| CHAPTER II | The Natural Law: St. Thomas Aquinas Learning Outcomes | At the end of this chapter, you should be able to: | 1. recognize the meaning of natural law and its relation to ethics; 2. explain how natural law is an imprint of the Divine Will on the free person; 3. appreciate and articulate the role of natural law in crafting an ethical life; and 4. discuss conscience and how this is defined by natural law. Introduction | Albert Camus opened his 1942 seminal book, The Myth of Sisyphus, by posing the question, “Why will I not kill myself today?” Locally, such a dramatic recognition of the sorry condition of the world is echoed by a column of Rina | Jimenez-David in the daily broadsheet Philippine Daily Inquirer on 25 October 2003 when in frustration she asked “Why would we not just close down the P Camus has lived through the two world wars (1914— | 1918; 1939-1945) and thus highlights the bitterness of his times and the task of man to live in sincerity, moderation, and justice with a playful heart even while confronted with utter meaninglessness in life. Jimenez-David saw two ppines?” | 45 | Scanned wit vamSciSS Part lb) THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS, Philippine people power revolutions Februar 17-20 January 2001) and some years after got so frustrat the country that she simply wanted to ask every F live elsewhere. An Italian Catholic priest who belongs to the religious Order of Preachers or Dominicans, St. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225. The title Aquinas identifies his place of origin, Aquino which belonged originally to the kingdom of Naples and about 120 km south of Rome. He was born to an affluent and influential family; his fother was | recognized as the count of Aquino. His early studies were under the tutelage of the Benedictine Abbot of Monte Cassino, but at the age of 14, he enrolled at the University of Naples. He was deeply impressed by the Dominicans whom he later met at this University that Thomas decided to join the Order of Preachers at the age of 19 in 1244 instead of the Benedictines who were his first teachers. After the struggle with his family who did not agree with his being a priest was finally settled, Thomas in 1248 studied with Albert the Great (1205-1280) in Cologne. Recognizing his student as a genius, Albert took Thomas with him to the University of Paris, Thomas later became the master of Theology in this university (1256) and the remaining 18 years of his life were spent on lectures, instructions, writings, and quodlibets (the tradition of answering questions posed by participants who were in a dialogue somewhat akin to the ancient symposiums of the Greeks). Thomas died on 7 March 1274 leaving behind him notable works like Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Thelogiae, and Dé Veritate. The Catholic Church honors him as a Doctor, a title given? saints who are recognized as giver of particularly important insight inthe understanding of Christian doctrine or faith. ocdiileu WILT Logg. strated in ilipino tg AINDCéCHAPTER Il: THE NATURAL LAW: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Our present age is not impervious to such attacks of absurdity, frustration, and near desperation. History, however, is gracefully replete with people who have exerted effort in | pointing out a viable way out of such darkness and confusion. One of the options, if one wants to call it that, was | arrived at through the meeting between Philosophy and a religion of revelation that is Christianity. The best representative of this integration and arguably also, an excellent thinking through of a reasonable way that addresses the questions of the human person, is the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomas’ systemic approach that is meant to guide human action is known as an ethics of natural law. While his metaphysics harks back to medieval times of belief in God, his ethi em endures until contemporary, times in the moral guidelines followed and lived out by religious believers who belong to the Catholic tradition. a Etsi Deus non daretur Thomas Aquinas begins from the standpoint of faith. His | perspective presupposes the existence of a God who is the | author (source) and the goal (end) of all reality. This Creator for Thomas, however, relates in freedom with the human person and so enables him/her in freedom to recognize through reason, the very principle of foundations of all things, In accordance with this foundational knowledge, the human. Person can choose to act in such a way that is worthy of one’s very reality. One who can reach the wisdom at the very heart of all things is obliged to act in accordance with his/ her dignity. The human being then is said to be gifted with “the ability to know the highest. good” that engages him/her in freedom in “choosing to act on the good that he/she ought to do.” Freedom here is knowing the best goal and being able to reach for it through decisive action. This is expressed 47 ocarneu wit LaMSceON Part |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS interiorly, that is in the very heart, of every human person a, the dictate of “doing good and avoiding evil.” For Aquinas, God reveals his Goodwill as the Eternal Law reflected in the order of reality. Relating with the Law. as governing all is relating with God himself whose wit) emanates to govern all that is. The reality then of life as growth, nutrition, and reproduction is founded on the will that is oternal. Even the reality of sensitive consciousness ag ruled by instinct that is true of animals is also in accordance with the same will. That “plants persist to carry themselves out to the fullness of being plants” is an imprint of the governing will that comes to human understanding as lay, That “animals governed by instincts behave in such and such a way” is also recognized by the human person as following the dictate of a law that guides all of creation. ‘The reality of the human person who is able, through his/ her intellect, to decide in freedom and, through his/her will, to move himself/herself voluntarily in accordance with the good that he/she can know follows the very will of God who has “created man in His own image” (Genesis 1, 27). Man in His fullness shares life with plants and animals but goes beyond them in his voluntary action and freedom in decisions. Human freedom for St. Thomas, therefore, is an imprint of the divine will in the very being of the human person. This sharing of human reason in the eternal will or divine law is for him/her the natural law. The relationship between the Eternal and Natural law for him/her is expressed in the Sacred book for Christians thus, “since the creation of the world God’s invisible will—his power and nature—has bee clearly seen being understood from what has been made visible so that people are without excuse” (Romans 1, 20) The Divine will, according to this quote, can be understo as governing all that is; man’s task is to act in such 2 ¥* 48 ocarined wurtamse:| CHAPTER TE THE NATURAL LAW: $1, THOMAS AQUINAS that his/her participation in the full unfolding, of nature directs it Co fulfillment, y freedom of the human her options and voluntarily will to take action. The rational human person's participation, ability to discern what is good from what is nob, is the very presence of the dictate of the law within him/her, and is also the imprint on him/her of the Creator (Divine will). This law impinges on the ver boing who can know laws that govern himself/herself, his/her s¢ relationship with all creation, is also the author of positive | Tnws. Natural law necessarily takes precedence over posi laws, Not all that is legal in human society reflects the law | that dictates on the human person as cthical in accordance with natural law—what is legal then is not always ne moral. This ethics of natural law has gained wide a at one point in the history of western civilization that it has come to be espoused even if one prescinds from the faith system that has engendered it. Etsi Deus non daretur is an expression that, highlights the validity of this ethical system with or without faith in the Creator God. Literally, etsi Deus non daretur means “even if there is no God.” ‘This implies that the wisdom of the ethical system that is natural law is valid and binding for the human person even if we bracket belief in God. Those who came up with the expression etsi Deus non daretur do not advocate atheism or protest against the faith. They simply mean that the deposit of knowledge or “divine wisdom” that comes to us as “natural law” is valid in itself and is, therefore, the reasonable code of conduct even for a man of goodwill who may be without faith. Even the Sacred Scriptures of Christians reflect this, “For when non-believers eptance 49 ocarimeu wit LamScePater s Vise PUEIANG Bote A who do not ha of the Jaw, they not have the: Ave Siow lay avatuires obser oe Vive grees res os Novn Son theanvedves: even 1 jan. They show the written in their hearts” (eran 2, 14 I, jrportaasst in he, Shor thaeat, “it, i Ope wn in moving the husnan person toward if one Solloy d sion on 6 inclined to con functioning, of an end goal that the right thing if one dor dictate then to follow the consci obligation to educate it. Not know excuse. Even if one does not know, he/sh If one acts badly ont of ignorance and does the situation by bothering to learn, that pe Angelic Doctor. While the conscience absolutely binds us in doing ¢ good and avoiding evil, con also absolutel tasked to be given formation. Th , therefore, c be mistaken, and being so docs not exempt the t from culpability. If he/she is able to know but fails to act j his/her obligation to do so, then he/she is not free from bla and responsibility for what, was done. There are different kinds of conscience that may lead to wrongdoing: callous, perplexed, scrupulous, and ignor: The uninformed conscience simply lacks education, while perplexed one needs guidance in sorting out one’s confusi The callous and scrupulous are binary opposites but both malformed in being too lax or too strict. Callousness of accountable according to th et 6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae la, ¢.79.0.13, 50_— CHAPTER Il THE NATURAL LAW: ST, THOMAS AQUINAS conscience results in the long-time persistence in doing evil that the self is no longer concerned whether what he/she does is good or bad. Scrupulonsness, on the other hand, fails to trust one’s ability to do good and, hence, overly conecrns itself with avoiding what. is bad to the point of seeing wrong where none. If one thinks about. it, these different consciences that lead to badness in action can readily be rectified by education. Putting effort in forming one’s own is there reall, conscience helps a person to exit from such malformations Given such propensity to error of the human conscience. can we then disobey the dictates of our conscie! St. Thomas Aquinas still insists, “absolutel Conscience remains to be our proximate norm that bids us to do the good and avoid evil; simply put, going against one’s conscience is doing the contrary of the dictate of what one knowingly elects as good. If the extent of what one knows determines what is the good to be done and the evil to be avoided, the self is obliged to act accordingly, i.e. “act on the good and shun the bad.” These occasions again show the importance of the commitment to educate one’s conscience, basically because one cannot do good if one does not. know it and since one’s norm for acting is the obligation that is set by one’s conscience: acquisition of knowledge as what ought to be done through education is critical for ethical living, according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Though separated by centuries, the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg later echoes St. Thomas in insisting that “education is crucial for moral living.” Three Contemporary Questions There are relevant questions that can help the Filipino student appreciate Thomistic Natural Law. If we follow what has been earlier said, that natural law is man’s participation in the execution of the good and avoidance of evil through 51 ocarneu wil LamScePART lL: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS the use of his/her reason and will, then three questions that originated from the writing of Alasdair Macintyre can be appropriated to highlight the relevance of Aquinas today Who am I? Who do I want to be? How can 1 get there?” ic Natural Law interrogates the identity of the human person. If one is endowed with his/her own facticity, history, and abilities, his/her present reality is accessible to him/her through self-knowledge and reflection, This sment of one’s own strengths and weaknesses is critical in being able to do good and avoid evil. This ethical task is not only an outward truth. Doing good determines the actor in a reality that is good and doing bad malforms him/ her too. The reality of human identity is that it defined yet also always in proce: Who am I? Thomi: is something The task of knowing the self is the point of departure for the task of building up the identity of the human person. Ethics here does not only cover the issues that usually call our attention, such as abortion, euthanasia, or other burning moral questions of this sort. Ethics for Aquinas is primarily a question of human identity. “All human acts are moral acts,” Aquinas said. Since it is through his/her acts that man defines himself/herself, the ethical man is the task of his/her free acts. Defining the self gives one a chance to clarify his/her goal; hence, it is important to raise the second question: Who do I want to be? The human person’s self-knowledge is dynamic, that is, it is always open to the direction set by what one wants to make of himself/herself, Self-knowledge here is malleable towards self-determination. Ethical acts give direction through freedom to build up the self towards @ particular goal. ‘The original version of these questions were given by Alasdair Macintyre in After Virtue (Indiona: University of Notre Dame, 1981). A Thomasite appropriation was made bY James Keenan with Daniel Harrington in Poul and Virtue Ethics (New York: Rowman & Litifield, 2010) 52 ovanneu wiurtamScCHAPTER II: THE NATURAL LAW: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS The human reason is so gifted that it is able to discern through options and daily realities. Decisions are the basis lom in choosing what one wants to be. ‘The self 's the truthful transition to what one ought to pe. Given this knowledge of himself/herself and the ability to evaluate his/her options and possibilities, the self can also better give direction to himself/herself. The third question is not very far from the other questions. In truth, How can I get there? also fully utilize the sound judgment of human reason and evaluates the best route to get to the goal decided upon. The last question preaks down the task to be done into the particulars of actions and daily routine. Self-knowledge and determination are here bridged by self-governance. The human person does not only access reason to assess his/her personal identity and personal goal; he/she is also gifted with the will to command the self to go through the steps and, hence, be able to do the transition from knowledge to a fully determined self. Goal setting through reason and decision is complemented by the ability to freely move the self and command the body in action. It is in orchestrating the actions to be consistent with the end in mind that the self reaches improvement. For instance, if one wishes to get to the goal of finishing a degree, one starts with the reality of the self. Knowing what one needs to improve on supports the goal of graduating. A sound decision helps the student to maximize the training and studies that go with being enrolled in the university. One knows in honesty that a paper diploma that reflects a degree is hardly of value without true knowledge and mastery of what one is expected to know. Hence, if one’s goal is to graduate with competence, one elects the daily, monthly, semestral, or even yearly tasks that ought to be completed. Professors, lectures, and even exams are then seen in this 53 Scanned wit LamMScePART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS light as aids in reaching the goal. Furthermore, the self is not only a passive receiver of what transpires externally; one designs the path and cooperates with the situation to reach the end that has been reasonably set by the self. The Relational and Perfection of Love in Aquinas Although we have suspended God-talk to make the case that natural law is relevant even for the human person without faith, the discussion of Thomistic ethics is incomplete if it docs not end with the love that is directed towards God. Thomistic natural law is not Christian simply because it is an ethics reconcilable or compatible with faith. It is a disciplined system that finds ultimate foundation and perfection in the reality of God. While through etsi Deus non daretur we are afforded the autonomy of a reasonable ethics independent from faith, ultimately this ethics is given full meaning and perfection in a relationship with God. The autonomy of ethics from faith afforded a level of disciplined reflection that enables man to not only copy the perfection that is God and apply it to himself/herself and his/her surroundings. The independence that is given in the ethical order also allows the human person in particularity to be himself/herself, as the singular subject that he/she is That is, through personal reflection, decisions, goal setting, and praxis, the human person attains the full realization of who he/she is. In this sense, the human being is not merely & stand-in for the Creator God. One is not a robot who learns the direction from everything else and applies it to oneself to function as a tool for Deus ex machina, or the God of the machine. The subjectivity of man and one’s search for fulfillment readily rest on the decisions and voluntary willing that one makes. 54 - - SCaliileT CHAPTER Il: THE NATURAL LAW: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS On the other hand, however, the Divine Will and also the entirety of all creation cannot be limited by the scope of satisfaction that is exclusively chosen by man. The human being remains to be one particular being among the multiplicity of beings. One cannot, given one’s limits, be the fulfillment of everything. Here a protest may arise. Is not his/ her goal setting inclusive of “the desire to be everything?” ‘Truly, he/she may have the longing, even the potential, to be what he/she wants to be, stretching it so far as embracing through his/her desire all that is. This potential, however, derives from what is actual in the reality of being; wanting to be all in all is not the same as truly being all in all. Yet the desire for this has to come from somewhere. Human beings are not capable of desiring all in all because they are limited. Who evokes this thirst in the human person? This desire, therefore, has to come from somewhere or someone else who awakens this in him/her. Here the relational that is inherent in the natural order finds value. The human person is not only bound to find full maximum capacity of one’s being in a search for self | actualization. He/She is not designed to find perfection on his/her own but thoroughly relates with other human persons and all of creation. He/She is not designed to be a Pharisee who is perfect: unto himself/herself. He/She is open to be in all and to exist for all. One’s goal, therefore, is not only to be the “self-made man/woman” but, in his/her full effort, “be open and available for everything else” and “be open for the love or fullness that is beyond him/her.” Ultimately, as held by St. Thomas himself, the true destiny of man lies in a gratuitous perfection that is beyond the human person yet relates with him/her thoroughly in freedom and, therefore, in fullness of love. This relationship and loving invitation exceeds the possibilities of achievements and realizations that are reachable by the human person in himself/herself. It may be called spiritual, beatific, or 55 Ree ocarimeu wit LamSceON PART I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS | heavenly but in the expanse of what is desired and reasonably attainable by the human person. It is avail him/her only through relating with someone who is him/her. The highest perfection of man for St. Thomas ig; his/her wanting to be with God. In the words that are used by believers, “The ethical man is not the perfect man but oye who wants to be saved by cooperating in freedom with what is attainable for him/her.” ra Conclusion Thomas Aquinas was influential in his articulation of the theory of natural law. He showed us that the universe was determined by an order of love that ought to define the sense of the good of human beings. Whether one believes in a transcendent, loving god or not, he showed how people could intuit an order to things that was inherent to all beings that | existed. Whether one was a believer or not, one could see that | there is this order which is the ground of people’s wholeness and self-realization. Many philosophers up to this day build upon this idea of a natural order upon which is founded a I natural law. Even in legal theories, this foundational idea is influential. However, as Western civilization evolved, other theories also evolved which insisted that the foundation of norms for the good should be rooted in human reason alone. In this school of thought, Immanuel Kant would be one of the most important thinkers. | HE Guide Questions 1. What is the natural law for St. Thomas? How aoe it guide the human being’s realization of the good! What makes it an imprint of the Divine Will om the free person? hat jg lable for beyong 56 ocarined witttamse:CHAPTER Il; THE NATURAL LAW: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 2. Does obeying the natural law mean that human beings must only conform their self-realization to the laws of nature? Explain your answer. 3. Why is it possible to hold the natural law as a framework for living a good life even if one does not believe in a god? 4. Why is the quest for doing the good tied to the question “Who am I”? 5. Why is the love of God the perfection of the ethical life? B xercise Form groups of five members each. Research and discuss among yourselves the following topics guided by the natural law of St. Thomas. Explain how they can help you decide one of the following: » whether abortion is morally acceptable and in what circumstances | » whether contractual labor is morally acceptable and why or why not » whether one can charge interest for a loan and why or why not » whether one can revolt against a tyrannical government administration Assign a reporter to share with the class your reflections. Present the main discussions and justifications, and discuss the agreements and disagreements among the members of your group. 57 scanner wiircamsci. | PART I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS RSS] References Aquinas, Tomas. Summa theologiae: Critical essays o¢ it by Brian Davies. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. de Finance, J seph. An Ethical Inquiry. Roma: Bitricg Pontifica Universita Gregoriana, 1991. Keenan, James. Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 1992. , Pinckaers, Servias. Sources of Christian Ethics. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995. 58 canned wit Anse:ene SS Chapter III Deontological Ethics: Immanuel Kant Learning Outcomes At the end of this chapter, you should be able to: 1. recognize the meaning of deontological ethics; 2. explain the categorical imperative; 3. appreciate and articulate the role of duty in crafting an ethical life; and 4, apply the principle of the categorical imperative in moral dilemma. a Introduction Franz Kafka once gave voice to the solitude of man and his/her task to find his/her own way. Kafka wrote the story of “an imperial message” directly addressing the reader as the pathetic subject. The story started with the sending of a message from the farthest distance. A dying king ordered his Herald to bring his whispered message. After confirming the accuracy of the message, the Herald was sent breaking. down obstructing walls and going beyond the great ones o the empire at first. Eventually, however, he is a ae by the huge crowd and the infinite distance that lie eta him and the receiver of the message. The reader to whom the message is addressed in the end sits by the window dreaming of the message that may come. s@ ocained wittcamsce= PART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS The reader is directly addressed by Kafka and invited to move out of dreaming and end his/her pathetic Passivity, Left on his/her own, he/she is tasked to find his/her own way and not give in to dreams of fullness of knowledge that are Siven to him/her or the discovery of a path that is yet to be revealed. A professor once hypothetically presented such a situation by asking, “If early morning tomorrow you wak © up 80 sure that there is no God, what would you do?” The German thinker Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Proposed a viable human solution to this quandary. His Philosophy views man as autonomous and most of himself/ herself as not subject to external conditions, results, and mandates. If left to himself/herself, is it possible for the human person to be ethical? Immanuel Kant thinks so. Born 22 April 1724 to a religious and lower middle-class family, Immanuel Kant had his education at the local Pietistic Friedrichskolleg of Konigsberg, East Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia). His interest in Philosophy started when he continued his studies at the University of Konigsberg. From 1746-1755 Kant worked as a tutor for the rich families of his city until he got an appointment as instructor at his own university. He was an effective teacher and in 1770 was awarded full professorship. “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe... the ember in the stars and the moral law within.” These occupied the studies of Kant that he made a name through his opus writings: General Natural History and Theory of Heavens (1755), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and Religion within the Limits of Reason (1792/94), He was never married though he enjoyed a vibrant social life. He died on 12 February 1804 with the last words es ist gut (It is Good). oOCdiINead WILT TSC: <CHAPTER Ill: DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS: IMMANUEL KANT Jn fact, he was so confident in the ethical system that he came up with what he declares its systematic independence from religion and even asserted that it is religion that is in need of his foundational ethics and not vice versa. Autonomous Reason, Goodwill, and Duty Kant insists that every time we confront moral situations there are formally operative a priori principles that can be brought to the fore. Highlighting these a priori truths can better help the learner of ethics sort through his/her task of living ethically. Kant’s research on ethics has named these as reason, goodwill, and duty. These are, for Kant, respectively, the foundation (reason), source (goodwill), and motivation (duty) of ethical living. The foundation of a sound ethics for Immanuel Kant can only be the authority of human reason. The voice of God is not heard directly today while man is living in this passing world. Voices of ministers and priests who claim to speak for God are but other human beings who make use of their own reason in trying to understand what goes on around them. This common human reason is also what they use as they comprehend the revelation that is said to be the foundation of their particular religion. Given that they share the same humanity with everybody else including the students of ethics, what they say ought to pass through the norm of reason that is internal to the moral subject himself/herself. Otherwise, arbitrariness holds sway in their claim to authority and what they capriciously hold as binding or gratuitously free. The person who acts in accordance to drawn-up lists of what one should do complies through the use of his/her Teason that they are indeed an obligation for his/her. The Teason, therefore, elects such and such as morally binding and 61 —scamren wirrcamscsParT |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS thus acts in accordance with what he/she thinks Her reason, therefore, functions as the very effor through moral principles and apply what he/she kn to the right thing to do. In fact, this internal av human reason is operative and takes precedence is so, His t to think OWS to got uthority of : every time the human person confronts a particular moral situation. This is human rationality that is discursive, i.e., humans Teason by “talking to themselves,” according to one of the Philosopher. readers of Kant named Hannah Arendt. What is ethical necessarily always implies the use of reason. Human acceptance of external mandates also makes use of this same reason. Kant then tells us that reason in itself can only be the sensible foundation of what is ethical for man. Kant then bids his students sapere aude that is “dare to think for yourselves.” Autonomous reason ventures to know what is ethical not on the authority of what is external to the self but grounded on (reason) itself. The loudness of external authorities cannot bend the autonomy of reason that on its own knows what should be done. What others say in turn is only acceptable if it is found to be reasonable by the use of one’s autonomous reason. If reason is the foundation of what is ethical for Kant, in turn its source can only be goodwill. This simply means that what is morally binding is rooted in reason as “doable for the human person.” The moral authority for Kant is immanent in man, that is, the origin of ethical obligation for man is his/het own goodwill. Instead of looking at the good as external to man, Kant locates the good in the very interiority of the self. The go! that is relevant to the person who through his/her reason knows what one ought to do, is that which he/she can do aM know as good. This goodwill implies the achievability of wh ig known through reason. One who claims what one says * 62 ocdiilleu w mSceCHAPTER Ill: DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS: IMMANUEL KANT oral obligation can do so by being free of impositions from outside. That is, he/she is of his/her own doing able to carry out his/her obligation. It can only oblige him/her insofar as he/she himself/herself through his/her own reason knows it as an obligation. In the same way that it is an obligation insofar that it is something that he/she on his/her own can manage to do. Kant calls “duty” the obligation that follows what reason deems as the action which is most worthy of our humanity. This duty is founded on human reason, that is, it passes through the sorting out made by our autonomous and discursive reason. Our duty is that which the reason determines as our obligation. Inasmuch as duty is the doable obligation for the human person, it is not a duty if it is impossible for man to do it, Duty, therefore, presupposes our ability for otherwise it is only a bother to the human person. Duty, therefore, is a doable good for the human will. Duty, while founded on human reason for determination, is at the very same time originating from the goodwill as a voluntary action that is doable for the human being. Duty or obligation is the motivation for reason and goodwill of the human person. If one asks why he/she had to do what he/she ought to do, the answer can only be because it is his/her duty. Reason tells the human person to do the obligation that is doable for the goodwill again since it is her/ her duty. The good that is reachable for the will of the human person is, therefore, owned by him/her as a duty. This then excludes any other external or internal motivation for the human person for doing what he/she ought to do: whether he/ she likes it or not; be it success or failure; whether it comes with applause or accusation; his/her reason and goodwill simply binds him/her to do what he/she ought to do because it is his/her duty. 63 ocarmeu wil LamScePu “Sy PART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS Obligation is Understood as “Man as an End in Himself/Herself,” Autonomous, and Universalizable Obligation for the human person is something one’s q reason elects and his/her goodwill owns simply as something she ought to do. Obligation is simply a must, a “categorical I imperative” or a duty that is defined by reason as doable for man’s volition and, therefore, should be carried out by the human person. In this sense, “Man as an end in himself/ herself” means the obligation cannot be passed on to others, That is, if confronted by a particular situation, the human person in his/her integrity as reason and goodwill is obliged to do his/her duty as the agent of action. “The buck stops here,” that is, the human person is himself/herself the center of action and responsibility in a given ethical situation. His/Her obligation is his/hers and it is his/her participation in this particular ethical event. He/She is autonomous in reasoning and willing the execution of his/ her defined duty. f If one remembers, however, reason as earlier mentioned is always discursive in its execution. His/Her autonomous fh reason, being thinking that is talking with himself/herself, i presupposes dialogue. Dialogue with the self approximates a reaching out beyond the confines and determinations of oneself only. The human person in reasoning out and determining his/her personal duty is in this sense nonetheless tied up with other reasonable beings before whom he/ | she is accountable. Is one’s obligation as defined by one’s autonomous reason acceptable to other reasonable beings wb? can stand in one’s shoes? One’s reason is also the presenc® of other reasonable beings one ought to strive to be im accord with. One’s definition of duty or his/her obligation ought to be universalizable in this sense. 64 ~- ocarined wrartAmsce| TER Ill: DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS: IMMANUEL KANT CHAP «Man as an end in herself” conjoined with this | responsibility to reach for duty that is universalizable | necessarily demands that other human persons ought to be treated not as instruments in the execution of what one should to do but as fellow reasonable beings, ends in themselves. They are reasonable human beings too before ‘«hom the self stands accountable. B Kantian Ethics and Religion | Immanuel Kant fully established the independence of his ethics from religion via the recognition of reason as the foundation, goodwill as the source, and duty as the motivation of what obliges the human person. In his essay “Religions | within the Limits of Reason”, Kant went as far as setting up his ethical system as that which is definitive in the | recognition of true religion. | ‘A “religion is not true to itself,” according to Kant, if it goes against what man “ought to do” as defined by his/her autonomous reason and goodwill that reaches for universalizability. Only false religion or cult falls unreasonably to superstition and does away with duty as an obligation for his/her goodwill. It is, therefore, such Kantian ethics that is foundational for religion and not vice versa. Kant, however, is not against religion. For him the value of religion rests on its reality as an openness to “what one can hope for.” Religion for Kant is the very openness of ethics to the complementary strength that is provided by hope. Unlike Aristotle, Kant does not define “happiness” as the motivation for his ethics of duty. What is ethical is indifferent to happiness for Kant and is purely motivated by duty itself. One does the obligation to reach for happiness, that will be self-serving for Kant and self-interest here moves away from the purity of duty. 65 — ovamneu wii4rcamSce“= PART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS Happiness, however, is understood by the human reason as reasonably related to ethics. “He/She who has lived justly by doing his/her obligation dutifully is the most fitting for happiness.” This truth, the human reason knows and even goes as far as protesting the reality of just men living \ miserably. “Happiness ought to be related to the ethical task | of man,” reason asserts in protest. t It is clear, however, that happiness cannot be a. motivation \ for the ethical obligation of man, according to Kant. He, therefore, suggests the determination of “happiness as gift” | for the ethical man. That is, “he/she who has lived justly is worthy of the gift of happiness.” Man cannot give this gift to himself/herself and therefore in his/her striving to live ethically opens himself/herself in hope. Kantian ethics, therefore, need not be hard-hearted in the pure preoccupation of duty as obligatory. The ethical person is open to happiness he/she cannot give to himself/herself. His/Her duty can also be an expression of hope that “he/she can make himself/ herself worthy of happiness.” For Kant, the ethical human person is like someone who woos in courtship the person one likes. He/She cannot oblige | the other to give him/her a positive answer to his/her offering i of love and devotion. He/She can only make himself/herself Ht worthy of a “yes.” Responding to his/her love is a gift he/she can only receive from the other. The answer cannot be forced | in the same way that happiness is something one expects to | collect after a lifelong striving of doing one’s duty. Happiness | is a gratuitous gift that one recognizes as within the realm of hope. Different religions for Kant express this balance | between the task of doing the duly and the hope for what one cannot give to oneself. Religion for Kant is the reconciliation of ethics and hope, the task of fulfilling one’s duty and the gift of happiness that one cannot gain by one’s efforts alone. 66 ocarineu wit CamSceer CHAPTER Hl: DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS: IMMANUEL KANT fo Conclusion s provided for a ground for legislating norms ational behavior for autonomous persons. His ethical em emerged at a time when Western civilization sought Kant’s ethi of ¥ st for a foundation for moral behavior that did not. depend on gave the faith or tradition. Kant provided that and in eff justification and possibility for reason being the sole ground for determining the good. The next ethical theory will provide another possible basis for determining the good using reason alone. [ll study Questions 1. Why is autonomous reason the only acceptable foundation of ethics for Kant? What is the importance of the Kantian shift from preoccupation with the external good to stress the internal goodwill? v ome autonomous 3. How does doing one’s moral duty be: and at the same time universalizable in the Kantian principle of “man as an end in himself/hersel! 4, What is the reasonable relationship between religion and ethics for Kant? Explain hope as the tension between gift and task for Kantian philosophy. || Exercise _ Read the newspapers for one week and identify a moral fisue where you ean use the entegorical imperative to discern , icemeé he duty of the persons involved. Report your moral issue in Class, a 67 ocarineu wit VamScePART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS fe References Kant, Immanuel. Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, Translated 12 Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Whitefish, NY: Kessinger 2007. Loude, Robert. Kant’s Impure Ethics. Oxford: Oxforg University Press, 2000. Reyes, Ramon. Ground and Norm of Ateneo Press, 1989. Savater, Fernando. Mandragora, 2007. Morality. Manila: Apéstatas Razonables. Barcelona: Savater, Fernando. Etica per un Figlio. Roma: Laterza, 2007. 68 ocdiiileu WiHAPTER IV utilitarianism: John stuart Mill Learning Outcomes able to you should be alist ethics; e end of this chapter, At the ing of a consequenti 1, articulate the mean 9. analyze the Greatest Happiness Princip! 3. examine the objections to Mill’s position and his responses tO each of them; and 4, evaluate ethical decisions from the point of vi utilitarianism. le; iew of Introduction decisions always have ¢ one decides to do something, one’s people in ways beyond how one thoug) continually affect the configuration and integrity of various forms of human relationships because jn deciding to do something, for instance, one actually brings something new into the world that has never existed before. Decisions bring forth new ideas, objects, and relationships into play in the realm of action and thought. Because one decides in a certain ad one affects others and the world in a particular way, re ‘rently from how one would have if one decided differently. an: pertiouler ‘eae have particular , e correspond to how one’s motives tré into action through a decision. a onsequences- Whenever 3 actions affect other it it would. Decisions Human 69 | OcalINeU Wit UallISCeParT I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS In making decisions, one either looks to one’s au to the foreseeable consequences of one’s actions. Oftentinn decisions are judged as good if they are brought about good and just motives and result in good consequence On the contrary, decisions are considered bad if they ay motivated by anything most of society deems as malicion and if they have destructi such as selfishness, spite or env consequences. However, as one knows, real life is a lot more complicat than this. One's motives are not always pure, aj consequences vary in kind and severity depending on tho affected. In this case, how does one judge the morality of. decision or an act? Does one examine the motivation behi the decision and see whether the act is mostly motivated goodness or does one look at the results of the act? If o judges the morality of an action based on its consequenc what categories can he/she use to judge whether the act di produce good consequences? How can one say that an acti did produce desirable consequences? Does the end justify means? Does the goodness of the consequences, for instan have more bearing than the way, the method, or mod operandi, with which such consequences are delivered? other words, even if one were to say that morality is a matt of producing the best consequences, how do we understat its moral value in relation to motive and action? Are moti irrelevant so long as an action or decision produces favoral consequences? Is the method by which a decision is carrit out immaterial in assessing the rightness or wrongness of act (for instance, the act itself is considered wrong, such lying)? Utilitarianism is a moral theory that tries to grapple wit these questions. Among the famous proponents of this way thinking, John Stuart Mill [1806-1873], is considered by ™ to be the most influential. His utilitarian theory of morali is a development and clarification of the earlier form of ¢ 70 ocdl leu Wit amScéON PART I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS | In making decisions, one cither looks to one’s Motives tothe foreseeable consequences of one's actions, One tl | decisions are judged as good if they are brought about 5 good and just motives and result in good Consequence, On the contrary, decisions are considered bad if they motivated by anything most of society deems as malig such as selfishness, spite or envy, and if they have destran consequences. However, as one knows, real life is a lot more complicated than this. One’s motives are not always Pure, and consequences vary in kind and severity depending on those affected. In this case, how does one judge the morality of a decision or an act? Does one examine the motivation behind the decision and see whether the act is mostly motivated by goodness or does one look at the results of the act? If one Judges the morality of an action based on its consequences, what categories can he/she use to judge whether the act did produce good consequences? How can one say that an action did produce desirable consequences? Does the end justify the means? Does the goodness of the consequences, for instance, have more bearing than the way, the method, or modus operandi, with which such consequences are delivered? In other words, even if one were to say that morality is a matter of producing the best: consequences, how do we understand its moral value in relation to motive and action? Are motives irrelevant so long as an action or decision produces favorable consequences? Is the method by which a decision is carried out immaterial in assessing the rightness or wrongness of a! act (for instance, the act itself is considered wrong, such a5 lying)? Utilitarianism is a moral theory that tries to grapple with these questions. Among the famous proponents of this way © thinking, John Stuart Mill [18061873], is considered by ma"! to be the most influential. His utilitarian theory of moralitY is a development and clarification of the earlier form of th 70 ocdiilleu WIL“ JOnN thoory aUthored Wy, derstay m 1748-1832] and SPO See f ‘ie am James Mill 18344) Janyosttber meschooled John Mary on i. Benthamite doctring, Which og. nian states that it is th, Breatosy happine, { the greatest Mmbey hat ig the messire OC TIME and Wrong, Happiness, n this context is “nderstoog aS the predominaney of Pleasure Over pain John Stuart later On re S doctrine distinction be and qu, bY highlight S of ple: pains. ing a ANtitie, ASUTES and Mill's moral the ‘Ory is Considered as rightness and wrongne, quences, Ag ©PPosed to dec that it judges the on their conse. Consequentialist in SS of actions based ontological theories Potentially Produces. These are ide questions to measure it. some gui e Intensity, How strong is the Pleasure? 2 Duration: How long does the Pleasure last? eae 3 Certainty or uncertainty: How likely or unikely wt 5 Pleasure will occur? ‘ iesesccnsicartha nara a or remoteness. ‘ ns . actionis followed ® Fecundity: What isthe probabiity that the Ree cs RSATIRE sh 6. wares tath ie peseeeiays as Sensations of the opposite 7 are affected? Extent: How many people —scanneu wit vamSceSS PART I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS of morality like Kant’s, which emphasi duty, and e the Motivation of rtue ethics, which emphasize the charag | agents, utilitarianism judges actions based on the q and quantity of pleasure they are able to extend to ay me? people as possible. In other words, Mill holds that hay” ter of Mality Appinegs rH (the predominance of pleasure over pain) is the Boal of morality. One deliberates and reflects upon what is right | before acting because one takes into account the potential pines. One, ity in making Not a solitary the fore one’s effects of one’s actions on other people's hay therefore, sees the importance of communi moral choices. Deciding on one’s happiness is affair but an act which essentially brings to relationship with others. ESS The Greatest Happiness Principle In Mill’s ethics, actions are understood as right with | respect to their capacity to promote happiness and wrong | when they tend to promote the opposite of happiness, Happiness, as defined by Mill, is pleasure and the absence of pain, while unhappiness is pain or the absence of pleasure. ' For him, the Principle of Utility or the Greatest Happiness | Principle is the supreme measure of morality. Pleasure and it the freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends, and all desirable things are desired either because they are inherently pleasurable or because they contribute to the prevention of pain. One of the foremost objections to such a doctrine is that it | seems to degrade the nature of the human person by reducing | morality to a pleasure-driven activity, not unlike that of & animal’s life that seeks only to multiply pleasure and avoid pain. Objectors point to the fact that it is a doctrine suited for the followers of the Ancient Greek philosopher Epicur's [341-270 B.C] who thought that the purpose of philosophy '§ to attain happiness and tranquility in life. He believed that L 72 Svanmeu wit GaMSca el CHAPTER IV: UTILITARIANISM: Jonny STUART MILL happiness corresponds to and freedom from fear and However, followers of the E, is actually their accusers t atarazia and aponia, the absence of pain, ‘Picurean doctrine res] hat. present the human person in a ng that human beings are incapable her form of pleasure other than that comparable to an animal’s. Mill adds that there is no Epicurean or any such-related i the peace respectively. pond that it reckless abandon and non-stop partying. Some kinds of pleasures are more desirable and valuable than others. How does one determine which pleasures are higher than others? Mill explains: If I were asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two Pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both sive a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a Superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small amount. pe "Sinton tthe Uttvintn and Oar Exo, (New ee Oxford Publsting, 1998), 139, 73 canned wil VamSce= PART I: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS If Bentham’s version of util Potential ianisin focuses on the Amount or quantity of happiness that an ac Potentially produce for it to be considered right, Mill’s ethics makes a sharp and nuanced division of higher and lower forms of pleasure in terms of quality. Happiness should not ion can “be measured solely on the basis of how long or how intense the feeling of pl ure is for a person or to those affected by an action as Bentham, for instance, had thought. Although both agree that an action’s rightness or wrongness must take into account the number of those that shall be affected, Mill says that even if more people benefit from an action’s consequences, but the kind of pleasure they experience is considered lower or baser than the consequences of an action that pleases a lot less people, but please them in a more human way, then the latter course of action is deemed more right, in that it promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number while considering the fact that some pleasures are more befitting of a human being than others. Mill says that the pleasures of a higher quality are those that employ our distinctively human faculties, such as the intellect. However, it should be noted that Mill is not saying that people who have experienced both the pleasures of sensation and pleasures of the intellect consistently prefer the latter on every occasion. He is not saying that competent judges of pleasures always prefer the higher forms of pleasure, say, reading a good book over having a night of drinks with friends. He says that these people would not choose 4 manner of existence that includes a greater amount of lower pleasures than higher pleasures. While it is reasonable to think that someone of experience of rational competence would sometimes prefer to go out and party with friends 00 some nights, it would go against reason for them to go out every night to party at the expense of experiencing highet forms of pleasure, albeit, of a smaller quantity. In other words, ‘a wise man would not exchange his lot for that of a fool's 74 ocdiileu mSce| | | CHAPTER IV: UTILITARIANISM: JOHN STUART MILL | | even if he were promised the pleasure’s befitting of a fool’s for a lifetime. This is precisely because a competently experienced puman recognizes that the pleasures of wisdom, though fewer jn quantity, far outweigh that of a fool’s. Mill does not assert, that the exercise of distinct human faculties like the intellect has a greater intrinsic value than the exercise of those that promote the pleasures of sensation. What he claims is that the pleasures derived from uniquely human activities such as reading, conversing with others, and philosophizing have superior value than other forms of activities. For example, if one is faced with the choice of playing online games all day for a week and studying school lessons for at least three hours a day for a week, one must ask oneself which course of action fulfills one’s higher faculties more. One should also ask how many people can benefit from such a choice compared to the other, as well as the kind of happiness it can bring these people. Let us thus examine the case: Playing online games Studying three hours all day fora week aday fora week + immediately satisfies one’s * tedious, yet allows one to search for fun and excitement develop his/her intellect and * allows one to hang out with virtue of perseverance in friends learning important lessons for + lets one enjoy oneself while eeniao) escaping the everyday + the discipline of focusing on pressures of daily tasks like relevant tasks related to one’s household chores, etc. education can go along way in + essentially satisfies one one's future endeavors ‘and one’s gaming friends * relatively solitary immediately + has the potential to bring pleasure to one's family by showing one's gratitude for their gift of education : When one carefully examines the kinds of pleasures at stake in the possible consequences of one’s decision, one ealizes that studying, while seemingly “painful” relative to 75 > ocarineu wit LamScePART L: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS one’s desire for immediate gratification, bears more potential ss in the long run compared to playing online games. Hence, even if we say, for instance, that playing online games brings more pleasure to more people in a more immediate manner, onc still has to ask what form of pleasure it brings them. Are these pleasures long-lasting? What happens after a week of camaraderie in the online gaming shop? Are the bonds created there bonds of true friendship or provisional bonds of usefulness (your alliances are created and judged based on your ability to play the game such that if you are a terrible player, is there any guarantee that people would want to play with you still?)? Does the pleasure of winning in a game bring you authentic human fulfillment or is the pleasure transitory and empty at the end of the day? to bring happine: On the other hand, if one chooses to instead use a shorter amount of time studying, one also has to ask if the pain of school work is worth the pleasure it potentially creates for oneself and others. Even if there is no guarantee that studying automatically translates into higher grades in school, is the activity still worth doing? What life skills does one gain from persevering through pages and pages of lessons? Notwithstanding that this choice might bring pleasure to less people (to just one’s parents and oneself, for instance), might it not be said that the quality of pleasure is significantly higher than the pleasures derived from playing online games all day? Is not the potential of deepening and expanding one’s knowledge and exercising one’s intellect worth the pain of the activity? Would not the possibility of exceling in school and eventually getting a good job benefit more people in the long run, and in more fulfilling ways? Now, one might say that Mill might conclude that studying is always better than playing. However, one may argue that one also learns useful skills in playing computer games and that the development of friendships is more important than getting a good job after graduating 76 ocdiilleu Wifrom school. Mill must saying that lower pleasu,, es t alw: : forms of pleasure, He dom °YS Bive = to higher mS as one- if one choose one activity, one must, two options one would be tr exclusively in the context oj if one were allowed to expel pleasure derived from playii amenable to be consigned ask hitaself/herself which of the uly happy and content in doing f being a human person. Third, rience the maximum amount of ing online games, he/she one be » Prefer to have his/ her immediate desires fulfilled by lower pleasures than to Postpone his/her gratification for the purpose of reaping the happiness involved in cultivating his/her higher faculties? Mill says that a human being whose capacity for enjoyment is low has a greater chance of having his/ her pleasures satisfied than a person predisposed towards experiencing higher forms of pleasure. The development of one’s capacity for enjoyment (capacity to appreciate the difference between higher and lower pleasures) is either ‘inherent in a person or more commonly due to the lack of °pportunity to experience the higher pleasure. Mill does not believe that a person who has had experience of both lower and higher pleasures would prefer the former at the expense of losing the opportunity to enjoy the latter. He clarifies this Point in this quote: Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile 77 amScéPART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS influences but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them and the society to which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower, though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.® Mill presents an important point in his utilitarian theory of morality. He recognizes a person's embeddedness in a social, cultural, and historical context that plays a crucial role in his/her capacity to recognize varying kinds of pleasures. If one is, for instance, born and raised in a society that ultimately favors the cravings and desires of the flesh over other pleasures, then it is likely that one will have a preference for these experiences since one does not know any better. Returning to our earlier example, if one lives in a household which does not nurture and encourage the discipline of studying and learning, it is but commonsensical to assume that this person is more susceptible to favor feelings which relate to activities that contain in themselves the prospect of immediate gratification, for instance, playing online games. The fact that most people associate happiness with sensual gratification and prefers this over other forms says something about the culture and values of society itself. 2 Utlitarionism, 141. 78 ocdl leu Wit‘A society with systems and institutions that legitimize and reward a life of excess is likely to produce a citizenry that is insensitive, if not blind, to a higher calling for humanity. One of Mill’s most famous quotes runs as follows: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.” Happiness, according to the Greatest Happiness Principle, must be pursued in direct proportion to the form of the being which desires it. In other words, a pig prefers pleasures befitting of its mature and would be clueless to the possibility of experiencing other or higher forms precisely because it is a pig and not a human being. A person, however, has the capacity to realize a higher form of happiness because his/ her nature as a rational being permits him/her to do so. A fool, therefore, is a person who has no idea that being human allows him/her to experience wisdom and so he/she relegates his/her existence as comparable to that of a pig’s, as it were. In other words, Mill is saying that the forms of pleasures that are considered higher, like the pleasure of gaining wisdom, because they are more difficult to attain and are to a certain extent more difficult to access, are oftentimes looked over in favor of pleasures that are easier to access and immediately gratifying. Ultimately, one must defer to the verdict of competent judges who have experienced a wide Spectrum of pleasures in order to secure a guide for moral Judgment. He says, “On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final.”" CHAPTER IV: UTILITARIANISM: JOHN STUART MILL | 7 © Uni 1 Uitiltarionism, 1.40, Wid, 1aq 73 PP ocarineu wil LamSceSS PART |: THE ACADEMIC ETHICAL TRADITIONS One may, therefore, say that in matters of diet, 5 instance, one ought to seek the opinion of 4 person experienced both sickness and health to find out vw consuming vegetables and fruits. One who has not knoy sickness due to a bad diet cannot have a w | of how important one’s health is over the sat palate. If this person, therefore, tells one that experi taught him/her the importance of eating a balanced di : can more or less be certain that he/she knows what he/sh: talking about, and that his/her opinion matters. To restate, the Greatest Happiness Principle, as the ultimate end of action, sponsors the view that morality is about fostering an existence that is exempt from pain as much as possible and one that is capable of enjoying pleasures | befitting a human person in terms of both quantity and quality which benefits not just oneself but others as well. i Tf one is in a quandary regarding which option offers the q prospect of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, ‘one must, aside from one’s use of reason, consult the wisdom of those that have experienced a broad range of pleasures t that are considered capable of assessing the value of every alternative. Eee] Replies to Objections To the objection that happiness | is unattainable | ‘There are some who object to Mill's proposition by savi0S that happiness is unattainable, Many things such as poverty: disease, and failure thwart one’s attempt at being happy: Mill responds by saying that if his objectors define happiness a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement, then it is true that such a life is indeed impossible. Pleasures often 0? 80