Pilrev Case Final

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY)
January 22, 2020
G.R. No. 201117
ROMEO A. BELTRAN AND DANILO G. SARMIENTO, PETITIONERS, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ASST.
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III JENNIFER AGUSTIN-SE, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, AND
COMMISSION ON AUDIT REPRESENTED BY DANILO SISON, ROMEO DE
GUZMAN, AND LUIS DIMOLOY (COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 02 TUGUEGARAO
CITY, CAGAYAN), RESPONDENTS.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari challenging the Decision of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon (Office of the Deputy Ombudsman) and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor's Order that allegedly upholds it. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found
Romeo A. Beltran (Beltran) guilty of serious dishonesty and ordered his dismissal from
government service, and recommended that criminal charges be filed against him and Danilo G.
Sarmiento (Sarmiento).
The Commission on Audit alleged that Mayor Castillo had entered into a P10,000,000.00-worth
Contract Agreement with KAICO for the construction of the Bato-Abuyo Farm-to-Market Road
in Alfonso Castañeda.
Auditors from the Commission on Audit later observed that only 3.78% of the project was
accomplished despite the entire P10,000,000.00 being disbursed and paid to KAICO. A
breakdown of the project's deficiencies was revealed in an Inspection Report prepared by the
Commission on Audit.
Sison and the other auditors executed a Joint Affidavit, confirming that the project was certified
by Beltran as 100% and was fully paid when only 3.78% was accomplished. They recommended
that the appropriate cases be filed against Mayor Castillo, Beltran, and KAICO's officers. Sison
later submitted a Position Paper, reiterating the need to file criminal and administrative charges
against them.
For his part, Beltran insisted that he was not a disbursing officer and that he had never handled
the project's funds. He added that he signed the Project Acceptance, which certifies that the
project is 100% complete, based on what he saw and reported. He invoked the presumption of
regularity in the discharge of official duties.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman rendered the assailed Decision, ruling that Beltran should
be held administratively liable for certifying that the project was 100% complete when only
3.78% was accomplished at the time he signed the Project Acceptance.
1 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION
LAWS AND LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICER)
As to the Findings and Observations of the Fact-Finding Team, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman found that it did not indicate the percentage of the actual accomplished work as
compared to the Inspection Report.
Hence, for Beltran failure to refute the claim that his certification in the Project Acceptance was
false, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman held that he committed fraud or falsification that
caused undue injury or serious damage to Alfonso Castañeda.
Accordingly, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Beltran guilty of serious dishonesty
and dismissed him from government service. It also recommended that criminal charges for
violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and falsification of public document under
Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code be filed against Beltran and Sarmiento. However, the
administrative charges against Sarmiento and Mayor Castillo were dismissed.
Beltran moved for reconsideration. Upon the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman's Decision, two
Informations for the recommended violations were filed before the Sandiganbayan However, the
petitioners manifested that a Motion for Reconsideration was pending before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman and prayed that the arraignment be postponed. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
reset the arraignment and instructed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to comment on Beltran's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued the assailed Order declaring that the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman did not err when it gave credence to the Commission on Audit's Inspection
Report over the Findings and Observations of the Fact-Finding Team and the barangay captains'
Certifications.
However, this Order did not contain a dispositive portion. Thinking that this Order was a denial
of Beltran's Motion for Reconsideration, Beltran and Sarmiento filed before the Office of the
Special Prosecutor a Manifestation and Motion praying that the Informations filed in the
Sandiganbayan be withdrawn. In view of this. the Sandiganbayan again deferred the
arraignment.
Later realizing that the Order did not contain a dispositive portion but a prayer, Beltran and
Sarmiento filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment.They argued that the Motion for Reconsideration
remained pending as the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Order was, in essence, a comment on
the Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Comment/Opposition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor argued that its assailed Order
was actually a denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and not a mere comment.
Thus, petitioners Beltran and Sarmiento filed this Petition for Certiorari; praying, among others,
that the Decision of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Order of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor be nullified.

With this case still pending, the Office of the Special Prosecutor rendered an Order expressly
denying petitioner Beltran's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The Order was
approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales (Ombudsman Carpio Morales)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in their rulings.
RULING:
No. The concept of a complaint-handling agency in the Philippines originated from several past
offices with similar-but not identical-functions, created by previous administrations in their
attempt to rid the government of graft and corrupt practices.
With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created. Its
powers, functions, and duties are now constitutionally provided under Article XI, Sections 12
and 13. The Constitution does not expressly provide the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
prosecute cases in courts. Instead, it converted the Tanodbayan, which had prosecutorial powers,
to the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
A couple of years later, Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was passed,
providing the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. Through it,
the office's powers were expanded to include not only the power to investigate, but also to
prosecute cases against government officers and employees.
At the same time, the Office of the Special Prosecutor retained its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases. Nonetheless, Republic Act No. 6770 effectively
placed the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the auspices of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The relationship between these offices has been defined more under Section 11(3) and (4) of the
Ombudsman Act.
Thus, in its current form, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is a component of the office of the
Ombudsman, with both concurrently exercising prosecutorial powers. However, in exercising its
functions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be under the supervision and control of the
Office of the Ombudsman and can only act upon its authority.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is but a mere component of the Office of the Ombudsman.
It does not possess an independent power to act on behalf of the Ombudsman. Only upon the
Ombudsman's authority can it decide on matters with finality. Therefore, except upon the
Ombudsman's orders, the Office of the Special Prosecutor has no power to direct the filing of an
information in court.
Such is the case here. Petitioners are correct to point out that the assailed Order could not have
been the denial of petitioner Beltran's Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent Office of the
Special Prosecutor had no power to do so; the Order was merely noted by Director Rodrigo V.
Coquia of the Prosecution Bureau II. Its findings, therefore, bear no imprimatur from the
Ombudsman.
Without the Office of the Ombudsman's approval, the Office of the Special Prosecutor's Order
cannot be considered a final denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
However, in Dumangcas, Jr. v. Marcelo, this Court held that even a one-line marginal note by
the Ombudsman is sufficient to approve or disapprove the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
recommendations. What is important is the Ombudsman's action on the investigating officer's
recommendations. Here, Ombudsman Carpio Morales' approval of the Order is shown through
her signature appearing on the last page of the Order. This is a discretionary act on her part, to
which this Court accords respect.
Further, with regards to the fact findings on petitioners, "Mere 'disagreement with the
Ombudsman's findings is not enough to constitute grave abuse or discretion.'" The Office of the
Ombudsman has both the constitutional and statutory mandate to act on criminal complaints
against erring public officials and employees. As an independent constitutional body, the Office
of the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude to conduct investigations and to prosecute cases to
fulfill its role "as the champion of the people" and "preserver of the integrity of the public
service."
Under the principle of non-interference, this Court is called to exercise restraint in reviewing the
Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts. it
generally defers to the sound judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman, which is in the better
position to assess the facts and circumstances necessary to find probable cause. Moreover, the
finding of probable cause for holding an accused for trial and for filing the necessary information
before the courts is an executive function. This Court will not interfere with this function, unless
there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
To constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Office of the Ombudsman must be shown to have
conducted the preliminary investigation in a manner that amounts to a "virtual refusal to perform
a duty under the law."
Here, when respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued the assailed January 21, 2010
Decision, it relied on the Inspection Report by the Commission on Audit as weighed against the
different documentary evidence submitted by petitioners. It considered the barangay captains'
Certifications and the Fact-Finding Team's findings and Observations, all submitted by
petitioners. In fact, it even concluded that these documents were insufficient to dispute the
Commission on Audit's findings
Hence, respondent Beltran failed to rebut that his certification that the construction is 100%
complete is false. Such fraud or falsification employed by said respondent caused undue injury
or serious damage to the Municipality of Alfonso Castañeda.

This Court does not find grave abuse of discretion in the determination of probable cause against
petitioners. It is within the Office of the Ombudsman's mandate and discretion to weigh the
different pieces of evidence presented before it during preliminary investigation. That is
precisely what happened here: respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman considered all the
relevant pieces of information before arriving at the conclusion that probable cause against
petitioners exists. Petitioners failed to show any grave abuse of discretion on its part. This Court
must, therefore, respect its findings.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)
January 22, 2020
G.R. No. 210013
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, PETITIONER, v. MARIA BELEN ANGELITA V.
MATIBAG, RESPONDENT.
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS:
Records show that Matibag used to be the Chief of Policy Studies, Research and Statistics
Division, DDB until she was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as Deputy
Executive Director for Operations (DEDO) with a rank of Assistant Secretary and stayed as
such until Office of the President Memorandum Circular (OPMC) No. 1 was issued.
Covered by the foregoing memorandum are those Non-Career Executive Service Officers (Non-
CESOs) occupying a Career Executive Service (CES) position in all government agencies who
remain in office and continue to perform their duties and responsibilities until July 31, 2010 or
until resignations have been accepted.
The Office of the President issued the Guidelines Implementing Memorandum Circular No.
1, which states that "all non-CESOs occupying CES positions in all agencies of the Executive
Branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties and discharge their
responsibilities until July 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been accepted, and/or until
their respective replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first, unless
they are reappointed in the meantime."
Matibag sent a letter requesting clarification on the coverage of OP-MC No. 1. In a letter,
Executive Secretary Ochoa stated that:
"Section 8, Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides
that entrance to CES third-level positions shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service
Board (CESB). Pursuant thereto, the requisite eligibility for a CES third-level position is not the
Career Service Executive Eligibility neither the Career Executive Officer rank
administered/conferred by the Civil Service Commission but the appropriate CESO rank
conferred by the CESB. Applied to your case, you are covered by MC for being a non-CESO
occupying a CES position."
It appears that following the letter, Undersecretary Edgar C. Galvante, the Acting Executive
Director of the DDB, issued a Memorandum addressed to Matibag, which states that
"considering that you are a Non-CESO holder and covered by Memorandum Circular No. 2, you
are hereby notified that your designation as DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS is terminated effective this date. This is without prejudice to your reappointment
to the position and/or the final resolution of the propriety of the issuance of MC 2 by the
Supreme Court."7
Matibag thus filed a complaint before the CSC for illegal dismissal.
The CSC ruled that Matibag was illegally dismissed. It ruled that Matibag enjoyed security of
tenure over the position of Deputy Executive Director and she cannot be removed except for just
cause since she possessed a Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) conferred by the
CSC.8 The dispositive portion of the CSC Decision states.
The CA affirmed the CSC. The CA ruled that the CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government mandated to establish a career service.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Matibag does not possess the CES rank appropriate for the position to
which she was appointed, thus making her appointment invalid.
RULING:
Matibag was validly dismissed. This issue centers on whether Matibag's CSEE from the CSC
was sufficient to consider her to be eligible for the position of Deputy Executive Director and to
permanently possess it.
This issue is not novel as it has already been resolved by the Court in Feliciano v. Department of
National Defense (Feliciano). In fact, Feliciano also involved Office of the President
Memorandum Circular (OP-MC) Nos. 1 and 2, the implementation of which also gave rise to the
present case.
Feliciano and Gonzalez served as Assistant Secretary and Chief of the Administrative Service
Office of the Department of National Defense (DND), respectively. Both possessed the CSEE
and thus were deemed not compliant with OP-MC Nos. 1 and 2, and accordingly relieved of their
positions. Both filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the CSC.
On appeal before the Court and in a consolidated Resolution, the Court upheld the CA. The
Court therein held that "the CESB is expressly empowered to promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation and career development of the
members of the CES."23
In fact, the CESB, as the Court ruled in Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service
Commission, which was cited in Feliciano, has the authority to "(a) identify other officers
belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by law; and (b) prescribe
requirements for entrance to the third-level."25
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that it is the CESB that has the authority to prescribe the
requirements for entry to the CES. Following this clear authority of the CESB, the Court held
that Feliciano and Gonzalez, even though holders of the CSEE, still needed to comply with
CESB Resolution No. 811 dated August 17, 2009, which states that holders of the CSC's CSEE

still needed to comply with the last two stages to get CES Eligibility, which are the assessment
center and the performance validation. CESB Resolution No. 811 specifically states
Here, similar to Feliciano and Gonzalez, Matibag only possessed the CSC's CSEE. She failed to
prove that she has completed the last two stages of the examination process under CESB
Resolution No. 811. Given this, she was not CES Eligible at the time she held the position of
Deputy Executive Director for Operations, and did not enjoy security of tenure. Her appointment
was temporary.
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES
positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in
the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the
appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent
obtention of the required CES eligibility x x x
Clearly, the petitioners' termination from their respective positions at the DND was effective and
valid.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY: CONDONATION)
January 15, 2020
G.R. No. 231120
RADAMES F. HERRERA, PETITIONER, v. NOEL P. MAGO, SIMEON B.
VILLACRUSIS, AND JOSE R. ASIS, JR., RESPONDENTS.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
FACTS:
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 103
granting an increase in the Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of local chief
executives, local vice-chief executives, sanggunian members, department heads, assistant
department heads, chiefs of hospitals, and division chiefs in special cities. The increase was
chargeable to the local government units (LGUs) concerned. The increase was retroactive to
January 1, 2013, subject to the 45% to 55% limitation on personal services expenditure under
Section 325(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160).
The Sangguniang Bayan of Vinzons, Camarines Norte passed Supplemental Budget No. 21-2013
and Appropriation Ordinance No. 02-2013 to cover its members' RATA increase from January to
June 2013. Mayor Agnes Diezno-Ang, however, vetoed in part the appropriation for "RATA
differential" insofar as it exceeded the 45% statutory limitation on personal services expenditure.
The Sangguniang Bayan unanimously voted to override the veto. Former councilor Enrique

Palacio, Jr. wrote petitioner Vice-Mayor Radames Herrera for the release of his "RATA
differential" for January to June 2013. In response, petitioner instructed Municipal Accountant
Leonilo Pajarin to prepare the corresponding payroll for "RATA differentials" due not only to
Enrique Palacio, Jr., but also to other former councilors Victor Ingatan, Gilberto Adorino, and
Nestor Pajarillo.
Municipal Accountant Leonilo Pajarin signified his reservations about the payment of "RATA
differentials" to the four (4) former councilors. He opined that pursuant to Section 106 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (PD 1445) and Section 454 of RA 7160, they were not entitled to
RATA differential because they were no longer in active service when the supplemental budget
and ordinance were passed. But despite Pajarin's reservations, Obligation Request corresponding
to the four (4) councilors' RATA differentials was released.
The obligation request was forwarded to Municipal Budget Officer Raul Rigodon, who refused
to sign it for the same reason. He annotated his objection on the obligation request. But, again,
despite this objection, a Disbursement Voucher was prepared and referred to Municipal
Treasurer Cynthia Jimenez, who refused to sign it and wrote "I invoke Section 344 of RA 7160
and Section 40 of NGA's and the right not to be liable/accountable from any liability that may
arise in this transaction."

In the end, it was only petitioner who signed the disbursement voucher in his capacity as agency
head or authorized representative. The amount was released and the four (4) former councilors
received their RATA differential.
On review, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Norte declared as inoperative

Supplemental Budget No. 21-2013 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 02-2013 based on the same
ground cited by Mayor Agnes Diezno-Ang. Subsequently, the Commission on Audit (COA),
Daet, Camarines Norte issued Notice of Disallowance. Petitioner and the four (4) former
councilors were, therefore, directed to return the amount, which they did.
Respondents Noel Mago, Simeon Villacrusis, and Jose Asis, Sr., all residents of the Municipality
of Vinzons, filed a Complaint Affidavit (with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension) against
petitioner. They accused petitioner of disregarding the ethical standards of public officials and
gravely abusing his position when he facilitated the release of the RATA differential for the four
(4) former councilors despite the refusal/reservations of the municipal accountant, municipal
treasurer, and municipal budget officer. Petitioner was guilty of grave abuse of authority, gross
ignorance of law, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of the rules
and regulations on the disbursement of public funds because of his act of illegally releasing the
RATA differentials to the four (4) former councilors.
Petitioner, in turn, denied any wrongdoing and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, thus, meting on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service with all the accessory penalties. Petitioner improperly interfered with the
release of the RATA differentials, despite the objections of the municipal officers,
tarnished the integrity of his office, and committed an act prejudicial to public interest.
Further, his clear intent to violate the law was manifest, amounting to grave misconduct
when he allowed payment of the RATA differential despite the absence of the respective
signatures of the municipal accountant and the municipal treasurer on the disbursement
voucher.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Office of the Ombudsman denied.
Petitioner, thereafter, sought affirmative relief from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. It held that the factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are accorded with
great respect and finality especially when these are supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the condonation doctrine.
RULING:

No. Petitioner can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine
The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija.
We now come to the main issue of the controversy-the legality of disciplining an elective
municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term
of office.
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities.
We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes
and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to divergence of views with respect to the
question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The
weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
"Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause
for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification
from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected, or appointed."
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor.
"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule
the will of the people."
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation.
Verily, we hold that petitioner can no longer avail of the condonation doctrine because although
the complaint below was instituted on January 9, 2015, he got reelected only on May 9, 2016,
well within the prospective application of Carpio-Morales.
The Office of the Ombudsman's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer coupled with the
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules.

Here, petitioner undoubtedly committed grave misconduct when he facilitated the release of the
RATA differential despite the absence of the mandatory requisites prescribed by Section 344 of
the Local Government Code that "no money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer
certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local
accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of
funds for the purpose."
Petitioner was shown to have willfully violated the law or disregarded established rules when he
facilitated, pursued, and even forced the release of the RATA differential to persons who were
not legally entitled to receive them. This constitutes grave misconduct.
Further, petitioner is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service considering
that his questioned act tainted the image and integrity of his office as Vice-Mayor.
Under Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, if the
respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges, the penalty for the most serious charge
shall be imposed and the other charges shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Likewise, under Section 4934 of the same Rules, the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present.
Grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal is meted
even for first time offenders. On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is a grave offense, which carries the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. Since
grave misconduct is the more serious charge and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
the penalty of dismissal and its accessory penalties should be imposed on petitioner.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
January 28, 2020
A.M. No. P-20-4042 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 16-4624-P)
MARIA IRISH B. VALDEZ,* COMPLAINANT,VS. ANDREW B. ALVIAR, SHERIFF IV
AND RICARDO P. TAPAN, STENOGRAPHER III, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 76, QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Valdez wanted to annul her marriage so she sought advice from a close friend of her sister ,
respondent Ricardo P. Tapan2 (Tapan), Stenographer III, Branch 76, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Quezon City, who told Valdez that he knew someone who could help her. Since Valdez and her
sister were based in Singapore, they went to the Philippines to meet with Tapan and his contact.
Valdez and her sister met with Tapan at a bar and restaurant, and he introduced them to
respondent Andrew B. Alviar (Alviar), Sheriff IV of the same court. In said bar, they discussed
the process of annulment and the respondents initially gave the amount of P200,000.00 for
speedy processing but eventually agreed to the amount of P150,000.00 after bargaining. Since
the respondents wanted the amount handed to them personally, instead of transferring or
depositing to their bank accounts, Valdez gave the P150,000.00 wrapped in a black plastic bag to
Tapan who immediately handed it to Alviar. Alviar told them that the processing of annulment
would take six (6) months to one (1) year, and claimed that his wife was a prosecutor who could
help them speed up the process. Alviar also told Valdez that she had to undergo a psychological
test.
After the test, Alviar had asked for Valdez's contact details so he could send Valdez the
documents. When Valdez asked for Alviar's contact number, Alviar told her to communicate
with Tapan and he promised that he would file the case with in two weeks. Thereafter, Valdez
went back to Singapore and waited for updates.
Valdez repeatedly contacted Tapan, but it was only after three months that Tapan replied that the
annulment proceedings were ongoing and that he would try to contact Alviar. Months and years
passed without any updates from Alviar, so Valdez asked her mother to follow - up with Alviar,
but Alviar claimed that he was still getting/waiting for the required documents. At one point,
when Valdez's mother was already contemplating to bring the matter to the authorities, Tapan
had advised her to meet first with Alviar's wife, Fiscal Elenita Alviar (Fiscal Alviar). Valdez's
mother met with Fiscal Alviar and requested the latter to return the money so she could start the
annulment proceedings on her own, but Fiscal Alviar claimed that she had no money of that
amount and told Valdez's mother that they could work this issue out.
The annulment case was eventually filed a year later, but it was dismissed for lack of interest to
prosecute because Fiscal Alviar had never contacted them or informed them about what
happened to the annulment case.

The OCA sent a 1st Indorsement to Alviar and Tapan directing them to submit a comment on
Valdez's complaint against them for grave misconduct. After filing a joint request for
extension, the respondents filed their respective comments. In a Comment, Tapan argued, among
others, that: the acts alleged by Valdez were not work-related since they had nothing to do with
his performance as a court stenographer. The allegations in the complaint were mere hearsay
because the complaint was signed not by Valdez, but by her mother; out of his desire to help
Valdez, he merely introduced the latter to Alviar, who was knowledgeable on annulment
proceedings, and said act did not constitute grave misconduct.
Alviar, on the other hand, filed an undated Comment which reproduced almost verbatim the
contents of Tapan's Comment (Ad Cautelam) save for certain modifications appropriate to
Alviar, such as changing the position from "court stenographer" to "court sheriff' and removing
statements that were inapplicable to him.
The Court referred the administrative case against Tapan and Alviar to the Executive Judge of
the RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Cecilyn
E . Burgos-Villavert (Executive Judge Villavert) submitted her Report, which recommended that
Alviar be found guilty of grave misconduct, be made to return the amount of P150,000.00 to
Valdez, and accordingly be dismissed from the service.
The OCA adopted the findings of fact in the Report of Executive Judge Villavert and
recommended that (i) Alviar be found administratively liable for grave misconduct punishable by
dismissal , and (ii) Tapan be found administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense. However, after noting several circumstances that should be appreciated in
favor of Tapan, the OCA recommended that his penalty be reduced to one (1) month suspension
instead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of grave misconduct.
RULING:
Yes. The Court finds that Alviar is guilty of grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the la w , or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence. Under the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (2011 RRACCS), grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from
service for the first offense.
In Pinlac v. Llamas (Pinlac), the Court found the respondent therein guilty of grave misconduct
for offering assistance and introducing the complainant to the surveyor to facilitate the titling of
the property. Viz:

In the present case, the respondent's act, more than anything else, is closer to the
direct solicitation or acceptance of money in connection with an operation directly being
acted upon by the court of which he was an employee, which the Civil Service Rules
penalize as a grave offense. The respondent offered assistance to the complainant, but the
offer was for a fee that was in fact paid, although the fee was ostensibly handed over to
the surveyor with whom a meeting had to be arranged by the respondent. In this role, the
respondent acted as an active intermediary in a fee transaction between the surveyor and
the complainant who was not even a friend, relative nor an acquaintance to whom, under
unique Filipino cultural practices, one may understandably be beholden to render some
assistance.
It is a misconduct because the respondent acted as an active and willing

intermediary who had demanded and received money in relation to a case pending before
the court where he worked. It is grave because the offer to help for a fee shows his
willingness and intent to commit acts of unacceptable behavior, transgressing established
and serious rules of conduct for public officers I and employees. In short, the respondent
undertook acts amounting to fixing, that the Court must necessarily recognize and
penalize, as they were made under circumstances that unavoidably leave a heavy and
adverse taint on the image of the Judiciary .
Here, the evidence shows that Alviar had asked and received money from Valdez and made her
believe that he could finish the annulment process within six (6) months to one (1) year. Alviar
had also used his previous assignment with the Family Court to convince Valdez and even
dropped the name of his wife, Fiscal Alviar, who would supposedly help them speed up the
process. It is apparent that Valdez would not have parted with her money if not for these
misrepresentations. Considering that the circumstances here in are analogous to Pinlac, and the
acts herein are even more unscrupulous than the acts in said case, the Court finds that the act of
Alviar in asking and receiving money from Valdez as some sort of a package deal for the
purported speedy processing of the annulment proceedings constitutes grave misconduct.
On the other hand, there was no clear showing that Tapan had received any share from the
money given by Valdez. While Tapan's acts may not squarely fall under the definition of "fixing"
tantamount to grave misconduct since his participation did not involve the acceptance of fees, the
Court finds that Tapan should still be held administratively liable.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to acts or omission s that violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish, or tend to diminish, the people's faith in the
Judiciary. By getting personally involved, Tapan had transgressed the strict norm of conduct
prescribed for court employees, that is, to avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed, or
misdemeanor, not only in the performance of his duty, but also in conducting himself outside or
beyond his duties. It bears stressing that he must still maintain a hands-off attitude in dealing
with party-litigants as an employee of the judiciary. Because his acts had, in effect, compromised
the integrity of the service and jeopardized the public's faith in the impartiality of the courts, he
should be held administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
January 29, 2020
G.R. No. 223623
ROBERTO C. EUSEBIO, PETITIONER, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 223644

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, v. ROBERTO C. EUSEBIO,
RESPONDENT.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Then Pasig City Mayor Eusebio appointed retired career diplomat Rosalina V. Tirona as
President of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasig (PLP) for a four (4)-year term or until January
31, 2012. The CSC approved Tirona's appointment.
Upon his re-election, Eusebio issued a memorandum urging all Pasig City chiefs of office,
including Tirona, to tender their courtesy resignations. Tirona did not heed the call and wrote
Eusebio why she will not resign.
Through letter, Eusebio terminated Tirona's appointment as PLP President and declared the
position vacant. He cited as reason Tirona's having reached the compulsory retirement age of
seventy (70). Aggrieved, Tirona questioned her termination before the CSC.
The CSC ruled that Tirona was illegally dismissed and, thus, ordered her reinstatement as PLP
President.
Eusebio and the PLP Board of Regents filed separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied.
They further appealed to the Court of Appeals via CA-G.R. SP No. 117512. The Court of
Appeals, meantime, did not issue any injunctive relief or restraining order to enjoin Tirona's
reinstatement. But still, Eusebio did not comply with the CSC's directive for Tirona's
reinstatement.
Consequently, the CSC motu proprio charged Eusebio with indirect contempt. The CSC denied
Eusebio's motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Eusebio filed another petition for review with
the Court of Appeals via CA-G.R. SP No. 129526, this time assailing the dispositions in the case
for indirect contempt.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals dismissed the first petition for review filed by Eusebio and the
PLP Board of Regents in CA-G.R. SP No. 117512. Their motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in reducing the fine imposed on Eusebio for indirect
contempt.
RULING:
First off, the verdict of guilt for indirect contempt against Eusebio had lapsed into finality and
may no longer be disturbed. Under the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law.
Yes. Under Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC en banc may promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before any of its offices so long as such rules do
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 42, s. 1990
which was later amended by CSC Resolution No. 071245, otherwise known as the CSC Revised
Rules on Contempt. Based thereon, the CSC wields the power to punish for contempt. Indeed,
the Court has never nullified the rules of procedure of Constitutional Commissions on ground
that their respective enabling laws supposedly do not authorize them to prescribe penalties for
contemptuous conduct. The Court never curtailed and will never curtail their power to punish
for contempt on such ground.
While it is true that Section 16(2)(d), Title I(A), Book V of EO 29233 states that the CSC
through its adjudicative arm shall have the power to "punish for contempt in accordance with the
same procedures and penalties prescribed in the Rules of Court", Section 12, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court states that the application of said rules is merely suppletory.
Indeed, the Rules of Court must defer to the CSC's power to promulgate and apply its own rules
in penalizing contempt committed against it. The existence of the CSC's Revised Rules on
Contempt, therefore, calls for the application of its own procedure and penalties, thus, precluding
Section 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court from coming into play at first instance. This is not an
expansion of the CSC's authority to punish for contempt under EO 292 but the Court's deference
to the CSC to wield such power.
Under Section 4 of the CSC Revised Rules on Contempt, a fine of P1,000.00 may be imposed on
the contemnor for each day of defiance of, disobedience to, or non-enforcement of, a final ruling
of the CSC. Further, if the contempt consists in the violation of an injunction or omission to do
an act which is within the power of respondent to perform, he or she, in addition, shall be liable
for damages as a consequence thereof.
In accordance, therefore, with Section 4 of the CSC Revised Rules on Contempt, the CSC
imposed a fine of P1,000.00 per day or a total of P416,000.00 on Eusebio for his contumacious
defiance of the CSC's directive to reinstate Tirona to her post as PLP President. This conforms
with the subsequent CSC rules penalizing contumacious conduct before it. Section 76, Rule 15 of
the 2011 Revised Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that if the
respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against the Commission, he/she
may be punished by a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos per day for every act of indirect
contempt
Meanwhile, Section 85 of the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service reads if
the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt against the Commission, he/she may be
penalized by a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per day for every act of indirect
contempt and/or suspension for one (1) month up to a maximum period of six (6) months.
As worded, the CSC may impose a fine of P1,000.00 a day for every act of indirect contempt
committed against it. The word "may" implies that it is discretionary, not mandatory. It means,
therefore, that the CSC may impose a fine less than P1,000.00 a day or even dispense therewith
depending on the circumstances of each case. In other words, it is not constrained to impose a
fine of P1,000.00 a day at every instance of contempt committed against it.
The attendant circumstances here compel the imposition of the maximum fine of P1,000.00 per
day for the repeated contumacious act committed by Eusebio against the CSC over a long period
of four hundred sixteen (416) days to be exact.
To emphasize, Eusebio's failure to reinstate Tirona as PLP President did not only come with the
obvious consequence of depriving her of the salaries and emoluments she would have been
entitled to. More than this, the public was unduly deprived of the professional services Tirona
would have been able to render them as PLP President. As it was, Eusebio's omission to reinstate
Tirona was not only deliberate, but undeniably tainted with evident bad faith.
Judgments of courts and quasi-judicial bodies are couched in mandatory language. Compliance
therewith is compulsory, especially when public interest is at stake. The authority of these
rulings, however, is diminished by the flagrant and stubborn refusal of party-litigants to comply
with their directives. This cannot be countenanced. Neither should the penalty imposed by the
CSC be reduced unnecessarily lest we trade the rule of law for a mere pittance. Indeed, the
rationale behind the fine of P1,000.00 a day is not difficult to divine---to give teeth to the
coercive powers to the CSC as the implementer of civil service laws. It is meant to deter those
who dare defy the authority of the CSC and in the process, interrupt, nay prejudice, the flow of
public service.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
January 28, 2020
A.M. No. P-14-3188 Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-P)
ARLENE L. AMBROSIO, COMPLAINANT, v. SOLMINIO B. DELAS ARMAS,
SHERIFF IV, BRANCH 265, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:

Complainant filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default in a Civil Case pending before
Branch 265, RTC, Pasig City in which Delas Armas was the branch sheriff. The said motion was
denied in the Order, copies of which were sent to the parties and their respective counsel by
registered mail on March 2, 2012, while complainant received her copy on March 8, 2012.
However, prior to the Order being sent to the parties, in the afternoon of February 29,
2012, Sheriff Delas Armas, through his number, contacted complainant's husband, Cesar
P. Ambrosio (Cesar) in his cellular phone number regarding complainant's case
Hearing the order of denial of the motion, Cesar immediately called Sheriff Delas Armas who
told him that allegedly there were two orders prepared by the trial court and that it was the order
denying the motion that was signed by the presiding judge. After which, they agreed to meet the
next day.

The next day, Cesar, with his friend Cyril Manaoag (Cyril), went to Branch 265, RTC of Pasig
City to secure a copy of the order. They met Sheriff De las Annas who showed them the order
and its dispositive portion denying complainant's motion to declare defendants in default. Cesar
told Sheriff Delas Armas that he will just accept the order although aggrieved. Thereafter, they
went outside the office to talk privately. The Sheriff said that there will be a cost if he will be
convincing the OIC and the Judge to grant his motion. That if the petitioner can produce 10,000
php or 5,000 php at the least, he may convince the judge to rule in his favor.
At 1:00 p.m. of the same day Sheriff Delas Armas texted Cesar saying that he was not
able to convince the OIC and the Judge to change the order because the said order had
already been made.

Cesar and Cyril went back to Branch 265 at around 4:00 p.m. But Sheriff Delas Armas
was no longer around. They requested for a copy of the order but the female staff who
attended to him denied knowledge of the order. Cesar then texted Sheriff Delas Armas
that he indeed went to Branch 265 and they agreed to just meet the next day.

Cesar and Cyril returned to Branch 265 and met with respondent Sheriff Delas Armas at
the 6th floor of the Hall of Justice where an argument ensued between Cesar and
respondent. Cyril heard the whole conversation as he was with Cesar the whole time he
was conversing with Sheriff Delas Armas.

Respondent Sheriff Delas Armas vehemently denied the complainant's accusations
against him contending that the allegations against him are purely fabricated coming from
a litigant who obtained an unfavorable order from the court.

Respondent denied to have ever represented to Cesar that he could, in any way, influence
the decision of the Honorable Judge. Moreover, respondent denied having asked Cesar
money or otherwise in exchange for influencing the Court to change its unfavorable order
to the complainant.

Respondent also stated that he does not know Cesar nor the complainant personally.

In a Resolution dated February 10, 2014, the instant administrative matter was referred to
the Executive Judge of RTC Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. In
his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Judge Danilo S. Cruz (Judge Cruz)
recommended that respondent Sheriff Solminio B. Delas Armas be meted the penalty of
suspension for one (1) month without salary with stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act of misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
On February 28, 2017, a Memorandum was passed by the Office of the Court Administrator
finding respondent Delas Armas guilty of grave misconduct.
Hence, the case was transmitted to this court for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.
RULING:
We agree and adopt the recommendation of the OCA in imposing on Sheriff Delas
Armas the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service for grave misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It is intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to
constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with
the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In order to
differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, and not a mere error of judgment, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that solicitation or receiving money from
litigants by court personnel constitutes grave misconduct. Under Section 46 (A) of
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, this is punishable by
dismissal from service even for the first offense. While there are cases in which the Court
has mitigated the imposable penalty for humanitarian reasons and other considerations
such as length of service, acknowledgment of infractions, feelings of remorse, and family
circumstances, none of these is applicable to the case at hand. Hence, respondent's
dismissal is proper.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds no reason to depart from the findings
and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the evidence on record
sufficiently demonstrate respondent Sheriff Delas Armas' culpability for grave
misconduct. This being an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof necessary for
a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This requirement has been met in
this case.

In the instant case, it is clear that in the afternoon of February 29, 2012, respondent
Sheriff De las Armas contacted Cesar through a series of text messages regarding
Arlene's Motion to Declare Defendants in Default in Civil Case No. 72902-PSG then
pending before Branch 265, RTC of Pasig City.
Consequently, when Cesar and respondent Delas Armas met the next day, it was there that
respondent intimated to Cesar that they can have the Order in Civil Case No. 72902-PSG
reversed in favor of the complainant for a fee.
Cyril, who accompanied Cesar at that time, confirmed that respondent Sheriff Delas Armas
extorted money from Cesar in his testimony during cross examination after showing the order
denying the motion of complainant.

In sum, there are three acts where the respondent can be made liable for. First,
communicating to a litigant who had a pending case in court where he was
assigned; Second, showing a court order, which was not yet released to the
parties, to persons who were not privy thereto, in violation of Section 1, Canon II
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and Third, making it appear that he could
influence a judge to modify or change the prepared order in exchange for money,
which constitutes grave misconduct.

The Court has always emphasized that all members of the judiciary should be free
from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial
branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order
that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice be preserved. Court
personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of desperate party-litigants
for monetary gain.

Grave misconduct merits dismissal. In some cases, the court exercised its
discretion to assess mitigating circumstances such as length of service or the fact
that a transgression might be the first infraction of respondent. However, due to
the gravity of the acts of respondent, no mitigating circumstances can be
appreciated.


January 28, 2020
A.M. No. P-20-4035 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 17- 4777-P)
RACQUEL O. ARCE, CLERK III, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, COMPLAINANT, v. FERDINAND E. TAURO, FORMER
COURT INTERPRETER, BRANCH 122, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Tauro narrated that he was heckled by Arce who was at that time looking for missing
records which were supposedly under Arce's custody. Arce allegedly shouted at Tauro,
"Ikaw ang kumuha, ikaw ang gumalaw ng mga records, sinungaling, sinungaling ka!
Dapat sa iyo mag-resign." Tauro kept his cool but Arce continued berating him for the
missing records.
Despite the intervention of other court personnel, Arce allegedly continued to throw
slanderous and threatening remarks against Tauro. When Tauro denied the accusations,
Arce became furious and, seemingly determined to kill Tauro, attacked him with a
kitchen knife. However, the attack was timely prevented by their fellow court employees.
In her Comment, Arce narrated that in the course of her work, she noticed that two (2)
case folders were missing from her desk. She needed these case folders for the purpose of
preparing the subpoenas for the following week's hearings. She was convinced that Tauro
was the one who took those folders as he used to take case records from her table without
permission supposedly for the purpose of preparing the court calendar. When she asked
him about the missing folders, he gave evasive and unresponsive answers.
An argument ensued between them. Because Tauro kept on provoking her instead of
giving straight answers, she got prompted to say “pag hindi ka pa tumigil sa kadadaldal
ng wala namang kinalaman sa tanong ko sa iyo, sasaksakin na kita." Although she
admitted she was holding a knife at that time, she denied ever aiming it at Tauro. It was
only out of frustration that she uttered those heated words because that was not the first
time Tauro took records from her table without permission and lied about it. She attached
Affidavits from their workmates who corroborated her version of the incident.
She was also spurred by fear that she would get mixed up in Tauro's blunders and her job
would be jeopardized. His dishonesty and inefficiency were well-known to everyone in
their office. In fact, the case records that were missing and for which she was unable to
issue subpoenas were later found in his possession. She did not have the capacity to harm
anyone.
She believed that if what she did was gross misconduct then fairness demanded that her
accuser be charged with gross inefficiency. As a court interpreter, Tauro was so inept
with his work that lawyers often complained to the judge and interpreted their own
questions for accuracy. He regularly made errors or missed out items on the court
calendar. Cases that should be listed in the agenda were not included and those that
should not be in the agenda were included.
Meanwhile, two (2) important developments occurred in this case. First, in an En Banc
Resolution dated, Tauro was dropped from the rolls for his unsatisfactory performance
ratings for the periods July-December 2011, January-June 2012, July-December 2012,
and January-June 2013. Second, in the Resolution involving the same altercation incident
that took place on May 3, 2012, the Court's Second Division found both Tauro and Arce
1 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW,ELECTION LAWS AND LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICER)
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a court employee and imposed a fine of Php5,000.00 on
each of them. Hence, this Resolution only refers to the remaining administrative case
against Tauro for dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and gross inefficiency.
The OCA found that Arce was able to substantiate most of her allegations against Tauro.
Although there were some charges that the OCA found unmeritorious, there was
adequate evidence that cases had been dismissed or erroneous actions thereon were taken
by the court or the parties due to the mistakes that Tauro made in the minutes and the
court calendar. Tauro had also been clearly negligent in the preparation of minutes and
court calendars that were incomplete or inaccurate and riddled with erasures and
corrections. It was also proven that he received exhibits from counsel in one case before
these exhibits were formally offered in violation of the strict directive of the presiding
judge to the court staff. Worse, he kept them inside the vault instead of attaching them to
the case records. Hearings had to be rescheduled when it was discovered that they were
not supposed to be included in the calendar for the day. It was also duly shown in the
portions of the TSNs Arce offered that Tauro committed numerous lapses during court
proceedings, for which the judge had to call his attention.
The OCA opined that Tauro's infractions amounted to gross neglect of duty which would
have been punishable by dismissal even on the first offense had he not been previously
dropped from the rolls. Hence, the OCA recommended that respondent Tauro be found
GUILTY of gross neglect of duty and be penalized with dismissal from the service; but
considering that he has been dropped from the rolls, making dismissal no longer feasible,
that he be penalized instead with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
RULING:
Yes. We fully adopt the OCA 's factual findings and recommendations.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, in so far as other persons may be affected. x x x In cases involving public
officials, (there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable."
It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not
necessarily include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from
situations where "such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of
instances, becomes so serious in its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening
the public welfare.
It cannot be gainsaid that the duty of a court interpreter to keep complete and accurate
minutes is vital to the efficient administration of justice. The Court observed in Atty.
Bandong v. Ching that among the duties of court interpreters is to prepare and sign "all
Minutes of the session." (Manual for Clerks of Court, 32). After every session they must
prepare the Minutes and attach it to the record. The Minutes is a very important document
because it gives a brief summary of the events that took place at the session or hearing of
a case.

As the OCA aptly noted, Tauro had repeatedly failed to prepare complete and accurate
minutes in various cases. This often resulted in mistakes in the calendaring of cases and
inconsistencies in the court records. Even taking into account that his neglect might not
have been willful or deliberate, the sheer frequency of his lapses had caused great
inconvenience to the judge and the litigants appearing before the court as Tauro's errors
had to be remedied in subsequent orders and proceedings. To aggravate matters, he
continued to commit the same mistakes over and over despite the presiding judge's
directives and his co-employees' reminders. Tauro's well documented carelessness and
inefficiency in the performance of his assigned tasks indeed warranted a finding of guilt
for gross neglect of duty.
We do not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal on Tauro. Time and again,
we held that the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and that all
public officers must be accountable to the people and must serve them with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The demand for moral uprightness is
more pronounced for members and personnel of the judiciary who are involved in the
dispensation of justice. As front liners in the administration of justice, court personnel
should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service, and
in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Thus, any
conduct, act, or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not
be tolerated.
This means, however, that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal can no longer be
implemented. The penalty of dismissal from the service includes the accessory penalties
of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. On the other hand, the dropping of a
government employee from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature and does not result in
the forfeiture of any benefit of the official or employee concerned nor in said official or
employee's disqualification from reemployment in the government. In several cases,
where the proper penalty was dismissal but it could not be imposed since the respondent
had been previously dropped from the rolls, the Court deemed it sufficient to impose the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. We, therefore, find
the OCA's recommendation as to the penalty to be appropriate.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Estrella M. Domingo v. Civil Service Commission and Victorino Mapa

Manalo, G.R. No. 236050, June 17, 2020, First Division, Lazaro-Javier, J.
Petitioner is the Chief Archivist of the Archives Preservation Division of the National
Archives of the Philippines (NAP). Mayor Strike B. Revilla of Bacoor City, Cavite,
requested the NAP to provide resource speakers for a three (3)-day Basic Records
Management Seminar Workshop and a two (2)-day Training on Paper Preservation at the
Productivity Center, Bacoor City, Cavite.
In reply, respondent Executive Director Victorino Mapa Manalo (respondent Manalo)

initially confirmed to Josephine F. Austria (Austria), then Chief of the NAP's Training
and Information Division, the availability of four resource persons, including petitioner,
to the City Mayor, but only for the Basic Records Management Seminar
Workshop. Austria prepared the draft conforme letter, draft Travel Order, schedule of
events, and the Document Endorsement Form. Austria forwarded these documents to
respondent Manalo.
In the Document Endorsement Form, however, respondent Manalo wrote his instruction
putting on hold all in-house trainings. He then returned the documents to Austria to revise
the schedule of the attendance of the resource persons.
Austria did not endorse back the conforme letter, Travel Order, schedule of events, and
the Document Endorsement Form to respondent Manalo, with the latter's revision. These
documents hibernated in Austria's custody. As a result, Bacoor City's request was left in
limbo.
Meantime, petitioner applied for a leave of absence. Her leave of absence coincided with
the seminar.
The City of Bacoor sent an email to the NAP requesting for its official seal to be used at
the seminar.
Petitioner, together with Austria and Lara Marie R. Abejuela, attended the seminar at
Tagaytay City. Petitioner acted as resource speaker. The NAP's handouts were presented
and disseminated during this seminar.
Respondent Manalo issued a show cause memorandum relative to the conduct of the
unapproved seminar and unauthorized use and dissemination of the NAP handouts.
In her answer, petitioner apologized and admitted to acting as resource person without
office approval. She however denied knowing for sure of the request's history. She
averred that her information about the prior request only came from Austria who had
informed her that a request in which she was one of the proposed speakers was still
pending approval by respondent Manalo. She claimed that she had to grace the seminar
as a resource speaker as she was a resident of Bacoor City and since Bacoor City had
already prepared the seminar's venue while awaiting the NAP's approval. She also
maintained that she had attended the seminar in her private capacity as she was on leave
then.
Petitioner and Austria were formally charged with serious dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the interest of public service while Abejuela was charged with
simple misconduct. A formal investigation ensued.
Meanwhile, Austria availed of early retirement while Abejuela resigned.
The NAP found petitioner guilty as charged and dismissed her from the service with the
accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service
examinations.
According to the NAP, petitioner's act of attending the seminar as a resource speaker
without prior office approval and use of official training materials were clear derogation
of office rules, which constituted grave misconduct.
According to the NAP, these acts constituted serious dishonesty because petitioner made
it appear that she had the authority to represent the NAP. Petitioner's actions also
constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Meanwhile, the charges against Austria and Abejuela were mooted by their retirement
and resignation, respectively, before they were formally charged.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied Aggrieved, petitioner appealed her
dismissal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC affirmed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner liable for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
RULING:
For purposes of resolving this petition for review on certiorari, we have to be mindful of
the facts established. This is because under Section 1, Rule 45, petitions of this kind shall
raise only questions of law. The factual findings are binding upon us and only questions
of law, and only from the Court of Appeals' disposition, may be litigated once
again. While jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to this rule, any of these exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so the Court may in its
discretion evaluate and review the facts of the case.
Petitioner does not invoke any of these exceptions.
We rule that petitioner is not liable for either grave or simple misconduct, serious
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly,

as a result of a public officer's unlawful behavior, recklessness, or gross negligence. This
type of misconduct is characterized for purposes of gravity and penalty as simple
misconduct.

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, clear
willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, supported by
substantial evidence.
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of

corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must
be manifest and established by substantial evidence. Grave Misconduct necessarily
includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct. Thus, a person charged with Grave
Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve
any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.
We stress that the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant. Public service is a
public trust, and whoever breaks that trust is subject to sanction. Dismissal and forfeiture
of benefits, however, are not penalties imposed for all infractions, particularly when it is
a first offense. There must be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or some other
grave offense meriting dismissal under the law was committed.
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner acted as resource speaker at the seminar organized
by the City of Bacoor for its Basic Records Management without office approval where
the NAP materials were disseminated for the purpose of conducting the seminar in
general. It may also be reasonably inferred from the established facts that petitioner
coincided her leave of absence so she could take part as a resource speaker at the
seminar, and along with Abejuela and Austria, kept respondent Manalo in the dark about
their attendance at this seminar.
Petitioner's actions, however, do not violate or transgress any rule of conduct. As

observed, the NAP, including the CSC and the Court of Appeals, did not mention the
exact law or office rule that petitioner has violated. We have inferred that the rule of
conduct adverted to in the administrative proceedings are, as stated, Executive Order No.
(EO) 77, series of 2019, Prescribing Rules and Regulations and Rates of Expenses and
Allowances for Official Local and Foreign Travels of Government Personnel, and its
implementing NAP office procedures, as well as Section 176. of the Intellectual Property
Code.
To be sure, EO 77, series of 2019, requires office approval only for local travels that are
official in nature, which refer to travels outside of official station on official time. The
NAP implementing procedures simply aid in the enforcement of EO 77, and therefore,
cannot require more than what EO 77 demands.
Here, petitioner opted not to avail of an official local travel. She decided instead to take a
leave of absence during the dates of the seminar. Hence, when she attended the seminar
at Tagaytay City, she was not on official time, had no right to claim for official expenses,
and cannot add the seminar to her credentials as an official work accomplishment.
Nonetheless, she was not barred from attending this activity on her own personal volition
and account as she was on leave of absence.
We take judicial notice of the fact that local travels when done on personal account do
not require travel authority, unlike in the case of foreign travels whether personal or
official. Local travels in a government employee's personal capacity, as they involve
absence from work and work station, only entail the filing and approval of leave of
absence.
We also cannot conclude that petitioner acted insubordinately to respondent Manalo. It

has not been established that petitioner knew of the status of the first request made by the
City of Bacoor. What has only been confirmed is that she was told by Austria of the

existence of the first request but not as to any update about respondent Manalo's action or
inaction upon it. Petitioner's taking advantage of the opportunity does not prove that she
was acting defiantly against her superior - these are two different things. For sure, she
could not have acted in defiance of an instruction she knew nothing about.
There is as well no law that obligated petitioner to inform the NAP or respondent Manalo
about her activities or whereabouts during her leave of absence. Her attendance as a
resource speaker at the City of Bacoor seminar, without more, during her leave of
absence, did not create a rule of conduct requiring her to obtain office approval to do so.
Further, it was not found as a fact that petitioner actually misrepresented herself at the
seminar to be acting on behalf of the NAP. That she was misrepresenting herself as such
was only an inference, not a factual finding, by the NAP.
The finding of fact is that the City of Bacoor asked the NAP for a copy of the NAP's
official seal as part of the credential-building for the seminar. There is no finding of fact
as to what happened to this request. It is not known if the NAP rejected the City of
Bacoor's request.
Equally true, petitioner did not violate any rule of conduct when the NAP's materials
were disseminated during the seminar. For one, it was not confirmed who directed the
dissemination of the NAP materials at the seminar. For another, under Section 176.1 of
the Intellectual Property Code, the government holds no copyright to its materials.
Notably, there is no finding of fact that petitioner personally materially benefitted from
her attendance at the seminar. Except for the fact that she could have created goodwill for
her own self, as she admitted to being a resident of the City of Bacoor, there is nothing on
record that she obtained a monetary profit from it.
As there could have been no misrepresentation by petitioner at the seminar as to her

representative capacity, there is no basis for the conclusion that petitioner committed
serious dishonesty.
Acts or omissions considered as dishonesty include: making untruthful statements in the

Personal Data Sheet, causing another person to take and pass the Career Service
Professional Examination on his or her behalf,41 use of fake or spurious civil service
eligibility,42 and use of position to make his or her "clients" believe that he or she could
give them undue advantage — over others without the same connection — by processing
their claims faster.43 Intent to deceive and defraud then, is evidently present in the
enumerated cases.
Here, intent to deceive or defraud are not manifest in the act complained of. There was no
showing that petitioner personally benefitted from her attendance as a resource speaker.
In fact, she rendered service to another government unit which had already made
arrangements and incurred costs for the seminar. More, in petitioner's letter-reply to
respondent Manalo's show cause memorandum, she readily apologized and admitted
conducting the seminar without prior office approval.
To conclude, in the absence of evidence proving misrepresentation or any of the other

elements above-stated, we cannot hold petitioner liable for serious dishonesty.
Petitioner's participation at the seminar cannot also constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.

Here, we cannot deduce from the records and circumstances how petitioner's act
amounted to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner's assailed act
did not tarnish the image of her public office, the NAP. Definitely, when petitioner
served as resource speaker at the seminar, she shared her expertise before another
government unit. The records also do not show that petitioner's failure to inform and
secure prior office approval to act as a resource speaker, tarnished the image and integrity
of his or her public office that would have eroded the public's trust and confidence in the
government. This is evident from the fact that the City of Bacoor sent the NAP a letter
after the seminar thanking it and its employees, petitioner and Austria, for their
invaluable contribution to the professionalization of its basic records management.
Hence, it cannot be said that petitioner is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
In the absence of a black-letter law prohibiting the attendance of employees at seminars,

even during their leaves of absence, which are otherwise more efficiently conducted at
the expert government office's behest, we cannot punish administratively an employee
who does so.

LAWS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Teresita Camsol v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 238059, June 8, 2020, Third
Division, Zalameda, J.
FACTS:
Records show that Camsol (petitioner) requested from the CSC-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) the authentication of her Career Service Professional
Eligibility. Thus, she indicated in the Eligibility/Exam Records Request Form (ERRF)
that she passed the Career Service Professional Examination (Computer-Assisted
Test/CAT) on September 16, 2002 in Baguio City with a rating of 82.10.
It appears, however, from the Master List of Eligibles on file with the CSC-CAR
that no Career Service Professional Examination, either Paper or Pencil Test (PPT) or
CAT, was conducted on September 16, 2002 in Baguio City. Instead, it was discovered
that Camsol took and failed the Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE)
conducted on May 2, 2002 and October 17, 2002, where she obtained ratings of both
48.08 on both occasions. Meanwhile, Camsol attributed the issuance of her alleged
spurious Certificate of Eligibility (COE) from a certain Allan, who 'sweet talked' her into
believing that the said COE was legitimate/authentic. That she personally received said
COE from Allan, after she gave him one hundred pesos (P100.00). Allan allegedly asked
for more money but she refused.cralawlawlibrary Finding a prima facie case, petitioner
was formally charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She denied the charges in her answer.
In its 05 February 2016 Decision, the CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR) found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CSC. The
CSC ruled that the CSC dismissed the petition for review filed by the petitioner, as it
affirmed the CSC-CAR's findings. The dispositive portion of the CSC ruling stated:
Wherefore, the Petition for Review of Teresita M. Camsol, Forest Technician II,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Community Environment
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Buguias, Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, is
hereby dismissed. Accordingly, Decision No. 16-0012 dated February 5, 2016 issued by
the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR), Baguio
City, which found her guilty of Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and imposed upon her the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except terminal/accrued leave benefits and personal
contributions to the GSIS, if any, perpetual disqualification from holding public office,
and bar from taking any civil service examinations.
The CSC agreed that petitioner's possession of a spurious/fake Certificate of
Eligibility (COE) sufficed to hold petitioner liable for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Petitioner's
possession of a fake eligibility, in exchange for a fee, constituted violation or
transgression of some rule and manifested corrupt behavior, making her liable for Grave

Misconduct. The CSC likewise found petitioner liable for Serious Dishonesty as her act
of securing the same for a fee tarnished the integrity, not only of the Commission, but the
entire bureaucracy. Further, said act was prejudicial to the interest of the public service.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied in the 07 February 2017
Resolution of the CSC. Hence, petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA denied the petition and affirmed in toto the CSC's decision. The CA held
that petitioner's procurement of the spurious COE, by itself, constituted Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. It emphasized that under Resolution No. 060538, a
dishonest act involving a Civil Service examination or fake Civil Service eligibility, such
as, but not limited to impersonation, cheating, and use of crib sheets, is serious
dishonesty. It added that seriously dishonest acts involving spurious civil service
eligibility likewise result in grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the service.
The offenses of petitioner being grave, the CA sustained the extreme penalties
imposed against her, without considering any mitigating circumstance such as petitioner's
previous clean record, noting that a government employee found guilty of a grave offense
may be dismissed even for the first infraction. For the same reason, the CA likewise
stressed that petitioner's length of service was of no moment, as the seriousness of her
offenses has eclipsed the effect of said circumstance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner is guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Service, and imposing
the penalty of dismissal, without considering any mitigating circumstance in petitioner's
favor.
HELD:
Yes, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding her guilty of the aforesaid
offenses for her mere act of presenting a fake civil service eligibility to the CSC for
validation. Petitioner is adamant that she did not seek the intervention of a certain Allan
to procure the same as she had nothing evil in mind to misrepresent, falsify, or use the
COE which turned out to be spurious. In fact, she neither used it for her benefit nor in any
transaction. When she went to the CSC, her intention was really to determine the
legitimacy of the COE which, to her, appeared to be genuine as it contained her personal
circumstances, signed by the CSC Chairman, and watermarked.
The same notwithstanding, petitioner is apologetic and begs the indulgence of this
Court to extend her some leniency on her transgression. She prays that the penalty of
dismissal and the forfeiture of her retirement benefits be mitigated. The OSG, on the
other hand, concurs with the CA that petitioner's purchase of the eligibility certificate
from Allan was patently illegal, and exemplified grave misconduct. Furthermore,
petitioner's possession of the forged document, knowing that she did not pass the exams,
reflected her want of integrity consistent with serious dishonesty for possessing a fake
Civil Service eligibility.
Nevertheless, the OSG agrees with petitioner that dismissal is too harsh a penalty
for the latter's misdeed. In lieu thereof, the OSG recommended the penalty of suspension
for one year of service.
At the outset, the court emphasize that questions of fact may not be raised
by certiorari under Rule 45 because the court are not a trier of facts. As We explained
in Encinas v. Agustin, et al., findings of fact of administrative bodies, like the CSC, will
not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. These factual findings carry even, more weight when affirmed by the CA, in
which case, they are accorded not only great respect, but even finality.
As adverted to earlier, the facts of the case are not disputed. Petitioner herself
admitted procuring the fake civil service eligibility, despite knowing fully well that she

never passed the civil service exam. What is worse, she even went to the extent of going
to the CSC office to check if the said document could stand the crucible of validation.
She is definitely not innocent, as she claims to be, and must be held accountable under
the law. As CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991 provides: An act which
included the procurement and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving
of assistance to ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion,
impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation of the Civil
Service examination, has been categorized as a grave offense of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty being grave offenses, the penalty of
dismissal may be meted even for the first-time offenders. However, it is not lost to Us
that under Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may still be appreciated in the penalty
to be imposed, with the disciplining authority having the discretion to consider these
circumstances in the interest of substantial justice.
Guided by these past judicious pronouncements and the peculiar circumstances
the court found herein, they find cogent reasons to impose a lower penalty upon
petitioner. Petitioner did not benefit from the spurious certificate of eligibility; neither did
she take advantage of the same to be promoted, as her current position does not require a
2nd grade eligibility. In fact, there was not an instance she indicated in her Personal Data
Sheet that she passed the same examinations. Moreover, petitioner has been diligently
serving the public for more than three decades, from being a casual laborer to her current
position as Forest Technician II. This was also her first offense, not having been the
subject of any complaint, administrative or criminal, since she started working. She was a
loyalty awardee, having rendered 30 years of dedicated service in the government and
was rated very satisfactory in her performance rating. Furthermore, petitioner is now 56
years old and at the threshold of her retirement. Her dismissal from the service could
foreclose her an opportunity to earn income and support her family.
While the court cannot condone or countenance petitioner's offenses, the court
subscribe to the OSG's apt suggestion to appreciate the foregoing factors to mitigate
petitioner's penalty. Indeed, the court should not be impervious to petitioner's plea as the
duty to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline errant employees, and to weed out
from the roster of civil servants those who are found to be undesirable comes with the
sound discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Accordingly,
petitioner is meted the penalty of suspension of one year without pay instead of dismissal.
Wherefore, the petition is partially granted. The penalty of dismissal from service
with accessory penalties imposed upon petitioner Teresita M. Camsol is reduced to one-
year suspension without pay, and with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, VS. HON.
FERNANDO F. FLOR, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-
17-2503, July 28, 2020
FACTS:
If ordinary people are presumed to know the law, judges are duty-bound to
actually know and understand it. Here, the judge's patent disregard of elementary rules in
the grant of bail applications constitutes gross ignorance of the law which merits
administrative sanction.
Atty. Jona Gay Pua-Mendoza, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court Branch
28 of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, wrote a letter to the Office of Deputy Court
Administrator stating that Judge Fernando Flor, Jr. granted bail in criminal cases
involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which is a non-bailable offense. As evidence,
Atty. Pua-Mendoza submitted the corresponding orders/resolutions and transcript of
stenographic notes. Specifically, in Criminal Case. The orders/resolutions granting bail
did not contain a summary of the prosecution evidence. In Criminal Case No. 6998, there
was no hearing on the motion to reduce bail. In Criminal Case No. 7091, there was no
summary of the prosecution evidence and a hearing on the motion to reduce bail. Lastly,
in Criminal Case No. 7826, the accused's motion for reconsideration to allow bail was
granted without a hearing.
Judge Flor, Jr. admitted that he issued the orders/resolutions without a summary
of the prosecution evidence. Moreover, Judge Flor, Jr. explained that he granted bail in
Criminal Case No. 7826 without a hearing because "the accused, though 17 years old, has
a mental capacity of a 10-year-old (Grade 5) boy". Lastly, Judge Flor, Jr. pleaded
compassion in view of his application for early retirement.
On May 8, 2017, the Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Flor, Jr.
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended a fine of P50,000.00. The OCA
also noted that Judge Flor, Jr. had been previously fined with P20,000.00 when he issued
a warrant of arrest knowing that the private complainant is his wife. The OCA's factual
findings are as follows: filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail which was granted and the
bail was reduced to P100,000.00.
II. People vs. Freddie Aquino y Bayaua, Criminal Case No. 7091, for Violation of Article
II, Section 5, R.A. 9165:
I. Criminal Case No. 6998, People vs. Khris Directo, for Violation of Article II, Section
5, R.A. 9165.
On May 15, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion for Bail. Pre-trial conference
was set on May 23, 2013, on motion of the public prosecutor and the defense counsel. On
June 28, 2013, the pre-trial conference was terminated and a Pre-Trial Order was issued

on the same date. On September 18, 2013, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
SPO2 Diosdado Pascual and PSI James Bad-e. The court issued a Resolution on
December 23, 2013, allowing the accused to post bail in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00). The accused, on the same day
After the termination of the pre-trial conference, accused on February 18, 2014,
filed a Petition for Bail, after presentation of some of the prosecution witnesses, the court
granted the motion to post bail in Criminal Case No. 7091 on December 12, 2014. The
accused' motion to reduce bail was granted on January 28, 2015. On January 29, 2015,
accused filed a Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Bail praying that the total reduced
bail be further reduced to P170,000.00. The public prosecutor wrote a marginal note
submitting the motion to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, on February 3, 2015, the
court granted the motion and the bail was accordingly reduced to P 170,000.00.
III. People vs. Edgar Allan Cadaiio and Johfen Garingan y Sandoval, Criminal Case No.
7826, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
The case involves a child in conflict with the law (CICL). Accused Johnfel
Garingan was 17 years old and 6 months old when he was arrested, the case was
originally raffled to Branch 29, a Family Court, but the presiding judge inhibited, records
reveal that there is a pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by counsel to allow him to
post bail which the court granted on February 6, 2015.
Going now to the crux of the controversy, the court find Judge Flor liable for
gross ignorance of the law for his failure to conduct hearings on the Motion to Reduce
Bail in Criminal Case Nos. 6998 and 7091 and on the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order denying bail in Criminal Case No. 7826.
In both cases, Criminal Case Nos. 6998 and 7091, Judge Flor complied with the
requirement of hearing under Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, when
both accused moved for the reduction of the bail, he granted the motions filed by the
accused without conducting a hearing or requiring the public prosecutor to comment on
the motion in Criminal Case No. 6998.
Judge Flor in haste granted the motion for reduction of bail in Criminal Case No.
6998 without giving the prosecution the chance to be heard. In Criminal Case No. 7091,
although the public prosecutor had a marginal note on the motion submitting the motion
to the sound discretion of the court, Judge Flor should have conducted a hearing to
ascertain if the public prosecutor was not contesting the reduced amount of bail. It is also
noted that a cursory reading of the resolutions issued in Criminal Case Nos. 6964, 7060,
7348-49, 7409 and 7091 shows that Judge Flor failed to make a brief summary of
evidence adduced by the prosecution, which is necessary to determine whether he has
adequate basis for granting bail. This was admitted by Judge Flor in his Comment.
Also, the procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail cannot be
dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense.
Utmost diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail
is not a matter of right. Certain procedure must be followed in order that the accused
would be present during trial. As a responsible judge. Judge Flor must not be swayed by
the mere representations of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts
of the case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Flor is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and,
accordingly, be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos.
HELD:
Yes, the Court adopts the OCA's findings with modification as to the penalty.
Judges should maintain competence and diligence which are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office. Their role in the administration of justice requires a
continuous study of the law and jurisprudence. A contrary rule will not only lessen the
faith of the people in the courts but will also defeat the fundamental role of the judiciary
to render justice and promote the rule of law. Thus, unfamiliarity with the laws and
procedures is a sign of incompetence which betrays the confidence of the public in the
courts. Indeed, judges ought to simply apply basic, simple and well-known rules and
jurisprudence. Anything less is ignorance of the law. In that light, the court find that
Judge Flor, Jr.'s disregard of the settled procedures in granting bail reflects gross
ignorance of the law.
Foremost, it is basic that bail cannot be allowed without a prior hearing to a
person charged with an offense punishable with Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment.
As such, bail is a matter of discretion and its grant or denial hinges on the issue of
whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Yet, the determination of the
requisite evidence can only be reached after due hearing. Thus, a judge must first
evaluate the prosecution's evidence. A hearing is likewise required for the trial court to
consider the factors in fixing the amount of bail. Notably, this Court outlined the duties of
a judge in resolving bail applications, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion;[25]
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond otherwise petition should be denied.
Admittedly, Judge Flor, Jr. granted bail in Criminal Case No. 7826 without a
hearing because the accused is a minor and a mental retardate. However, the 2009
Revised Rules on Children in Conflict with the Law is explicit that a child charged with a
capital offense shall not be entitled to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. As discussed,
the determination of the requisite evidence is a matter of judicial discretion.
Consequently, absent a prior hearing, the order granting bail can hardly be a product of
Judge Flor, Jr.'s sound discretion. Also, Judge Flor, Jr. exhibited cavalier indifference to
the rules when he allowed in Criminal Case No. 7091 the motion to reduce bail without a
hearing. This is contrary to the clear mandate of the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding
Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial that a
motion to reduce bail shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases.
Lastly, Judge Flor, Jr. conceded that the orders/resolutions granting bail in
Criminal Case Nos. 6964, 7060, 7348-49 and 7409 did not contain a summary of the
prosecution evidence. In numerous cases, the court held that the order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence which is an aspect of judicial due
process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong. The summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of judicial due process for
both the prosecution and the defense. Taken together, Judge Flor, Jr. committed gross
ignorance of the law and procedure in granting bail applications without a prior hearing
and in not stating the factual and legal reasons in his Orders or Resolutions. This
administrative offense is classified as a serious charge and is punishable by any of the
following penalties: (1) fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00; (2)
suspension from office for more than three but not exceeding six months, without salary
and other benefits; (3) or dismissal from service, with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits.
The multiple counts of gross ignorance of the law in this case and the previous
misconduct in A.M No. RTJ-06-1995 raised a serious question on Judge Flor, Jr.'s
competence and integrity in the performance of his functions as a magistrate. Indeed, the
several occasions that Judge Flor, Jr. disregarded the rules in granting bail applications
could have been the subject of different administrative complaints which deserve separate
penalties for each violation.[38] As such, the Court could no longer afford to be lenient this
time, lest it would give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated
offenders are being countenanced in the judiciary. Considering Judge Flor, Jr.'s repeated
infractions and refusal to correct his ways despite previous warning, the Court is
constrained to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.
The court remind that when a judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law
which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for
the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
itself, thus: To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.
Hence, they are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. They are likewise
expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith.
Further, judges should administer their office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of law itself, remembering that they are not depositories of arbitrary power,
but are judges under the sanction of law. It must be emphasized that this Court has
formulated and promulgated rules of procedure to ensure the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Wanton failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom
behind them and diminishes respect for the rule of law.
For these reasons, the Court finds Judge Fernando F. Flor, Jr. guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and orders his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, VALLADOLID-SAN ENRIQUE-
PULUPANDAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL A.M. No. 20-06-18-MCTC, September
29, 2020
FACTS:
For consideration is the Final Report dated January 16, 2020 on the financial audit
conducted on the books of accounts of Mr. George E. Santos, Mr. Ignacio D. Denila, and
Mr. John O. Negroprado of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid-San Enrique-
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The financial audit was conducted due to Negroprado's
failure to submit his monthly financial reports over the following funds maintained by the
MCTC: (1) Fiduciary Fund (FF); (2) Sheriffs Trust Fund; (3) Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF); (4) Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF); (5) Mediation Fund
(MF); and (6) Clerk of Court General Fund-Old (COCGF-Old) and General Fund-New.
This resulted in the withholding of his salaries effective April 24, 2009 and his exclusion
from the payroll beginning January 2010 to the present.
For the FF: The audit of the Court's FF account showed a balance of P342,100.00
as of April 30, 2013. However, the balance of the Court's FF account in the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP), Bacolod Branch, Savings Account No. 0421-2704-73 was only
P89,600.00 disclosing a shortage of P252,500.00 The accountability of P252,500.00
pertains to Mr. Negroprado which was only settled on January 3, 2019.
For the JDF: A financial audit of the JDF also disclosed a shortage of P71,932.50
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, Denila and Santos had excess remittances on the
JDF Account. The over remittance made by Denila in the amount of P20,698.00 and the
P674.00 over remittance made by Santos were intended to be deposited to the COCGF-
Old. While Denila and Santos had excess remittances, Negroprado incurred a shortage in
the amount of P93,304.50 which he restituted only on January 3, 2019.
For the SAJF: The audit of the SAJF likewise disclosed that Negroprado had an
accountability balance of P152,105.50, to wit: On January 3, 2019 and November 5,
2019, Negroprado deposited the amount of P152,105.30 and P0.20, respectively, to settle
his accountability on the SAJF account.
For the MF: The audit further disclosed that Negroprado incurred an
accountability balance of P44,000.00 in the MF. The P44,000.00 shortage on the MF was
only settled by Negroprado on January 3, 2019.
For the COCGF-Old: The audit of the COCGF-Old showed that Denila, Santos,
and Negroprado had an accountability balance of P21,478.00 on the account.
After examination, it was discovered that P20,698.00 of the P21,478.00 shortage
was due to Denila's excess deposit to the JDF. Also, Santos' P647.00 shortage in the
COCGF-Old was also due to.his over remittance to the JDF. While Denila and Santos'
accountabilities were merely due to their inadvertent excess remittances to the JDF
account, Negroprado actually incurred shortage on the COCGF-Old account in the
amount of P106.00 which he restituted on July 19, 2019.
Collectively, Negroprado incurred shortages on the various judiciary funds in the
sum of P542,015.80. On December 4, 2015, Negroprado submitted to Atty. Gilda A.
Sumpo, then Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Accounting Division, Financial Management
Office (FMO), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), his explanation that he was
forced to use the collections of the Court to sustain the needs of his family. He added that
due to his low take-home pay, he incurred loans from the Supreme Court Loan
Association and the Government Service Insurance System to pay off his loans for the
hospitalization of his three minor children due to dengue fever.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Negroprado violated Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 and
OCA Circular No. 113-2004 and should be fined with the amount of P25,000.00.
HELD:
Yes, the Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice from judges to the most junior clerks is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict
propriety and decorum at all times. OCA Circular No. 113-2004 dated September 16,
2004 mandates that the Monthly Reports of Collections and Deposits for the JDF, SAJ,
and FF should be sent not later than the 10th day of each succeeding month to the Chief
Accountant, Accounting Division, FMO, OCA.
Moreover, Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as amended, dated August 20,
2004 requires that the daily collections, of funds in the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, MCTC,
Shari'a District Court and Shari'a Circuit Court should be deposited everyday with the
nearest LBP branch, or if depositing daily is not possible, deposits for tit fund shall be at
the end of every month, provided, however, that whenever collections for the fund reach
P500.00, it shall be deposited immediately even before the period above-mentioned.
Being a court personnel holding the position Clerk of Court II, Negroprado was
expected to comply with the foregoing circulars by faithfully submitting his monthly
reports and by remitting his judiciary collections accordingly. However, Negroprado
failed to do so.
Being the custodians of court funds and revenues, clerks of court have always
been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to
the authorized government depositories pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 35-2004,
as amended, dated August 20, 2004; and to timely submit their Monthly Report of
Collections, Deposits, and Withdrawals conformably with OCA Circular No. 113-2004
dated September 16, 2004. For the delayed deposit of his judiciary collections and the
late submission of his financial reports, Negroprado was indubitably remiss in his duties
as branch Clerk of Court II of the MCTC.
When asked to explain, Negroprado readily admitted that he was forced to use the
collections of the Court to sustain the needs of his family. He added that due to his low

take-home pay, he incurred loans from the Supreme Court Loan Association and the
Government Service Insurance System to pay off his loans for the hospitalization of his
three minor children due to dengue fever. For this, the OCA recommended that
Negroprado be fined with P25,000.00 and be sternly warned that a repetition of the same
offense will be dealt with more severely.
In determining the applicable penalty, the Court had, in the past, mitigated the
administrative penalties imposed on erring judicial officers and employees. This is
consistent with the precedent where this Court refrained from imposing the actual
administrative penalties prescribed by law or regulation in the presence of mitigating
factors.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Former Clerk of Court Jamora, et al.,
Clerk of Court Angelita A. Jamora was found liable for her failure to timely deposit her
judiciary collections. She explained that the delay in the restitution of her shortages in the
sum of P124,267.60 were caused by financial difficulties. She explained that she was the
sole income earner of her family because her husband had a disability, and that they had
four children who were still studying. Observing that it was her first administrative case;
that she fully restituted the amounts involved; and that she held two positions at the same
time, the Court tempered its decision and reduced her penalty to a fine of P10,000.00.
Indeed, while the Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to
discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, the Court also
has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy, especially in this
time where employment and the economy face catastrophe because of the pandemic.
In this case, the Court takes into consideration Negroprado's full restitution of his
collections leaving no outstanding accountabilities. The Court also notes that he fully
cooperated with the audit team during the investigation of his infractions by submitting
his Monthly Report of Collections, Deposits, and Withdrawals without any irregularities,
tampering, or falsifications. To the Court's mind, these acts amount to remorse and taking
full responsibility for the infractions he committed, and thus, may be duly appreciated in
imposing a penalty.
All told, for Negroprado's failure to immediately deposit the various judiciary
funds received by him, in violation of Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as amended;
and for his failure to timely submit his Monthly Report of Collections, Deposits, and
Withdrawals, in contravention of OCA Circular No. 113-2004, the Court Adopts the
recommendation of the OCA that Negroprado must be held administratively liable by a
Fine. However, the Court finds the recommended Fine of P25,000.00 insufficient and
instead imposes upon him the Fine of P50,000.00, conformably with Viesca, to be
deducted from the withheld salaries to be released to him.

IN RE: ALLEGED CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS IRREGULARITY OF
MR. VILLAMOR D. BAUTISTA, CASHIER I, AND MS. ERLINDA T. BULONG,
CLERK IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOTH OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA A.M.
NO. 17-01-16-MTCC
IN RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST DOCKET CLERK ERLINDA
BULONG, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
IN CITIES, SANTIAGO CITY, ISABELA A.M. No. 16-03-29-MTCC, September
29, 2020
FACTS:
In a letter dated 28 January 2016, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the results of its
investigation into alleged serious dishonesty committed by Bautista and Bulong. The
charges stem from irregularities in taking the civil service exam. Bautista
supposedly took the civil service exam on 19 June 1997 in Quezon City, while
Bulong took the exam on 24 May 1998 in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. However, the
CSC found discrepancies when it compared the photos in their Personal Data Sheets
(PDS) to their photos in the picture seating plan during their respective exams.
Meanwhile, the OCA received an anonymous complaint proffering the same
allegations against Bulong.
The OCA directed Bautista and Bulong to comment on the CSCs report. In
his Comment, Bautista denied the charge and maintained that he has been serving
the Judiciary faithfully since 1997. On the other hand, Bulong denied the allegation
saying that she did not take the civil service exam but instead availed of the
"cultural minority eligibility" since she was an Ybanag.
In a Resolution dated 20 March 2017, the Court ordered the complaints to be
consolidated and referred to Executive Judge Alexander De Guzman for investigation,
report, and recommendation. In his Report, Judge De Guzman found Bautista and Bulong
administratively liable. First, Judge De Guzman found that there was indeed another
person who took the civil service exam in Bulong's name, but she denied knowing that
person. She also denied taking the civil service exam, but admitted reflecting the results
thereof in her PDS, making it appear that she did take and pass the exam. She claimed
that she made a mistake and pleaded for mercy since she did not use the same to apply for
a promotion.
Second, Judge De Guzman held that Bautista failed to substantiate his claim that
he personally took the exam and submitted his own picture for that purpose. Judge De
Guzman found Bautista's explanation for why the picture of another person appears in the
picture seat plan to be insubstantial. The investigating judge noted that Bautista cannot
deny the identity of the person who took the exam because he himself knew the person to
be Romeo Gatcheco, former sheriff of Branch 1, MTCC Santiago City.
The OCA adopted Judge De Guzman's findings and recommendation. The OCA
found that while Bulong admitted that she did not take the civil service exam and claimed
to not know who actually did take it, she still claimed the result as her own. It was noted
that the test result is reflected in Bulong's PDS. The OCA also brushed aside Bulong's
claim that the irregularity is part of a plot concocted by her husband's mistress, who
supposedly has relatives in the CSC. As to Bautista, the OCA held that his denials were
unsupported by any corroborating testimony. The OCA also rejected Bautista's claim that
he did not know the person whose picture appears in the picture seat plan, noting that
even Judge De Guzman recognized that person as a former Santiago City MTCC
employee; hence, Bautista's former co-worker.
The OCA averred that while neither Bautista nor Bulong used the falsified civil
service eligibility for promotion, both "enjoyed their respective permanent positions
without the requisite eligibility." The OCA recommended that Bautista and Bulong be
found guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of Public Documents,
and dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification
from government employment. Further, the OCA also recommended the forfeiture of
Bautista's accrued leave credits from the day of his appointment as Cashier I (09
December 1997) until the present because he was ineligible for the position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bautista and Bulong are guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
and Falsification of Public Documents.
HELD:
Yes, Republic Act No. 9416 has declared "any form of cheating in civil service
examinations" to be illegal and unlawful. Specifically, Section 3 (b) defines cheating, to
wit:
Cheating refers to any act or omission before, during or after any civil service
examination that will directly or indirectly undermine the sanctity and integrity of the
examination such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Impersonation;
(7) Possession and or use of fake certificate of eligibility;
These are the acts being attributed to Bautista and Bulong. Both deny the charges
and claim lack of knowledge of the irregularity, but the evidence, nonetheless, bears out
their guilt. An examination of the picture seat plan which bears the name of Bautista
clearly shows the picture of a person different from the person whose picture appears in
Bautista's PDS. The signature used by Bautista in his PDS is also unmistakably different
from the signature that appears on the picture seat plan. Bautista never explained these
glaring discrepancies. Instead, Bautista relies only on denial. However, it is well-settled
that denial is an inherently weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with no
evidentiary value." No such evidence was offered by Bautista. On the contrary, the
evidence shows that the person whose picture appears on the picture seat plan is
Bautista's former co-worker, and someone known enough within the Santiago City

MTCC for Judge De Guzman himself to recognize. Bautista did not deny this fact;
indeed, he did not even address this important point in his explanation.
Interesting, too, is that Bautista never proffered evidence to support his claim that
he took the exam himself. The only conclusion is that such exonerating evidence does not
exist.
On the other hand, Bulong's claim of her own lack of knowledge fails to persuade.
It is noteworthy that the signature on the picture seat plan appears to be similar to
Bulong's signature on her PDS. Likewise, the person who signed the picture seat plan
gave the exact same date as her birthday. Yet, the photo that appears on the picture seat
plan is of a person indubitably different from the person whose picture appears in
Bulong's PDS. Bulong never even claimed that she took the exam herself, explaining that
she had gained her civil service eligibility as a member of a cultural minority. She,
however, has not given a sufficient explanation why her name, signature, and birthday
appeared in the picture seat plan. Instead, Bulong accuses her husband and his mistress of
conspiring against her.
Pinning the blame on a nefarious plot by a wayward husband and his mistress is
not even new. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Bermejo, the offender employed
the same tired tactic to evade liability. The Court in that case noted that Bermejo was
unable to explain how her husband and his mistress could have manipulated the CSC
personnel and persuade another person to take the exam in her name. Needless to say, the
Court was not swayed then and it is not swayed now.
Bulong did not present any evidence to support this claim. Neither did she explain
why they devised the scheme against her. Morever, if there was indeed such a scheme,
Bulong never informed the CSC, her superiors in the MTCC, or even this Court, of this
plot.
As the Court has previously noted, "in the offense of impersonation, there are
always two persons involved. The offense cannot prosper without the active participation
of both persons." That she claimed the test results as her own further convinces the Court
that the plot was known to Bulong. Also noteworthy is that neither Bautista nor Bulong
disputed the authenticity of the picture seat plan. The records of the CSC are "presumed
correct and made in the regular course of official business." In particular, the Court has
recognized the picture seat plan as "a public document which is admissible in evidence
without need of proof of its authenticity and due execution." As such, "the entries thereof
made in the course of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein."
The Court has also upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties of the CSC personnel, thus:
Those government employees who prepared the picture seat plan and who
supervised the conduct of the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination, enjoy the
presumption that they regularly performed their duties and this presumption cannot be
disputed by mere conjectures and speculations. Both Bautista and Bulong failed to
overcome the presumption of regularity in administering the civil service exam. They
also did not present any proof to counter the CSC's documentary evidence. More
importantly, Bautista and Bulong have not satisfactorily explained why they claimed the
results of the exams in their PDS. If it is true that they have no knowledge of the
irregularity on taking the exam, they should not have claimed these results in their PDS
knowing the same to be false information. Even if the Court were inclined to believe they

were not party to the irregularity, it does not overturn the fact that they knowingly used
the false Certificate of Eligibility for their own advantage.
On this matter, the law and CSC rules are clear: "the use of a false certificate of
eligibility constitutes an act of dishonesty under civil service rules warranting the penalty
of dismissal. "The same acts also "resulted to the prejudice of the government and the
public in general," which the Court will never countenance. In claiming the results of the
civil service exam, they did not take as their own and reflecting the same in their PDS,
Bautista and Bulong committed Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document.
Falsification of the PDS is considered a "dishonest act related to their employment" and
"shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an
intention to violate the truth."
Finally, the court agrees with the OCA's recommendation on the penalty to be
imposed on the transgressing employees.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 9416 states:
SECTION 9. Administrative Liability- Any person found administratively liable under
any of the acts mentioned above, shall be liable for serious dishonesty and grave
misconduct and shall be dismissed from the service with all the accessory penalties for
government employees. Nongovernment employees found administratively liable shall be
perpetually barred from entering government service and from taking any government
examination.
Meanwhile, the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RAACCS)
makes the following classification of offenses:
Rule 10
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
Section 50. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave and light, depending on the depravity and
effect on the government service.
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
1. Serious dishonesty;
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
3. Gross Misconduct;
4. Being Notoriously Undesirable;
5. Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude;
6. Falsification of Official Document;
Bautista and Bulong are both guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Falsification of Official Document. These are all grave offenses, making them unfit
to remain as public servants and employees of the judiciary. By their acts, Bautista and
Bulong "failed to take heed of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which regards
all court personnel as sentinels of justice expected to refrain from any act of impropriety."
The Court has always maintained that Judiciary employees are required to strictly and
faithfully adhere to the highest degree of ethical conduct. In failing to do so, Bautista and
Bulong have forfeited their place in its esteemed halls.

While the OCA recommended the forfeiture of Bautista's leave credits from the
time of his employment in the judiciary because he was not qualified for the position, the
Court, however, finds no legal basis for the same. In Cabanatan v. Molina where a sheriff
of the Regional Trial (RTC) was dismissed from the service, the Court, in ordering the
forfeiture of therein respondent's retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits,
applied by analogy, Rule 140, Section 11(1) of the Rules of Court on the discipline of
judges and justices of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Appeals, to wit:
SEC. 11. Sanction. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, [37] any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the services, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
The Court also notes that in previous cases of Dishonesty committed through falsification
of civil service eligibility, impersonation, or falsification of the PDS, where the penalty
imposed is dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, the Court
explicitly excludes accrued leave benefits from such forfeiture.

ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO P. PINTAC AND
MS. LORELEI T. SUMAGUE, STENOGRAPHER, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 15, OZAMIZ CITY
A.M. No. P-20-4091 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3559-P]
EXECUTIVE JUDGE EDMUNDO P. PINTAC V. ROLANDO O. RUIZ,
PROCESS SERVER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 15, OZAMIZ CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2598 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3600-RTJ]
ROLANDO O. RUIZ, PROCESS SERVER, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 15, OZAMIZ CITY V. JUDGE EDMUNDO P. PINTAC, EXECUTIVE
JUDGE AND PRESIDING JUDGE, SAME COURT
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2599 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3633-RTJ]
ROLANDO O. RUIZ V. EXECUTIVE JUDGE EDMUNDO P. PINTAC,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 15, OZAMIZ CITY.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ABBA
MARIE B. DEL ROSARIO, COURT INTERPRETER I; ATTY. MARIA PAZ V.
ZALSOS-UYCHIAT, FORMER CLERK OF COURT VI; AND ATTY. AISA B.
MUSA-BARRAT, INCUMBENT CLERK OF COURT VI, ALL OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE, RESPONDENTS.
A.M. No. P-20-4071, September 15, 2020
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ABBA MARIE
B. DEL ROSARIO, COURT INTERPRETER I; ATTY. MARIA PAZ V. ZALSOS-
UYCHIAT, FORMER CLERK OF COURT VI; AND ATTY. AISA B. MUSA-
BARRAT, INCUMBENT CLERK OF COURT VI, ALL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
This is an administrative matter stemming from an audit conducted by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the books of accounts of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tubod, Lanao del Norte, in view of the resignation on January
31, 2017 of Atty. Maria Paz Teresa V. Zalsos-Uychiat (Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat) as
Clerk of Court.

The objectives of the financial review were: (1) to determine the accuracy and
regularity of the cash transactions of the said court; (2) to ascertain whether all the
judiciary fund collections have been deposited in full within the prescribed period; (3) to
examine whether the filing fees collected were in accordance with Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court; and (4) to aid the Clerk of Court of the said court on the proper bookkeeping
and accounting of judiciary funds.
The audit team of OCA (Financial Audit Team) reported that the court employees
acted as accountable officers with the corresponding accountability period. In its Report
dated June 18, 2020, the Financial Audit Team found numerous irregularities in the
management of judiciary funds, as well as missing or unaccounted amounts from the
court a quo's bank accounts, to wit:
1. The cash count on October 8, 2018, under the accountability of Atty. Aisa B.
Musa-Barrat (Atty. Musa-Barrat), yielded a cash shortage of PI 64,520.00.
This represents unremitted collections for the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF), Special Allowance for Judiciary Fund (SAJF), Mediation Fund (MF),
Fiduciary Fund (FF), Legal Research Fund (LRF) and Land Registration
Authority (LRA).
2. All official receipts (ORs) requisitioned from the Property Division of the
Office of Administrative Services (OAS), OCA, were duly accounted for
except for three booklets with serial numbers 86677451 -86677500 and
6538201-6538300 which were not presented for examination. As of September
30, 2018, 310 out of 437 booklets had been utilized, with 118 booklets unused.
3. An examination of the Undertakings of Cash Bond Deposit, Release Orders

from Detention and original ORs show discrepancies in the data shown in the
ORs. The Financial Audit Team found that in some instances when a cash
bond was posted, the court only issued an Undertaking of Cash Bond Deposit
in lieu of the corresponding OR. In other cases, the OR numbers were falsified
while the receipts were tampered. These irregularities resulted in a total
amount of P2,342,500.00 in unremitted and un-receipted cash bond
collections. These irregularities occurred between 2014 and January 2017
during the incumbency of Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat as Clerk of Court. However,
Ms. Del Rosario admitted to tampering and falsifying some of these receipts.
4. With regard to the Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF), the Financial Audit Team found
that a total amount of P6,000.00 was withdrawn by Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat on
April 15, 2016 without matching collection. No supporting document for said
STF withdrawals was attached to the file copies of the court's monthly
financial reports.
5. As to the JDF Collections, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat failed to remit a total amount

of PI 1,849.00 covering the period of January 1 to 20, 2017.
On the other hand, Atty. Musa-Barrat under-remitted the amount of Pl,443.80.

Nevertheless, she restituted the amount of Pl,475.80 on January 9, 2019 and
January 29, 2020. The Financial Audit Team observed that Atty. Musa-Barrat
incurred delay in the remittance of the JDF collections.
6. With regard to SAJF collections, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat failed to remit the

amounts covering the period of January 1 to 20, 2017, or a total of P14,296.00.
Ms. Perocho had an unremitted amount of P91.00 but was able to restitute the
same.
Atty. Musa-Barrat failed to remit on time the amount of PI,862.60. She
restituted PI,662.60 on January 9, 2019 and P200.00 on February 14, 2020.
7. For General Fund - New (GF-New), Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat failed to remit the
total amount of PI 9,832.00.
8. Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat has an outstanding balance of P500.00 for unremitted MF

collections.
Atty. Musa-Barrat failed to remit the amount of PI,500.00 but was able to
restitute the same on January 10, 2019.
9. An examination of the collections for the LRF and the LRA revealed shortages
of P3,282.41 and P3,790.00, respectively. Ms. Perocho restituted P790.00 to
the LRA on January 31, 2020. On the other hand, Atty. Musa-Barrat remitted
PI,000.00 on January 10, 2019.
10. In fine, the unrestitituted accountabilities of Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat and Ms.

Perocho are broken down
The Financial Audit Team found that with regard to the missing amount of
P672,000.60 from the FF that was initially attributed to Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat,
P648,000.00 was actually unaccounted for due to the machinations of Ms.
Abba Marie B. Del Rosario (Ms. Del Rosario).
11. Further, the Financial Audit Team also made the following findings:
1. The court incurred delay in the submission of the monthly financial reports for
December 2017 to September 2018 to the Accounting Division, Financial
Management Office (FMO), OCA;
2. The court failed to maintain an official cash book for each fund for the
recording of financial transactions;
3. Fines imposed in drug cases and as penalty for the crime committed were
receipted and remitted to the FF account instead of the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and GF-New accounts, respectively, pursuant to OCA Circular
No. 26-2018 dated 13 February 2018; and
4. The Victim's Compensation Fund (VCF) of Five Pesos (P5.00) was not
collected in civil cases filed in court, in violation of Section 20 of Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.
The explanation of Ms. Del Rosario is that in her letter dated December 13, 2018,
Ms. Del Rosario made the erasures, tampering and non-issuance of ORs due to the
unavailability of court receipts for several months in 2015. She likewise admitted that she
failed to issue ORs for some bonds because of her failure to replenish the funds therefor.
She also asserted that she was not well acquainted with the process of issuance of
receipts.
Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat executed an Affidavit dated December 13, 2018, claiming
that she had no knowledge of the irregular practices in the court a quo as well as her
surprise that the Financial Audit Team arrived at such findings. She asserted that she
delegated all fiscal matters to Ms. Del Rosario, believing in good faith that the latter was
performing such functions properly. As proof of her innocence, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat
provided screenshots of Ms. Del Rosario's text messages confessing to the irregularities
that were discovered by the Financial Audit Team.
Atty. Musa-Barrat explained that because she was new to her job, she was not
able to submit the monthly reports on time. She alleged that on her first day as Clerk of
Court a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 was posted by an accused, which amount she
was not able to deposit because the bank closed early. She kept the said amount in her
bag for safekeeping but the same was stolen when she had dinner in a fastfood restaurant
in Iligan City. She was unable to restitute the said amount on time because it took months
before she received her initial salary. As to her other lapses, Atty. Musa-Barrat
acknowledged the same and sought the Court's forgiveness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OCA should issue a Memorandum adopting the findings of the
Financial Audit Team and recommending disciplinary actions to be taken.
HELD:
Yes, this report be docketed as a regular administrative matter against the
following personnel:
1. Ms. ABBA MARIE B. DEL ROSARIO, Court Interpreter I, RTC, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, for receiving collections without issuing official receipts (ORs) as an
acknowledgment of payments, tampering of the triplicate and duplicate copies of ORs,
using one (1) OR for two (2) different transactions, falsifying of data collections in the
Undertaking of Cash Bond Deposits, lapping of collections and remittances, and non-
remittance and non-reporting of collections;
2. Atty. MARIA PAZ TERESA V. ZALSOS-UYCHIAT, former Clerk of Court VI,
RTC, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for failure to exercise reasonable diligence, prudence and
due care in the performance of her duties which resulted to the shortages in the judiciary
fund; and
3. Atty. AISA B. MUSA-BARRAT, incumbent Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Tubod, Lanao
del Norte, for failure to remit the court collections and submit the monthly financial
reports on time, record the financial transactions in the respective book of accounts,
exercise prudence in the handling of court's ORs and to take necessary and reasonable

measure that could have prevented the loss and misuse of court receipts and the
occurrence of unremitted collections.
4. Ms. ABBA MARIE B. DEL ROSARIO, Court Interpreter I, RTC, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, be METED the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits considering that the infractions committed involve dishonesty, grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty;
5. Atty. MARIA PAZ TERESA V. ZALSOS-UYCHIAT, former Clerk of Court VI,
RTC, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, be FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (PHP
30,000.00), considering that the infractions committed constitute simple neglect of duty;
6. Atty. AISA B. MUSA-BARRAT, incumbent Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Tubod, Lanao
del Norte, be METED the penalty of suspension without pay considering that her
offenses involve neglect of duty, with stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Upon appointment to a public office, an officer or employee is required to take his
or her oath of office whereby he or she solemnly swears to support and defend the
Constitution, bear true faith and allegiance to the same; obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; and faithfully discharge to the
best of his or her ability the duties of the position he or she will hold. Thus, the
Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. At the
outset, a review of the nature of the offenses involved in this administrative matter is in
order. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It is intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To warrant
dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence.
Dishonesty, as an administrative offense, is defined as the concealment or
distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the
performance of his duties. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and
lack of fairness and straightforwardness. Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad
judgment or negligence, but a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person charged with dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of
mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal
for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning
he could have had at that moment. Gross dishonesty on the part of an employee of the
Judiciary is a very serious offense that must be severely punished.
Lastly, neglect of duty can be classified into simple neglect and gross neglect.
Simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper
attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference." On the other hand, gross neglect of duty is defined as
"negligence characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never
fail to give to their own property." Gross neglect of duty denotes a flagrant and culpable
refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty.
In accordance with Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), the penalty for the offenses of grave misconduct,
gross or serious dishonesty, and gross neglect of duty is dismissal from the service, even
for first time offenders, and carries with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service. As to simple neglect of duty, it is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second offense under Section 46 (D) of the RRACCS.
With these parameters in mind, the court now proceed to the administrative
liabilities of Ms. Del Rosario, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat and Atty. Musa-Barrat.
The Court modifies the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
As to the Liability of Ms. Del Rosario, the safekeeping of funds and collections is
essential to an orderly administration of justice, and no protestation of good faith can
override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability for
government funds. It is for this reason that court circulars and other relevant rules for
proper documentation such as by submission to the court of reports of collections of all
funds and proper issuance of receipts, among others, were designed. Clerks of Court and
those acting in this capacity - such as Ms. Del Rosario who was delegated to manage the
fiscal matters of the court a quo -perform a delicate function as designated custodian of
the court's funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. Hence, any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of those funds and property makes them accountable. As such,
even the mere delay by the Clerks of Court or cash clerks in remitting the funds collected
is considered as gross neglect of duty or as grave misconduct. In delaying the remittance
of court collections without advancing any valid or legal justification, and in tampering
and falsifying official receipts to make it appear that court payments received were issued
the proper receipts, Ms. Del Rosario committed gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and
gross neglect of duty. Moreover, her acts may subject her to criminal liability. Verily, her
grave misdemeanors justify her severance from the service.
As to the Liability of Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat the court disagree with the OCA's
assessment that Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat is guilty only of simple neglect of duty. Her
transgression constitutes gross neglect of duty. As the former Clerk of Court of the court a
quo, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat performed a delicate function as the designated custodian of
the court's funds. revenues, records, properties, and premises. She had the primary
responsibility to immediately deposit the funds received by her office with the authorized
government depositories. She likewise exercised general administrative supervision over
all of the court personnel under her charge. The fact that Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat delegated
the fiscal matters of the court a quo to Ms. Del Rosario does not exonerate her from
administrative liability for the numerous grave irregularities that were committed under
her watch. As Clerk of Court, it was incumbent upon Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat, at the barest
minimum, to ensure that Ms. Del Rosario was properly carrying out her tasks. Her
lackadaisical management, indifference to the financial status of the court a quo, and
overall failure to exercise the required degree of supervision over Ms. Del Rosario
ineluctably enabled the latter to sustain her fraudulent machinations for more or less three
years. Her theatrical declaration that she was "shocked, surprised, and flabbergasted" by
the scale of the loss of judiciary funds only lends credence to the proportionate magnitude

of her negligence. Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat is, ultimately, "liable for any loss, shortage,
destruction or impairment of those entrusted" to her as Clerk of Court. Indeed, it is settled
that any shortages in the amounts remitted and any delays incurred in the actual
remittance of collections shall constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerks of
court concerned shall be held administratively liable. This principle squarely applies to
the instant administrative matter.
In view of her resignation on January 31, 2017, the penalty of dismissal can no
longer be imposed against Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat. This, however, does not free her from
administrative liability. As the Court declared in a case: Neglect of duty is the failure to
give one's attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such neglect that, from the
gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten the public welfare. The term does not necessarily include willful
neglect or intentional official wrongdoing. Those responsible for such act or omission
cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court. The imposable penalty for gross
neglect of duty is dismissal from the service.
Ordonez resigned effective May 4, 2009, purportedly to migrate to Canada. His
resignation would not extricate him from the consequences of his gross neglect of duty,
because the Court has not allowed resignation to be an escape or an easy way out to
evade administrative liability or administrative sanction. Ordonez remains
administratively liable, but his resignation prevents his dismissal from the service. A fine
can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion of the Court.
Section 56 (e) of Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules provides that fine as a penalty
shall be in an amount not exceeding the salary for six months had the respondent not
resigned, the rate for which is that obtaining at the time of his resignation. The fine shall
be deducted from any accrued leave credits, with the respondent being personally liable
for any deficiency that should be directly payable to this Court. He is further declared
disqualified from any future government service.
Prescinding from the foregoing pronouncement, the court hereby impose a fine
equivalent to Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat's salary for six (6) months in lieu of dismissal from the
service. In addition, she is disqualified in perpetuity from holding any future public
office.
As to the Liability of Atty. Musa-Barrat, based on the foregoing discussions on
the responsibilities of clerks of court with regard to the safeguarding of judiciary funds,
Atty. Musa-Barrat's failure to remit court collections within the prescribed period also
constitutes gross neglect of duty. Nevertheless, in Judge Arganosa-Maniego v. Salinas,
the Court held that: However, in several administrative cases, the Court has refrained
from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as
the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his or her
infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable
considerations, respondent's advanced age, among other things, have had varying
significance in the Court's determination of the imposable penalty. Conformably with the
above pronouncement, dismissal is too harsh a penalty for Atty. Musa-Barrat. Unlike Ms.
Del Rosario and Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat, she sincerely acknowledged her shortcomings,
exhibiting genuine remorse and vowing to learn from this undesirable experience. The
court deem it proper to impose upon her the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1)
year without pay, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

A final note. Time and again, this Court has made the pronouncement that any act
which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of
those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.
Accordingly, the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times
in order to merit and maintain the public's respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless
to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity,
honesty and uprightness." As front liners in the administration of justice, court personnel
should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service, and
in this light, are always expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Any conduct, act,
or omission that may diminish the people's faith in the Judiciary should not be tolerated.
Wherefore the judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ms. ABBA MARIE B. DEL ROSARIO is found GUILTY of gross dishonesty, grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. She is ordered DISMISSED from the service,
effective immediately. All benefits - except accrued leave credits, if any - are hereby
FORFEITED. She is DISQUALIFIED from reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. Furthermore, she is ORDERED to restitute the shortage in the Fiduciary
Fund amounting to Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Pesos (P648,000.00), with a copy
of the machine validated deposit slip as proof of restitution. She is DIRECTED to
SUBMIT the following within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to FMD, CMO,
OCA:
a. Pertinent documents to validate the unidentified withdrawal from the High Yielding
Savings Account (HYSA) on 20 August 2009 amounting to One Hundred Five Thousand
Pesos (P105,000.00), otherwise, this will be added to the shortages of P648,000.00 and
restitute the same; and
b. One (1) booklet of missing ORs with serial numbers 8677451 - 8677500, otherwise,
CAUSE the posting of Notice of Loss of the said booklet at least for a period of one (1)
month in three (3) conspicuous places in Tubod, Lanao del Norte and the publication of
the same in the newspaper of local circulation for at least two (2) days.
c. Any future withdrawal of cash bond/s pertaining to the collections for the period 2014
to January 2017, not included in the list of un receipted and unremitted collections for the
said period or in the Statement of Un-withdrawn FF as of 30 September 2018 be
CHARGED to Ms. Del Rosario;
d. Any unpaid accountabilities of Ms. Del Rosario be CHARGED against her available
terminal leave pay and other benefits;
e. The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, OCA be
DIRECTED to COMPUTE the balance of earned leave credits of Ms. Del Rosario and
FURNISH the Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA with the Certificate of Leave
Credits, computerized service record and Notice of Salary Adjustment; and
f. The FMO, OCA be DIRECTED to APPLY the monetary value of the accrued leave
credits and other benefits of Ms. Del Rosario against her unpaid accountabilities,
dispensing with the usual documentary requirements.
2. Atty. MARIA PAZ TERESA V. ZALSOS-UYCHIAT is found GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty. She is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to her salary for six (6)
months, computed at the salary rate of her former position at the time of her resignation.
She is further declared DISQUALIFIED from reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. She is ORDERED to restitute the shortages in the Fiduciary Fund, Sheriffs
Trust Fund, Judiciary Development Fund, Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund,
General Fund -New, Mediation Fund, Legal Research Fund, and Land Registration
Authority Fund in the total amount of Eighty-Six Thousand Pesos and 1/100
(P86,000.01), with a copy of the machine validated deposit slips as proofs of restitution.
3. Atty. AISA B. MUSA-BARRAT is found GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. She is
SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year without pay with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. She is
ordered to SUBMIT the two (2) booklets of missing ORs with serial numbers 6538201-
6538300, otherwise, CAUSE the posting of Notice of Loss of the said booklets at least
for a period of one (1) month in three (3) conspicuous places in Tubod, Lanao del Norte
and the publication of the same in the newspaper of local circulation for at least two (2)
days. She is likewise ordered to PAY and DEPOSIT the amount of Twenty Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Pesos and Eighty-Nine Centavos (P20,320.89) representing
unearned interests for her delayed remittances in the Fiduciary Fund, Judiciary
Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund computed at six
percent (6%) per annum.
4. Ms. FLORENCE O. PEROCHO, incumbent OlC/Court Legal Researcher II, RTC,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, is ORDERED to:
CONDUCT an inventory of cases listed in the Unwithdrawn Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF)
and indicate therein the status of the cases whether already dismissed/decided; and
NOTIFY the respective plaintiffs/payors to claim their refunds for any remaining amount
in their STF deposits within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the government. The amount forfeited shall be held in abeyance until
further notice from the Court; REQUIRE the Sheriff and Process Server of this court to
utilize/accomplish the suggested Forms for STF cash advances, liquidations and
reimbursements (pending the Court's issuance of an STF circular)
Hon. RICHIE GAY T. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte is ORDERED to: STRICTLY SUPERVISE and MONITOR the financial
transactions of Ms. FLORENCE O. PEROCHO, OlC/Court Legal Researcher II, RTC,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to ensure strict compliance with the circulars and other
issuances of the Court regarding the proper handling of judiciary funds, otherwise, she
may be held liable for the infractions which may be committed by the employees under
her supervision; and PREPARE a uniform fare matrix to simplify and expedite the
disbursement and liquidation of transportation and travel expenses to be incurred by the
Sheriff and Process Server in the service of summons, subpoenas and other court
processes to standardize the expenses to be deducted from the court's STF collections in
compliance with OCA Circular No. 263-2018 dated 27 December 2018 and FURNISH
the FMD, CMO, OCA with the same for file and record purposes. The Property Division,
OAS, OCA is ORDERED to provide, as soon as possible, the RTC, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, official cash books for JDF, SAJF, FF, STF, GF-New and Mediation Fund; and
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to coordinate with the prosecution
arm of the government to ensure the expeditious prosecution of Ms. Del Rosario's
criminal liability, and to update its audit until the present.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gary Fuensalida
A.M. No. P-15-3290, September 01, 2020
EN BANC DELOS SANTOS, J.:
FACTS:
Clerk of Court Valino of RTC Sorsogon City, wrote a Letter to the Office of
the Court Administrator and reported a check was lost in their office while checks
were being distributed to the employees of the court. The check was dated October
31, 2012 amounting to P21,379.00. The check belonged to Toledo who was Court
Stenographer.
According to Valino was responsible for the theft and its consequent
endorsement by forging the signature of Toledo.
Toledo requested the Fiscal Management and Budget Office for stoppage of
payment of the check. However, the FMBO informed Ms. Toledo that the check was
already negotiated on November 7, 2012.
Fuensalida denied stealing the check and forging the signature of Toledo.
Valino wrote a Letter to the Sorsogon Provincial Crime Laboratory Office,
requesting for handwriting examination/investigation. Valino submitted the logbook
of the checks, which contained the handwriting of the employees.
In the Document Examination Report, PCI Villanueva concluded that the

questioned handwriting of Toledo appearing at the back of the check & the
submitted standard handwriting of Fuensalida appearing in the logbook where
written by the same person
Fuensalida admitted that he stole and encashed Toledo's check. Fuensalida

claimed he was tempted to steal the check of Toledo due to financial distress that his
family was experiencing during that time.

The OCA found that the act of Fuensalida of stealing and encashing the
check payable to Toledo without the latter's authority constituted grave misconduct
and was also considered as serious dishonesty. According to the OCA, even
assuming that Fuensalida did not admit to the charge, there was substantial
evidence to hold him liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fuensalida should be administratively liable for Grave

Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty.
HELD:
Yes, Fuensalida should be administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and

Serious Dishonesty.
It was established that Fuensalida was an accountable officer, being the

custodian of all the property and financial collections of the court. Fuensalida's
tasks included safekeeping of important and financial documents that required his
utmost trustworthiness.
The Court concurs with the OCA that his act of stealing, forging the signature of
Toledo in the endorsement of the check, and finally, encashing the check for
personal gain, constituted grave misconduct and serious dishonesty.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate [grave] misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
Dishonesty covers a broad spectrum of conduct, Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Resolution No. 06-0538 sets the criteria for determining the severity of dishonest
acts.
According to Section 3 of CSC Resolution No. 06-0538, for dishonesty to be

considered serious, any of the following circumstances must be present:
1. The dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the
government;
2. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest
act;
3. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves
property; accountable forms or money for which he is directly accountable; and
respondent shows intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption;
4. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent;
5. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the

commission of the dishonest act related to his/her employment;
6. The dishonest act was committed several times or on various occasions;
7. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination irregularity or fake Civil
Service eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib
sheets;
8. Other analogous circumstances.
Grave misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses each punishable by

dismissal on the first offense under Section 46 (A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal
from service carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation
of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Alleged Examination Irregularity Commited by Court Stenogrpaher Norhata
Abubacar,Shari’a Circuit Court, Lumbaran, Lanao del Sur
A.M. No. 15-02-02-SCC, October 06, 2020
En Banc, . PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 10, referred a Preliminary
Investigation Report to the SC with respect to the civil service eligibility of
Abubacar. The Report revealed that a person purporting to be Abubacar applied
for and took the 07 November 1999 Career Service (CS) Sub Professional
Examination in Cagayan de Oro City and obtained a rating of 85.07%.
Abubacar indicated in her 17 January 2000 Personal Data Sheet that she
passed the aforementioned examination, with a rating of 85.07%. That on 15
February 2000, a permanent appointment as Court Stenographer I (SG-8) was
issued to Abubacar by the Supreme Court, Manila.
Comparison of Abubacar's picture attached to her 17 January 2000 Personal

Data Sheet and the picture attached to the 07 November 1999 Career Service (CS)
Sub Professional examination picture seat plan reveals that another person took the
examination on her behalf, considering the disparity of the facial features of the
person depicted in the pictures. Further, the signature appearing on the Personal
Data Sheet and that appearing in the Picture Seat Plan shows dissimilarity
The Office of the Court Administrator required Abubacar to submit her

comment on the Report twice. Despite receipt of the OCA's directives, Abubacar
failed to comply.
The SC directed Abubacar to show cause why she should not be held
administratively liable for disobeying the Court's orders. She was further required
to submit her comment within 5 days from notice, otherwise, the Court would

decide the case on the basis of the records at hand. Abubacar still failed to file her
comment.
The OCA found Abubacar guilty of dishonesty and insubordination, and

recommended that she be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Abubacar wrote the Supreme Court seeking reconsideration. She explained

that her non-compliance with the earlier show cause order was due to the crisis in
Marawi. The Supreme Court granted Abubacar a non-extendible period often (10)
days from notice within which to submit her comment.8
The OCA submitted its Memorandum recommending that Abubacar be

dismissed from the service for dishonesty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abubacar be dismissed from the service for dishonesty?
HELD:
Yes, Abubacar be dismissed from the service for dishonesty
The Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA.
Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows

lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray, or intent to
violate the truth. Allowing another person to take civil service examination on one's
behalf has been ruled to be an act of dishonesty.
Abubacar committed dishonesty when she declared in her PDS that she took
the Civil Service Sub Professional Examination. This necessitates the imposition of
the ultimate penalty of dismissal on Abubakar.
Under Section 53 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in

the Civil Service,the disciplining authority may, in the interest of justice, consider
extenuating, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances, in imposing the
penalty on the erring employee. In this case, however, respondent did not invoke
any mitigating or extenuating circumstance. At any rate, the Court finds the OCA's
recommendation in order and finds no reason to impose a lesser penalty than
dismissal from the service.
It must be emphasized that respondent's misrepresentation of her civil

service eligibility is a material fact that enabled her to secure a permanent
appointment as Court Stenographer I. In addition, she committed a deliberate
fabrication of the truth. She has not even shown the Court that she feels any
remorse or contrition for her actions.
By her act of dishonesty, Abubacar failed to meet the stringent standards set
for a judicial employee. She does not deserve her position in the judiciary, and, as
such, must be dismissed from office.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
V.C Ponce Inc. vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 213821, January 26, 2021
INTING, J.:
FACTS:
Mandaue-Opon Bridge Project was criticized because it could only allow the
passage of small boats and not large international vessels which caused the
government to renegotiate with VCPCI for a redesign of the project. To expedite the
redesign and construction, the government and VCPCI decided not to draw a new
contract, but to undertake extra work under the original contract flexible enough to
cover alterations and new work that would allow the passage of international
vessels. The parties considered the extra work under "Section 9-4 Extra Force
Account under Standard Specification for Highways and Bridges" (SSHB) wherein
VCPCI was to be compensated for Phase II of the contract with actual cost up to
P9,197,194.50, subject to Article II of the original contract; and with the actual cost
over and above P9,197,194.50 to be regarded as actual cost plus 15% allowance for
profit margin.4
The amount of P9,197,194.50, as well as the 11.5% interest thereon, was to be

paid from toll collections by the Bureau of Public Highways. However, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos instructed the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
through Secretary Hipolito, to stop toll collections. The amount of P9,197,194.50
plus interest and all other amounts over and above P9,197,194.50 were to be paid
out of the appropriations under Republic Act No. (RA) 5187.
The parties could not agree on the amount owed by the government to
VCPCI under Phase II of the Mandaue-Opon Bridge project. The government and
VCPCI signed an agreement to establish a fixed amount due and to be paid for the
period 1968 to 1985. Three items were left blank in the agreement: (1) the amount
that would fix a sum due and to be paid in installments to VCPCI as contractor; (2)
the balance that was to be amortized by the government for a period of four years in

four equal installments, representing the fixed and liquidated sum due to VCPCI as
of November 1985 for Phase II; and (3) the initial payment, thus leaving
undetermined the balance that was to be amortized in four equal installments
The government proposed a "Recomputation of Cost of Money Phase II

November 29, 1968-August 31, 1973" and a "Computation of Contractual Liability
'from July 1, 1973 to November 15, 1985." VCPCI rejected both proposals. From
January 14, 1986 to December 10, 1991, DPWH paid a total amount of
P72,549,006.78 directly to two banks: UCPB and Metrobank. DPWH asserted that
P66,350,725.09 represented full payment for Phase II with P5,198,281.69 as
overpayment. But for VCPCI, the amount of P72,549,006.78 was only the payment
for interest charged by the different banks for loans covered by Certificates of
Indebtedness issued by the government as collateral for VCPCI's loans with the
banks.8
On the other hand, DPWH opposed the petition for mandamus and alleged
that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a contractual duty
especially if the contract is in dispute; the claim or demand had either been paid or
extinguished; and the complaint is a claim against the State which it has not given
its consent.
RTC ruled in favor of VCPCI and against DPWH. The DPWH filed an
appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The DPWH filed
a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in.
The DPWH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 before the Court
questioning the Decision of the CA. The Supreme Court denied the petition for
failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that the CA committed a reversible error.
DPWH filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court denied the motion.
VCPCI then filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution before the
RTC. The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. DPWH filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the CA questioning the Order of the RTC issuing the
writ of execution
The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ
of execution. It ruled that judgments in money claims should first be filed with the
COA. VCPCI should have waited for COA's imprimatur of its claim instead of
moving for the execution of the RTC Decision.
The COA denied VCPCI's claim and required Ponce to pay the
overpayment. The COA did not allow the payment of interest which is over and
above the original contract amount. The COA also ruled that the amount of
P24,841,847.82 cannot earn interest as it has already been paid by way of the
Certificates of Indebtedness issued by the government as collateral for VCPCI's
loans with the banks.
ISSUE:
Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing the final
and executory decision of the RTC with respect to the government's liability to
VCPCI over the Mandaue-Opon Bridge project Phase II?
HELD:

Yes, COA committed grave abuse of discretion in reviewing the final and
executory decision of the RTC with respect to the government's liability to VCPCI
over the Mandaue-Opon Bridge project Phase II
The computation of the government's liability to VCPCI, except for the

interest due on the sum of P24,841,847.82 which the RTC directed to be submitted
to arbitration, had been settled in the RTC Decision dated January 30, 2004. The
CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision in its Decision dated October 29, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 18, 2005. The Court denied DPWH's petition in its
Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and its motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
dated October 17, 2005. The Court Resolution became final and executory on
November 18, 2005.
Therefore, the COA, in denying VCPCI's money claim and in ruling that
VCPCI is liable to refund an overpayment amounting to P33,795,346.43, in effect
reviewed and modified the final and executory Decision of the RTC. In doing so, the
COA invokes its primary jurisdiction over all money claims against the government.
The Supreme Court distinguished the two (2) main types of money claims
which the COA may be confronted with: (1) money claims originally filed with the
COA; and (2) money claims which arise from a final and executory judgment of a
court or arbitral body.
The case at bar brings to the fore the parameters of the power of the
respondent COA to decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public
funds. Undoubtedly, the exercise of this power involves the quasi-judicial aspect of
government audit. As statutorily envisioned, this pertains to the "examination,
audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities." The process
of government audit is adjudicative in nature. The decisions of COA presuppose an
adjudicatory process involving the determination and resolution of opposing claims.
Its work as adjudicator of money claims for or against the government means the
exercise of judicial discretion. It includes the investigation, weighing of evidence,
and resolving whether items should or should not be included, or as applied to
claim, whether it should be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part. Its conclusions
are not mere opinions but are decisions which may
Thus, the Court ruled that the "COA's audit power over money claims
already confirmed by final judgment of a court or other adjudicative body is
necessarily limited,"30 and laid down the guidelines, as follows:
(1) Once a court or other adjudicative body validly acquires jurisdiction over a
money claim against the government, it exercises and retains jurisdiction over the
subject matter to the exclusion of all others, including the COA;
(2) The COA has no appellate review power over the decisions of any other court or
tribunal;
(3) The COA is devoid of power to disregard the principle of immutability of final
judgments; and
(4) The COA's exercise of discretion in approving or disapproving money claims

that have been determined by final judgment is akin to the power of an execution
court.31

The money claim of VCPCI before the COA undoubtedly falls under the
second type of money claim, i.e., money claims which arise from a final and
executory judgment of a court or arbitral body. The money claim stemmed from the
Decision dated January 30, 2004 of the RTC, affirmed by the CA and the Court,
that had long become final and executory. The COA gravely abused its discretion in
denying VCPCI's money claim that was based on a final and executory judgment;
and when it substituted the RTC's findings and computations with its own.
The case is remanded to the Commission on Audit for payment of the money claim
in accordance with the decision of the RTC of Quezon City
ELECTION LAW
Bongbong Marcos vs. Robredo
PET Case No. 005, November 17, 2020
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Bongbong Marcos filed a "Strong Manifestation with Extremely Urgent

Omnibus Motion for the Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen, Re-
raffle of the Election Protest, the Resolution of all the Pending Incidents in the
Above Entitled Case alleging that his protest has "remained in limbo."
Marcos alleged that the pronouncements of Justice Leonen in a number of

landmark cases, his previous employment history as well as the manner in which he
has handled the election protest will prove that he will not be a fair and impartial
ponente.
Protestant underscores that delaying the resolution of this election protest is

against public policy because it "disregards the sanctity of votes and the popular
choice of the people. He cites Republic Act No. 1793, which requires for an election
protest to be decided within twenty 20 months after "it is filed, as the standard for
the expeditious resolution of election protests.
The OSG filed a motion arguing that ever since the protest was raffled to
Justice Leonen, the people has been suspended in animation for close to a year. The
Solicitor General suggests that this inordinate delay manifests Justice Leonen's bias
and partiality against protestant The Solicitor General moves for Justice Leonen's
inhibition for the best interest of the State and the People.

The Solicitor General concludes that Justice Leonen prejudged the
participation of the entire Marcos family in plunder when they were exiled. The
Solicitor General emphasizes that undue delay characterized the proceedings under
the previous and current members in charge: "The inaction of Justice Leonen, for
the past 11 months, coupled with his expressed disdain to the members of the
Marcos family, compelled to OSG to move for his inhibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen should

inhibit from this election protest?
HELD:
No, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen should not inhibit from
this election protest
The Court will not require a judge to inhibit himself in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that he will dispense justice
in accordance with law and evidence. A Member of the Court may in the exercise of
his or her sound discretion, inhibit himself or herself for a just or valid reason other
than any of those mentioned in Rule 8, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court.
None of protestant and the Solicitor General's arguments cited a clear

ground to warrant Justice Leonen's inhibition under the Rules. There were no prior
proceedings where he may have participated. He had no professional engagement
with, pecuniary interest relative to, or relation within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsels.
Protestant urges Justice Leonen to voluntarily inhibit. However, a movant

seeking the inhibition of a magistrate is duty-bound to present clear and convincing
evidence of bias to justify such request. Protestant failed to do so.
Alleging delay in this case, protestant cited Republic Act No. 1793, Section 3.
The provision which protestant cited is no longer good law. Administrative Matter
No. 10-4-29-SC, otherwise known as The 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal governs the Tribunal's proceedings. The relevant provision reads:
RULE 67. Procedure in Deciding Contests. — In rendering its decision, the

Tribunal shall follow the procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Sections
13 and 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
There is no rule requiring that an election protest should be decided within

twenty 20 months or twelve 12 months and the allegation of undue delay is severely
unfounded.
A litigant's right to seek inhibition must be balanced with the judge's sacred
duty to decide cases without fear of repression. At its core, deliberating with fellow
justices to decide a case is this Court's most basic function:

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(IPRA & FORESTRY REFORM CODE)
DIOSDADO SAMA Y HINUPAS AND BANDY MASANGLAY Y ACEVEDA,

PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. G.R. No.
224469, January 5 2021, EN BANC, LAZARO-JAV1ER, J.:
Facts:
By Information dated May 27, 2005, petitioners and Demetrio were charged with the
crime of Violation of PD 705, or the Forestry Reform Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2005, at Barangay Calangatan, Municipality

of San Teodoro, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority
as required under existing forest laws and regulations and for unlawful purpose,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did and then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly cut with the use of unregistered
power chainsaw, a Dita tree, a forest product, with an aggregate volume of 500 board
feet and with a corresponding value of TWENTY THOUSAND (Php20,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency.
On arraignment, all three (3) accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, they filed a
Motion to Quash Information dated July 31, 2007, alleging among others, that they
are members of the Iraya-Mangyan tribe, and as such, are governed by Republic Act
No. 8371 (RA 8371), The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The
motion was denied for being a mere scrap of paper.
As trial ensued, PO3 Villamor D. Ranee testified that, while patrolling the
mountainous area of Barangay Calangatan, they heard the sound of a chainsaw and
saw a tree slowly falling down. They immediately crossed the river and traced the
source of the sound. In the area where the sound was coming from, they caught the
accused in the act of cutting a dita tree. They also saw a bolo stuck to the tree that had
been cut.
The team inquired from the accused if they had a license to cut down the tree. The
latter replied they had none. After informing the accused of their violation, the team
invited them to the police station for further investigation. The team left the illegally
cut tree in the area because it was too heavy. Pictures of the accused and the cut down
tree were also taken.
On the defense’s side, Barangay Captain Rolando Aceveda (Barangay Captain

Aceveda) of Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro testified that on March 15, 2005, he was
resting at home when he noticed several police officers and DENR employees passing
by. He inquired where they were headed. They told him they were on their way to
Barangay Laylay in San Teodoro for surveillance on illegal loggers.
After two (2) or three (3) hours, the team returned. They had arrested and brought
with them the accused who are members of the Iraya-Mangyan indigenous peoples
(IPs). The police officers told him they caught the accused cutting down a dita tree.
He then asked the accused if the allegations against them were true. They told him
they cut the tree for the construction of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs' community toilet. He
was aware of this construction and confirmed that the dita tree was planted within the
ancestral domain of the Iraya-Mangyan IPs.
The RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused as charged, ruling that a
dita tree with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet can be classified as "timber"
within the purview of Section 68, now Section 77 of PD 705, as amended. Thus,
cutting the dita tree without a corresponding permit from the DENR or any competent
authority violated the law. It further held that a violation of Section 77 of PD 705
constituted malum prohibitum, and for this reason, the commission of the prohibited
act is a crime in itself and criminal intent does not have to be established. The trial
court dismissed the defense of the accused that they had an IP right to log the dita tree
which they intended to use for the construction of a communal toilet for the Iraya-
Mangyan IPs. Accused moved to file a motion of consideration but was then denied

further by the RTC. Petitioners Hinupas and Aceveda appealed from the trial court’s
ruling.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, focusing on the failure of the accused to
present any license agreement, lease, or permit authorizing them to log the dita tree. It
also faulted the accused for relying on IPRA as the source of their alleged rights to
cultural heritage and ancestral domain and lands.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners’ claim of ethnicity as Iraya-Mangyan IPs are tenable.
Whether or not the dita tree cut and collected from a forest land an alienable or
disposable public land, or a private land, as contemplated in Section 77 of PD 705, as
amended, and as such, makes the petitioners criminally liable under PD 705?
Held:
First, Petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs who are a publicly known ICC inhabiting
areas within Oriental Mindoro.
IPs in the Philippines inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindoro, Negros,
Samar, Leyte, Palawan, Mindanao, and Sulu group of islands. In Cruz v. Secretary of
Natural Resources, the Court recognized the following ICCs residing in Region IV:
Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan
or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo, and Iraya of Oriental and
Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon,
Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
The Information stated that petitioners are residents of Barangay Baras, Baco,

Oriental Mindoro. They supposedly logged a dita tree in Barangay Calangatan, San
Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro. Notably, the municipalities of Baco and San Teodoro are
areas where the Iraya-Mangyan IPs are publicly known to inhabit. They have
continuously lived there since time immemorial.
The first evidence that petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs is the testimony of Barangay

Captain Aceveda of Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro. He testified in clear and
categorical language that petitioners are Mangyans and the dita tree was grown on the
land occupied by the Mangyans. As barangay captain of Barangay Baras, Baco,
Oriental Mindoro where petitioners and the Iraya-Mangyan IPs live, Aceveda is
competent to testify that petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs and the dita tree was
grown and found in the land where these IPs have inhabited since time immemorial.
The second evidence that petitioners are indeed Iraya-Mangyan IPs is the fact that the
NCIP - Legal Affairs Office has been representing them from the initiation of this
case until the present. Under the IPRA, the NCIP is the lead government agency for
the protection, promotion, and preservation of IP/ICC identities and rights in the
context of national unity. As a result of its expertise, it has the primary jurisdiction to
identify ICCs and IPs. Its Legal Affairs Office is mandated to represent and provide
legal assistance to them.
Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is no reason to doubt that
petitioners are Iraya-Mangyan IPs.
Second, yes, the dita tree is an alienable or disposable public land, or a private land, as
contemplated in Section 77 of PD 705, although that does not completely proves that
the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt and are criminally liable under PD
705.
Section 3(d) of PD 705, as amended defines forest lands as including the public

forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations. Section 3(c)
defines alienable and disposable lands as "those lands of the public domain which
have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not
needed for forest purposes."
Section 3 further defines private lands indirectly as those lands with titled rights of

ownership under existing laws, and in the case of national minority, lands subject to
rights of possession existing at the time a license is granted under PD 705, which
possession may include places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old
clearings, but exclude productive forests inclusive of logged-over areas, commercial
forests, and established plantations of the forest trees and trees of economic values
Justice Caguioa firmly opines, however, that ancestral domains and lands are outside
the ambit of Section 77 as these are neither forest land, alienable or disposable public
land, nor private land.
He is correct that ancestral domains and lands are unique, different, and a class of

their own. They have been referred to repeatedly as sui generis property, which sets
into motion the construct or paradigm for determining the existence, nature, and
consequences of IP rights.

Nonetheless, the text of Section 77, as amended is very clear. It does not exempt from
its coverage ancestral domains and lands. Too, as Chief Justice Peralta aptly points
out, the term "private land," which Section 77 expressly covers, includes lands
possessed by "national minorities" such as their sacred and communal grounds. This
term should mean no other than what we sensitively and correctly call today as
the IPs' ancestral domains and lands.
To be sure, Section 77's reference to forest lands and even alienable and disposable

public lands could have also encompassed ancestral domains and lands. This
is because laws were subsequently passed converting some of the lands through the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation and cultivation of IPs (then
stereotypically referred to as members of the national cultural communities) by
themselves or through their ancestors into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
Section 77 of PD 705, as amended, punishes, among others, "[a]ny person who shall
cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority ... shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code...."
People v. CFI of Quezon held that the elements of this offense are: 1) the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) the timber or other
forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to
any private individual; and 3) the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
was without any authority granted by the State. Furthermore, Ownership is not an
essential element of the offense as defined in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the
failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not
material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or
license from the government.
To conclude, the dita tree, as a specie of timber, was cut and collected beyond
reasonable doubt from a private land, as contemplated in Section 77 of PD 705, as
amended, or at the very least, a forest land or an alienable or disposable public
land converted from ancestral lands, is covered, too, by PD 705, as amended. This
notwithstanding that the land is also petitioners' ancestral domain or land which they
own sui generis.
the fact is that this case is still about two men who acted pursuant to precisely the kind
of cultural choice and community-based environmental agency that they believe IPRA
contemplated they had the freedom to exercise. The petitioners hang their liberty on
the question of whether or not IPRA, vis-a-vis forestry laws, has failed or delivered on
its fundamental promise. That the Court cannot categorically either affirm or negate
their belief, only casts reasonable doubt not only as to whether or not they are guilty
of an offense, but whether or not there was even an offense to speak of. At most, this
doubt only further burdens the fate of the petitioners with constitutional questions, the
answers to which must await a future, more suitable opportunity.

At the very least, this doubt 'must merit their acquittal.
ELECTION LAWS
FERDINAND “BONGBONG” R. MARCOS, JR. v. MARIA LEONOR “LENI

DAANG MATUWID” G. ROBREDO, P.E.T. Case No. 005, February 16, 2021,
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
Protestant Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. is before the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (Tribunal) challenging the election and proclamation of incumbent Vice
President Maria Leonor “Leni Daang Matuwid” G. Robredo) in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections. Robredo garnered 14,418,817 votes while Marcos came
at a close second with 14,155,344 votes. P.E.T. Case No. 005 is the first and only
election protest before the Tribunal in which the recount and revision process of the
pilot provinces were successfully concluded and the protest itself resolved on the
merits.

This Resolution does not yet resolve the entire case but is merely preliminary and
interlocutory in nature. It is designed to hear the parties fully on the various legal
issues relating to their controversy.
In consideration of these purposes, the Tribunal, with Marcos’s agreement,

categorized his causes of action into the following:
First Cause of Action -Annulment of Proclamation
The proclamation of protestee Robredo as the duly elected Vice President is null and
void because the COCs generated by the CCS are not authentic, and may not be used
as basis to determine the number of votes that the candidates for VICE PRESIDENT
received.
Second Cause of Action – Revision and Recount
Revision and recount of the paper ballots and/or the ballot images as well as an
examination,verification, and analysis of the voter’s receipts, election returns, audit
logs, transmission logs, the lists of voters, particularly the EDCVL, and VRRs,the
books of voters and other pertinent election documents and/or paraphernalia used in
the elections, as well as the automated election equipment and record~ such as the
VCMs, CCS units, SD cards (main and backup), and the other data storage devices
containing electronic data and ballot images in ALL of the 36,465 protested clustered
precincts pursuant to Rules 38 to 45 of the 2010 PET Rules; and
Third Cause of Action – Annulment of Elections
Annulment of election results for the position of Vice President in the provinces of
Maguindanao,Lanao de/ Sur and Basilan, on the ground of terrorism; intimidation and
harassment of voters as well as pre-shading of ballots in all of the 2,756 protested
clustered precincts that functioned in the aforesaid areas.
The Tribunal issued a Preliminary Conference Order setting forth the parties’
respective admissions and stipulations, the issues for the Tribunal’s resolution, and the
parties’ proposed witnesses. The Preliminary Conference Order also indicated
Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental as Marcos’s designated pilot provinces
pursuant to Rule 65 of the 2010 PET Rules. The revision of ballots was to begin with
these three (3) provinces, which shall serve as “test cases” by which the Tribunal will
determine whether to proceed with the revision of ballots of the remaining contested
clustered precincts.

The Tribunal partially granted the retrieval of the ballot boxes and other election
documents, and the decryption of ballot images, only for the pilot provinces of
Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental. It also deferred action on the technical
examination of the signature of voters in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Basilan,
following Rule 65 of the 20 l 0 PET Rules. Rule 65 pertains to the initial
determination of the grounds for the protest. Rule 65 grants the protestant the
opportunity to designate three (3) provinces that best exemplify the frauds or
irregularities raised in his or her Protest. These provinces constitute the “test cases” by
which the Tribunal will determine whether it would proceed with the protest. The full
effect of Rule 65, however, is yet to be determined by the Tribunal based on the
required submission of Memoranda mentioned in this Resolution.
In relation to the decryption and printing of ballot images, the Tribunal directed the
COMELEC to inform the Tribunal of its recommended procedures, logistics,
schedule, and cost of the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the pilot
provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental. In compliance thereto, the
COMELEC, submitted its Manifestation/Compliance with Motion, attaching thereto
Resolution No. 10155 on the Guidelines to Decrypt Ballot Images and other related
resolutions, the Order of Payment, and Summary of Supplies.
Marcos paid the COMELEC the costs and expenses for the conduct of the decryption
and printing of ballot images, election returns and audit logs for all the protested
clustered precincts of the pilot provinces. As scheduled, the decryption and printing of
the ballot images for the three (3) pilot provinces commenced on October 23, 2017 at
9:00 a.m. Representatives from protestant, protestee and the Tribunal, together with
representatives from the COMELEC-ERSD, stood as witnesses in the authentication
of the printed ballot images.
Robredo filed an Urgent Ex-pa rte Motion to be Allowed to Secure Soft Copies of the
Ballot Images and Other Reports from the Decrypted Secured Digital Cards, praying
that she be allowed to secure soft copies of the ballot images and other reports from
the decrypted SD cards, in lieu of the printed images. The Tribunal granted.
The Tribunal allowed Marcos to secure only photocopies or soft copies of the
decrypted ballot images, election returns, and other reports for all the protested
clustered precincts of the pilot provinces, subject to the payment of incidental costs.
The Tribunal held that for the purpose of the conduct of the revision proceedings, the
custody of the official, printed, and authenticated copies of the decrypted ballot
images, election returns, and audit logs from the protested clustered precincts of the
said pilot provinces shall remain with the Tribunal.
The Tribunal resolved to create an exploratory mission/retrieval team composed of

nine (9) officials and personnel of the Tribunal to facilitate such retrieval of ballot
boxes and election documents from the three (3) pilot protested provinces. The
exploratory mission entailed coordinating with concerned officials from COMELEC,
the local government units and the Philippine National Police, the PhilPost, and
finding suitable transportation procedures and storage places to assure the most
efficient, expeditious, and safest way to retrieve and transport the ballot boxes.
The Tribunal approved the use of the SC gymnasium for revision and the parking
space of the SC-Court of Appeals Multi-Purpose Building as storage for the ballot
boxes and other election documents.
Start of the Revision Proceedings
The main purpose of the revision proceeding is to conduct a physical recount of the
ballots and provide the parties with an opportunity to register their objections and
claims thereon, the validity of which will later be ruled upon by the Tribunal during
the appreciation stage. For the present case, the revision process was undertaken by
fifty (50) RCs constituted by the Tribunal, each composed of an Head Revisor, and
one representative of the protestant and one representative of the protestee (Party
Revisors). Revision Supervisors, who were lawyers, were designated by the
respective offices of the Chairman and Members of the Tribunal to directly oversee
the revision process. 169 Each revision day, two (2) Members of the Tribunal were
required to assign lawyers from their offices who had previously undergone the
necessary training to act as Revision Supervisors.
The Incident Reports prepared by the Revision Supervisors involving alleged
tampered ballots and irregularities on the external condition of the ballot boxes,
glaringly different BEI signatures on the ballots, excess ballots, and damaged and wet
ballots were referred for appropriate action by the Tribunal to the panel of
Commissioners who will examine the ballots subject of the Incident Reports vis-a-vis
the relevant election documents.
The City and Municipal Treasurers and the BEI were required to explain the
irregularities found on the ballots, ballot boxes, and other election paraphernalia. The
revision of ballots for the pilot protested precincts commenced on April 2, 2018 and
was concluded on February 4, 2019. Paper ballots and decrypted ballot images were
revised in a total of 5,415 clustered precincts. Three (3) clustered precincts were left
unrevised as the paper ballots contained in their ballot boxes were wet, damaged and
unreadable, and at the same time, COMELEC failed to provide the Tribunal with their
respective decrypted ballot images.
The Tribunal directed the parties to strictly observe the sub Judice rule. However,
despite these directives, the parties and their counsel continued to disclose sensitive
information on the Protest, as shown in several news reports. The Tribunal, directed
the parties to show cause and explain why they should not be cited in contempt. Each
denied having violated the sub Judice rule. It found out that the parties violated the
sub Judice rule, which restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice.

Accordingly, the Tribunal imposed the penalty of fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(PS0,000.00) on both parties, and were sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
As to the threshold, Rule 43(1) of the 2010 PET Rules provides that during
segregation of ballots in the revision process, a 50% threshold is to be applied in
determining a valid vote:
(1) xxx. However, marks or shades which are less than 50% of the oval shall not be
considered as valid votes. Any issue as to whether a certain mark or shade is within
the threshold shall be determined by feeding the ballot on the PCOS machine, and not
by human determination.
On the other hand, the Revisor’ s Guide provides that any issue on whether a mark or
shade is within the threshold must be resolved by the assigned Revision Supervisor.
As to what must be used in its revision of ballots, the Tribunal noted that the purpose
of the revision process is simply to recount the votes of the parties. This is
implemented by mimicking how the VCMs read and counted the votes during the
elections. Hence, in the segregation of ballots, the Tribunal held that its Head
Revisors must be guided by the number of votes indicated in the Election Returns.
The election return is a document in electronic and printed form directly produced by
the VCM showing the date, province, municipality, and precinct in which the election
was held, and the votes in figures for each candidate in a clustered precinct where the
said VCM was utilized.
Marcos filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Alfredo

Benjamin S. Caguioa on the ground of evident bias and manifest partiality in favor of
Robredo due to his close ties with former President Benigno Simeon C.Aquino, a
classmate of Justice Caguioa and had previously appointed him as Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, Secretary of Justice, and eventually, as Associate Justice of the SC.
Marcos asserted that former President Aquino and his family bore a grudge against
Marcos and had handpicked Robredo as the Liberal Party’s candidate for Vice
President in the 2016 National and Local Elections.
Appreciation of Ballots
After the revision had concluded, the revised ballots were then appreciated. During
this process, the Tribunal validates and verifies the physical count of the ballots
during the revision stage and rules on the parties’ respective claims and
objections thereon.The Ballot Appreciation Guidelines were used in the appreciation
of the ballots, specifically in determining the validity of the ballots and whether they
contained valid votes. The cardinal objective of ballot appreciation was to discover
and give effect to the intent of the voter.

The Tribunal proceeded with the appreciation of the ballots following the Ballot
Appreciation Guidelines and taking into consideration the objections and claims of
the parties. The Tribunal ruled on the objections and claims of the parties, and to
determine the validity of each ballot and vote, regardless of whether the parties
registered an objection or claim.
Issues:
Whether the protest is sufficient in form and substance
Whether a threshold to be applied is 50% or 25%
Whether Justice Caguioa should be inhibited
Held:
Yes. In its previous ruling in Roxas v. Binay, the Tribunal emphasized that in
determining the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest, what is merely
required is a statement of the ultimate facts forming the basis of the Protest. Based on
this yardstick, the Tribunal found the allegations in the Protest sufficient to apprise
Robredo of the issues that she had to meet, and to inform this Tribunal of the ballot
boxes that had to be collected.
The Tribunal ruled that it did not have any basis to impose the 25% threshold as even
the RMA Report – the document presented by Robredo to support her claim –
indicates the impossibility of using such threshold. Moreover, the Tribunal held that
the mention of a threshold in the Revisor’s Guide is in reference to the 50% threshold
in the 2010 PET Rules. Hence, the Tribunal retained the 50% threshold under the
2010 PET Rules as the basis of the HRs in determining a valid vote.
The Tribunal clarified that, prior to the Motion for Reconsideration of Robredo, it was
never furnished a copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 16- 0600 which appeared to be
the only official act of the COMELEC that referred to a 25% threshold. Before the
filing of these pleadings, the Tribunal was merely furnished a copy of the RMA Guide
which was not an official act or issuance by the COMELEC en bane and could not
have constituted a sufficient basis to amend the rules of the Tribunal. The Tribunal
likewise emphasized that the parties were apprised of the 50% threshold under the
2010 PET Rules before the start of the revision proceedings, but neither of them
brought COMELEC Resolution No. 16-0600 to the Tribunal’s attention. In any case,
the Tribunal declared that from the submissions of the parties and the COMELEC,
what was adopted during the 2016 National and Local Elections was a range of 20%
to 25% shading threshold.
No.The Tribunal unanimously denied Marcos’s Motion to Inhibit in its Resolution
196 dated August 28, 2018 for utter lack of merit, ruling that the grounds cited by
Marcos did not fall under any of the grounds for inhibition under Section 1, 197 Rule
8 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Citing Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Spouses Dy, the Tribunal held that the mere imputation of bias
or partiality was not sufficient ground for inhibition, especially when the charges
against Justice Caguioa were without basis and not supported by any evidence. The
Tribunal further held that an opinion piece in a news website and an unauthenticated
video circulating on social media websites were not credible and admissible
supporting evidence, and that these were not even worthy of cognizance.
The Tribunal also found that Justice Caguioa had shown impartiality and that the
proceedings in the Protest had moved forward with utmost dispatch despite the
numerous pleadings filed and incidents brought up by both parties and the
COMELEC, as well as the logistical and administrative concerns in relation to the
Protest. The Tribunal also emphasized that all of its decisions were arrived at through
a majority vote of all the members of the Court sitting en bane as the Tribunal, and
not decided by the Member-in- Charge alone.
Thus, based on the final tally after revision and appreciation of the votes in the pilot
provinces, protestee Robredo maintained, as in fact she increased, her lead with
14,436,337 votes over protestant Marcos who obtained 14,157,771 votes. Before the
Tribunal proceeds to make a ruling on the effects of the results of the revision and
appreciation of the votes for the pilot provinces on the Protestant’s Second Cause of
Action the Parties will be required to submit their position stating their factual and
legal basis and to the Third Cause of Action.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(GOCC - Relationship of Parent Corporation to Subsidiary Corporation)
RIZAL M. ADVINCULA et. al., vs COA, G.R. No. 209712 [Formerly UDK-
11994], Feb 16 2021, EN BANC, INTING, J.:
Facts:
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 (BCDA) was created pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7227 to act as the lead instruments tasked to facilitate the
conversion of the Clark and Subic militay reservations and extensions into alternative

productive uses. Herein petitioners are employees of BCDA Management and
Holdings Inc., a subsidiary of BCDA.
On September 18, 2003, the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) approved Resolution
No. 2003-09-186 authorizing the payment of 2003 Annual Gift Checks. On the
strength of their parent companys Board Resolution No. 2003-09-186 and guidelines,
BMHI management released the AGCs to its employees and the members of the
Board. The payment was approved by Isaac S. Puno III (Puno), BMHI President,
stating that the "expenses/advances [are] necessary, lawful and incurred under [her]
direct supervision" and that "supporting documents [are] complete and proper, and
cash [is] available,'' respectively.
the COA, relative to the payment of AGCs through Corazon V Espafio, Audit Team
Supervisor, issued Audit Observation Memorandum No. (AOM) 2004-05 addressed
to Puno. According to the COA, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
prescribes that year-end and other fringe benefits, such as the AGCs, are personnel
benefits granted in addition to salaries, or paid only when basic salary is also paid.
The members of the BMHI Board are not entitled to these benefits because they are
not salaried government officials.
Thereafter, the COA issued ND No. BMHI-04-002-(03) disallowing P2,158,000.00

of the total P2,912,000.00 paid for AGCs for the following reasons: first, it was paid
in excess of the rate authorized under the approved corporate budget, and second, a
part of said proceeds were paid to the members of the Board, which were non-
Salaried employees.
The COA director, upon the appeal of the aggrieved personnel, upheld the
disallowance for lack of legal basis. BMHI's employees are not automatically entitled
to the benefits accruing to the personnel of the parent corporation. BMHI, a
subsidiary, has a personality separate and distinct from BCDA, its parent.
Furthermore, the BMHI Board 'is not entitled to AGCs. Under the BMHI by-laws;
the members of the Board shall be entitled only to a reasonable per diem· allowance
per board meeting and compensation, which shall not exceed 10% of the preceding
year's net income before income tax.
On appeal to the COA proper, said disallowance was still sustained for lack of legal
basis, reiterating that BMHI Board did not pass a resolution granting AGC’s to
BMHI personnel. Furthermore, Administrative Order No. (AO) 37 dated November
21, 1998 and DBM Circular No. 16-98 dated November 26, 1998, prohibit
government-owned-and-controlled corporations from granting incentives and/or
allowances, unless previously authorized by the Office of the President via
administrative order.
In its assailed Resolution, the COA Proper upheld the disallowance for lack of the
requisite executive approval, as required by AO 37. However; it restored the payees'
liability to return the disallowed amount and declared that the payees' obligation to
refund is founded on the principles of implied trust and unjust enrichment. Thus,
good faith is not a defense. Hence, petitioners who are the payees of the disallowed
amount filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the disallowance of the Annual Gift Checks is proper
Held:
YES, the disallowance is proper.
The court still upholds the disallowance of payment for AGCs, as well as payees’
concomitant liability for the following reasons: first, the ruling had already attained
finality and in any case, the ruling is in accord with the law and prevailing
jurisprudence.
The fundamental principles governing government financial transactions require all

public disbursements to be founded on a specific statutes and to bear the approval of
the proper officials. Otherwise, these payments shall be considered as illegal. A
closer look at the subject transaction reveals that the payment of AGCs was not
founded on any specific law authorizing its grant/release.
It is undisputed that BMHI paid the subject AGCs solely based on BCDA Board
Resolution No. 2003-09-186, which was passed by the Board of its parent company,
not its own.
Verily, the law considers a corporate act valid and effective only if it bears the
board's seal of approval, which is ordinarily evidenced by a resolution passed by-the
board acting as a body and in accordance with the formalities requited by the
corporate by-laws. However, the formal approval of corporate powers must be
understood to be specific to a corporation's own board. A corporate act's validity
cannot be made to rely on a resolution passed by the board of another entity, even
that of its parent company because the authority to approve corporate transactions is
purely personal to a corporation's own board. Certainly, without an express statutory
grant and/or a specific board resolution approving its payment, the release of AGCs
contravenes the law and must be disallowed.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law)
MIGUEL C. WYCOCO, former Regional Manager of National Food

Authority et. al., v COA; Eric L. Bonilla et. al., v COA, G.R. Nos 237874;
239036, Feb 16, 2021, ZALAMEDA, J.:
Facts:

In December 1998, then NFA Administrator Eduardo Nonato Joson (Administrator
Joson) wrote a letter to former President Joseph Estrada (President Estrada), asking
for the approval of the grant of food assistance and emergency allowance in the
amount of Php7,000.00 to all NFA officials and employees. President Estrada
granted the said request.
Five years thereafter, and during the term of former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (President Arroyo), then Chief Presidential Management Staff Ricardo
Saludo (Secretary Saludo) issued on 04 November 2003, a Memorandum addressed
to the heads of government financial institutions (GFIs) and government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) to exercise moderation when granting bonuses to
their employees. NFA Administrator Arthur Yap requested the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) to render an opinion on whether it was
proper for the agency to grant its employees food/grocery incentives every Christmas
season, which was opined affirmatively by said Office.
Allegedly pursuant to these “presidential issuances” and OGCC opinion, the NFA
Council approved Resolution No. 226-2K5 on 18 May 2005 authorizing the annual
grant of Food and Grocery Incentives (FGI) in the amount of Php20,000.00 to every
NFA official and employee, payable in two (2) tranches. Consequently, the annual
release of FGI triggered COA’s issuance of several NDs prohibiting the same,
including those that are being challenged here in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. No. 237874, the COA Audit Team Leader (ATL) and Supervising Auditor
(SA) issued ND No. 11-003-GOF(10) disallowing the amount of P660,000.00
representing the FGI granted to the officials and employees of NFA-Zamboanga
Regional Office in CY 2020. Meanwhile, ND No. 2014-01(12), the subject of G.R.
No. 239036, was issued to disallow the grant of FGI to the officials and employees of
NFA-ADNPO for CY 2012. Petitioners were ordered to refund the amount of
Php480,000.00.
The COA Proper affirmed the disallowance of the FGI and ruled that nothing in the
Memorandum of Secretary Saludo or the letter of Administrator Joson supports the
conclusion that Presidents Estrada and Arroyo authorized the annual grant of FGI.
Issues:
Whether or not the COA Proper committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
disallowance of petitioners' FGI.
Whether or not the grant of the FGI enjoyed any presidential approval

Held:
First, The COA Proper did not gravely abuse its discretion when, in both cases, it upheld
the disallowance of the FGI. The COA Proper’s decisions were supported by sufficient
legal bases, negating any allegation that these were rendered it a whimsical, arbitrary,
despotic, or capricious manner. The Court further held the recognition of its decision in
Escarez v. COA, and the same amounts to res judicata and a conclusive and binding
precedent to the impropriety of FGI.
G.R. No. 237847 and G.R. No. 239036 share the same subject matter and issues with
Escarez. These cases involve the same benefit, FGI, which, in both instances were
authorized by NFA Council Resolution No. 226-2K5. All the cases raise the same issue
of the propriety of NFA’s grant of FGI. Even the defenses raised by petitioners in these
separate cases to prevent disallowance are also identical, i.e., that the FGI enjoys
presidential imprimatur and that it has been traditionally given. We also find identity of
parties although in G.R. No. 239036 the petition was filed by members of a regional
office of the NFA different from those involved in Escarez. The principle of res judicata
only requires substantial identity of parties premised on a common interest between them,
to such an extent that a favorable decision to one would also favorably affect the other.
Second, Section 12 of RA 6758 provides that, as a general rule, allowances due to

government employees are deemed integrated into the new standardized salary rate save
for these exceptions: (1) representation and transportation allowance; (2) clothing and
laundry allowance: (3)subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels; (4) subsistence allowance of hospital personnel; (5) hazard pay; (6)
allowance of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and, (7) such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be determined by the DBM.
Meanwhile, DBM BC No. 16, s. 1998 prohibits the grant of food, rice, gift checks, or any
other form of incentives/allowances, except those authorized via Administrative Order by
the Office of the President. Similarly, Administrative Order No. 103 (AO 103)
suspended the grant of new or additional benefits to officials and employees of GOCCs
except for Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) Incentives, and (b) those expressly
provided by presidential issuance.
It is apparent that FGI is not among the enumerated exceptions in Section 12 of RA 6758,
and therefore, applying the general rule, should be deemed included in the standardized
salary. The only way to justify its separate grant is to show that: (a) it’s an allowance
sanctioned by the DBM, or, (b) it was authorized by the President.
The alleged “presidential imprimatur” of President Estrada could not be used as legal
basis for the annual release of FGI. To begin with, Administrator Joson was seeking
approval for the grant of the Food Assistance and Emergency Allowance (FAEA), which,
in Our eyes, is an entirely different benefit with a significantly smaller amount. Even if
the FAEA eventually evolved to FGI, still, the tenor of the letter suggests that the FAEA
is to be granted only for the Christmas Season of 1998. There is nothing that would
warrant an interpretation that President Estrada authorized the yearly grant of FGI. To
ascribe such view to the mere presence of President Estrada’s signature in the letter
would be to stretch one’s imagination and read something in the letter that was clearly
not there.
On the same boat was President Arroyo’s purported presidential approval allegedly
contained in the Memorandum by Secretary Saludo addressed to the heads of GFIs and
GOCCs. The Court cannot see anything in the above memorandum to convince Us that
President Arroyo intended to give continuing authority to NFA to grant its employees
FGI on a yearly basis. The purpose of the memorandum is clear and simple: to remind
heads of GFls and GOCCs not to give their employees exorbitant amounts by way of
bonuses. The memorandum did not even authorize the release of a specific benefit,
bonus or allowance. It spoke of a “proposal to grant” a benefit, which, again, was entirely
different from FGI, and of an obvious smaller amount. Nevertheless, nothing categorical
was given, much less authorized perpetually by virtue of the memorandum.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Locus Standi on Administrative Complaints, & Insubordination - Gross or Simple)
ELENA M. BORCILLO, REYNALDO E. MANUEL, JR., AND ROMIEL S.

VALLENTE v. EDNA LAGO MAGHINAY, G.R. No. 246542, Feb 10 2021, EN
BANC, CARANDANG, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Elena M. Borcillo (Borcillo), Reynaldo E. Manuel, Jr. (Manuel, Jr.), and
Romiel S. Vallente (Vallente; collectively, petitioners) were the Department of Education
(DepEd) Cagayan de Oro City’s School Division Superintendent, Assistant School
Division Superintendent, and the Administrative Officer (AO) V Administrative Services
Division, respectively. They filed a complaint against respondent Edna L. Maghinay
(Maghinay), AO V of the DepEd, Cagayan de Oro City Division alleging that pursuant to
DepEd’s approved Rationalization Plan (RP), Borcillo issued Special Order (SO) No. 123
dated January 23, 2015, reassigning Maghinay from AO V of the Administrative Services
Division to AO V — Finance (Budget) Division, effective January 26, 2015.
On June 4, 2015, the DepEd RO-10, through Officer-In-Charge Office of the Regional
Director (OIC-RD) Atty. Shirley O. Chatto, issued a Resolution revoking SO No. 123
and directing Maghinay's reinstatement to her former position as AO V-Administrative
Services. On February 12, 2016, the DepEd Secretary, through Undersecretary Alberto T.
Muyot, rendered its Decision granting the appeal and upholding the validity of SO No.
123. It was clarified that since the appointment paper of Maghinay provides that her
station is Division of Cagayan de Oro City, not Administrative Services, she can be
assigned by the appointing authority, Borcillo, to any of the offices in the Division of
Cagayan de Oro where she can perform her duties and responsibilities as Administrative
Officer V. It was explained that the reassignment order is supported by Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 02-05 dated January 4, 2005 and Rule IV
ofDepEd Order No. 1, s. 2003 dated January 6, 2003. It was also held that there was no
constructive dismissal because Maghinay still occupies the position of Administrative
Officer V (Step 8) and receives the same salary.
Maghinay appealed the Decision of the DepEd Secretary before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Pending her CSC appeal, Maghinay refused to assume and discharge
the functions of her office as AO V-Finance (Budget) Division while continuously
receiving her salaries. She also refused to submit her 2015 Individual Performance
Commitment and Review Form (IPCRF). Maghinay countered that she already submitted
an IPCRF based on her actual performance. However, the IPCRF she submitted did not
pertain to her assigned functions.
On April 21, 2016, while the appeal of Maghinay to the CSC was still pending,
petitioners filed an administrative case for Gross Neglect of Duty against her before the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).
Meanwhile, on May 16, 2017, the CSC rendered its Decision19 declaring SO No. 123
void. The CSC ordered that Maghinay be restored to her original station at the
Administrative Services of DepEd Cagayan de Oro.
On December 22, 2016, the OMB rendered its Decision, holding Maghinay
administratively guilty of Gross Insubordination. The 0MB found no proof indicating that
Maghinay' s reassignment was arbitrary, oppressive, or otherwise done out of mere whim

and caprice. The 0MB held that Maghinay cannot claim that the reassignment was a
demotion because she retained the saine position, rank, and salary rate she previously
held.
The CA, however, reversed and set aside the decision of the OMB, noting that the
Decision dated February 12, 2016 of the DepEd Secretary was void for being issued
without jurisdiction because the appeal was belatedly filed.
Thus, the present petition.
Issues:
Whether petitioners have legal standing to initiate the administrative complaint against
Maghinay with the OMB;
Whether Maghinay, in refusing to comply with her reassignment order while her appeal
to the DepEd Regional Office was still pending, should be held administratively liable for
gross insubordination.
Held:
First, as the immediate supervisors of Maghinay, they having standing to initiate an

administrative complaint against an erring subordinate.
The procedure in administrative cases stated in Section 3 of Rule III of Administrative

Order No. 7 states: “An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint under
oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidence in support of the charge.
Such complaint shall be accompanied by a Certificate of NonForum Shopping duly
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant or his counsel. An administrative proceeding
may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his
initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a criminal action or a grievance
complaint or request for assistance.”
Clearly, with or without a complaint, an administrative proceeding may be initiated by

the OMB against erring public officers under the jurisdiction of the OMB.
Second, Maghinay is only liable for simple insubordination, a less grave offense, instead
of gross insubordination.

Insubordination refers to "a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is
entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of
the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer."
Maghinay cannot be held liable for gross insubordination for defying the DepEd
Secretary's Decision. However, Maghinay is not absolutely free from administrative
liability. She should have immediately complied with the reassignment order Borcillo
issued while her appeal remained pending with the DepEd RO-10. This inaction and non-
compliance constitutes a disregard of the instructions of her supervisor. While the case of
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Salvana is not on all fours with the present case, it is
worthy to highlight the Court's explanation that "what respondent should have done
would be to occupy the new position and then file the proper remedies. She should not
have defied the orders of her superiors." Thus, upon receipt of SO No. 123, Maghinay
should have immediately reported to her new work assignment though she may not agree
with it.
Maghinay should be held liable only for the less grave offense of insubordination instead
of gross insubordination because this is only her first offense and she firmly believed,
based on the advice of her counsel, that she could defy the reassignment order pending
the resolution of her appeal in the Civil Service Commission. Absent any proof of willful
or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instruction of her superior,
Maghinay cannot be held guilty of gross insubordination.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Administrative Liability)

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DILG v. REXLON T.
GATCHALIAN; PP v. REXLON T. GATCHALIAN et. al., G.R. Nos. 230679;
232228-30, Feb 10 2021, FIRST DIVISION, ZALAMEDA, J.:
Facts:
On 13 May 2015, a tragic fire occurred inside the compound of Kentex in Valenzuela
City causing the death of seventy-four individuals and injury to several other persons.
The Inter-Agency Anti-Arson Task Force (IATF) conducted an investigation on the
tragic fire. It found that the immediate cause of the fire was the stockpiling of 400 sacks
or ten tons of Supercell Blowing Agent known as Azodicarbonamide, in an area not
intended for such storage and adjacent to the welding activities near the stockpile. Due to
the lack of fire exits, sixty-nine casualties were found at the second floor of Building 3,
while three were found on the mezzanine stairs of Building 2, which indicated that they
died due to lack of exit point.
Based on available records, Kentex was issued by the City of Valenzuela Business
Permits for 2010 and 2011 despite the lack of Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC)
for the years 2010 and 2011. On 18 December 2012, an FSIC was issued by the
Valenzuela City Fire Station, which was valid for one year or until 18 December 2013.
No subsequent FSIC was renewed or issued for the years thereafter. Despite the lack of
FSIC, the City of Valenzuela issued a Business Permit on 15 January 2014 to Kentex.
Aside from the absence of FSIC, the Fire Code Technical Support Group of the IATF
Team noted other fire safety violations committed by Kentex at the time of the incident.
Thus, the IATF recommended the filing of criminal and administrative charges against
several individuals, including Mayor Gatchalian and Atty. Padayao. Consequently, the
Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau-MOLEO (FFIB-MOLEO) filed an administrative
complaint for Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Neglect of Duty before the
Ombudsman against, among others, Mayor Gatchalian, Atty. Padayao and Carreon.
The Ombudsman later found Mayor Gatchalian, Atty. Padayao, Carreon liable for
granting licenses and permits in 2014 and 2015 in favor of Kentex, despite the latter's
failure to secure the required FSICs. Carreon recommended the approval of: the permits
while Atty. Padayao approved them for Mayor Gatchalian. The Ombudsman concluded
that this constituted gross and inexcusable negligence in enforcing the law and their
partiality to Kentex. In addition, the Ombudsman found conspiracy among the BFP-
Valenzuela and the City of Valenzuela.
Issue:
Whether Mayor Gatchalian is administratively liable for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty, as head of the City Government of Valenzuela City when its BPLO
issued business permits to Kentex despite the absence of FSICs;
Held:
No, Mayor Gatchalian is not administratively liable for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty.
Grave misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer
coupled with the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the official
or employee's act of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position to gain benefit for one's
self.
On the other hand, gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is
the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to
their own property. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person
to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
The Court holds that no substantial evidence exists to support the assailed Joint
Resolution of the Ombudsman. Administrative proceedings are governed by the
substantial evidence rule where a finding of guilt would have to be sustained for as long
as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent committed acts stated in the
complaint.
To begin with, the DTI and DILG issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1 dated 06
August 2010 which encouraged Local Government Units (LGU) to reduce the steps ancl
processing time for business permits, and allowed LGUs to issue "temporary permits"
that would give applicants a period of time (usually 2-3 months after issuance of the
permit) to comply with the other requirements such as the FSIC. The Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Valenzuela City enacted Ordinance No. 62, Series of 2012 instituting
"The 3-S in Public Service Program" and the post-audit scheme for the issuance of
business permits and clearances in Valenzuela City.
Ordinance No. 62 was uniformly applied in the issuance of all business permits in
Valenzuela City, including those issued to Kentex. In addition, DILG memorandum dated
04 January 2011 reiterated that the fire safety inspection must be conducted promptly and
should be completed before the end of the year.

The BFP Memorandum dated 24 September 2012, on the other hand, provides the
guidelines in the processing of FSIC during renewal of business permits specifically in
areas where a One-Stop Shop is implemented. Meanwhile, the BFP Operational
Procedures Manual released in 2015 likewise provides for the procedure in the issuance
of the FSIC in cases where the LGUs employ a Business One-Stop Shop (BOSS). The
BFP Manual provides that Section 7 of the Fire Code mandates that a fire safety
inspection is a pre-requisite in the granting of business permits. However, due to the
BOSS scheme, the BFP is obligated to prescribe a shortened procedure.
Considering the foregoing, it is beyond dispute that the streamlined procedure for the
issuance of business permits allowed submission of the FSIC within a reasonable time
after the issuance of business permits. Therefore, in issuing business permits to Kentex,
the City Government of Valenzuela merely followed the procedure laid down in Joint
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Ordinance No. 62 and other administrative issuances of the
BFP and DILG.
It appears that Mayor Gatchalian had no hand in the issuance of the business permits of
Kentex and all other business establishments during the time material to the case since
the matter has been delegated to the BPLO. Carreon recommended the approval of the
permits, while Atty. Padayao approved the same for Mayor Gatchalian.
ELECTION LAW/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

(Condonation Doctrine)

JUNE VINCENT MANUEL GAUDAN V. ROEL R. BEGAMO; OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN V. ROEL DEGAMO; JUNE VINCENT MANUEL GAUDAN V.
ROEL R. BEGAMO G.R. NO. 226935; 228238; 228325, February 9 2021, EN
BANC, INTING, J.:
Facts:
In the May 2010 elections, Degamo won a seat as Provincial Board Member of Negros
Oriental (the Province). However, due to the sudden deaths of Governor-elect Emillio C.
Macias II on June 13, 2010 and Vice Governor-elect Agustin Perdices on January 5,
2011, Degamo, as the Provincial Board Member who garnered the highest number of
votes in the last elections, assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession.
As then incumbent Governor, Degamo requested from the Office of the President the
release of calamity funds for fiscal year 2012 for the rehabilitation, repair, and
reconstruction of damaged infrastructures in the aftermath of Typhoon Sendong and a
magnitude 6.9 earthquake which had struck the Province.
On June 5, 2012, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Regional Office
No. VII issued Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) No. ROVII-12-0009202 to the
Province in the amount of P961,550,000.00, to be drawn from the Calamity Fund under
the 2012 General Appropriations Act. Two days later, P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the
total amount of the SARO, was released and deposited to the bank account of the
Provincial Government.
In a Letter dated June 19, 2012, DBM Undersecretary Mario L. Relampagos (Usec.
Relampagos) informed Degamo of. the immediate withdrawal of the SARO for
noncompliance with the existing guidelines of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) on large-scale fund releases for infrastructure projects amounting to
P10,000,000.00 or higher, as such, the release of funds was withdrawn. Director Ferman
also sent a letter dated July 10, 2012 demanding the return of the prior released amount.
In the meantime, the Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government held a
special meeting for the conduct of a pre-procurement conference for infrastructure
projects to be implemented by the Province out of the Calamity Fund released.
Thereafter, Degamob awarded eleven infrastructure project contracts and released the
total amount of P143,268,441.59, representing 15% of the contract price as advanced
payment, to the respective project contractors.

COA questioned the disbursements for lack of the required certificate of availability of
funds. After audit, the COA issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing the advanced
payment made to the project contractors of the above-mentioned infrastructure contracts
due to the lack of available funds as a result of the DBM's withdrawal of SARO.
On October 29, 2013, June Vincent Manuel S. Gaudan (Gaudan) filed a Complaint-
Affidavit with the Ombudsmat against Degamo and several others21 for: (a)
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and violation of Section 3(e) RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (b) Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Abuse of Authority docketed as in connection with their
refusal to return the amount of P480,775,000.00 to the National Treasury as a
consequence of the issuance of the negative SARO.
In the Joint Resolution dated January 12, 2016, the Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict Degamo and his co-respondents for 11 counts of Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification. As regards the administrative aspect of the case, the Ombudsman
found Degamo and his co-respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct, and meted out against
them the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government. The Ombudsman, however, applied the
Condonation Doctrine to Degamo’s case and opined that the penalty against him could no
longer be imposed in view of his reelection as Provincial Governor in 2013.
However, upon Gaudan's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 25 the Ombudsman, in its
Joint Order dated, May 16, 2016, amended its earlier ruling and dismissed Degamo from
the service, taking into consideration the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in the
2015.
The CA, however, granted Degamo’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO given the extreme
urgency involved in the case. The CA explained that the implementation of the
Ombudsman's Joint Order against Degamo would "undeservedly deprive the electorate of
the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. "
In the Decision dated August 3 0, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's
Joint Resolution and Joint Order, but only insofar as the administrative aspect of
Degamo's case was concerned.
Issues:

Whether the condonation doctrine is applicable to Degamo, who first assumed office as
Governor of the Province by succession.
Held:
First, Yes, the condonation doctrine is applicable to Degamo.
Through the years, the condonation doctrine has served as a major obstacle against
exacting public accountability from a number of elective local officials, whose
subsequent reelections effectively rendered the administrative cases 1gainst them moot
and academic.
Then came the Court's Decision in Carpio Morales which, in no uncertain tenns, declared
the condonation doctrine as obsolete and more importantly, bereft of legal bases in this
jurisdiction. The Court found the concept of public accountability to be "plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior.term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even to another elective post.
To recall, Degamo won a seat as Provincial Board Member of the Province in the May
2010 elections. He then assumed office as Governor of the Province by succession
following the sudden deaths of Governorelect Emillio C. Madas II and Vice Governor-
elect Agustin Percides not long after the elections were concluded. Three years later,
Degamo ran and won as Governor of the Province in the May 2013 elections.
In line with the Madreo ruling, the Court rules that the condonation doctrine is applicable
in Degamo's case by reason of his reelection in 2013, or before the Carpio Morales ruling
attained finality on April 12, 2016. Thus, Degamo cannot be precluded from relying on
said doctrine as a defense against the present administrative charges against him.
Contrary to Gaudan's assertion, the fact that Degamo was elected as a Provincial Board·
Me1nber and not as Governor of the Province in the May 2010 elections is of no
consequence.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(Speedy Disposition of Cases, Period for Conduct of Preliminary Investigation of
Sandiganbayan)
JOAN V. ALARILLA v SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 236177-210, FEB 3 2021, FIRST DIVISION,
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Facts:
In May 2007, petitioner was elected city mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Subsequently,
she was re-elected mayor in the 2010 and 2013 elections. On 18 January 2008, or a few
months into her first term, Rolando L. Lorenzo (Lorenzo) filed a complaint against
petitioner and her now deceased husband, Eduardo A. Alarilla, who was the former city
mayor and later, general consultant for Meycauayan, before the Office of the
Ombudsman for malversation through falsification of public documents as well as grave
misconduct and dishonesty. In his complaint, Lorenzo alleged that during the months of
July and August of 2007, petitioner and her husband misappropriated a total of
P5,130,329.14 by issuing and receiving the proceeds of 43 checks drawn from public
funds kept in the Philippine National Bank accounts owned by the local government of
Meycauayan. According to Lorenzo, petitioner and her husband falsely misrepresented
these checks as payment for goods and services from suppliers but in truth there were no
actual goods delivered or services rendered.
On 07 May 2008, the Ombudsman directed petitioner and her husband to file their
counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence. Pursuant thereto, petitioner and her
husband filed a joint counter-afndavit vehemently denying the accusations against
them on 09 July 2008. Later, on 04 March 2009, petitioner's husband passed away
while the case was still pending with the Ombudsman.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on 13 March 2017, alleging that the Ombudsman
erred in findlng probable cause. On 24 March 2017, petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration emphasizing that her right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated since the Ombudsman took nine (9) years to resolve the case. The Ombudsman
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then presented her Omnibus
Motion (Re. Dismissal and/or Judicial Determination of Probable Cause) asserting
that there was inordinate delay in resolving the criminal case before the Ombudsman,
which violated her Constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s omnibus motion, finding that here was no
delay of the kind that could have unduly prejudiced the rights of herein petitioner. It
further considered the timeline of proceedings before the Ombudsman and the
consolidated cases lodged against petitioner and her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that her right to speedy disposition of cases
was not violated.
Held:
Yes, Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motions
despite her timely and consistent assertion.
Under AO 1, the Ombudsman now has clearly specified time periods for conducting
not only preliminary investigations, but also fact-finding investigations and
administrative adjudications.
For preliminary investigations, AO 1 provides:
Section 8. Period for the conduct of Preliminary

Investigation. - Unless otherwise provided for in a
separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a
special panel of investigators/prosecutors and prescribing
the period for completion of the preliminary investigation,
the proceedings therein shall not exceed twelve (12)
months for simple cases or twenty-four months (24)
months for complex cases, subject to the following
considerations:
(a) The complexity of the case shall be determined

on the basis of factors such as, but not limited to, the number
of respondents, the number of offenses charged, the volume
of documents, the geographical coverage, and the amount of
public funds involved.
(b) Any delay incurred in the proceedings,

whenever attributable to the respondent, shall suspend the
running of the period for purposes of completing the
preliminary investigation.
(c) The period herein prescribed may be extended by

written authority of the Ombudsman, or the Overall Deputy
Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman
concerned for justifiable reasons, which extension shall
not exceed one (1) year.

In the present case, the the formal complaint was filed on 18 January 2008. Petitioner and
her husband were able to submit their joint counter- affidavit on 09 July 2008. However,
after filing their counter-affidavit, it took the Ombudsman more than eight (8) years to
issue the Resolution dated 03 November 2016 finding probable cause against petitioner.
Applying either the short 10-day period in Javier and Catamco, or the more generous 12
to 24-month periods under AO 1, it is apparent that the Ombudsman exceeded the
specified time period for preliminary investigations. Thus, following Cagang, the burden
of proof shifted to the prosecution, who must establish that the delay was reasonable and
justified under the circumstances. Once the burden of proof shifts, the prosecution must
prove the following: first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third,
that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Given the inordinate delay of almost nine (9) years in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the Ombudsman's clear failure to provide sufficient justification, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it refused to uphold the petitioner's
timely asserted right to speedy disposition of cases. Consequently, the criminal actions
filed against petitioner should be abated and dismissed.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW/PENAL LAW
(Declaration of SALN, RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 238660, FEB 3, 2021, FIRST DIVISION, ZALAMEDA, J.:
Facts:
Private respondent was a security guard of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) who assumed
office on 01 April 1979 and resigned on 16 October 2015. Pursuant to Investigation
Authority No. 108-2014-9-24BC dated 03 September 2015, petitioner Department of
Finance — Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) conducted a lifestyle check
on private respondent's assets, liabilities, net worth, business interests and financial
connections.
The DOF-RIPS compared private respondent's Statements of Assets, Liabilities and

Networth (SALNs) from 2002-2014 with documents obtained from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Land Registration Authority, Land Transportation Office, Securities
and Exchange Commission, and Department of Trade and Industry. The lifestyle check
revealed that for the years 2002 until 2014, private respondent failed to declare in his
SALNs several properties under his name and one property he donated in 2015 to his
daughter, Michelle Germar (Michelle).
The DOF found that private respondent declared in his SALNs, for the years 2002 to
2014, only three (3) out of the seven (7) properties registered in his name, i.e., a
residential property, a piggery, and an apartment, without declaring their real actual
valuations. It also noted that a criminal information for robbery was filed against private
respondent by the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos Bulacan, While it was eventually
provisionally dismissed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), petitioner still made an
untruthfoJ statement when answered item 37(a) in his 2014 Personal Data Sheet (PDS)
"NO" to the question, "Have you ever been formally charged."
On May 2016, the DOF filed a complaint against private respondent for violation of
Section 7 of RA 3019 and for Falsification by a Public Officer and False Testimony and
for Perjury. In its Decision dated 15 June 2017, the OMB found probable cause to charge
private respondent. In any event, private respondent may only be prosecuted for failure to
disclose the properties in his SALNs only for the years 2008 to 2014. This, considering
that a violation of RA 6713 prescribes in eight (8) years from the time of its commission.

The Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration in its
Order dated 08 November 2017. Hence, the istant Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there is no probable
cause to charge private respondent with Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC for
failure to disclose several of his properties in his SALN.
Held:
No, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse in its discretion in ruling that there is no
probable cause against private respondent for falsification under Article 171 ( 4) of the
RPC for making untruthful narration of facts. The Court agrees that the third element of
the crime. Where the satements made are absolutely false, was wanting.
In this case, the element of taking advantage of one's position is patently lacking. There is
no showing that private respondent had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise, to
intervene in the preparation of the SALNs, or he had the official custody of the same.
Taking advantage of one's official position for the purpose of committing falsification of
public document under Article 171 "is considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or
preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document." A public officer is
said to have taken advantage of his or her position if he or she has the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document or if he or she has the
official custody of the document which he or she falsifies.
The preparation and filing of a SALN is not a special duty of any particular office. It is
not based on rank or salary grade. The preparation and filing of a SALN is required of all
public officers and employees "except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers
and casual or temporary workers." Hence, when it comes to the preparation of SALNs, no
office has an advantage over the other.
The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an
Information should be filed. Nonetheless, for this Court to review the Office of the
Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers in criminal cases,
there must be a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
Petitioner, in this case, must prove that public respondent committed not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of d


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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

2 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

4 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

5 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

7 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

8 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

The Sangguniang Bayan unanimously voted to override the veto. Former councilor Enrique

9 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

On review, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Norte declared as inoperative

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied.

Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the condonation doctrine.

10 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

11 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

12 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

13 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

Whether or not the respondents are guilty of grave misconduct.

14 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

It is a misconduct because the respondent acted as an active and willing

15 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

G.R. NO. 223644

16 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

18 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

22 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,ELECTION

1 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

2 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

3 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

Estrella M. Domingo v. Civil Service Commission and Victorino Mapa

In reply, respondent Executive Director Victorino Mapa Manalo (respondent Manalo)

The CSC affirmed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner does not invoke any of these exceptions.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly,

5 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of

Petitioner's actions, however, do not violate or transgress any rule of conduct. As

We also cannot conclude that petitioner acted insubordinately to respondent Manalo. It

6 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

As there could have been no misrepresentation by petitioner at the seminar as to her

Acts or omissions considered as dishonesty include: making untruthful statements in the

To conclude, in the absence of evidence proving misrepresentation or any of the other

7 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

In the absence of a black-letter law prohibiting the attendance of employees at seminars,

8 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

9 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

10 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

11 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

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15 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

17 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

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24 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

3. An examination of the Undertakings of Cash Bond Deposit, Release Orders

5. As to the JDF Collections, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat failed to remit a total amount

On the other hand, Atty. Musa-Barrat under-remitted the amount of Pl,443.80.

6. With regard to SAJF collections, Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat failed to remit the

8. Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat has an outstanding balance of P500.00 for unremitted MF

10. In fine, the unrestitituted accountabilities of Atty. Zalsos-Uychiat and Ms.

27 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE

29 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (ADMINISTRATIVE