G.R. No.

L-12191 , October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.

The plaintiff Jose Cangco a clerk in the defendant Manila Railroad Company filed for damages, founding his action
upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform.

When the plaintiff alighted from the defendant train, his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons, resulting
in an accident and the injuries he has suffered permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.

Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant company, for reason that the plaintiff himself had failed to use due
caution in alighting and was therefore precluded from recovering. Thus, the plaintiff appealed.

Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should
be apportioned.

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. Ordinary or reasonable care means the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury."

Issue:

1) Whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way, is that of ordinary or reasonable care.

Ruling:

YES. The train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted. Thousands of person alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions. Plaintiff would not have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place. The plaintiff had a right to assume,
in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear and as the railroad
station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident
occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

Furthermore, by the contract of carriage defendant has the duty to carry the plaintiff in safety and to provide safe
means of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

When the cause of action is based on a contractual undertaking and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify fault or negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. When it is based on a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails.

Wherefore, the decision of lower court is reversed

G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.

Respondent Corporation filed a complaint for damages against petitioner under Article 32 considering that the
issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending among others that, the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The same was dismissed on the ground
that, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner further contends that Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is
a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38 is a special law on the superior public officers’
liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, it is
dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.

The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

Ruling:

(1) the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

(2) Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of both superior
and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. The presence of bad faith,
malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages.

(3) Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages
against a public officer, and that is, a tort. It is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of
constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38
and 39 of the Administrative Code. Bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the
Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action, it is
enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

(4) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES, respondents.

G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver cargoes from Concepcion Industries. While the truck
was traversing, it collided with another truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.

An insurer of Concepcion Industries, FGU Insurance Corporation, paid for the value of the covered cargoes. Then it
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid from GPS. GPS did not heed the claim.

FGU as the subrogee filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver.

GPS, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court granted the motion to dismiss, explaining that plaintiff failed
to adduce evidence that the truck in question is a common carrier. Accordingly, the application of the law on
common carriers is not warranted. Thus, the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in
case of loss, damage or deterioration of goods during transport is not availing.

The laws governing is the laws on obligation and contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts. Under
the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not presumed. FGU has the burden of proving negligence
on the part of GPS, which it failed to do.

Issue

Whether GPS can be held liable for damages

Ruling

Yes. In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests, the mere proof of the existence of the contract
that is in this case, the delivery of the cargoes in its custody to the place of destination and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.

In regards to the driver, not being a party to the contract of GPS and Concepcion Industries, he may not be held
liable under the agreement.

Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for
damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant, unlike culpa contractual.

Wherefore the order is reversed

G.R. NO. 217311, July 15, 2020

ALESON SHIPPING LINES, PETITIONER, VS. CGU INTERNATIONAL INS. PLC. AND CANDADO SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

M/V Romeo, is owned by Candano Shipping Lines, it was on its way out of the pier in Apo Channel when it collided
with M/V Aleson , owned by Aleson Shipping. M/V Romeo sink and with it are the bags of cement from Apo Cement
Corporation as per the time charter agreement.

Apo Cement demanded payment from Candano Shipping and Aleson Shipping, but to no avail; hence, it made an
insurance claim with CGU Insurance, which was granted.

CGU Insurance then filed a case against Candano Shipping and Aleson Shipping for damages. The trial court ruled
that under Article 1733 of the New Civil Code, Aleson Shipping and Candano Shipping are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence as common carriers. If there was loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods it carries,
they are presumed responsible, unless they can prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. Aleson Shipping
failed to overcome this presumption.

In this Petition, petitioner Aleson Shipping argues that the lower courts erred in applying the law on common
carriers in determining its liability.

It explains that it cannot be sued based on contract of carriage, because it is not a party to the time charter
agreement between Candano Shipping and Apo Cement Corporation, as well as to the contract of insurance
between Apo Cement and CGU.

Issue:

(1) whether or not the lower courts erred in applying the civil law provisions on common carriers;

(2) whether or not the petitioner exercised the degree of diligence required.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. The applicable law in resolving complaints for damages would depend on the complainant's cause of action.
If the action is based on contract of carriage, the Civil Code provisions on common carrier are applicable. If the cause
of action is based on tort, the provisions of the Code of Commerce on vessel collision would govern.

The cause of action of respondent CGU Insurance against petitioner is not based on the time charter agreement but
on maritime tort or negligence. Petitioner is correct in alleging that it is not a common carrier with respect to any of
the parties.

Accordingly, the applicable provisions are found in Articles 826 and 827 of the Code of Commerce. To be cleared of
liability under these provisions, a vessel must show that it exercised ordinary diligence. This level of diligence is the
diligence which "an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property."

(2)No. The Court finds that M/V Aleson was recklessly operated. Captain Cabeltes admitted that M/V Romeo was still
in the pier when M/V Aleson was about to enter the Apo channel, the Apo channel cannot accommodate 2 vessels.
He himself declared that he was informed by the pier operator to standby and to not enter the wharf yet, but it still
proceeded.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

 G.R. No. 207004, June 06, 2018

ASTRID A. VAN DE BRUG, MARTIN G. AGUILAR AND GLENN G. AGUILAR, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, RESPONDENT.

The petitioners spouses Aguilar, used to be borrowing clients of respondent Philippine National Bank, their loans was
secured by real estate mortage which was foreclose due to failure to pay their obligation. With the enactment of RA
7202 , the Sugar Restitution Law the spouses ask for a reconsideration of their account.

[PNB] required them to comply with certain matters. The Aguilars failed to do so. Hence, [PNB] argued that whatever
rights [the Aguilars] have under RA 7202 were already forfeited when they failed to comply with the requirements.

The RTC found PNB guilty of malice and bad faith in not pursuing its duty in helping the Aguilars avail of the benefits
of RA 7202 and, pursuant to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, justified the award of damages.

What [PNB] has done in denying to the [Aguilars] the benefits of the Sugar Restitution Law is against the spirit that
created the said Law, i.e. to help the sugar producers, who suffered due to the acts of government agencies.

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, PNB appealed to the CA. The CA granted the appeal. The CA found that PNB
recomputed the accounts of the late spouses Aguilar bases on the provision of R.A 7202, which were audited and
certified by the COA, and the recomputation resulted in the absence of any excess payment pursuant to the same
law [the Aguilars] were not entitled to restitution.

Issue

Whether PNB is guilty of acting with malice and bad faith

Ruling

No.

Art. 19 of the civil code States that, Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith
has the duty to prove the same.

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.

In this case, the Aguilars failed to substantiate the said requisites to justify the award of damages in their favor
against PNB, who merely exercised its legal right as a creditor pursuant to RA 7202.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED

Good faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith Ordinary Diligence.
has the duty to prove the same This level of diligence is the diligence which "an
ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his
Exceptions: own property.
Common carriers
motor vehicle mishap - and if he is violating any traffic rules Ordinary or reasonable care
death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or The care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
substance under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
culpa aquillana
culpa contractual