China-Pakistan nexus and its implication for
India
Riddhi Chopra,
International Relations, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University,
Gandhinagar, India
 ally during Beijing's period of international isolation in the
Abstract - While China’s friendship with a number of countries
has waxed and waned over the decades, Sino-Pak relationship is
said to have withstood the vicissitudes of larger international
politics as well as changes in regional and domestic currents.
Pakistan, one of the first countries to recognize the People’s
Republic of China, thus providing China with a corridor into the
energy rich Muslim states which was reciprocated with a
continual stream of no-strings-attached military hardware and
defense-related assistance from Beijing. The joint enmity towards
India also provided the initial thrust to a burgeoning Sino-Pak
friendship.
This paper intends to provide a profound analysis of the strategic
relation between China-Pakistan and examine India as a
determining factor. The Pakistan-China strategic relationship
has been conventionally viewed by India as a zero sum game,
wherein any gains accrued by Pakistan or China through their
partnership is seen as a direct detriment to the evolution of India-
Pakistan or India-China relation. The paper evaluates various
factors which were crucial for the synthesis of such a strong
relation and presents a comprehensive study of the various
policies and programs that have been undertaken by the two
countries to tie India to South Asia and reduce its sphere of
influence.
The geographic dynamics is said to breed a natural coalition,
dominating the strategic ambitions of both Beijing and
Islamabad hence directing their relationship. In addition to the
obvious geopolitical factors, there are several dense
collaborations between the two nations knitting a relatively close
partnership. Moreover an attempt has been made to assess the
irritants in China-Pak relations and the initiatives taken by the
two to further strengthen it.
Current trends in diplomatic, economic and defense cooperation
– along with the staunch affinity rooted in history and consistent
geo-strategic interests – points to a strong and strengthening
relationship, significant in directing India’s foreign and security
policies. This paper seeks to analyze the changing power
dynamics of the China-Pak nexus with external actors such as US
and India with an ulterior motive of their own and predict the
change in power dynamics between the four countries.
Keywords— Pakistan, China, India, strategic
I. INTRODUCTION
Since establishing diplomatic ties in 1951, China and
Pakistan entente has displayed incredible tenacity over the
years. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the
People's Republic of China in 1950 and remained a staunch
1960s and early 1970s [1]. Their shared understanding of
politics, culture and ideology has facilitated the construction
of close and mutually beneficial ties between the two.
As Pakistan and China strengthen their relations,
questions have arisen around the changing nature of thier
partnership and the implications of the presence of the Pan
Asian power in Pakistan for the region. More hard-line
elements in Washington and New Delhi argue that souring
US-Pak relations have pushed Pakistan closer to China, giving
the latter influence and access in pivotal regions where both
U.S and Indian interests are at stake, while others would claim
that the changing equation between India-US stipulated China-
Pak relation.
This paper accentuates the strong historical relation
between Pakistan and China with the deep rooted strategic and
political culture being the cornerstone of their alliance and
would expand this canvas by examining the mutual leverages
and limitations that underwrite the tenor and logic of their
partnership. However, the relationship, like most alliances,
had its ups and downs and has been influenced by each
country’s relation with India and the United States.
II. US – THE LESS RELIABLE ALLY?
For contextualizing Sino-Pak strategies, it is crucial to
consider the changing nature of Sino-US relation. America
was one of the first countries to have established peaceful
relations with Pakistan but the ulterior motive with which US
provided financial aid and support had its limitations,
especially in terms of influencing the narrative and Pakistan’s
policy on counter-terrorism. In order to establish
preponderance of its power, US relegates other nations to the
backstage. Even though the United States has funded billions
in the form of economic aid and military assistance, it has
been unable to secure the kind of influence it desires over
Pakistan. As a consequence of US’s demands and
interference, it is constantly under suspicion and considered a
fickle ally. Pakistan considers China a more reliable ally than
the United States, citing years of diplomatic manipulation and
neglect on the part of Washington. As the following
timeline explains, Pakistan and China grew closer in the 1960s
as Washington and Islamabad began to part ways over the
handling of regional issues [2].
After the Sino-Indian war in 1962 over Aksaichin, the
dynamics of their relation altered when China took advantage
of deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the United
States, as Islamabad saw US support for India in the war as a
sign of betrayal [3]. The war compelled Pakistan to reconsider
its allies and since then it has supported China on myriad of
crucially importance issues, especially those questioning
China's sovereignty like Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang and other
sensitive issues such as human rights. China reciprocated by
supporting Pakistan over the Kashmir issue at the United
Nations.
The 1965 Indo-Pakistani war gave new strength and
meaning to this alliance when United States blamed Pakistan
for the skirmishes in Kashmir – thereby defaulting the 1959
Agreement of Cooperation, which stated that the United States
would provide Pakistan military aid at its request but instead
issued a statement of neutrality [4]. After the discontinuance
of American military, China gave Pakistan the political
support it desired by backing its position and even threatened
to intervene if necessary. Subsequently the 1965 US embargo
on weapons to Pakistan, China became a strategic supplier of
conventional weaponry. China has played a significant role in
building Pakistan’s defense industry as the United States
imposed severe nuclear sanctions in the 1970s.
The 1971 India–Pakistan war over Bangladesh marked
another significant juncture in Sino-Pakistani relations and it
rose above the humdrum of routine diplomacy, when China
supported Pakistan, although in a more restrained manner than
in 1965, and used its veto for the first time as a permanent
member of the Security Council thereby rejecting
Bangladesh’s application for recognition as an independent
country in order to offset Indian dominance.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the invasion of
Afghanistan, the US-Pakistani relationship entered into a new
phase where Pakistan once again became strategically vital to
the United States. But soon Pakistanis were stung by what
they saw as U.S. indifference towards Pakistan after using it to
funnel aid to the Afghan Mujahadeen to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan. The Indo-US civil nuclear deal compounds
Pakistan's distrust in the United States, hence providing a
motive to the Pakistani officials to secure a similar deal with
China, consequently eroding the potency of the US as a
determining factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy initiatives.
China has repeatedly backed Pakistan’s position and its
stance on territorial sovereignty; for instance supporting
Pakistan’s demand for an apology from the United States for
the soldiers killed in November 2011 before reopening the
NATO supply route to Afghanistan. China also acknowledges
Pakistan’s future role as a major non-NATO ally which has
proven to be important for peace-building in Afghanistan.
In a nutshell, the Chinese offer of military assistance
and economic aid to Pakistan and the growing relation
between the two was to reinforce ‘a new friendship that came
into being on account of American neglect and a shared
euphemism for India’s rise’ [5].
III. CHINA-PAK – THE GROWING BONHOMIE
China maintains a robust relationship with Pakistan and
views a strong partnership a useful way to contain Indian
power in the region and meet its quest to seek maritime and
geographic access to bolster power. The China–Pakistan
partnership follows the paradigm of realism by forming a de
facto alliance against India. Chinese officials also view a
certain degree of India–Pakistan tension as advancement to
China-Pak relation as friction would box India down to South
Asia and would interfere with New Delhi’s ability to
accomplish its global ambitions and compete with China at the
international level [6].
Both the nations have established a power-packed
regime and have been mutually benefited by the relation in
numerous ways. China’s enduring relation with Pakistan has
fulfilled its three important objectives in its foreign policy.
1) Pakistan’s role as a leading Muslim state and its
proximity to the energy rich central states provides a corridor
to the Islamic nations.
2) Pakistan’s proxy war would not only engage India, but
more importantly contains India’s strategic influence.
3) The Karakoram to Gwadar highway corridor provides
China an access to the Indian Ocean and more importantly the
vital Persian Gulf and Malacca strait. [7]
Pakistan’s growing partnership with China has helped it
accomplish its objectives.
1) Assure the survivability of Pakistan by enabling it to
become a nuclear weapons state.
2) A nuclear Pakistan is more emboldened to wage a proxy
war against India without fear of any major response from
India.
3) China’s collaboration and joint research in several sectors
of the economy has enhanced Pakistan’s growth and
development. [8]
China-Pak cooperation covers all facets of economy,
military, energy industry with nuclear and military transfer
which has proven to be a keystone of their alliance. The
following section encompasses detailed analysis of their
shared security perception which provides necessary backdrop
to the evolution of their relation.
A. Military Cooperation
The role of military-to-military ties and defense cooperation
is often used as a highly symbolic tool to signify the strength
of their relation. Both countries consider nuclear technology
as a potential currency of power that represents the ultimate
security against overwhelming aggression. In the face of US
embargo, closed Russian market and expensive French mirage
fighters, China faithfully provided military assistance to
Pakistan, fitting in terms of price and ease of operation and
maintenance of Chinese weapons. The rising military
capabilities of China has accelerated Pakistan’s
metamorphosis into a great military power providing scientific
proficiency to Pakistan’s defense nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
The most significant development in Chinese–Pakistani
military cooperation occurred in 1992, when China supplied
Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Beijing
also built a turn-key ballistic missile manufacturing facility
near Rawalpindi, and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-
range solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile [9]. In 2003,
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist,
instrumental in developing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
program, confessed that China had supplied Pakistan with
significant quantities of low-enriched uranium, allowing
Pakistan to accelerate the production of weapons-grade
uranium in the early 1980s [10]. There are indications that
China provided Pakistan with nuclear warhead designs from
China’s 1966 nuclear test. In 1994, information surfaced that
China’s Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had transferred
5,000 ring magnets to a Pakistani nuclear weapons lab for use
in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. The harsh international
reaction to the transfer prompted China to pledge in 1996 that
it would not allow any further cooperation with unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities.
China expedited the delivery of 50 additional JF-17
fighter jets to Pakistan after the death of Osama bin Laden
[11]; assisted Pakistan in building its first frigate a month later
and in August 2011 launched a communications satellite for
Pakistan. This was followed by Pakistan’s keen interest in
sending an astronaut on a Chinese spacecraft. Finally, reports
that the Pakistani military had given China access to the US
helicopter that had crashed during the raid on bin Laden’s
compound in Abbottabad alarmed Washington, although
China and Pakistan both vehemently denied the accusations
[12].
Sphere of cooperation covers supply of weapons,
intelligence-sharing, counter-terrorism and joint exercises.
Pakistan and China carry out military exercises every two
years and have tested their capacity to conduct operations
from a joint command center to search and destroy missions,
simulation of large-scale intelligence gathering by Chinese
and Pakistani troops.
B. Interpretation of China-Pak Nuclear Program
India’s nuclear test in 1974 was followed by the nuclear
alliance between China and Pakistan. The interpretation of
China-Pakistan nuclear relation can be done from the
traditional realist point of view with “Balance of power” as its
core conception. Beijing’s motivations in transferring
materials and technology to Pakistan derive largely from
Chinese concern about the regional balance of power and are a
part of Chinese struggle to pursue a strategy of containment in
its enduring rivalry with India. Also in case of an acute
conflict and an intense arms race between India and Pakistan,
India would continue to be employed with smaller regional
rival Pakistan and not China. Both the countries indulge in
sub tactical activities against India under the nuclear shield.
China assisted in building Pakistan’s nuclear weapon
capability and civilian energy programme in 2004. China also
built two new nuclear reactors for Pakistan, Chasma III and
Chasma IV, but U.S. indicated that Beijing must first seek an
exemption after having joined NSG which forbids any
exchange of nuclear technology to those countries that have
not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Beijing has argued that the proposal should be viewed as a
part of an earlier agreement struck with Pakistan before
Beijing joined the NSG and thus be accommodated, which
was then approved.
China also supports Pakistan’s fight against terrorism gives
the latter the kind of political support it desires which is
largely lacking from the international community and was
most clearly illustrated when China supported Pakistan after
the US raid in May 2011 that killed bin Laden where it called
on the U.S. to respect the “independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity” of Pakistan and announced it would
expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 aircraft equipped with
upgraded avionics to Pakistan. Pakistan and China have also
been put under sanctions by the US in order to mount pressure
on the transfer in ballistic missiles under Missile Technology
Control Regime to prevent the transaction but US’s efforts
went in vain.
The Chinese aid to Pakistan’s nuclear programme is
believed to be ranging from supply of design information,
setting up of enrichment plants, supply of nuclear test data,
conducting nuclear tests on behalf of Pakistan, supply of
heavy water and transfer of reprocessing technology. [13] Pak-
China civilian programme has also come under International
criticism when allegations that A.Q Khan sold the nuclear
know- how and technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea.
C.Economic cooperation
Most of the Chinese investment in Pakistan is aimed at the
public sector. China and Pakistan have planned to implement
36 projects worth $14 billion under the Five Year
Development Programme for Trade and Economic
Cooperation [15]. The Karakoram Highway, completed in
1986, has served as a vital artery connecting China’s western
regions to Pakistan.
In early 2007 Pakistan and China began a joint venture
developing the Haier-Rub Economic Zone near Lahore which
was the first overseas Chinese special economic zone aimed at
developing Pakistan’s capacity to become a regional industrial
hub [16]. From 2009 to 2012 MoU’s were signed for the
construction of 12 small- and middle capacity dams in
Pakistan along with Chinese financial and technical support
for the Bunji dam in Pakistan’s northern areas thereby
enhancing the country’s water supply.
China also provided necessary financial aid in 2010 for
the natural disaster that wrecked their economy which was the
highest Chinese disaster aid to any country. Apart from
monetary aid, for both the 2010 and the 2011 floods, China
had sent search-and rescue teams, delivered aid quickly
through land routes and pledged reconstruction assistance,
especially for transport links and agricultural and irrigation
networks, which were badly damaged. The 2010 floods also
marked the first time Chinese military helicopters carried out
an overseas humanitarian mission [17].
D.Strategic investments
Strategic investments in Sino-Pakistani economic relations
are based, first, on economic development which is aimed to
keep Pakistan stable to avoid any flux in Xinjiang; second,
access to vital maritime routes to secure China’s energy
supplies. The latter would also facilitate China’s drive to
surpass Indian and US influence in the Indian Ocean and the
South China Sea. A third consideration is that investing in
Pakistan also keeps Indian ambitions in check, as Indian
observers become more vigilant about Chinese maritime
ambitions regarding the ‘String of Pearls’ – a reference to
ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka that are
available for China to use [18].
China has taken initiatives in public-sector financing,
including telecoms, shipping and energy projects, as well as
assistance in engineering and scientific research and
development. China’s policy on foreign aid refrains from
imposing nay kind of political conditions and lays emphasis
on non-interference in a country’s internal affairs, which
resonates with Pakistan.
E. Gwadar port
Pakistan is China’s land corridor to Indian Ocean and line
to the gulf and West Asia. China has gained commensurate
maritime access with a possibility of surge into the Indian
Ocean through Gwadar port. Gwadar is situated on the
Arabian Sea in Balochistan province of Pakistan, just 180
nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, through which a
third of the world’s oil supply passes. It offers a prime
location to monitor shipping passing through the Strait of
Hormuz from the Persian Gulf, as well as access to cheap land
route through Pakistan into western China and Central Asia.
The port is a foremost destination in CPEC. China’s
financing of the port has drawn considerate attention since
access to the port would allow China to secure oil and gas
supplies from the Persian Gulf and potentially project power
in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Gwadar also offers a staging
area for launching missiles against enemy ships which has
been a subject of serious concern for Japanese, Indian, US,
Malaysian SLOC’s in the region.
Gwadar faces out onto the Arabian Sea, running
alongside India on one side and the Horn of Africa on the
other, with the Persian Gulf on the right and the Red Sea on
the left [19]. It is one of the busiest areas of the world and of
fundamental importance especially for China, since it not only
covers 44% of Beijing’s crude oil imports but also 66% of
India's and 75% of Japan's. India, the U.S., and other
countries are concerned that China may eventually seek access
to the port for its warships which would pose a menace to their
ambitions in the region.. Gwadar offers geo-economic and
geo-strategic pivot to both China and Pakistan.
China’s ‘string of pearls’ is a term used to refer to the
ports in Indian Ocean that China has invested in. China has
sought to build stronger relations with not only South East
Asian states but also other countries like Japan and Australia
to counter the growing Indian strategic convergence. China
has financed commercial ports in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri
Lanka (Hambanto and Colombo), Bangladesh (Chittagong)
and Myanmar (Sittwe and Kyaukpu). Among all these ports,
Gwadar is the most important pearl. Gwadar has attracted
international attention and has long been labelled as a node in
China’s ‘String of Pearl’ that would provide a number of
maritime access points in the Indian ocean which the Chinese
navy should be able to use to enhance its dominance in the
region.
F. CPEC
April 2015 was a crucial month for Sino-Pakistan relations
when Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif signed an agreement worth $46 billion
for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is
considered to be the largest investment by China in a foreign
country This Corridor is one of the most notable projects, as it
would connect most of the key geostrategic locations in South
Asia. It will mainly act as a trade bridge between China, the
Middle East and Europe through Pakistan.
In terms of trade route, China primarily relies on the
shipping route that passes through the Strait of Malacca which
takes around 45 days to reach Europe via the Middle East.
With CPEC, the Kashgar-Gwadar route would be of
paramount importance as it would reduce staggering amount
of time and distance up to 10 days. Moreover, the reliance on
the Malacca route would be significantly reduced, as it is a
potential flashpoint of blockade by the United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) in periods of hostility which poses
trouble for China.
Large portion of CPEC has also been reserved for
power projects that aim at reducing demand-supply gap in
energy-starved Pakistan. Moreover, the expansion of road
network across the country is a major central point for both
infrastructural development and Chinese goods to pass
through. The project is seen as a source of wealth that would
bring about stability for the two regions which are a source of
serious concern for both Beijing and Islamabad: Pakistan’s
Baluchistan and China’s Xinjiang, first, which borders
Afghanistan and Iran, one of the main breeding grounds of
Islamic extremism, the second, inhabited by the Uyghurs, a
Muslim minority that feeds terrorism into Beijing. The hope
of the two governments is that an enhanced standard of living
may ease the tensions and curb extremism.
G.Trade
While the United States outranks China in private
investment, the latter focuses its investments in the public
sector, Sino-Pakistani trade is currently 20% higher than US–
Pakistani trade. This growth was spurred by the 2006 visit of
Hu Jintao to Pakistan, when a bilateral free trade agreement
(FTA) was signed, directed at raising the value of trade
between the two countries and facilitating exports of Pakistani
agricultural produce to China. Bilateral trade registered an
overall growth of 22%, rising to $10.6 billion in 2011 from
$8.7 billion in 2010. However, the level of bilateral trade is
still fairly low for a number of reasons, including Pakistan’s
limited range of commodities for export and its restricted
market. China focuses on exporting cheap goods to Pakistan.
On the whole, the FTA has benefited China more than
Pakistan as the latter’s exports is unable to compete in the
Chinese market [20]. Pakistan principally exports textiles and
cotton to China but the relative advantage it had in producing
finished textiles has now been usurped by the ability of
Chinese factories to produce finished goods at a lower unit
price. As a result the Balance of Payment has been unstable
and more tilted towards China.
Hence, we can conclude that the cooperation between
the two has created cushions for the security for both the
countries and has also attributed to the global rise of China.
IV. IMAPCT ON INDIA
Historically, India has had tense political relations with
Pakistan and China. It has fought wars with both countries
and faces similar problems: disputed borders, competition
over natural resources, and the threat of Islamic militancy.
India is still regarded as the biggest threat to Pakistan – a
perception reflected in its foreign policy.
Clandestine nature of Sino-Pak relation has promoted
a culture of mistrust and disbelief in the minds of Indians
First, India is concerned about the sharing of intelligence,
military technology and defense cooperation between its
nuclear-armed neighbors, and about reports of China wanting
to construct military bases in Pakistan [21]. Second, India is
worried about China’s drive to secure energy and trade supply
routes in Central Asia and the Indian Ocean where India can
witness the Chinese building a ‘string of pearls’ that would
encircle their country.
India is apprehensive about China’s assistance in
building Pakistan’s civilian nuclear capabilities and supply of
ballistic missiles and aerospace weaponry. In June 2011 the
Nuclear Suppliers Group approved the supply of two
additional nuclear reactors by China to Pakistan, which was
viewed by Indian analysts as ‘a blow to our security interests’
[22]. The Pakistani army was the first foreign army to
conduct exercises on Chinese soil and, predictably, these joint
military exercises have also grabbed the attention of security
circles in New Delhi and been reported in the Indian media as
a mechanism to intimidate India.
The China-Pak strategic convergence in its maritime
dimensions opened a new gambit against India. China has
gone out of its way to woo countries in India’s periphery like
Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal in order to employ its
"String of Pearls" strategy that would substantially isolate
India by strengthening Chinese trade relations South Asian
countries thereby guaranteeing Beijing an economic influence
that can easily be transposed into political and military
influence. The airport zones acquired by Beijing will also
increase the ability of the Chinese Navy to use them as centers
for supply and for surveilling maritime routes. It is crucial that
India’s maritime strategy takes into account the expansion of
Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and seeks to mitigate
Chinese ambitions.
For India, CPEC means that China shall have the
upper hand in the Arabian Sea as it will have complete control
over the Straits of Hormuz through Gwadar’s seaport. The
convergence of oil lines into Gwadar signals Pakistani intent
to emerge as a pivotal link between Central Asia and the
Arabian Sea attempting to scuttle the India-Iranian undersea
pipelines that skirts Pakistani territorial control [23]. This is
likely to have adverse effects on India’s trade route and the
reason why India has started working with Iran for making
Chabahar seaport. Further India has a long term ambition to
join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), but China’s
opposition and providing support to Pakistan for the same
elevated India’s concern.
Another line of argument presumes India’s improved
relation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia ,
Vietnam is to counter Chinese strategy with its own policy
‘Necklace of diamond’ where India is building military
relations with key countries in the Indian and Pacific Ocean
and its neighboring countries to challenge any Chinese
initiatives in the region. India is trying to expand its influence
from North East Asia to South East Asia by gaining access to
Singapore’s naval facility for staging operation in the Malacca
strait to gain strategic access. Last year India commissioned
NAS Baaz, India’s first naval air station at Campbell Bay, the
southernmost island of the Andaman and Nicobar group of
Islands, which will enhance its surveillance capacity not only
in the Straits of Malacca but also the Straits of Sunda and
Lombok. India has also established relation with Vietnam as it
offers a window to monitor Chinese naval activity in the South
China Sea that serves as a strategic listening post for maritime
activity east of the Malacca strait. [24] This initiative has been
severely opposed by China on the grounds of disputed
territory where any 3rd nation should not interfere. Similarly
India is trying to enhance its relation with Western countries,
US being the most formidable ally. Recently, India also sought
to build drones partnering with key Middle Eastern player
Israel.
Hence it’s vital for India to safeguard its own
nationality sovereignty and territorial integrity by evolving a
better understanding of the threats posed and thereby issuing
and effective policy to counter it
V.IS AMERICAN INTERESTS AT STAKE TOO?
India is not the only nation sceptical of China’s behaviour;
also the US has shared similar concern regarding the same.
According to the ‘String of Pearls’ Theory, CPEC corridor is
one of the many megaprojects planned by China in Central,
South and South East Asia for expanding its political and
economic influence to also counter the relatively better
established US sphere of influence in the region. The Chinese
strategy is seen as a direct challenge by the US. The US has a
similar agenda in the form of ‘Pivot to Asia’, which aims at
countering China’s economic and military expansion in Asia-
Pacific. Consequently US is engaged in alliance formations
with regional players such as India, Japan, Indonesia and
Singapore in its quest to seek a comprehensive maritime
security to prevent the Chinese dragon from spreading its
influence.
The hostile nature of these moves has made Pakistan a
major player that can potentially balance the superpower
rivalries as it has good relations with both the West and China.
Therefore US realized the need for maintaining Pakistan as an
ally and a couple of weeks after Xi Jinping's visit to
Islamabad, the United States delivered, at a "special price" 14
fighter jets, 59 trainers and 374 vehicles for transporting
troops to Pakistan. Technically, the aircrafts were classified by
the Pentagon as ‘defense items in surplus’. It lies in best
interest of US to have Pakistan as an ally in order to pursue
and sustain a strong influence in the region.
VI. CHALLENGES
Despite the flowery and saccharine words used to describe
the depth and strength of their relationship, the low level of
people-to-people contact and cultural links between China and
Pakistan has been a constant challenge in their partnership.
China tries to stay short of getting entangled into any of
Pakistan’s misadventures. China’s ventures in Pakistan have
been constrained by its lack of personnel and funds as well as
instable political condition where it can’t guarantee the safety
of its own workers. Pakistan knows it has more to gain from
the relationship via Chinese investments and political support,
and reacts swiftly to any attacks on Chinese interests. But its
chronic instability has prompted China to reassess its ‘all-
weather’ ties with Pakistan behind the scenes, while it publicly
remains a staunch ally.
Though both the countries are trying to overlook the
minor frictions in the greater interest of sustaining friendship,
there are various factors that emerge as irritants which
characterize their axis, are further discussed in the section
below.
A. Financial issues
Thought China provides timely aid but the trade between
the two countries isn’t a strong attribute in their relation.
China has refrained from investing in the private sector due to
uncertainty in the region. Also Pakistan fails to provide a
diverse market for Chinese goods thereby limiting the trade.
Total direct investments in Pakistan have mostly been
portfolio investments rather than investments in industrial and
manufacturing ventures which reflect the volatility as well as
the lack of opportunity in Pakistani economy.
The PRC typically lends large amounts in barter—
such as loans for oil—or to fund substantive engineering
projects which are not frequent in Chinese–Pakistani
economic transactions. Indirect evidence comes from the
Pakistan–China Investment Company (PCIC) - an alliance
between the China Development Bank and the Pakistani
government [25]. Elsewhere, the China Development Bank
uses such entities extensively. A consistence reference in this
regard is the flourishing China–Africa Development Fund,
which has outstripped PCIC not only in terms of capital but is
also far more active [26].
The final, and perhaps most important, indication of
the limits of the China– Pakistan financial relationship is the
PRC’s not-so-gentle shunting of Pakistani aid requests to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF denied large-
scale aid requests made by Pakistan after the September 2008
world crisis, forcing Islamabad to accept a multi-billion$ IMF
program with stringent economic conditions. At the end,
China did agree to provide concessionary lending to Pakistan,
but its refusal to provide large-scale loans clearly indicates
China’s attitude towards Pakistan’s financial woes.
B. Xinjiang
Xinjiang is the largest political subdivision of China,
accounting for more than one-sixth of its territory and a
quarter of its boundary length [27]. Xinjiang’s is China’s
largest gas-producing and second largest oil-producing region,
with one of the largest networks of pipelines in the country. It
also contains 40% of wool and is a rich source of precious
metals such gold, copper and energy sources such as thermal
power and natural gas. The region is home to nine million
Uighurs, a Muslim population of Turkic origin, among which
separatist sentiment run high. In the western part of Xinjiang,
which borders northern Pakistan, ethnic tensions have grown
between the Uighur population and the Han, China’s ethnic
majority. During the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s,
hundreds of Uighur militants were trained in Pakistani
madrassas and returned to Xinjiang to join violent ultra-
nationalist groups which has led to much violence in the
region [28].
According to analysts China has privately begun to
question Pakistan’s ability to deliver on China’s interests in
the country. China does not want to become a target for
militants, especially in Xinjiang, because that would
compromise its wider goals of domestic stability, energy
security and economic growth. Beijing has in the past reacted
to militant attacks by closing the Karakoram Highway and
suspending land-based trade agreements that stalled the
economic growth for the time being [29]. Officials stated that
growing terrorism in the region had direct links with Pakistan,
where for the first time China has raised it concern. This
signaled the Chinese government’s increasing frustration over
Pakistan’s inability to check cross-border militancy, a linchpin
of Chinese support. Beijing is trying to balance its interest in
suppressing the Uighur threat with the possibility that such
suppression might further fuel Uighur separatism and provoke
further attacks against Chinese interests. One of the main
reasons that China has refrained from providing material
support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan is to avoid being
portrayed as part of an alliance against Islam. The Chinese
believe that the United States’ low favorability rating in
Muslim countries is proof that U.S. interference in the internal
affairs of these countries comes with serious blowback and
would thereby limit Chinese influence and its corridor into the
Islamic nations. The turmoil ridden Muslim majority of
Xinjiang has come to be a critical barometer and crucial litmus
test for the all-weather friends – China and Pakistan.
C.Low people to people contact
China has also been reluctant to let in Pakistani immigrants in
significant numbers for business, tourism or educational
purposes to limit any threats to internal stability. But in order
to promote cultural ties it has agreed to promote Pakistan as a
destination for its own population though these efforts have
not led to any significant change in numbers. Despite attempts
by both governments to bolster language and cultural links,
Pakistanis do not see learning Mandarin as a substitute for
learning English, especially in provinces such as Sindh and
Balochistan, which are furthest away from China. While
educational exchanges are often touted as examples of the
strength of the relationship, there have been cases of Pakistani
students sent to China on scholarships and then facing
financial hardship because the funding they were meant to
receive never materialized [30].
D.Balochistan
In other regions such as Sindh and Balochistan in Pakistan,
nationalist groups see targeting Chinese investments as an
effective means of attracting the immediate attention of the
Pakistani provincial and federal government. Having
observed how sensitive the government is in terms of
responding to an attack on Chinese interests or to any event
that would destabilize their relations, they follow the tactic of
attacking the latter.
Pakistan faces a low-scale insurgency in Balochistan
province — where Gwadar is located and where the proposed
pipelines will pass. Though China has built some inroads in
Pakistan, it still needs to lay thousands of kilometers of gas
and oil pipelines and railway track in order to turn Gwadar to
economic use which will cost money, which China is reluctant
to invest in this volatile region owing to its instability. A
number of feudal lords are opposed to large-scale foreign
investment, fearing it will bring an influx of outsiders.
Frequently Chinese workers have been victims of targeted
attacks which have resulted in a limited use of the port even
after the Chinese possessing the operating authority of the
port.
Pakistan’s geographical position is of key strategic
importance to China. However, the areas of economic and
security cooperation demonstrate the limitations of political
goodwill between the two countries. A stable Pakistan
benefits China in securing its national security interests in
Xinjiang but Pakistan’s deteriorating domestic traditional and
non-traditional security conditions have tested Islamabad’s
capacity to protect Beijing’s interests and to contain the fallout
of the volatility within its borders. The current situation has
exposed Islamabad’s limitations in terms of helping deliver
stability in Xinjiang and protecting Chinese investments and
assets in Pakistan.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growing China-Pak relation can have larger
implications for India. Presence of Chinese navy in the Indian
Ocean which is facilitated by Pakistan poses a serious threat to
India’s security in the region. With china trying to dominate
the South Asian sphere by following its policy “String of
Pearls” so as to reduce India’s sphere of influence and trying
to secure the vital energy routes, India will have to strategize,
devise and trigger its military operations following the
“Necklace of diamonds” policy as a counter measure to hold
on to and amplify its sphere of influence.
Also the China-Pak axis can cause trouble to the much
established influence India has in Afghanistan, with the new
Ghani government having its tilt towards Pakistan in a bid to
secure peace in his country. A reduced footprint for Indian
intelligence in Afghanistan could be on the cards as well. The
transfer of Chinese defense technology doesn’t pose as a
warning only to India to upkeep its security but also the other
non-proliferation regimes are at a risk. Moreover, with China
trying to flood Chinese in Tibet so as to make it loose its
cultural identity and looming with its own Dalai Lama
establishment, India might lose its only bargaining chip to
China. It is crucial for India to create stakeholders in China in
order to gain some discrete influence and have a say in its
policies. Also in case of an extreme situation like a war
between India-Pakistan,
 Can India expect a two war front, where China would
readily interfere and engage India from both the sides?
 With growing India-US relation and with the discontent
amongst US-Pak relation, will US completely side-line
Pakistan and have a pro India stance?
It is crucial that India formulates its policies to respond to
the China-Pak alliance and secure its own interest by
expanding its relations with countries having geo strategic and
political supremacy to curb the influence of the former. The
China-Pak-India strategic triad would determine remains the
future of South Asian security environment.
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