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The Future of India-Pakistan Relations:
The Declining Role of Mediation Between
These Rival States
KISHALA SRIVASTAVA
1. INTRODUCTION
VI. CONCLUSION
Juris Doctor Candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class
of 2019; B.A Political Science and B.A. Business Administration, University of Florida.
221
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
I. INTRODUCTION
'See Asad Hashim, Timeline: India-Pakistan Relations, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.alj azeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/06/201161
5113058224115.html (providing a chronological timeline of significant events in the
history of Indo-Pakistani relations, starting with the partition of British India into India and
Pakistan, and ending with formal talks in 2014 between the states' respective leaders
discussing future bilateral relations).
2 See AMIT DHOLAKIA, THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN RESOLVING INDIA-PAKISTAN
CONFLICT: PARAMETERS AND POSSIBILITIES 53 (2005). See generally India Rejects China's
Mediation Offer on Kashmir, AL JAZEERA (July 13, 2017),
http://www.alj azeera.com/news/2017/07/india-rejects-china-mediation-offer-kashmir-
170713205330786.html.
222
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
weapons, water disputes, and the territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.
Part II will end with a brief summary of present-day relations between the two
states.
Part III will detail past third-party mediation efforts, both successful
and unsuccessful, by the United Nations, United States, and China. Part IV
will provide context for past successful mediation efforts relating to border
disputes, highlight reasons for the successful results, and explain why these
results may not particularly apply to Indo-Pakistani relations. Part V will
demonstrate why mediation techniques will not be successful in the future in
alleviating the tension between India and Pakistan. Finally, Part VI will
succinctly conclude the paper.
223
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
Since the partition into India and Pakistan, both states have exhibited
actions that can be loosely described as "jingoism" towards each other, but not
on individual levels to the rest of the international community. Jingoism is
defined as "extreme patriotism, especially in the form of aggressive or warlike
foreign policy."12 This form of severe nationalism is rooted in religious
a See William Dalryple, The Great Divide, THE NEW YORKER (June 29, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-dalrymple.
See generally Alex Von Tunzelmann, Who Is to Blame for the Partition?Above All,
Imperial Britain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/opinion/india-pakistan-partition-imperial-
britain.html (drawing a parallel to how the British Empire ran India to how they hastily
transferred power without thinking of the ramifications).
9
See The Partitionof India: The Unruly End ofEmpire, ECONOMIST (July 19, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/9507188 ("The decision to divide India on religious lines
was taken with regret but little foreboding and carried out with outrageous haste and
unconcern by the British government and its viceroy in India, Lord Mountbatten.").
10 See id.
" Jeffirey Weiss, India and Pakistan- A CautionaryTale for Israel and Palestine, 18
CONN. J. INT'L L. 455,459 (2003).
2 Jingoism, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
224
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
'3 Manjeet S. Pardesi & Sumit Ganguly, The Rise of India and the India-Pakistan
Conflict, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 131, 135 (2007) (at the time of the partition, the
state of Jammu and Kashmir was geographically in India, but had a majority Muslim
population, with a significant number of Hindus and Buddhists living there).
14 See Religious Intolerance in India, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/opinion/religious-intolerance-in-
india.html?mtrref=www.google.com&assetType=opinion.
'sId
16See generally id
" See generally India: Unchecked Attacks on Religious Minorities, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 18, 2018), httpsi/www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/india-unchecked-attacks-
religious-minorities.
I SId
19 Aritry Das, BJPLawmakers Continue TargetingIndia'sReligious Minorities,ASIA
TIMES (February 8, 2018, 3:43 PM), http://www.atimes.com/article/bip-lawmakers-
continue-targeting-indias-religious-minorities/ (Member of Parliament Vinay Katiayr
stated, "Why do the Muslim need to stay in this country when a partition was created based
on [the religions of the] population? They were given a separate piece of land. So they
should go to Pakistan or Bangladesh; what purpose do they have here?").
* See generally Mohammed Hanif, Pakistan, Land of Intolerant,N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/pakistan-muslims-
ahmadis.html.
225
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [V ol. 34:1 2019\
Since the partition in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in three
official wars before the development of nuclear weapons by both sides and
skirmishes after the development and testing of nuclear weapons by both
states.24 The first war between the states was fought in 1947, when lashkars
(armed tribesmen) from Pakistan entered Jammu and Kashmir, which was
largely independent at that time as it neither acceded to Pakistan nor India. The
Maharaja (ruler) of Jammu and Kashmir asked the Indian government for
military assistance in exchange for agreeing to officially accede to India.2 The
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is hotly disputed, as there are claims
that the Maharaja acceded under military pressure by India and the inhabitants
of Jammu and Kashmir, who are majority Muslim, were not treated fairly as
26
they were placed under the control ofthe Indian government. This war ended
in 1949, when the United Nations intervened and arranged for a ceasefire,
establishing a ceasefire line." This will be elaborated upon further in Part II.C.
The second war between the states erupted in 1965, which resulted in
a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations (UN). 28 Although this was initiated
by a border control clash, it resulted in thousands of Pakistani soldiers crossing
21 Id
226
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
2 Id
30
Id
31 India-Pakistan Background UNITED NATIONS,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombackgr.html.
32 Khan, supra note 25, at 497 (citing RICHARD SISSION & LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND
SECESSION: PAKISTAN, INDIA AND THE CREATION OF BANGLADESH (1990)).
33 Id
' Hashim, supra note 1 ("The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of
December 17, 1971, as being the new 'Line-of-Control (LoC)' between the two countries,
which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally, and which 'shall be respected by both
sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side.'").
" Khan, supra note 25, at 523-24.
36
Id at 525-26.
3 See generally Adam Packer, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 38 COLUM. J.
227
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:120191
Indian side of the Line of Control." This conflict ended when the United States
conducted a diplomatic, not military, intervention and pressured Pakistan to
41
remove its troops from Indian territory along the Line of Control.
Since the Kargil War in 1999, there have been a substantial amount of
skirmishes, but none that amount to a full-scale, or even limited, war.42 One of
the more notable events that took place to truly upset Indo-Pakistani relations
was the 2008 attack on Mumbai, where armed militants opened fire on
civilians at many prominent locations in the city, even holding civilians
hostage for three days in a hotel.4 3 It is not officially known whether the
gunmen acted upon orders by the Pakistani government." Although the
Pakistani government vehemently denied any involvement by Pakistani
intelligence agencies, the government admitted to the possibility of the attacks
being planned in Pakistan, as one of the attackers was allegedly part of
Lashkar-e-Taiba, a well-known terrorist group originating in Pakistan. 45 Since
then, tensions have not risen to an alarming level; it should be noted that
nuclear war in the South Asia geopolitical region seems less likely as a result
of the concept of mutually assured destruction. Mutually assured destruction,
a doctrine that came out of the Cold War Era, states that under reciprocal
deterrence, either side has the capability to strike back in response to a nuclear
attack."
C. Water Dispute
' Sheila Rajan, The Prospect of Third-Party Mediation of the Kashmir Dispute: Is
" Keith Norman, MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction, 58 ALA. LAW. 8 (1997).
4
Dr. Waseem Ahmad Quresh, The Indus Water Treaty and the Role of World Bank
as the Mediator, 24 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 211, 212-215 (2017)
(explaining that the Indus Water Treaty was enacted as a result of the struggle over fresh
water in that region; each state was granted control over three rivers; however, the conflict
is rooted in the use of Pakistan's river water as the river first flows through India).
228
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
and helped both states ratify the treaty in 1960.4 The World Bank was
especially effective in foreshadowing potential conflicts that could occur after
the treaty had been ratified. The treaty stipulates that each state may use waters
from the other state's respective rivers in four ways: agriculture, domestic use,
hydroelectricity, and nonconsumptive use. 49 The World Bank demonstrated
effective mediation by a third party by brokering a relatively fair agreement
while also establishing its continued role in the water dispute."
Recently, both parties have appealed to the World Bank to resolve a
dispute. Pakistan alleges that India's construction of hydroelectric plants on
Pakistan's rivers is hindering Pakistan's ability to provide adequate
irrigation.5 1 However, both states rejected a mediation offer, as advised by
World Bank, because they want different means of dispute resolution.52
Pakistan seeks reconciliation through the Court of Arbitration, while India
seeks the appointment of a neutral third party. 53
The World Bank's mediation of Indo-Pakistani tension over water
disputes has been viewed as largely successful. However, it is unlikely that
these types of mediation techniques will prove to be effective when tackling
larger issues, such as the de-escalation of nuclear tension and the border
dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.
8 Id at 216.
49
1d at 217.
50 Id at 218-219. The World Bank is responsible for appointing a neutral party for
conflict resolution, managing a trust fund to compensate the neutral party, and establishing
a Court of Arbitration. Id
5' Id at 223-224. The construction of the hydroelectric plants are disturbing the
natural flow of the rivers and hence hindering the irrigation system. Id Additionally,
Pakistan is worried that India's obstruction of the flow of water could serve as a pressure
point for Pakistan in times of war and conflict. Id
5
2 Id at 224.
5 Id
54 Anthony Wanis St. John, The MediatingRole in the Kashmir DisputeBetween India.
and Pakistan, 21-SPG FLETcHER F. WORLD. AFF. 173,174 (1997).
229
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
important to look at the history of the region since the partition of British India
into India and Pakistan.
The state of Kashmir is located in the Northern Himalayan mountain
range and is adjacent to both India and Pakistan. 55 In 1947, after the British
formally partitioned British India into the two states, the Kashmiri population
was over seventy percent Muslim, but it was ruled by a Maharaja Hari Singh,
a Hindu ruler.5 6 At the time of independence, Maharaja Singh was dedicated
to securing autonomy for Kashmir.57 However, when a group of Muslim
tribesmen invaded Kashmir in October 1947 and Maharaja Singh was
unprepared to defeat them, he requested India's military aid. 58 In return for
providing troops and military support, India requested that Maharaja Singh
formally accede Kashmir to India.59
Following this accession of Kashmir to India, both India and Pakistan
continued to fight over the region, resulting in a stalemate after Pakistan sent
troops into India and India launched a counterattack.W This led to the UN
intervening and brokering a ceasefire in 1949; the lines drawn split Kashmir
into Azad Kashmir, which came under Pakistani control; and the Kashmir
Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh, which remained under Indian control.6 1 China
currently owns a portion of Kashmir as well."
In 1965, the two states once again clashed over control over Kashmir,
this conflict erupted when Indian forces invaded West Pakistan after Pakistan
launched "Operation Grand Slam," in which they intended to attack a bridge
that linked a vital city in Kashmir to India. 63 Following weeks of fighting, the
UN proposed a ceasefire; however, this proved ineffective as both sides
continued to violate the ceasefire." At the time, both the United States and the
5 Id
56 Id at 174-175; LESLEY TERRIS, MEDIATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFuCrS: A
RATIONAL MODEL 139 (2017).
57
TERRIS, supra note 56, at 139.
s8 Id at 139-40 (explaining that the group of tribesmen invaded Kashmir after the
Maharaja's government quashed a rebellion by the Muslim majority in September 1947.)
After the Mahajara requested aid from India, the Indian government sent troops, military
equipment, and supplies to Kashmir. Id
9
Id at 140.
* Id
61
Id; Ather Zia, ErasingKashmir'sAutonomous Status, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 14, 2017),
http-//www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/erasing-kashmir-autonomous-status-
170813093425950.html.
62
Katie Hunt, India and Pakistan'sKashmir Dispute: What You Need to Know, CNN
(Sept. 27, 2017), https:J/www.cnn.com/2016/09/30/asia/kashmir-explainer/index.html
(explaining that China currently owns a portion of Kashmir called "Aksai Chin").
63
TERRS, supra note 56, at 153.
6 Id
230
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
65
1Id at 156 (explaining that the United States ultimately was not
the ideal candidate
for mediating this dispute. The United States was preoccupied with its involvement in
Vietnam at the time. Additionally, the United States was not perceived to be a neutral
mediator by India because it had previously supported Pakistan by supplying weapons and
support).
* United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated Mar. 24, 1966 from the Permanent
Representative of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/7221 (Mar. 25, 1966). The letter details the Tashkent Declaration, under which the Prime
Minister of India and President of Pakistan at the time "hereby declare[d] their firm resolve
to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote
understanding and friendly relations between their peoples." Id
67
TERRIS, supra note 56, at 157.
6 Id at 158.
' Hashim, supra note 1.
70 See Kashmir Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/08/world/kashmir-fast-facts/index.html. For example, in
2001, India ended a six-month ceasefire and invited Pervez Musharraf to engage in peace
talks. Id Although both states have met multiple times to discuss the conflict in Kashmir,
they have not had success in either producing a joint statement and agreement on Kashmir
or ending the hostilities between the states. Id Most recently, both India and Pakistan have
relocated their respective populations to safer locations, as there has been an exchange of
fire. Id
" See India-Pakistan Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/topic/destination/indiapakistan-relations (discussing that, more
recently, there has been cross-border clashes that have resulted in both civilian and soldier
deaths. Additionally, India has resorted to force in quelling Kashmir protests).
231
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
A. An Overview of Mediation
7 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR 43 (Carlos Esplugues & Silvia Barona eds., 2014).
7 See id at 44-45.
74 Id at 44.
75
Id at 44-45.
76
1d at 43-44.
" Id at 45-46.
' Id (stating confidentiality is an "essential ingredient in mediation"). The promise
of confidentiality also alleviates any concerns by parties that the information provided will
be used against them in later proceedings. Id
79 Id at 45.
8" Id
232
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
'
Additionally, as parties seek out a credible mediator, two factors are
considered: (1) the trustworthiness of the mediator; and (2) the mediator's
capability of implementing the agreement.' Without the presence of these two
factors, mediation is unlikely to be successful.
81
Id at 47 (explaining that the mediator assumes an "equidistant role" by maintaining
a safe distance from the parties and is prohibited from developing a relationship with either
party that would show preference toward them).
" TERRIS, supra note 56, at 9.
8 J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 26 (6th ed. 2017).
" Id at 27 (giving the example of the International Committee of the Red Cross
mediating disputes involving humanitarian conflicts, with the addition of non-
governmental organizations as a potential mediator); Molly M. Melin, When States
Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 78,79 (2013).
233
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
Although the UN, with the exception of the Security Council, lacks
binding authority, the organization places a high emphasis on the importance
of mediation in peacekeeping and dispute resolution. The UN published an
extensive guide on international mediation, which emphasizes the importance
of factors such as preparation, consent by the participating parties, neutrality,
and inclusiveness. 85 There are three actors within the UN that are involved in
international mediation processes: the Security Council, who passes binding
resolutions; the General Assembly; and the Secretariat (specifically the
Secretary General).
The UN has been involved in Indo-Pakistani affairs since the
beginning of the dispute. In response to the war that erupted in 1947, the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 39, which established the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) " to monitor and mediate the
dispute over Kashmir." UNCIP is comprised of representatives from
Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the United States.89
Following Resolution 39, both India and Pakistan became parties to the
Karachi Agreement, which established a ceasefire line that would be
maintained and supervised by military observers.90 The UN deployed military
advisors to Kashmir to aid the two states in drawing the line and dividing
Kashmir into respective territories.9 ' The United Nations Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was formed to both continue the
responsibilities of UNCIP after its dissolution and observe the ceasefire in
Kashmir." UNMOGIP still exists today.9 3 The UN also intervened in the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1965, brokering a ceasefire and adopting Resolutions 209
234
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
and 210.' Following the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in
1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1172, which condemned
both states for testing nuclear capabilities, demanded that both states
discontinue testing, and calling on both to become members of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.9 5
The UN's recent mediations effort proved to be futile, as it lacked
leverage and resources to not only provide the support needed by the two
states, but also to influence India and Pakistan to cooperate peacefully.' It is
unlikely that the UN will evolve into an effective mediator in the future.
235
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Vol. 34:1 20191
an ally was eased when the United States intervened in the 1999 Kargil War;
the Clinton Administration pressured Pakistan to withdraw its forces and
retreat behind the Line of Control. 102 Additionally, under the Bush
Administration, the United States lifted the 1998 economic sanctions
03
following the 9/11 attacks as a sign of good faith. Since then, the United
States has had relatively stable relationships with both India and Pakistan.
The United States' future involvement as a mediator between India
and Pakistan is uncertain under the Trump Administration. At the earliest
stages of the Trump Administration, it was perceived that the United States
would be a neutral party, attempting to broker peace between the two states.10
However, the United States has recently chilled its relationship with Pakistan
and is growing warmer towards India.
On January 1, 2018, the President of the United States tweeted that the
United States intended to cut off aid to Pakistan, stating that Pakistan provides
shelter to terrorists; in response, Pakistan's foreign minister called United
States the "friend who always betrays."' 05 This exchange shows that Pakistan
would not view the United States as a neutral mediator.
Although the United States, one of the world's leading superpowers,
has the influence, money, and capabilities of serving as a mediator between
India and Pakistan, the United States' recent favoritism toward India makes it
an unlikely candidate to mediate the conflicts between the two states.
10 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, The United States' Role and Influence on the India-
PakistanConflict, DISARMAMENT FORUM: INDIA AND PAKISTAN: PEACE BY PIECE, 33-34
(2004), https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIRjpdf-art2l l7.pdf.
Gidvani, supranote 100, at 743.
'03
104 See India Rejects US Offer to Mediate with Pakistanon Kashmir Issue, TIMES OF
INDIA (Apr. 5, 2017), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-rejects-us-offer-to-
mediate-with-pakistan-on-kashmir-issue/articleshow/58018616.cms.
" Javid Ahmad, Mistrust Is the OriginalSin of US-PakistanRelations, THE HILL,
(Jan. 8, 2018, 3:45 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/intemational/367943-mistrust-is-the-
original-sin-of-us-pakistan-relations.
236
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
India and China have had various border disputes in the areas of Aksai
Chin in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh,106 which have led to wars and
increased tension between the two states.107 In 1962, Sino-Indian relations
worsened as the two states engaged in deadly war over the territory of
Doklam'OS and since then, both states have been on high alert in the disputed
regions.'". Each side has deployed and stationed troops along the nation's
shared border, although the exact number of troops is unknown." 0
Additionally, India's relationship with Tibet continues to be a source of
contention. 1" The Dalai Lama has been living in India for the past several
decades, establishing his base in Dharamsala." 2
Since the establishment of Sino-Pakistani relations in 1951, the two
states have been strong allies, both militarily and economically." 3 During two
of the Indo-Pakistani wars, China provided Pakistan with tremendous military
and development assistance, evidently taking Pakistan's side." 4 Additionally,
China played a pivotal role during the nuclear arms race between India and
' 0 Arunachal Pradesh is a state in India located in the northeast part of the country
and borders China. Deryck O. Lodrick, Arunachal Pradesh,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Arunachal-Pradesh (last visited on Oct.
30, 2018).
107 See generally WILLEM VAN EEKELEN, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BORDER
DISPUTE WITH CHINA 94 (2016).
"0 Doklam is the disputed area between India, China, and Bhutan. Christopher
Woody, Tensions Are Still Simmeringa Year After the World's 2 Biggest CountriesAlmost
Clashedover a Border at the Top of the World, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018, 3:40
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tensions-between-china-and-
india-continue-year-after-doklam-standoff-2018-8.
109 Steven George, China Holds Live FireDrills, as Border Dispute with India Enters
Fifth Week, CNN (Aug. 25, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/19/asia/india-china-border-standoff/index.html.
10 Julie McCarthy, In a Remote Himalayan Corner, Tensions Rise Between India and
China NPR (July 10, 2017, 6:17 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/07/10/535976567/in-a-remote-himalayan-
corner-tensions-rise-between-india-and-china.
"' Tanvi Madan, India's Relation with China: The Good the Bat and the
(Potentially) Ugly, BROOKINGS (Oct. 8, 2013),
https-//www.brookings.edu/opinions/indias-relations-with-china-the-good-the-bad-and-
the-potentially-ugly/.
112 Sugam Pokharel, DalaiLama Caught in the Middle as India and China Reboot
Ties, CNN (Mar. 30, 2018, 8:08 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/asia/india-tibet-
china-dalai-lama-intl/index.html.
113 Raymond Lee, The Strategic Importance of Chinese-PakistaniRelations, AL
JAZEERA (Aug. 3, 2016), http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/08/strategic-
importance-chinese-pakistani-relations-1.60803101555719.html.
114 Id
237
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ONDISPUTE RESOLUTION (Vol. 34:1 20191
1
5Jamal Afridi & Jayshree Bajoria, China-Pakistan Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (July 6, 2010), https-//www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-pakistan-relations
("China supplies Pakistan with nuclear technology and assistance, including what many
experts suspect was the blueprint for Pakistan's nuclear bomb.").
16 China PakistanTies Driven by Rivalry with India: US Experts, ECONOMIC TIMES
(July 12, 2018, 6:23 PM), https:/economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-
pakistan-ties-driven-by-rivalry-with-india-us-experts/articleshow/5140233 8.cms.
" 7 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, Pakistan's Burgeoning Relationship with China, THE
DIPLOMAT (Jan. 24, 2018), https:/thediplomat.com/2018/01/pakistans-burgeoning-
relationship-with-china/.
"8 TERRIS, supra note 56, at 2.
" Approaches to Solving TerritorialConflicts: Sources, Situations, Scenarios and
Suggestions, CARTER CENTER (2010),
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/conflictresolution
/solvingterritorial conflicts.pdf.
238
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
12 Id at 26.
121 Id at 7.
12Id at 26.
2 Id. at 63.
2
4 Id at 23.
125Id
16 Id at 24.
127
2
Id at 24.
1CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT, WORDS OVER WAR:
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT 31.5-16 (Melanie C.
Greenberg et al. eds., 2000).
239
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
240
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
3
m Sandeep Gopalan, India-Pakistan Relations: Legalization and Agreement Design,
40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687, 702 (2007).
33
Id ("[T]he two countries recognized that 'the prerequisite for reconciliation, good
neighborliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to
peaceful coexistence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and
noninterference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit."' (quoting Soimla Agreement, India-Pak., para. 2(iii), July 2, 1972, 858 U.N.T.S.
71)).
" Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of Sovereignty in
International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 141, 142-44
(2004).
"s Gary J. Bass, The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention, 40 YALE J. INT'L L.
226,231 (2015).
136 See generally id In 1970, India intervened in East Pakistan (current-day
Bangladesh) by supporting a Bengali guerilla insurgency, citing humanitarian reasons,
when Pakistan cracked down on the population after a contested election. Id Pakistan has
in the past violated India's sovereignty through the territorial dispute in Kashmir). Id
241
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol 34:1 20191
242
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
141 Id at 9 (stating that mediator credibility plays a vital role in successful resolution
of disputes, because parties are unwilling to accept offers from a mediator who is deemed
to be untrustworthy or unable to provide resources necessary to carry out the resolution).
142 See generally David Yanofsky, Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tarfs Will Now
Exempt Most of US Imports, QUARTz (Mar. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1235803/trumps-
steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-which-countries-are-exempt. The United States has announced
tariffs placed on steel and aluminum imports, placing a 25% tariffon steel and a 10% tax
on aluminum. Id Although the United States has announced that certain states and the
European Union will be exempt from this tariff, India will still be impacted by this new
economic policy. Id
143 Shaiq Hussain & Annie Gowen, 'No More!' Trump Tweets to Pakistan, Accusing
It of 'Lies & Deceit', WASH. PosT (Jan. 1, 2018),
https-//www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/no-more-trump-tweets-to-pakistan-
accusing-it-of-lies-and-deceit/2018/01 /01/2d185032-efle-l 1 e7-95e3-
efl284e71c8dstory.htmlutmterm=.2ed7090abbc4 (explaining that Trump suspended
security aid to Pakistan, prompting a quick response from Pakistan stating that the United
States has given Pakistan nothing but "invective and mistrust").
243
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
party to serve as a mediator, as the United States is not only muddling relations
with both states, but also has vested economic, military, and diplomatic
relations with the respective states.
As stated previously, China cannot be trusted by India and thus is
effectively ruled out as a potential mediator. If one party does not trust the
mediator, it undermines the process, and the resolution is not likely to be
accepted. The UN lacks the influence and binding authority to serve as an
effective mediator.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that mediation will play a role in resolving
the territorial disputes, and thus those stemming from the tension in Kashmir,
because there is no actor in existence that has the capacity to play this role. In
the past, individuals have been able to resolve disputes (for example, the Pope
in the Beagle Channel dispute). However, no individual leader or public figure
currently holds enough influence over India and Pakistan. In regard to other
states, no state is trusted by both India and Pakistan to be neutral and impartial.
Finally, non-state organizations lack the influence and power to compel India
and Pakistan to successfully mediate the dispute and accept the resolution.
Mediation will not resolve the dispute between these two states
because they-especially India-are simply not willing to accept any offers to
mediate. India, a strong proponent of bilateralism, continues to reject offers to
mediate by actors such as the United States and China." In 2017 alone, India
rejected two efforts to mediate, one each by the United States and China." In
April 2017, Nikki Haley, the United States Ambassador to the UN, made this
remark that was rebuked instantly by India: "[The United States] very much
wants to see how we deescalate any sort of conflict [between India and
Pakistan] going forward."'4 The Indian government released a statement in
response to Haley's remarks reinforcing India's stance on third party
interference.'4 7
144 See generally Pakistan Welcomes US Offer to Mediate After India Rejects It,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/04/05/pakistan-
welcomes-us-offer-to-mediate-after-india-rejects-it_a_22026666/.
145 India Rejects China's Mediation Offer on Kashmir, AL JAZEERA (July 13, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/india-rejects-china-mediation-offer-kashmir-
170713205330786.html. After increased tensions at the Line of Control between India and
Pakistan, China extended an offer to "play a constructive role." Id In response, the
Ministry of External Affairs for the Indian government stated, "We are ready to talk
Kashmir with Pakistan, but no third-party mediation." Id
14 6
Saleem H. Ali, Peace Between India and PakistanShould Be a PriorityforTrump,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/peace-
between-india-and-pakistan-should-be-priority_us_599ed38ce4bOa62d0987adl5.
47 India Rejects US Offer to Mediate, supra note 104. The statement reads, "The
government's position for bilateral redressal of all India-Pakistan issues in an environment
free of terror and violence hasn't changed." Id
244
THE FUTURE OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
Since the Kargil War ended in 1999 with the United States diplomatic
intervention, India has consistently rejected offers by third parties to mediate
the Kashmir conflict with Pakistan. Instead, India advocates for a resolution
founded upon efforts of bilateralism. Following the United States' offer to
mediate the Kashmir conflict via Nikki Haley, India reinforced its
commitment to resolve tensions with Pakistan bilaterally, without the
intervention and influence of any other state.' 5' India has been adamant about
refusing third party intervention in resolving disputes, maintaining the
Kashmir conflict is between India and Pakistan solely.5 2
Logically, if one party is adamant about resolving the dispute
bilaterally, mediation is not even considered an option. Due to the fact that
India is determined to resolve the Kashmir territorial dispute bilaterally
through diplomatic relations with Pakistan, it would never consent to
mediation efforts or accept a resolution. Therefore, the possibility that Indo-
Pakistani relations will improve with mediation techniques is bleak.
245
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 34:1 20191
VI. CONCLUSION
246
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
VOLUME 34
ISSuE 2
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW
OFFICERS OF ADMINISTRATION
Michael V. Drake, B.A, MD., President ofthe University
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