Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

The Latin American World Model (a.k.a. the

Bariloche model): three decades ago
*
Gilberto C. Gallopin
Director, Systems for Sustainable Development Programme, Stockholm Environment Institute, Lilla
Nygatan 1 Box 2142, S-103 14 Stockholm, Sweden

This article is dedicated to Amı́lcar O. Herrera, the “father” of the LAWM, a friend and an inspiration,
and also one of the few truly planetary minds I ever have been privileged to meet.
“The optimist proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this
is true.” James Branch Cabell (1879–1958)

Abstract

Almost twenty five years ago, “Catastrophe and New Society. A Latin American World
Model” was published [Herrera AO et al. Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American
World Model. Canada: DRC, 1976]. It described the work of a group of Latin American
researchers, led by the late Amilcar O. Herrera, and it represented both a response to the
diagnostic and proposal embodied in World 3, the first world model sponsored by the Club
of Rome [Meadows D, et al. The Limits to Growth. New York: Universe Books, 1972], and a
new proposal for the global system. It remains to date the only global model made in the South.
The present paper is a personal reflection by one of the authors of the Latin American
World Model (LAWM) on what the model meant (and what it may still mean) in the context
of the limits debate and the more general issue of the future(s) of the world system.  2000
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. The global debate

It is probably useful to recall the circumstances in which that global debate took
place. The concept of development was a relatively new one; at the international

* Current address: Division of Environment and Human Settlements, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Casila 179D, Santiago, Chile. Tel.: +56-2-2102329; fax: +56-
2-2080484.
E-mail address: ggallopin@eclac.cl (G.C. Gallopin).

0016-3287/01/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 0 1 6 - 3 2 8 7 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 5 - 0
78 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

level, the 70’s were defined as the second development decade. A few years had
elapsed after the publication of the influential book “Silent Spring” which very effec-
tively brought to public attention the emergence of environmental problems [1]. The
1960s and the 1970s witnessed the debate on the newly discovered environmental
problematique and the need for a new international world order [2].
It was a rich period which saw bold, creative, challenging and encompassing stud-
ies on the future of the planet. Despite their differences, those studies had in common
long-term and global perspectives. Moreover, they were based on the hopes and
expectation that the models and other studies could make a contribution to the sol-
ution of humankind’s problems. These studies addressed the two most burning global
problems of the 70s—first, the perceived need for a new international economic
order—to change the North-South relation by decreasing the gap between the rich
and the poor nations, and second, what had become known as “the global prob-
lematique”, by which was meant the combined problem of non-renewable resource
depletion, environmental deterioration, overpopulation and pollution threatening the
survival of humanity [3].
In this context, the construction and launching into public debate of the World 3
model described in “The Limits to Growth” was a brave and pioneering initiative.
Perhaps the single most important and positive impact of the model was its use of
a systemic approach to the global problematique, including an effort to explicitly
tackle interlinkages and nonlinearities. The fact that the model was rather crude and
based on arguable empirical basis and interpretation, and the fact that it had, to
some degree, a self-fulfilling-prophecy-structure based on exponential growth of key
variables does not detract from its importance in this regard.
But World 3, as any global model, embodied a certain worldview. By worldview
I mean, in this context, the set of beliefs and theoretical assumptions determining
the perception of reality, the explanations provided, and the kind of actions proposed;
some worldviews mentioned in the literature include e.g., conservative, reformist,
and radical [4]; fatalist, hierarchist, individualist [5]; technological optimist, techno-
logical skeptic, Northern, Southern. A worldview embodies not only value judge-
ments about the desirability of alternative images of the future (goals and wishes),
but also causal inferences about how the different futures come to be, and manage-
ment styles or preferred strategies (controlling, laissez-faire, etc).
It is important, in global modeling, to make the worldview as explicit as possible
(and in some cases also to use alternative worldviews), because the role of the world-
views and ideologies becomes critical given: a) the very incomplete knowledge about
functional relations and future surprises; b) the lack of generally agreed theoretical
frameworks to explain the functioning of the world system; and c) the fact that
different social actors have different goals for the global system.
The worldview unavoidably is reflected in the explanatory assumptions made, the
selection of the critical variables to be included in the model, the perceived solutions,
and the offered recommendations.
Since the model was explicitly declared to be of use for decision-making, it rep-
resented a political, as well as a scientific, statement. The same was true of the
LAWM; the latter, however, was explicitly and deliberately so, while WORLD 3
 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88 79

was often presented as an objective, value-free, based on “our best current knowl-
edge” model. This was a central issue that characterized the LAWM in its role as
a response to World 3 and to the neomalthusian position prevailing in some quarters
at that time.

2. The Latin American world model as a response

The LAWM was a response from the South (I would like, but it would be perhaps
presumptuous, to call it “by the South”) to the widespread position—mostly sup-
ported by the North—that attributed underdevelopment, international problems, and
poverty to overpopulation in the developing countries. Our critique of World 3 as
the first of the global models should be seen in this context. Our critique had a
technical, a philosophical, and an ethical dimension.
Given that the World 3 model was presented as a scientific demonstration that
the basic limits to growth in the foreseeable future (first decades of the 21st Century)
were physical (and therefore, assumedly rather inflexible) in character, and that the
only way out of a catastrophic future was through the reduction of population growth
and the stabilization of industrial outputs per capita,1 the LAWM team performed a
critical analysis of the assumptions and structure of World 3.
The technical criticisms made by the LAWM team referred mainly to the assump-
tions regarding signals of natural resource scarcity, absence of constructive regener-
ation processes (e.g. soil and ecosystem restoration), the strong exponential behavior
of the critical variables (leading inexorably to overshoot), and the sensitivity of
World 3 to small joint parameter variations that could drastically alter the projected
trajectories even within the standard or business-as-usual run.
It is important to clarify that we never rejected the existence of physical limits.
This differentiated our position from that of other critics of World 3, some of which
were based on unfettered technological optimism and the concept of infinite substitut-
ability between production factors. Our argument was that, in the time horizon envis-
aged and at the global or regional scales, the operational limits to humankind were
sociopolitical and not physical. Our own model included a slowdown of economic
growth once the basic seeds were satisfied, and incorporated environmental conser-
vation and protection as additional costs of production, leading to a society intrinsi-
cally compatible with its environment and natural resources. We did not posit indefi-
nite material economic growth.

1
The political problem for the South with this diagnosis and recommendations was clearly that it
could easily be used to justify proposals to stop population growth in the South (and some even advocated
the use of force if necessary) and to maintain the existing income disparities between the South and the
North by reducing industrial growth everywhere. It is not my intention to reopen the debate of those
times, or to attribute this intentionality to the authors of World 3. I have known Dana and Denis Meadows
for decades and I know them to be deeply concerned, honest, and committed to the betterment of human-
kind—but it is clear that some powerful interests were using the recommendations of the model to support
the position described above.
80 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

Other differences in interpretation that could be grouped with the technical issues
were the implied or explicit causal relationships considered. A clear example is the
relation between inequity and demography; while Limits to Growth explicitly stated
that demographic pressures leads to inequality in the distribution of resources for
people [6], the LAWM adopted the opposite explanation, namely, that poverty and
inequity are the major drivers of population growth.
We also decided we needed to disaggregate the South and the North, and we
subdivided the world in four regions, three of them in the South.
The philosophical/epistemological criticism was mainly focused on the claims of
objectivity of the World 3. This was reflected in the explicit statement that the
LAWM was a “normative model”:

“Any long-term forecast of the state of humanity is founded on a perception

of the world that incorporates a system of values and a concrete ideology. An
attempt to describe the current world structure and project into the future does
not (as it is sometimes maintained) constitute an “objective” vision of reality, but
necessarily implies the acceptance of an ideological position. For this reason, it
is not justifiable to differentiate between extrapolative and normative models.

The model presented here is quite explicitly normative. It is not an attempt to

discover what will happen if present trends continue but tries to indicate a way
of reaching a final goal, the goal of a world liberated from underdevelopment and
misery. It does not pretend to be “objective” in the sense of being value-free as
generally understood. It portrays a conception of the world shared by its authors
and to which they are deeply committed. On the other hand, it is objective in that
it starts from a distilled but realistic view of the problems facing the world and
seeks solutions based on the capacity for change and creativity that human
societies have demonstrated so often in the past.” [7]

It seems clear to me now that we were using the term “normative” in two different
senses. The first referred to the assumptions and worldview explicit (e.g. LAWM)
or implicit (all other models) in the modeling exercises. The second sense was related
to what is sometimes called “backcasting” i.e., defining a desired future state of the
world and then searching for feasible trajectories to reach it. This approach is often
contrasted to the so called “extrapolative” or “projective” approaches (describing the
trajectory or trajectories the system will follow “left to itself”.2 In this sense, the
LAWM was the only normative model (although it was also run in a projective mode
for the period 1960 to 1980—the year when the normative mode started through the
operation of an optimization process).

2
Of course, the reality of the global system “left to itself” is open to question, particularly when many
of the critical social variables and mechanisms are excluded from the equations due to lack of knowledge
of the causal relations.
 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88 81

Finally, the ethical criticism focused on the argument that, while the other global
models were concerned with a crisis looming in the future, already the majority of
humankind was living in a state of poverty and misery. For those people, the crisis
was already here; to ignore that fact amounts to accepting the central values of
society as it is now, and relegate the need for changes to the avoidance of a future
catastrophe that would bring the crisis to the North. In this context, policies oriented
towards getting a state of global equilibrium as precognized in Limits to Growth
would tend to ensure that the present injustices in the global systems are maintained.
Originally, the value of building an alternative simulation model was not obvious.
However, it soon become clear to us that either a response or an alternative view,
if expressed only in narrative terms (even including quantitative analysis) would
be much weaker than the original message. This was due to the magical (in the
anthropological sense) component of computer simulation models: the apparent rigor
and infallibility of computer models gave them a prestige and credibility with the
public and decision-makers (at least at the time) well beyond other forms of inter-
preting and presenting information. This was, together with the available competence
provided by the existence of significant computer facilities in the Fundación Barilo-
che of Argentina, an additional element to use a simulation model as well as narrative
arguments for our enterprise.
The LAWM was also a concrete demonstration that the South could stand up on
equal terms with the most advanced institutions of the North in the discussion of
the global problematique.

3. The Latin American world model as a proposal

The other, more important, dimension of the LAWM was its meaning as a proposal
for a new world.
On the basis of our analysis, we did not accept the position (particularly prevalent
in the North) that uncritically accepts the central values of current society, and (in
some cases because of this) holds that the most fundamental problems currently
facing humanity are those of physical limits. Our stance was radically different: we
argued that the major problems facing (the global) society are not physical but soci-
opolitical.

“These problems are based on the uneven distribution of power, both between
nations and within nations. The result is oppression and alienation, largely founded
on exploitation. The deterioration of the physical environment is not an inevitable
consequence of human progress, but the result of social organizations based larg-
ely on destructive values.” [8]

Our proposal could not be fully contained in the mathematical model because
some of its critical features could not be formalized in a sensible way. We dis-
tinguished therefore between the proposed society (a desirable future society defined
by a series of basic attributes) and the mathematical simulation model, which essen-
82 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

tially was used as an instrument to explore the material viability of that society (and
of the trajectory leading to it), a type of material /economic feasibility analysis.
Our conceptual model of the “ideal” society was based on the premise that it is
only through radical changes in the world’s social and international organization that
man can finally be freed from underdevelopment and oppression. The basic elements
of any desirable society were, in our view, the following:

1. equity at all scales. A basic principle was the recognition that each human being,
simply because of his/her existence, has inalienable rights regarding the satisfac-
tion of basic needs—nutrition, housing, health, education—that are essential for
complete and active incorporation into his/her culture.3
2. non-consumerism, in the sense that consumption is not an end in itself; production
is determined by the social needs rather than profit, and the structure and growth
of the economy are steered in such a way as to attain a society that is intrinsically
compatible with the environment.
3. recognizing that social needs, above and beyond these defined as basic, might be
defined in different ways at different times by different cultures, and by different
forms of societal organization, we allocated highest priority to participation of
the members of society in the decisions, both as an end in itself and as the princi-
pal mechanism for establishing the legitimacy of needs in the new society.

The concept of private property of the means of production was replaced by the
more universal concepts of the use and management of the means of production.
How to manage them would be decided and organized through the same discussion
processes that would regulate all the other social activities. Within this conceptual
framework, many different forms of management and administration of property will
be found—depending on traditions, cultural features, and social organization. In this
sense, the proposal was socialist rather than capitalist, although the central emphasis
on democratic participation in the ideal society sharply distinguished our proposal
from the then existing socialist states. The same proposal, should it be made in the
current historical period, would undoubtedly be qualified as post-capitalist, and
would emphasize self-organization and decentralization as basic elements.
Those traits could only partially be reflected in the mathematical model. Equality
was introduced in the optimization process (although alternative runs of the model
were also made to test the impact of maintaining the current, unequal income distri-
bution on the feasibility of attaining the objectives in each of the four regions). The
policy was explicitly defined by the yearly allocation of capital and labor by the
nonlinear optimization process, and varied according to the values of the relevant
variables; the objective was to maximize the life expectancy at birth (an indicator
of the satisfaction of basic needs) subject to a set of (time-varying) constrains. This

3
Those needs were chosen as basic because unless each one of them is satisfied, it is impossible to
participate actively and with dignity in the human world. These needs are invariable in that they are
common to all members of the species, regardless of culture, origin, race, sex, etc.
 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88 83

use of life expectancy at birth (rather than GNP) remains a distinguishing character-
istics of the LAWM.
In retrospect, and considering the decades that followed, if can be said that our
model, and proposal, were the most idealistic of the efforts of the first wave of global
modeling. The call for global solidarity, for an equalitarian and participative society
(a call in which we were only one among many voices), remains unanswered.
Our model, however, had an impact on the global debate, and it merited the active
interest of the United Nations, particularly by the International Labor Organization
and UNESCO, and it was also used in some developing countries (e.g. Egypt and
Brazil). In many senses, there are fewer signs of hope for a better international and
social order now than in the 70’s, despite the end of the cold war, the impressive
technological and economic progress, and an unprecedented global GNP of more
than 30 trillion dollars.

4. Wavering moods

A number of authors have noticed that after a “golden decade” of long-term global
studies in the 70s, there was a clear retrenchment during the 80s even including the
dissolution of many research groups that had produced such studies. This is attributed
by some to a general disappointment about planning in general, and the poor predic-
tive performance shown by those studies. [9] Steenbergen (1994), while considering
that possibility, suggests also the alternative explanation of a change in the overall
“mood of the time” associated to the 80s as the decade of the “conservative revol-
ution”. The later explanation is also proposed by Burrows et al. [10].
In the 1990s there seems to be a renewed interest in long-term global studies.
Steenbergen (1994) wrote an interesting analysis of the major similarities and differ-
ences between the studies belonging the two waves.4 I attempted to summarize his
analysis in Table 1; significant shifting in terms of world views, values, ideologies,
burning issues and, last but not least, the issue of global equity are indicated. It is
interesting that despite the enormous advances in information technologies, modeling
methodology does not appear as a determinant difference.
From the viewpoint of the South, and indeed of solidarity in general, the new
wave represents a clear step back. As put by Steenbergen:

This lack of interest in the less developed world by the West has to do with a
general change in the Western cultural climate, which can be described as a
decreasing interest in and solidarity with the less well off, both “internally” (the
declining support for the welfare state) and externally (the poor nations). The
West seems to be primarily interested in the successful ones, in those who “made

4
Steenbergen defines global models as including not only mathematical simulation models, but also
qualitative global-oriented, long-term future studies.
Table 1 84
Comparison between the two waves of global studies of the future (based on Steenbergen 1994) [29]

Decade 1970’s 1980’s

Major purpose “Reshaping” the future ‘Scanning’ the future

Time horizon Longer-term (50–100 years)
Scientific mode More explicitly normative, less explicit use of
economic theories, included policy recommendations
Prevailing mood Most (except Kahn) are “conditional pessimist” (the
future is gloomy under business-as-usual, but we can
change that)
deep concern for future of humankind
Technological optimism Low
North-South dimension Most emphasized the necessity for a new relationship North-South relation no longer a burning issue
between the North and the South.
Despite different approaches and recommendations,
the relationship between the First and the Third
Worlds was considered a crucial and burning issue,
and an axial principle in most studies and models
Shorter-term (less than 20 years)
More “scientific” (make explicit use of economic theories), and adopt
a “decisionist model” (alternatives are presented for choice)
Most are optimistic about the future; they do not reflect any need for a
more fundamental change of the global system. Therefore they are not
very innovative; they project in many ways a “surprise-free” future,
and such a future is not seen as deeply worrying
High; great confidence in our capacity to solve in the future the
problems we are causing today
Much more focused on the “internal” relationship between the three
regions of the North (North America, Western Europe and Japan)
Most based on Northern-centrism; South almost absent -a negligible
factor; the underdeveloped nations and regions are neglected in three
G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

ways: as (potential) economic powers; as objects of care and attention

of the developed world; and as objects of exploitation by the North (as
emphasized in dependencia theories)
Ecological problematique. In many, economic growth seen as incompatible with All emphasize sustainable growth.
ecology in the long term, as the “villain”
The global problematique (the combined problems of Many put high economic growth as the “hero”, the savior of “virgin”
non-renewable resource depletion, environmental nature; economic growth is needed not only to fulfil our needs for
deterioration, overpopulation and pollution) was a prosperity but also to improve the environmental condition of the
burning issue planet
The important and often beneficial role of industry is emphasized

(continued on next page)

Table 1 (continued)

Decade 1970’s 1980’s

Socio-political and Some considered a possiblity of fundamental change Most are solidly based on the primacy of economics and, within the
cultural dimensions in the realms of politics, economics and culture realm of economics, on very traditional economic theories (Friedman,
von Hajek, Shumpeter, Keynes, etc.) whereas new economic theories
like those which emphasize the need for a renewed relationship with
the natural environment are not taken into account; they lack
“sociological imagination”
Dominant ideology The first system (governments and intergovernmental The second system (the business world and specifically the
organizations) seen as the main “shaping actor” for transnational corporations) is the main actor. The choice is between
global reform. the three economic giants. Shaping actors assumed unchanged.
Some considered significant changes of shaping The worries of the second system have become dominant in these
actors, and the emergence of new actors studies; especially the question of the economic competition between
the USA, Japan, and Western Europe, seems to have become the most
burning issue of our time
Paradigm shift Some posited a paradigm shift from a materialistic to Bounded to the dominant paradigm: capitalistic, materialistic and
post-materialistic world “economistic” (i.e. with primacy of economics over all other spheres
of life); lack of even a hint towards a possible paradigm shift in the
G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

future
Only more or less new global burning issue is problem of migration
85
86 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

it” (nations, people, etc.) and is no longer concerned about what Attali has called
“the losers of the next millennium”. [11]

5. Looking into the Future (Again)

The present situation regarding the outlook for the future is, as it was in the 70’s,
somewhat surrealistic if not schizophrenic. The same path that has been officially
designated as unsustainable in 1992 by some 100 heads of state in the Earth Summit
of Rio de Janeiro is heralded as a triumphal ascent by the World Bank and other
international financial organizations.
On the one hand, there seems to be a general “official” belief on a single global
future, involving only marginal variations around a central theme, and most of the
discussions about the long-term future focus on the issues of economic competi-
tiveness and financial gains. Human needs and human development seem to have
become a non-issue.
On the other hand, a number of indicators of the possibility of ruptures in the
historical trajectory are also being more and more documented, as shown, for
instance, by analysis on the negative environmental trends made by the United
Nations Environmental Program [12] and the reports on increasing inequality
between and within nations made by the United Nations Development Program. [13]
A significant advance regarding our understanding of the human predicament, and
our capacity to predict the future, is the emergence of the studies on complexity
and complex systems, self-organization and chaos, suggesting that uncertainty and
unpredictability may be built-in in the fabric of reality. It is a sobering thought that
what are now considered the two most visible truly global environmental problems,
namely global climate change and the depletions of the ozone layer, were not antici-
pated by the global models. Global climate change in particular results from highly
complex interactions between space and time scales, and between human actions
and natural processes.
But complexity is not increasing just in terms of our understanding; there are good
reasons to believe that complexity is also increasing in reality. This complexification
of the real world arises from many sources, all pointing that the global system is
immersed in a period of turbulence and deep, structural changes that may lead to
alternative, qualitatively different, futures. This is associated, for instance, to the
emergence and unfolding of major processes such as the techno-economic revolution,
the political breakdown of the bipolar world, the unprecedented level and type of
environmental change, and the fast economic globalization. Those changes are cre-
ating new opportunities but also new challenges and threats, changing not only the
structure of production but also the very nature of work, as well as the type and
importance of comparative advantages, including a number of ecologically-based
advantages. [14]
The information revolution is powered by breathtaking technological advances,
accelerating world trade and the spread of free-market policies, yet that same revol-
 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88 87

ution is creating a new division of labor with far-reaching consequences for the
fortunes of nations and individuals. The International Commission on Global
Governance warns that globalization is in danger of widening the gap between the
rich and the poor. [15] Other analyses show that this is not just a danger; the gap
has already being increasing, both between and within countries. [16] Under these
conditions the only certainty may be that things will change very much, and that
the future world trajectory will NOT be a projection from past trends. The increase
in complexity and connectedness (specially non-evolved and non-planned
connectedness) might lead, as a number of results from different areas suggest, to
decreased stability and increased vulnerability, and to a sharp increase in the costs
or error.
In this context, trying to identify the possible “breaking points” and qualitatively
different future trajectories may be more useful then attempting to refine our descrip-
tion of “the” trajectory. This is what motivated a group of people to apply the scen-
ario approach to explore the possibilities of the future. Recognizing the inevitability
of imposing a world view on the analysis, we deliberately tried to mitigate the prob-
lem by having as many world views as possible represented in the group. The group
(called the Global Scenario Group) has members from the North and South, East
and West.5
Our analysis [17] has convinced us that:

1. Alternative, qualitative different scenarios are possible for the global system in
the next 30–50 years.
2. Some scenarios imply a gradual unfolding from the present situation, without
ruptures or discontinuities. Those we group under Conventional Worlds, dis-
tinguishing the Reference scenario (i.e. business-as-usual) and the Policy Reform
scenario (a scenario in which strong polices for sustainability are implemented,
but continuity in institutions and values is assumed, as well as rapid economic
growth and global convergence to the Northern standards).
3. However, other scenarios, equally or even more likely, are possible, such as the
Barbarization scenarios (either a generalized Breakdown of civilization or a For-
tress World within a polarized planet composed of elite countries and groups, and
an excluded, impoverished majority). Those imply a rupture with the historical
trends and a breakdown of institutions and the economy. Positive scenarios include
the New Sustainability Paradigm (a sustainable, human and equitable global
civilization) and Eco-communalism (a small-is-beautiful scenario, essentially
localist). Both require fundamental changes in societal values and new socio-
economic arrangements.
4. At present, most policy discussions focus on some form of Conventional Worlds
scenario; Conventional Worlds, however, are in no way guaranteed; the Reference
scenario is clearly unsustainable, and even the strong policies assumed in the

5
The term “scenario” is used here in its original meaning, namely a sequence of events representing
a trajectory of the system towards a future state or image.
88 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88

Policy Reform scenario may not be enough to cope with the immense challenges,
unless changes in lifestyles and value also take place.

It is interesting to note that our analysis did not detect separable limits, either
physical or social, as significant elements in the dynamics. In our view the major
clusters of driving forces6 which propel the unfolding of the scenarios interact
dynamically (with varying preponderance) resulting in a total socio-ecological
dynamics where no single factor can be labeled as an absolute limit.
The concept of limits should be re-examined in the light of the new understanding
of the behavior of complex systems, [18], and of the behavior of large managed
natural systems (Gunderson et al. 1995)7 [19].
Looking back to the LAWM in the light of the elapsed, momentous decades and
with the benefit of current knowledge, I believe that the central message of the model
is still valid: there is a feasible path to a sustainable and desirable future, but it
almost certainly requires fundamental institutional changes and a transformation of
the value system now prevailing. Business-as-usual strategies will lead to unnecess-
ary and widespread human sufferance and environmental unsustainability. The cur-
rent trends are not encouraging (it could even be argued—at least in terms of
inequity—that the world has moved some steps towards the Fortress World scenario
since the 70’s).
The recent analysis by the Global Scenario Group also highlights one of the
important messages of the LAWM: there are no separate solutions, one for the North
and one for the South; either a Global solution is found, or there will be no solution
at all.

References

[1] Carson R. Silent Spring. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

[2] Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. 1975. What Now. Another Development. The 1975 Dag Ham-
marskjöld Report on Development and International Cooperation Development Dialogue:1/2.; Ner-
fin, Marc (ed). 1977. Another development: Approaches and Strategies. The Dag Hammarskjöld
Foundation. Uppsala.; United Nations. 1972. Development and Environment (Founex, Switzerland,
June 4–12 1971). Mouton: Paris.
[3] van Steenbergen B. Global modeling in the 1990s. Futures 1994;26(1):44–56.
[4] Miles I. Scenario analysis: identifying ideologies and issues, pp. 31–54 In: UNESCO. 1981. Methods
for Development Planning, Paris: UNESCO Press.
[5] Thompson M, Ellis R, Wildavsky A. Cultural Theory. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
[6] Meadows D, Richardson J, Bruckmann G. Groping in the Dark. The first decade of global modeling.
Chichester: Wiley, 1982.

6
The driving forces include a geopolitical/economic cluster, an equity cluster, a demographic cluster,
an environmental cluster, and a technological cluster. An additional institutional cluster is significant in
the New Sustainability Paradigm scenario.
7
I believe that the concept of limits (either physical or social) for the global system needs to be
replaced or at least complemented by those of dynamic constraints, synergic reinforcements, and co-
evolutionary (socket-nature) dynamics. But this belongs to another discussion.
 G.C. Gallopin / Futures 33 (2001) 77–88 89

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