What is a Community· of Inquiry?

:
consideration on an email discussion list

EDITED BY TIM SPROD

PARTICIPANTS:

Tim Sprod Australia TS

David Kennedy USA DK
Steve Williams UK SW
Berrie Heesen Netherlands BH
Hannu Juuso Finland HJ
Richard Fox UK RF
Hreinn Palsson Ieeland HP
Mark Weinstein USA MW
Hrannar Baldursson Ieeland HB
Jen Glaser Israel JG
Laurance Splitter Australia LS
Wendy Turgeon USA WT
Clive Lindop Australia CL
Ann Sharp USA AS
Richard Anthone Belgium RA

Abstract
In early 1997, participants on the p4c-list, an email discussion list, reacted
to an anecdote about Wittgenstein's lectures at Cambridge by engaging in a
three month long exchange on the nature of a Community of Inquiry. This
article is a lightly edited transcript of that discussion and, as such, not only
addresses many aspects of the substantive issue, but also provides an exemplar
of at least one type of Community of Inquiry.

Introduction
In Philosophy for Children circles, the phrase community o} inquiry is usually
taken to mean the standard classroom methodology of reading, gathering
questions and discussing. However, when Philosophy for Children practitio-

© Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, Autumn, 1997. Vol. XVII, No. 1.
AUTUMN 1997, VaL. 17, No. 1 5

ners from around the world join together in an email discussion list and raise
the question of whether other situations come under this phrase, then we have
what may or may not be a community of inquiry into the nlea.ning of 'commu-
nity of inquiry.' Readers can both follow the course of our discussion for
whatever light it throws on the subject, and engage in their own meta-level
analysis as to whether what follows does constitute a community of inquiry.
This article consists primarily of the contributions to a discussion held on
the p4c-list email discussion list between January and March 1997. The
discussion list is maintained and moderated by Richard Anthone in Belgium, at
majordomo@belnet.be. While I have edited out some comnlents that seemed to
me not central to the discussion (mainly to try to reduce the length) and tidied
up some of the "email-ese" (spelling errors, lack of capitalisation, clumsy
grammar etc, so common in email), the contributions as reproduced here are
almost entirely the work of the people to whom they are attributed 1 •

The Discussion
DK: James Battye and I are interested in earlier historical sources in
community of inquiry theory and practice, e.g. suggestive passages in Plato,
Aristotle, the pre-socratics, and up through the tradition, with an aphoristic
flavor - brief or nlid-Iength quotes which flash with insight. Anyone have any
references they can turn us on tOt

TS: There is an interesting passage in Malcolm's "Memoir" about Witt-

genstein 2 and his lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1929. Part of it
folIows:
It is hardly correct to talk of these meetings as 'lectures', although
that is what Wittgenstein called them. For one thing, he was carrying on
original research in them ... For another thing, the meetings were largely
conversation. Wittgenstein commonly directed questions at various peo-
pIe present and reacted to their replies. Often the meetings consisted
mainly of dialogue.

There's more-I haven't time to copy it all. I've always thought it interest-
ing as a small community of inquiry.

DK: While I thank Tim for his quote about Wittgenstein's lectures, I
hesitate to call them a Community of Inquiry.

BH: The quote from Malcolm raises the issue of the facilitator as thinker
in an adult Community of Inquiry. As I have never favoured the idea that
6 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISClPLINES

Community of Inquiry is just one method, I like to distinguish between

different settings. For instance the adults who join so-called 'socratic dia-
logues', or conversations, (originally founded in Germany, but spreading over
Europe) make use of a specific method that is worthwhile for a longer period
of investigation (at least one weekend).
Working with children in a school setting also demands a specific meth-
od. Ludwig's Community of Inquiry was also a group of adults with some
shared specific interests, who agreed to let one lead the discussion (even
better, that was their motivation to join). This is often an effective way to get
somewhere. Is your hesitation based on the obvious director in the dialogue?
It seems to me that in most cases when adults are investigating a specific
question and have time to do this, we most often appreciate one who takes the
lead.
I do not see any general Community of Inquiry, but different settings that
need different methods. My own 'couple' method was born out of necessity to
deal with classes of 25 or 30 pupils which is still ordinary here in the Nether-
lands.
Honestly speaking, if I spend time to share an investigation with other
adults for a longer period, I also want a clear structure; in most cases, it is a
serious option to have one who takes the lead. It can certainly be inquiry, but
Community of Inquiry as a method is, according to me, too often used in a too
general setting.

Hl: Can we call Wittgenstein's way of working with his group a Commu-
nity of Inquiry? This question is interesting for many reasons. For me, this is
especially so because we are speaking about Wittgenstein in a context of doing
philosophy. As is weIl known, his ideas concerning traditional western philos-
ophy were very radical. How should we respond to his opinion that philo-
sophical questions in western tradition are only misunderstandings and misuse
of the language? What would be Wittgenstein's reaction to Philosophy for
Children and its core concept Community of Inquiry? It would be interesting
to hear your comments on this.
A second thing from Berrie's last message: many kinds of communities of
inquiry. I think that we can have the descriptions of the ideal communities of
inquiry as regulative ideas-depending on the settings, as I hear Berrie sug-
gesting. And in those settings still nlany variations. For example, in a
scientific setting, Peirce's description about how an participants (scientists)
should work together forms one regulative idea. When speaking about educa-
tion, the Community of Inquiry is different just because there are little chil-
dren and adult teachers included. The pedagogical setting offers the "perspec-
tive" according to which the practice is generated. In Wittgenstein's case, all
participants are adults but it still is a kind of educative situation-or is it?
AUTUMN 1997, VaL. 17, No. 1 7

What might help us to understand the different communities of inquiry is to

find out those rules that guide interaction (or the logic of dialogue) in different
settings.
SW: I agree that Community of Inquiry should be tuned to contexts, but
the question is: at what point does a discussion cease to be a Community df
Inquiry?

DK: Berrie reacts to my uneasiness with characterizing Wittgenstein's

lectures as a Community of Inquiry. Berrie thinks that there is not one
Community of Inquiry, but many, with different "contexts" and "methods." I
guess I can accept that, if the same process is going on "underneath" in all
cases, which can be summed up in two words: dialogue and dialectic.
Dialogue: in a group, it would seem to me to imply distributive thinking:
Le. the argumentative structure is a shared one. Everyone is participating in
some way in moving it along. A person like Wittgenstein might have some
extraordinary things to say, which might move it along mightily, but, ideally,
half of them would be questions, and the other half would draw responses
wh ich would alter them in some way. So if Wittgenstein is the center of
attention, the one person whom every other individual person is in dialogue
with, I don't know if I think that's Community of Inquiry. There is a problem
of power here.
Dialectic: in a philosophical Community of Inquiry we sense that the
argument is bigger than any one of us comprehends from our own perspective.
The horizonal goal is a coordination of perspectives, but that doesn't come-
one never reaches the horizon. We are interested in the special moment when
the argument "clicks," "moves," "emerges," "connects," "shifts" ... I can't seem to
find the word, Le. when pieces which had been more or less isolated fit
together, when there is a structural cha.nge which is nlore inclusive, and which
leads all of us, even those who appear to be "right/' into a moment of self-
correction and expansion, which two might be the same thing. Does Wittgen-
stein's discourse facilitate that group dialectical movement? I would claim
that's logically impossible, no matter how wise, brilliant, elegant, persuasive,
humble etc he iso I guess I am trying to say that the key to Community of
Inquiry is in the dynamics of thegroup structure, and therefore the great leader
in this case is the one who serves, who consciously and skilfully empowers
others, even at the cost of "sacrificing" his or her gift so that it can be
developed, appropriated, expressed, etc. by the whole group.

RF: David, I think you are doing us a service in meditating in this way on
the question of whether or not Wittgenstein's lectures constituted a Commu-
nity of Inquiry. The definition, or conception, of a Community of Inquiry
8 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

perhaps constitutes the central ground for discussions of "orthodoxy" (and

"heterodoxy") in the Philosophy for Children movement. As we move gradu-
ally further away in time and space from Mat Lipman's original exposition and
developing conception of P4C, there will surely be many arguments about the
"true" or "authentic" P4C as opposed to "diluted" or "misconceived" or "im-
proved" versions. I think this is inevitable for all such movements which have
pioneers, disciples, pupils and fellow travellers, and also those who stay for a
while and then move on.
For myself, I don't want to lose sight of the centrality of Lipman's convic-
tion that it is through dialogue and through community that we advance our
philosophies. On the other hand, I think it is amistake to believe that progress
in thinking can only take place through dialogue or social interaction. Some-
times lone thinkers make progress through reflective thought. Secondly, I also
think it is amistake to believe that children can only learn through dialogue or
social interaction. So I have "heterodox" views on the Community of Inquiry
to some extent. I think it has value but that it is not the one and only authentic
form of educational enterprise.
As for Wittgenstein, Ray Monk relates a story in his wonderful biography
of Wittgenstein in which some eminent philosopher (RusselI? Moore?) is
asked if he has been in discussions with Wittgenstein and he replies along the
lines of: "Wittgenstein discusses; I listen ..." It seems that Wittgenstein was very
over-bearing in this way. He liked to think aloud with an audience, and that
is perhaps what the famous "1ectures" were like. But then, Plato's Socrates in
the dialogues is not so very different: the scriptwriter is always on Socrates'
side and there is not much real dialogue... I think Wittgenstein did not
particularly believe in progress through dialogue with others, but rather in
using others to stimulate thoughts, to bounce ideas off them and to force
himself to articulate and explain his thoughts. Others ameliorated the loneli-
ness of his thinking. But then, he was an unusual guy, and in many ways a sad
one. Most of us need the Community of Inquiry, at least some of the time.

DK: Your last comments about Wittgenstein-his loneliness, his over-

bearing quality, his "sad" characteristics-are what make the difference for me.
I think his thought would do more for the world if he were healed, "saved," if
you will, into community. Obviously this is stretcQing Community of Inquiry,
and you needn't agree at all. Perhaps I'm a Pythagorean at heart: it would seem
to me that the inquiry is-has to be, or else it is meaningless-into relational
and emotional healing as much as into cognitive "truth." What's "true," after
all , wh ich is not efficacious on those other levels? My new definition of
philosophy here is of therapy, I suppose. So "orthodox" Community of
Inquiry actually changes the definition of philosophy in rather a dramatic way?
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 9

MW: Was the Community of Inquiry in which Wittgenstein participated

the people who came to his lectures, or was it the many thinkers whose deep
thoughts he pondered? Perhaps those at his lectures became part of the
Community of Inquiry when they pondered his ideas in texts orconversations
with others.
HB: I would like to begin this letter by expressing nlY agreement with
David. That a community of inquiry is only a conlmunity of inquiry if the
power relations between the individuals in the group are on an equal basis. I
wonder about what has been expressed about Wittgenstein, if the person who
saw hirn as directing the discussion is describing it accurately. I have heard
about my own classes from a friend of mine that he heard I directed the
classroom as a general, but that's not true. A general commands, but I try to
lead and give the leadership to others. I think the person who expressed this
to my friend was not being accurate for some reason. Perhaps he wasn't
sensitive to the context of no power-relations? Could this not have happened
to Wittgenstein?
But, then Richard Fox brings a clear description of Wittgenstein as a
thinker who USES others to stimulate hirnself, and becomes overwhelming in
a dialogue. This is veiy interesting. We take it as a very important notion in
the community of inquiry to SHARE ideas. But what is the difference between
sharing ideas and using others to stimulate ones own' ideas? I see the differ-
ence as what separates professional thinkers and beginners. Some of the
beginners are strong thinkers, others are weaker. In order not to overpower
the weaker we need to give more than take, and in a careful manner. Some
groups of professional thinkers could develop a community of inquiry where
each is using the other in order to stimulate hirn or herself without worrying
about overpowering the other. I don't know if this is what Berrie would call
two different settings of Community of Inquiry that need two different kinds
of methods? Anyway, it would be excellent to get some clarification about the
settings of Community of Inquiry.
Mark, I would like a clarification. What is the difference between the
community of people who came to Wittgenstein's lectures and the community
of the many thinkers Wittgenstein pondered and conversed with. Can we
make this distinction? And by the way, is any of us able to know where s/he
gets ideas from?
But then we crash into a problem Hannu introduced to us a few weeks ago:
"How should we respond to Wittgenstein's opinion that philosophical ques-
tions in western tradition are only misunderstandings and misuse of the lan-
guagei' Actually we can add something more from Wittgenstein: "What we
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." I hope this last phrase will
not silence uso
10 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPUNES

JG: Just a quick note to say I am following and enjoying the Community
of Inquiry discussion. I simply don't have time to contribute at the moment...
but I have an article in front of me that begs to be brought into the conversa-
tion. So my contribution shall be to point to the words of others! It is /IOn
Flourishing and Finding Üne's Identity in Community" by David Wong. 3

HJ: Jen, the article you mentioned sounds interesting. Can you find some
time to describe its content... or Wong's basic ideas? lassume that many
listmembers do not have the original article available.

DK: Mark was asking, what/who was Wittgenstein's Community of

Inquiry? WeIl yes, in the same way our Community of Inquiry certainly
includes Hegel, Nietszche, etc., and even those we haven't read are being
brought into the conversation by those who have read them and are respond-
ing to their ideas. In fact, I would identify Richard Fox's skepticism as a
position in part, at least, influenced by Wittgenstein's ruminations on how
language games work.
But that leaves everything as it iso I still want to claim that if Wittgenstein
came back, found his way into philosophy for children and committed hirnself
to doing philosophy dialogically in groups, that something else might happen
to his thought. I might even want to say this about Socrates!

MW: David's comment on Community of Inquiry a.nd Wittgenstein

suggests that neither he nor Socrates engaged within a Community of Inquiry
in their main dialogical practice. That's probably right if P4C is the defining
model for a Community of Inquiry. I wonder which aspects of P4C constitute
the Community of Inquiry, since the novels model a very different community
interaction then the practice in workshops, and at least in my experience, the
practice in classrooms.

JG: OK. On Hannu's request 1'11 try to summarise the article - but if I get
that far, 1'11 add my comments also - so much for time!

[There followed a summary of David Wong's article, too long to include

here. The main points relevant to this discussion are raised in the commen-
tary.]
The most important idea for me was that it introduces into the discussion
of Community of Inquiry an aspect that I think has been neglected so far -
namelYi what the purpose of a Community of Inquiry is and how that purpose
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 11

contributes to our understanding of its defining features (and thus our judg-
ments in particular cases - like Wittgenstein); i.e., what does it mean for a
Community of Inquiry, and members within it, to flourish?
For me, the purpose of a Community of Inquiry is closely connected to
our idea of what it is to flourish as a human being. For me, this flourishing is
in realising our understanding of 'the good'-unity-wholeness. This involves us
in a search for the truth, but it isn't reducible to head stuH, as I think the search
for 'the good' is also the struggle to realise the good in our lives - in this case,
to establish 'the good life' in the Community of Inquiry itself (this is what I
take Plato to mean when he speaks of the search for logos as being, at the same
time, a search to realise logos in ourselves and in the world).
The purpose of establishing philosophical Communities of Inquiry in
classrooms is then to establish flourishing communities engaged in personal
flourishing (not as two distinct things, but two dimensions of the one activity).
This personal flourishing might be seen as establishing our own sense of ourselves
- of who we are - as we reHne or deepen our understanding of, and orientation
toward, 'the good life.' Here, I think Plato was right in thinking that this is the
aim of philosophy (and of course links the life of reason as a search for
knowledge/truth/good to our flourishing).
The question is then, what does Community of Inquiry oHer as education?
Here I think we have to look at what it is to be initiated into philosophy as a form
of life (or orientation toward life). It might be true, as Richard reminds us, that
we don't only think in social frame\vorks, we also think, and do philosophy, on
our own. But if the aim is to establish flourishing communities as an expression
of developing a sense of what it means for ourselves to flourish on our own
then, educationally, philosophy will be carried out in social frameworks. This
is where I think David Wong's notion of effective agency and effective identity is very
interesting and helpful - and where Wittgenstein's philosophical style needs
to be challenged as Community of Inquiry. The question for me is not
whether Wittgenstein dominated the talk in his classroom, but whether he was
interested in developing the effective agency of his students such that they
came to see themselves as philosophers in the sense outlined above... On this
point I read Plato differently than Richard vis-a-vis what Socrates' dialogues
exemplify. Unlike Wittgenstein, I think the dialogues really do reflect a
Community of Inquiry at work - while Socrates dominates the talk, he
genuinely seeks to establish a non-contradictory and collaborative relation-
ship between hirnself and his conversational partner. That is, I see hirn willing
to play the role of David's group leader. Of course, that doesn't mean he is
always successful!
On this point, Hrannar and Richard's question "But what is the diHerence
between sharing ideas and using others to stimulate one's own ideas?" comes
down to a difference between Sophistry and Dialectic: if participants are using
other's ideas only to promote their own thinking, then I would say there is no
12 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISClPLINES

Community of Inquiry. If participants are using one another's thinking to

stimulate their own thinking as they engage in a collaborate search for truth,
then I'd say we have a clear case of Community of Inquiry. Perhaps the
difference between professional (in the sense of seasoned) thinkers and begin-
ners comes in between these two extremes - when there is a will to collabo-
rate, but there is also a pull to use thoughts of others for the promotion of one's
own ideas in the group.
On the issue of care and power, again (Plato's) Socrates is useful- as I see
it, for Socrates, care is expressed toward the other because one cares about the
unity of the whole (the flourishing of logos within the community). It is not
care toward the other qua 'being human'. This doesn't have to reduce care to
an instrumental concern, but it stops care being based purelyon the personal.
It introduces a duty of care to the flourishing of the community. As such, care
towards the power relationships in the group are essential for its unity and its
flourishing. Did Wittgenstein display this in his 'dialogues' with students?
This also distinguishes between Communities of Inquiry as the communi-
ty of discourse (as Heidegger, Lipman and Rorty are part of ours) and the
classroom Community of Inquiry as a community of practice (co-practitio-
ners?). Wittgenstein may have been in a Community of Inquiry in the first
sense (as Mark says, with the many thinkers whose ideas he pondered) but not
in the second. As an educational ideal, the Community of Inquiry has avision
of flourishing that it wants students to become effective practitioners - and I
would go one step further (though too far for sonle, I fear) and say it captures
an orientation toward life that we want to become part of the students'
effective identity (the sort of person they see themselves to competently be).
All this goes far beyond the hermeneutic activity (engaged perspectives or
'horizons') of a Community of Inquiry a.nd the notion of Community of
Inquiry as those whose ideas and perspectives we engage with.
Perhaps it would be useful to think about the Community of Inquiry not
in terms of a "What is Xi' question, but rather, in terms of (i) what it takes to
be an effective member of one; (ii) the duties being a member of a Community
of Inquiry requires of participants; (iii) and the kind of orientation toward life
such a community seeks to engender?

DK: I never did hear a response to Steve William's question, "at what
point does a discussion cease to be a Community of Inquiry?"
'If one adopts a model of chaotic, emergent system for the structure and
dynamics of the argument, it would be difficult to consider any topic irrelevant
(viz. that butterfly in Beijing). And I suppose the dimension of the inquiry could
shift as weIl - from cognitive to affective to practical, and various combina-
tions. So what are the criteria for saying, "this is indeed Community of Inquiry
now going on," or not?
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 13

SW: My question of the Community of Inquiry was about what the core
of it iso Of course, there are a range of learning sequences that can be
appropriate to different contexts. I wonder how important it is for a Commu-
nity of Inquiry that the initial questions come from the group and not the
group leader?

BH: David claimed that something else might happen to Wittgenstein's

and Socrates' thought if they did philosophy dialogically. Mark rightly said
that novels, workshops and classroom all model a different form of Communi-
ty of Inquiry. I agree.
What David is stating is that philosophy, especially philosophers, will
change their views once they engage in Community of Inquiry. I doubt if
Wittgenstein was not very seriously exchanging thoughts with some others.
The trouble is that it is impossible to evaluate his thought given this approach,
because we will be part of the mass of interpreters of Wittgenstein; Kripke
(Meaning and Necessity) gave an interpretation that according to me asserts the
need of a community as a precondition for meaning at all. Others have argued
against this view.
I doubt very much that any new philosophy will emerge from doing
Community of Inquiry, apart from theories about the value of doing philoso-
phy in Communities of Inquiry in society. Such theories already exist (Lip-
man). That language itself is changing because of Community of Inquiry, this
is what I seriously doubt. I do not see why so.

TS: Well, didn't I start a big discussion with my anecdote about Wittgen-
stein's 'lectures'! I posted it off just before two weeks of holiday, and came back
to find heaps of messages about Ludwig and the Community of Inquiry. Now
I am able to take into account in this reply the views of a lot of people.
My feeling is that the discussion has taken too much for granted the idea
of Community of Inquiry within the Philosophy for Children tradition. I'm
not sure why that is, given Berrie's early contribution when he said "I do not
see any general Community of Inquiry, but different settings that need differ-
ent nlethods" and proceeded to sketch in versions for adults (which he labelled
'socratic dialogue'), and for schools. In this, he explicitly mentions Wittgen-
stein's position as leader, commenting that the attendees at his lectures "agreed
to let [Wittgenstein] lead the discussion (even better, that was their motiva-
tion to join)./I
So, is Berrie right that Wittgenstein's lectures can be taken as a variety of
Community of Inquiry (as was my original assertion when I sent the quoteto
David)? What are the possible varieties of Communities of Inquiry, and what
14 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKINC ACROSS THE DISClPLlNES

(to paraphrase Steve's later question) marks them off from similar entities that
are not Communities of Inquiry?
Hannu had something interesting to say about this: "I think that we can
have the descriptions of the ideal communities of inquiry as regulative ideas -
depending on the settings. And in those settings still many variations." He
goes on to instance not only Wittgenstein and the classroom, but also Peirce's
Community of Inquiry amongst scientists. This raises two thoughts I my
mind. Firstly, the phrase 'community of inquiry' was, if perhaps not original to
Peirce, certainly famously associated with Peirce and consciously taken from
hirn by Lipman. This suggests that its use in classroom settings is at least a
modification of Peirce's use, and the classroom Comnlunity of Inquiry cannot
be used as a paradigm against which to measure others. Secondly, Hannu's
reference to regulative ideals brings to mind Jürgen Habermas' Ideal Speech
Situation.
To deal with the first point first: I don't think that we can take the
classroom Community of Inquiry as the paradigmatic Community of Inquiry
(Mark raises this question too). It is, I think, a distorted Community of Inquiry
(distorted for good reasons, as 1 will attempt to explain later). This leads
directly to Habermas.
If there is a regulative ideal that defines the Community of Inquiry, 1 feel
that Habermas is close to having it in his ISS. For the benefit of list readers
who are not familiar with Habermas, 1'11 rapidly sketch in my understanding of
the ISS:
The ISS has four conclitions and (according to Seyla Benhabib) two
substantive ethical assumptions. The conditions are: intelligibility (partici-
pants are using the language correctly), truth (factual claims made are true),
correctness (evaluative claims made are normatively correct) and sincerity
(participants are sincere). The substantive ethical assumptions are universal
moral respect (all can participate) and egalitarian reciprocity (all have an equal
right to speak, ask questions etc). According to Habermas, the ISS doesn't
exist (since e.g. there are no perfect language users, no one has' knowledge of
all facts, access to all should include across all time), but is anticipated in all
communication. Perhaps we can say that the paradigmatic Community of
Inquiry is founcl in the ISS, and it is equally counterfactual.
In the light of this, we can judge any putative Community of Inquiry as to
the ways in which it is distorted from the ISS. Some distortions are inevitable
in real life communities, but in order to count as a Community of Inquiry, it
seems that the distortions should have three characteristics: they ought to be
not too great, they should be transparent (open to all participants and poten-
tially addressable), and they should be justifiable.
Habermas recognises that the four conclitions are often not met, and uses
the term 'discourse' to refer to dialogue that attempts to substantiate (or
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 15

redeem) disputed claims. He concentrates on theoretical discourse (attempts

to substantiate factual claims) and practical discourse (attempts to redeem
normative claims), though no doubt similar discourses can deal with disputes
about intelligibility and sincerity. A Community of Inquiry can thus differ
from the ISS on these four conditions provided the mechanisms for attempting
to reach agreement (which may include agreement to disagree) are in place.
Equally, it may for pragmatic reasons (e.g. lack of time or space, the needs of
following a line o·f argument) vary from the ethical assumptions.
David at one point does try to characterise what is distinctive about a
Community of Inquiry in two terms: dialogue (distributed thinking) and
dialectic (merging of horizons) - an attempt I like but will not directly discuss.
In relation to the first, however, he draws attention to the problem of power
(specifically, Wittgenstein's power). He is right to do so - for the exercise of
unequal power distorts the ISS and violates the egalitarian reciprocity assump-
tion and possibly the sincerity condition. But he goes on to say "the great
leader in this case is the one who serves, who consciously and skilfully
empowers others, even at the cost of 'sacrificing' his or her gift so that it can
be developed, appropriated, expressed etc by the whole group."
Surely such aleader is also exercising power and distorting the ISS - in
this I disagree with Hrannar who says we can only have a Community of
Inquiry if the "power relations between the individuals in the group are on an
equal basis." Questions of transparency and sincerity are raised - such aleader
is engaged in 'Socratic irony' - the pretence that they know less than they do.
The question is: is there a sufficient justification for wielding this power in
a classroom Community of Inquiry? My answer is "yes," and David's quote
above explains why (see also len's excellent discussion of care and power).
The classroom Community of Inquiry is being used educatively, to empower
the participants. It might be referred to more accurately as a developing Com-
munity of Inquiry - one which aspires to becoming a Community of Inquiry,
as the participants become more able. I think we fool ourselves if we deny that
the teacher in a classroom Community of Inquiry is in a position of power, or
that they should be. I really like Susan Gardner's article 4 in this regard (though
I have reservations about the sole role of truth in it).
Mark's remark that Wittgenstein may have been engaged in Conlnlunities
of Inquiry both in his lectures (cf the classroom Community of Inquiry) and in
his reading and interaction with other philosophers (cf Peirce's scientific
Community of Inquiry or Oakeshott's 'conversation of humanity') seems to me
correct on both counts. lust how to judge (Steve's question) how far a
discussion can vary from the ISS and still be a Community of Inquiry, though,
is a harder question which I won't address here - I've taken up too much space
already. David and others have attempted something like it.
16 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

CL: With reference to the regulative idea for the Community of Inquiry,
Tim has suggested Habermas' ISS which has the built in ethical constraints of
the Community of Inquiry. Habermas' idea is not new - RS Peters wrote about
a similar set of constraints as being the logical requirements for anyone
engaging in serious dialogue with others (Ethics and Education, Allen &
Unwin 1965) which are, of course, the universal moral principles of freedom,
equality, respect, justice. Taking the ideas of Habermas and Peters would be
a good starting place to explore and explicate the regulative idea of the Community
of Inquiry -and I might get around to doing this sometime this year if others don't.
AS: Tim, I like what you say - the criteria of Habermas are helpful - but
I wish you would give some thought to the concept of inquiry.
Participants in a Community of Inquiry are there for a specific purpose -
to inquire about issues that they feel are important. In other words, there is
work to be done and the people all have to feel involved in the work. And the
work has to seem important to the participants - it has to make a difference -
that is why they are willing to put so much time into it. And this work of
inquiry? What does it entail specifically? I doubt that all dialogue or discourse
is inquiry.

TS: Ann, you are quite right, of course. My email was getting too long
anyway, so I skated over this. Much of what I had to say, as you point out, was
about community. However, I think that Habermas has something to offer
here too, with his concepts of theoretical and practical discourse - those types
of discourse which are entered into when theoretical (does this equal factual?
what about conceptual?) or normative claims are challenged. This is when
communicative action becomes inquiry. Now, I'm not sure that this stands
sufficiently on its own (e.g. see the parenthetic questions above), but I feel that
it can be developed. I don't want to do that here, though.
I might also refer to Susan Gardner's article again. However, I must point
out that Susan is referring to a classroom Community of Inquiry, with its
inherent power imbalance (inherent because it is educational). I wa.nt to claim
that the paradigmatic Community of Inquiry does involve no power imbal-
ance, as in the ISS. In this (counterfactual) ideal, no one participant takes on
the role of ensuring the rigor of the inquiry - that role is equally distributed.
In the classroom Community of Inquiry, the teacher takes on (the bulk of) the
role, albeit with the intention of gradually passing it over (this being the
justification for the power imbalance). If the teacher does not assume this role,
with its inherent power imbalance, then (as you say Ann), the work does not
get done and (as Susan says) we end up with a community but no inquiry.
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 17

HJ: I agree very much with you, Tim, about teacher's role in Community
of Inquiry. It seems to me that many people assume that if we say "teacher has
power" that this is something negative. The meaning of the concept of
"power" is here associated in a certain, onesided way. As a teacher I certainly
have power, but the USE of power is (or should be) PEDAGOGICAL. Actu-
ally, turning to Peirce"s analysis concerning the stages of power would be
helpful, but I don't want to go on in this. The same idea can be found in
Lipman when he says that the role of teacher in a Community of Inquiry
should be "PEDAGOGICALLY strong" (capitalletters are mine because of my
later purposes). Lipman speaks also about teacher's "professional judgement"
which I see having the same root. But can we speak more explicitly about the
concept of PEDAGOGY because it seems to be a key to understanding the use
of power by a teacher in a classroom? This leads also back to Habermas and
his "communicative action" and "strategie action" (ISS belonging to the space
of communicative action). As Tim pointed out ISS could be seen as a
paradigmatic Community of Inquiry with symmetrical relationships between
all the participants. Community of Inquiry in the school context cannot be
reduced to this as argued before (the relationship between the teacher and the
students is asymmetrical). Neither can it be reduced to strategie action
because it implies the use of power as an alienating force (by the way, this
might be the underlying assumption when considering all power as negative).
So there has to be the third kind of action, namely PEDAGOGIC action
constructed from pedagogic relationship between the educator (or parent) and
the child. What are the elements of this relationship? In his book ''The Tact
of Teaching" Max van Manen suggests that they are "love," "hope" and "re-
sponsibility."

BH: I do believe that Hannu is right. Pedagogy is the main issue at stake
in our discussion.
My reaction is like this: Such a Community of Inquiry can only exist if all
are voluntarily participating. This is not the case in the classroom: you have
to go to school. Therefore this ideal Community of Inquiry cannot be even
halfway reached in classrooms. They have learned the right social behaviour,
but almost never are all of those 25 at that specific moment really doing that
what they wish to do at that very moment. They have not made a choice.
Given my experience in an anti-authoritarian school for three years, I
know kids often don't like to make a choice at all. Voluntary participation in
education is not possible. Force to become civilised is necessary - Wittgen-
stein was right that kids need to be trained to learn language (=culture).
To develop criteria for Community of Inquiry in classrooms we need an
analysis of school as a social institution where strategie targets must be
fulfilled. School is a battlefield between strategie learning targets and commu-
nication. The battle is never ended. It seems to me that school is one of those
18 INQUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

institutions halfway between economy and communication. Halfway between

the 'life world' and 'system violence' (to keep Habermas connected to the
discussion). So I argue that Foucault's use of the term paresia is useful in
understanding some elements of the dialogue in classrooms.
Kids have to speak up against the authority of the teacher in some cases.
This is always risky, and it demands paresia. I consider such a criterion
important in analysing what is happening in Communities of Inquiry in
classrooms in ordinary schools. It is not only speaking up against the teacher
in some cases, but also against what is considered the peer opinion in your
class. The power structures and strategie moves are part of what is happening.
So Hannu gives the right direction, we need to talk about pedagogy and the
actual school environment.
In our discussion, we mention thinkers, books, concepts (like I did Fou-
cault's paresia). In explaining the Community of Inquiry to teachers and others,
I always say: you can only bring in things you are willing to defend or explain
yourself. So you cannot bring in IIWittgenstein said that when we ask stupid
questions language is on holiday." Yo,u have to state it as something you think,
so we can ask to you what you mean. I consider this an important strategy for
keeping the Community of Inquiry straight. It is one of the preconditions to
keep progress in dialogue possible.
In this written dialogue we behave differently. So even the channel (Eco's
semiotics: sender, message, receiver, channel, reference) is influencing the
Community of Inquiry a lot. Or is this not a form of Community of Inquiry?
My experience is that even walking in a forest influences dialogue compared
to sitting around a table (you cannot see each other's faces when walking).
Channel: written, spoken
Form: sitting, walking, standing, light or darkness (I once proposed to
continue the Community of Inquiry at the Madrid conference with the light
off, but the group was unwilling to try the experiment)
Institution: voluntarily or obliged
Target: just communication or connected to strategie goals.
Setting: with or without facilitator.
Participants: children or adults (socratic dialogue is only possible with
adults as far as I can see).

WT: Tim's reference to questions of transparency and sincerity, a leader's

use of Socratic irony: In what way(s) is the developing Community of Inquiry
a false or artificial community? In consciously lessening her contribution, is
the teacher (or any participant) being untrue in some way? I am thinking of an
adult community, such as a workshop at Mendham, where the participants
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 19

consciously choose not to put forth their expertise so that the less experienced
members may feel safer. Yes, I think that word, "safe" captures the feeling
tone. Is this being duplicitous or is something else going on here? Perhaps
akin to Aristotle's concept of virtue: habitual activity in accordance with rea-
son ...
The other remark that has me thinking is Berrie's Prison Model of school.
My goodness, is it quite that bad? Yes, while children must attend school and,
in some cases or at least on some days, would rather not be there, the
Community of Inquiry is not constituted by attendance in the room but rather
by one's choice to be engaged in the discussion. One can be a speaker or a
quiet listener, but in any case, the choice to be a merrlber of the Community
of Inquiry is one the child (or adult) must make. Community of Inquiry thus
represents a cognitive and affective stance towards an issue and a group of
people engaged in that issue. Perhaps Community of Inquiry is an ideal and
never attained in its full stature (the ISS model), but to be approximating a
Community of Inquiry or moving towards one it would seem that the criteria
discussed so far include:
• care, an attention to people as people, empathy in acceptance;
• an issue or issues upon which to focus;
• power, in the sense of shared or at least, in the hands of the teacherl
facilitator, used in a benevolent manner to organize towards a
"f1ourishing" of its participants;
• honesty (although I do suggest above that this could be problematic).
What have I missed? I appreciated Hannu's summary and development.
Finally, I agree with Berrie, the references to other's writings can be
helpful if one is fully aware of the philosopher and what he/she has said.
Otherwise they can be unhelpful unless explained. There is the danger that
they will exclude from participation in the Comnlunity of Inquiry members
who know nothing about Habermas, Wong, Wittgensteip, etc. and feel
intimidated or excluded. But, should that matter? Should it be the speaker's
responsibility to explain everything or not reference a previous writer who
they feel sheds light on the issue because someone might not understand the
reference? Maybe the members of a Community of Inquiry have a certain
degree of responsibility to be informed? But to what extent?

DK: Thank you Hannu, for the summary of the Community of Inquiry
discussion so far. Thank you Tim for introducing some new criteria.
I'm still reacting to what I think I heard Berrie say in relation to Wittgen-
stein and an educational Community of Inquiry, i.e. that doing philosophy in
dialogical collaborative groups is not a qualitatively different form of philo-
sophical discourse, and brings no new philosophical information into the
20 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DrSClPLINES

world. So Wittgenstein would have the same thoughts whether he was in

group or not - in fact, a group might slow hirn down.
Perhaps Berrie didn't say this at all, in which case I welcome his clarifica-
tion. Either way, I disagree with it, and feel that it disregards two major
characteristics, still relatively unexplored, of Community of Inquiry: distribu-
tive thinking, and non-linear system.
If we take the notion of distributive thinking seriously, we must think of
the thinking happening IIbetween" a.nd lIamong" us rather than lIin" uso This is
analogous but not equivalent to the sort of internal dialogue which many
thinkers conduct. Every statement - or IIsign" in Peirce's language - changes
the whole situation - the whole sign IIseries" - i.e. the whole structure of the
argument, and also altered in its reception by each individual in the group. So
we are like one brain thinking. To put it all too crudely: a collective brain like
this is bound to have different thoughts from an individual brain. That
individual brain - Wittgenstein's for example - can still be extraordinary, and
have the same kinds of thoughts when alone or reading others; but the
moment it subjects (an interesting choice of term) itself and becomes part of
the one brain of distributive thinking, there's going to be new information of
some kind. Because no matter how brilliant Wittgenstein might be, he can't
take into account all those reactions, and there's bound to be one that will
change his sign in the series.
As for the non-linear systems piece: this collective one brain is an emer-
gent structure or system, which I would wildly hypothesize moves by the same
principles as any chaotic system, generally speaking to a certain extent self-
organizing, with a fairly high level of unpredictability, and propelled forward
into continual transformation by disequilibrium. Here is where Peirce's cate-
gories of the movement of mind become so valuable: in particular interpretive
musement, tychism, abduction and synechism. They describe, it seems to me,
the way the argument-system works in Community of Inquiry.
Both of these characteristics - distributive thinking and non-linear sys-
tems - indicate that there is information available here that will never be
available within the mind of one individual, no matter how brilliant, and that
therefore Community of Inquiry represents a way of doing philosophy that, if
pursued, will result in a novel outcome philosophically, not to mention in
other dimensions of life on the planet.

BH: I think I did not say this. So, I think, I need to react. I argued that
what Wittgenstein did during his lectures was a borderline case of Community
of Inquiry, because as far as we know, Wittgenstein was thinking aloud, raising
questions, falling silent, communicating without a clear goal where to end, he
was researching. He was immensely occupied with a few problems he wanted
to solve. So I think he was very sensitive to reactions of others, although he
AUTUMN 1997. VOL. 17. No. 1 21

was not wel1 behaved and most of the time convinced that nobody understood
his point.
So I do not want to make any kind of distinction between a sole individual
and a group - Wittgenstein was in communication. It is my conviction that his
experiences, his efforts as a teacher immensely influenced his later philosophy.
I think there he discovered the question: How did we learn this word? that so
often pops up in his investigations. Wittgenstein was not a thinker in solitude,
although he withdraw from the world several times in Norway.
His research on the nature of language, how language works in language
games, is a cornerstone in thinking about language. He opened up doors to
see things differently. What I doubt is that Community of Inquiry would
change philosophy in other directions tha.n philosophy has so far developed.
What makes someone a great philosopher: he is influencing many people
because he is presenting new insights.
David is right that each dialogue is effective to the meaning of the words
that are used. But the question is rather: what is the value of this effect against
the existing (conventional) meanings of the language that was used in that
specific dialogue?
Sorry, I feel that I am not able to make the point I have in mind. Here is
an analogy to help me out. A child is not making art because it is not aware
of al1 the things done in art so far. One needs some sort of an overview of the
Held or awareness of it before one can add to it. I guess something like this is
also true for thoughts.
Whatever kids say, a.nd they do say marvel10us things, I do not consider
these as contributions to philosophy. I do consider them as enrichments of
our culture, but that is something else. Is it less valuable? It is not less valuable,
but I have not made up my mi nd what criteria would determine comparing the
two statements (of the philosopher and the child).5
Concerning distributive thinking: It seems to me that doing Community
of Inquiry makes one aware of the language games and gets people out of the
Augustinian picture of language (wh ich is the real prison).

DK: I am moved by Berrie's reply, which sets me back and makes me

think.
We could be talking about two different things here, at least: adults doing
philosophical Community of Inquiry, or children doing philosophical Com-
munity of Inquiry. If we're talking about adults, Berrie, would you stil1 say we
cannot make philosophy, in the sense of new information, new insight arising,
as were Wittgenstein's, in Community of Inquiry? Nor have I given up the
question: Would Wittgenstein's insights have been different if they had emerged
(if that's possible) from Community of Inquiry?
22 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISClPLlNES

BH: In the discussion of Community of Inquiry and Wittgenstein several

people have referred to Habermas' Ideal Speech Situation Model. This sur-
prised me, because I did not see the relation to education, so I looked it up.
Habermas' Ideal Speech Situation (ISS) model. Habermas states that in
such a situation:
(a) all participants have equal chance to draw back from communicative
acting and start a discourse in which the consistency of truth claims can be
tested by argumentative means.
(b) all participants within the discourse have an equal chance to express
opinions, criticize, propose alternatives, so that no prejudiced opinions can be
protected from being thematized and all alternative opinions can be elaborated.
These two preconditions are dependent of two other preconditions:
(c) no differences in power exist between participants that hinder certain
opinions from being expressed or criticized.
(d) all participants to the discourse express themselves truly, so that they
do not manipulate each other.
According to me the precondition (c) will never be fulfilled in classrooms.
There do exist differences in power between teachers and pupils that cannot
be ignored. Therefore the ISS model is not an ideal for schools and it seems
to that it is better not to have this as the ideal horizon, because that is a denial
of the actual situation. What we need is a pedagogical horizon to strive for,
given the well-known limitations of school environments.

TS: Berrie, it was I who first introduced the ISS. The point about the ISS,
as I see it, is that Habermas says that the ISS is counterfactual not just for
children in classrooms, but for everyone. It is impossible to meet all the
conditions in any real life situation. Nevertheless, he argues that such a
concept underlies all communicative action, including (I assert) a classroom
Community of Inquiry.6
In P4C, we are wielding power as teachers. What gives us the right to do
that? Because we are aiming to educate. We are holding unequal discussions
in our classroom, with a hidden aim (manipulative - breaking also Berrie's
condition (d)), but we are doing it in order to equip children to come closer (as
close as possible) to being able to participate in an ISS. So the ISS is a guiding
or regulating ideal for the Community of Inquiry. I further argue that we can
deHne that troublesome word 'autonomy' along similar lines - that autonomy
is what is built in participating in a Community of Inquiry - the approach
towards being independently (i.e. free of a teacher's cues and prompts) able to
participate in an ISS, and hence autonomy is also a counterfactual regulating
ideal.
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 23

RA: I must remind you all of a discussion we had two years ago? where we
compared this discussionlist with the principles of Community of Inquiry
without going too much into the criteria for discussion. Someone (I think it
was Stella from Argentina) even launched the term ECOI (electronic Commu-
nity of Inquiry). Later in the discussion we compared the ECOI with system
theory and the principles of entropy (second law of thermodynamics).
Secondly I did send a questionnaire to all of you last year in May. The
results were incorporated in a paper called "philosophical Inquiry and the
Internet" I wrote for the SOFIA conference in Glasgow last year. In this paper
I compared the Internet discussion type with the discussion clubs and corre-
spondence clubs which were organised by the Royal Society and l'Academie
des Sciences in the 17th and 18th century, which gave an enormous boost to
the modernist development of our society. Most of the scientists (and philos-
ophers were considered to be scientists as well) like Locke, Leibniz, Descartes,
Hobbes, Berkeley, Diderot and many, many others conducted very impressive
discussions by snail mail a.nd participated in numerous discussions in various
countries (also in Scotland, Holland, Poland, Russia and so on).
The question is: was this also a community of inquiry. I tend to say yes.
You could speak of a community (a very international one) and you must
definitely agree with the fact that there was inquiry. There was cross fertili-
sation of ideas. There were (at least in the discussion clubs) mIes of speech.
My point is that Internet can and certainly does fulfil the same role as in those
days. But probably we will see the results many many years from now.

Hl: Berrie says "no" to ISS because, according to hirn, it denies the actual
situation in classrooms. Tim also says that ISS is impossible to reach in reallife
situations, but still argues on behalf of it as a regulative ideal underlying and
guiding the interaction also in classroom Communities of Inquiry.
I am inclined to say "no" to the Habermas idea. Somehow it seems too
narrow a concept applied in the pedagogical context in which we always have
a teacher and students. As has been said many times before, the teacher's
power is an essential part of the pedagogical relation. Without his / her power
we are not any more speaking about pedagogy (critique, please!).
Could we say that ISS is what teacher is striving towards in his / her group,
between the children, but the teacher is not included? Habermas' original idea
seems to disagree with this.
My second point - against "yes" - is that in Habermas' theory (when
applied in education) I see too strong an emphasis on argumentation. It is like
a quest for consensus, with every member of the group expected to accept the
best argument. Even though reasoning - inquiring into the given reasons - is
one of the basic elements in (western) philosophy and also in doing philoso-
phy in Community of Inquiry with children, I doubt that what we want in a
24 INQUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPUNES

pedagogical Community of Inquiry is just the one and right reasoned answer.
Does this sound like relativistic thinking? Can somebody help in this?

TS: I agree absolutely with Hannu's claim that the teacher's power is an
essential part of the pedagogical relation. However, I don't agree that this
makes Habermas too narrow (but see below) - we are talking about an ideal
end point here, not a description of what a classroom can be like. Something
must justify the teacher's use of power in pedagogy (in too many classrooms,
the power becomes an end in itself). To put it another way, in Habermas'
terms, the teacher is taking part in strategic (instrumental) action, but with the
aim of equipping the children for participation in communicative action,
including theoretical and practical discourse (through practice in something
that approaches, where possible, communicative action). This redeems the
manipulative nature of pedagogy.
To put your point slightly differently, Hannu: what the teacher is striving
towards is equipping the children to take part in (something approaching) ISS
beyond the classroom - and even in the classroom when the community
becomes 'mature' enough, as in when the teacher ca.n either (a) withdraw and
leave the children to it (as Hannu says above) or even better (b) relinquish the
role of teacher and become just one of the participants in the Community of
Inquiry.
Hannu, I agree again with your second point. I too think that Habermas'
account is too consensus driven, takes too much for granted that rational
agreement is possible in all areas. Seyla Benhabib, in her book Situating the Self
makes similar criticisms. Nevertheless, I feel that a modified version of
Habermas' account ca.n be used as the basis of an account of what a Commu-
nity of Inquiry aspires to, and from this particular instantiations of Communi-
ties of Inquiry (such as in the classroom, or Peirce's scientific Community of
Inquiry, or Wittgenstein's lectures) can be critiqued.

DK: Per a few requests for clarification, here is some information on the
four Peircean terms I flung into cyberspace in arecent post, with a bonus fifth
added:
Abduction: Taking a creative leap beyond the example or case towards a
new relational category. The "logic of relations": "The ordinary logic has a
great deal to say about genera and species, or in our nineteenth century
dialect, about classes. Now, a class is a set of objects comprising all that stand
to one another in a particular relation of similarity. But where ordinary logic
talks of classes, the logic of relations talks of systems. A system is a set of
objects comprising all that stand to one another in a group of connected
relations. Induction according to ordinary logic rises from the contemplation
of a sampIe of a class to that of the whole class; but according to the logic of
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 25

relatives, it rises from the contemplation of the fragment of a system to the

envisagement of a complete system." (CP 4.5)
Interpretive Musement: A form of abductive reasoning involving observation,
imaginative manipulation of observed facts, and the formulation of explanato-
ry hypotheses. Cognitive play, proliferation of ideas and connections be-
tween ideas. Connected with SchiIler's Spieltraub. The method by which we let
go of more predictable abductions and hypotheses, so we can enter into a
deeper rhythm of semiosis. IIIt is the resemblance between the observed
configuration of facts and the pattern of expectations generated by a given
belief or system of beliefs that is the source of abductive insight. When, in
some instances, this resemblance is not readily apparent, it becomes necessary
IIplayfuIly" to manipulate or rearrange the observed data; at the same time, the
various implications of hypotheses must be alternatively suppressed and em-
phasized in order to test their explanatory power. Musement greatly accentu-
ates this playful aspect of abduction; indeed, it is playful enough to allow
latent belief habit to exert its creative influence."
Synechism: The tendency to see continuity within and among the orders of
the world. The tendency of ideas to spread and form connective bridges. The
impulse, both cognitive and affective (he does not strictly separate them)
towards connectedness and relation. The logic of continuity. The IIl aw of
mind" is synechistic, in that no item within the mi nd obtains in isolation from
other items. This is true in a distributive (communal) as weIl as an individual
sense.
Tychism: Chance (tyche) exists not only in the interstices between and
among events, but in the continually active forms of cosmogenesis. Chance as
the power for diversification, novel emergence. The variety of the universe,
which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable. The power of spontaneity, the
"room" for creative variation. Chance has a metaphysical and cosmological
priority over law in the universe. Chaotic emergence of the novel, continual
reorganization as a result. The chance that begets order. Variety and diversity
cannot be explained in terms of uniformity, but uniformity can be explained in
terms of variety and diversity. The universe is evolving from chaos to order.
Chance as a catalyst involved in the production of higher levels of uniformity.
Agapism: The tendency towards unity of mind(s) under the guiding thread
of purpose. Love as the true goad for mental growth. IICreative love" as the
principal if not the only role in evolution. The movement of love is circular,
as one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and
drawing them into harmony.
If this doesn't make sense, don't blame Peirce (not until you've read hirn
anyway), blame me. Also, don't quote me, because I have taken language from
Peirce hirnself, from Robert Corrington's An Introduction to C.S. Peirce, from
Michael Raposa's Peirce's Philosophy o} Religion, and fram (?)'s Tychism and Evolution.
16 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THfNKING ACROSS THE DfSClPLINES

I offer them (as before) as categories of experience of Community of

Inquiry. One place a phenomenology of Community of Inquiry could start.

SW: I think Tim is right to talk of Habermas' ideal speech 'situation as just
that - an ideal. Perhaps the way Susan Gardner uses "truth" in her article
Inquiry is no mere conversation is also an ideal. lust as there are competing values
in society, so there are competing ideals. lust because we value open inquiry,
it doesn't mean we should reject, for example, our ideal to be a responsible
teacher and lead a group of children.
Perhaps we can accept that there should be no overriding ideals. 8 Then
we don't have to reject useful ideals when they don't match up to a given
situation.
On the Wittgenstein discussion - presumably, his lectures were the end
product of an inquiry through reading people's books and speaking to others.
Could his lectures be seen as a one of his lengthy responses to this dialogue/
inquiry not in real time but in what Mikhail Bakhtin called "great time"?

AS: I think we need to remember that argumentation is only one way of

doing philosophy - (I might add a very traditional way and very male way) .....but
there are other models - take for example Plato's dialogues, or Montaigne's
essays or Nietzsche's and Wittgenstein's style.
In my view, philosophical thought owes more to Iwho we are' than
sometimes argued. Our conscious thinking rests on a vast mental life, a deep
core personality always hidden in the mist from our conscious point of view.
We can grasp and analyse the stuff of argumentation, the non-dialogical sort
of reasoning in most philosophical texts, with our powers of reason, within our
conscious thinking. This is the force and weakness of reason: reason always
rests on firm, common ground. But this is not where great new ideascome
from, capable of shaking the house of reason.
Peirce undoubtedly had tremendous powers of reasoning, but I believe
part of his greatness lay in his ability to come up with new fundamental ideas,
feel their potential and keep pursuing those of promise to hirn. Argumentation
is one style of doing philosophy - but only one - there are many others.

Afterword: thoughts on Community of Inquiry

Were Wittgensteinls lectures an example of a Community of Inquiry or
not? This email discussion, unsurprisingly, has not come up with a definitive
answer, but I am still inclined to think that they were. Was the email
discussion itself a Community of Inquiry? That question was hardly ad-
dressed, but again I would agree that it was. It has some special features
AUTUMN 1997, VOL. 17, No. 1 27

compared to a classroom Community of Inquiry, notably in that, since all

comments were written, there is much greater opportunity for detailed critique
and linking of previous comments.
This discussion has, like most, raised far more issues than it has resolved.
My feeling after editing it is that some of the complexity of the question is now
more evident. In particular, there are at least two broad senses in which the
phrase 'Community of Inquiry' can be used (though I note that I counted
eleven different exemplars in the discussion), and that the two senses probably
need somewhat different analyses. Only then can we explore what allows us
to use the same term for both of them.
The first (though not historically) sense is what we might call the Lip-
manesque Community of Inquiry. This is the meaning that is best known to
practitioners of Philosophy for Children, and we are tempted to forget that
there are other possible mea.nings. Such a community is paradignlatically
constituted in a classroom and facilitated by a teacher.
The prior use of the phrase, of course, was by C. S. Peirce to refer to the
world-wide community of scientists, often working in geographical and, to
some extent, temporal isolation, but able to communicate through books,
papers, correspondence, conferences and so on. Such Communities of Inquiry
are not face-to-face and do not, in theory at least, have a powerful facilitator
to guide them. Yet each participant has their own agenda; the sense in which
they are cooperating in the search for knowledge may be weak and the extent
to which they are committed to each other even weaker.
Wittgenstein's lectures probably sit somewhere in between the two -
although this assurnes that the two are end-points on a unidimensional spec-
trum, an assumption that probably needs to be examined more thoroughly.
The lectures were educational in character and Wittgenstein took the role of
the leader, presumably with the intention of improving the philosophical
competence of those attending. These appear to be Lipmanesque character-
istics. Yet, on Malcolm's account, they were also sites of research in progress
- seemingly more a Peircean characteristic (though this might be disputed by
those, like Gareth Matthews, who claim that children create new philosoph-
ical positions in at least some discussions). It is clear to me, however, that
these Wittgenstein lectures were much closer to either type of Community of
Inquiry than most philosophy lectures are. To have been a student at them
would no doubt have been a renlarkable experience.
One thing that seems to be clear to me after participating in this particular
Comnlunity of Inquiry is that there is a lot more work to be done on the
concept. In my judgement, some of the most important issues raised and
addressed, but certainly not yet answered include:
• the characterizations of what we might call different core types of
Community of Inquiry;
28 INOUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES

• the relationships (both of tension and of synergy) between these

various types;
• the possibility and nature of ideal Communities of Inquiry (or ideals
within them), and their regulative roles in real communities;
• what separates a Community of Inquiry (of whatever type) from similar
entities that do not deserve that name;
• the issue of legitimate and illegitimate wielding of power andlor
feigned ignorance within the Lipnlanesque Community of Inquiry, and its
relationship to pedagogic issues, especially care for, and commitment towards,
the students;
• the possibility that the Community of Inquiry (should this read: "a more
Lipmanesque Community of Inquiry"?) is a new way of doing philosophy, that
would, if adopted by professional philosophers, lead to new philosophical
insights.
No doubt the other articles in this special edition of Inquiry will make a
start on dealing with these and other important issues to do with the theory of
the Community of Inquiry. As such, they will contribute further to the world-
wide Peircean Community of Inquiry of which this email discussion was also
an important part.

Endnotes
1 The full text of the discussion can be retrieved from the list-server. Send an email message
to <majordomo@belnet.be> containing the word 'help' for further instructions on
how to do this.
2 Quoted by George Pitcher in "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein," Prentice-Hall, 1968, p

8. Later in his introductory chapter (p 14), Pitcher notes the similarities between
Wittgenstein and Socrates, saying (amongst many other things): 'Both carried on
their philosophical teaching by discussion, rather than lecturing. Both thought that
philosophical knowledge could not be simply transferred from the mind of the
teacher to that of the student - rather, in the dialectical procedure of questions and
answers, the student must come to see the truth for hirnself. The student was
encouraged by both to think for hirnself: /11 should not like my writing to spare other
people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of
his own." (Philosophical Investigations, Preface, p. x).'
3 In MidWest Studies in Philosophy, XIII (1988).

4 Susan Gardner (1995) Inquiry is no mere conversation, Critical &Creative Thinking 3 (2),38-

49.
5 These comments led to a discussion about children, art and philosophy, which is not

reproduced here.
6 A good book on the relation of Habermas to education is: Young, R.E. (1990) A critical

theory of education: Habermas and our children's future. New York: Teachers College Press.
7 This discussion can be retrieved from the p4c-list archives at <majordomo@belnet.be>.

See note 1.
B This remark led to a discussion on ideals - personal and societal - which is not reproduced here.