INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATION: CHALLENGES &

OPPORTUNITIES

A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE F0R THE PARTIAL FULLFILMENT
OF THE DEGREE IN ARTS

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Department of Political Science Name – Teju Bhoi
D.A.V. (Autonomous) College, Titilagarh Roll No. - BA-19-PSC-072
Class - +3 Final Year Arts

Semester – VI
2022

D.A.V. (AUTONOMOUS) COLLEGE, TITILAGARH,

DIST- BALANGIR
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my deep gratitude and thankfulness to my teacher PRO.DR.

RAMAKANTA BEHERA head of the Dept. of political Science who guided me
in preparing this project. Without his guidance this project work would not have
been possible.

I am equally thankful to DR. DURGESWARI MAHANANDA dept. of

political science, DR. UMAKANTA SAHU, MRS. SHABYARANI SUNA of
dept. of political science for their encouragement and help in completing this
project.

My special thanks are due to my friends and the library staff of this
college for their help.

Signature
 DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that the project entitled “INDIA-PAKISTAN

RELATION: CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES” in political science DSE-
IV submitted by me for the partial fulfilment of the requirement for the
degree in arts.

The project prepared by me is original except extracts quoted from

difference in my work.

Signature of the Student

 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this project work on “INDIA-PAKISTAN

RELATION: CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES” is the original work of
Mr. TEJU BHOI, Roll No.- BA-19-PSC-072 of class
+3 Final year Arts.

He has prepared this project under my guidance and direct supervision.

Prof. ____________
Dept. _____________

4
 CONTENTS

CHAPTER-I PAGE 01-12

INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
REVIEW OF THE LITRATURE
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

CHAPTEE-II PAGE 13-40

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION/ CASE STUDIES
PROCESSING DATA WITH HYPOTHESIS

CHAPTER-III PAGE 41-45

FINDING AND SUGGESTION/ SUGGESTION AND CONTRIBUTTION BY
THE STUDY SCOPE FOR FURTHER STUDY

CONCLUSION PAGE 46-51

REFERENCE
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER-1

INTRODUCTION

Since, India got its independence and partitioned by British government

5
between India and Pakistan in 1947. The relationship between these two countries
has been mostly unstable with ever growing distrust on each other. Both countries
have fought wars in the South Asia region at different fronts and continue to face
problems like border terrorist activities, infiltrations, low intensity wars and
intelligence/spy operations that seem unstoppable as both will continue to consider
each other as an untrustworthy enemy. It is seen that after the end of cold war, it
has become one of the most dangerous and volatile regions in the international
politics for which several reasons are responsible such as pre-independence
hostility between the Muslim League and the Indian national Congress and
bloodletting riots in post-independence period at the time of partition.

Moreover, disputes over waters flowing from India to Pakistan and finally,
Kashmir which remains a subject of conflicts and bone of skirmishes between
these two countries. However, there are many changes in the field of technology,
global political economy and social networks took place particularly after the
disintegration of Soviet Union. With this, the controversial and disappointing
relationship between India and Pakistan has worsened as both have become
nuclear states. The argument of this study is that fluctuation in relationship between
both countries will continue because both have now nuclear weapons which could
have unpredictable consequences for South Asia region.
For this, the paper analyses the historical relationship between India and
Pakistan including wars and disputes particularly Kashmir issue which would
contribute to the transitory nature of their relations to draw analytical inferences.
In recent years, infiltration, proxy war and civilian attacks by Pakistan are
increasing which is taking both states far away from the negotiation table. So
many times, Pakistan took resort to International Organizations to solve the
matters which in turn creates space for external powers as well. On the face of it,
6
the study will discuss disputes resolving attempts and the role of external powers
while looking forward to Indo-Pakistan‘s future relations.
In keeping with its ―Neighbourhood First Policy‖, India desires normal
neighbourly relations with Pakistan. India‘s consistent position is that issues, if
any, between India and Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally and peacefully, in
an atmosphere free of terror and violence. The onus is on Pakistan to create such a
conducive environment. It has been made clear that India will not compromise on
issues relating to national security and will take firm and decisive steps to deal
with all attempts to undermine India‘s security and territorial integrity.
India and Pakistan came into existence as two separate nation-states in 1947.
They have a history of only fi fty-seven years of existence as separate countries as
compared to about a thousand years of joint existence before the British Raj. Their
common identity revolves around aspects of shared history, geography, language,
culture, values, and traditions. However, during partition, only one aspect of the
identity was considered i.e. the religious identity of the peoples of India. Over the
years, common identity has often been suppressed and buried under the pressure of
the confl ict of identity between India and Pakistan. One expression of the confl ict
between India and Pakistan is the issue of Kashmir. This confl ict has continued
ever since the partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. Kashmir is an
open confl ict similar to the Israel-Palestine confl ict, and has continued over more
than half a century. While many people do not realize the gravity of the issue, it is
a central issue in Indian-Pakistani relationship, and we need to address this issue.
The two countries have to fi nd a solution to the deeper and broader confl ict in
order to enable them to develop friendly ties with each other. My paper aims to
discuss the various aspects of identity shared by both India and Pakistan and
suggests some solutions for the confl ict of identity.
I will briefly explain the process that led to the creation of Pakistan, and the
7
continuing confl ict since then over Kashmir. I will also outline the different levels
of identity and how Indians and Pakistanis share a common identity that has, at the
same time, some distinctive characteristics. Finally, I would like to suggest what
steps India and Pakistan might take to be able to overcome their differences and
co-exist peacefully. India and Pakistan emerged in August 1947 as successor states
of British India with distinctive identities. India normatively and constitutionally
ensconced secularity, albeit with Hindu majoritarianism. Pakistan, in part because
of its relative ethnonational diversity, opted for an overwhelming Islamic character
for nation-building and securitization vis-à-vis a ‗Hindu‘ enemy. These
incompatible state ideologies ensured that the India and Pakistan fought a
war right after independence over the control of Jammu and Kashmir1 (Hussain,
2013, pp. 109–120). Moreover, the two states conflicted over the assessment and
distribution of the colonial institutional and financial legacy; in particular how the
civil and military bureaucracy would be divided and the appropriation of the
capital. In 1965, India and Pakistan fought another inconclusive war over Kashmir
and a few years later in December 1971 fought a third war that saw India support
East Pakistani rebels and partition Pakistan, creating the independent state of
Bangladesh. Nevertheless, Pakistan‘s quest for strategic parity with nuclearcapable
India continued in the following decades. The Siachen issue (1984), Brasstacks
(1987) and Zarb-e-Momin (1989) further confirmed the deteriorated nature of
bilateral relationship. Though then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited
Pakistan in 1989, the two sides failed to normalize their bilateral relations in the
1990s. Driven by their security concerns and fear of the other‘s intentions, both
states fought once more over the border town of Kargil in Kashmir in 1999.
The much-hyped Agra Summit in July 2001 provided a window of
opportunity to the two countries‘ leadership to sit and talk together. However, the
embedded misgivings and mistrust remained staunchly intact. Currently, India–
8
Pakistan relations are replete with examples of territorial conflict (namely Kashmir
and Sir Creek), security challenges (terrorism), energy deficits and resource
shortages (water scarcity), strategic uncertainty (arms race) and geopolitical tussle
(proxy war in Afghanistan). This rivalry takes place in the backdrop of an overall
abysmal state of human development in both states. Today, approximately 25–30
per cent of Pakistanis, or 60 million people, live below the poverty line with a
similar percent of Indians living in abject poverty. The history of the India–
Pakistan rivalry raises several important questions. First and foremost is that if the
status of socioeconomic indicators are so poor in both India and Pakistan, why do
the two countries still prefer military competition over political and economic
cooperation? Can any of the two state‘s rare bilateral agreements, such as the Indus
Waters Treaty (IWT), be replicated? What type of dangers are posed by the
nuclear arsenals that the two states possess, and is there any possibility of nuclear
reversal? Finally, can India and Pakistan talk over issues such as terrorism
meaningfully?
These are the lingering but crucial questions that are at the core of the four
recently published books under review in this article. The first of these books is
Daniel Haines‘ Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the making of India and
Pakistan which as its name suggests looks into the complicated relations that the
two states have over their shared river and how the water is utilised. The second
book is Mario Carranza‘s India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy: Constructivism and
the Prospect for Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia, which offers an
alternative approach to the conventional narrative surrounding India and Pakistan‘s
nuclear weapons. Finally, both Hein Kiessling in his book Faith, Unity, Discipline:
The ISI of Pakistan and A.S. Dulat, Asad Durrani and Aditya Sinha in The Spy
Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace explore the central role that
Pakistan‘s Army, or more specifically its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have
9
had on recent Pakistani foreign policy and the vested interests it may have in
keeping the animosity with India alive. In order to analyse the contributions of
each book, this article is divided into four sections, one each dedicated to the
books in question before concluding with a brief overview of their importance to
developing a holistic overview of Indo-Pakistani relations.

10
 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

In this project, I have the following research objectives.

 The main objective this project study is gets a vast knowledge about the
challenges and opportunity between India and Pakistan.

 To assess whether a negotiated settlement is possible in the persisting Kashmir

Conflict in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

 To examine how the persisting Kashmiri conflict affects the bilateral

Relationship of India and Pakistan.

 To analyze whether pursuing policies that enhance regional economic integration

and growth would narrow the scope of the Kashmir conflict and improve the
bilateral relations.

 To examine the nexus between politics and religion in the Kashmir conflict.

 To examine the possibility of security (nuclear) confrontation between India and

Pakistan in the South Asia region.

11
SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The analysis and examination of a specific territory is hardly an arbitrary

matter. One‘s perspective depends on their particular geo-political context, which
in turn affects their study of the given area. Nothing is ―neutral‖ about a territory.
The spatial arrangement of the world is often viewed through the three varying
outlooks – global, state, and local. This phenomenon of geographical scale is
socially constructed and greatly effects the interpretations of space. ―Today the
question of scale inserts itself at the outset é at the foundation, as it were é of the
analysis of texts and their interpretation of events. The result depends on the scale
chosen as primary or essential.‖ Within each geographical scale lies the scope of
the conflict. This determines the outcome of the conflict and its solution at either
the local level or its proliferation into a global problem.

―The continuous reshuffling and reorganizations of spatial scales are an

integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment.‖ The
scope of the Kashmir conflict has been widened by the involvement of the United
States and United Nations. Thus, the global scale of the Kashmir dispute has
allowed for the Kashmiri people‘s desires for an independent state to be ignored.
In order to bring ―control and empowerment‖ back to the Kashmiri people,
the conflict needs to be rescaled as a local issue in order to find a solution that will
bestbenefit its people.

―Spatial scale has to understood as something that is produced historically; a

process that is deeply heterogeneous and contested.‖ The conflict in Kashmir is
not only the eleven-year war of insurgencies but it has been an ongoing struggle
rooted deep in colonization, imperialism and religion. The complete history and
demographics of this disputed territory plays a huge role in how Kashmir is
12
specialized today.Pakistan‘s Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, disputed the
accession. He claimed that the accession was illegal because it was brought about
through violence between Pakistan and India. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime
minister of India, promised the Kashmiri people that the decision would have to be
confirmed by them. The United Nations intervened and proposed a plebiscite. To
this day, a plebiscite has not taken place in Kashmir. In order to hold a plebiscite,
both countries would have to withdrawal troops and neither India nor Pakistan has
done so.

13
REVIEW OF LITREATURE

Many scholars who focus on the Kashmir conflict have shed light on its
origins. For example, Corbel (1956) and Mohan (1992) blame British colonialism
for the birth of the conflict. In their analysis, they stress that mutual suspicion,
hatred, and anger have almost thwarted the long-standing agreement between the
governments of India and Pakistan, and prevented the fate of Kashmir being
decided by the democratic process of plebiscite (Korbel 1956; Mohan 1992).
Sharing a similar viewpoint with them, Ninian (2009) and Akhtar (2010) further
add that deeply rooted political rivalries between the major religious communities
of the subcontinent, and the greed or personal shortsightedness of the leaders on
both sides of the border are the root causes, obstructing an amicable, peaceful
solution to the conflict. Echoing Korbel, and Ninian, Ahmed (2002) argues that the
partition of British India into India and Pakistan epitomizes the politics of identity
in its most negative form. He emphasizes that the partition has replaced trust and
understanding with fear and insecurity generating anger at various levels of state
and society (Ahmed 2002). The findings of Choudhry and Akhtar (2010), Misra
(2007), Shekhawat (2009), and Yusuf & Najam (2009) all are significant to this
study. These researchers, however, focus mainly on various aspects of the peace
process between India and Pakistan. Choudhry and Akhtar (2010), for example,
analyse the way in which the Kashmir conflict has become a source of tension
between these two countries. Revisiting the past peace processes, they urge the
leaders of both countries to embrace much larger and longer strategic perspectives
without sticking only to Kashmir as a national policy.

Despite this, this project has several limitations. First, Kashmir remains a
politically volatile part of the world and the situation on the ground can change
quickly. Hence, the findings of this study cannot apply indefinitely. Second, owing

14
to time and financial constraints, this research has been conducted from South
Africa, without visiting the area under study. Nonetheless, while it is important to
acknowledge these weaknesses, they do not detract from the value of this study.
Indeed, the study provides insight into the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan
in the context of the Kashmir conflict. More importantly, I prescribe an
appropriate solution to the conflict in accordance with the changing contextual
conditions on the ground. I also recommend ways of normalising the bilateral
relations between both countries and in South Asia in general. Above all, these
factors add to a growing body of literature fulfilling the knowledge gap in the field
of discourse as earlier stated.

15
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

This is a qualitative desktop-based study which relies on the method of

documentary analysis of documentary sources. I draw on only secondary sources. I
also draw upon select newspaper articles about the conflict. In terms of secondary
sources. I examine journal articles, published papers, books and book chapters. I
employ the tool of content analysis (Mayring 2000) to examine these relevant
secondary, scholarly and non-scholarly documents. By analysing this available
data, I prescribe an appropriate solution to the protracted Kashmir conflict in
accordance with the changing contextual conditions on the ground. I also use the
above data to recommend ways of normalising bilateral relations between India
and Pakistan.

The research design refers to the overall strategy that you choose to
integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way,
thereby,
ensuring you will effectively address the research problem. The study uses
qualitative research where scholars gather a deep understanding of human
character and the reasons that guide their behavior. The researchers investigate the
"how" and "why" of decision-making. Apart from this, the research examines the
idea, policies and strategies used in explaining and understanding the research
topic. The source of information secondary online sources and this chapter
discusses the information in the methodology. This study is critical in identify
certain issues that surround the conflict in Kashmir conflict especially issues in
regards to the role of the leadership of both Pakistan and India. Identifying the role
of the leadership in both countries is essential in understanding why the conflict in
Kashmir erupted and further how it can be controlled or eventually topped.
Another goal in this research study is to understand the different perspectives of
16
Indian and Pakistani leaders in Kashmir. From the study it is clear that both
countries do not want Kashmir to claim its independence a factor that will be
analyzed especially looking at the interest of both India and Pakistan in Kashmir
that leads them not wanting Kashmir to be subjected to a referendum that will
eventually determine its independence.

The themes of this project paper are divided into three chapters. This, the
first chapter introduces the study and provides the overall objective to the research
topic. It identifies the scope and literature review of the study methods adopted for
conducting the research.

17
 CHAPTER-2
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION/CASE STUDIES
PROCESSING DATA WITH HYPOTHESIS

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Political parties are primarily instruments of power, academic discussion of party
systems has centered around the question of the degree of competition among
parties. The party system is but a by-product of the social system say Sirsikar and
Fernandes Further, they say that social composition on the one hand and economic
development on the other are the two most crucial variables or sets of variables
that determine a party system" The party system is a necessary equipment and an
integral; part of representative government. Hence, the structure of government is
influenced by the nature of the party system. "The character of the political system
of any modern state is substantially dictated by the manner m which political
forces are organised a party system".

PROCESSING DATA WITH HYPOTHESIS

The present study is based on the following hypotheses:

1. After the Cold War India is not getting utility hardware and diplomatic support
from Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union. So India was rather
forced to unveil a new chapter of relationship with the U.S.A.to suit its national
interest.
2. In the post - Cold War period, India has adopted a new bilateral economic
policy.
3. In the immediate post-Cold War period, India has lost its strategic importance,
once attached by Moscow during the Cold War era. Rather, in the post-Cold War
years, this has been replaced by improved Indo-U.S. ties as evidenced, by the joint
18
 naval and air exercises by the two countries.
4. The U.S.A. being a victim of global terrorism wants India to support its fight
against terrorism.
5. Both Washington and New Delhi have separate interests in concluding the Civil
Nuclear Deal.There will be no positive relationship between India and African
countries in terms of trade and economic relation.
6. Both governments of these countries will not play an immense role for
strengthening trade and economic relation between India and Africa.Central Asia
has emerged as strategically important region from the Indian perspective. Central
Asia is a landlocked and resource rich region. India is a democratic and secular
nation with a huge market for Central Asian oil can become an important political
friend and economic partner of the newly independent Muslim majority but
secularCentral Asian nations

19
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

After gaining the liberation of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam in a meeting

convened in the Chamber of Commerce Bombay said that ―We will live in
Pakistan and you will live in India. In this way, we will be the neighbors. We want
to live in a friendly way, friends in trade and commerce as two brothers‖ (Hilali,
2005). India and Pakistan were birthed out of bloody partition that heartened each
to define herself in hostility towards the other, and they have waged four wars
since partition. India has a hegemonic design and never maintains good relations
with other small neighboring countries in South Asia (Oimstead, 2014).

Pakistan and India have negotiated at various issues between 1984 and
1997, including the disputes over Siachen, sir creek and Tulbul or Wular, with little
achievement. The representatives met, debated and prepared contracts, but final
approval of management was lacking due to years of mistrust, hate and hostility
between the two nations. Neither India nor Pakistan was willing to take the step by
changing the positions previously mentioned and finding a compromise or another
position. Firearms continued to explode, security forces continued to fight,
exhaustion and terrorism continued to kill thousands, and negotiators met on a
regular basis, but no positive conversion took place at that time.

The Kashmir conflict, the unfinished agenda of partition further plagued

their ties with hostility and suspicion. Pakistan has faced three major wars; 1948,
1965 and 1971, and later on, the Kargil conflict and many other serious clashes.
Pakistan and India have faced many security risks from the first day of the
partition of the sub-continent due to the hostile relationship which was the major
challenge for Pakistan in the past. As a matter of fact, traditional Indian
capabilities were a major threat to Pakistan, but the atmosphere changed between
20
the two states after a nuclear explosion in 1998. After nuclear tests in May 1998,
the head of state and government of India showed typical pragmatism in the fight
against long-standing uprisings in Kashmir. India considered this a better force
than Pakistan. In the face of this threat, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear test
and made a political decision to ignore all global pressure. Government decisions
received general support at the national level, which allowed leaders to cope with
national restrictions associated with nuclear explosions. The interplay of nuclear
and traditional threats is a new dimension in Pakistan-India relations. Nuclear
tests created some equilibrium of
power in the region which forced a settlement of the Kargil crisis of 1999
(Johnson, 2005).

There is a clear demonstration of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent that

has drawn attention to this region of the international community, especially the
Kashmir issue. Pakistani and Indian officials say nuclear deterrence has minimized
the likelihood of a major war in the region. However, there is a possibility of
misunderstanding, and technical errors can lead to accidental nuclear wars.

Timely access to real-time nuclear weapons information has become more

important. This deficit will have grave concerns and challenges for the population
and society of both states. South Asian countries inherited a weak, backward and
traditional economic substructure from their colonial masters or the indigenous
authoritarian rulers. Except for Sri Lanka and India where some kind of
infrastructural development had taken place during the colonial rule, the other
countries lacked even the basic economic infrastructure. All the South Asian
countries began with the process of modernization and development in the fifties.
There have been numerous problems and challenges which have affected the South
21
Asian economies. Despite deep cultural, social, historical and geographical
connections, the unusual pattern of positive and passive conflicts between the two
South Asian neighbors effectively alienates and separates them (Upreti, B.C).

In the general sphere of suspicion, rivalry and mistrust, new and unexpected
problems emerged after 1947 and became extra signs of apparently endless
conflict between Pakistan and India. One country's failures, frustrations, and
mistakes made one of the most important news in another country, and the gap that
widened in 1947 grew even larger. However, other factors bring them closer
together or at least prevent them from worsening the conflict. Behind the current
rivalry is the recognition of common cultural ties, economic interdependence and,
in particular, the desire to avoid a frontal confrontation in the shadow of nuclear
weapons. Their relationships are therefore contradictory: the search for solutions to
old conflicts goes hand in hand with the emergence of new problems, sometimes
separated and sometimes more closely connected.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan is rooted in British colonialism. In

1947, the British Empire partitioned India into two separate colonies, a generally
Hindu India and a predominantly Muslim Pakistan. At the time of the partition, the
ruler of Jammu & Kashmir (a princely state in the northwestern section of the
colony) hesitated to determine with which side he would integrate his state
politically. A rebellion in the western portion of the state stripped him of this
decision, as Pakistani tribal militias moved into Kashmir to stake their claim,
forcing Kashmir‘s ruler to join India and sparking the Indo–Pakistani War of 1947.
The UN-mediated ceasefire that brought this war to an end established a Line of
Control (LOC), designating Indian- and Pakistani-occupied portions of Kashmir.
The UN-mediated ceasefire did not resolve the conflict by any means. The

22
military organizations of both states continued to grow, and their suspicions of one
another grew with them. In 1951, during negotiations over demilitarizing Kashmir,
each accused the other of warmongering and concentrating their armies on the
Indo-Pakistan border.1 China is also a claimant of 15 percent of Kashmir (Ladakh)
and carried out a one-month war against India over the territory in 1962. This war
ended in a ceasefire and an establishment of a second line of control in Kashmir
(which came to be known as the Line of Actual Control [LAC]).

23
CONFLICTS BETWEEN PAK & IND: WAR & BOARDER CLASHES

Kashmir War (1947-48)

Pakistan and India got their independence in 1947. They fought their first
war within first year of their freedom. The 1947-48, Kashmir War is considered to
be the first of the four full fledged wars between both states. During the process of
partition, it was decided that states with majority population will join the state with
respective majority i.e. Muslim majority states with Pakistan and Hindu majority
with India. Kashmir is a Muslim majority area that was ruled by a Hindu Ruler
who decided to annex with India despite the opposition of its masses. In the result
of his annexation with India, masses started agitation and the protests erupted in
the valley. (The Hindu, March 1, 2013)

To support the Kashmiri Muslims, the tribal troops from NWFP now
Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa (KP) and FATA marched towards Srinagar. These tribal
troops moved forward without any support of Pakistani military which was in
weak and shaky condition at the time. When these troops moved forward rapidly,
the Hindu ruler of Kashmir, asked for military assistance from India which was
obliged immediately. The Indian forces along with British Troops captured the two
third area of Kashmir including Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh, where as the
tribal area got hold of one third area of the valley. On January 1, 1949, a cease fire
was signed between Pakistan and India under the mediation of United Nations and
it was decided that Kashmir Issue will be resolved according to the wishes of
Kashmiri People under the UN resolution but it was never being conducted by
India henceforth the issue remains unresolved and biggest conflict between both
states as it became the reason of another three wars between these two hostile
states.

24
War of 1965: Second War over Kashmir Issue
The second major conflict between Pakistan and India was the 1965 War.
The war was the result of number of border skirmishes between both states from
April and September 1965. The War was fought for seventeen consecutive days
and ended after the intervention of international community. The official end of the
war was considered after the signature of Tashkent Agreements between both
states. At the end of the war, both states declared victory. According to some
neutral analysts, India won the war while some think that Pakistan gain more
grounds but largely it is considered to be the stalemate.This war saw the largest
tank battleof the world since WWII. The real reason of this war was once again
the issue of Kashmir which remained unresolved even after this major war. The
War of 1965, highlighted the capabilities of fighting, training and weaponry of
both states from which both states started to enhance their military powers to new
level to keep the balance in the South Asian Region. (Johnson, 2005: Tucker,
2004)
War of 1971: Civil unrest and Indian Intervention in Eastern Pakistan
The War of 1971, may be the most significant and vital war between both
states as in result of this conflict Pakistan was disintegrated and the East Pakistan,
emerged as a new state, Bangladesh. The civil unrest started in the East Pakistan
after political, economical and social differences between both wings of the state.
This slowly led to the unrest in the Eastern part of Pakistan. The masses in the
wing were not happy with policies of central government and were of the view that
they were not being given due share in the national profit and earning. Field
Marshall General Ayub Khan tried to resolve the issue by launching economical
and political policies. The industries were shifted to the region and the people from
that wing were taken into civil and military institutions but the policies did not
prove to be successful and unrest kept on increasing. (Kemp, 2010: Nawaz, 2008)
25
 The real conflict increased after the first General Elections of Pakistan in
1970s when both sides‘ political leadership refused to accept the dominance of
others hence the insurgency and civil unrest started in the East Pakistan which led
to the military operation by Pakistani military. India took the advantage of this
internal unrest of Pakistan and started to interfere through the militant and terrorist
elements and played a vital role in increasing the civil war inside Pakistan. The
conflict reached to the point where military forces turned into direct and full war.
In this war again thousands of people died and both sides faced heavy losses. Due
to strategic and geographic location the Pakistani Army remained unable to take
up and fight to its full capacity resulted in the defeat. After the end of war, the
Eastern Wing was disintegrated and become a new country named Bangladesh.
(Cohen, 20004: Haqqani, 2005)

This war proved to be Indian interference in the internal matters of

Pakistan which resulted in its division. The Conflict was proved to be a tangible
one but after the creation of Bangladesh, both Pakistan and newly emerged state
tried to negotiate on Interest based conflict resolution to survive with cooperation.

Kargil War: High Altitude Conflict

The Kargil War was fought in 1999 between Pakistan and India again on the
issue of Kashmir. The war started when the freedom fighters and Pakistani Army
personals attacked the Indian Posts at Kargil in winters and captured most of the
Indian posts. The Indian Army retaliated with the help of its Air Force and took
back most of its posts. The Pakistani army refused to admit that its military men
were involved in the operation but later statement of Pakistani Prime Ministers and
documents found on the bases proved that there was involvement of Pakistani
26
Army in the operation. Both sides faced high number of causalities during this
conflict. (Tavares, 2006)

The Kargil War is not considered to be the full fledged war but it is one of
the
critical conflicts between Pakistan and India. The region has the importance with
the context of Kashmir issue as it was a reinforcement line to Indian Army present
in Kashmir Valley. The War brought out the serious threat of the nuclear war as
both states had tested their nuclear bombs very little time prior to this conflict. The
Conflict was ended with the intervention of international community and halted it
from becoming a full fledge nuclear war. (Hussain, October 21, 2006)

27
INDIAN SURGICAL STRIKES: WHAT AND WHY (URI & AIR STRIKE)
URI Surgical Strike
As per the submission of the then Indian Army‘s DGMO, Lt. Gen. Ranbir
Singh, and the detailed media reports that followed, the surgical strikes 20 were
conducted in the early morning of September 28, 2016. Operations began around
12:30 am as commandos were air-dropped at the LoC – the de facto border
between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The commandos crossed the LoC and
entered from 500 meters to upto two kilometers into the PoK to conduct strikes in
the sectors of Bhimber, Hotspring, Kel, and Lipa. Operations ended approximately
by 4:30 am, following which commandos reached the Indian side of the LoC
where they would be picked up in helicopters. Details of operations suggest that
these surgical strikes were well below 21 the levels of even a low-scale
conventional attack.
The strikes were essentially stealth operations executed overnight by
specially trained commandos of the Indian Army and they did not involve any
movement of infantry or armoured divisions of the conventional armed forces.
Simultaneously, given the Indian government‘s open acknowledgement of having
sanctioned the strikes and that Indian Army personnel were involved in conducting
the strikes, these surgical strikes are attributable and thus cannot also be labelled as
a ―sub-conventional attack‖ – the latter primarily relies on militancy, insurgency,
proxy war and terrorism as means of inflicting damage. It is therefore argued that
these surgical strikes capture a new space of conflict between India and Pakistan,
which could perhaps be labelled as asymmetric conventional conflict.
It must be highlighted here that the Indian Army has reportedly 22
conducted similar strikes in the past. However, what makes the surgical strikes of
September 2016 unique is the Indian government‘s acknowledgement of having
sanctioned those strikes. Attribution adds political value to those surgical strikes,

28
without which they remain mere military operations of limited potency. In
assessing the implications of Indian surgical strikes of September 2016 in the
subsequent sections, this paper makes reference to both military and political
values of the strikes. India’s Objectives
India arguably conducted these surgical strikes with three objectives:
eliminate future terrorist infiltration bids from the Pakistani side of the LoC;
punish Pakistan for its sub-conventional war; and deter Pakistan‘s sub-
conventional war. According to the media briefing given by the DGMO, the
primary objective for the surgical strikes was to eliminate an increase in
infiltration bids from Pakistan‘s side of the LoC. Intelligence reports suggested that
terrorists had begun gathering in large numbers along the LoC with the objective
of crossing the border and targeting locations in Jammu and 23 Kashmir, as well as
other metropolitan cities across India. New Delhi had thus ordered pre-emptive
attacks in the form of these surgical strikes to eliminate these terrorist camps and
bases. While this was the officially stated objective of the surgical strikes, political
claims made over the success of surgical strikes add two more dimensions to
India‘s objective – to punish Pakistan for its sub-conventional war and to deter this
sub conventional war. Indian news reports suggest that it was Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi who, a day after terrorists affiliated with the
Pakistanbased Jaish-e- Mohammed attacked the Indian Army brigade headquarters
in Uri, decided to abandon the posture of strategic restraint. The PM authorised
then Indian Army Chief, DS Suhag and the National Security Adviser, Ajit
Doval, to ―examine all feasible military options that could 24 deliver an ‗effective
response‘.‖

29
On Status-Quo between India and Pakistan

Based on the claims made by the Indian Army‘s DGMO, India succeeded in
meeting the first and primary objective of eliminating the identified terrorist cells
and bases in PoK near the LoC. Members of the Indian media, apparently briefed
by the Indian Prime Minister‘s Office, reported the destruction of seven terror
launch-pads, killing 38 terrorists and their handlers and two Pakistani soldiers. The
Indian government, however, did 29 not officially disclose any of these figures.
Details of gallantry awards given to Indian Army personnel in January 2017
confirmed details of operations, including accounts of ―destruction of terrorists,
massive casualties to terrorists and enemy regulars [Pakistani army troops] 30
supporting them.‖ Thus, the surgical strikes had no doubt served the primary
objective of eliminating terrorist cells and bases and, consequently, avoiding near-
future terrorist infiltration bids and terror attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and the
rest of India, capturing the limited military utility of surgical strikes.

On the second Indian objective of punishing Pakistan for its

subconventional war, three factors require a more nuanced assessment – inflicting
real damage on Pakistan, assuaging domestic public anger, and hurting Pakistan‘s
international reputation. The controlled nature and low scale of operations suggest
negligible material losses to Pakistan, especially in consideration of claims by
Indian intelligence sources that an investment of about INR 100 crore (US$ 15
million) was made by Pakistan 31 in fuelling militancy and unrest in the Kashmir
Valley in just 2015-16.

30
Incident
On 26 February 2019, Pakistan announced the intrusion of Indian aircraft
into its airspace, but asserted that the Indian fleet was intercepted, causing them to
retreat, to release their bombs which hit an open area, and to dump their
fuel.[33] In a press briefing, Pakistan's Director-General Inter-Services Public
Relations (ISPR), Major General Asif Ghafoor, stated that three IAF teams were
spotted approaching the Pakistan border from various sectors in the early hours of
26 February. He added that the two of these teams did not cross the border
following a challenge from Pakistani aircraft flying combat air patrol, but the third
one crossed the Line of Control from the Kiran Valley near Muzaffarabad before
being intercepted by Pakistani Air Force (PAF) jets within three minutes of the
incursion. Pervez Khattak, Pakistani Defence Minister, stated that the Pakistani Air
Force did not retaliate at that time because "they could not gauge the extent of the
damage". Later on 26 February 2019, India confirmed the airstrike, stating that the
Indian Air Force conducted them in retaliation to the Pulwama attack. The strikes
were subsequently claimed to be "non-military" and "preemptive'' in nature;
targetinga Jaish-e-Mohammed facility within Pakistan.

The airstrike was the first time since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 that
attacking warplanes had crossed the Line of Control. Indian media claimed to have
confirmed from official sources that twelve Mirage 2000 jets were involved in the
operation. The Indian Express further reported that the Mirage 2000s were
carrying SPICE 2000 & Popeye precision-guided munitions and that they
were supported by four Sukhoi Su- 30MKI, Netra and Phalcon airborne
early warning and control aircraft, an IAI Heron UAV and two Ilyushin Il-78
aerial refuelling aircraft. Furthermore Indian officials claim that four SU-30MKIs

31
were launched from their South Punjab base and headed towards Jodhpur and on
to Barmer, Rajasthan before turning West towards Jaish-e-Mohammed
headquarters in Pakistan located in the populous town of Bahawalpur. These four
aircraft, tasked as decoys, successfully drew PAF fighters way south of the main
attack force.
After releasing the bombs, the jets returned into Indian airspace unharmed and the
Indian media claimed that whilst Pakistan scrambled its F-16 jets, they could not
engage the Indian planes. Retired PAF Air Marshall Masood Akhtar opined that
the air forces of both countries may have been instructed not to attack each other to
avoid further escalation of conflict.

The Target
There has been ambiguity among the sources as to what the exact
target was, and about whether the madrassa – Taleem ul-Quran run by Masood
Azhar's brother-in-law, Muhammad Yusuf Azhar, was an active JeM camp or not.
According to WikiLeaks, a 2004 United States Department of Defence
interrogation report stated that Balakot had "a training camp that offers both basic
and advanced terrorist training on explosives and artillery." In contrast, military
analysts asserted that whilst the area used to host militant camps, they dispersed
after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake to avoid detection by the international aid
groups providing relief in the area.

Indian intelligence sources claim that the camp was located in a hilltop
forest, 20 km (12 mi) from Balakot, and that it was a resort-style facility, with
space and room for 500–700 militants, including a swimming pool, cooks and
cleaners. The New York Times mentioned western security officials of having

32
doubted the existence of such large-scale training camps, asserting that Pakistan no
longer runs them and that "militant groups are spread out in small groups around
the country".

The local people varied as to the purpose of the facility. In the immediate
aftermath of the strikes, whilst some claimed of it being an active Jaish training
camp, others asserted it to have been a mere school for the local children and that
such militant camps used to exist far earlier. On later visits by Reuters, the locals
claimed that the school had been shut down about a year back and was no longer
operational.

Reaction
Foreign diplomats from the United States, United Kingdom, Russia,
Australia, Indonesia, Turkey, China, and six ASEAN nations were briefed by
Indian foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale on the strike conducted. Arun Jaitley, the
Indian cabinet minister of Finance stated two reasons, for Pakistan denying the
effectiveness of the airstrike stating, "There are two plausible reasons. First, the
Pakistan army had created a big aura about its prowess among Pakistanis, and it
did not want its image dented." Jaitley noted that the second reason was more
important, and stated "Had the Pakistan army admitted that our fighters bombed its
buildings, the first question to be raised would have been: What was the extent of
damage? Experts would have come for a survey of the buildings and asked about
the people staying inside... then Pakistan would have had to reveal names of the
Jaish fighters who died there."

Australia noted its condemnation of Pulwama attack and asked Pakistan to

crack down on terrorists operating from its soil. It also asked both India and
33
Pakistan to restrain from actions that would jeopardize peace. China's foreign
ministry spokesman Lu Kang stated "We hope that both India and Pakistan can
exercise restraint and adopt actions that will help stabilize the situation in the
region and improve mutual relations". France asked both India and Pakistan to
exercise restraint, saying that it supported Indian actions against terrorism and
asked Pakistan to stop allowing its territory to be used by
terrorists. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation condemned the airstrike and
called on both India and Pakistan to show restraint. United States Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo termed the attack as a "counter-terrorism action" and
reaffirmed US-India ties. He asked both sides to show restraint.

34
CONFLICT RESOLUTION

There have always been major and vital challenges for Pakistan and
India for resolving and managing their conflicts. Some of the major challenges
bothsides face are:

Lack of Trust
The top most issue and challenge for both sides is lack of trust between
them. Since the inception, both states are not ready to trust each other. The issue of
trust deficit remains between them. After any incident, issue or even minor clash
both sides start to look each other with suspicion and a blame game starts. The
border clashes mainly occurred because of this phenomenon as both sides are
always on alert against each other and because of this most of the talks,
agreements, and accords have failed between them. During a negotiation process
the atmosphere is full of lack of trust. The signed agreements have been failed and
the talks have ended futile at the verge of signing by both sides. (Kibal, 2005)

The major examples are the Tashkent Declaration signed on January 19,
1966 by both sides after of 1965 war. The major clause of this agreement was that
no side will interfere in internal matters of other side. This clause was clearly
violated by India during 1971 mainly because of suspicion and lack of trust.
During Agra Summit in 2004 the agreement was not signed by both states right at
the last moment. Both sides were not ready to trust each other especially in case of
Kashmir Issue. The Pakistani delegation wanted to call the fighters as freedom
fighters of Kashmir whereas Indian wanted to call them as the terrorists and this
resulted in no agreement. The same case has happened during the Parliament
attack in 2001 and Mumbai Attacks in 2008 when both sides started to blame each
35
other.Again there was no trust on each other. (Caranza, 2008)

This trust deficiency is the major reason of the conflict resolution effort
failures between both sides. The efforts made to resolve issues have proved to be
futile on both official and non-official fronts. All the round of talks on Kashmir
issue have been ended in failure because both sides are not ready to believe each
other although they have the UN Resolutions present for the resolution but still not
ready to act upon them. (Khan, 2009)
Border Clashes
The hostility at the mutual border of both states is another major issue for
the relations of Pakistan and India. This issue has become the reason of the failure
of several conflict resolution efforts. The Border clashes and skirmishes have
remained the major reason of hostility of both states since 1947. Right after the
independence these neighbouring states were involved in border clash in shape of
Kashmir War in 1947. That was the point from where the unstable border issues
like LOC, Sachin Issue, Run of Koch conflict, and Water border has been the top
of the foreign policies of both states. All these border clashes have become the
main reason of the failure of diplomatic efforts and negotiations between Pakistan
and India. (Carranza, 2008)

Furthermore these clashes have resulted in stretching the conflict and

relational gap between both states to new level and much longer time period. The
cross border firings usually ended in the death of civilians on both sides which
leads to the new confrontation, blame games and widened relation gap. The border
confrontation has took the shape of cross border terrorism in which both states
blame each other of terrorist activities like Parliament Attack, Mumbai Attacks of
2008, Insurgency of Balochistan especially after 2005, the terrorism in shape of
36
TTP. These all border conflicts have led to more suspicions and failure of peace
process between both sides. The unstable border has resulted in unstable relations.
The long border has never remained stable for longer time period which is the
reason of constant hostile relations of Pakistan and India. A stable border and less
border conflicts will definitely assure sustainable and strong relations between
these important South Asian states. (Clyde, 2015)
Lack of Economic Interdependence
The world has become a globalized village especially since 1991. The states
have become economically interdependent on each other which led to more
peaceful and stable relations among the states. One of the failures of conflict
management between Pakistan and India is the lack of economic interdependence
on each other. The economic interdependence most definitely increases the
communication, contact between the states which increase the trust on one another
and the threat of war reduce because of the economic interests and investment on
each others‘ territory. Due to very low economic investment there are no mutual
interests between both states which proved to be vital for failure of the conflict
resolution efforts between both states. This challenge of no economic
interdependence has been discussed and analyzed by both states on numbers of
occasions but ultimatelyhas failed die to numerous reasons.

The economic interdependence could have saved number of clashes

and wars between both states and have made the mutual relations strong as well as
the regional circumstances stable and prosper. The economic interdependence
has
ended the hostility of many states in Europe but Pakistan and India has failed to
acquire advantages from that model. (Sardar, 2005)

37
Social and Media Hostility
Although people on both sides of the border have lived together for
centuries prior to the partition but the differences between them have proved to be
a critical challenge for both Pakistan and India. The social, religious and
traditional differences between masses of both states have proved to be another
fundamental reason of the failure for establishing strong relations. Two states
were divided mainly on the idea of Two Nation Theory which states that people
on both sides are different in almost every aspect especially in religious values.
Both have totally opposite teaching in most aspects of life. Furthermore during the
partition, millions of people were killed by the mobs on both sides which sow a
deep seed of hatred between Pakistanis and Indians. (Moahmmad. Naqvi, 2008)

38
TERRIOTY, CONFLICT & CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY

The existing literature on the Partition and the postcolonial South Asian
states takes a unlined view of the nations of territory, conflict and sovereignty.
Scholars such as Arthur Michel (1967, pp.10-35), Undala Alam (1998), Majed
Akhter (2015), Sarah Ansari (2005, pp.18-45) and David Gilmartin (2015, pp.1-
14, pp.182-98) have explored different aspects of decolonization, democracy, civil-
military relations and territorial conflict between India and Pakistan. Yet such
scholarship has underestimated the potential of territorial waters in shaping
political and strategic perceptions, public policy choices, notions state formation
and the military strategy in India and Pakistan. Moreover, existing accounts tend
not to problematize ―territoriality‖ the way that Haines in his Rivers Divided has
attempted to. Taking a conceptual and empirical departure from the existing works
that are grounded in history, topography and (in)security of the subcontinent, the
author is more into the politics of the Indus waters. In so doing, the author has
invoked the overwhelming impact of the Cold War geopolitics on the domestic
politics, national leadership and choice formation in India and Pakistan.

In conceptualizing ‗territory‘ in the pre-Partition period, Haines, who

implicitly applies a constructivist cover to the data, conducts a discursive survey of
nationalist thought being popularized by both the Hindu and the Muslim
leadership. The All India National Congress along with plethora of right-wing
Hindu religious organisations such as the RSS equated the material notion of
territory with the physical and spiritual characteristics of humans in terms of
‗Mother India‘ (Haines, 2016, p.22). In contrast,

Muslim visions of territory were more diverse. While some Muslims joined
Congress and worked for a composite, all-India nationalism, the Muslim League
39
challenged Congress and Hindu nationalist visions of India as one nation, with one
territory. Apart from any cultural and spiritual distinctiveness, Muslim political
consciousness coalesced around the separate representation that the colonial
government granted to Muslims in councils and assemblies…The Lahori poet,
Muhamamd Iqbal, as president of the Muslim League in 1930, argued that
Muslims in India should not be seen as part of an Indian nation, alongside Hindus
and others…Iqbal emphasized the commonality of the ummah (community of
believers) in a world of internationalism. By contrast, Mohammad Ali
Jinnah…insist[ed] that India was not a nation but a geographical space where the
two nations lived.

For instance, Indian leadership, as Haines‘ archival research points out,

predicated its ‗absolute sovereignty‘ on Kashmir with reference to state formation.
To the contrary, Pakistan assumed Kashmir as ‗territorial integrity‘ for the
federalization of the state that comprised of two separate parts, namely, East and
West Pakistan surrounded by India (Haines, 2016, pp.43-55). Though the
Radcliffe Award, delimitated the Indo-Pakistani boarders, though not as fully as is
generally believed, it produced problems due to its neglect to clearly divide rivers
and adjacent areas. Since the Indus waters flow from Indian administered Kashmir
into Pakistan, the two sides developed competing notions of territoriality that were
linked with their subjective conception of sovereignty. Therefore, when India
stopped the flow of water for Pakistan in May 1948, the latter not only protested
but asserted ownership over the Indus Basin on the basis of ‗prior appropriation‘.
In other words, Pakistan claimed that the pre-independence areas that constituted
Pakistan had utilised the Indus waters uninterrupted for aeons and thus had the
topographical and ethical right to receive water supply without Indian interference
into the basin.

40
INSTITUTION, CONFLICTS & RIVALRY
One of the main, if not the primary, spoilers for any reconciliation between
India and Pakistan can be found in the latter‘s internal political and institutional
struggles. There is no dearth of literature on Pakistani‘s politics, history and civil-
military relations (Siddiqa, 2007, pp.1-20). These accounts have identified the role
of the state institutions, particularly the military, in the country‘s politics, society,
economy and the foreign policy. However, fewer studies exist to map the outreach
and analyse the role and impact of sub-institutions such as the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) that has assumed immense significance, at least, in the Indian
strategic and intelligence communities. As already mentioned, Kashmir conflict
and India-Pakistan (nuclear) relations constitute the core of India-Pakistan Nuclear
Diplomacy and Rivers Divided. There is, then, a need to problematize the role of
the permanent state institution(s) in comprehending the level and degree of the
lingering territorial conflicts, dangers of (nuclear) arms race and prospects for
strategic stability in the South Asian region.
To begin with, Lal‘s The Monstrous Face of ISI (2000, pp.6-14) and Dhar‘s
Fulcrum of Evil: ISI-CIA-Al Qaeda Nexus (2006, pp.15-45) offers particularistic
view of the ISI‘s role in Kashmir, Northeast India and, for that matter, Afghanistan
and the Middle East. This literature, by and large, does not highlight the internal
structure, financial and institutional capacity of the organization. In contrast,
Winchell‘s Pakistan‘s ISI: The Invincible Government (2003) and Sirrs‘ Pakistan‘s
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (2017, pp.13-48) shed light on the internal
intricacies of the formidable force.
As far as Pakistan‘s security/foreign policy was concerned, the agency‘s
capacity and role was quite miniscule under the Ayub regime. However, since
1957, the ISI was involved in fomenting anti-India insurgencies in Northeastern
India. Paradoxically, this anti-India development took place in the show of India-

41
Pakistan negotiations over the Indus Basin. Besides, the book leaves the
impression that, perhaps during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the role and outreach
of the agency was quite limited. If so, this then explains the its inability in
acquiring and communicating intelligence during the 1965 war (p.23). However,
during the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan, the ISI proved to be highly competent and
efficient by forwarding copies of General Manekshaw‘s operational instructions on
the forthcoming Indian invasion. Yet, despite this windfall, the country‘s military
and civil leadership could not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan.
In the post-1971 period, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tended to rejuvenate morale of
the military. To prevent the penetration of the Soviet and Afghan elements in
Pakistan‘s bordering areas with Afghanistan and Iran, the Bhutto government
entrusted the Inter-Services-Intelligence that trained and utilized around 5,000
strong Afghan guerrilla troops. Colonel Syed Raza Ali, in this regard, played a
leading role. However, owing to the intricacies of imbalanced civil-military
relations, the Bhutto government was dismissed by General Zia ul Haq in July
1977. He ‗insinuated a possible conspiracy had been hatched against him among
the military leadership and the intelligence agencies‘ (Kiessling, 2016, p.39).

42
CHALLENGES
I will now turn to how we have addressed the external challenges
confronting Pakistan and how we are working to create a promising environment
for peace and development in South Asia and beyond.

Our external challenges arise from the threat of terrorism and the old
conflicts that have afflicted the region. Our neighbourhood has remained disturbed
mainly on two counts: the conflict in Afghanistan and the unresolved Kashmir
dispute that has been source of tension between Pakistan and India since the two
countries became independent over half a century ago.
Terrorism and Extremism
When speaking about terrorism and extremism I need to clarify a
misperception. The Western media often portrayed Pakistan as a breeding ground
for extremism and some have even alleged government support for extremist
groups. Let me clear this false perception.

When Afghanistan became last front of the Cold War, the world community
and Pakistan stood together to check the Soviet advance. Over ten long years,
conflict raged in Afghanistan with active support of most of the free world.
Madrassas were encouraged inside the refugee camps as nurseries for recruits.
Twenty to thirty thousand Arab youth were brought to the Afghan front. The
infrastructure that is seen to support international terrorism today was created at
that time.

Thus extremism and terrorism in Pakistan is a blow back from the

unfortunate developments in Afghanistan. This phenomenon poses a formidable
challenge to our vision of a moderate and progressive society. We regard

43
extremism and terrorism as regressive forces that de-stabilise societies and are
anti-progress. Our resolve to fight these forces is therefore strong and primarily in
our own interest.
Extremism is a complicated phenomenon and it relates to a state of mind.
We have adopted a multi pronged strategy to address it combining military,
political, economic and social elements. Force is used against those who refuse to
renounce violence. We have banned militant outfits, frozen their financial assets
and have acted against those spreading prejudice and hate, but military action can
only go this far. Our broader effort hinges on winning hearts and minds by
expanding economic opportunities, increasing education, reforming madrassas,
broadening political participation and mobilizing civil society to help spread the
message of tolerance and moderation.

Pakistan-India peace process

In our effort to build a peaceful and secure regional environment, we are
engaged with India in a peace process to ensure durable peace in South Asia. We
are seeking resolution of all outstanding issues including the core dispute over
Kashmir. Confidence building measures have already led to improved relations.
We want the momentum for peace to become irreversible. But for this to
happen, we must address the Kashmir dispute. President Musharraf's proposals on
demilitarization, self-governance and joint management reflect out-of-the-box
thinking. Kashmiris must be associated with the peace process on Kashmir. The
challenge before us is to demonstrate courage, sincerity and flexibility to resolve
the outstanding issue of Kashmir. The international community can help by
encouraging both countries to move forward and make meaningful progress.

44
Pakistan as a Regional Economic Hub
We have a vision for Pakistan rooted in our geography to become a hub of
economic, trade and communications activity linking our neighbouring regions of
South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia or the Middle East.
Pakistan provides the shortest access to the sea for landlocked countries of
Central Asia as well as Western China. To facilitate linkages we have developed a
third port at Gawadar close to the Gulf. We are engaged in large-scale construction
of roads and plan to have a rail network as well that would serve to link up the
adjoining regions, especially Central Asia. We also plan to develop oil and gas
pipelines and electricity grids which could satisfy our growing energy needs and
become energy corridors for China and India. We are conscious that for the
realization of these ambitious objectives we need to promote peace and help
conflict resolution in the area.

Vision for Pakistan

We are transforming our challenges into opportunities. We are designing
our policies to benefit from globalization, taking advantage of ore" geography and
are determined to build on the sustained economic growth, political stability and
peaceful regional environment that we have been able to achieve. Pakistan is
committed to play its part in the promotion of peace, stability and development in
our region and in the world. With the United States, today we are partners in the
war on terror as well as in the efforts to build a more peaceful, secure and stable
world. Our strategic interests now converge on a wider spectrum of bilateral,
regional and global issues.

45
 CHAPTER-3

FINDINGS & SUGGESTIONS

FINDINGS
Since the ancient time India had social-cultural federal set-up. Before Britishers
India had never unitary system of government. It had always federal polity in
which there were organic links among the lowest level to the highest level;

•Britishers introduced unitary system in India (1773). Gradually they realized the
compulsions of the unitary system. In the beginning of the twentieth century
through the Act of 1909, 1919 and 1935 they facilitated the introduction of federal
polity in India to a very limited extent;

•Prior to the idea of partition national leaders wanted India to be federal with strong
states but the partition of India changed it to vice-versa;

• After independence Indian federalism under the one dominant party system was
centralised federalism. Centre was very powerful, states had little role as units of
the Indian federalism and centre government treated the states as administrative
units. They were directed by the centre in all the matters. Centre was not hesitant to
impose its will as elder brother in those states where Congress was in power;

• Congress used Article 356 and the institution of Governor to debacle the opposition
in the states or to manage the power for Congress .

•Till 1977 Congress power was not challenged at the centre. Although in the states
regional parties with the help of the non-Congress parties formed the governments
and demanded more power for the states;

•Janata party won the election on the plank, Congress misused the powers
byimposing national emergency in 1975;
46
 • Janata party in its agenda gave priority to strengthen the federal system in
positive manner due to the short span and bickering within the party Janata party it
failed to fulfill its promises. Congress regained power in 1980 and remained in
power till 1989. It was the period when Congress was in majority but position was
different from pre 1977 period. Although Congress had majority in the Parliament;
but centrifugal forces and pressures within Congress itself by region based leaders
for more powers was consolidated and expressed from different platforms;
The demand for more federalize system pursued by the opposition and regional
parties in concrete manner through opposition conclaves from 1983;

Rising pressures and strengthening of pluralistic society led to the change in

Indian federal system; •Mass political participation led to the coalition era at the
centre. Coalition politics in India gave space to the regional parties as
supplementary to the national parties;

Effectiveness of regional parties enhanced at the national level. Their increasing

bargaining power at the national level helped to grow the system in co-operative
federalism;

47
SUGGESTIONS

On the basis of present study the following suggestions can be given: • Bi-nodal
system has evolved in India. The national parties and regional parties should give
priority to the national interest and they should try to accommodate their interests
accordingly. • Objective criteria should be followed to allocate the economic
resources to the states. • Priority should be given to develop the infrastructures in
those states which lacks that: • Economic federalism should be strengthened by
restructuring the taxation system in favour of the states.

• On the basis of present study regarding the future of federalism it can be

concluded that India has reached a stage where coalition is the permanent
phenomena in the near future stable position of regionsd parties also indicate the
importance of centrifugal forces. Present Indian socio-economic, political system
indicates that the socio-economic development is one of the important issue
around which the entire political system revolves. National and regional parties
will focus on the development of the masses. They will cooperate with each other
at the national and state level to develop healthy federal relations. Which is
necessary for their survival. Hence Indian federalism will grow into a healthy
federalism when there will be a balance between national and regional interest.
Imbalanced economy, rising disparities and hegemony of rich states in the Indian
system. In such conditions centre's role can't be denied in maintaining equilibrium
in the vast land of the India. States should not under estimate the position of the
centre as coordinator facilitator of the system.

48
 FINDING POINTS

The article has following findings:-

 Pakistan and India has never enjoyed sustained and stable relations for longer time
of period.
 The Conflict Resolution are few and were never continued for a sustainable time.
 Pakistan and India‘s conflict resolution efforts have always been hindered by
some border clash, war or non-state actors‘ terrorism.
 Both states have always kept the grudge and never have trusted each other wholly.
 These two South Asian States have not taken the model of regional cooperation
like European Union, hence always remained at loggers head with each other.
 The governments of both states have remained unable to control the religious and
nationalist elements in their territories which have led to more hostility at social
and domestic level.
 The tool of economic interdependence has never been used by both neighbouring
states in today‘s globalized world because of which the hostility has always on
rise.
 The deep rooted social enmity among the masses in a major reason for the failures
in conflict management between these two states
 The failures of conflict management has not only led to the mutual enmity but also
have created instability in the South Asian Region.
 Pakistan and India need to establish constant communication channels which can
even work during the hostile times
 The trust building measures must be taken by both governments through cross
border interactions of different social groups like students, businessmen, diplomats
and academics
 A Hot Line must be established between both heads of the states like US and
49
USSR presidents during Cold War which diverted the Cuban Missile Crisis at last
moment Umbreen Javaid & Naseem Sahrai Conflict Management betweenThe
media interaction needs to be increased especially through films medium as joint
production can lead to more social understanding between the masses on both
sides of the border.

50
CONCLUSION

Pakistan and India have never enjoyed friendly relationship for loner time
period rather both sides have remained hostile for most of the time in their mutual
history. The Wars, border clashes and non-state militant attacks have increased the
relational gap between them. Over the course of time the policies of both
sideshave hindered and failed the conflict management efforts. The conflict
resolution and management steps like diplomacy, negotiations and mediations
have mostly ended in failure and efforts ended in futile. Both sides need to
increase the communication through different channels like social, economical,
diplomatic, and unofficial diplomatic windows. The conflict resolution of different
issues between these states is not only necessary for them but also for the whole
South Asian Region.

The four texts analysed share some common themes: territory, conflict,
sovereignty and (limited) cooperation. Rivers Divided set the tone by highlighting
the hydro-political significance of Kashmir over which India and Pakistan fought
three wars. Since the much-hyped Indus Waters Treaty failed to resolve the
Kashmir conflict, it gradually lost relevance for conflict resolution in a dissimilar
setting; for example the Farakka barrage in the Bengal basin. The contested
notions of territoriality and sovereignty factored into elite decision making that, on
the one hand, perpetuated mutual mistrust and misgivings and, on the other,
embedded conventional rivalry that took a nuclear turn in the 1970s onward. The
past decades have only added to strategic uncertainty in the South Asian region,
posits India- Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy. Importantly, the state institutions, both
civil and military, in the subcontinent seem to have lost faith in creating peaceful
conditions for coexistence. Faith, Unity, Discipline has, thus, provided with useful

51
insights about the role, functions and outreach of one of the powerful state
institutions in Pakistan, the ISI that views India in rival terms.

Last but not the least, The Spy Chronicles provides a detailed discussion of
the challenges that hinder normalization in India-Pakistan relations, and the
opportunities being missed in the past and the ones available presently. If the two
countries are able to revisit, and revise their revisionist policy and posture and
stride in building bilateral confidence, the toughest of issues can be resolved. In
order to do so, however, both the states will have to reorient its institutional mind-
set, remould state nationalism and re-work on antagonistic populism; which, by
default, demand further studies on the subject Being the two major regional
powers in South Asia, both the states could contribute for the socio-economic
development of the region but the hostility between the two kept the region devoid
of its potential development and progress. This is the reason that it is least
integrated region of the world as South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) has remained hostage to this hostility. In a conference in Carnegie
International, Khalid Kidwai stated it as:
‗How can sustained socioeconomic progress come about if the threat of
outstanding conflict, tension and recrimination hangs permanently in the air when
eyeball to eyeball stance with nuclear weapons in the background?‗140

The resolution of the Kashmir dispute is the key for the sustainability of
peace in South Asia. Stressing the two states to resolve the issue bilaterally, has
not and will not bring any conclusive result. Alternatively, the third-party
mediation becomes the need of the hour. UN resolutions have time and again
called for the plebiscite and the peaceful resolution of the dispute. Since the
resolutions are not self-executioner instruments, all permanent members of

52
Security Council owe the responsibility to persuade India to respect the UN
resolutions. Meanwhile, the issue of gross human rights violations also need to be
addressed in accordance withthe international humanitarian law.

To make the environment conducive for cooperation, India being the bigger
player in the region, should behave responsibly and should try to minimize the
level of threat perception in Pakistan emanating from India. M K Bhadrakumar,
former Indian diplomat writes, ‗the hallmark of a responsible regional power is the
capacity to douse tensions rather than queer the pitch of tensions that may affect
regional security and stability.‗ 141 India has to leave the policy of Pakistan‗s
encirclement by either encouraging the smaller neighboring states to adopt anti-
Pakistan approach, which is quite obvious in its relations with Afghanistan142 and
Bangladesh, or influencing smaller neighbors to follow Indian approach in forums
like SAARC. It should be realized that India cannot exert the same level of
influence and hegemony over Pakistan as it does in case of other smaller South
Asian states. It should be realized that the employment of Hindutva Slogan and the
consequent treatment of minorities in India and scourging Pakistan to harvest
political gains at domestic level, is not in the benefit of the people of any of the
states and only helps in worsening the already hostile environment. The politics in
India is overwhelmed with untenable anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Especially, portraying
Pakistan as the supporter of terrorism has not only been the part of India‗s
diplomacy at international level but this perception has also been strengthened
within India through media and politics.

53
 The future trajectory of Pakistan- India relations doesn‗t seem to be smooth.
Though, there has been a marginal increase in trade volume, uncertainty clouds the
environment; it has been and it can be subjected to disruptions due to any future
crisis. Though the chances of war are reasonably curtailed with the deterrence
stability brought in by nuclear weapons, continuous modernization of Indian
conventional and strategic capabilities is likely to trigger strategic arms race in
South Asia. Hence, the probability of war may not diminish altogether. Economic
integration, infrastructure connectivity and strategic hostility cannot go along
simultaneously and that too in the presence of core conflicts.

There is a strong domestic politics dimension to the whole issue which

would continue to influence the relations between the two countries. The recent
victory of BJP in Uttar Pradesh143, indicate that Modi is likely to continue his
aggressive approach towards Pakistan, to influence the domestic politics in his bid
for getting second term in the next general elections in 2019. Nevertheless, in an
optimistic scenario, when so many voices are being raised even in India144, there
could be possibility of changing the status quo, as the leadership in India with the
background like Modi, known as and trusted for Hindu nationalistic approach
could take the bold step of breaking the impasse in negotiations on all issues
including Kashmir. This would however require an innovative approach by both
Pakistan and India.

54
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