Chapter 1

Framing Civic and Citizenship

Education for the Twenty-First Century

Abstract This chapter outlines the broad theoretical approaches that underpin civic
and citizenship education (CCE) and provides case studies of two democratic states
(Australia and the United States of America) to show how CCE develops as a response
to unique contexts of time, place and values. The focus of the chapter is CCE for
democratic education, but there is an acknowledgment that CCE is also of interest
to authoritarian regimes that use it largely to bolster regime legitimacy. CCE for
democratic education, on the other hand, seeks to consolidate democratic processes
and values in the belief that free institutions and tolerant attitudes are the best way to
enable nations to progress and indeed survive. The case studies included here show
how democratic consolidation came, over time, to represent the major aim of CCE.
Yet there is a new narrative of ‘democratic deconsolidation’ (Foa and Mounk, 2016)
suggesting that democracy seems to be losing its appeal among some groups thus
posing new problems for CCE in the future.

Keywords Democracy · Citizenship · Civic and citizenship education ·

Consolidation · Historical development · Democratic deconsolidation

1.1 Introduction

Whether in Ancient Greece, Rome, China or India, older generations have always
sought to inculcate in young generations their expected duties, obligations and
responsibilities in order to ensure the maintenance of the existing order, its val-
ues and its priorities. The targets of these kinds of civic expectations were usually a
ruling class, often consisting largely of men, who at times viewed their civic respon-
sibilities as a necessary condition of their status and position in society. Maintaining
the status quo was in the interest of these ruling classes and it was to this end that
informal civic learning was directed usually in forms of education available only to
the ruling class.
In Europe, the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century
represented seismic shifts in political change, shifts that were not felt in Asia. Yet
these political changes did little to expand social inclusion so that slavery, gender
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 1
K. J Kennedy, Civic and Citizenship Education in Volatile Times,
Springerbriefs in citizenship education for the 21st century,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6386-3_1
2 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

discrimination and electoral politics, such as they were, continued to exclude not
just large sections of the population from participation but in the case of slavery
visited some of the most inhumane treatment ever countenanced against fellow
human beings. These early political revolutions did not create socially just and
equitable societies, despite their nod toward democratic values and institutions and
the trappings of minimal forms of electoral democracy.
The advent of mass schooling in the nineteenth century to meet the needs of
growing industrialization in Great Britain, Europe, the United States and Australia
expanded opportunities but did little to develop democracy. The products of such
schooling were worker-citizens rather than democratic citizens and what forms of
civic learning they experienced were little different from the class-based system
of earlier times. Loyalty, patriotism and hard work were regarded as civic virtues,
and these were drilled not so much from formal lesson of civic education but in
flag-raising ceremonies, pledges of allegiance and patriotically inspired holidays
(Independence Day in the United States, the Queen’s Birthday in Great Britain (and
in British colonies like Australia, Canada and New Zealand), Bastille Day in France).
In addition, there was also the moral element of such education whether from a
religious or secular perspective—the world has always needed ‘good’ citizens who
do the ‘right’ thing. There were, of course, debates about the qualities of such citizens
and the respective roles of secular and religious values in public systems of education.
But there was little debate about the neo-Aristotelean purposes of schooling to shape
character, to develop virtues, civic or otherwise and to ensure social stability.
It was left to the twentieth century, reeling from the effects of the First World War,
to develop a civic education with broader purposes, especially relating to democracy,
social inclusion, tolerance and more equitable societies. Such a development was
by no means universal and results were not achieved quickly. By century’s end,
many countries with some commitment to liberal democracy and its values were still
working through ways to make these explicit for young people. An important side
effect of this new focus was the belief that the school curriculum could be used to
secure these ends. It could be in the form of a separate subject, often called Civic
Education (but also terms such as citizenship education, moral education and political
education have been used). In some education systems, the focus on civic learning
was not represented by a school subject but used as a theme that was meant to be fused
into other school subjects like History, Geography or English. In addition to a single
subject or integrated forms of civic education, extracurricular activities might also
be used (as they were in the past) to highlight important civic learning opportunities.
These can include flag-raising ceremonies, visits to parliamentary institutions and
guest speakers who have some political experiences to share. This diversity of formats
does not belie the importance of civic education: rather, it suggests that schools have
become important sites for the civic education of young people in the search for
broader social and political purposes, especially as the twentieth century progressed.
So important did civic learning become to nations and their citizens that in 1975 the
first international attempt to assess what young people knew was made by a team of
researchers (Torney, Oppenheim, & Farnen, 1975). Subsequent attempts were made
in 2001 (Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001), 2009 (Schulz, Ainley,
1.1 Introduction 3

Fraillon, & Losito, 2010) and 2016 (Schulz et al., 2017). Testing both civic knowledge
and civic values, these international assessments have attempted to provide some
indication of what young people know, believe and plan to do as future citizens. It is
a recognition that civic education is significant and has an important role to play in
the education of young people.
The above narrative has focused on the development of civic education in the
context of a gradual recognition that democracy itself needs to be supported if it is
to be maintained. There are other narratives that highlight the importance of civic
education for other purposes—to support authoritarianism, dictatorships and other
non-democratic forms of political association (see, for example, Chong, Kennedy,
& Cheung, 2018; Kennedy, Fairbrother, & Zhao, 2014; Wang, 2019). It is important
to understand these but they will not be the focus of this book. Hopefully, the issue
of non-democratic civic and citizenship education will be taken up in another vol-
ume in the Civic and Citizenship Education in the Twenty-First Century Series. The
remaining chapters, therefore, will highlight civic education for democracy and the
challenges it faces in the twenty-first century.

1.2 Protecting Democracy

In the second decade of the twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson wanted to make
the world ‘safe for democracy’ and much of the century witnessed concerted efforts
to do just that. Democratic globalists took this mission so seriously that often they
supported direct intervention in the affairs of independent nation states to promote
democracy worldwide. At the same time, antidemocratic forces were also strong
throughout the twentieth century. Often the clashes between the ‘forces of democ-
racy’ and opposing ideologies such as fascism and communism are portrayed as a
popular binary. Yet the world is still not ‘safe for democracy’. In the second decade
of the twenty-first century, The Guardian (8 December 2015) warned in a newspaper
editorial that ‘the combination of global economic uncertainty, mass migration and
jihadi terrorism is taking a growing toll on liberal democracies across the world’.
Mouffe (2016) added to this warning the threat of populism when he highlighted
what he saw as Europe’s ‘crisis of liberal democracy’. Making the world ‘safe for
democracy’, therefore, is an ongoing struggle on the part of liberal democracies and
it can be seen in retrospect that there are two sides to the struggle.
One is external, represented by the belief that democracy is part of the natural
order of things and therefore should be spread universally. This is the view of ‘demo-
cratic globalists’ who seek to ‘blanket’ the world with democracy (Krauthammer,
2004, p. 15). Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is quoted as an example:
‘the spread of freedom is … our last line of defense and our first line of attack’
and former President George W. Bush is described as an equally strong supporter.
Krauthammer (2004, p. 17), a well-known US conservative, described himself as a
‘democratic realist’ who supported external action ‘that intervenes not everywhere
that freedom is threatened but only where it counts—in those regions where the
4 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

defense or advancement of freedom is critical to success in the larger war against the
existential enemy.’ It is a neat distinction within the neoconservative camp, but the
rationale and outcomes of globalism and realism are the same: Liberal democracy
must be defended by external action whenever it is seen to be under threat. The
unanswered questions in this assumption are related to the assumed significance of
the threat and the extent of action that should be sanctioned in making the world
‘safe for democracy’.
The other side of the struggle might be classified as internal as liberal democracies
seek to shore up support for democracy within their own borders. Within each liberal
democratic nation state, there are elections, support for human rights, the rule of law
and other democratic values. For democracy to survive within the nation state, these
values are seen to be in need of consolidation. In addition to modeling democratic
processes, concerted efforts are made to ensure that young people growing up will
be exposed to these values, come to appreciate them, advocate for them and as a
result become democratic citizens of the future. Schools, therefore, become important
social institutions to achieve democratic consolidation and programs of civic and
citizenship education (CCE) the means by which this end might be achieved. How
this process should work in the twenty-first century and what might be both the
barriers and pathways to success will be the focus of this book.
There are two key questions that will be addressed throughout:
• Is the issue of democratic consolidation any different at this point in the twenty-first
century than at any other time? and
• Is making the world ‘safe for democracy’ still a legitimate aspiration?
In addressing these questions, it is important to understand that CCE is not a neutral
or simple component of the school curriculum. It can be constructed by different
theoretical frameworks and historical contexts that have created its different forms
wherever it is implemented. What follows is an attempt to identify those frameworks
and contexts and their impact on CCE.

1.3 Theoretical Framings of CCE

While there is a general view that schools, and public schools in particular, have a
role to play in the political socialization of young people, the focus and extent of
such efforts have provoked debate.
Westbrook (2005) argued, for example, that schools in the United States seemed
to have veered away from their civic mandate to pursue more utilitarian purposes.
Yet not everyone viewed this as a problem. Leo Strauss and his students, for example,
promoted a two-tier system of civic education: one for the elites who would steer
democracy and the other for the common people who were simply expected to imbibe
its values (Burns & Connelly, 2010). Straussians, therefore, had few expectations
about the civic competence of citizens apart from the importance of voting. At the
other end of the spectrum were the Deweyan progressives, of whom Westbrook
1.3 Theoretical Framings of CCE 5

(2005) is one, supporting public participation in the civic life of the nation along lines
advocated by traditional republicanism (Pettit, 1997). Consequently, progressives see
an important role for schools in preparing active citizens for future participation. The
tension between the conservative and progressive views of the role of school and the
nature of civic education has characterized debate in the United States over many
years. On the one hand, the minimalist conservatives supported the obligation to
vote and the need to accept the values decided by the elites while the progressives
advocated for more active participation in the civic life of the nation.
The lines of the debate elsewhere have been quite similar. There have certainly
been those like the conservatives in the United States advocating the importance of
studying history as a school subject—especially the history that showed progress and
development rather than the history that shows racism, discrimination and class wars.
The conservative argument has been run in places as diverse as Australia and Hong
Kong. In different Western countries, including Australia, there has also been a look
backward to Judeo Christian traditions and their contribution to values along with
an appreciation of the country’s British parliamentary institutions. Conservatism has
taken many different forms. It was based on an assumption of shared values, a focus
on harmony rather than diversity and the production of a docile citizenry grateful for
the past and trustful of the future and those who will manage it. Ironically, such an
argument can be used to support a role for CCE in both democratic and authoritarian
societies.
Yet conservatives are not alone in claiming how society can best function. Many
European countries, for example, maintain a strong progressive tradition that advo-
cates a more liberal or republican view stressing the importance of citizenship partic-
ipation as an important outcome of school CCE programs, participation that includes
but goes beyond voting in elections. Studies at the school level have shown that devel-
oping this participatory culture is often seen as the key attribute of school-based CCE.
Nevertheless, public discourse shows that both conservative and progressivist voices
can be heard on the issue and the contexts that create such voices need to be well
understood.
Despite these different approaches to CCE, there is a commonality between con-
servative and progressive views. It is to do with what Merriam (1931, p. 35) called ‘the
essential elements in the texture of group cohesion’. How do groups come together
and how do they stay together? Conservatives answer this question with reference to
the values of the past that they assume will provide the foundations for the future.
Progressives, on the other hand, believe that future citizens must actively construct
the future and that the best way to do this is by active participation in the political and
social life of society. This issue is of relevance in societies that are diverse and where
the commonalities are not immediately clear in terms of social characteristics such
as religion, language, values and family structures. What binds citizens and what
rents them asunder? This was really Merriam’s (1931) central question, although
expressed here somewhat more colorfully to highlight the issue. The consequential
question is what kind of CCE is needed to address the issues of both cohesion and
diversity so that one does not override the other. This remains a fundamental question
for liberal democracies.
6 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

Viewed in this way, however, CCE can be positioned differently within distinctive
theoretical positions. While conservatives and progressives provide different answers
to Merriam’s question, neither has recognized that the question itself poses a problem.
Post-structuralist theorists, however, have identified what they see as the problem with
Merriam. Luke (1990, p. 253), views Merriam’s focus on ‘cohesion’ more akin to
Foucault’s ‘disciplinary technologies’, the purpose of which is ‘making citizens’ who
will support the democratic state rather than any alternative. Critical of traditional
approaches to CCE, whether they are conservative or progressive, post-structural
theorists view the consolidation of democracy itself as a tool of the state designed
to produce docile citizens content with the status quo. Post-structuralists themselves
will often hold a more radical view of the citizen, but they argue that current attempts
at CCE are more likely to stress tradition, conformity and stability in a democracy
rather than revolution and renewal. Luke (1990, pp. 253–254) concluded that:
as reductionist categories within predictive theories for producing ‘true’ and ‘false’ state-
ments about political stability, legitimacy and support, the political culture/political socializa-
tion discourse be seen as a new system of rules. Hence its interpretation tends to complement
the “general politics” of truth in the East-West struggle for power by affirming disciplinary
practices underpinning liberal capitalist democracies.

In other words, CCE’s role is to consolidate the values and practices of the demo-
cratic state that for both post-structuralists and critical theorists is linked to support
for capitalism.
With this interpretation, CCE becomes an instrument of state power to wield
over docile citizens. Such an argument needs to be carefully considered, but as Li
(2015) has shown recently state capacity to control CCE varies considerably. In the
democratic and semi-democratic states, she studied (Taiwan and Hong Kong) the
state’s capacity to control CCE was shown to be considerably constrained while she
concluded that an authoritarian state, such as the People’s Republic of China, had
much greater capacity to direct the form and function of CCE. The role of the state
in the formation of CCE is clearly an important issue to consider, as is the state’s
capacity to direct and control what it sees as the desirable outcomes for civic learning.
Yet some researchers have thrown doubt on whether schools ought to have a role
in CCE (Merry, 2018; Murphy, 2007; Van der Ploeg & Guérin, 2016). CCE is seen
to have predetermined outcomes which are not consistent with broader intellectual
outcomes that seek to equip students to make their own decisions rather than uncrit-
ically adopt whatever citizenship narrative a school seeks to impose. Merry (2018,
p. 2), for example, argued that such narratives are often ‘elitist and racialized’. This
raises important questions about the role of schools in democratic societies, how the
‘democratic narrative’ is constructed and the extent to which it can meet the needs
of a diverse society. As will be shown throughout this book, however, schools must
learn how to confront the challenge since to abrogate responsibility for CCE is no
longer an option.
These different and often conflicting theoretical constructions of CCE might be
speculative and even distracting from the practical task of developing school pro-
grams for CCE. Yet a note of civic urgency has recently been introduced to the debate.
1.3 Theoretical Framings of CCE 7

Foa and Mounk (2016) have pointed out that recent international surveys have identi-
fied not just declining support for democracy’s institutions, such as electoral partici-
pation, party politics and conventional forms of civic engagement, but for democracy
as a regime type. They showed that over time respondents in countries such as the
United States and the United Kingdom, where support for democratic regimes has tra-
ditionally been high, have shown increasingly less support for democracy in general
and less concern about living in an authoritarian regime. They point to the surge in
support for rightwing political groups in those countries and in Europe and Australia.
They refer to declining support for traditional democratic regimes as the ‘deconsoli-
dation of democracy’ (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 15). This analysis is in line with other
analyses that in general refer to the ‘crisis of democracy’ (Geiselberger, 2017) and the
need to respond to it (Azmanova & Mihai, 2015). Appardurai (2017, p. 1), for exam-
ple, has referred to ‘democracy fatigue’ and while Blühdorn (2014) has pondered
whether we are witnessing ‘the erosion or the exhaustion of democracy’. What is more
Blühdorn and Butzlaff (2018) have argued that what is now characterized as ‘the crisis
of democracy’ may well be a permanent feature of a new post-democracy landscape.
CCE cannot ignore these political trends that will be discussed in more detail
later in this book. Yet the main point to note is that the so-called crisis of democracy,
represented by ‘deconsolidation’, is exactly the opposite effect that CCE is designed
to achieve in relation to preparing young people for citizenship. As mentioned earlier,
CCE’s role in liberal democracies has traditionally been to consolidate democracy
and its institutions in contexts where the superiority of democracy is usually taken
for granted. This book will not explore this ‘taken for grantedness’ or the varying
conceptions of democracy that are evident both theoretically and practically. That
would be an important study for another book.
Yet if Foa and Mounk (2016) and others are to any extent correct, then nothing
can be taken for granted and CCE in its traditional form becomes a counter narrative
in times where democracy is under stress and a means to prepare young people for
an unpredictable and uncertain future.
Against this background and considering the various theoretical frames that seek
to inform it, what follows reviews the role and function of CCE with a special focus
on how it has developed over time and how it might be shaped in the future. Two
cases will be presented, that of Australia and the United States, because they provide
different examples of how liberal democracy has developed and changed and how
CCE developed with it. The preparation of citizens has always been a central issue
for both countries. In the Australian case, this concern was shown even prior to
independence from British colonial rule (Kennedy, 2007). Yet CCE has emerged
in different ways in these different contexts. Wherever it exists, CCE is always
influenced by the contexts in which it is embedded and takes forms that reflect
specific national priorities and values.
The purpose of the remainder of this chapter, therefore, is to frame CCE as a
context-dependent phenomenon taking multiple forms and seeking to meet local
priorities as they emerged from specific contexts. The narrative in both cases is largely
one of democratic consolidation. Yet different theoretical impulses influencing CCE
8 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

can be seen over time leading to its status. As the new forces of deconsolidation take
their place internationally, implications can be drawn for the future role of CCE.

1.4 Case 1: CCE in Australia: The Evolution of a National

Perspective

It did not seem to occur to those who nurtured Australia from colony to independence
at the beginning of the twentieth century that new forms of civic and citizenship
education (CCE) might be needed to induct young citizens into new political forms,
new allegiances and new ways of thinking about Australia’s place in the world. Prior
to the Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901 there had been a kind of proto-
civics reflecting a ‘growing commitment to democracy and responsible government,
the promotion of loyalty to individual colonies, loyalty to the British Empire and a
moralistic element that sought to produce “good” citizens’ (Kennedy, 2007, p. 104).
After federation, however, there was little difference between the old colonies and
the new federation in terms of their orientation to Great Britain, the British Empire
and citizenship. This latter point requires some explanation.
Australian citizenship as a distinct form did not result from the Federation of the
Australian colonies. The Australian-born remained British subjects until 1949 and
the passing of the Australian Citizenship Act that introduced for the first time ‘the
local national status of Australian citizenship acquired by birth, descent or grant’
(Pryles, 1981, p. 40). Yet even this step was not really a reflection of national sen-
timent or popular outcry seeking greater local autonomy. Rather, it was the result
of a Commonwealth-wide initiative that sought to expand citizenship categories in
former British colonies (Kennedy, 2001, p. 21). Its main impact was seen to be on
immigration rather than the development of a new Australian identity (Pryles, 1981).
This historical context is important to understand because it shows how citizenship
issues were of very little priority in a newly federated and independent Australia in
the early years of the twentieth century.
In those years, there was a certain taken for grantedness about citizenship, and it
is probable that the term itself was rarely used. A visit to Australian schools in those
years would have found students singing the British national anthem; if it happened
to be the 24th of May there would have been a half day holiday to celebrate Empire
Day (that coincided with Queen Victoria’s birthday); and the British flag was safely
embedded as part of the Australian flag (as it still is till this day!) The approach to
civic education in this context was explained in this way (Kennedy, 2007):
This British/Empire orientation was reflected in civic education programmes that focused
on the qualities of good citizens and Australia’s role as a loyal member of the Empire.
History was the key school subject that had a civics orientation and often History and Civics
were linked as a single subject in the curriculum. There were arguments for more integrated
approaches to civics, but disciplinary perspectives remained strong throughout this period.
Civics can best be described in this period as “Empire civics” - British in orientation and
substance reflecting a tenuous independence from a still dominant colonial power. (p. 104)
1.4 Case 1: CCE in Australia: The Evolution of a National Perspective 9

This ‘Empire civics’ did not prevent schools from engaging in ceremonies to com-
memorate Australia’s engagement in the First World War and especially the Gallipoli
campaign. Perkins (2014) has provided evidence to show that such ceremonies were
underway just one year after the campaign and were both community and school
events. While Australian involvement in the Gallipoli campaign has gone on to
become part of Australian nation building, it was essentially part of an English war
strategy involving Australian troops, so it was not at odds with the Empire narrative.
Bates (2013) put it this way:
for the decades following 1915, the imperial context of Anzac Day had been fundamental to
the rituals and meaning of 25 April; newspapers, for example, commonly placed the King’s
or Queen’s message on the front page and the day was inextricably linked with Australia’s
military contribution to the British Empire. (pp. 24–25)

At the same time, as Perkins (2014) showed, the initial commemorations were
strongly linked to the values of Christianity, so there was nothing radical about
commemorating such an event. It simply supported the Empire narrative.
Textbooks of the time also supported this narrative (for example, Alice Hoy’s
Civics for Australian Schools and Walter Murdoch’s The Australian Citizen), but it
was a narrative supplemented with references to emerging democratic institutions,
the virtues of obedience and sacrifice and the needs for stability in a changing world.
Yet there was also a darker side to the narrative as highlighted by Davidson (1997).
There was the racism of the White Australia Policy and attitudes to indigenous
Australians, gender inequality relating to the role of women in the workforce and
class differentiation that seemed to support the role of those ‘born to rule.’ This
suggests that in the post-federation years up to the Second World War Australia was
an emerging democracy very much in the shadow of the British Empire, grappling
with significant social issues, confronted with financial turmoil at the end of the 1920s
and global catastrophe at the end of the 1930s. These issues, of course, were reflected
in civics textbooks and by implication civics classrooms. As Davidson (1997, p. 82)
reminded us, young people coming of age in Australia after the Second World War
had grown up with a steady diet of this kind of citizenship preparation. Yet the post-
1945 world was a different world characterized by immense social change, economic
challenges and cultural uncertainties all of which should have influenced CCE. As
will be shown below, however, this was not to be the case, at least until the 1990s.
An Australian historian characterized the above changes:
By about 1960, however, it was clear that Australia had almost become an American satel-
lite, although many of the trappings of imperial loyalty remained. But the main props of
the British association - defence and foreign policy - had been knocked away; and the pro-
portions of British trade, migration and capital investment had all declined, as had British
cultural and technological influence. Contacts with Asian countries were growing steadily.
The old Australian isolationism had gone forever, in the sense that modern communications
increasingly exposed the continent to international ideas and fashions. (Serle, 1973, p. 180)

European immigration started to flow in the early 1950s contributing toward a less
British and more multicultural population, secondary education became available to
all students rather than a select few and Australia’s foreign policy pivot to the United
10 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

States that had commenced during the Second World War continued. Yet it has been
commented that during this period ‘civics … seemed to go underground’ (Kennedy,
2007, p. 104). In New South Wales, for example, the 1941 History, and Civics
and Geography syllabuses were replaced in 1952 by an integrated social studies
curriculum for primary schools. There were strong civics dimensions to this new
curriculum and much of the subject-based content was retained as was the assumption
of links to the Empire and the British monarch. Yet basically civics education as a
separate area disappeared in the post-war period. This trend to dispense with civics
was reinforced by successive curriculum documents in the 1970s and 1980s where
the emphasis was on ‘investigation’ and processes of learning rather than specific
content so that even traditional content disappeared. As Kennedy (2007, pp. 104–105)
commented ‘this is not to say that there was no informal civic education taking place
in schools’ including rituals and ceremonies such as flag raising, ANZAC Day and,
in the 1950s at least, even Empire Day. The point to note, however, is that despite
the rapidly changing social context, Australia’s changing place in the world and the
press of technological change including globalization, there was no specified civic
knowledge or civic skills permeating Australian classrooms. The school curriculum
became ‘civics free’ in the post-war period.
This gap in the provision of CCE in Australian schools was noted by Thomas
(1994) when he reviewed the history of civics education as part of a wide-ranging
review (Civics Expert Group, 1994) commissioned by the then Prime Minister, Paul
Keating. The review marked a revival of CCE based very much on Keating’s view
that it was time for Australia to sever the British connection and become a republic.
To achieve this end required knowledge of Australia’s civic institutions, political
structures and global positioning. In receiving the report, Keating (1995) unabashedly
advocated what a revived CCE could achieve:
A comprehensive civics and citizenship education program is the best start we can have. We
can give young Australians knowledge of their past and a sense of where they belong in the
story. We can tell them about the gift of Australian democracy and how it should be defended.
We can imbue them with a faith in the core values of Australia not a conformist ideology,
but an awareness of the principles of freedom and tolerance which are still emerging in our
community. If we can do this we can help to keep ownership of the Australian political
system with the Australian people. We can keep the democracy alive and that old value
of egalitarianism functioning and with new meaning, with women and new migrants and
Aboriginal Australians included in the ethos that used to keep them out.

A new political party replaced the Keating Labor Government in 1996 with no less
support for CCE although with a different vision for the future, a different perspective
on the past and a more conservative perspective on the role of citizens in society.
This view was summarized by Kennedy (2008) commenting on new Minister David
Kemp’s announcement of the new government’s civic education initiative:
The speech looked back to and valorised the development of democratic institutions in Aus-
tralia consequent upon British possession of the land and its existing peoples. It highlighted
the advances and achievements that were seen to have been made to the present time and
signalled a fundamental commitment to the teaching of Australian history. It announced
that the civics and citizenship education program, now to be called Discovering Democracy,
1.4 Case 1: CCE in Australia: The Evolution of a National Perspective 11

would refocus its efforts on ensuring that young people were aware of and appreciative of
the institutions of the past that have shaped present day Australia. Knowledge of the growth
of democracy in Great Britain and Europe were seen as a fundamental prerequisite for young
Australians entering the twenty-first century. (pp. 182–183)

Thus, the reintroduction of CCE reflected how it could be politicized and how
it could be made to reflect different theoretical positionings. What was on offer,
however, was a long way from the Empire narrative of the early twentieth century, the
retraction of CCE altogether in mid-century and the tentative starts to reinstate CCE
in the 1990s. It is ironic, however, that despite this recommitment to civic education
by both sides of Australian politics, there is no longer a democratic consensus in
Australia on major issues such as asylum seekers, marriage equality, or the creation
of an Australian republic. There is considerable disillusion with mainstream political
parties and a tendency to support minor parties that are often willing to pursue an
antidemocratic agenda. At the same time, international terrorism continues to pose a
threat, even on Australian soil. These remain significant challenges for schools and
the CCE programs they offer.

1.5 Case 2: The United States of America: Secularism

and the Civic Mission of Schools

Great Britain’s Australian colonies evolved as independent entities voting to join

together as the Commonwealth of Australia whereas the North American colonies
actively rebelled against their colonial masters to come together as the United States
of America. As shown above, Australia’s colonial heritage lingered well into the
twentieth century, but what of the United States? Having so decisively rejected colo-
nialism, how did the newly independent country seek to create a new ‘revolutionary’
state? In particular, what role, if any, did CCE play?
The political revolution that characterized the emergence of the United States was
not matched by a social revolution and this was particularly true when it came to
education. As Cubberley (1919) has shown, there was little interest in education as
part of the discussions at the constitutional convention that followed the Revolution-
ary War. Education was left as a state responsibility rather than as a responsibility of
the new Federal government. This resulted in a fragmented approach to educational
provision dependent on the resources and inclinations of individual states, especially
religious inclinations. As in Europe and Great Britain, colonial education had been a
private rather than a public concern and was largely supported by a variety of Chris-
tian denominations and it continued in much the same way after the war of 1776.
As Cubberley (1919, p. 71) has pointed out, support for education after the war was
strongest in the New England states but the motivation still came from the Calvinis-
tic view that personal salvation required a knowledge of the Bible and therefore the
need for literacy among the population. In other words, there was no national con-
sciousness regarding the importance of education because of the war and, according
12 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

to Cubberley (1919), such consciousness did not start to emerge until after the War
of 1812–1814.
Yet this apparent neglect of what might be called a ‘revolutionary’ approach to
education can be easily understood in the context of the times. This certainly reflected
the spirit of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries not just in the United
States but in Great Britain, much of Europe and Australia. Education of any kind was
considered either the preserve of elites, as charity to the poor or as the prerequisite for
salvation that provided the pathway to the next life. This is not to say that there were
not advocates for education in the evolving nation. Cubberley (1919) has shown how
successive early Presidents made supportive public comments about the importance
of schools and education. Yet education was not in their preserve at the Federal level
so little action resulted. Even among the advocates of public education, however,
there was not agreement about its purposes or forms.
Bartrum (2008), for example, has highlighted the different views of Thomas Jef-
ferson and Noah Webster. Jefferson proposed a system of education in his home
state of Virginia that would have provided a broad education for all but an elite
education for future leaders unconnected to either religion of politics. As one com-
mentator noted, ‘Jefferson did not believe that schooling should impose political
values or mold the virtuous republican citizen’ (Bartrum, 2008, p. 274). Education
was important for those who would be leaders because it would be these leaders and
not the masses who would secure democracy’s future. Webster, on the other hand,
viewed public schools ‘as founts of political and religious guidance’ and famously
proclaimed as part of his educational creed ‘begin with the infant in the cradle; let
the first word he lisps be Washington’ (Bartrum, 2008, p. 276). Jefferson was more
a rationalist, an Enlightenment supporter an advocate, whereas Webster represented
the continuation of the New England Calvinistic tradition by which religion and val-
ues needed to be shaped as part of a new national story. As Bartrum (2008) pointed
out, it was Webster’s rather than Jefferson’s view of schools and education that most
influenced the early development of education in the United States. Nevertheless, the
clash between Jefferson’s rationalism and Webster’s Christian world view can still
be seen in much of the public discourse around US education today.
The Jeffersonian perspective, however, was not forgotten. It is best seen in a
statement by Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter in a ruling (McCollum v. the Board
of Education 1948) on the role of state support for religion in education (Murray,
2008):
[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out
divisive forces than in its schools. (p. 94)

This view has come to be referred to as the ‘legal secularist’ view because it
sought to abolish religion from public schools in line with a view of the constitu-
tion that expressly prohibited links between government and religion. At the same
time, however, it constructs schools as the standard bearers of a secular democracy
where all children can be educated according to a common curriculum and where
they might be free outside of school to pursue whatever religious paths they chose.
1.5 Case 2: The United States of America: Secularism … 13

As Murray (2008, p. 99) has shown it took some time for American schools to emerge
from their religious roots where Christian moralism was dominant. Yet by the mid
twentieth century talk of religion in public schools was increasingly prohibited in
what were essentially secular public schools.
It is as part of this process of secularization that CCE came to the fore—almost as
a civil religion giving some substance to Frankfurter’s view of schools as ‘symbols of
democracy.’ This is very much a twentieth-century phenomenon, but it takes place in
a context where schools come to be the crucibles of democracy rather than religion.
Schools without religious divisions come to be reflective of the democratic ideal
characterized by equality, freedom of expression and the rule of law. Of course, this
ideal worked only for some and over time there were many exclusions on account
of race, gender, ethnicity and class. Yet few other countries have valorized schools
in such a way and it is an important context in which to consider the development of
CCE.
Writing in 1918 Cubberley (1919, p. 487) argued that ‘we have, during nearly
three centuries of educational evolution gradually transformed the school from an
instrument of the church to a civil institution … reasonably well suited to a great
democratic society such as our own.’ Yet at this particular time in US history the
challenges for this civil institution were seen to be significant so that ‘the youth of
the land, girls now as well as boys, must be trained for responsible citizenship in our
democracy, so filled with the spirit and ideals of our national life that they will be
willing to dedicate their lives to the preservation and advancement of our national
welfare’ (Cubberley, 1919, p. 500). This is an annunciation of the civic mission of
schools and the rationale for CCE in the United States. It came in response to the
changing nature of the US population, the growth of cities, the development of mass
secondary education and an acceptance following the First World War that the United
States had a larger role to play on the international stage.
This conception of the civic mission of schools came to be supported by CCE.
Most commentators agree that CCE did not become part of the school curriculum
in the United States until the early twentieth century (Feith, 2011, p. 5; Malone,
1968, p. 110). Yet over time, it grew to become a requirement for all students in
most US states. Sometimes it takes the form of a separate subject, often called Civic
Education, and at other times there have been graduation requirements for the study
of US History. However CCE is offered, its purpose has always been to build support
for democracy and to prepare citizens for their future roles. Yet, as in Australia,
greater polarization in US politics and society means that today there is much less
agreement on values and priorities. Some argue for prayers to be said in schools,
others oppose it. Some want a liberal immigration policy but many people do not.
Some are in favor of abortion but others are not. As society splinters, the civic mission
of schools takes on different values and the task of CCE becomes harder since even
what count as ‘democratic’ values become increasingly contested.
14 1 Framing Civic and Citizenship Education …

1.6 Conclusion

In both Australia and the United States, the traditional role of CCE has been to
support prevailing democratic values. As the twenty-first century progresses, how-
ever, the task has become more complex. The task is no longer just to consolidate
democracy among a new generation but to defend it and to resist the forces of decon-
solidation. The ‘crisis of democracy’ referred to earlier requires such a response if
liberal democracy and its values are to be sustained.
As discussed in forthcoming sections, this may be CCE’s special role in the
twenty-first century. Being part of a curriculum, however, is just the first step in a
subject’s providing effective learning for students—any curriculum is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for learning. More needs to be known about the contexts
in which CCE will operate and some assessment needs to be made of its potential to
be successful as a counter narrative to democratic deconsolidation.
This suggests two broad questions that need to be addressed:
• What will be the challenges for CCE in the future? and
• As currently conceived, can CCE cope with these challenges?
These questions will be addressed in successive chapters.

1.7 Synopsis

This chapter has outlined the broad theoretical approaches underpinning CCE and
used case studies of Australia and the United States to show how CCE developed as a
response to the unique context of both countries. While historical circumstances dic-
tated different local responses to the development of CCE, Australia and the United
States shared a commitment to the consolidation of democracy and its values. By
mid-twentieth century, such consolidation remained largely unquestioned in both
countries. Yet the twenty-first century has seen much greater internal polarization in
both countries, the common threat of international terrorism, and increasing resis-
tance to liberal democratic values. Thus, CCE’s role in the future may need to be
directed against democratic deconsolidation to protect democracy and its values not
only in Australia and the United States but worldwide.

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