviousness. Nevertheless, his
conviction is pending appeal while he is confined in the New Bilibid Prison. During the
pendency of his appeal, he won a reelection bid as Representative for the First District of
Zamboanga Del Norte. As such, he filed a motion to be allowed to discharge his mandate
on the grounds that his election win must be given priority over any ruling.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held the immunity from arrest or detention of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication, or
equitable considerations. No less than the Constitution provides that members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason is a
legitimate one, more so a confinement for a crime committed which is punishable
by imprisonment of more than 6 months.

Further, the ruling on Aguinaldo v. Santos whereby a public officer cannot be

removed from office for acts done prior to his present term of office, or the
condonation doctrine, does not apply to imprisonment for arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. It only applies to administrative removal of a public
officer.

Further, finally, the Constitution provides that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both rights and responsibilities.

In the present case, firstly, the Accused-Appellant has been convicted for the
crimes committed. Although pending appeal, confinement is public self-defense
whereby society must protect itself. Secondly, the Condonation Doctrine cannot
be applied because the case involves criminal offenses, not administrative
offenses. Finally, the election to the position of Congressman or Representative
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
TITLE CASE: Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent
would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum."
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected
to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech?
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered the following remarks:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal.

I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that,
I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature.
I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a
different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the
impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent
members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified.

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending
that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ
Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be
afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express
admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words,
there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission.

Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady
senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her
excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation
on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the
controversy her utterances had managed to stir.

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it,
the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective
forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their
private indulgence, but for the public good."
TITLE CASE: Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of jurisdiction

FACTS: Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections.
On May 14, 2004, at 11:30 a.m., the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) proclaimed
respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone congressional district of Camarines
Norte. On July 2, 2004, the COMELEC (First Division) ordered the suspension of the effects
of the proclamation of respondent Unico. On July 23, 2004, it lifted the said order on the
ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only
divested the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and
qualifications, but also automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.

Subsequently, the COMELEC (First Division) issued the Resolution dated April 13, 2005,
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated preliminarily that the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-
President, Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List.

The COMELEC (First Division) also held that the MBC or PBC had no discretion on matters
pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they were simply
performing a ministerial function. Absent a lawful order from the COMELEC to suspend or
annul a proclamation, the PBC of Camarines Norte, in particular, was mandated to comply
with its duties and functions including the proclamation of respondent Unico as the winning
candidate for the lone congressional district of Camarines Norte. His petition was dismissed
for utter lack of merit.
Aggrieved, petitioner Chato filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was elevated to
the COMELEC en banc for resolution.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
HELD: No. In the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006, the COMELEC en banc
denied petitioner Chato’s motion
for reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a
Member of the Thirteenth (13th) Congress. It reasoned, thus:
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105278, November 18,
1993), the Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, thereby
divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the pre- proclamation controversies against
members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.
 The Honorable Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling in the recent case of
Aggabao vs. COMELEC, et al. (G.R.No. 163756, January 26, 2005), where it
held that:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Considering that private respondent Renato Unico had already taken his oath
and assumed office as member of
the 13th Congress, the Commission had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

TITLE CASE: Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466

NATURE:
DOCTRINE: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan?
FACTS: In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against
petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she
being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon,
were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

HELD: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the
“members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
 members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-
list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when
it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and
Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

TITLE CASE: Henry Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

NATURE:
DOCTRINE: The Constitution mandates HRET to "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications" of its members. The Court cannot use its own judgment as a
replacement for HRET’s.
ISSUE: Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353
dated November 27, 2008?
FACTS: Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. (petitioner) and Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes (private respondent) were
rivals for the congressional seat in the 2nd district of Taguig in the 2007 National Elections.
After the canvass of the votes, Dueñas received 28,564 votes and was declared the winner.
After the declaration, Reyes filed an election protest and prayed for the revision or recount
on the ground that he was cheated through insidious and well-orchestrated election frauds
in the protested 170 (of 732) precincts.

In the September 25, 2008 order, HRET instructed the continuation of the revision of the
remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts as governed by Rule 88 of HRET rules.
On October 27, 2008, Dueñas filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts. HRET denied this motion and recalled its order requiring
Duenas to segment his cash deposit. HRET instead use its own fund for the revision of the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.
Moreover, HRET issued Resolution No. 08-353 under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and
settled jurisprudence on November 27, 2008. This resolution states that HRET has the
discretionary power to dismiss the protest and counter-protest or continue the revision
based on reasonable grounds which might compromise the integrity of the election results.
Duenas elevated the matter to the Court.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
1. He alleged that there was cheating 1. HRET argues that it has the
and massive fraud (misreading, discretionary power to dismiss the
miscounting, misappreciation) in the protest and counter-protest or continue
170 precincts which resulted in the the revision based on reasonable
reduction of his votes. grounds which might compromise the
2. HRET’s failure to ascertain the true integrity of the election results.
will of the electorate proves the private 2. HRET argues that the mere filing of
respondent’s failure to prove his case. a motion to withdraw/abandon the
3. HRET committed grave abuse of unrevised precincts did not
discretion in ordering the continuation
 of the revision of the remaining 75% automatically divest the Tribunal of its
counter-protested precincts. jurisdiction over the issue.
4. HRET committed grave abuse of 3. HRET ruled that its task of
discretion in assuming the costs of the determining the true will of the people
continued revision. was not confined to the examination of
5. A counter-protest aims to protect the
ballots being contested. It could
protestee and not the private
respondent; hence, the motupropio review the validity of every
latter cannot claim benefit therefrom. ballot involved in a protest or counter-
6. HRET can only invoke Rule 88 when protest.
the initial results show that evidence
that officially
proclaimed results would be affected.
HELD: The Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
HRET has constitutional authority as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications"36 of its members but also on the limitation of
the Court’s power of judicial review. Thus, the Court cannot and should not
exercise jurisdiction on the raised issues.
Petitioner was also wrong when he claimed that there was no point in continuing
the revision of the
remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. The Court argued that such a claim
is plainly a conjecture which he also alleged against the respondents.

Furthermore, the Constitution mandates HRET to "be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"42 of its members.
The Court cannot use its own judgment as a replacement for HRET’s
constitutional mandate. This jurisdiction is anchored on the following rules:

RULE 7.Control of Own Functions. — The Tribunal shall have exclusive control,
direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and
operation. (emphasis supplied)
RULE 88.Pilot Precincts; Initial Revision. — Any provision of these Rules to the
contrary notwithstanding, as soon as the issues in any contest before the
Tribunal have been joined, it may direct and require the protestant and counter-
protestant, in case the protest or counter-protest involves more than 50% of the
total number of precincts in the district, to state and designate in writing within a
fixed period at most twenty-five (25%) percent of the total number of precincts
involved in the protest or counter-protest, as the case may be, which said party
deems as best exemplifying or demonstrating the electoral irregularities or frauds
pleaded by him; and the revision of the ballots and/or reception of evidence shall
begin with such pilot precincts designated. Upon the termination of such initial
revision and/or reception of evidence, which presentation of evidence should not
exceed ten (10) days, and based upon what reasonably appears therefrom as
affecting or not the officially- proclaimed results of the contested election, the
Tribunal may direct motupropio the continuation of the revision of ballots in the
remaining contested precincts, or dismiss the protest, or the counter-protest,
without further proceedings. (emphasis supplied)

The only prerequisite to the HRET’s exercise of its prerogative under Rule 88
was its own determination on whether the presented evidence could affect the
officially proclaimed results. And if ever abuse is discretion is committed, it has
to be grave in which they exercise arbitrariness by reason of passion and hostility.
An ordinary abuse of discretion cannot be appreciated.

The Court, however, does not declare any winner because it does not have the
authority to do so. The Court is merely remanding the case to the HRET for the
continuation of revision proceedings. To determine who the real winner is.
TITLE CASE: ABAKADA Guro Party-list v. Purisima
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions

ISSUE: Whether the presentment of IRR to Congress for approval as condition for its effectivity
violates the constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment?
FACTS: RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF,
DBM, and NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service
officials and employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target; and further, to
issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the
CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving the
formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO
became functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing
and enforcing said law.

Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on

the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function
should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation
of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

HELD: YES.

Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House
of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both
chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the
validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber legislative veto and a
congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval
or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is
a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto
is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such
presentment even if approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress. Second, it must be presented to and
approved by the President. As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:

A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate

except for some measures that must originate only in the former chamber.

The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure
and its referral by the Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee
for study.

The bill may be “killed” in the committee or it may be recommended for approval,
with or without amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held
thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee
bill.

Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this
stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended
when desired. The second reading is the most important stage in the passage of
a bill.

The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies
thereof are distributed at least three days before the third reading. On the third
reading, the members merely register their votes and explain them if they are
allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.

Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will
also undergo the three readings. If there are differences between the versions
approved by the two chambers, a conference committee58 representing both
Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the
House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.

The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter
authenticated with the signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the
Secretaries of their respective chambers…

The President‘s role in law-making: The final step is submission to the President
for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must
be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of
the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature
when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that
legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by the language
of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due
process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be
executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute
the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the
President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its
members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
TITLE CASE: Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Contempt Powers of Congress

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci?
FACTS: In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between Gloria Arroyo and
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a
plan to rig the elections to favor Arroyo. The recordings then became subject of legislative
hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Chiz Escudero
moved for a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged.
Sen. Ping Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National
Defense and Security headed by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon. Garcillano (referred to as “Garci” by
Arroyo in the leaked tapes) subsequently filed two petitions. One to prevent the playing of
the tapes in each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible and the other to prohibit and
stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT
Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already
HELD: played in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already
overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition
must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of
the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.”

The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on 30 June
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.
TITLE CASE: Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Contempt Powers of Congress
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered
into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed
by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence
laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent
committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

The communications are covered by executive privilege
HELD:
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not
in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area
of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of
the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on
the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in
“her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did
not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law
TITLE CASE: Philippine Judges Association v. Prado
NATURE:
DOCTRINE: Bicameral conference committee
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass
the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its
final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ARGUMENTS: PETITIONER RESPONDENT

No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
HELD:

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of
the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and
PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No.
4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke
Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a
conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also
binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members
of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.