Compendium Petitioners

1ST SHRI.
NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
COMPENDIUM OF CASES CITED ON BEHALF OF THE COUNSELS FOR THE

PETITIONERS
IN THE MATTER OF:
MR. MOHAN SINGH,

MR. RANGARAJ .…………………………………………………………..PETITIONERS
V.
UNION OF RASHTRAKUTA……………………………………………..RESPONDENT
COMPENDIUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
1
COMPENDIUM OF THE PETITIONERS
1ST SHRI. NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
INDEX
S. NO. AUTHORITY CITED PAGE NO.

1. Abuse of Sedition After Kedar Nath Judgement 03
2. Arrests Under Sedition Charges Rise But Conviction Falls To 09
3%
3. Article 19 Of The International Covenant On Civil And Political
Rights Adopted On 16th December, 1996 By General Assembly
Resolution 2200A (XXI)
4. Article 19 Of The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, 1948
5. Freedom In The World, 2021 Of Freedom House

6. NCRB Report On Sedition From Lok Sabha Starred Question
No. *281, Ministry Of Home Affairs, Government Of India
7. Memorandum Of Association And Rules And Regulations Of

The Board Of Control For Cricket In India
8. Sedition Law Has Been Junked In The Following Countries
9. Statement Of United Nations High Commissioner For Human

Rights At 46th Session Of The Human Rights Council, 26th
February 2021
10. Steps Taken In Rashtrakuta To Remove The Offence Of Sedition
11. The First Constitutional Amendment, 1951

12. Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. CBI & Anr., Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 149 Of 2012
13. S. G. Vombatkere vs. Union Of India
14. Shreya Singhal vs. UOI, (2015) 5 Scc 1
15. Vinod Dua vs. Union Of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 154
Of 2020
2
ABUSE OF SEDITION AFTER KEDAR NATH JUDGEMENT
S. No. List of Dates Events

1) 20.01.1962 The Constitutional Bench judgment of this Hon’ble Court in
Kedar Nath case settled the law and restricted the application of
Section 124A to only those activities that had an intention or
tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order or
incitement to violence. The judgment further stated that if these
essential ingredients were not read into the meaning of sedition,
Section 124A would be rendered unconstitutional.
2) November In November 2010, noted writer and activist Arundhati Roy and
2010 5-6 others were charged with Sedition by Delhi Police for
allegedly having made anti-India remarks at an event organized
in Kashmir on 21.10.2010.
3) September Aseem Trivedi, a noted political cartoonist was arrested on the
2012 09.09.2012, based on a political activist’s complaint that his
cartoons insulted the country. The charge was in connection to
a cartoon he had made depicting the national emblem in support
of the anti-corruption movement in the country.
4) 2007 Binayak Sen, a civil rights activist and two others were was
arrested by Chattisgarh Police in 2007 on the charges of Sedition
and having links with Naxalites. Raipur sessions court found
Sen guilty of sedition and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
An appeal was filed in the Chhattisgarh High Court challenging
the High Court order.
5) 15.04.2011 This Hon’ble Court granted bail to Binayak Sen while, orally
observing, as per several newspaper reports, that the evidence
on record proves no sedition case against Sen. At the worst he
could be termed active sympathizer of Naxals. The court also
observed that mere possession of Naxal literature does not make
a person a Naxalite, guilty of sedition, as one who possesses
3
Mahatma Gandhi’s autobiography cannot call himself a

Gandhian.
6) September Anti-Nuclear activist S.P. Udayakumar (petitioner no.2 herein),
2011 faced several cases of sedition for protesting against
Kudankulam Nuclear power Plant in Tamil Nadu. Between
September and December 2011 alone, the Tamil Nadu
Government slapped sedition charges on 6,000 protesters/
villagers at a single police station
7) December As per the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Report,
2014 2014 as many as 47 sedition cases were reported in 2014 alone,
across nine Indian states. Many of these cases did not involve
violence or incitement to violence, which is a prerequisite for a
sedition charge. It is submitted that as per the NCRB figures
total of 58 persons were arrested in connection with these cases,
but the government has managed only one conviction
8) October 2015 Tamil folk singer S Kovan was slapped with a sedition case
for singing songs critical of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J
Jayalalithaa and her liquor policy. He had criticized the state
government for allegedly profiting from state-run liquor shops
at the expense of the poor. The petition was later dismissed
by this Hon’ble Court.
9) 05.01.2016 A resident of Malappuram district, Kerala Anwar Sadhik was
arrested by police under Section 124A (sedition) for a
derogatory Facebook comment.
10) 12.02.2016 Kanhaiya Kumar, the president of Jawaharlal Nehru University
Student’s Union along with his colleagues Umar Khalid,
Anirban Bhattacharya and one other were arrested and charged
with sedition by the Delhi Police for raising antiIndia slogans in
a student event organized within the JNU campus. When Kumar
was brought to the Patiala House court on February 15, 2016,
JNU students and professors, as well as journalists, were
attacked by a group of lawyers. On 17 February, Kumar was
once again assaulted by some lawyers inside the Patiala House
4
court. On February 22, 2016, India Today broadcast a video in

which three lawyers of the Patiala House court claimed that they
had beaten Kanhaiya Kumar while the latter was in police
custody. A six member Supreme Court-appointed panel later
confirmed that the policemen present at the Court were
responsible for the security lapses, and further stating that police
allowed 2 persons to enter the court room, and continued to let
the assault take place, in direct violation of the SC direction on
Kanhaiya's safety. On 02 March 2016, Kanhaiya Kumar was
released on interim bail for lack of conclusive evidence. A
separate magisterial investigation appointed by the Delhi
Government did not find any evidence of Kanhaiya Kumar
participating in anti-national slogans. There are conflicting
reports about the veracity of the videos and some of them have
been found to be doctored.
11) 15.02.2016 Former DU lecturer S.A.R Geelani was arrested on sedition
charge. On March 19, 2016 a Delhi Sessions court granted bail
to Geelani.
12) June 2016 Karnataka state police registered a case of sedition and arrested
two police officers for demanding better wages and living and
working conditions. They had threatened to go on leave
protesting alleged "harassment" by senior officials, lesser pay
and absence of proper leave.
13) 2016 In the matter of Arun Jaitley v. State of U.P. [(2016) 92 ACC
352], the Allahabad High Court was confronting a case filed
against ex-Minister Arun Jaitley for an Article titled “NJAC
Judgment – An Alternative View” written by him and posted on
his Facebook Page. Holding that none of the ingredients
essential for invoking the offence of Sedition was found in the
case, the Allahabad High Court concluded that the Magistrate
had committed a manifest illegality by forming an opinion that
offence under the provision stood committed
5
14) September A case of sedition had been filed against the political activist
2019 Shehla Rashid for her tweets against the alleged torture done by
the Indian Army in disputed Kashmir. She alleged that the
Indian Army tortured the Kashmiri men by placing a
microphone next to them so that the entire area can hear them
screaming. Even though the Indian Army refuted the allegations,
the allegations had been proved by a report on army abuse,
which was published in the media. She was charged for
spreading fake information against the government and the
Army. She had to fight the case and was left in considerable
financial implications, which had a very chilling effect on the
freedom of speech and expression.
15) October 2019 an FIR charging Sedition was lodged on the order of the
subordinate court against 49 celebrities in India, including
writers and social workers of immense repute such as Mani
Ratnam, Shyam Benegal, Ramchandra Guha etc, for writing to
the Prime Minister against the frequent mob-lynching incidents
throughout the nation.
16) 2020 In Karnataka, Fareeda Begum, a 50-year-old teacher, and
Nazbunnisa, a 36-year-old parent, were arrested over a
children’s school play depicting the fear gripping the country’s
minority due to the contentious Citizenship Amendment Act
(CAA). Human Rights Watch published an Article titled “India:
Arrests of Activists Politically Motivated - Sedition,
Counterterrorism Laws Used to Silence Dissent” which reported
that the children, as young as 6 to 7 years, were questioned,
harassed and intimidated by the police for hours for several days,
merely for participating in a play that talked about the ill-effects
of NRC, and allegedly criticized the Prime Minister.
17) January 2020 FIR was lodged under Sedition against a former JNU student in
January 2020 for delivering an allegedly seditious speech at the
Shaheen Bagh Protest in Delhi and he was arrested. Following
this in connection with an unconnected event at the Queer
6
Aazadi March in Mumbai in February 2020, an FIR was filed

against a transgender activist and 50 others for raising a slogan
in support of the JNU student at the event.
18) January 2020 A police complaint was registered against Shaheen School in
Bidar for allowing students to stage a drama against the
Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register
of Citizens (NRC). The complainant had alleged that the school
authorities used the fourth, fifth, and sixth standards to perform
a drama on January 21, where they allegedly ‘abused’ Prime
Minister Narendra Modi.
The Principal District and Sessions Court in Bidar while
granting anticipatory bail to accused Abdul Qadeer in the
infamous Bidar Sedition Case observed that the play enacted by
students at Shaheen Urdu Medium School on January 21 did not
constitute sedition under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code.
19) 26.01.2021 FIRs were lodged in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi
against Member of Parliament Shashi Tharoor, journalists
Rajdeep Sardesai, Vinod K Jose (Caravan), Zafar Agha, the
Group Editor-in-Chief of National Herald, Ananth Nath, the
Editor of Caravan, Paresh Nath and Mrinal Pande under the
offence of Sedition and other Sections of the Indian Penal Code,
for tweeting and spreading fake news pertaining to the death of
a farmer during a tractor rally on 26th January 2021 as part of
the farmers agitations.
20) February 2021 FIR under Sedition and other offences filed against
environmentalists in what is now popularly known as the
“toolkit conspiracy case”, 22-year old climate change activist
was arrested and released on bail by a district court in Delhi. The
case was filed against the activists on the charge of creating a
protest toolkit backing the farmers agitation with the aim of
allegedly tarnishing the image of India, with the backing of pro-
Khalistani elements
7
21) May 2021 An FIR under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code was
lodged against news channels TV 5 and ABN Andhrajyoti by
the Andhra Pradesh Police, for airing "offending speeches"
made by YSR Congress lawmaker, Kanumuri Raghu Rama
Krishna Raju. In a separate FIR registered by the police, Raju
was also arrested by the Andhra Pradesh police
22) June 2021 Aisha Sulatana, a filmmaker of the Malayalam film industry,
had given her opinion on the use of biological weapons against
the people of Lakshadweep Island by the Centre in a debate
telecast by a news channel, following which a case was
registered against her under Section 124 A and 153 B of the IPC,
which stated that she was trying to create disharmony among
different communities of people. She filed for an anticipatory
bail from the Court which was granted to her. She had clarified
her stand with an apology for making her statement. She stated
that she did not have any intention to promote separatism and
communalism in the minds of school children by the statement.
8
ARRESTS UNDER SEDITION CHARGES RISE BUT CONVICTION FALLS TO 3%
This extract is taken from the article “Arrests under Sedition Charges rise but Conviction
Falls to 3%” by Rahul Tripathi, The Economic Times
9
10
ARTICLE 19 OF ICCPR
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
ARTICLE 19 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
11
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD, 2021 of FREEDOM HOUSE
(By Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz)
12
NCRB REPORT
NCRB Report On Sedition From Lok Sabha Starred Question No. *281, Ministry Of
Home Affairs, Government Of India
13
14
15
MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF BCCI
(As per judgement dated 9 th August 2018 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Civil Appeal No. 4235 of 2014 & connected-matters)
2. The objects and purposes of the BCCI are:
(c) To strive for sportsmanship and professionalism in the game of Cricket and its governance
and administration; inculcate principles of transparency and ethical standards in players, team
officials, umpires and administrators; and to ban doping, age fraud, sexual harassment and all
other forms of inequity and discrimination;
(h) To foster the spirit of sportsmanship and the ideals of cricket amongst school, college and
university students and others and to educate them regarding the same;
16
SEDITION LAW HAS BEEN JUNKED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES
The United States repealed the Sedition Act of 1918 which

extended the Espionage Act of 1917 to cover speech and the
expression of opinion that cast the government or the war effort
in a negative light and forbade the use of "disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language" about the United States
government, its flag, or its armed forces or that caused others to
view the American government or its institutions with
contempt. Those convicted under the act generally received
sentences of imprisonment for 5 to 20 years. Under Section
2385 of the US Code, it is unlawful for anyone to knowingly
teach/advocate the propriety of overthrowing the government,
by force. However, in respect for freedom of speech, this law is
rarely enforced.
A Law Commission working paper recommended that the
common law offence of sedition in England and Wales (even in
the mild form that it existed there) be abolished in the ground
that this offence was redundant and that it was not necessary to
have any offence of sedition.
-Offences classified under Sedition were repealed in Kenya.

The Nigerian Federal Court of Appeal, declared sedition
offences in Nigeria unconstitutional in the case of Chief
Arthur Nwankwo v. The State.
The Republic of Korea did away with its sedition laws during
democratic and legal reforms.
17
In July 2001, Ghana passed the Criminal Code - Repeal of the

Criminal and Seditious Laws (Amendment) Act 2001;
thereby repealing criminal libel and sedition from the
Ghananian Penal Code. The decision removed a law used to
arrest, try and imprison journalists for allegedly defaming
members of the government.
Sedition was declared as "unconstitutional" in Indonesia.
Following a recommendation from the New Zealand Law

Commission, the New Zealand government announced on 7
May 2007 that the sedition law would be repealed. Sedition
ceased to be a crime following the introduction of The Crimes
(Repeal of Seditious Offences) Amendment Bill in 2007, which
was enforced w.e.f. 1st January 2008. The Crimes (Repeal of
Seditious Offences) Amendment Act 2007 was passed on 24
October 2007, and entered into force on 1 January 2008.
Sedition was abolished in U.K. with effect from 12th January
2010 through Section 73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
which abolished sedition and seditious libel. Claire Ward, the
then Justice Minister, said while abolishing the law: “Sedition
and seditious and defamatory libel are arcane offences from a
bygone era when freedom of expression wasn’t seen as the right
it is today. Freedom of speech is now seen as the touchstone of
democracy, and the ability of individuals to criticize the state is
crucial to maintaining freedom … Abolishing these offences
will allow the UK to take a lead in challenging similar laws in
other countries, where they are used to suppress free speech,”
The Uganda Constitutional Court declared null and void the
sedition provisions from the Uganda Penal Code because they
were in contravention with the enjoyment of the right to
freedom of expression. (Facts-Journalist Andrew Mwenda
made several comments critical of the President and the
government of Uganda on his live radio talk show. The state
charged him with the crime of sedition, pursuant to sections 39
18
and 40 of the Penal Code, because his remarks were made to

bring hatred and contempt against the President, government,
and Constitution.)
In Scotland, Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing
(Scotland) Act 2010 abolished the common law offence of
sedition
Australia's sedition laws were amended in Australia on 19
September 2011. The ‘sedition’ clauses were repealed and
replaced with ‘urging violence.’
Ireland removed the controversial section of the constitutional
clause on freedom of speech which made “blasphemous,
seditious or indecent matter” a punishable offence. The change
in law came after the people of Ireland voted overwhelmingly
in referendum in October 2018 to amend its constitution to
remove the clause.
19
STATEMENT OF UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Extract from the statement by Michelle Bachelet at the 46th session of the Human Rights
Council.
20
STEPS TAKEN IN RASHTRAKUTA TO REMOVE THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION
S. No. Date/ Year Step

1. 1898 The Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (IV of 1898) amended
the section. As a result of the amendment, the single explanation to
the section was replaced by three separate explanations as they
stand now.
2. 1948 The draft Constitution of India was tabled before the Constituent
Assembly. Fundamental rights were provided in Chapter III of the
draft Constitution and Article 13(1)(a) [one of the predecessors to
Article 19(1)(a)] guaranteed all citizens the right to freedom of
speech and expression. Article 13(2) [predecessor to Article 19(2)]
provided that such freedom of speech and expression would not
affect any existing law or prevent the State from making any law
relating inter alia to Sedition. The drafting committee had retained
the word ‘Sedition’ in the draft Constitution of 1948. Article
13(1)(a) and 13(2) which contained Sedition as one of the
restrictions on free speech and expression. The debates that ensued
were extensive and are mentioned in the Petition. The debates show
that the Framers of the Constitution were unanimously and
vehemently against any such provision being retained in the
Constitution to curtail freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by the draft Constitution. One of the framers of the
Constitution - Sardar Bhopinder Singh Man is quoted below- “I
regard freedom of speech and expression as the very life of civil
liberty, and I regard it as fundamental. For the public in general,
and for the minorities in particular, I attach great importance to
association and to free speech. It is through them that we can make
our voice felt by the Government, and can stop the injustice that
might be done to us. For attaining these rights, the country had to
make so many struggles, and after a grim battle succeeded in
getting these rights recognized. But now, when the time for their
21
enforcement has come, the Government feels hesitant; what was

deemed as undesirable then is now being paraded as desirable.
What is being given by one hand is being taken away by the other.
Every clause is being hemmed in by so many provisos. To apply the
existing law in spite of changed conditions really amounts to
trifling with the freedom of speech and expression… To my mind,
suppression of lawful and peaceful opposition means heading
towards fascism.” Sedition was thus deleted from the Constitution
with the Constituent Assembly unanimous in their view that the
citizens of the country must retain the power to challenge the
existing law, namely, Section 124A, which in their view deserved
to be tested by the judiciary and declared invalid in order for the
citizens to retain their civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
3. 15.08.1950 India adopted its Constitution. ‘Sedition’ was not included in the
final Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. Article 19(2) read thus
“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation
of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevents the State
from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation,
contempt of court or any matter which offends against decency or
morality or which undermines the security of, or tends to
overthrow, the State.”
4. 16.05.1951 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 was proposed. It
included two important changes to Article 19 (2): - First, it added
the word “reasonable” before the word restrictions which made 19
(2) justiciable. - Second, it included the expressions “friendly
relations with foreign States” “public order” and ‘incitement to
offence” as grounds for legislative restriction on freedom of speech
& expression. The debate which took place in the Parliament vis-
à-vis the first Constitution Amendment is very important,
particularly the words used by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime
Minister in connection with the impugned section: - “Take again
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. Now so far as I am
concerned that particular Section is highly objectionable and
22
obnoxious and it should have no place both for practical and

historical reasons, if you like, in any body of laws that we might
pass. The sooner we get rid of it the better. We might deal with the
matter in other ways, in more limited ways, as every other country
does but that particular thing, as it is, should have no place.”
5. 1973 Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to make the offence
of sedition cognizable and non-bailable. By contrast, the offence of
sedition was non-cognizable in the U.K. The maximum sentence in
the U.K. was 2 years as compared to life imprisonment in India.
6. 10.04.1979 -India ratified the UDHR. Article 19 propounds freedom of
opinion and expression as a right that admits of no interference.
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.”
-India also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR provides that “Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Article
19 (3) provides that “The exercise of the rights provided for in
paragraph 2 of this Article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b)
For the protection of national security or of public order (order
public), or of public health or morals.” The General Comment 34
of the United Nations discusses the application of Article 19 (3) of
the ICCPR. In Clause 25 the meaning of the term “provided by law”
in Article 19 (3) is explained thus
7. 2011 A private member Bill titled the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Bill, was introduced in the Rajya Sabha by Mr. D.
23
Raja. The Bill proposed that section 124A IPC should be omitted.
It was reasoned that the British Government used this law to
oppress the view, speech and criticism against the British rule. But
the law is still being used in independent India, despite having
specialised laws to deal with the internal and external threats to
destabilise the nation. Thus, the section should be omitted to check
the misuse of the section and promote the freedom of speech and
expression. The Bill was never passed.
8. 2015 Another Private member Bill titled The Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Bill, 2015, was introduced in Lok Sabha by Mr.
Shashi Tharoor to amend section 124A IPC. The Bill suggested that
only those actions/words that directly result in the use of violence
or incitement to violence should be termed seditious. This proposed
amendment revived the debate on interpretation of sedition.
9. 30.08.2018 Opinion was sought by the Union government from the Law
Commission in response to which a “consultation paper” was
released by the Law Commission. The ‘consultation paper’
recommended a “review or even repeal” of the provision because
of its unsuitability in a democratic country.
24
THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 1951
The First amendment in the Constitution took place by virtue of the Constitution of India (First
Amendment) Act, 1951 with retrospective effect. In the debates which took place in the
Parliament, reference was made to the judgment in Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan. At
this juncture itself, the Petitioners wish to state that the observation made in Kedar Nath that
the statement of law as contained in the dissenting judgment of Fazal Ali J. was accepted (vis-
à-vis Para 14 of Fazal Ali J. in Brij Bhushan) is not correct as explained hereinbelow. A
comparison of the original Article 19(2) and the amended version is given below:
“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall "Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so affect the operation of any existing law, or
far as it relates to, or prevents the State from prevent the State from making any law, in so
making any law relating to, libel, slander, far as such law imposes reasonable
defamation, contempt of court or any matter restrictions on the exercise of the right
which offends against decency or morality or conferred by the said sub-clause in the
which undermines the security of, or tends to interests of the security of the State, friendly
overthrow, the State.” relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to
contempt of court, defamation or incitement
to an offence."
Accordingly, the amendment extended the powers of the State to place “reasonable”
restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression by way of law in the interests of the
security of the State which is much different from undermining the security of state which has
a much higher threshold and further added restrictions on the grounds of security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order and incitement to an offence.
The opposition leaders were of the opinion that the amendment will dilute the sanctity of
freedom of speech and expression which was accepted by the majority judges in Romesh
Thapar and Brij Bhushan. At the same time, they welcomed the addition of the word
“reasonable” before the word “restrictions” in the following words:
25
“I think that the introduction of the word “reasonable” before the word “restrictions” in
Article 19 (2) introduces a very important change in the original draft. It places in the hands
of the judiciary the power to determine whether a restrictive piece of legislation is reasonable
or not.”
H.N. Kunzru
“The addition of the word “reasonable” before “restrictions” in 19 (2) is a very wholesome
change. It makes 19 (2) justiciable and I do not wish to minimize the importance of this change
in the protection of civil liberty in this country.”
Syama Prasad Mookerjee
The debate which took place in the Parliament vis-à-vis the first Constitutional amendment is
very important, particularly the words used by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister:
“Take again Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code. Now so far as I am concerned that
particular Section is highly objectionable and obnoxious and it should have no place both for
practical and historical reasons, if you like, in any body of laws that we might pass. The sooner
we get rid of it the better. We might deal with the matter in other ways, in more limited ways,
as every other country does but that particular thing, as it is, should have no place…
I do not think myself that these changes that we bring about validate the thing to any large
extent …. Suppose you pass an amendment of the Constitution to a particular Article, surely
that particular Article does not put an end to the rest of the Constitution, the spirit, the
languages the objective and the rest...”
Parliamentary Debates of India, Vol. XII, Part II
It is clear from the views expressed by Pt. Nehru that he was of the opinion that the restrictions
on the freedom of speech have to be reasonable, that the law of Sedition was not only
unreasonable but “objectionable” and “obnoxious” and that in a free India there is no need to
have an offence like Sedition. He also expressed the requirement of making changes in Article
19 and, therefore, it is not correct to say (Re: Kedar Nath) that the amendment was a complete
acceptance of what Justice Fazal Ali in minority said in Brij Bhushan and Romesh Thapar.
Later judgments have approved the view taken by the majority in these judgments.
26
AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH V. CBI & ANR.
(Before P. Sathasivam J. and B. S. Chauhan J.)
Extract from Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah V. CBI & Anr., Writ Petition No. 149 of 2012
Maintainability of writ petition under Article 32:
50) Regarding the maintainability, namely, filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, learned ASG submitted that it is only on complete examination and
appreciation of facts, materials and evidence that it can be decided as to whether these distinct
conspiracies form part of the same transaction in view of the law laid down by this Court. He
further pointed out that the CBI which is the investigating agency, after a full fledged
investigation, came to a conclusion that the conspiracy to eliminate Tulsiram Prajapati was a
distinct and separate offence, accordingly, such disputed questions of fact are not and ought
not to be decided in a writ petition under Article 32. He also pointed out that apart from the
fact that there are sufficient remedies to raise such a plea under the Code before a court of
competent jurisdiction, such disputed questions of fact can only be adjudicated after carefully
examining and appreciating the evidence led in. It is also pointed out that there is no question
of any prejudice suffered on account of prayer of the petitioner since if the offences are distinct
and separate which is so emerging from the present case, there can neither be joint trial nor
could the charge sheet filed in the present case be treated as supplementary charge sheet. As a
concluding argument, Mr. Rawal, learned ASG submitted that this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 32 may not like to adjudicate such disputed questions of fact which
require evidence to be led and its appreciation.
51) As against this, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the CBI is not faced with any prejudice which is to be caused to it, if the relief as prayed
for by the petitioner is granted. Admittedly, the petitioner is not praying for quashing of the
charge sheet dated 04.09.2012. During the course of argument, when this Court specifically
put a question to learned ASG appearing for the CBI as to what prejudice would be caused to
the CBI if instead of treating the charge sheet dated 04.09.2012 to be fresh and independent
charge sheet, the same will be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first charge sheet,
there was no definite answer as to what prejudice would be caused to the CBI. For the sake of
27
repetition, it is relevant to mention that in our order dated 08.04.2011 in Narmada Bai (supra),
while disposing of the said writ petition, this Court directed the CBI to take up the investigation
as prayed accepting their contention that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same
series of acts in which Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and, therefore, Tulsiram Prajapati
encounter should also be investigated by the CBI. Accepting the above assertion of the CBI,
this Court directed to complete the investigation within six months.
53) In the light of the specific stand taken by the CBI before this Court in the earlier proceedings
by way of assertion in the form of counter affidavit, status reports, etc. we are of the view that
filing of the second FIR and fresh charge sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Article
14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which
an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically
accepted the CBI’s plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of
cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed
the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely,
registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various
judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment.
54) In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29.04.2011 being
RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by the CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment
and order dated 08.04.2011 by this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2009 and
accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge sheet filed on 04.09.2012, in
pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first FIR. It is
made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for
the trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons
arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition (Criminal)
No. 5 of 2013.
28
S. G. VOMBATKERE VS. UNION OF INDIA
Copy of Order dated 11-05-2022 in S.G. Vombatkere vs. Union of India in Writ Petition(C)
No. 682 of 2021:
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
SHREYA SINGHAL V. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1
(Before Chelameswar J. and Rohinton Fali Nariman J.)
This extract is taken from Shreya Singhal V. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1
Severability:
93. The argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General on this score is reproduced by us
verbatim from one of his written submissions:
"Furthermore it is respectfully submitted that in the event of Hon'ble Court not being satisfied
about the constitutional validity of either any expression or a part of the provision, the Doctrine
of Severability as enshrined under Article 13 may be resorted to."
94. The submission is vague: the learned Additional Solicitor General does not indicate which
part or parts of Section 66A can possibly be saved. This Court in Romesh Thappar v. The
State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 repelled a contention of severability when it came to the
courts enforcing the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) in the following terms:
"It was, however, argued that Section 9(1-A) could not be considered wholly void, as, under
Article 13(1), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent
of the inconsistency and no more. Insofar as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance
of public order would include the security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to
the latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of Article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be
valid. We are unable to accede to this contention. Where a law purports to authorise the
imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions
both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting
such right, it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional
limits, as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not
sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional
and void. In other words, clause (2) of Article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions
on the freedom of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved,
an enactment, which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise,
cannot be held to be constitutional and valid to any extent." (At page 603)
36
95. It has been held by us that Section 66A purports to authorize the imposition of restrictions
on the fundamental right contained in Article 19(1)(a) in language wide enough to cover
restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action.
We have held following K.A. Abbas' case (Supra) that the possibility of Section 66A being
applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out. It must, therefore,
be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Romesh Thappar's Case was distinguished in
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930 in the context of a right
under Article 19(1)(g) as follows:
"20. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [ (1950) SCR 594], the question was as to the
validity of Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 23 of 1949. That
section authorised the Provincial Government to prohibit the entry and circulation within the
State of a newspaper "for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public
order." Subsequent to the enactment of this statute, the Constitution came into force, and the
validity of the impugned provision depended on whether it was protected by Article 19(2),
which saved "existing law insofar as it relates to any matter which undermines the security of
or tends to overthrow the State." It was held by this Court that as the purposes mentioned in
Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Act were wider in amplitude than those specified in Article 19(2),
and as it was not possible to split up Section 9(1-A) into what was within and what was without
the protection of Article 19(2), the provision must fail in its entirety. That is really a decision
that the impugned provision was on its own contents inseverable. It is not an authority for the
position that even when a provision is severable, it must be struck down on the ground that the
principle of severability is inadmissible when the invalidity of a statute arises by reason of its
contravening constitutional prohibitions. It should be mentioned that the decision in Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras [ (1950) SCR 594] was referred to in State of Bombay v. F.N.
Balsara [ (1951) SCR 682] and State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. [ (1953) SCR
1069 at 1098-99] and distinguished."
96. The present being a case of an Article 19(1)(a) violation, Romesh Thappar's judgment
would apply on all fours. In an Article 19(1)(g) challenge, there is no question of a law being
applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution for the simple reason that the eight
subject matters of Article 19(2) are conspicuous by their absence in Article 19(6) which only
speaks of reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. The present is a case
where, as has been held above, Section 66A does not fall within any of the subject matters
contained in Article 19(2) and the possibility of its being applied for purposes outside those
37
subject matters is clear. We therefore hold that no part of Section 66A is severable and the
provision as a whole must be declared unconstitutional.
Article 14
97. Counsel for the petitioners have argued that Article 14 is also infringed in that an offence
whose ingredients are vague in nature is arbitrary and unreasonable and would result in
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the criminal law. Further, there is no intelligible
differentia between the medium of print, broadcast, and real live speech as opposed to speech
on the internet and, therefore, new categories of criminal offences cannot be made on this
ground. Similar offences which are committed on the internet have a three year maximum
sentence under Section 66A as opposed to defamation which has a two year maximum
sentence. Also, defamation is a non-cognizable offence whereas under Section 66A the offence
is cognizable.
98. We have already held that Section 66A creates an offence which is vague and overbroad,
and, therefore, unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2). We have
also held that the wider range of circulation over the internet cannot restrict the content of the
right under Article 19(1)(a) nor can it justify its denial. However, when we come to
discrimination under Article 14, we are unable to agree with counsel for the petitioners that
there is no intelligible differentia between the medium of print, broadcast and real live speech
as opposed to speech on the internet. The intelligible differentia is clear - the internet gives any
individual a platform which requires very little or no payment through which to air his views.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has correctly said that something posted on a site or
website travels like lightning and can reach millions of persons all over the world. If the
petitioners were right, this Article 14 argument would apply equally to all other offences
created by the Information Technology Act which are not the subject matter of challenge in
these petitions. We make it clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the
internet and other mediums of communication for which separate offences can certainly be
created by legislation. We find, therefore, that the challenge on the ground of Article 14 must
fail.
38
Procedural Unreasonableness
99. One other argument must now be considered. According to the petitioners, Section 66A
also suffers from the vice of procedural unreasonableness. In that, if, for example, criminal
defamation is alleged, the safeguards available under Section 199 Cr.P.C. would not be
available for a like offence committed under Section 66A. Such safeguards are that no court
shall take cognizance of such an offence except upon a complaint made by some person
aggrieved by the offence and that such complaint will have to be made within six months from
the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Further, safeguards that are
to be found in Sections 95 and 96 of the Cr.P.C. are also absent when it comes to Section 66A.
For example, where any newspaper book or document wherever printed appears to contain
matter which is obscene, hurts the religious feelings of some community, is seditious in nature,
causes enmity or hatred to a certain section of the public, or is against national integration, such
book, newspaper or document may be seized but under Section 96 any person having any
interest in such newspaper, book or document may within two months from the date of a
publication seizing such documents, books or newspapers apply to the High court to set aside
such declaration. Such matter is to be heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges or in
High Courts which consist of less than three Judges, such special Bench as may be composed
of all the Judges of that High Court.
100. It is clear that Sections 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code reveal a certain degree
of sensitivity to the fundamental right to free speech and expression. If matter is to be seized
on specific grounds which are relatable to the subject matters contained in Article 19(2), it
would be open for persons affected by such seizure to get a declaration from a High Court
consisting of at least three Judges that in fact publication of the so-called offensive matter does
not in fact relate to any of the specified subjects contained in Article 19(2).
39
VINOD DUA V. UNION OF INDIA, W.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. 154 OF 2020
(Before Uday Umesh Lalit J. and Vineet Saran J.)
This extract is taken from Vinod Dua V. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) no.
154 of 2020
67. It must however be clarified that every Journalist will be entitled to protection in terms of
Kedar Nath Singh, as every prosecution under Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC3 must be in
strict conformity with the scope and ambit of said Sections as explained in, and completely in
tune with the law laid down in Kedar Nath Singh2.
68. In conclusion:
i. We quash FIR No.0053 dated 6.5.2020, registered at Police Station Kumarsain, Distt. Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh, against the petitioner; Writ Petition (Criminal) No.154 of 2020 Vinod Dua
vs. Union of India & Ors.
ii. but reject the prayer that no FIR be registered against a person belonging to media with at
least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee as suggested.
69. Writ Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
40

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1ST SHRI.

NITYANAND JHA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022

COMPENDIUM OF CASES CITED ON BEHALF OF THE COUNSELS FOR THE

IN THE MATTER OF:

MR. MOHAN SINGH,

COMPENDIUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

S. NO. AUTHORITY CITED PAGE NO.

5. Freedom In The World, 2021 Of Freedom House

7. Memorandum Of Association And Rules And Regulations Of

8. Sedition Law Has Been Junked In The Following Countries

9. Statement Of United Nations High Commissioner For Human

11. The First Constitutional Amendment, 1951

ABUSE OF SEDITION AFTER KEDAR NATH JUDGEMENT

S. No. List of Dates Events

Mahatma Gandhi’s autobiography cannot call himself a

court. On February 22, 2016, India Today broadcast a video in

Aazadi March in Mumbai in February 2020, an FIR was filed

ARRESTS UNDER SEDITION CHARGES RISE BUT CONVICTION FALLS TO 3%

ARTICLE 19 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1948

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD, 2021 of FREEDOM HOUSE

(By Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz)

MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF BCCI

2. The objects and purposes of the BCCI are:

SEDITION LAW HAS BEEN JUNKED IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES

The United States repealed the Sedition Act of 1918 which

-Offences classified under Sedition were repealed in Kenya.

In July 2001, Ghana passed the Criminal Code - Repeal of the

Following a recommendation from the New Zealand Law

and 40 of the Penal Code, because his remarks were made to

STATEMENT OF UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

STEPS TAKEN IN RASHTRAKUTA TO REMOVE THE OFFENCE OF SEDITION

S. No. Date/ Year Step

enforcement has come, the Government feels hesitant; what was

obnoxious and it should have no place both for practical and

THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 1951

Syama Prasad Mookerjee

Parliamentary Debates of India, Vol. XII, Part II

AMITBHAI ANILCHANDRA SHAH V. CBI & ANR.

(Before P. Sathasivam J. and B. S. Chauhan J.)

Maintainability of writ petition under Article 32:

S. G. VOMBATKERE VS. UNION OF INDIA

SHREYA SINGHAL V. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1

(Before Chelameswar J. and Rohinton Fali Nariman J.)

This extract is taken from Shreya Singhal V. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1

VINOD DUA V. UNION OF INDIA, W.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. 154 OF 2020

(Before Uday Umesh Lalit J. and Vineet Saran J.)

69. Writ Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

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