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Equality of Arms: A Fundamental Principle of Fair Trial Guarantee Developed by

International and Regional Human Rights Instruments

Article · June 2014

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[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 1

EQUALITY OF ARMS: A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF FAIR

TRIAL GUARANTEE DEVELOPED BY INTERNATIONAL AND
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

by

SHAJEDA AKTHER*
DR. ROHAIDA BINTI NORDIN**

Abstract

Among many other fair trial guarantees that have been enshrined in
international and regional human rights instruments (Article 14 of the
ICCPR, Art 6 of ECHR, Art 8(2) of ACHR) the most significant guarantee
is the principle of equality of arms. This principle underpins the equal
opportunities of the parties in criminal proceedings. It ensures the
procedural equality of the parties to present their case during the course of
trial. In criminal proceedings everyone charged with an offence must have
an equal opportunity to defend himself with that of the prosecution. Th is
principle includes certain specific rights and standards which ensure the
equal opportunities of the parties. The scope of this paper is to discuss the
principle within the ambit of fair trial guarantees that are set out in Article
14 of the ICCPR for equal protection of the parties.

Key words: Equality of arms, Fair trial guarantee, Criminal proceedings,

International and regional human rights instruments.
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 2

I. Introduction

The object of the criminal justice administration is not only to protect

society by punishing the offenders for baneful acts but equally to ensure that
no one should be punished without giving equal guarantee of a fair trial.
‘Equality of arms’ as a principle of fair trial guarantee ensures that the
accused persons are given sufficient opportunity to defend their case. This
principle entails equal opportunities between the parties. This principle
underpins some procedural guarantees that lie at the heart of the right to
defence. Most democratic legal systems guarantee this principle. In a
criminal trial where the accused’s liberty or even life may be deprived, a
high level of fairness and equal treatment is thereby required. In criminal
cases in which the State is involved and where the prosecution enjoys vast
resources and advantages, it is only the principle of equality of arms that
helps the accused to vindicate his or her case. It is not possible to say that
justice has been done if the accused is punished proportionally and rightly
but not ‘fairly’ ie, without giving the proper opportunities to present his
case, to defend himself and receive sufficient information and legal aid
(Wiaderek, 2000:9). In this paper, some basic procedural guarantees of this
principle that have been enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (hereinafter as ICCPR), the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter as
ECHR), and American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter as ACHR)
as a paramount consideration to afford to the parties equal terms in the
context of the concept of a fair trial in the criminal proceedings will be
examined.
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 3

II. The Principle of Equality of Arms

Article 14(1) of the ICCPR specifically states that “everyone shall be

entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.” Among others, minimum procedural
guarantees are provided in this Article for a person in the determination of
criminal charges brought against him or her. The principle of ‘equality of
arms’ is fundamental for the adversarial system of criminal proceedings.
The ‘equality of arms’ principle is concerned with substantive as well as
procedural equality. Substantive equality denotes the equal treatment of the
parties during the whole course of the proceedings; from a procedural
standpoint, it is meant to secure enjoyment of the same procedural rights
and guarantees (Negri, 2005:523).

The Human Rights Committee (hereinafter as HRC) in its General Comment

32 on the right to equality before the courts and tribunals expressed that:

“The right to equality before courts and tribunals also ensures equality of
arms. This means that the same procedural rights are to be provided to all
the parties unless distinctions are based on law and can be justified on
objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or other
unfairness to the defendant” (Paragraph 13).

The principle means that everyone who is a party to proceedings must have
a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the court under conditions
which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-á-vis his opponent.
This principle ensures a fair balance between the parties (DE Haes and
Gijsels v. Belgium, 1997). This principle is violated when a trial judge
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 4

refuses to grant an adjournment to enable an accused person to obtain legal

representation, where several adjournments already been granted when
prosecution witnesses were unavailable or not ready (Robinson v. Jamaica,
HRC: 1989). The provisions of equality of arms principle provided in
Article 14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR provides that “In the determination of any
criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality to be tried in his presence, and to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of his right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so
require, and without payment by him in any such case if does not have
sufficient means to pay for it”.

Article 14 (3) (e) of the ICCPR also provides the guarantee to the accused
person to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on h is behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him. This provision also ensures the
equality of arms principle.

The most elaborate article regarding equality of arms in the ACHR is Article
8 which inter alia, states the minimum guarantees during criminal
proceedings are the rights of the accused to be notified in detail of the
charge against him (Article 8(2) (b) of ACHR), to defend himself personally
or by legal counsel (Article 8(2) (d) of ACHR), to be assisted by counsel
provided by the state if the accused does not defend himself personally or
engage his own counsel within the time established by law (Article 8(2) (e)
of ACHR), and to examine witnesses (Article 8(2) (f) of ACHR).
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 5

The European Convention which is widely regarded as being the world’s

most effective system for the protection of human rights, played a concrete
role to set out the principle of equality of arms regarding fair trial
guarantees. The equality of arms principle is governed by Article 6(3) which
offers some aspects of principle of equality of arms that apply in criminal
cases such as, the accused should have sufficient time and resources to
prepare a defence 6(3) (b), to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient me ans to pay for
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require .

III. Essential Components of the Principle of Equality of Arms

The following guarantees are included as essential components of the

principle of equality of arms under Article 14(3) (d) and (e) of ICCPR,
Article 6(3) (b) and (c) of ECHR, Article 8(2) (b) (c) (d) (e) and (f) of
ACHR. These are:
to be tried in his presence;
to access to lawyer;
to defend oneself in person or through legal counsel;
to receive free legal assistance; and
to examine or have examined the witnesses.

In the following discussion these rights will be examined.

1. Right to be Present at Trial

One of the fundamental aspects of fair trial guarantees of an accused is the

right to be present during the determination of any charge against him. In a
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 6

criminal trial, the accused person’s life and liberty may be at stake and in
order to escape him from a perilous situation, he/she should be brought
before the court. Article 14(3) (d) of the ICCPR states that in determination
of any charges against him “everyone has the right to be tried in his
presence.” This right is related to the principle of ‘equality of arms’. The
HRC in this regard states that “the concept of a ‘fair trial’ within the
meaning of Article 14 … must be interpreted as requiring the fulfillment of
a number of conditions, such as equality of arms and respect for the
principle of adversary proceedings. These requirements are not respected
where … the accused is denied the opportunity personally to attend the
proceedings …” (Dieter Wolf v. Panama, 1988).

The presence of the accused at the trial is beneficial to the prosecution as

well as the accused. For example, the presence of the accused could enable
the prosecution to confront the accused with important questions relevant to
the case (Marasinghe, 1995:28). Although neither the European Convention
nor the American Convention explicitly guarantee this right, but the
European Court provides the opportunity to the accused to be present at the
trial through the interpretation of Article 6. The European Court was of the
view that the object and purpose of the Article shows that a person ‘charged
with a criminal offense is entitled to take part in the hearing’ (Colozza &
Rubinat v. Italy, 1985). This was confirmed in the case of Ensslin, Baader &
Raspe v. FRG (1978), where the decision to allow the accused to be present
at trial depended on the determination of a Court of Appeal whether his
presence was needed to examine a particular witness.
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 7

The requirement to be present at trial can be construed that no trial is

permitted in absentia. Although there is no developed theory by
international bodies about trial in absentia, according to the HRC, trials in
absentia occur in some circumstances, for instance, when the accused
declines to be present at trial despite being sufficiently informed of the
trial, and is permissible if due notification of the place and date of the trial
is provided to the accused with a view to enabling him to prepare his case.
The HRC found violation of this case where the accused does not receive
such notification, is not given adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence, cannot defend himself through legal counsel of
his own choosing, and does not have the opportunity to examine or have
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance of
witnesses on his behalf (Mbenge v. Zaire, 1983).

2. Right to Access to a Lawyer

The right to access to a lawyer is one of the most important aspects of fair
trial guarantees that give an accused ample opportunity to challenge the
legality of his or her detention. Of fundamental importance, the principle of
equality of arms will be worthless if this right is not observed. Early access
to a lawyer is also important in order to draw up a sound defence strategy
(Fair Trial Manual, 2010, Chapter 2:1). It can be considered as the initial
step of enjoying the wider right of legal assistance. The international and
regional human rights instruments also recognise the advantages of
representation by counsel. In the interest of the administration of justice, the
accused must be represented by counsel. An unrepresented accused is
disadvantaged, not merely because he or she almost always has insufficient
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 8

legal knowledge and skills, but also because an accused in such a position is
unable dispassionately to assess and present his or her case in the same
manner as the prosecutor and in this sense there is no equality of arms. As
Justice Michael Kirby of the Australian High Court put it:

‘...the notion that judges should preside over serious criminal trials where
accused persons, otherwise than by their choice, are not properly
represented by a trained lawyer, involves a concept of law as a charade and
mere formality: not as an enterprise of substantive justice’ (Kirby, 2004).

The right to access to a lawyer under Article14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR which
inter alia, guarantees the right of the accused “… to defend himself in
person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interest of justice so require, and
without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it” (Article 6(3) (c) of ECHR). Article14 (3) (d) of the
ICCPR provides three distinct due process guarantees; first, the right to
defend in person; secondly, the right to opportunity to choose freely one’s
counsel if one does not wish to defend oneself; and thirdly, to be given free
legal assistance when one has not got sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance and the interest of justice so require. The purpose of this
guarantee is to ensure that no proceedings will take place against the
accused, unless there is an adequate representation on the part of the
defense.
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 9

3. Right to Defend in Person or through Legal Counsel

As a guarantee of equality of arms the accused person must be given an

opportunity to be represented by himself or through a counsel o f his own
choosing. This right is based on the natural justice principle ‘audi alteram
partem’ which literally means ‘hear the other side’ and implies that no one
should be punished without being heard. The modern human rights
jurisprudence has also established the right of the accused to defend in
person or through legal assistance. The right to defend in person or legal
assistance ensures the guarantee of the right to an efficient defence and
protects the accused person’s physical and mental integrity. The right to
access to a lawyer under Article14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR which inter alia,
guarantees the right of the accused “… to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not
have legal assistance of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interest of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay
for it.”

Article14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR provides three distinct due process
guarantees; (i) the right to defend in person; (ii) the right to opportunity to
choose freely one’s counsel if one does not wish to defend oneself; and (iii)
to be given free legal assistance when one has not got sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance and the interest of justice so require. The purpose of
this guarantee is to ensure that no proceedings will take place against the
accused without an adequate representation from the part of the defence.
Apart from this, Principle 1 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 10

(hereinafter as Basic Principles) states that “all persons are entitled to call
upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and establish their
rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.” Principle 5
of the Basic Principles and Principle 17 of the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment
(hereinafter as Body of Principles) explicitly state that a person who is
arrested, detained or charged must be immediately informed of the right to
legal assistance.

The right to choose a lawyer by the accused is important for trust and
confidence between the accused and his lawyer. But this right is not
unrestricted, particularly if the State is paying the costs. However, in death
penalty cases, the HRC has viewed that the State should give preference to
appointing counsel chosen by the accused, including for the appeal (Pinto v.
Trinidad and Tobago, 1990). The European Commission also did not find
violation of the European Convention in cases where lawyers were excluded
for failure to comply with professional ethics and refusal to wear robes
(Ensslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 1978).

In its General Comment No. 13, the HRC emphasized that “the accused or
his lawyer must have the right to act diligently and fearlessly in pursuing all
available defences and the right to challenge the conduct of the case if they
believe it to be unfair” (HRC General Comment No. 13). Article14 (3) (d)
requires that when an accused does not wish to defend himself in person, he
should be able to have legal assistance through a lawyer. The object of this
guarantee is to ensure that no proceedings will take place against an accused
without an adequate representation of his case based on the principle of
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 11

equality of arms. The Human Rights Committee has expressed that Article
14(3) (d) has been found violated where the right of access to legal
assistance was not effectively available (Weismann Lanza and A. Lanza
Perdomo v. Uruguay, 1980). In terms of equality of arms, the right to
defend through a lawyer also serves ‘as a watchdog of procedural
regularity’, both in the public interest and for his client (Ensslin, Baader
and Raspe v. FRG, 1978).

The Committee has also found a violation of article 14(3) (d), where the
domestic law has not authorized the accused to defend himself in person,
which allows the accused to choose whether he or she wishes to defend him
or herself – be it through an interpreter – or to have the defence conducted
by a lawyer (M. and B. Hill v. Spain, 1997). Under this article ‘assistance’
by a legal counsel is guaranteed. So, to ensure effective assistance, mere
assigning of a counsel is not sufficient. Effective measures must be taken by
the counsel to provide effective representation in the interest of justice. In
this regard, the Committee further expressed its caution that it is essential
under Article 14(3) (d) that the domestic court “should ensure that the
conduct of a case by the lawyer is not incompatible with the interests of
justice”, and the Committee will itself examine whether there are any
indications to show that the lawyer “was not using his best judgment in the
interests of his client” (N. Lewis v. Jamaica, 1997).

As a basic requirement of fair trial guarantee, the right to legal assistance

also entails the right to confidentiality between a lawyer and his client.
Regarding this, the HRC also viewed that the confidentiality of
communication between the accused and his lawyer is condi tioned on the
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 12

established professional standards and this communication should be held

“without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue influence from any
quarter” (HRC General Comment 13). The right of the accused was found
violated by both the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights
when he was held in pre-trial detention preventing confidential
communication with his lawyer (S v. Switzerland, 1991). Principles 8 and 22
of the Basic Principles, Principle 18 of the Body of Principles and Rule 93
of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955, also
deal with confidentiality between the lawyers and clients.

4. Right to Receive Free Legal Assistance

The right to legal assistance will have no meaning if no steps are taken t o
provide effective legal representation to an accused person who is indigent,
underprivileged and has no means to pay. There is, of course, a difference
between the terms, “the right to legal assistance””the right to free legal
assistance”. In the latter case, legal assistance is assigned by State
authorities through the administrative process to an accused who cannot
afford legal representation by himself. Article 14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR
(Principle 6 of Basic Principles and Principle 17(2) of Body of Prin ciples)
provides a significant guarantee of right of the accused to legal aid. When
he does not defend in person and cannot engage one for himself, he ought to
be informed of his right to legal aid. The accused’s right to legal assistance
is violated when he does not know of his right and cannot exercise this right
(Supreme Court of Ireland, 1976).
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 13

Under ICCPR, assignment of free legal assistance to the accused is available

subject to two conditions: first is that the accused does not have sufficient
means to pay for legal assistance and the second is that the interests of
justice require it. It is the State’s obligation to provide an indigent accused
free legal aid who is unable to defend himself against the resourceful state’s
machinery for lack of legal knowledge and pecuniary resources. To
determine the ‘interests of justice’ require legal representation, the facts of
each case must be taken into consideration. The European Court considered
the following three criteria to determine interests of justice: f irstly, the
seriousness of the offence and the severity of the sentence risked; secondly,
the complexity of the case; and thirdly, the personal situation of the
applicant (Quaranta v. Switzerland, 1991).

The HRC held that it is axiomatic that legal assistance be available in

capital cases. This is so even if the unavailability of private counsel is to
some degree attributable to the (accused) himself, and even if the provision
of legal assistance would entail an adjournment of proceedings. This
requirement is not rendered unnecessary by efforts that might otherwise be
made by the trial judge to assist the (accused) in handling his defence in the
absence of counsel. In the view of the Committee, the absence of counsel
constituted (an) unfair trial.” (Robinson v. Jamaica, 1987).

Similarly the HRC has viewed that Art 14(3) (d) was violated when the
accused's counsel withdrew from the case for non-payment of fees and the
court decided to proceed in the absence of counsel. In Reid v. Jamaica
(1990), the Committee found a violation of the same Article, where the
counsel was appointed for the accused by the State despite the indication by
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 14

the accused to be presented by himself. However, it was subsequently

considered by the lawyer that there was no merit in the appe al and he
advanced no legal arguments in favour of it being granted. Bearing in mind
that the case involved the death penalty, the Committee considered that the
State Party should have appointed another lawyer or allowed him to
represent himself. The Committee in the case of T Jones v. Jamaica (1994)
stated that, where the penalty is death, it is the duty of counsel to inform the
accused of the prospects of the case. This would enable him to seek another
lawyer to represent him.

According to the Committee’s jurisprudence under article 14(3) (d):

“The court should ensure that the conduct of a case by a lawyer is not
incompatible with the interests of justice. While it is not for the Committee
to question counsel’s professional judgment, the Committee consider s that
in a capital case, when counsel for the accused concedes that there is no
merit in the appeal, the Court should ascertain whether counsel has
consulted with the accused and informed him accordingly. If not, the Court
must ensure that the accused is so informed and given an opportunity to
engage other counsel” (M. Morrison v. Jamaica, 1998).

Mere assigning a counsel for free legal assistance does not ensure effective
representation by the counsel. Free legal assistance must be adequate and
effective. To ensure effective representation, measures such as consulting
with and informing the accused must be made if the counsel intends to
withdraw an appeal or to argue that the appeal has no merit (Kelly v.
Jamaica, HRC 1991).
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 15

5. Right to Examine or have Examined Witnesses

As an essential fundamental element of the principle of equality of arms and

the right of the accused, fair trial guarantees confer on the accused the right
to call and examine witnesses for fairness of justice. Article 14(3) (e) of the
ICCPR enshrines the guarantee that “everyone shall be entitled to examine,
or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him” (Article 6 (3) (d) of the ECHR and Article 8 (2) (f)
of the ACHR).

Under this Article, the accused and the prosecution stand on equal footing in
calling and examining witnesses. The right given under Article 14(3) (b) of
the ICCPR to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence is linked to
Article 14(3) (e), where it is the duty of the prosecution to inform the
defence of the witnesses it intends to call so that the accused may have
sufficient time to prepare his defence. A violation was found by HRC in the
case of Peart and Peart v. Jamaica (1991), where a statement of witness for
the prosecution was not made available to the defense, obstructing in this
way its cross-examination of a witness.

The examining of witnesses by both the parties provides the court with an
opportunity to hear and challenge the evidence and to make a just decision.
By the phrase ‘to examine or have examined’, both adversarial and
inquisitorial systems of trial have been taken into account. According to the
text, the accused’s right to cross-examination of witnesses against him and
right to call and examine witnesses on his behalf is not absolute, but must be
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 16

consistent with the equality of arms principle. In this regard the HRC has
noted that it does not provide for “an unlimited right to obtai n the
attendance of witnesses requested by the accused or his counsel” (D.
Gordon v. Jamaica, 1992).

The purpose of providing information is to enable the accused to prepare a

defence and this information must be given in a language in which the
accused understands. The right implies that the domestic authorities must
provide adequate interpreters and translators in order to fulfill this
requirement, which is essential for the purpose of allowing a suspect to
defend him or herself adequately. With regard to this right, Principle 14 of
the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, provides more general interpretation
specifically stating that “a person who does not adequately understand or
speak the language used by the authorities responsible for his arrest,
detention or imprisonment is entitled to receive promptly in a language
which he understands the information referred to in principle 10, principle
11, paragraph 2, principle 12, paragraph 1, and principle 13 and to have the
assistance, free of charge, if necessary, of an interpreter in connection with
legal proceedings subsequent to his arrest.”

6. Right to have Adequate Time and Facilities

To ensure a fair trial of an accused in criminal proceedings, Article14 (3)

(b) of the ICCPR (Article 6(3) (b) of the ECHR and Article 8(2) (c) of the
ACHR) everyone charged with a criminal offence “must have adequate t ime
and facilities to prepare the defence”. This is the counterpoint to that in
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 17

Article14 (1) by which an accused must be tried within a reasonable time.

This Article also confers the right to communicate with counsel of his own
choosing that overlaps with Article14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR.

The right to have adequate time and facilities starts from the moment when
a person is subject to a criminal charge and is given access to a lawyer. The
HRC in its General Comment 13, explained that the time adequate to
prepare a defence depends on the nature of the proceedings and the factual
circumstances of each case but the right to adequate facilities to prepare a
defence must include access to documents and other evidence which the
accused requires to prepare his case, as well as the opportunity to engage
and communicate with counsel (HRC General Comment 13).

The obligation under Article14 (3) (b) to have adequate time and facilities is
related with the fundamental principle of “equality of arms” in which both
the parties to the criminal proceedings must be treated equally and they
must have the equal opportunity to prepare and present their case. The
worse the situation and complexity of the crime, the higher the duty to
ensure the accused is in a position to prepare his defence to face the
prosecution. The HRC has noted that where the defence considers that it has
not had sufficient time and facilities to prepare itself, it is important to
request an adjournment of the proceedings (M. Steadman v. Jamaica, 1997).
The Committee has also emphasized that “in cases in which a capital
sentence may be pronounced, it is axiomatic that sufficient time must be
granted to the accused and his or her counsel to prepare the defence for the
trial”, and that “this requirement applies to all the stages of the judicial
proceedings” (C. Wright v. Jamaica, 1992).
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 18

In the case of Marais, the Committee found violation of Article 14(3) (b),
where the accused was unable to communicate with his lawyer and to
prepare his defence, except for two days during the trial itself. Although the
lawyer had “obtained a permit from the Examining Magistrate to see his
client, he was repeatedly prevented from doing so”, his client being held
incommunicado (D. Marais, Jr. v. Madagascar, 1983).

The Committee has significantly specified with regard to access to

documents by the accused and/or his or her legal counsel under Article
14(3) (b) that it “does not explicitly provide for a right of a charged person
to be furnished with copies of all relevant documents in a criminal
investigation, but does provide that he shall ‘have adequate time and
facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing” (O. F. v. Norway, 1984).

IV. Conclusion

In the adversarial system of criminal procedure, strict compliance of the

principle of equality of arms is fundamental. In criminal pr oceeding, trials
can only be fair if there is equality of arms between the prosecution and the
defence. It is true that in a criminal trial, the defence faces major difficulties
in obtaining adequate time and facilities, proper legal assistance and
sufficient payment to provide quality and equal representation for their
clients against the human and economic resources of the State for the
prosecution. For a fair trial, an effective prosecution as well as effective
defence is an imperative requirement. So, in order to ensure a fair trial the
principle of equality of arms must be protected.
[2014] 1 LNS(A) lii Legal Network Series 19

______________________________________________________________

* (Corresponding Author) PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan

Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia. E-mail: shajeda9@yahoo.com and
also Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Chittagong, Chittagong -
4331, Bangladesh

** Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Bangi,

Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia. E-mail: rohaidanordin@yahoo.com

Acknowledgement

Authors would like to thank Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for providing the Zamalah
Research University Fellowship Grant.

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Body of Principles. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
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Colozza & Rubinat v. Italy, Series A, No. 89, (1985): Commission Report,(1983).

Communication No. 223/1987, Robinson v. Jamaica, HRC 1989 Report, Annex X. H.

Communication No. 16/1977, Mbenge v. Zaire, Views adopted on 25 March 1983, 2

SEL. Dec, 76, at 78.
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