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Bodily Knowledge: Epistemological Reflections on Dance

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 Bodily Knowledge: Epistemological Reflections on Dance
Author(s): Jaana Parviainen
Source: Dance Research Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer, 2002), pp. 11-26
Published by: Congress on Research in Dance
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 Bodily Knowledge: Epistemological Reflections on Dance
Jaana Parviainen

Introduction
This articleis concernedwith epistemologicalquestionsof dance,specifically,the natureof
danceknowledge.The aimis to addresstherole of ourbodilyactivityandthe tactile-kinaes-
theticsensein epistemologyandto clarifytheconcept"bodilyknowledge"-knowingin and
throughthe body. I startwith reflection on the standpointsof traditionalepistemology and a
feminist critique of it, then, extending the concern with epistemological inquiry of dance
knowledge, explore Sondra Fraleigh's and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone'snotions of cognitive
capacitiesof themovingbody.Finally,settingoutfromthegroundwork of EdmundHusserl's,
EdithStein's,andMauriceMerleau-Ponty's phenomenology of thebody,I use somekey con-
cepts from Michael Polanyi's epistemology to describe the natureof bodily knowledge. The
argumentis that there is a distinction and a connection between "skill" and "knowledge"in
respect to the body's movement.GilbertRyle's "know how" implies abilities ranging
frombodily skills to abstractcontemplativecases, but it cannotexplain"knowhow"in the
absence of skill. Thus, the rationaleunderlyingthis discussion can be put more clearly by ask-
ing why dance teachers are able to teach dance studentsmovements they can no longer exe-
cutethemselves.

TraditionalEpistemology and Feminism

Epistemologytypicallyaddressesissues like the role of sensoryperceptionin knowledge
development,types of knowledge,the differencebetweenknowingand believing,and the
degreeof certaintyin knowledge.SincePlato,thetraditionalphilosophicalaccountof knowl-
edge has defined it as "justifiedtruebelief," while twentieth-centuryAnglo-Americananalytic
philosophy calls it propositional knowledge.To understandany propositionis to know under
whichconditionsit is trueandwhichfalse.A justifiedtruebeliefcanbe knowledgewhenit is
derived from a reliable method. The majorquestion occupying traditionalepistemology con-
cerns necessary and sufficient conditionsfor knowledge; a set of conditionsthatwould be log-
ically structuredto prevent the possibility of a knowledge's claims being shown to be false.
This has been rarelyconnectedto the questionof how one knows.In fact, one of the main

Jaana Parviainen holds a Ph.D. in Philosophyfrom the Universityof Tampere,Finland. She

is the author of Bodies Moving and Moved: Phenomenological Analysis of the Dancing
Subjectand the Cognitive and EthicalValues of Dance Art (TampereUniversityPress, 1998).
She has taught the philosophy of dance and phenomenological dance and movementanalysis
to undergraduatesin the Departmentof PerformingArts at TurkuPolytechnics. She is cur-
rentlya postdoctoral researcherat the Academyof Finland where her researchfocuses on the
conception of technique in contemporarydance. In addition to academic work, she has stud-
ied differentstyles and techniquesof contemporarydance.

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questions in traditionalepistemology has been whetherwe can know at all (Duran 1994, 89).
Thus, traditionalepistemology is focused more on epistemic justification than on the nature
of knowledge (Pollock 1986, 7).1
Another traditionalarea of inquiry for epistemology has been the debate over the extent
to which our knowledge stems from the senses or whetherwe ought to think of its foundations
as being nonsensory.According to empiricists, knowledge is derived from what is given in
perception.Rationalism,in contrastto perceptualor empiricalknowledge, tends to assert the
possibility of innate knowledge, the source of which is usually defined as "what is known
independentlyof experience,"or perhaps,"whatis known on the basis of reason alone." The
traditionalanalysis of empiricalknowledge claims that a person has empiricalknowledge of
a proposition,p, if and only if thatpersonhas empiricallyjustified truebelief in thatp (Moser
1986, 3). Such an analysis suggests that what perceptionprovides is not knowledge itself, but
becomes knowledge aftersome "transformation" (Dancy 1985, 2). This transformationentails
conceptualizing perception-formulating "propositions" regarding perception-which
implies thattraditionalepistemology,with its notion of propositionalknowledge, does not rec-
ognize as knowledge, for example, knowledge of how to ride a bicycle unless it can be shown
to be reducibleto propositions(Dancy 1985, 23). In other words, knowledge must be clearly
articulatedin orderto count as real knowledge. Traditionalepistemology is explicitly norma-
tive and formal;it is concernedwith whetherwe have acted well or badly, responsiblyor irre-
sponsibly, in forming the belief we have.
Feminist work has criticizedthe primaryinterestsof traditionalepistemology,which seem
to allow no role for subjectivityin the formationof knowledge (Lennon and Whitford 1991,
2). In traditionalepistemology, being has been divorced from knowing and both have been
separatedfrom either ethics or politics. As Jane Flax points out:

These divisions were blessed by Kant and transformedby him into a funda-
mental principle derived from the structureof mind itself. A consequence of
this principle has been the enshrining within mainstreamAnglo-American
philosophy of a rigid distinction between fact and value which has had the
effect of consigning the philosopherto silence on issues of utmost importance
to humanlife. Furthermore,it has blinded philosophersand their interpreters
to the possibility that apparentlyinsoluble dilemmas within philosophy are
not the productof the immanent structureof the human mind and/or nature
but ratherreflect distortedor frozen social relations. (1983, 248)

Traditionalepistemology yields a perspectivethat is a "God's-eye view" or a "view from

nowhere" (Lazreg 1991, 83). This conception of knowledge does not reflect on the subject
who producesit. As Flax asserts, knowledge is the productof humanbeings. Since all know-
ers are situated-historically, culturally,socially, spatially,temporally,kinesthetically-all the
dimensions of situationbecome part of the epistemological context. Each being has its own
life history and perception,its own patternof structurallycoupled interactionwith the world.
This implies that knowledge is always self-referential and reveals something about the
knower. In other words, knowledge bears marks of its producer.And because knowing has
bodily roots, it is also to some extent unique.Although the significance of uniquenessand the

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knowing subject is here emphasized, it is difficult simply to abandonentirely objectivity or
the referentialclaims of knowledge as conceived in traditionalepistemology.
Feminism's most compelling epistemological insight lies in the connections it has estab-
lished between knowledge and power (Lennon and Whitford 1991, 2). Many feminists, draw-
ing on Michel Foucault's account of the practice of self, argue that power not only prevents,
but also enables (Martin 1992, 284). Knowledge enables us to perceive, act, and move in a
world, and as we act, perceive, and move, the world comes forth as a result of our actions and
observations (Krogh and Roos 1995, 51). Epistemological objectivity, with its anonymity,
impersonality,detachment,and impartiality,may lead to the constitutionof knowers as mere
objects of knowledge, ratherthan as subjects acting within a historically changing environ-
ment and reflecting back on the knower. Epistemological considerations in feminism no
longer mean merely developing knowledge about women, in which women feature as the
objects of knowledge; they also involve an understandingof the subjective process whereby
women understand,create, and use knowledge. This implies understandingwomen as the sub-
jects of knowledge, in the sense of being subject to and shapedby the social forces constitut-
ing particularforms of knowledge, as well as intentionallycreating and using new forms of
knowledge to transformthose social forces (Crowley and Himmelweit 1992, 1).
Nevertheless, feminist epistemology is neither a specification of a female way of know-
ing nor simply the articulation of female subjectivity (Lennon and Whitford 1991, 13).
Feminist epistemology consists ratherin attentionto epistemological concerns arising out of
feminist projects, which prompt reflection on the nature of knowledge and our means of
attainingit. Some feminists have surmisedthat a feminist epistemology might be an answer
to a "masculinistepistemology,"but it does not seem to be an answerto the current"Western"
crisis of knowledge (Sartori 1991, 58).
The growingrecognitionin many disciplinesis thatthe traditionalconceptionof cognition,
equatedwith verbaland symbolic conceptualizationandits focus on the criteriaof justification,
is inadequateto describeor explainthe varietiesof modes in which humanknowing occurs and
by which humanknowing may be represented(Reimer 1992, 27). Not only philosophersand
feminists, but also social scientists, historians, organizationalresearchers,and aestheticians
have been urgentlyaddressingepistemologicalquestions.Why not dance scholars?

Toward an Epistemological Inquiry of Dance Knowledge

The dancer wrestles with sensations and images of movement, its meaning, quality, shapes,
and textures,strugglingto capturesome half-graspedor intuitive complexity of visual-kinetic
form. As Maxine Sheets-Johnstonestates, thinkingin movement we discover the fundamen-
tal creative patternof thought that is founded upon a kinetic bodily logos (Sheets-Johnstone
1999, 491). Dancing is hardlyless rationalthan conceptualthinking, althoughthe medium is
different.Some dancers are more talented than others;however, all of them have knowledge
of movement. Knowing in dancing always has something to do with verbal language;never-
theless, it essentially concerns the body's awareness and motility. If we acknowledge that
dancersknow something and that for the most parttheir knowing is nonverbal,it leads us to
ask, Whatdo they know, and even more importantly,How do they know?
The often stated but rarely analyzed issue of dance studies is the question of knowing in
and throughthe body.Althoughthe concept of "bodilyknowledge"has been aroundfor a long
time in dance practiceand dance research,the intuitionof bodily knowledge is not yet articu-

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latedadequately.Exploringissuesrelatedto knowingin andthroughthe body,bothSheets-
JohnstoneandSondraFraleigh,in theirgroundbreakingwork,haveappealedto cognitivepsy-
chologyandphenomenology. Fraleighsays:

Indeed,we commonlyspeakof skillin danceas a formof knowledgeandalso

speakof kinestheticintelligenceas an aspectof skillfuldancing.But dance
involves morethanjust knowinghow to do a movement.It also involves
knowinghow to expresstheaestheticintentof themovementandhow to cre-
ateaestheticmovementimagery.All of theseformsof knowinghowareforms
of bodilylived (experiential)
knowledge.As such,theyareavenuesfor self-
knowledge. (1987, 26)

She arguesthatdanceknowledgeinvolvesmorethanbodily skills or knowinghow to do

movements,andconcludesthatall formsof knowing-howin dancingareformsof bodilylived
knowledge.It seems,at first,thather"bodilylived,experientialknowledge"refersto bodily
knowledge,butknowingthe body seemsto addressonly the body as object.In otherwords,
onlythe body-objectcanbe known,in the sensethatthebodyitselfcanbecomethe objectof
ourattention,butthe body-subjectcanonly be lived(1987, 15).
Fraleighhas discussedself-knowledgeacquiredthroughdancingas beingrelatedto Ulic
Neisser'sfive differentkindsof knowledgethatwe mayhaveof ourselves(Neisser1988).She
arguesthatdancingdependson realizationof intent,for intendingto danceis intendingto do
somethingmorethanjust move, and suggeststhatwhatwe can know of ourselvesthrough
dancedependson the fulfillmentof ourintentionsin movement.Suchdancingmomentspro-
vide thebasis for a certainkindof self-knowledge at canbe describedas somethingknown
ths
by the dancer throughexperience(Fraleigh1993, 102-103).Althoughshe discussesdanceas
a sourceforself-knowledge, heranalysisdoesnottakeintoaccountthewaysin whichdancers
acquireanddevelopknowledgefor dancing(Fraleigh1999, 12). If the trivialityandcontra-
dictionsof epistemologicaldiscourseare to be overcome,whatstill needs to be done is to
assimilateFraleigh'sphenomenological descriptionof cognitiveaspectsin danceintoanover-
all theoryof knowledge.
Sheets-Johnstone arguesthatmovementis the motherof all cognition;it formsthe I that
moves beforethe I thatmoves formsmovement.Her purposeis to show how our tactile-
kinaestheticbodiesareepistemological gateways(Sheets-Johnstone 1999,253).Theseepiste-
mologicalgatewaysopena wayto understand ourselvesandtheworldthroughthemovement.
Through our kinaesthetic consciousness we constituteourselvesas epistemologicalsubjects.
Criticizing terms such as "embodiment" and "livedbody,"she goes on to showhow the term
"animateform"captureswhatwe experiencewhen we experienceour own bodies andthe
bodiesof others:animation,aliveness,dynamicallychangingconformations andcontours,and
qualitativelymeaningful forms. Animate form to
attempts place the discussionof the living
bodyin the context of a natural history(1999, 365). She that
argues genuineunderstandings
of consciousnessdemandclose and seriousstudyof evolutionas a historyof animateform.
Focusingon animateorganismsas living,movingthingsshe attemptsto showthatthereis no
fundamental breakbetweennonhumans andhumans(1999, 133).Discussingthehumanbody,
she attempts to adumbrate by animateform (Leib)thebody'sphysicalmatterof factandpos-
sibilities,suchas, thebodymovesmoreeasilyforwardthanbackward.

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 Sheets-Johnstone emphasizesthe notionthatmovementis foundationalin an epistemo-
logicalsense,thatan infant'sfirstmodeof knowingis in movement.She says that

we come to know the worldthroughmovement...preciselyin the way we

intuitivelyknewas infantson the basisof ourtactile-kinestheticexperiences,
andknewwithouttheaidof scarequotes,of qualitativehappeningsandvital-
ity affects.Suchknowingis a manner-or perhapsbetter,a style-of cogni-
tion thatmaybe difficultfor some adultsto acknowledgesince it is nonlin-
guisticandnonpropositional and,just as significantly,has no solidobjecton
whichit fastens.(1999,270)

By "physicalknowledge"she refers to a mode of a nonlinguisticand nonpropositionalknow-

ing in andthroughmovement.Focusingon infants,however,she stopsshortof considering
adultdancers)gainthisphysicalknowledgein general.
how adults(in particular
My purposeis to show how this physical knowledge or bodily knowledge forms a source
for dance knowledge, althoughmy main effort concentrateson providingevidence of the exis-
tenceof bodilyknowledge.WhileI hopeto contributeto the developmentof an "epistemol-
domainof artisticoraes-
ogy of dance,"it is my intentionto arguethatthereis no autonomous
thetic knowing, but that the theory of knowledge should cover artisticproduction,including
dancing, as well as any other human activity. I consider a theory of knowledge that could
explaina mode of knowingin termsof bodily movements.Whileconcentrating mainlyon
contemporary dance,it is to
necessary stressherethatdancers
as a grouparenothomogenous;
theyhaveverydifferentexperiences,perspectives,andproblematics, dependingon variables
such as class, country,age, culture,or sexuality.Thus,my purposeis not to define dance
knowledgebutto approachan epistemologythatcan recognizethe elementof knowledgein
a dancer's skill. This implies that dancers are not only objects of knowledge, but subjects of
knowledge, understandingthe subjective process whereby they create and use knowledge
(Martin1998, 204-205).

A Phenomenology of the Body and Epistemic Openness

stressedthatthephysicalbody(Korper)andthe
EdmundHusserl,in his latephenomenology,
living/lived body (Leib) are essentially different (Husserl 1960, 97; Husserl 1970, 107). The
living body is given to me in perceptionas my own body, not as a thing but a "phenomenon."
The physical body is a corporealentity,properlydefined as a complex of brain waves, neural
pathways,circulation,and muscularfibers. The physical body and the living body are on dif-
ferent incommunicablelevels of being; they cannot be reducedto one another.
Discussing the living body given to me in perception,the GermanphilosopherEdith Stein
wishes to demonstratethatthe living body is constitutedin a two-fold manner.Sensationsthat
impinge on the living body are given to the living-body senser.The living body perceives and
is perceived by itself. Stein calls this double mode of experiencingthe body the phenomenon
of "fusion"(Stein 1989, 47). When I touch my left hand with the right hand, my right hand
feels the cool surface of my left hand, but at the same time my left hand feels the warm sur-
face of the righthand'spalm. I am touching and touched, a two-fold but one. I can transfermy
awarenessof the toucherand touchedto the hands.Accordingto Stein, this fusion implies that
I can also see my hands, while I can feel the double givenness of touch.

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 There are similarities between Stein's dissertationof empathy, which dates from 1917,
and the Visible and Invisible by Merleau-Ponty(1968), who also had access to the same
unpublishedmanuscriptof Ideas II, whereinHusserlplaces greatemphasison the fact thattac-
tile sensationsof a body are double (Balzer 1991, 272). For Husserl there is a touched-touch-
ing, but not a seen-seeing, since the eye cannot be seen by the seer. Merleau-Pontyrestores
the parallelism between touch and vision, detecting in both of them the same reversibility.
However, he wants to emphasize that neither in touch nor in vision is there a complete
reversibility:What touches is never quite what is touched; what sees is never quite what is
seen and what sees is never quite what is touched (Dastur 1984, 123). The living body's
reversibility of touching and touched, seeing and seen, seeing and touched do not coincide
easily with each other; rather,they escape each other in what Merleau-Pontycalls a "diver-
gence" or "ecart"(Merleau-Ponty1968, 257). "Thepoint"at which they interweaveMerleau-
Ponty calls "chiasm"(le chiasme). The living body is the other also to itself, since the body-
self is never entirely known and perceived by itself (Merleau-Ponty1962, xii).2 In addition,
the way in which I perceive my body must be different,at least in some cases, from the way
in which I perceive other creaturesand things.3
My heart,brain, and liver function whether I am aware of them and their functioning or
not. The same is true of my retinaor my iris, but it is not true of my eyes (Schmitt 1970, 160).
I can move my eyes, close my eyes, look at/on/out of/in/into/away, watch, gaze, stare at,
glance. In Krisis, Husserl comes to the conclusion that our kinaestheticsensations underthe
heading of the constitutionof the living body are the "subjectof the will." The living body as
executor of my choices and decisions is experiencedin kinaestheticsensations.However, the
living body is not a mere instrumentof action or an object of action, but both the mover and
the moved. What becomes increasinglyimportantwith regardto the living body in Husserl's
Krisis is the fact that the subject is intentionallyrelated to things "throughthe living body."
This means thatI am relatedto them neitheras a pureego nor as one physical object is related
to another;rather,the expression"beingrelatedvia the living body"refersto the body's motil-
ity and kinaestheticsense (Bell 1990, 209-210). The pure ego of Husserl's Ideas I has been
transformedinto the living body of Krisis; the Cartesiancogito has been replaced by some-
thing capableof "kinaesthesis,"thatis, the originalphenomenologicalmethodhas been broad-
ened to become somethingHusserl at one point calls "thephenomenological-kineticmethod"
(Bell 1990, 215).
Comparedwith Husserl's phenomenological-kineticmethod, both Sheets-Johnstoneand
Michael O'Donovan-Andersondiscuss our tactile-kinaestheticsense as a central organizing
role for perceptions as a whole (O'Donovan-Anderson 1997; Sheets-Johnstone 1999). As
Sheets-Johnstonepoints out, we learn by moving and by listening to our own movement. We
can feel, for example, the swiftness or slowness of our movement or its tensional tightness or
looseness that evolves on the basis of the bodily awareness.This particularepistemic sensi-
tivity affordedus by bodily motion allows the world to limit and guide our organizationsof
sensation. O'Donovan-Andersonargues that much of our knowledge is gained in the course
of "ourbodily negotiations"with the world, and that much of our knowledge is, indeed, con-
stitutedby these interactions,and that they lay the groundworkfor absorbingand interpreting
knowledge gatheredby other means. Epistemic openness requiresnot only bodily sensitivity
and responsivenessto the world, but also the living body's awarenessof itself.

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 Husserl sought to show that knowledge about the (physical) body and knowledge of the
(living) body are of two categoricallydistinguishablesorts (Bell 1990, 211). Knowledge about
the body is little differentin kind from the knowledge I have of any arbitraryphysical object.
Such knowledge is based on observation, and is justified provided the observation is made
responsiblyand in appropriateconditions. The resultingknowledge is contingentand empiri-
cal, and can be conceptually articulated.However, there is anotherform of knowledge that
standsin sharpcontrastto knowledge aboutthe body. I can reach out, grasp a coffee cup with
my hand,pickit up, andputit downin anotherplace.I do notneedfirstto locatemy hand,to
ascertainits positionin objectivespace on the basis of observation,in orderto go about
movingit or usingit to performsometask.Thisimpliesthatin normalcircumstances I know
wheremy handis, thatits positionis given to me. This sortof knowledgecannotbe assimi-
latedto theconceptuallyarticulated or empiricalmode.WhenI movemy handnormally,I do
not firstjudgeor acquirea belief thata certainstateof affairsobtains,namely,thatmy hand
occupiessuch-and-such a positionin space.
O'Donovan-Anderson remindsus thatthe motionsof the disabledare no less epistemi-
cally valuablethan are the morepredictablysmoothbodilymotionsof the "fully-abled." In
thecase of cerebralpalsy,for example,therangeandthefluidityandpredictability of muscle
movementis severelyrestricted,so thatin the courseof reachingfor a coffee cup, a muscle
spasmmightcause one to reachthrough,insteadof to, thusknockingthe cup over.Such a
mishapis hardlygroundsfortheclaimthatthepersonwasmistakenaboutwherethecupwas,
or what actions were requiredto reach it (O'Donovan-Anderson1997, 123). If we agree that
theknowledgeof a disabledperson'slivedbodyis epistemicallyvaluable,we shouldaskwhat
the disabledknowaboutthe movingbodythatfully-abledbodiesdo not.
BeforeI continuethis discussionof bodilyknowledge,I turnto considertwo of Michael
Polanyi'sepistemologicalconceptsthatofferan epistemicopennessto bodilyknowledgeon
thebasisof the reversibilityof the livingbody.

Tacit and Focal Knowledge

MichaelPolanyiponderswhy we areableto identifya humanface amonga thousandwith-
outbeingableto tell quitehow,or on whatbasis,we cando this.4How can we recognizethe
moodsof the humanface, althoughwe areunableto tell, exceptquitevaguely,the signs by
whichwe knowthem(Polanyi1966,4-5)? Orhow canwe distinguishthetasteof winefrom
the tasteof coffee or the differentblendsof tea?Reflectingon thesequestions,Polanyicame
to the conclusionthat"we know morethanwe can tell."He arguesthatthereis a kind of
knowledgethatis not explicitandarticulated, butunspecifiable,implicit,andtacit,andthis
kindof knowledgeis epistemicallyrelevant(Sanders1988,2). He arguesfurtherthatin any
activitytherearetwo differentlevels or dimensionsof usingandacquiringknowledge,which
aremutuallyexclusive.Knowledgeaboutthe objector phenomenonin focus he calls "focal
knowledge."Knowledgethatfunctionsas a background to whatis in focus is "tacitknowl-
edge."Thefocal andtacitdimensionsarecomplementary. Tacitknowledgeassistsin accom-
plishinga taskthatis in focus.Forexample,whenwe reada text,wordsandlinguisticrules
functionas tacitsubsidiaryknowledge,while ourattentionis focusedon the meaningof the
text (Sveiby 1997).Tacitandfocal arenot categoriesor levels in a hierarchy,but morelike
two dimensionsof the sameknowledge.We are switchingbetweentacitknowingandfocal

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knowingeverysecondof ourlives. It is a basichumanabilityto blendtheold andwell known
withthe new andunforeseen;otherwise,we wouldnot be ableto developourpotential.
Polanyistressesthattacitknowingachievescomprehension by indwelling.He insiststhat
all knowledgeconsistsof oris rootedin suchactsof comprehension (Polanyi1966,55). In all
ourwakingmomentswe rely on ourawarenessof contactsof ourbodywiththingsoutsidein
orderto attendto these things.When we make a tool function,as in riding a bicycle, we incor-
porateit into our body-or extendour body to includeit-so thatwe come to dwell in it
(1966, 16).Inthiscase,indwellingawareness,as in cycling,andfocalawareness,as in observ-
ingtrafficandroute,aremutuallyexclusive.As a pianistpracticesa newpiece,he movesfrom
fumblingincompetence,frombeing"allfingersandthumbs,"towarda fluencythatnot only
permits,butalsodemandsthatthefingersbe left to themselves.Readinga pieceof music,the
pianistis not in generalthinkingabouthis fingerson the keys-that becomesnecessaryonly
whena piecerequiresunusualdexteritythatstretchesexistingtechnique.A piecewithinone's
compasswill takeshapeunderthe controlof ourvisionof the meaningof the musicas con-
veyed to us by indwellingand tacit integration(Puddefoot1996). If a musicianshiftsthis
attentionfromthe piece he is playingto the observationof whathe is doingwithhis fingers
whileplayingit, he becomesconfusedandmayhaveto stop(Sveiby1997).
Stein's and Merleau-Ponty's accountsof the doublenessof the living body clarifies
Polanyi's idea of tacitand focal aspectsof knowingin respectto thebody.Theexampleof my
touchingmy own hand is almost identicalto the musicianwho may shifthis attentionfrom
the piecehe is playingto the observationof whathe is doingwithhis fingers.Thisis the liv-
ing body'sreflectivitywhereinit showsitself to be a beingwithtwo sides.
Polanyiemphasizesthata humanbeing'sactivityis alwaysknowingas indwelling.That
which is tacit variesfrom one situationto another.Tacitknowingoperateson an internal
action,whichwe arequiteincapableof controllingorevenfeelingin itself(Polanyi1966, 14).
ForPolanyi,knowledgeis an activitythatwouldbe betterdescribedas a processof knowing.
Polanyi thus regardsit as both static "knowledge"and dynamic "knowing."When dynamic
propertiesare emphasized,he uses verbs like knowing or learning (Sveiby 1997).
Using the term tacit knowing, Polanyi seems to come very close to the English philoso-
pher GilbertRyle's concept "knowing-how,"but in fact he argues against Ryle. Ryle's know-
ing-how does not imply a subsidiary,indwelling awareness as Polanyi's tacit knowing does.
Polanyi does not use the label at all, probablybecause he was contesting Ryle. "Knowing-
how" is characteristicof an expertwho acts, makesjudgments,and so forth withoutexplicitly
reflecting on the principles or rules involved. Expertswork without having an explicit theory
of their work; they simply perform skillfully without deliberation or focused attention
(Barbiero1999).5Ryle points out that the boxer or the surgeonor the poet apply their special
criteriawhen they accomplishtheir special tasks. They are regarded(by others) as good or bad
or creative not because of their ability to reflect on what they are doing, but because of the
result of their performance.Rylean "know how" involves the skill and ability to act in social
contexts, consequently "how" in the concept implies problem-solving, but not an ability to
reflect on the rules.

Bodily Knowledge
In Polanyi'sview, all skillsexhibitthe structureof tacitknowing,not only bodilyskills such
as running,swimming,orthoseinvolvingtheuse of toolsas in cycling,butalsolinguisticskill

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as in speechandthe abstractlogicalthinkingskillrequiredin playingchess.If we discardthe
Ryleannotionof knowing-how,we need to explorethe correlationof bodily skills and the
body'sreflectivity.It is the body'sreflectivitythatturnsbacktowardwhatlivingbodiescan
do; precedingdoing,it is the possibilityof doing.In this context,bodilyknowledgeaimsto
describethe livingbody'smovementability,whichis not doingitself;however,this learning
evolves on the basis of bodilyawareness,kinaesthesis,andperception.As mentionedin the
exampleof thepianistwhopracticesa newmusicalpiece,bodilyknowledgeis developedwith
the doubleness of tacit and focal aspects in practicing the piece, but it differs from actual
doing,whichis playingthe piece skillfully.Thepianist'sbodilyknowledgeis the realization
of heror his livingbody'smovementabilityto pushandreleasefingerson key witha certain
intensityandrhythmto producethe soundthe piece demands.Bodily knowledgedoes not
involvea meretechniqueor the productionof a skill;togetherwith the body'sreflectivityit
offerspossibilitiesto choosewaysto move.
In thisepistemologicalanalysis,thedefinitionof bodilyskillsis restricted,roughlyspeak-
ing, to the body'smuscularactslike playingthe piano,andmuchsimpleracts suchas chop-
pingwood,typingon a typewriter, or swimmingthecrawl.Theacteris ableto accesswhether
theactionhasbeensuccessfulor not.Sincethecriteriaof skillsareculturally, historically,and
are
sociallyshaped,they usuallyjudgedby othersfrom the resultsof the acter'sperformance.
Swimmingis a skill accessibleto almostanybody,andtwo individualsmay swim usingthe
sametechniqueandproducingthesamemovements,so thattheirperformances lookthe same.
However, theirmethods of acquiring the skill may have been different, maybe the bodily
as
schemaor the body'stopography while swimming.
Thus,whatis actuallyhappeningwhenI learna bodilyskill suchas swimming?Oneway
of viewing this is to say that I am reviving,and also reshaping,bodily schema,where
"schema"impliesnot only formor pattern,butalso somethingmuchmoredynamic:a basic
way of doing something,a mannerof proceeding,a mode of acting.A schemafor bodily
action,suchas thatfor doingthe crawlstroke,is intermediary betweenimageandrule,thus
betweenthe specificandthe general(Casey1996,27). Ultimately,thewaterI placemyselfin
andthe body placedthereteachme morethanany set of wordsI reador hear.Ourunder-
standingof a thingis not a conceptualcoveringup of the real,but a revelationof the given
essenceof thethingby themoving,sensuousbody.Wearein epistemiccontactwiththestruc-
turedworldfromtheverybeginningin exploringanobject,in its gradualtransitionforus into
a tool, changingconstantlyourfocal andtacitawareness.Thecrawlstrokeschemaitself,that
whichI embodyas I swimthis stroke,is sociallytransmitted andthusto someextentsocially
determinate. Unlikea text, the bodily schemais intrinsicallyindeterminate, oscillatingas it
doesbetweenimageandrule.It is indeterminate becausethebodyas livedandexperiencedis
itselfindeterminate:thebodyis the"generalmediumof my existence."Not surprisingly, then,
corporealschemahaveno finalor definitiveformulation(Casey1996,29).
Seriouslyinjuredpersonswhosebodieschangeas a resultof theinjuriestypicallyneedto
relearna skill,for example,the abilityto walkor speak.The skillsthatsufficedfor theirpre-
viousbodiesarenot sufficientforthe productionof the sameexternalperformance withtheir
changedbodies(Turner1994, 58). By the same token, one would suppose that if theirskills
couldbe transplanted to the bodiesof anotherperson,they wouldhavethe samekindof dif-
ficulty with the productionof externallysimilarperformances: theywouldneedto relearn,or
adapt, the habits acquired to fit with their new bodies. For bodily skills, then, sameness

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of external performanceis not necessarily a result of sameness of internal structure(Turner
1994, 59).
As statedearlier,bodily knowledge does not imply the exposition of bodily skills, though
there is an intimate correlation of bodily knowledge and body's skills. The living body
acquiresknowledge by doing, moving itself, by not only aimless wandering,but also practic-
ing socially and culturallyshaped skills. Knowledge of executing movement is sedimentedin
the bodily schema, which oscillates between image and rule, producingvarieties of choices to
do movements in particularsituations (Tiemersma 1989, 291-292). The body chooses an
appropriatemovement in a situationnot automatically,but "reflectively,"by negotiationwith
the environmentthe body if necessary modifies the movement. For example, when walking
on differentsurfaces of the ground,I tend to walk differently,or I as the living body choose a
differentway of walking on differentsurfaces of the ground.When a road is slippery,there is
a reflectivity between focal awareness and tacit awareness of walking. Although I can nor-
mally rely on my tacit knowing of walking as indwelling, now I must concentrateon each step
of my walking so that I do not fall down on the slippery surface. I do not need to translate
movement discoveries in walking into the literal form; the body itself is capable of a knowing
that is closely relatedto a "corporealintellect."Speaking of corporealintellect, the computer
could never be as "smart"as a human being not only because of its limits in simulatingthe
behavior of the human mind or movements, but also because it could not replicatethe living
body's reflectivity.
Dancers learn to move with the result that their movements do not take place coinciden-
tally; they acquireknowledge as indwelling awarenessto producein their bodies movements
of a desired form and meaning. As Susan Foster remarks,dancerscan learn curves or angles
that the body can form, and place these in a particularshape at a given time (1997, 239).
Bodily knowledge enables them to make distinctionsin motion. They can distinguishkinetic
bodily feelings as smoothness and clumsiness, swiftness and slowness, brusquenessand gen-
tleness; in a word, they make bodily-felt distinctions (Sheets-Johnstone1999, 57). Making
bodily-felt distinctions is a process of categorizing movement elements of the world. This
requiressensitivity to the differentqualities of movements. Learningdancing means becom-
ing bodily sensitive in the respect of the kinaestheticsense and one's own motility.6Thus, bod-
ily knowledge is not aboutcorrectlyperforminga movement skill, such as a pirouette,but the
ability to find proper movements throughbodily negotiation, variations of the pirouette. If
dancers learn by doing, as MarthaGrahamsaid, they not only learn to performa movement
vocabulary,as she would argue, but in becoming skillful movers they also acquire a knowl-
edge of the humanbody's motility (Graham1993, 3). While dancerslearnto performa move-
ment like a simple pirouette,they usually simultaneouslyhave a bodily knowledge of circular
motion and the balance of the body.
As we know, movement skills may disappearbecause of an accident or the aging process.
If we assume that knowledge of the moving body and performanceof a bodily skill do not
mean the same thing, then we can arguethat aging or injureddancersstill have bodily knowl-
edge. Althoughaging or injureddancersmay no longer be able to performthe same skills, they
still have theircorporealschemato comprehendmovementsin theirown bodies and-through
"kinaestheticempathy"-other bodies' movements.Kinaestheticempathymeans thatthey can
both perceive and feel the motion of other lived bodies in their corporeal schema without
moving themselves (Stein 1989, 58-68). This implies, among otherthings, that they (aging or

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injureddancers)can teachdancing,transmita knowledgeof the movingbody to dancestu-
dentsusingsmallermovementsandverbalguidance,althoughtheyareunableto executethose
movementsthemselves.In additionto bodilyknowledge,of course,the teachershouldhave
thepedagogicalskill to passon knowledgeandideasof movementsto students.
Polanyiidentifiesthreemechanismsby whichtacitknowledgeis usuallytransmitted:
imi-
tation, identification, and learning-by-doing. Contemporarydance teachers seem to favor
usinglearning-by-doing, avoidingmereimitationor identification
in transmittingknowledge
of dancing.Forexample,in releasetechniqueclassesa teacherdoes not expectthatstudents
shouldlearnto executea movementas the teacherdoes it or identifythemselveswith the
teacher'spersonalstyle of moving.Teachingis indirect:the focus of learningis not on the
movementas such,butthe qualityof motion,suchas the diversityof flow whenthe bodyis
falling.Dancersthuslearnto releasethe bodynot only in this particular
movement,butalso
in othermovements.Teachers'speechandlinguisticexpressionfrequentlycompletetheirbod-
ily performance;thatis, theydo not tryto translatetheirknowledgeintoliteralform.
As we try to describe the correlationof bodily skills and bodily knowledge, it becomes
obviousthatcontemporary danceas an artisticactivityis not a merecollectionof skills that
we couldlearnandthenrepeatautomatically over andover again.If dancingwere a simple
matterof stepsandturns,meremovementskillsortricksthatwe couldlearnby imitation,then
a long-termdanceeducationwouldnotbe needed.Theevidenceaboutwhatis learnedis more
thantheevidenceof correctbehavior;however,I do notunderestimate thesignificanceof per-
formingbodily skills.Dance is
practice neithera visible object nora linguisticobject,suchas
a sentence.Onecannotget a degreein danceeducationwithoutacquiringsomedeeplyrooted
intellectualallegiancesalongthe way.Clearly,this showsthatdancepracticeis not directly
accessible,and the means of accessingit indirectlyare fraughtwith difficulties(Turner
1994, 43).
Although a dancermay have completed a formal dance education,dancersproducea new
knowledge of the moving body by dancingin a choreographicprocess or in teaching a dance.
In the choreographicprocess, dancersand choreographersuse theirprevious skills and knowl-
edge of movement and produce a new bodily knowledge of movements usually by improvi-
sation. In making a dance work, artistsacquireknowledge of movement materialand how it
"behaves,"and, as a consequence, they may incidentallydiscover proceduresfor handlingthe
materialin a new manner.In a working situation,searchingfor appropriatemovements is also
a trial-and-errorprocess; nonetheless, we can only partly capture its internal logic. As
Bourdieu (1986) argues, we tend to forget all the details of a messy, nonlinear learning
process, interpolatingand generalizingabout our own skills development.
Dancers and choreographersacquireknowledge of movement graduallyin the process of
doing dance work;they cannotpossess knowledge and skills of the moving body immediately,
but only throughconstantpracticingof the dance. In other words, the dancer'sbodily knowl-
edge is a path, developed and formed graduallyduringhis or her career.A new skill learned
yesterdayis sedimentedin the dancer'sbody, becoming his or her indwelling tomorrow.This
sedimentationof skills, knowledge, and experiences in the body can be regardedas a path or
as a personal choice. Studying a certain movement style, the body habituatesto this vocabu-
lary,eventuallylivingthroughit (Parviainen1998).7

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Articulated Knowledge
The paradoxin discussingbodilyknowledgeis thatI am tryingto articulatea phenomenon
thathappensonly in bodilyawareness.Thisarticulation cannottranslatebodilyknowledgeto
a literalform;it can only indicatethe existenceof bodilyknowledge.As a Zen philosopher
wouldsay,thefingerthatpointsatthemoonis notthemoon.In a senseit is livingknowledge,
transmitted froma bodyto a bodyveryoftenthroughlearing-by-doing.
AlthoughI have emphasizedherethe significanceof the bodilyknowledgeof dancers,I
do not wish to underestimate articulatedknowledgeaboutdance.By articulated knowledgeI
simplymeana modeof knowledgeexpressedin words,numbers,formulas,andprocedures,
communicatedin an exact manner(althoughnever exclusively so). While bodily knowledge
differsfrom"knowing-how," articulatedknowledgedoes not meanRylean"knowing-that"
involvesconsciouslyaccessibleknowl-
(Ryle 1984,25-61). Ryle'sconcept,"knowing-that,"
edge thatcan be articulatedand is characteristicof the personslearninga skill throughexplicit
instruction,recitation of rules, attentionto their movements. While such declarativeknowl-
edgeis usedfortheacquisitionof skills,it becomesunnecessary forthepracticeof thoseskills
once a studentbecomesan expertin exercisingthem.
Articulated knowledgeaboutthebody'smovementcannotreplaceits tacitcounterpart and
As has
bodilyknowledge. Polanyi argued,whenwe acquirea skill, we acquire correspon- a
ding understanding that defies articulation.For example,the skill of a drivercannotbe
replacedby thoroughschoolingin theengineeringof thecar,or again,theknowledgeI have
a
of my ownbodydiffersaltogetherfromtheknowledgeof its physiologyandanatomy(Polanyi
1966,20). Whenspeakingof bodilyknowledgeof specificpractices,suchas dancing,play-
ing the piano,or medicalcare,expertiseinvolvesbodilyknowingthatcannotbe articulated.
An expertin knowinghow to do somethingmayor maynotbe an expertin associatedartic-
ulatedknowledge.An accomplisheddancermayknowlittleaboutthe historyof theWestern
dance,but a dancehistorian'sknowledgeof choreography does not makeher a professional
choreographer. Dance researcherswho are educated
aesthetically to degreelevel mayhave a
great deal of articulated
knowledge aboutdance, but thateducation about dance,in the sense
of verballearningsaboutthe art, does not replaceeducationin dance (Reimer1992, 42).
Nevertheless,articulated knowledgeandbodilyknowledgeof danceshouldnot be treatedas
competitors; on the contrary,they are usuallyinterwovenor complementary modesof pro-
founddanceknowledge.

Summation
I have attemptedto expandthe notionof bodilyknowledgeto show how it intersectswith
dance studies and epistemology. I have suggested that the traditionalepistemological idea of
knowledgeis insufficientto explainthe modesof knowingin the
knowledgeas propositional
The
dance. traditional inquiryhasdifficultyexplainingthemeaningof bodily
epistemological
movement in relation to human cognition, as Sheets-Johnstonehas shown. Turningto a phe-
nomenology of the body, I have tried to elucidate an epistemological inquiryaboutthe role of
the kinaestheticsense in cognitivepowers.Drawingon MichaelPolanyi'sepistemology,I
have analyzed focal and tacit aspects of knowing and the difference between "skill" and
"knowledge"in respect to the body's movement.
The deepest question addressedin this paper-one that is persistentlypresenteven if sel-
dom stated and analyzed-is the place and meaning of bodily knowledge in the "epistemol-

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ogy of dance."To attemptto epistemologically analyze bodily knowledge and its relation to
bodily skills, techniques, and articulatedknowledge is a centraltask of dance studies episte-
mology, a task thatpoints towarda synthesis of differentmodes of knowing in the dance field.
Based on a phenomenology of the body, this epistemological considerationin dance does not
mean merely developing knowledge about dancers,in which dancersfeatureas the objects of
knowledge; it also involves an understandingof the subjective process whereby dancers
understand,create, and use knowledge. Nevertheless, epistemology of dance is neithera spec-
ification of a dancer'sway of knowing nor simply the articulationof dancing subjectivity.The
epistemology of dance consists rather in attention to epistemological concerns about the
natureof dance knowledge and our means of attainingand communicatingit. A great deal of
work still remains to be done in this domain. In pursuing this epistemological inquiry, we
should, of course, examine ways to communicatebodily knowledge. Phenomenologicalideas
of intersubjectivity, Stein's study of (kinaesthetic) empathy, Merleau-Ponty's theory of
reversibility,EmmanuelLevinas's discussion of ethic responsibility,and some new findings
in cognitive psychology and dance studies are promising avenues for our continuedinquiry.

Notes

1. It is commonplaceto citetheoriginsof "traditional

epistemology"in PlatoandthenDescartes,
butmerecitation of the relevantthinkersfrom the past hardlyenough.In fact,the typeof
is
theoryof knowledgethat we examine here is no more thanapproximately a centuryold.
productof the
Epistemologyis the tupr-of-thee-century thinkingby severalBritishthinkers,
notablyBernardRussellandG. E. Moore,andlaterworkof the 1930sand 1940sby thinkers
usuallylabeledpositivists(Duran1994,85).
2. The phenomenological notionof the bodypresentedherediffersfromFraleigh'sidea of the
body-subjectas a "completewholeness"(Fraleigh1987, 13). However,her descriptionsof
"body-object" and"body-subject" followHusserl'sdistinctionbetweenthephysicalbodyand
living body. The way that Sheets-Johnstoneunderstands the living body is parallelwith
Husserl's,but she hardlyagreeswiththe centralityof reversibilityin this notionof the phe-
nomenologyof the body(see Sheets-Johnstone 1999,304).
3. Merleau-Ponty wantsto generalizethephenomenon discoveredby Husserland
of reversibility
to thinkaboutintertwiningthe self andtheworld.Reversibilitycharacterizesthebody'sinter-
actionswithself, withothers,andwiththe world.Theintimaterelationships thatreversibility
makespossiblebetweenhumansandhumans,humansandanimals,humansandthings,ani-
malsandanimals,andanimalsandthingsarethemselvesgroundeduponwhatMerleau-Ponty
calls ecart. UnlikeSheets-Johnstone,Merleau-Ponty's notionof the bodydoes not isolateus
fromanimalsandthings;on thecontrary, it opensdoorsto understanding creaturesotherthan
ourselves(Sheets-Johnstone 1999, 362-368). Thereis nevera totalreciprocitybetweenthe
othersandmyself,but,rather,thereremainsthe inevitableasymmetryof the I-Otherrelation.
tcart preciselymakesall formsof bodilydifferentiation possible(Parviainen1998, 67-73;
Weiss1999,128).Merleau-Ponty wantsto showus thatthematerialworldandspiritualworlds
arenot opposedto eachother;the differentation existsas a bond.As Merleau-Ponty reminds
us, thereis "thebondbetweentheconvexandtheconcave,betweenthesolidvaultandthehol-
low it forms"(Merleau-Ponty he haselab-
1968,232). Startingfromthe ideaof reversibility,
orateda completelynew ideaof philosophy.

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4. Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) was a Hungarianmedical scientist whose researchwas mainly
done in physical chemistrybefore he turnedto philosophy at the age of fifty five. He accepted
a personal chair in social studies at the University of Manchesterin 1948. His lectures were
collected in Personal Knowledge:Towardsa Post Critical Epistemologyin 1958. Inspiredby
Gestaltpsychology, Polanyi regardsthe process of knowing as senso-motoric.His conception
of knowledge has been particularlyinfluential; nevertheless, he was never recognized as a
"true"philosopherby his contemporaries.Although in his writings Polanyi alluded briefly to
Merleau-Ponty'sstudies of the body, he did not discuss parallelideas in his epistemology.
5. Ryle brought the notion of "know how" to the forefrontof philosophical thought in episte-
mology and philosophy of the mind. In his book, The Conceptof Mind (1984), he claimed that
all humanbehaviorrelevant to psychology could be explained exclusively in terms of know-
ing-how. Ryle offered a dispositional account of knowledge-how, which is now widely dis-
credited. In Ryle's philosophy, knowing-how implies abilities ranging from simple motor
skills, such as knowing how to walk or ride a bicycle, to abstract,highly contemplativecases,
such as knowing how to prove a mathematicaltheorem.
6. Dance educationdoes not necessarily make bodies sensitive; it can also "numb"them.
7. Sheets-Johnstonestates that we share a common fundamentalkinetic repertory,for we are all
the same kind of animateform (1999, 225). Although all humansshare a common background
of motility, we evolve our own personal movement repertories.Almost all of us can walk,
jump, hit, shake, and tremble, depending on the cultural and social context and individual
motivations, but the cultivation of our movement potentials varies drastically.There are no
identical movement repertories;in fact, some of them can be exclusive. As Susan Foster has
pointed out, ballet dancers cannot assume to performthe vocabularyof movements found in
contact improvisation,and vice versa (1997, 241). Learningto move is also about choosing
some movements and excluding others, since it is the individualbody schema that enables us
to comprehendnew movements and reconsiderfamiliarones.

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