ASSIGNMENT ON

MOOT MEMORIAL

Submitted By Submitted To,

Sruti Das
Anirban Chakraborty
Asst. Professor
ID – 16ATBL122
ICFAI LAW SCHOOL
th
BBA-LL.B(H), 5 Year
ICFAI University, Tripura

Signature of Student Signature of Faculty

 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR
INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT
COMPETITION,
2014

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

Case Concerning on a
WRIT PETITION (PIL) No. ……../ 2014

Ms. NASREEN SHAH

(Petitioner)
Vs
UNION OF INDIANA
(Respondent)

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ARTICLES 32 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA

Written Submission on Behalf of Respondent

 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................4
A. CASES
B. STATUTES
C. INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS
D. REGULATIONS
E. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
F. BOOKS
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................5
4. QUESTION RAISED BY PETITIONER…………………………......5
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................5
6. STATEMENT OF ISSUES.....................................................................6
a. Whether the case is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indiana?

b. Whether Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 containing

extremely wide, vague and ambiguous terms is violative of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) &
21 of the Constitution of Indiana.

c. Whether Section 66A places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech

as opposed to free speech in the real world?
d. Whether Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 is
Unconstitutional?
e. Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 gives unbridled
powers to a police officer, to arrest any person, without warrant, found in any public
place who is reasonably suspected of being about to commit any cybercrime/offence
under the Information Technology Act, 2000?
f. Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is violative of
Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana

7. ARGUMENT SUMMERY……………………………………………..6
8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ………………...………………………..8
a. Whether the case is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Indiana?

b. Whether Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 containing

extremely wide, vague and ambiguous terms is violative of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) &
21 of the Constitution of India.

c. Whether Section 66A places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech

as opposed to free speech in the real world?

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

d. Whether Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 is

Unconstitutional?
e. Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 gives unbridled
powers to a police officer, to arrest any person, without warrant, found in any public
place who is reasonably suspected of being about to commit any cybercrime/offence
under the Information Technology Act, 2000?
f. Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is violative of
Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana

9. PRAYER………………………………………………………13

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 2

LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
IT Information and Technology
Hon’ble Honourable
PIL Public Interest Litigation
FIR First Information Report
MP Member of Parliament
U.K United Kingdom
Sec. Section
SFLC.in Software Freedom Law
Centre
UT Union Territory

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

1. Cases:
a. Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015
b. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins
2. Statutes:
a. Criminal Procedure of Code,1973
b. U.K. Communications Act, 2003
c. Information Technology Act, 2000
3. International Convention
European Convention on Human Rights
4. Constitutional Provisions
a. Art.14, Constitution of India,1950
b. Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of India, 1950
c. Art.21, Constitution of India, 1950
5. Books
a. BARE Act “The Constitution of India”
b. Dr. J.N. Pandey “Constitutional Law of India”
c. Justice Khastgir “Criminal Manual”
d. BARE Act “Information and Technology Act,2000”

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Hon’ble, Supreme Court Of Indiana, the petitioner has approached
under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indiana by fining the instant petition by way of PIL on
7th August 2012 seeking ‘section 66A of the IT Act and certain provisions of the Information
Technology (intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011’ to be declared as unconstitutional and
violative of Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It is humbly submitted
that this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the matter.

QUESTION RAISED BY PETITIONER

1. Whether the vague description of various acts constituting an offence under Sec. 66A
of the IT Act., without any definition or prescription of standards, is violation of the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the constitution

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The petitioner is a bona fide citizen of the country. The petitioner is an author and
social-activist.
2. The petitioner is a regular user of internet and social networking site such as
Friendsbook and he posted a comment and cartoon relating to a prominent political
leader of a national party, National People’s Party (NPP) on 20th July, 2012 on
Friendsbook, a social networking site.
3. A FIR was filed under section 66A of IT Act, 2000 against by Petitioner and taking
cognizance of the FIR, the police arrested the petitioner on dated…./2012
4. Later the petitioner has released on bail.
5. An important event that have happened that occurred in this regard was that Two
employees of Air Indiana were arrested by Maharashtra Police under inter alia
Section 66A of IT Act, 2000 for putting up a content on Friendsbook against a Trade
Union Leader and Some politicians and were held custody for 12 days.
6. Aggrieved by the action of police, and other similar incident, the petitioner has filed a
writ Petition under article 32 of the constitution of India before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Indiana by way of PIL on 7th August, 2012.
7. The present petition seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of various
provisions of the amended Information Technology Act, 2000, under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indiana by way of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), including Sections
66A and 80 as being violative of Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana.
8. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, relating to restrictions on
online speech, as unconstitutional on grounds of violating the freedom of speech
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of Indiana.

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1
Whether the case is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India?

Issue 2
Whether Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 containing extremely
wide, vague and ambiguous terms is violative of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) & 21 of the
Constitution of Indiana.

Issue 3
Whether Section 66A places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech as
opposed to free speech in the real world?

Issue 4
Whether Section 66A of Information Technology Act, 2000 is Unconstitutional?

Issues5
Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 gives unbridled powers
to a police officer, to arrest any person without warrant, found in any public place who is
reasonably suspected of being about to commit any cybercrime/offence under the Information
Technology Act, 2000?

Issues 6
Whether Section 80 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is violative of Articles
14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the present petition is
not maintainable. The petition filed by Ms. NASREEN SHAH is not maintainable as her
Fundamental Rights are not violated.

ISSUE 2
WHETHER SECTION 66A OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT,
2000 CONTAINING EXTREMELY WIDE, VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TERMS IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE ARTICLE 14, 19(1)(A) & 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA, IN AS MUCH AS SECTION 66A PLACES UNREASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS ON ONLINE FREE SPEECH AS OPPOSED TO FREE SPEECH IN
THE REAL WORLD?

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 containing extremely wide, vague and ambiguous terms is
not violation of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana, in as much as
Section 66A places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech as opposed to free speech
in the real world. Art.14, 19(1), & 21 are not being violated and all prescribed tests are being
satisfied.

ISSUE 3
WHETHER SECTION 66A PLACES UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON
ONLINE FREE SPEECH AS OPPOSED TO FREE SPEECH IN THE REAL
WORLD?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A is not
places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech as opposed to free speech in the real
world

ISSUE 4
WHETHER SECTION 66A OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A of
Information Technology Act,2000 is not unconstitutional. As this section is place for the
protection of individual sentiment as well as the state.

ISSUES 5
WHETHER SECTION 80 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
GIVES UNBRIDLED POWERS TO A POLICE OFFICER, TO ARREST ANY
PERSON, WITHOUT WARRANT, FOUND IN ANY PUBLIC PLACE WHO IS
REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF BEING ABOUT TO COMMIT ANY
CYBERCRIME/ OFFENCE UNDER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT,
2000?
The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Police officer not
below the rank of Inspector General of Police in the metropolitan cities or Deputy
Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of Police at the district level have the power to
arrest any person without warrant if he commits any cyber-crime where there have motive to
create any aggression to the public which will hamper the dignity of the any public person or
state.

ISSUES 6
WHETHER SECTION 80 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14, 19 & 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that section 80 of the IT
Act, 2000 does not violate the Article 14, 19, 21 of the Constitution of Indiana because

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

ARGUMENT ADVANCE

ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the present petition
is not maintainable. The petition filed by Ms. NASREEN SHAH is not maintainable as her
Fundamental Rights are not violated. The petitioner is an active subscriber of Internet and is
an Author. Apparently, the petitioner has filed the instant petition to gather fame and
publicity and therefore the instant case must be dismissed as the petition is motivated for
publicity and there is no Public interest involved. Moreover, the petitioner is an accused
under section 66A of the IT Act, and investigation into the case is still continuing. The
petitioner is also trying to justify and oppose the course of investigation by filing this instant
PIL. Therefore, this petition deserves to be rejected with cost.

ISSUE 2
WHETHER SECTION 66A OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT,
2000 CONTAINING EXTREMELY WIDE, VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TERMS IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE ARTICLE 14, 19(1)(A) & 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIANA, IN AS MUCH AS SECTION 66A PLACES UNREASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS ON ONLINE FREE SPEECH AS OPPOSED TO FREE SPEECH IN
THE REAL WORLD?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 containing extremely wide, vague and ambiguous terms is
not violation of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) & 21 of the Constitution of India, in as much as
Section 66A places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech as opposed to free speech
in the real world. The respondents submit the following arguments to affirm the same.
Vagueness is not a reason to declare unconstitutional a law if it is actually eligible and
unarbitrary. The respondents submit the following arguments to affirm the same.

In the case of Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015, In reply, Mr. Tushar Mehta,
learned Additional Solicitor General defended the constitutionality of Section 66A. He
argued that the legislature is in the best position to understand and appreciate the needs of the
people. The Court will, therefore, interfere with the legislative process only when a statute is
clearly violative of the rights conferred on the citizen under Part-III of the Constitution. There
is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. Further, the Court would
so construe a statute to make it workable and in doing so can read into it or read down the
provisions that are impugned. The Constitution does not impose impossible standards of
determining validity. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision cannot be a ground to declare a
provision invalid. Loose language may have been used in Section 66A to deal with novel
methods of disturbing other people's rights by using the internet as a tool to do so. Further,
vagueness is not a ground to declare a statute unconstitutional if the statute is otherwise
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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

legislatively competent and non-arbitrary. As applied to the case in hand, the Court found that
Section 66A is capable of limiting all forms of internet communications as it makes no
distinction “between mere discussion or advocacy of a particular point of view, which may be
annoying or inconvenient or grossly offensive to some and incitement by which such words
lead to an imminent causal connection with public disorder, security of State etc.”

In a 2006 judgment in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins, arising out of racist

references in messages left by a constituent on the answering machine of a British MP, the
House of Lords laid down a seminal test for determining whether a message is ‘grossly
offensive.’ It agreed with the formulation by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court that, in
determining whether a message is ‘grossly offensive’ the “Justices must apply the standards
of an open and just multi-racial society, and that the words must be judged taking account of
their context and all relevant circumstances.” The House of Lords added that “there can be no
yardstick of gross offensiveness otherwise than by the application of reasonably enlightened,
but not perfectionist, contemporary standards to the particular message sent in its particular
context.” Most importantly, the House of Lords held that whether a message was grossly
offensive did not depend merely on the degree of offence taken by the complainant but on
whether it violates the basic standards of an open and just multi-racial society. This is
considered a ‘reading down’ by the House of Lords of Section 127(1) of the U.K.
Communications Act 2003, a hugely controversial legislation in the U.K. for its chilling
effect on speech. It is particularly relevant in India where the ‘hurt sentiments’ of particular
groups (or of individuals purporting to represent particular groups) is viewed by the state as
sufficient to take criminal action against speech and expression.

While Section 66A(b) of the Indian IT Act has unbelievably lumped causing annoyance and
inconvenience in the same Section as criminal intimidation and made it subject to the same
punishment, Section 127(1)(b) of the U.K. Communications Act is limited to the sending of a
message that he knows to be false “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or
needless anxiety to another.”

Section 127(1)(b)

The punishment for the offence in Section 127(1)(b) is a maximum of six months’
imprisonment or a fine of £5,000 while Section 66A imposes a much more serious
punishment of imprisonment up to three years and a fine without limit. Therefore, Section
66A(b) of the IT Act is not the same as Section 127(1)(b) of the U.K. Communications Act,
2003 in terms of scope of the offence or the punishment.

Ironically, the Indian government defends Section 66A by saying it has been copied from
Section 127 of the U.K. Act, while in the U.K., there are calls for repeal of this Section,
already ‘read down’ by the House of Lords in order to ensure compliance with Article 17 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. Instead of defending Section 66A on the
grounds that it has been copied from U.K. legislation, the Union Government should take
inspiration from the House of Lords’ view about what is ‘grossly offensive.’ This is the
standard that should have been incorporated in the advisory issued by the Department of
Electronics and IT.
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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

ISSUE 3
WHETHER SECTION 66A PLACES UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS ON
ONLINE FREE SPEECH AS OPPOSED TO FREE SPEECH IN THE REAL
WORLD?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A is not
places unreasonable restrictions on online free speech as opposed to free speech in the real
world
The court has struck down Sec. 66A in its entirety on grounds of vagueness,
overreach, and the chilling effects it has on online speech. It also reads down Sec.79
(intermediary liability), holding that intermediaries are liable to take down content only upon
receipt of actual knowledge from a court order or on being notified by the appropriate
government. It, however, upholds Sec. 69A and the rules under the IT Act (blocking of
websites) on the grounds that there are internal safeguards and reasonable procedures
available within Sec.69A.

Our Legal systems sometimes recognize certain limits on or to the freedom of speech,
particularly when freedom of speech conflicts with other rights and freedoms, such as in the
cases of libel, slander, pornography, obscenity, fighting words, and intellectual property. In
Europe, blasphemy is a limitation to free speech. For example, defaming Muhammad the
Prophet of Islam does not fall under free speech. Justifications for limitations to freedom of
speech often reference the "harm principle" or the "offence principle". Limitations to freedom
of speech may occur through legal sanction or social disapprobation, or both. So in this case
the petitioner has harmed the emotion of a prominent Leader which should restrict in online
speech which is harm the sentiment to any person.
Our online speech is heavily dependent on policies (both government and industry lead)
which affect digital platforms like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Recognizing this fact,
SFLC.in, in March, published a comprehensive report which captures the legal landscape in
India and key international developments on content liability on internet platforms.

We believe that government regulation such as the draft amendment to the rules that regulate
platform liability undermines free speech and privacy rights of Indians in the online world,
while promoting private censorship by companies.

Having said that, acknowledging the problems of circulation of illegal content, legitimate
access to law enforcement and disinformation on the internet, the law should mandate
governance structures and grievance mechanisms on the part of intermediaries, enabling
quick takedown of content determined as illegal by the judiciary or appropriate government
agencies.

So, Section 66A of IT Act, 2000 gives to maintain some reasonable restriction on online
speech which is a safeguard of the sentiment of people and also a safeguard for state policy
also but it is not opposed to free speech of real world.

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

ISSUE 4
WHETHER SECTION 66A OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Section 66A of
Information Technology Act,2000 is not unconstitutional. The respondents submit the
following arguments to affirm the same.

Section 66A reads: "Any person who sends by any means of a computer resource any
information that is grossly offensive or has a menacing character; or any information which
he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction, insult, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and with fine."

In the case of Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015, Additional Solicitor General
defended the constitutionality of Section 66A. He argued that the legislature is in the best
position to understand and appreciate the needs of the people. The Court will, therefore,
interfere with the legislative process only when a statute is clearly violative of the rights
conferred on the citizen under Part-III of the Constitution. There is a presumption in favour of
the constitutionality of an enactment. Further, the Court would so construe a statute to make
it workable and in doing so can read into it or read down the provisions that are impugned.

The Constitution does not impose impossible standards of determining validity. Mere
possibility of abuse of a provision cannot be a ground to declare a provision invalid. Loose
language may have been used in Section 66A to deal with novel methods of disturbing other
people's rights by using the internet as a tool to do so. Further, vagueness is not a ground to
declare a statute unconstitutional if the statute is otherwise legislatively competent and non-
arbitrary.

ISSUES 5
WHETHER SECTION 80 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
GIVES UNBRIDLED POWERS TO A POLICE OFFICER, TO ARREST ANY
PERSON, WITHOUT WARRANT, FOUND IN ANY PUBLIC PLACE WHO IS
REASONABLY SUSPECTED OF BEING ABOUT TO COMMIT ANY
CYBERCRIME/ OFFENCE UNDER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT,
2000?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Police officer not
below the rank of Inspector General of Police in the metropolitan cities or Deputy
Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of Police at the district level have the power to
arrest any person without warrant if he commits any cyber-crime where there have motive to
create any aggression to the public which will hamper the dignity of the any public person or
state.

In the case of Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015, In reply to the Shreya
Singhal petition, the Union government defended the constitutionality of Section 66A relying

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

first on the “Advisory on Implementation of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act
2000” issued by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology on January 9,
2013 to the Chief Secretaries and the Director General of Police of all States/UTs. The
advisory asks State governments not to allow the police to make arrests under Section 66A of
the IT Act without prior approval from an officer not below the rank of Inspector General of
Police in the metropolitan cities or Deputy Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of
Police at the district level. However, this advisory is clearly not sufficient as political
interference in law enforcement is well known and the arrests, as shown above, have not
abated.

ISSUES 6
WHETHER SECTION 80 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14, 19 & 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA?

The Respondent humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that section 80 of the IT
Act, 2000 does not violate the Article 14, 19, 21 of the Constitution of Indiana because

In the case of Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015, In reply to the Shreya
Singhal petition, the Union government defended the constitutionality of Section 66A relying
first on the “Advisory on Implementation of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act
2000” issued by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology on January 9,
2013 to the Chief Secretaries and the Director General of Police of all States/UTs. The
advisory asks State governments not to allow the police to make arrests under Section 66A of
the IT Act without prior approval from an officer not below the rank of Inspector General of
Police in the metropolitan cities or Deputy Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of
Police at the district level. However, this advisory is clearly not sufficient as political
interference in law enforcement is well known and the arrests, as shown above, have not
abated.

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 LATE JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAKAR INTERCOLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2014

PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare
that;

1. The PILs filed by the petitioners are not maintainable and are frivolous in nature and they
shall pay compensation for the same as decided by the court; and
2. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 containing extremely wide,
vague and ambiguous terms is not violative of the Article 14, 19(1)(a) & 21 of the
Constitution of Indiana, and should restrict online speech if it is found any bed
motive, and
3. Section 66A of Information Technology Act,2000 is not an unconstitutional in nature
and it is not violative of constitution of Indiana, and
4. Section 80 of the amended Information Technology Act, 2000 is not violative of
Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of Indiana, the power has given to a police
officer, not below the rank of an Inspector, to arrest without warrant any person found
in any public place who is reasonably suspected of being about to commit any
cybercrime/ offence under the Information Technology Act, 2000, and
5. It is maybe the inherent defect in of Section 66A of the amended Information
Technology Act, but it was taken from English law and it will be amended so it is not
an unconstitutional, and

AND/OR
Pass any order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the Respondent as in duty bound, shall humbly pray.

Counsels for the Respondent

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