Labor Relations Compiled Case Digest PR

LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS 2012
TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER AND

EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
FRANCISCO VS. NLRC
AUGUST 21, 2006
Facts: Sometime in 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during

its incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant and Corporate
Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of the company.
She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City of Makati to secure
business permits, construction permits and other licenses for the initial
operation of the company.
In 1996, petitioner was designated Acting Manager. As Acting Manager,
petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of all employees and perform
management administration functions; represent the company in all dealings
with government agencies, especially with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
Social Security System (SSS) and in the city government of Makati; and to
administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant
which is owned and operated by Kasei Corporation.
For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager. As of
December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing
allowance and a 10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation. In January 2001,
petitioner was replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Petitioner alleged
that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she
was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei Corporation. Timoteo
Acedo, the designated Treasurer, convened a meeting of all employees of Kasei
Corporation and announced that nothing had changed and that petitioner was
still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant toSeiji Kamura and
in charge of all BIR matters. Thereafter, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary by
P2,500.00 a month beginning January up to September 2001 for a total
reduction of P22,500.00 as of September 2001. Petitioner was not paid her mid-
year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. On
October2001, petitioner did not receive her salary from the company. She made
repeated follow-upswith the company cashier but she was advised that the
company was not earning well.
On October 15, 2001, petitioner asked for her salary from Acedo and the
rest of the officers but she was informed that she is no longer connected with
the company. Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report
for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter
Issue: whether there exist an employer-employee relationship
Held: Yes. The supreme court used the underlying economic realities of
the activity or relationship method in determining the existence of employer
employee relationship in the case. the determination of the relationship
between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole
economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are
an integral part of the employer’s business; (2) the extent of the worker’s
investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control
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exercised by the employer; (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; (5)
the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of
the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the
relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of
dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in
that line of business.
The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is
dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of
business. In the United States, the touchstone of economic reality in analyzing
possible employment relationships for purposes of the Federal Labor Standards
Act is dependency. By analogy, the benchmark of economic reality in analyzing
possible employment relationships for purposes of the Labor Code ought to be
the economic dependence of the worker on his employer.
SONZA vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

JUNE 10, 2004
Facts: ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and
Development Corporation (MJMDC). Referred to as AGENT, MJMDC agreed to
provide Jay Sonzas services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent. After more than
two years, Sonza as agent of MJMDC wrote a letter to ABS-CBN notifying them of
the former’s intention to rescind the agreement. Sonza waived and renounced
the recovery of the remaining amounts stipulated in the agreement
but reserved the right to seek the recovery of other benefits under the same.
Later, SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the DOLE-NCR, alleging
that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under
the Employees Stock Option Plan ("ESOP"). In response ABS-CBN filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties. Meanwhile, pursuant to the Agreement, ABS-CBN
continued to remit SONZAs monthly talent fees through his account at PCI Bank.
ABS-CBN later opened a new account with the same bank where ABS-CBN
deposited SONZA’s talent fees and other payments due him under the
Agreement
Issue: whether an employer-employee relationship exist in the case
Held: No. Case law has consistently held that the elements of an employer-
employee relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s
power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is
accomplished.18 The last element, the so-called "control test", is the most
important element.
Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills,

expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific
selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance
indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. If
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SONZA did not possess such unique skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN
would not have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would have hired
him through its personnel department just like any other employee.
JAVIER VS. FLYACE CORP

FEBRUARY 15, 2012
Facts: On May 23, 2008, Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for
underpayment of salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he
was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing various tasks at
the respondent’s warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items
before their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be
ordered to accompany the company’s delivery vehicles, aspahinante. that on
May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the
company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Ruben Ong (Mr.
Ong), his superior; that after several minutes of begging to the guard to allow
him to enter, he saw Ong whom he approached and asked why he was being
barred from entering the premises; that Ong replied by saying, "Tanungin mo
anak mo;" that he then went home and discussed the matter with his family;
that he discovered that Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn after the
two met at a fiesta celebration in Malabon City; that Annalyn tried to talk to Ong
and convince him to spare her father from trouble but he refused to accede;
that thereafter, Javier was terminated from his employment without notice; and
that he was neither given the opportunity to refute the cause/s of his dismissal
from work.
On the other hand Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the business of
importation and sales of groceries. Sometime in December 2007, Javier was
contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an
agreed rate of P 300.00 per trip, which was later increased to P 325.00 in
January 2008. Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month
whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not
available. On April 30, 2008, Fly Ace no longer needed the services of Javier.
Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace insisted that there was no illegal
dismissal.Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling
Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment to Javier
for his contracted services bearing the words, "daily manpower (pakyaw/piece
rate pay)" and the latter’s signatures/initials.
Issue: Whether an Employer-employee relationship exist
Held: No. The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to
pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employee’s conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is whether
the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only
as to the result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the
result is to be accomplished.
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In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements
exist in his case.1avvphi1 He could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace
engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an
employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at
work. In other words, Javier’s allegations did not establish that his relationship
with Fly Ace had the attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the
basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Worse, Javier was not able to refute
Fly Ace’s assertion that it had an agreement with a hauling company to
undertake the delivery of its goods. It was also baffling to realize that Javier did
not dispute Fly Ace’s denial of his services’ exclusivity to the company. In short,
all that Javier laid down were bare allegations without corroborative proof.
Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip"
rate as a stevedore, albeit on apakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail to note that
Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid on
a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent
evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures
affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents because
"forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery."
SMCEU-PTGWO vs. BERSAMINA
Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for
merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are
independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). It was understood that there is no employer-employee
relationship between san Miguel and Lipercon and d’rite. Petitioner San Miguel
Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO (the Union, for brevity) asked san Miguel
to regularize the employment of Lipercon and D’rite employees. Liperscon and
d’rite employees also signed up for membership before the petitioner union.
Issue: Whether there exist an employer-employee relationship between san

Miguel and lipercon and d’rite employees
Held: No. the elements of employer-employee relationship are; (1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Of these
elements, the most important criterion is whether the employer controls or has
reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work
but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be
accomplished. It was clear in this case that lipercon and d’rite employees are
not employees of san Miguel, rather they are independent contractors.
DEFINITION OF LABOR DISPUTE
CITIBANK VS. CA
NOVEMBER 27, 1998
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Facts: In 1983, Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. (hereafter El Toro)
entered into a contract for the latter to provide security and protective services
to safeguard and protect the bank's premises, situated at 8741 Paseo de Roxas,
Makati, Metro Manila. Citibank renewed the security contract with El Toro yearly
until 1990. On April 22, 1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro
expired. Citibank did not renew its contract with El toro and instead replaced
them with Golden Pyramid Security Agency. respondent Citibank Integrated
Guards Labor Alliance-SEGA-TUPAS/FSM (hereafter CIGLA) filed after referring
the case before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) it filed a
notice of strike. Citibank filed an injunctive relief from the trial court, while
respondent moved to dismiss since the jurisdiction should be in the labor arbiter
being a labor dispute. Citibank contended that the case is not a labor dispute
since no employer-employee relationship exist between Citibank and el toro.
Issue: whether the case is a labor dispute hence the labor arbiter should have
jurisdiction
Held: No. This Court has held in many cases that "in determining the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally
considered: 1) the selection and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment
of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the employer's power to control the
employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be
accomplished". 7 It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee relationship existed
between a company and the security guards assigned to it by a security service
contractor. 8In this case, it was the security agency El Toro that recruited, hired
and assigned the watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency
that was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards.
The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank and the security
guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of whether they stand in the
relation of employer and employees? Article 212, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code
provides the definition of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or
matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security agency is one
regarding the termination or non-renewal of the contract of services. This is a
civil dispute. 9 El Toro was an independent contractor. Thus, no employer-
employee relationship existed between Citibank and the security guard
members of the union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the
bank's premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no right to
strike against the bank.
ARTICLE 217 JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
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HALAGUENA v PAL
OCTOBER 2, 2009
Facts: Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of Philippine

Airlines (PAL) and likewise members of Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP). PAL and FASAP entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) regarding: retirement age (Male: 60 years old and
Female: 55 years old). FASAP demanded equal treatment to male counterpart
regarding the age retirements.
FASAP filed a special civil action for declaratory relief with temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
city against PAL contending the invalidity of Sec.144-A of the CBA.
RTC Makati acquired jurisdiction reasoned that the CBA violates the Labor
Code/CEDAW to which the court ruled in favor of the petitioners and issued a
TRO enjoining PAL to implement the provision of the CBA in dispute. And
directed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against PAL.
PAL filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in
favor of PAL declaring RTC Makati had no jurisdiction over the matter. FASAP
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over FASAP’s action challenging
the constitutionality or legality of the provision of the CBA (sec 144-A).
HELD: Yes. A Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the employer

and employees are not merely contractual in nature. They are so impressed
with public interest. Hence, any violations with respect to the constitutionality of
the provisions of the said CBA, the regular courts are not divested of its
jurisdiction to decide on matters pertaining to the legality of the said provisions
of the CBA.
Santiago v. CF Sharp
July 10, 2007
Facts: Petitioner worked as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management for about five
years. Petitioner signed a new contract with respondent for nine months. POEA
approved said contract. A week before departure, Santiago was advised not to
board MV Seaspread but he was reassured for some future deployment.
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Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal because he was not deployed
and said contract was not fulfilled as agreed in the contract of service.
Labor Arbiter rendered its decision holding respondent CF Sharp liable for illegal
dismissal. On appeal, respondent NLRC ruled that there was no employer-
employee relationship between the parties hence there was no illegal dismissal
to speak of in the first place.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC for lack
of merit. Then the matters were elevated to the CA via petition for certiorari. CA
decided that damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed
by his agency. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s POEA approved employment contract falls

within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: Yes. The instant case of the petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter. The law provides, R.A. No. 8042 (Migrants Workers Act)
particularly:
Section10 Money Claims: Labor Arbiter of the NLRC shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
Therefore, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to try and hear the case at bar.
Atlas Farms v NLRC, J. Dela Pena

November 18, 2002
Facts: Dela Pena employed as veterinary aide by petitioner Atlas Farms. He

was among several employees terminated but he was re-hired and given
additional jobs. Pena was allegedly caught urinating and defacing on company
premises. He was notified about said violation but disregarded the matter.
Notice of Termination with pay was sent to him. Co-respondent Abion was
likewise terminated for the same reason as Pena. Pena and Abion filed a
separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were consolidated.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the action holding that the grievance machinery in the
CBA had not yet been exhausted. Respondents availed the grievance process
but refilled before the NLRC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction of the NLRC.
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Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding the case was one of illegal
dismissal and did not involve the interpretation or implementation of any
provision of the CBA. NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Atlas filed
a petition for review on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The latter denied the
petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and NLRC had jurisdiction over illegal
dismissal cases.
HELD: Yes. The NLRC found that Atlas did not comply with the requirements of
a valid dismissal. The relationship between the employer and the employees are
not merely contractual in nature, it is imbued with public interest; hence, any
dismissal of employees must yield to the due process clause as enshrined in the
Constitution.
In order to constitute a valid dismissal the requirements must concur: 1) due

process must be strictly observed and 2) dismissal must be for any valid causes
provided by law.
PERPETUAL HELP v. FABURADA

October 08, 2001
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch-DOLE for

illegal dismissal. PHCCI (Perpetual Help) filed a motion to dismiss contending
that there is no employer-employee relationship because they are members and
co-owners of the cooperative.
Perpetual Help filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging that Article 121
of the R.A. 6939 (cooperative Development Authority Law) requires conciliation
or mediation before resorting to courts. Labor Arbiter denied the motion to
dismiss holding that there is employer-employee relationship. On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship thus conferring

jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: Yes the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over illegally dismissed employees.
Perpetual Help hired the respondents to work for it and it was duly proven that
the said employees: 1) worked regularly 2) assigned with specific duties and 3)
paid regular wages.
To establish employer-employee relationship the requisites must be present to

which:
1) The power of selection/ hire
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2) Power to dismiss
3) Payment of wages
4) Power to control
Austria vs NLRC
(August 16, 1999)
Facts: Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the

Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law and
is represented by the other private respondents. Petitioner was a pastor of SDA
until 1991, when his services were terminated.
Austria worked with SDA for 28 years.He started as a literature evangelist in

1963 then got promoted several times. He became the Assistant Publishing
Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA in 1968 and Pastor in the West
Visayan Mission in 1972. Finally in 1989, he was promoted as District Pastor of
the Negros Mission of the SDA.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

communications from Mr. Ibesate, treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the
former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the
same to the Negros Mission.
In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it
was private respondent Pastor Buhat and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to
collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that
time.
Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros
Mission, and asked for a convention to settle the dispute between petitioner and
Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner because there was
no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner left the office.
However, while on his way out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw
inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough)” which prompted him to go back
and overturn Pastor Buhat’s table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhat’s
attaché case and throw the phone.
Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to
discuss the non-remittance of church collection and the events that transpired
between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to
investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious
misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense
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against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for

the termination of his services.
(Nakakainis ‘tong part na ‘to dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)
1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. =
decision rendered in favor of petitioner
2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent
3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor

Arbiter
4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of

respondent (grabe ang kulit!)
Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.
Issues:
1) WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint
filed by petitioner against the SDA;
2) WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and, as such, involves the separation of church and state;
Held:
1) YES.
2) NO.
Ratio Decidendi:
The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case.
The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed
up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-neighbors."The idea
advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one against the other
because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions.
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to
bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one
that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption
and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations
for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such
associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with
attached religious significance. The case at bar does not even remotely concern
any of the given examples. What is involved here is the relationship of the
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church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and

has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the
church. The matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in
nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the
religious congregation.
DFA VS. NLRC

SEPTEMBER 18 1996
Facts: a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Upon receipt of summons, both the ADB and DFA notified the labor
arbiter that the ADB, as well as its president and officers, were covered by
immunity from legal process except for the borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities pursuant to article 50(1) and article 55 of the agreement establishing
the ADB.
Issue: whether the labor arbiter has jurisdiction
Held: No. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., 19 this Court has explained the
matter in good datail; viz: In Public International Law, when a state or
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a
foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of
"suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in
an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as
to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the attorney General to submit
to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In
England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a
certification to the effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, In
International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim
of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration
Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing
the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that
effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of
the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
"suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the
"suggestion" in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
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In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office
of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of
petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in
support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly
to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza
vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas vs. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80
Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and
companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can in quire into the facts and make their own determination as to
the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
PNB v. CABANSAG
G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts: In late 1998, Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She

applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National
Bank, a private banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, with principal offices at the PNB Financial Center, Roxas
Boulevard, Manila. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm
of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-
President of the Bank. At the time, too, the Branch Office had 2 types of
employees: (a) expatriates or the regular employees, hired in Manila and
assigned abroad including Singapore, and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied
for employment as Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of
$SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C.
Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a letter to
the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence
O. Cabansag, for the position.
The President of the Bank was impressed with the credentials of Florence O.
Cabansag that he approved the recommendation of Ruben C. Tobias. She then
filed an ‘Application,’ with the Ministry of Manpower of the Government of
Singapore, for the issuance of an ‘Employment Pass’ as an employee of the
Singapore PNB Branch. Her application was approved for a period of 2 years.
Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a

temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars
4,500.00, a month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be
determined solely, by the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the
Bank, a permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was
subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. “You will be on probation for a period of three (3) consecutive months
from the date of your assumption of duty.
2. You will observe the Bank’s rules and regulations and those that may be
adopted from time to time.
3. You will keep in strictest confidence all matters related to transactions
between the Bank and its clients.
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4. You will devote your full time during business hours in promoting the
business and interest of the Bank.
5. You will not, without prior written consent of the Bank, be employed in
anyway for any purpose whatsoever outside business hours by any
person, firm or company.
6. Termination of your employment with the Bank may be made by either
party after notice of one (1) day in writing during probation, one month
notice upon confirmation or the equivalent of one (1) day’s or month’s
salary in lieu of notice.”
Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. Barely 3

months in office, Florence O. Cabansag submitted to Ruben C. Tobias, on March
9, 1999, her initial ‘Performance Report.’ Ruben C. Tobias was so impressed
with the ‘Report’ that he made a notation and, on said ‘Report’: ‘GOOD WORK.’
However, in the evening of April 14, 1999, while Florence O. Cabansag was in
the flat, which she and Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice-President and Deputy
General Manager of the Branch and Rosanna Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of the
said Branch, rented, she was told by the 2 that Ruben C. Tobias has asked them
to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job. Florence O. Cabansag was
perplexed at the sudden turn of events and the runabout way Ruben C. Tobias
procured her resignation from the Bank. The next day, Florence O. Cabansag
talked to Ruben C. Tobias and inquired if what Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna
Sarmiento had told her was true. Ruben C. Tobias confirmed the veracity of the
information, with the explanation that her resignation was imperative as a ‘cost-
cutting measure’ of the Bank. Ruben C. Tobias, likewise, told Florence O.
Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a
remittance office and that, in either way, Florence O. Cabansag had to resign
from her employment. The more Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed. She then
asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a ‘Formal Advice’ from the
PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused. Florence O.
Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.
Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and

demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he
needed a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with
the information that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired
and will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she submitted
her letter of resignation, her employment record will be blemished with the
notation ‘DISMISSED’ spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer,
Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time
to look for another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be ‘out’ of her
employment by May 15, 1999.
However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O.

Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She
refused. On April 20, 1999, she received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias
terminating her employment with the Bank.
Issues:
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1. WON the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has
jurisdiction over the instant controversy;
2. WON the arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Region is the most
convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the instant controversy;
and
3. WON the respondent was illegally dismissed, and therefore, entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
Held:
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the
Labor Code as follows:
“ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after
the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in
the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:

“SECTION 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including termination
disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers
(OFW).
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Respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the

PNB branch in that city state. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to
obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower.
Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration
regulations of that country.
The Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the country to first

obtain a local work permit in order to be legally employed here. That permit,
however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by
local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of
one’s national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as a
worker in the issuing country.
a branch office in Singapore. Significantly, respondent’s employment by the

Singapore branch office had to be approved by Benjamin P. Palma Gil, the
president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila. This circumstance
militates against petitioner’s contention that respondent was “locally hired”;
and totally “governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and
customs” of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does
this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal
definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence,
petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of
the NLRC and the labor arbiter.
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the
contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic
public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers.
Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads:
“Section 1. Venue – (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear
and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction
over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases
of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the Regional Arbitration
Branch where the complainant resides or where the principal office of the
respondent/employer is situated, at the option of the complainant.
“For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality

where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It
shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a
temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as
ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly
assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages
15 | P a g e
or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their
employers.”
Under the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” (RA 8042),
a migrant worker ”refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has
been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a
legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino
worker.” Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office
in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state.
She thus falls within the category of “migrant worker” or “overseas Filipino
worker.”
As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against

petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal
office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent
has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II,
Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City,
she has made a valid choice of proper venue.
Respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal,

because her three-month probationary period of employment had already
ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered
a regular employee.” Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the
time it dismissed her, by giving her one month’s salary in lieu of a one-month
notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.
As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and

privileges provided under our labor laws. One of her fundamental rights is that
she may not be dismissed without due process of law. The twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process,
and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the
constitutional guarantee.
In dismissing employees, the employer must furnish them two written notices:
1) one to apprise them of the particular acts or omissions for which their
dismissal is sought; and 2) the other to inform them of the decision to dismiss
them. As to the requirement of a hearing, its essence lies simply in the
opportunity to be heard.
Respondent was not notified of the specific act or omission for which her
dismissal was being sought. Neither was she given any chance to be heard, as
required by law. At any rate, even if she were given the opportunity to be heard,
she could not have defended herself effectively, for she knew no cause to
answer to. All that petitioner tendered to respondent was a notice of her
employment termination effective the very same day, together with the
equivalent of a one-month pay. This Court has already held that nothing in the
16 | P a g e
law gives an employer the option to substitute the required prior notice and
opportunity to be heard with the mere payment of 30 days’ salary.
The employer shall be sanctioned for noncompliance with the requirements of,
or for failure to observe, due process that must be observed in dismissing an
employee.
Moreover, Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code provide the valid
grounds or causes for an employee’s dismissal. The employer has the burden of
proving that it was done for any of those just or authorized causes. The failure
to discharge this burden means that the dismissal was not justified, and that the
employee is entitled to reinstatement and back wages.
Petitioner has not asserted any of the grounds provided by law as a valid
reason for terminating the employment of respondent. It merely insists that her
dismissal was validly effected pursuant to the provisions of her employment
Contract, which she had voluntarily agreed to be bound to.
BANEZ VS. VALDEVILLA

MAY 9, 2000
Facts: Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its
branch in Iligan City. In 1993, private respondent "indefinitely suspended"
petitioner and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in Iligan City. In a decision dated July 7,
1994, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan found petitioner to have been
illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, and of backwages and attorney's fees. On November 13, 1995,
private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial
Court. On January 30, 1996, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the above
complaint. He interposed in the court below that the action for damages, having
arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of
the Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case.
Issue: Whether RTC has Jurisdiction
Held: NO. Art. 217(a), paragraph 4 of the Labor Code, which was already in
effect at the time of the filing of this case, reads: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this
Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
17 | P a g e
agricultural: 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations;
SANTOS VS. SERVIER PHILIPPINES

NOVEMBER 28, 2008
Facts: employee filed a complaint (money claim) for incomplete retirement

benefit and a tax was deducted from the retirement package.
Issue: whether the NLRC can decide on the legality of deduction
Held: YES. The issue of deduction for tax purposes is intertwined with the main
issue of whether or not petitioner’s benefits have been fully given her. It is,
therefore, a money claim arising from the employer-employee relationship,
which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
This is not the first time that the labor tribunal is faced with the issue of
illegal deduction. In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) v.
Amarilla, IBC withheld the salary differentials due its retired employees to offset
the tax due on their retirement benefits. The retirees thus lodged a complaint
with the NLRC questioning said withholding. They averred that their retirement
benefits were exempt from income tax; and IBC had no authority to withhold
their salary differentials. The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the case, and this
Court made a definitive ruling that retirement benefits are exempt from income
tax, provided that certain requirements are met.
PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS VS. GALANG

SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were
suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola bottles.
On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft against
them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal complaint for
falsification of private documents. On November 26, 1987, after a preliminary
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the
complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed on April 8, 1988, by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private
respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987.
As a result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City on December 1, 1987, and
decisions manded reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in
the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, on April 4, 1988, a separate civil complaint
against the petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be their
malicious prosecution.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-employer
relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The motion was
18 | P a g e
granted on February 6, 1989. On July 6, 1989, however, the respondent judge,

acting on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was
"distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts."
The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.
Issue: whether RTC has jurisdiction
Held: YES. It does not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection"
between the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and
employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in fact could
have arisen independently of an employment relationship between the parties.
No such relationship or any unfair labor practice is asserted. What the
employees are alleging is that the petitioners acted with bad faith when they
filed the criminal complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended
"to harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the
Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest
probability that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed
against them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to
resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code.
"Talents differ, all is well and wisely put," so observed the philosopher-poet. So
it must be in the case we here decide.
ARTICLE 218
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEVERINO LISTANA,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 168105, July 27, 2011
Facts: Listana is the owner of a property located in Sorsogon. The land was
voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. (LBP) valued the property for acquisition at
P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary
proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by (DAR).
Listana executed a deed of transfer upon acceptance of payment from the
government in the form of cash and LBP bonds worth P3.7M. DAR issued a
decision declaring the value of the property worth P10M. After a year LBP filed a
petition for judicial declaration of just compensation before the RTC contending
that the valuation was unacceptable. Listana filed a motion to dismiss
contending that the contract was binding and therefore constitutes res judicata
citing also a pending case against LBP for contempt. A motion for
reconsideration as well as the appeal by the LBP was denied. LBP filed a
application for writ of preliminary injuction against the of their manager which
was later granted by the RTC. Listana filed a petition for certiorari before CA
which nullifies the decision of the RTC. The trial court issued the order granting
respondent's motion for reconsideration and dismissing the petition for having
been filed almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARAD's decision. A
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for
determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day
19 | P a g e
period or more than 100 days after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a
summary administrative proceeding.
Ruling: The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to

R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is essentially a
judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court and
cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision
of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57
that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary
to §57 and therefore would be void.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court
reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator's decision
on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in
the DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should
therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC
within the said period.
Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC
within the prescribed fifteen-day period or a reasonable time after notice of the
denial of its motion for reconsideration.
It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on finality of
judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at
the risk of occasional errors.
ARTICLE 221
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. JAN CARLO GALA

G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304 March 7, 2012
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Facts: Gala was employed by Meralco as probationary lineman. He initially

served the crew of two trucks under the supervision of by Matis and Zuniaga
respectively. On July 27, 2006, barely four months on the job, Gala was
dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical supplies,
particularly, for the incident which took place on May 25, 2006. On that day
Gala was assigned to help digging for a post in Velenzuela. When they came in
to the vicinity they found out that the team of Valenzuela was already there so
they decided to help. Gala noticed a non-employee named Llanes who
conversing with the foreman. Llanes boarded the trucks, without being stopped,
and took out what were later found as electrical supplies. Aside from Gala, the
foremen and the other linemen who were at the worksite when the pilferage
happened were later charged with misconduct and dishonesty for their
involvement in the incident. Unknown to Gala and the rest of the crew, a
Meralco surveillance task force was monitoring their activities and recording
everything with a Sony video camera. Meralco called for an investigation of the
incident and asked Gala to explain. Gala denied involvement in the pilferage,
contending that even if his superiors might have committed a wrongdoing, he
had no participation in what they did. Despite Gala’s explanation, Meralco
proceeded with the investigation and eventually terminated his employment on
July 27, 2006. Gala responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint against
Meralco. The complaint was dismissed by the labor arbiter. NLRC reversed the
decision of the LA upon appeal but it ruled out Gala’s reinstatement, stating that
his tenure lasted only up to the end of his probationary period. It awarded him
backwages and attorney’s fees. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration
but the same was denied. Both parties filed a petition for certiorari before CA
ruling for the reinstatement of Gala and denying the petition of Meralco, hence,
this present. Gala contended that the petition should be dismissed because of
procedural defect in the verification and certification and that the counsel of
Meralco failed to indicate his MCLE compliance number.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed due to procedural defect
Ruling: NO. We stress at this point that it is the spirit and intention of labor
legislation that the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process is duly
observed.19 In keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial justice,
we deem it proper to give due course to the petition, especially in view of the
conflict between the findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the
NLRC and the CA, on the other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v.
S.S. Ventures Labor Union,20 "the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice."
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NATIONWIDE SECURITY and ALLIED SERVICES, INC.,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and JOSEPH DIMPAZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EDWARD ODATO, FELICISIMO
PABON and JOHNNY AGBAY,
G.R. No. 155844 July 14, 2008
Facts: 8 security guards filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NSAS
before the LA. LA ruled that NSAS was not liable for the dismissal of the security
guards but it was ordered to pay their separation fees, unpaid salaries and
attorney’s fees. NSAS appealed before the NLRC but it was denied for filing
beyond the reglamentary period and insufficiency of bond. A petition for
certiorari under rule 65 to CA was also denied for the said errors assigned were
not reversible.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL

OVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENTION OF THE LABOR CODE UNDER ARTICLE 221
Ruling: Yes. At the outset it must be pointed out here that the petition for
certiorari filed with the Court by petitioner under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. The proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 purely
on questions of law. There being a remedy of appeal via petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court available to the petitioner, the filing of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is improper.
But even if we bend our Rules to allow the present petition for certiorari,
still it will not prosper because we do not find any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals
when it dismissed the petition of the security agency. We must stress that under
Rule 65, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. No
such abuse of discretion happened here. The assailed decision by the Court of
Appeals was certainly not capricious nor arbitrary, nor was it a whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.
Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and executory. The
right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of the right must
comply with the statute or the rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must
be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial business. It is only in
highly meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply the rules
and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The exception does not
obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the decision of the Labor Arbiter
already became final and executory because petitioner failed to file the appeal
within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision.
ARTICLE 223 APPEAL
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ISLRIZ TRADING VS. CAPADA ET AL

JANUARY 31, 2011
Facts: Respondents Efren Capada, Lauro Licup, Norberto Nigos and Godofredo
Magnaye were drivers while respondents Ronnie Abel, Arnel Siberre, Edmundo
Capada, Nomerlito Magnaye and Alberto Dela Vega were helpers of Islriz
Trading, a gravel and sand business owned and operated by petitioner Victor
Hugo Lu. Claiming that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner on August 9,
2000 before the Labor Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of
work against respondents. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents
but was reversed before the NLRC. Petitioner did not pay the judgment
monetary award to the respondents pending appeal of the case to the NLRC.
Petitioner now contends that since the judgment was reversed, it has no
obligation to pay anymore the monetary award by the labor arbiter
Issue: whether respondents may collect their wages during the period between
the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC
Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
Held: Yes. paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code which reads: In any
event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately
be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for
reinstatement provided herein. Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of
appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee
has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is
reversed with finality, the employee is notrequired to reimburse whatever salary
he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services
during the period.
GARCIA VS. KJ COMMERCIAL

FEBRUARY 29, 2012
Facts: Respondent KJ Commercial is a sole proprietorship. It owns trucks and

engages in the business of distributing cement products. On different dates, KJ
Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck helpers petitioners Cesar V.
Garcia, Carlos Razon, Alberto De Guzman, Tomas Razon, Omer E.
Palo, Rizalde Valencia,Allan Basa, Jessie Garcia, Juanito Paras, Alejandro Orag,
Rommel Pangan, Ruel Soliman, and Cenen Canlapan . On 2 January 2006,
petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ
Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their
23 | P a g e
trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in Sison, Pangasinan. They also
blocked other workers from reporting to work. On 3 February 2006, petitioners
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salary and non-payment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.
The labor arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioners. On appeal the NLRC initially
denied KJ’s appeal with motion to reduce the bond and presenting a partial bond
of PHP 50,000 however it was later on granted after KJ filed a motion of
reconsideration and presented to the total amount for the bond (2,612,930.00).
petitioner now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the appeal. Petitioners claim that KJ Commercial failed to perfect an
appeal since the motion to reduce bond did not stop the running of the period to
appeal.
Issue: whetherthe Labor Arbiter’s 30 October 2008 Decision became final

and executory;
Held: No. KJ Commercial’s filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed posting
of the P2,562,930 surety bond did not render the Labor Arbiter’s 30 October
2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows
the filing of a motion to reduce bond subject to two conditions: (1) there is
meritorious ground, and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. In Ong v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that the bond requirement on appeals may be
relaxed when there is substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC or when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. The Court
held that, “While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards
has been relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was
substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least,
exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial bond.”
ONG VS. CA
SEPTEMBER 22, 2004
Facts: Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Milestone Metal Manufacturing

(Milestone), which manufactures, among others, wearing apparels, belts, and
umbrellas.3 Sometime in May 1998, the business suffered very low sales and
productivity because of the economic crisis in the country. Hence, it adopted a
rotation scheme by reducing the workdays of its employees to three days a
week or less for an indefinite period.On separate dates, the 15 respondents filed
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) complaints for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and attorney’s fees
against petitioner. These were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter
Manuel Manasala. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of respondents, Petitioner
filed with the NLRC a notice of appeal with a memorandum of appeal and paid
the docket fees therefor. However, instead of posting the required cash or
surety bond, he filed a motion to reduce the appeal bond. The NLRC, in a
resolution dated April 28, 2000, denied the motion to reduce bond and
dismissed the appeal for failure to post cash or surety bond within the
reglementary period.7 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
24 | P a g e
denied. Petitioner contends that the bond required (P1,427,802,04) was unjust
and prohibitive furthermore he faults the NLRC because it took 102 days to
resolve his motion
Issue: whether THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF

PETITIONERS FOR NON-PERFECTION WHEN A MOTION TO REDUCE APPEAL BOND
WAS SEASONABLY FILED was valid.
Held: Yes. Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process, it is merely a statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of
the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. Biogenerics Marketing and
Research Corporation v. NLRC, The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection
of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted provision that the appeal may be
perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. It is not an excuse that
the over P2 million award is too much for a small business enterprise, like the
petitioner company, to shoulder.The law does not require its outright payment,
but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid
should the appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and
reasonable sum for the premium for such bond.
While the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been
relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was substantial
compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited
willingness to pay by posting a partial bond. 22 Petitioner’s reliance on the case
of Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC23 is misplaced. Petitioner in the said case
substantially complied with the rules by posting a partial surety bond of fifty
thousand pesos issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. while his
motion to reduce appeal bond was pending before the NLRC.
ROSEWOOD PROCESSING VS. NLRC
Facts: a complaint for illegal dismissal; underpayment of wages; and for

nonpayment of overtime pay, legal holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and
rest day, thirteenth month pay, cash bond deposit, unpaid wages and damages
was filed against Veterans Philippine Scout Security Agency and/or Sergio Jamila
IV. Thereafter, petitioner was impleaded as a third-party respondent by the
security agency. The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by the National
Labor Relations Commission for failure of the petitioner to file the required
appeal bond within the reglementary period. In its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner contended that it received a copy of the labor arbiter's Decision only
on April 6, 1993, and that it filed on April 16, 1993 within the prescribed time a
Notice of Appeal with a Memorandum on Appeal, a Motion to Reduce Appeal
Bond and a surety bond issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. in
the amount of P50,000.
Issue: whether there was Substantial Compliance with the Appeal Bond
Requirement despite being insufficient
25 | P a g e
Held: Yes. The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in
the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such
legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory. Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision
involving a monetary award in labor cases may be perfected "only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond." 10 The lawmakers intended the posting of the
bond to be an indispensable requirement to perfect an employer's appeal.
However, in a number of cases, this Court has relaxed this requirement in order
to bring about the immediate and appropriate resolution of controversies on the
merits. 12 Some of these cases include: "(a) counsel's reliance on the footnote of
the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may
appeal . . . within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration of
substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust
enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation
pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special
circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the
issue involved." 13
FSFI vs NLRC
DECEMBER 11, 2003
Facts: that a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims for service
incentive leave, 13th month pay and night shift differential was filed by
respondents against petitioners before the NLRC The complaint was assigned to
Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. who ordered the parties to file their position
paper. Respondents complied, but not the petitioners despite several warnings
and time extensions. The inaction was construed as a waiver by petitioners of
their right to present evidence.
The Labor Arbiter decided the complaint on the merit and ruled in favor of
respondents. He sustained their claim of illegal dismissal as petitioners failed to
adduce contrary evidence. Petitioners were ordered to reinstate respondents.
The monetary claims of the respondents were likewise granted.
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. For the first
time, they submitted evidence that respondents were project employees and
that their dismissal was due to the discontinuation of the Jaka Tower I project
where they were assigned. Respondents, however, assailed the jurisdiction of
the NLRC over the appeal for failure of the petitioners to file the appeal bond
within the ten (10)-day reglementary period. They further contended that it was
too late for petitioners to present evidence in the NLRC.
The NLRC nevertheless assumed jurisdiction over the appeal. Due to the
evidence presented by petitioners on the issue of illegal dismissal, it remanded
the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied.
26 | P a g e
Issue: Whether the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in assuming

jurisdiction and remanding the case to the labor arbiter
Held: Yes. The Labor Code provides a ten (10)-day period from receipt of the
decision of the Arbiter for the filing of an appeal together with an appeal bond if
the decision involves a monetary award in favor of the employees, viz:
ART. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer

may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In the case at bar, petitioners alleged that they received a copy of the Arbiters
decision on October 31, 1998. Their memorandum of appeal was
dated November 9, 1998, but their appeal bond to stay execution of the
decision was executed only on November 17, 1998. The records show no partial
payment of the bond was made during the reglementary period nor was there
any explanation for its late filing. Given these facts, the late filing of the bond
divested the NLRC of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioners appeal.
BUENABORA VS. LIM KING GUAN

JANUARY 20, 2004
Facts: Petitioners were employees of private respondent Unix International

Export Corporation (UNIX), a corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing bags, wallets and the like.Sometime in 1991 and 1992,
petitioners filed several cases against UNIX and its incorporators and officers for
unfair labor practice, illegal lockout/dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, proportionate 13th month pay, unpaid wages, interest, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the
petitioners and the judgment become final and executory. Petitioner contends
that UNIX in order to avoid judgment incorporated another entity called FUJI
which is composed of same owners. Petitioner filed another case against FUJI
and won.
Private respondents FUJI, its officers and stockholders filed a

memorandum on appeal and a motion to dispense with the posting of a cash or
surety appeal bond on the ground that they were not the employers of
petitioners. They alleged that they could not be held responsible for petitioners’
27 | P a g e
claims and to require them to post the bond would be unjust and unfair, and not
sanctioned by law.
NLRC denied FUJI’s motion however on respondents second motion for

reconsideration, the NLRC allowed them to file the bond which the petitioner
assails being already filed out of time.
Issue: whether the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the posting of respondent’s bond
Held: No. The provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of
bond on appeals involving monetary awards must be given liberal interpretation
in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. 3 If
only to achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the reglementary
periods may be relaxed if warranted. The NLRC, Third Division could not be said
to have abused its discretion in requiring the posting of bond after it denied
private respondents’ motion to be exempted therefrom.
It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect
an appeal has the effect of making the judgment final and executory. However,
technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. 4 We have allowed
appeals from the decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond
the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. The facts and circumstances
of the instant case warrant liberality considering the amount involved and the
fact that petitioners already obtained a favorable judgment on February 23,
1993 against their employer UNIX.
REINSTATEMENT ASPECT OF LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION
PIONEER TEXTURIZING COPR vs. NLRC
Facts: Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners' reviser/trimmer

since 1980. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus based her assigned work on a paper
note posted by petitioners. The posted paper which contains the corresponding
price for the work to be accomplished by a worker is identified by its P.O.
Number. On August 15, 1992, de Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the
cloths' ribs. She thereafter submitted tickets corresponding to the work done to
her supervisor. Three days later, de Jesus received from petitioners' personnel
manager a memorandum requiring her to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with the intention of cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no
28 | P a g e
trimming. The memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for
thirty days starting from August 19, 1992. In her handwritten explanation, de
Jesus maintained that she merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O. No.
3853 as it has the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824 which has an
attached price list for trimming the ribs and admitted that she may have been
negligent in presuming that the same work was to be done with P.O. No. 3853,
but not for dishonesty or tampering. Petitioners' personnel department,
nonetheless, terminated her from employment and sent her a notice of
termination dated September 18, 1992. The labor arbiter held that Lourdes was
accorded due process but her dismissal was not justified. On appeal the NLRC
ordered her reinstatement but with no backwages. Petitioner contends that a
writ of execution is needed to enforce reinstatement.
Issue: whether an order of reinstatement needs a writ of execution
Held: No. the necessity for a writ of execution under Article 224 applies only to
final and executory decisions which are not within the coverage of Article 223.
Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five
(5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and
executory. It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be
appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of
Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately
executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite
obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even
pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of
execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would
certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i.e.,
the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An
application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for
numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled
hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC
could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict
mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. In other words, if the
requirements of Article 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then
the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article
223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual.
ROQUERO VS. PAL

APRIL 2, 2004
Facts: Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of
respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for brevity). From the evidence on
record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing
and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL
security officers and NARCOM personnel. The two alleged that they did not
29 | P a g e
voluntarily indulge in the said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato
who was introduced to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport
Maintenance Division of PAL. Pabayo alleged that Alipato often bragged about
the drugs he could smuggle inside the company premises and invited other
employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was unsuccessful, until one day,
he was able to persuade Pabayo to join him in taking the drugs. They met
Roquero along the way and he agreed to join them. Inside the company
premises, they locked the door and Alipato lost no time in preparing the drugs
to be used. When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men
entered the room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo and seized the drugs and the
paraphernalia used.1 Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical
examination where the results showed that they were positive of drugs. They
were also brought to the security office of PAL where they executed written
confessions without the benefit of counsel. Petitioners were subsequently
terminated and filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor
arbiter upheld the validity of the dismissal, while the case was pending on
appeal before the NLRC, the RTC acquitted the petitioners on drug possession
on the ground of instigation. The NLRC found PAL guilty of instigation and
ordered the reinstatement, to which PAL refused to execute and file an appeal
before the CA. the CA reversed NLRC’s decision and held tht the dismissal was
valid however it denied the payment of separation pay and attorneys fees.
Issue: whether the reinstatement order by the labor arbiter can be halted by a
petition filed in higher courts without any restraining order or preliminary
injunction ordered in the meantime
Held: No. Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code as amended by Section
12 of Republic Act No. 6715, 21 and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on
Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, provide that an order of
reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending
appeal. The rationale of the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC:
"In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a

decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the
law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and
enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man.
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of

the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his
salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the
issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is
ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In
the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on
PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to
do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated,
from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this
Court. We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases
where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to
effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them.
30 | P a g e
Note: Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may
authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed
to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the
appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the
dismissed or separated employee and his family."
AIRPHIL CORP VS. ZAMORA

AUGUST 7, 2004
Facts: Enrico Zamora (Zamora) was employed with Air Philippines Corporation
(APC) as a B-737 Flight Deck Crew. He applied for promotion to the position of
airplane captain and underwent the requisite training program. After completing
training, he inquired about his promotion but APC did not act on it; instead, it
continued to give him assignments as flight deck crew. Thus, Zamora filed a
Complaint with the Labor Arbiter. He argued that the act of APC of withholding
his promotion rendered his continued employment with it oppressive and unjust.
He therefore asked that APC be held liable for constructive dismissal. APC
denied that it dismissed complainant. It pointed out that, when the complaint
was filed on May 14, 1997, complainant was still employed with it. It was only
on May 22, 1997 that complainant stopped reporting for work, not because he
was forced to resign, but because he had joined a rival airline, Grand Air. The
labor arbiter held that there was illegal dismissal and ordered payment of
unpaid salaries. On appeal the NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and held that
there was no illegal dismissal but ordered to pay the unpaid salaries. Petitioner
questions the ruling of NLRC with respect to the payment of unpaid salaries
since there was no illegal dismissal
Issue: whether there was a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioner
to pay respondent’s unpaid salaries despite finding that there was no illedgal
dismissal
Held: NO. The premise of the award of unpaid salary to respondent is that prior
to the reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the order of
reinstatement embodied therein was already the subject of an alias writ of
execution even pending appeal. Although petitioner did not comply with this
writ of execution, its intransigence made it liable nonetheless to the salaries of
respondent pending appeal. There is logic in this reasoning of the NLRC.
In Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., we resolved the same issue as follows:
We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the
Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate
the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by
the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated
during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality,
31 | P a g e
the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is

entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
LANSANGAN VS. AMKOR TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES

JANUARY 30, 2009
Facts: An anonymous e-mail was sent to the General Manager of Amkor

Technology Philippines (respondent) detailing allegations of malfeasance on the
part of its supervisory employees Lunesa Lansangan and Rosita Cendaña
(petitioners) for "stealing company time." Respondent thus investigated the
matter, requiring petitioners to submit their written explanation. In handwritten
letters, petitioners admitted their wrongdoing. Respondent thereupon
terminated petitioners for "extremely serious offenses" as defined in its Code of
Discipline, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
it. The labor arbiter held that the dismissal was valid but ordered reinstatement
"as a measure of equitable and compassionate relief" owing mainly to
petitioners’ prior unblemished employment records, show of remorse, harshness
of the penalty and defective attendance monitoring system of respondent. The
petitioner employees did not appeal the issue regarding the validity of their
dismissal but rather moved for the issuance of writ of execution as to the order
of reinstatement. Hence the order as to the validity of their dismissal became
final and executor. Amkor appealed the order of reinstatement and the NLRC
reversed the LA’s ruling. Petitioner now claims that they are entitled to the
unpaid salaries when the case was pending since the order of reinstatement
was immediately executory.
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to the payment of unpaid salaries when
the case was pending appeal relying on the case of roquero vs. PAL
Held: NO. The decision of the Arbiter finding that petitioners committed
"dishonesty as a form of serious misconduct and fraud, or breach of trust" had
become final, petitioners not having appealed the same before the NLRC as in
fact they even moved for the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the
decision. It bears recalling that it was only respondent which assailed the
Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC – to solely question the propriety of the order for
reinstatement, and it succeeded.Roquero, as well as Article 223 of the Labor
Code on which the appellate court also relied, finds no application in the present
case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or
separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as
what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of illegal
dismissal, as in the present case.
The Arbiter found petitioners’ dismissal to be valid. Such finding had, as stated
earlier, become final, petitioners not having appealed it. Following Article 279
which provides:
In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
32 | P a g e
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied),
petitioners are not entitled to full backwages as their dismissal was not found to
be illegal. Agabon v. NLRC so states –– payment of backwages and other
benefits is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed.
GENUINO VS. NLRC

DECEMBER 4, 2007
Facts: Genuino was employed by Citibank sometime in January 1992 as

Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice-President. She
received a monthly compensation of PhP 60,487.96, exclusive of benefits and
privileges. On August 23, 1993, Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with
"knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions "which were irregular or even
fraudulent." In the same letter, Genuino was informed she was under preventive
suspension. Petitioner asked for the details of the accusations since the charges
were too general, her counsel asked for a bill of particulars from Citibank but
the latter refused, petitioner did not attend the administrative investigation nor
sent any answer and was subsequently terminated by Citibank. Petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal; the labor arbiter held that genuino’s dismissal
was without just cause and ordered Citibank to reinstate and pay genuine for
unpaid salaries and for damages, On appeal, the NLRC held that the dismissal
was for just cause but ordered Citibank to pay genuine because the dismissal
was not in accordance with the two twin notice requirement.
Issue: whether genuine is still entitled to the payment of her unpaid salary
pending appeal of the case as ordered by the LA, since an order of
reinstatement is immediately executory
Held: NO. Ordinarily, the employer is required to reinstate the employee during
the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor
Code, which states:
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or

separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall
either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
If the decision of the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding
that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require
the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries s/he
33 | P a g e
received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted from the
accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from
his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement
provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to
work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the
compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund.
Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll

reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not
entitled to be paid the salaries awarded pending the case was on appeal.
JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,

INC
G.R. No. 164856 January 20, 2009
Facts: The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by PAL against
its employees-herein petitioners3 after they were allegedly caught in the act of
sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers
raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section.
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of
Discipline, prompting Petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages which was, resolved by the Labor Arbiter in their favor, thus ordering
PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the
decision. Upon appeal to NLRC the decision of the LA was reversed. Petitioner’s
MR was denied followed by the entry of judgment.
Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) placed PAL (hereafter referred to as respondent),
which was suffering from severe financial losses, under an Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver
Subsequently LA issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement
aspect of its former decision, and later issued a Notice of Garnishment (Notice).
PAL thereupon moved to quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners
moved to release the garnished amount. NLRC ruled in favor of petitioners. PAL
filed a petition for certiorari with injunction against NLRC which was granted by
the CA. The rehabilitation proceeding was terminated, hence this petition.
Issue: WON a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for
implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiter’s decision
Ruling: NO. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall
either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay
34 | P a g e
the execution for reinstatement provided herein. (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied)
The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:
x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by
the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during
the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the
employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is
entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the
Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement,
which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is
ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and
it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
The spirit of the rule on reinstatement pending appeal animates the
proceedings once the Labor Arbiter issues the decision containing an order of
reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further elaboration.
Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate execution during the
pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At the same
time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution,
as observed in Panuncillo and as what actually transpired in Kimberly,23
Composite,24 Air Philippines,25 and Roquero,26 should not be countenanced.
After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee
may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in
enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the
employer.
The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the
delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the delay
is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required
to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
MT. CARMEL COLLEGE, vs. JOCELYN RESUENA, EDDIE VILLALON, SYLVIA

SEDAYON and ZONSAYDA EMNACE,
G.R. No. 173076 October 10, 2007
Facts: Respondents were employees of MCC, Jocelyn Resuena (Accounting

Clerk), Eddie Villalon (Elementary Department Principal); Sylvia Sedayon
(Treasurer), and Zonsayda Emnace (Secretary to the Director).
Respondents, together with several faculty members, non-academic personnel,
and other students, participated in a protest action against MCC. MCC issued a
Memorandum to each of the respondents directing them to explain in writing
why they should not be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence for joining the
protest action against the school administration. After hearing conducted by the
Fact-Finding Committee they recommended the dismissal of the respondents
which were latter terminated after the notice of termination was given to them.
Separate complaints were filed by each of the four respondents against
35 | P a g e
petitioner before Regional Arbitration for illegal dismissal. LA affirmed the

validity of dismissal of the respondents but they were awarded separation fee,
13th month pay and attorneys fees. MCC appealed to the NLRC but it was
dismissed. Labor Arbiter Drilon issued to the parties a Notice of
Judgment/Decision of his 25 May 1999 Decision indicating that a "decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the
reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal. An MR before the NLRC was denied. An appeal by certiorari
before the CA was also denied. Respondents filed on 14 July 2004 yet another
Motion to Issue a Writ of Execution to collect backwages from 1 January 2004 to
30 June 2004. Petitioner opposed the motion, but the Motion to Issue a Writ of
Execution was granted. MCC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
Order contending that the judgment of the NLRC mandated the payment of
separation pay as computed in the appealed decision. A MR by MCC was denied
and their petition for certiorari before the CA was dismissed.
Issue: WON Art.223 of the labor code is applicable in this case
Ruling: NO. This Court had declared in the aforesaid case that reinstatement
during appeal is warranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the
dismissed employee should be reinstated. But this was precisely because on
appeal to the NLRC, it found that there was no illegal dismissal; thus, neither
reinstatement nor backwages may be awarded. In the instant petition, the NLRC
Decision dated 30 October 2001 finding the termination of respondents illegal,
had the effect of reversing Labor Arbiter Drilon’s Decision dated 25 May 1999.
This Court sees no cogent reason as to the relevance of a discussion on whether
or not reinstatement is self-executory. However, since petitioner raised this
issue, this Court has opted to discuss it. Verily, Article 223 of the Labor Code is
not applicable in the instant case. The said provision stipulates that the decision
of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even
pending appeal.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate that execution is the final stage of
litigation, the end of the suit. It can not and should not be frustrated except for
serious reasons demanded by justice and equity.47 "Litigation must end
sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the verdicts. Courts
must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon
any attempt to prolong them."
NERISSA BUENVIAJE, SONIA FLORES, BELMA OLIVIO,

GENALYN PELOBELLO, MARY JANE MENOR, JOSIE RAQUERO,
ESTRELITA MANAHAN, REBECCA EBOL, and ERLINDA ARGA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER SEVENTH
DIVISION),
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HONORABLE ARBITER ROMULUS PROTASIO, COTTONWAY MARKETING

CORPORATION and MICHAEL G. TONG,
G.R. No. 147806 November 12, 2002
Facts: Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp.

(Cottonway), hired as promo girls for their garment products. After their services
were terminated as the company was allegedly suffering business losses,
petitioners filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment
of salary and non-payment of other remuneration against their employer. LA
ruled in favor of the validity of retrenchment but ordered Cottonway to pay their
separation fee and 13th month pay. Upon appeal to NLRC the decision of the LA
was reversed ordering the reinstatement of the petitioners plus payment of
back wages and remunerations. A motion for reconsideration by Cottonway was
denied. Cottonway filed a manifestation before the NLRC stating that they
already gave notice to the petitioners requiring them to go back to work but the
latter failed to do so prompting Cottonway to terminate their employment. A
petition for certiorari before the SC by Cottonway was dismissed. Petitoners filed
a motion for execution before the NLRC contending that the judgment of NLRC
became final and executor. Cottonway filed another manifestation reiterating its
first allegation and that the petitioners have found employment elsewhere. They
also filed a manifestation requesting for reception of evidence for the same
matter. LA issued an order that the amount of back wages shall only cover the
time the petitioners are illegally terminated until the order of reinstatement
contending that the failure of the petitioners to report despite the notice given
by Cottonway is a justifiable reason to decrease their back wages. The order
was set aside by the resolution of the NLRC ordering the LA to issue a writ of
execution according to the decision of NLRC. Upon appeal to CA the decision of
NLRC was reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the decision of LA is

immediately executor
Whether or not the order of the LA decreasing the back wages of the
petitioner is valid
Ruling: 1. YES. In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
2. NO. The foregoing provision is intended for the benefit of the employee and
cannot be used to defeat their own interest. The law mandates the employer to
either admit the dismissed employee back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate him in the payroll to
abate further loss of income on the part of the employee during the pendency of
the appeal. But we cannot stretch the language of the law as to give the
employer the right to remove an employee who fails to immediately comply
with the reinstatement order, especially when there is reasonable explanation
37 | P a g e
for the failure. If Cottonway were really sincere in its offer to immediately
reinstate petitioners to their former positions, it should have given them
reasonable time to wind up their current preoccupation or at least to explain
why they could not return to work at Cottonway at once. Cottonway did not do
either. Instead, it gave them only five days to report to their posts and when the
petitioners failed to do so, it lost no time in serving them their individual notices
of termination. We are, therefore, not impressed with the claim of respondent
company that petitioners have been validly dismissed on August 1, 1996 and
hence their backwages should only be computed up to that time. We hold that
petitioners are entitled to receive full backwages computed from the time their
compensation was actually withheld until their actual reinstatement, or if
reinstatement is no longer possible, until the finality of the decision, in
accordance with the Decision of the NLRC dated March 26, 1996 which has
attained finality.28
PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR FERDINAND

CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON, AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE,
Petitioners,
vs.
GERALDINE VELASCO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177467 March 9, 2011
Facts: Velasco was employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional

Health Care Representative. Velasco had a medical work up for her high-risk
pregnancy and was subsequently advised bed rest which resulted in her
extending her leave of absence. Velasco filed her sick leave for the period from
26 March to 18 June 2003, her vacation leave from 19 June to 20 June 2003, and
leave without pay from 23 June to 14 July 2003. While Velasco was still on leave,
PFIZER through its Area Sales Manager, Cortez, personally served Velasco a
"Show-cause Notice" dated 25 June 2003. Aside from mentioning about an
investigation on her possible violations of company work rules regarding
"unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or samples and unauthorized
withdrawal and/or pull-out of stocks" and instructing her to submit her
explanation on the matter within 48 hours from receipt of the same, the notice
also advised her that she was being placed under "preventive suspension" for
30 days or from that day to 6 August 2003 and consequently ordered to
surrender the following "accountabilities;" Velasco sent a letter addressed to
Cortez dated 28 June 2003 denying the charges. Velasco received a "Second
Show-cause Notice" informing her of additional developments in their
investigation. Velasco filed a complaint for illegal suspension with money claims
before the RAB. PFIZER sent her a letter inviting her to a disciplinary hearing.
Velasco received it under protest and informed PFIZER via the receiving copy of
the said letter that she had lodged a complaint against the latter and that the
issues that may be raised in the July 22 hearing "can be tackled during the
hearing of her case" or at the preliminary conference set for 5 and 8 of August
2003. Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice” which Velasco failed to
heed prompting Pfizer to terminate her employment. LA ruled that Velasco’s
dismissal was illegal which was affirmed by the NLRC. A motion for
reconsideration by Pfizer was denied. Pfizer filed a petition for certiorari under
38 | P a g e
Rule 65 before CA which the court granted in its favor. Velasco filed an MR and
the court affirmed the validity of her dismissal ordering Pfizer to pay her the
wages to which she is entitled to from the time the reinstatement order was
issued until the promulgation of the decision.
Pfizer filed the instant petition assailing the aforementioned CA Resolutions as
to the period from which to be computed for the payment of respondent’s back
wages.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the LA requires a writ of execution to

become executory to be included in the period to which back wages will be
computed
Ruling: NO. In sum, the Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement
pending appeal necessitates that it must be immediately self-executory without
need for a writ of execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to
serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on the part of the employer to evade
or delay its execution should not be allowed. Furthermore, we likewise restate
our ruling that an order for reinstatement entitles an employee to receive his
accrued backwages from the moment the reinstatement order was issued up to
the date when the same was reversed by a higher court without fear of
refunding what he had received.
Foreseeably, an employer may circumvent the immediately enforceable

reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter by crafting return-to-work directives
that are ambiguous or meant to be rejected by the employee and then disclaim
liability for backwages due to non-reinstatement by capitalizing on the
employee’s purported refusal to work. In sum, the option of the employer to
effect actual or payroll reinstatement must be exercised in good faith.
Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an employee entitled to

reinstatement “shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.” It is established in jurisprudence
that reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had
been removed or separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he had
occupied prior to his dismissal.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the
part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
ARTICLE 224 EXECUTION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS OR

AWARDS
SY ET AL KNITCRAFT CO.,
DECEMBER 12, 2011
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Facts: Petitioners are employees of Weesan Garment (Labor only) which is

contracted by Fairland Knitcraft. The employees filed a complaint for
underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for
holidays, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. A
certain atty. Geronimo appeared and filed position papers on behalf of fairland
and weesan. The Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
However the NLRC reversed said decision. Respondent appealed to the CA
which was granted on the ground that the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction of
the respondents, contending that atty. Geronimo was not authorized by fairland,
and that fairland was not summoned or was sent a copy by the NLRC hence the
decision did not attain finality under art 224, because the service must be sent
to the parties and counsel. That the service to counsel binds the client is not
applicable.
The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were not separately
furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying the
motions for reconsideration of its November 30, 2004 Decision, said Decision
cannot be enforced against Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of
this, said November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland
solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality
Issue: whether the ruling of the NLRC attained finality.
Held: Yes. Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final decisions,
orders or awards both to the parties and their counsel in connection with the
execution of such final decisions, orders or awards. However, for the purpose
of computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the CA,
same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or award by
the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule that notice to
counsel is notice to party. And since the period for filing of an appeal is
reckoned from the counsel’s receipt of the decision, order or award, it
necessarily follows that the reckoning period for their finality is
likewise the counsel’s date of receipt thereof, if a party is represented by
counsel. Hence, the date of receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in
force New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that decisions,
resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become executory after 10 calendar
days from receipt of the same, refers to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus
contrary to the CA’s conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to
Fairland, 10 calendar days after Atty. Tecson’s receipt thereof. In sum, we hold
that the Labor Arbiter had validly acquired jurisdiction over Fairland and its
manager, Debbie, through the appearance of Atty. Geronimo as their counsel
and likewise, through the latter’s filing of pleadings on their behalf.
YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS VS. CA

JANUARY 16, 2002
40 | P a g e
Facts: a writ of execution was issued against Artex Development Corporation

as a consequence of the decision rendered by the said commission in labor
case. Petitioner Yupangco alleges that its property was wrongfully levied by the
said execution. Petitioner filed a third party claim before the labor arbiter but
was dismissed, likewise his appeal to the NLRC. Petitioner filed a complaint
(accion revindicatoria) before the RTC and appealed to CA which was also
dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Issue: Whether the power of the commission to execute its judgment extends
to properties belonging to persons not party to the case. And whether there is
forum shopping
Held: No. The power of the NLRC to execute its judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor (Special Servicing
Corp. v. Centro La Paz, 121 SCRA 748).
"The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief, applies only when no third-
party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
133 SCRA 141 [1984]). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a
claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his claim by an
independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of the
judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor." (Underscoring
ours)
in Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991],
we ruled that:
"The well-settled doctrine is that a 'proper levy' is indispensable to a valid sale
on execution. A sale unless preceded by a valid levy is void. Therefore, since
there was no sufficient levy on the execution in question, the private respondent
did not take any title to the properties sold thereunder x x x.
"A person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over
the levied properties is not precluded, however, from taking other legal
remedies."
Forum shopping
No. In Golangco v. Court of Appeals, we held:

"What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping
exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party
who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same on
related caused and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different for a upon the same issues.
41 | P a g e
"There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were questioned, two

distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought."
Remedy when there is wrong levy
, a third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a
decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies
to protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies
cumulatively, and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of
the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed
of.
Thus, a third party may avail himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the
NLRC.13
Even if a third party claim was denied, a third party may still file a proper action
with a competent court to recover ownership of the property illegally seized by
the sheriff. This finds support in Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of
Court.
ANDO VS. CAMPO

FEBRUARY 16, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI
as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse
of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks. In June 1998, respondents
were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and
some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City. The labor arbiter and NLRC
ruled in favor of the respondents employees, and upon finality respondents
moved for execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff
Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property
over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140167 in
the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando."
This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the
property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could
not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the
judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latter’s properties.
42 | P a g e
On December 27, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the prayer for a TRO,
holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The
RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment,
petitioner’s remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Despite
lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case.
The CA affirmed the ruling RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Issue: whether the regular courts has jurisdiction to restrain the

implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Labor arbiter
Held: NO. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction
to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the
enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by
appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment.
To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.
Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment
that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body.
Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by
analogy or in a suppletory character.
Consider the provision in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on third-party
claims:
SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.—If the property
levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee,
on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the
third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on.
In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the
court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing
of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his
claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from
claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required,
and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the
levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor,
the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
43 | P a g e
On the other hand, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals
specifically with third-party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a
third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to
or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out the
procedure for the filing of a third-party claim, to wit:
SECTION 2. Proceedings. — If property levied upon be claimed by any person
other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such
right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof served
upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the prevailing
party. Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings with respect to the
execution of the property subject of the third party claim shall automatically be
suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct
a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity of the
claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his decision is
appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days from notice, and the
Commission shall resolve the appeal within same period.
There is no doubt in our mind that petitioner’s complaint is a third- party claim
within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a "third
party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis-à-vis the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner
and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs
to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can
consider that petitioner’s wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.
Note: petitioner should have filed a third party complain before the NLRC, wrong
choice of remedy but nevertheless the SC granted the petition kasi sobrang
tagal na nung kaso.
ARTICLE 226 BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILS VS. BAYER PHILS

DECEMBER 6, 2010
Facts: Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines3 (EUBP) is the exclusive

bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines (Bayer), and
is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). In 1997, EUBP, headed by
its president Juanito S. Facundo (Facundo), negotiated with Bayer for the signing
of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). During the negotiations, EUBP
44 | P a g e
rejected Bayer’s 9.9% wage-increase proposal resulting in a bargaining

deadlock. Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute.
In November 1997, pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Avelina

Remigio (Remigio) and 27 other union members, without any authority from
their union leaders, accepted Bayer’s wage-increase proposal. EUBP’s grievance
committee questioned Remigio’s action and reprimanded Remigio and her
allies. On January 7, 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering
EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA retroactive to January 1, 1997 and to be
made effective until December 31, 2001. The said CBA was registered on July 8,
1998 with the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE-National Capital Region
(NCR).
Meanwhile, the rift between Facundo’s leadership and Remigio’s group

broadened. On August 3, 1998, barely six months from the signing of the new
CBA, during a company-sponsored seminar,6 Remigio solicited signatures from
union members in support of a resolution containing the decision of the
signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as Reformed
Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new constitution and
by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and
elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the
CBA between EUBP and Bayer.7 The said resolution was signed by 147 of the
257 local union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the
first resolution.
A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking
recognition from Bayer and demanding remittance of the union dues collected
from its rank-and-file members. On September 8, 1998, Remigio’s splinter group
wrote Facundo, FFW and Bayer informing them of the decision of the majority of
the union members to disaffiliate from FFW. This was followed by another letter
informing Facundo, FFW and Bayer that an interim set of REUBP executive
officers and board of directors had been appointed, and demanding the
remittance of all union dues to REUBP. Remigio also asked Bayer to desist from
further transacting with EUBP. Facundo, meanwhile, sent similar requests to
Bayer requesting for the remittance of union dues in favor of EUBP and accusing
the company of interfering with purely union matters. Bayer responded by
deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union
dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two groups is
resolved. EUPB filed a complaint against Bayer for no remittance of union dues
and for violating the CBA, the labor arbiter held that it has no jurisdiction
because the root cause for Bayer’s failure to remit the collected union dues can
be traced to the intra-union conflict between EUBP and Remigio’s group and
45 | P a g e
that the charges imputed against Bayer should have been submitted instead to
voluntary arbitration
Issue: whether NLRC has jurisdiction
Held: Yes. The NLRC and not the BLR has jurisdiction in the case, An intra-union
dispute refers to any conflict between and among union members, including
grievances arising from any violation of the rights and conditions of
membership, violation of or disagreement over any provision of the union’s
constitution and by-laws, or disputes arising from chartering or disaffiliation of
the union. Sections 1 and 2, Rule XI of Department Order No. 40-03, Series of
2003 of the DOLE enumerate the following circumstances as inter/intra-union
disputes, viz:
RULE XI
INTER/INTRA-UNION DISPUTES AND
OTHER RELATED LABOR RELATIONS DISPUTES
Section 1. Coverage. - Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
(a) cancellation of registration of a labor organization filed by its members
or by another labor organization;
(b) conduct of election of union and workers’ association
officers/nullification of election of union and workers’ association officers;
(c) audit/accounts examination of union or workers’ association funds;
(d) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements;
(e) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation;
(f) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;
(g) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion of union and workers’
association officers and members;
(h) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition;
(i) opposition to application for union and CBA registration;
(j) violations of or disagreements over any provision in a union or workers’
association constitution and by-laws;
(k) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations
and collective bargaining agreements;
(l) violations of the rights and conditions of union or workers’ association
membership;
(m) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements;
(n) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-
organization, union membership and collective bargaining –
(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations;
(2) between and among members of a union or workers’ association.
46 | P a g e
Section 2. Coverage. – Other related labor relations disputes shall include any
conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual, entity or
group that is not a labor organization or workers’ association. This includes: (1)
cancellation of registration of unions and workers’ associations; and (2) a
petition for interpleader.
It is clear from the foregoing that the issues raised by petitioners do not fall
under any of the aforementioned circumstances constituting an intra-union
dispute. More importantly, the petitioners do not seek a determination of
whether it is the Facundo group (EUBP) or the Remigio group (REUBP) which is
the true set of union officers. Instead, the issue raised pertained only to the
validity of the acts of management in light of the fact that it still has an existing
CBA with EUBP.
MONTANO VS. VERCELES

JULY 26, 2010
Facts: Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on October
1, 1994.Subsequently, he joined the union of rank-and-file employees, the FFW
Staff Association, and eventually became the employees’ union president in July
1997. In November 1998, he was likewise designated officer-in-charge of FFW
Legal Center.
During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW,
Atty. Montaño was nominated for the position of National Vice-President. In a
letter dated May 25, 2001, however, the Commission on Election (FFW
COMELEC), informed him that he is not qualified for the position as his
candidacy violates the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws, particularly Section
76 of Article XIX and Section 25 (a) of Article VIII, both in Chapter II thereof. Atty.
Montaño thus filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that his name
be included in the official list of candidates.
Election ensued on May 26-27, 2001 in the National Convention held at Subic
International Hotel, Olongapo City. Despite the pending motion for
reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of
respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the
convention and president of University of the East Employees’ Association
(UEEA-FFW) which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates allowed
Atty. Montaño’s candidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed as the
National Vice-President.
On May 28, 2001, through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty.
Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaño’s candidacy which he
manifested during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the
Convention. On June 18, 2001, Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to the
President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest. Subsequently
verceles also filed a petition for nullification of the election of montano
before the BLR, petitioner on the other hand assails that the regional
director of DOLE should have jurisdiction
Issue: whether the BLR has jurisdiction
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Held: Yes. Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the
Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and
intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of
election of union and workers’ association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to
the BLR’s jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions of a
federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation’s
constitution and by-laws.
Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra-union dispute settlement mechanism.
Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard ‘shall be filed in the Regional
Office where the union is domiciled.’ The concept of domicile in labor relations
regulation is equivalent to the place where the union seeks to operate or has
established a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.
The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra-union dispute
involves a federation, because the geographical presence of a federation may
encompass more than one administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under
Article 226, this Bureau exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes
involving federations. It is well-settled that FFW, having local unions all over the
country, operates in more than one administrative region. Therefore, this
Bureau maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from
any violation of or disagreement over any provision of its constitution and by-
laws.
DIOKNO VS. CACDAC
JULY 4, 2007
Facts: The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is

a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco.
Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES.
On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on
Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May
2003. The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman,
and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members.
Private responded edgardo daya and others are candidates for the said elections
but was disqualified because the COMELEC held that daya and his group allowed
themselves to be assisted by other unions the Meralco Savings and Loan
Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association
(MEMABA) and exerted undue influence on the members of FLAMES. Daya and
other private respondents filed a petition to nullify the election before the med
arbiter. The petitioner members of comelec assails the jurisdiction of BLR
because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to exhaust
administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner that
Article 226 of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter-
union and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Section
14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary
arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board.
Issue: Whether BLR has jurisdiction
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Held: Yes. ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. – The Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the
Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their
own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or
affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation
of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before it,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties.
The amendment to Article 226, as couched in Republic Act No. 6715, which is
relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been divested of its
jurisdiction, simply reads, thus:
Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same Code is likewise
hereby amended to read as follows:
"The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it,
subject to extension by agreement of the parties."
This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, interpreting Article 226 of the Labor
Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article
226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and
exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there
should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union conflict
would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-union
controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions.
More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z), Rule I of
the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and among union
members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or
disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union,
including cases arising from chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or
from any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for
in the Code.
The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no question
that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union.
At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Daya, et
al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections. It must also be
stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that private respondents
Daya, et al., sought the help of non-members of the union in their election
campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not detract from the real
character of the controversy. It remains as one which involves the grievance
over the constitution and bylaws of a union, and it is a controversy involving
members of the union. Moreover, the non-members of the union who were
alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are not parties in the
case.
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ARTICLE 227 COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
MAGBANUA v. UY
MAY 6, 2005
Facts: The Supreme Court rendered a final and executory decision which
affirmed the decision of the NLRC to determine the amount of wage differentials
due the eight petitioners therein. Petitioners filed a motion for issuance of writ
of execution. Respondent, Uy, filed a Manifestation stating that judgment award
was satisfied. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the issuance of Writ of
Execution claiming that they received partial payment only.
Uy opposed contending that said award was fully satisfied. Six out of the eight
petitioners filed a Manifestation requesting the case be considered closed as
they are already satisfied with what have received from the respondent.
Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the motion of the petitioners. On appeal,
NLRC reversed the decision holding that a final and executor decision can no
longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are normally frowned upon
as contrary to public policy.
Court of Appeals held that said compromise agreements may be entered into
even after final judgment. Motion for reconsideration was denied for having
been filed out of time.
ISSUES:
Whether or not final and executor judgment of the Supreme Court could be
subject to compromise agreement.
Whether or not petitioner’s affidavits waiving their awards without the
assistance of their counsel and labor arbiter is valid.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement as shown in
the following facts:
They signed respondent’s Manifestation (filed in the Labor Arbiter) that the
judgment award was satisfied;
They executed joint affidavit attesting to the receipt of payment and waiver of
all benefits due them and
Six out of eight petitioners filed a manifestation with the Labor Arbiter
requesting that the case be terminated because of their receipt of payment in
full satisfaction of their claims.
the principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise agreement after
final judgment. A compromise agreement of a final judgment operates as a
novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite. In
the present case, the incompatibility of the final judgment with the compromise
agreement is evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to
supersede the former.
The presence or absence of a counsel when a waiver is executed does not
determine its validity. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and
intelligently; whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable.
Petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
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SOLOMON v. POWERTECH CORP

January 22, 2008
Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims filed by the
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Powertech Corp. at the Arbitration level of the
NLRC, Labor Arbiter dela Cruz rendered a decision declaring illegal termination
of 22 employees and granting their monetary claims. On appeal by Powertech,
Mr. Gestiada, for himself and on behalf of other complainants executed a
quitclaim, release and waiver in favor of Powertech for P150,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid compromise agreement made by Mr.

Gestiada in behalf of the complainants.
HELD: No. The NLRC and the Supreme Court stated that the P150,000
compromise is inequitable compared to the P2.5M award already won on the
Arbiter level. It does not represent a true and fair amount which a reasonable
agent may bargain for his principal.
In support to their decision, reiterates the landmark case of Galicia v. NLRC,

which held that the consideration for the quitclaim, a measly P12,000/worker
and the total sum of P300,000 are inordinately low and exceedingly
unreasonable relative to the P107,380/worker. The quitclaim cannot be
considered an obstacle to the pursuit of their legitimate claims.
It was established that Powertech colluded with Mr. Gestiada in shortchanging

fraudulently deprived the other employees of their just share in the award. The
Supreme Court held that collusion is a species of fraud. Article 227 of the Labor
Code empowers the NLRC to avoid compromise agreement for fraud.
Thus, NLRC was justified in declaring the compromise agreement for P150,000
as void and reinstating the judgment award of P2.5M.
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS INC. v NLRC

SEPYEMBER 22, 2008
Facts: PJI is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication and sale of

newspapers and magazines. Journal Employees Union (exclusive bargaining unit
of rank-and-file employees) filed a notice of strike before the NCMB, claiming
that PJI was guilty of unfair labor practice. PJI was then going to implement a
retrenchment program due to “over-staffing or bloated work force and
continuing actual losses by the company.” DOLE certified the labor dispute to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
Parties were required to submit position papers. PJI filed a motion to dismiss
contending that the Secretary of Labor had no jurisdiction to assume over the
case and erred in certifying it to the NLRC. NLRC denied the motion, PJI then
filed a motion to defer further proceedings, alleging that the filing of its position
51 | P a g e
paper might jeopardize attempts to settle matter extrajudicially. NLRC also

denied the motion. The case was submitted for decision.
NLRC declared that 33 complainants were illegally dismissed and that there was
no basis for the retrenchment program. Parties executed a compromise
agreement then PJI undertook to reinstate the 31 complainants without loss of
seniority rights and benefits. NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally
dismissed. Petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals by the
Union. CA rendered decision and held NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling for PJI. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC Resolution, which includes a pronouncement that the
members of a union had been illegally dismissed is abandoned or rendered
“moot and academic” by a compromise agreement subsequently entered into
between the dismissed employees and the employer.
HELD:
No. contrary to the allegation of PJI, the execution and subsequent approval by
the NLRC of the agreement forged between it and the Union did not render the
NLRC Resolution ineffectual nor render it moot and academic. The agreement
becomes part of the judgment of the court or tribunal and as logical
consequence, there is an implicit waiver of the right to appeal.
The compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take
part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent. A compromise
agreement is also a contract; it requires the consent of the parties and it only
then that agreement may be considered as voluntarily entered into.
Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the compromise agreement
pertained only to the “monetary obligation” of the employer to the dismissed
employees and in no way affected the NLRC Resolution where it made the
pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation of petitioner’s
retrenchment program.
Petition is denied.
ARTICLE 232 PROHIBITION ON CERTIFICATION ELECTION
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN v. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND

FACULTY
SEPTEMBER 18, 2000
Facts: Respond Union initiated the renegotiation of its CBA, on that some year
the Union elected new set officers wherein respondent Ambas is the new
president. Ambas wanted to continue negotiation but petitioner claimed that
CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties.
Petitioner accused the Union officers of bargaining in bad faith. Labor Arbiter
decided in favor of petitioner but NLRC reversed the decision. Union notified the
NCMB of its intention to strike on the grounds that petitioner did not comply to
the following: 1) delete the name of Atty. Legres as the Union’s counsel 2)
refusal to bargain.
52 | P a g e
Parties agreed to start a new 5-year CBA, then Ambas was informed that her
work schedule was changed. Ambas protested and due to petitioner’s inaction
the Union filed a notice of strike. Petitioner dismissed Ambas for
insubordination. However, petitioner stopped the negotiation after a new group
of employees filed a petition for certification election. Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees to return to work.
Petitioner readmitted striking Union except Ambas.
Secretary of Labor issued an Order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor
practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas with backwages. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain with the Union when it suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new
CBA upon mere information that a petition for certification has been filed by
another legitimate organization.
HELD:
Yes. Although the management has the prerogative to discipline its employees
for insubordination but when the exercise of such management right tends to
interfere with the employee’s right to self-organization, it amounts to Union
busting and is therefore a prohibited act.
The dismissal of Ambas was clearly designed to frustrate the Union in its desire
to forge a new CBA. When management refused to treat the charge of
insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the grievance machinery, the
action of the college in finally dismissing her from the service constitute a
violation of right to due process against Ambas.
Petition is denied.
ARTICLE 234 REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION
MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

DECEMBER 21, 2009
Facts: Respondent, Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Siam Ceramics Inc.

(SMMSC-independent) was issued a certificate of registration by the DOLE
Region IV-A. petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of Union Registration
against SMMSC, claiming that they violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not
complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and
misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
Regional Director issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the
registration and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-
53 | P a g e
Independent, appealed to the BLR and ruled in favor of the Union, thus, they
remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Mariwasa appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with
20% union membership requirement for its registration because of the
disaffiliation from the total number of Union members of 102 members who
executed affidavits recanting their union membership. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the failure to comply with the 20% union membership
requirement.
Whether or not withdrawal of 31 union members affected the petition for
certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned.
HELD:
Supreme Court denied the petition.
While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a
resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the Union’s
application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they
comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration
as a labor union.
Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership
during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union
must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its
existence.
It appears that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to the
petition before filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals
made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is
convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after filing the
petition are deemed involuntary.
Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the
employer’s pressure and so the voluntariness of the employee’s execution of
the affidavits became suspect. The cancellation of a union’s registration
doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization.
For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union
registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and
misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent
of a majority of union members.
ELECTROMAT MANUFACTURING AND RECORDING CORP. v. LAGUNZAD

JULY 27, 2011
Facts: Respondent Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Electromat-

Wasto (Union), a charter affiliate of the Workers Advocates for struggle,
transformation Organization (WASTO), applied for registration with the BLR.
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BLR issued union a certification of Creation of Local Chapter (equivalent to the

certificate of registration of an independent union) pursuant to D.O. No. 40-03.
Petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate, for the
union’s failure to comply with Article 234 of the Labor Code. It argued that D.O.
40-03 is an unconstitutional diminution of the Labor Code’s union registration
requirements under Article 234. Acting Director Lagunzad dismissed the
petition. On appeal, BLR Director affirmed the dismissal. Then elevated to the
Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari contending grave abuse of discretion
by the BLR. It assailed the validity of D.O. 40-03 reducing the requirements
under Article 234. It maintained that BLR should have not granted the
registration through the issuance of a certification of creation of local chapter
since the union submitted only the charter certificate issued by WASTO.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On motion for reconsideration,
Elecromat argued that union’s certificate was invalid because WASTO do not
have at least 10 locals or chapter as required by D.O.40-03. Court of Appeals
denied the motion holding that no such requirement is found under the rules.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. 40-03 is a valid exercise of the rule making power of the
DOLE.
HELD:
Yes. In view of the principle of “progressive development” – the intent of the law
in imposing lesser requirements in the case of a branch or local registered
federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a
federation or national union in order to increase the local union’s bargaining
powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.
D.O. 40-03 represents an expression of the government’s implementing policy
on trade unionism. In any case, the union has more than satisfied the
requirements the petitioner complains about.
Petition is denied.
EAGLE RIDGE GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and EAGLE RIDGE EMPLOYEES UNION (EREU)
G.R. No. 178989 March 18, 2010
Facts: 20% of Eagle Ridge’s rank-and-file employees—the percentage threshold

required under Article 234(c) of the Labor Code for union registration—had a
meeting where they organized themselves into an independent labor union,
named "Eagle Ridge Employees Union" (EREU). EREU’s application was granted
by the DOLE. EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge
Golf & Country Club but it was opposed by Eagle Ridge followed by a petition for
cancellation due to an alleged fraud and misrepresentation in their constitution
and by-laws and election of officers. Petitioner contends that in the EREU
registration form they declared that they have 30 members while in their
meeting it shows that they only have 26 and that five of their members have
manifested their intention to withdraw through their affidavits. EREU on the
55 | P a g e
other hand contends that the petition for cancellation was deficient in form
lacking certification against forum shopping, they admitted 4 new members and
that they have ratified their constitution and by-laws. DOLE ruled in favor of
Eagle Ridge. EREU elevated the case before the BLR which affirmed the decision
of DOLE Regional Director. An MR reversed the decision of DOLE and BLR. Eagle
went to CA for certiorari but the same was denied for giving a machine copy of
the resolutions and the deficiencies in the certification against forum shopping.
Issue: WON the withdrawal of the employee affects the status of the Union
Ruling: NO. Before their amendment by Republic Act No. 9481 40 on June 15,
2007, the then governing Art. 234 (on the requirements of registration of a labor
union) and Art. 239 (on the grounds for cancellation of union registration) of the
Labor Code respectively provided as follows:
ART. 234. REQUIREMENTS OF REGISTRATION. –– Any applicant labor
organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal
personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration
based on the following requirements:
(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;
(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor
organization, the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of workers
who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all
the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate;
xxxx
(e) Four copies (4) of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union,
minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the members who
participated in it.41
A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement,
or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration.
In Eastland Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Noriel,52 the Court emphasized, and
reiterated its earlier rulings,53 that "even if there were less than 30% [the
required percentage of minimum membership then] of the employees asking for
a certification election, that of itself would not be a bar to respondent Director
ordering such an election provided, of course, there is no grave abuse of
discretion."54 Citing Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of
Labor Relations,55 the Court emphasized that a certification election is the most
appropriate procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the
competing organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining.56
We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly
undated written statements submitted by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven
months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration, partake of the
nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Union’s filing of a
petition for certification election on March 21, 2000. We have in precedent
cases said that the employees’ withdrawal from a labor union made before the
filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while
withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and
56 | P a g e
does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership
done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate
such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to
nullify the registration of the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to
agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor gravely err when
it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no
evidentiary weight.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED,

petitioner,
vs.
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO, respondent.
G.R. No. 142000 January 22, 2003
Facts: The THEU- Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization

(PTGWO) representing the majority of the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE. Petitioner
opposed the petition on the ground that the list of union members submitted by
it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of
supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees,
as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and
separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only
71 were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI. DOLE ruled in favor of THEU.
An MR by the petitioner was denied and DOLE ruled that the twenty percent
(20%) membership requirement is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate
status. A petition for certiorari was filed before SC and the case was referred to
CA but it was denied by the CA for failure to adduce substantial evidence to
support its allegations.
Issue: WON the opposition of the petitioner is sufficient to question the

personality of the Union
Ruling: NO. After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal

personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in
an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V,
Book IV of the "Rules to Implement the Labor Code" (Implementing Rules) which
section reads:
Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers’ association shall
be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance
of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be
subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent
petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job
titles and ranks,24 there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors’ respective
duties, powers and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively
recommend managerial actions which require the use of independent
judgment.25
As this Court put it in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor:26
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Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject

employees x x x The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does
not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation
where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member
of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation vs. Laguesma (G. R. No.
103743, January 29, 1996), it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employee’s function and not the
nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee
has rank-and-file or managerial status or whether he is a supervisory employee.
S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) and DIR. HANS LEO CACDAC, in
His capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 161690 July 23, 2008
Facts: The Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in
behalf of the rank-and-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542)
signatures, 82 of which belong to terminated Ventures employees, appeared on
the basic documents supporting the petition. Ventures filed a Petition 1 to cancel
the Union’s certificate of registration invoking the grounds set forth in Article
239(a) of the Labor Code. Ventures contend that they maliciously included 82
signatures of former employees, some signatures appeared twice or thrice, a
meeting was not held for the purpose and the union failed to attain the 20%
membership requirement under the Labor Code.
In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss,5 the Union denied committing the imputed
acts of fraud or forgery and alleged that: (1) the organizational meeting actually
took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball court in Mariveles; (2)
the 82 employees adverted to in Ventures’ petition were qualified Union
members for, although they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year
prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not yet lapsed; (3) it had
complied with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542
members; and (4) the "double" signatures were inadvertent human error.
DOLE ruled in favor of the Ventures ordering the cancellation of the certificate of
the Union. Union filed MR before BLR and it was filed belatedly but it was given
due course by BLR and treated is as an appeal. Ventures filed a motion to
expunge the appeal but BLR rendered decision in favor of the Union. A motion
for reconsideration by Ventures was denied by the CA.
Issue: whether the union complied with the 20% requirement for registration
Ruling: Yes.To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals’ active

participation in the Union’s organizational meeting and the signing ceremonies
58 | P a g e
thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union,
even without the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code
requires to be submitted, to wit: Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.—Any
applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and shall be
entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the
following requirements:
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all
the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.
In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the
names of [542] members x x x. This number easily complied with the 20%
requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even
subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within
440 or 20% of the maximum total of 2,202 rank-and-file employees.
Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed
employees is better addressed in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a
pre-election conference x x x. The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82
employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to
cancel union registration.
ARTICLE 238 – 239
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, acting through its owner, GRAND PLAZA
HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND
ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER
(NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), Respondent.
G.R. No. 178296 January 12, 2011
Facts: The Union filed with the (DOLE-NCR) a petition for certification election.
The petition was affirmed by the Med-Arbiter and DOLE secretary and allowed
the holding of a pre-election conference. Heritage filed MR but it was denied.
The pre-election conference was held a year later. Petitioner moved to archive
or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of
respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The
pre-election conference resumed 2 years later. Subsequently, Heritage
discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the (BLR) its annual financial
report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration
papers in 1995. Heritage filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of
respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents.
Heritage reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the
[Certification Election] Proceedings,5 arguing that the dismissal or suspension of
the proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of respondent is
seriously being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration.
Nevertheless the election proceeded and the Union was the winner. Heritage
filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner.
Union filed an Answer contending that Heritage is stopped from questioning
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their status, Heritage is not a party in interest and that the Union complied with
the requirements of the law. DOLE ruled in favor of the Union and MR by the
Heritage was denied. An appeal to the BLR and CA was also denied.
Issue: whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law despite
the belated filing of Financial Reports
Ruling: YES. Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read:
ART. 238. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL
The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether
national or local, shall be canceled by the Bureau if it has reason to believe,
after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more
of the requirements herein prescribed.34
ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION.

The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30)
days after the closing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false entries or
fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or
whenever required by the Bureau.35
These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a
petition for cancellation of a union’s registration, particularly, determining
whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient
to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required
documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all,
the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and
list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as
an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or
fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by
respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list
of individual members in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code.
However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the
cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory
authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. Yet
there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and
requiring periodic documentation thereof.
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The
rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific constitutional
guarantees. x x x Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken
much less nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of association demands
that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital
punishments against the association itself."
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
ARTICLE 247-249
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GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS,

Petitioner, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS
CITY) Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a

significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, thus to curb
the negative effects on the company, it implemented three (3) waves of an
Early Retirement Program. An inter-office memorandum was also issued
mandating to put on hold “all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both
regular and temporary positions in [the] Head Office and in the Plants.” Faced
with the “freeze hiring” directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of
JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency. Petitioner then filed with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the
ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for
contracting-out services regularly performed by union members.
In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice
for contracting out jobs to JLBP.
The NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the
system was meant to curtail the right to self-organization of petitioner’s
members.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA uphold the NLRC’s finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor
practice. It held that the contract between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount to
labor-only contracting. It found that JLBP was an independent contractor and
that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management
prerogative to meet exigent circumstances.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Hence, the Court deny the Petition.
The issues raised by petitioner of whether JLBP is an independent contractor,

whether CCBPI’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair labor
practice, and whether such action was a valid exercise of management
prerogative, call for a re-examination of evidence, which is not within the ambit
of this Court’s jurisdiction.
The CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its assailed Decision
and Resolution. The CA itself examined the facts and evidence of the parties
and found that, based on the evidence, CCBPI did not engage in labor-only
contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice.
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The NLRC found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the company’s
action to contract-out the services and functions performed by Union members
did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’
right to self-organization.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge
of unfair labor practice. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing
substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice,17 which
burden it failed to discharge.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs. DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF TEACHERS AND
EMPLOYEES UNION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), respondents.
FACTS: Dela Salle University (UNIVERSITY) and Dela Salle University Employees
Association – National Federation of Teachers and Employees Union (DLSUEA-
NAFTEU), which is composed of regular non-academic rank and file employees,
(UNION) entered for a new collective bargaining agreement which, however,
turned out to be unsuccessful. After several conciliation-mediation meetings,
five (5) out of the eleven (11) issues raised were resolved by the parties. The
parties entered into a Submission Agreement, identifying the remaining six (6)
unresolved issues for arbitration, namely:
(1) scope of the bargaining unit,
(2) union security clause,
(3) security of tenure,
(4) salary increases
(5) indefinite union leave, reduction of the union presidents workload, special
leave, and finally,
(6) duration of the agreement.
The parties appointed Buenaventura Magsalin as voluntary arbitrator.
Voluntary arbitrator rendered the assailed decision as follows:
On the first issue, ruled that the Computer Operators assigned at the Computer
Services Center, should be included as members of the bargaining unit; The
discipline officers, belong ) to the rank-and-file on the basis of the nature of
their job; and with respect to the employees of the College of St. Benilde, they
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had a personality separate and distinct from the University and thus, they are
outside the bargaining unit of the Universitys rank-and-file employees.
On the second issue regarding the propriety of the inclusion of a union shop
clause, the voluntary arbitrator opined that a union shop clause is a valid form
of union security while the CBA is in force and in accordance with the
Constitutional policy to promote unionism and collective bargaining and
negotiations.
With respect to the use of the “last-in-first-out” method in case of retrenchment

and transfer to other schools or units, the voluntary arbitrator upheld the
“elementary right and prerogative of the management of the University to
select and/or choose its employees, a right equally recognized by the
Constitution and the law.
Regarding the fourth issue concerning salary increases, the voluntary arbitrator
opined that the proposed budget of the University for SY 1992-93 could not
sufficiently cope up with the demand for increases by the Union.
As to the Unions demand for a reduction of the workload of the union president,
special leave benefits and indefinite union leave with pay, the voluntary
arbitrator denied the Unions demand for special leave benefits.
On the last issue, regarding the duration of the collective bargaining

agreement, the voluntary arbitrator ruled the same became a binding
agreement between them.
Subsequently, both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration .
ISSUES:
(1) whether the computer operators assigned at the Universitys Computer

Services Center and the Universitys discipline officers may be considered as
confidential employees and should therefore be excluded from the bargaining
unit which is composed of rank and file employees of the University, and
whether the employees of the College of St. Benilde should also be included in
the same bargaining unit;
(2) whether a union shop clause should be included in the parties collective
bargaining agreement, in addition to the existing maintenance of membership
clause;
(3) whether the denial of the Unions proposed “last-in-first-out” method of

laying-off employees, is proper;
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(4) whether the ruling that on the basis of the Universitys proposed budget, the
University can no longer be required to grant a second round of wage increases,
is correct;
(5) whether the denial of the Unions proposals on the deloading of the union
president, improved leave benefits and indefinite union leave with pay, is
proper;
(6) whether the finding that the multi-sectoral committee in the University is the
legitimate group which determines and scrutinizes the annual salary increases
and fringe benefits of the employees of the University, is correct;
(7) whether the ruling that the 70% share in the incremental tuition proceeds is
the only source of salary increases and fringe benefits of the employees, is
proper.
RULING:
The Court affirm in part and modify in part.
On the first issue, the Court agrees that the express exclusion of the computer
operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-
negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit.
As to the discipline officers, the Court agree that based on the nature of their
duties, they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in
the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.
As to the the employees of the College of St. Benilde, they should be excluded
from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University,
because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical
personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the
veil of corporate fiction.
On involving the inclusion of a union shop clause, the Court affirm the ruling.
On the issue regarding the use of the “last-in-first-out” method, the Court
agree that as an exercise of management prerogative, the University has the
right to adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for terminating or
transferring employees.
On the issue involving the Unions proposals on the deloading of the union
president, The Court we agree with the rejection of the said demands, there
being no justifiable reason for the granting of the same.
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On the sixth issue, the Court finds that the voluntary arbitrator did not gravely
abuse his discretion on this matter.
On last issue involving the ruling that the 70% share in the incremental tuition
proceeds, the Court deems that any determination of this alleged error is
unnecessary and irrelevant.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petitions in these consolidated cases,

are partially GRANTED. The assailed decision of voluntary arbitrator
Buenaventura Magsalin is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the issue
on salary increases for the second and third years of the collective bargaining
agreement be REMANDED to the voluntary arbitrator for definite resolution
within one month from the finality of this Decision, on the basis of the externally
audited financial statements of the University already submitted by the Union
before the voluntary arbitrator and forming part of the records.
MSMG-UWP v. Ramos (April 27, 2001)
FACTS: The petitioners were terminated by the company but the NLRC upheld
the dismissal. Later on, the SC reversed the decision and ordered all of them
reinstated and paid full backwages but it also held that the officers of the
company shouldn’t be held liable. This is the subject of this motion for
partial record as the union argues that it was the officers who made the decision
to terminate the employees. Petitioners further contend that while the case was
pending, the company began removing its machineries and equipment from its
plant and began diverting jobs intended for the regular employees to its sub-
contractor/satellite branches.
ISSUE: W/N the officers should be held liable for the illegal dismissed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the officers cannot be held liable because a crop has
a personality separate and distinct from those acting in its behalf. The rule is
that obligations incurred by the corp, through its
directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities. In labor cases, corporate
directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the
termination of employment or corporate employees done with malice or in bad
faith. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose of some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or will; it partwages
of the nature of fraud. In this case, there is nothing on record to show that
the officers acted in patent bad faith or were guilty of gross negligence in
terminating the services of petitioners so as to warrant personal liability.
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ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INC., ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit

corporation that operates and maintains a country club and various sports and
recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993,
Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to
conduct a study on the profitability of ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department (F
& B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B
Department had been incurring substantial losses. Realizing that it was no
longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the
management decided to cease from operating the department and to open the
same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire, which would be willing to
operate its own food and beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its
F & B Department employee’s individual letters informing them that their
services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The
Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an
authorized cause, particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is
valid.
Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and
open the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel
assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at the
department.
Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to
substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents
were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is allowed under Article
283 of the Labor Code. The closure of operation of an establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes
both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a
company’s activities.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004
Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees
were members of a union which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC
and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which included
the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years which will
expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the
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expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that
a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on October 1991, GMC
received collective and individual letters from the union members stating that
they have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the
union disclaimed any massive disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13,
1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union member. The union protected
the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure
provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with
a union which is no longer existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor
Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a certification election to
determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers.
Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty
to bargain collectively and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to
self-organization.
Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the
union upon its request for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA
on November 29, 1991. the union’s proposal was submitted within the
prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious
that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union.
The refusal to send counter proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the
economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair labor practice under
Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this
obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years
from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article
252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of
the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears
stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is
mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting
industrial peace.
The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by
13 union members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated
that GMC exerted pressure on the employees. We agree with the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union
members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its employee to self-
organization.
Hcienda fatima vs. NFSW food and general trade

January 28, 2003
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Facts:The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows: “Contrary to

the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused
to work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the
records is replete with complainants’ persistence and dogged determination in
going back to work.
“Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers’
having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union was
certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification elections,
respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit
down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not
given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike
which was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement
which stipulated among others that:
‘a) The parties will initially meet for CBA negotiations on the 11th day of
January 1991 and will endeavor to conclude the same within thirty (30) days.
‘b) The management will give priority to the women workers who are
members of the union in case work relative x x x or amount[ing] to gahitand
[dipol] arises.
‘c) Ariston Eruela Jr. will be given back his normal work load which is six
(6) days in a week.
‘d) The management will provide fifteen (15) wagons for the workers and
that existing workforce prior to the actual strike will be given priority. However,
in case the said workforce would not be enough, the management can hire
additional workers to supplement them.
‘e) The management will not anymore allow the scabs, numbering about
eighteen (18) workers[,] to work in the hacienda; and
‘f) The union will immediately lift the picket upon signing of this
agreement.’
“However, alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons,

respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain
collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of
private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises.
“Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work
assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike on January
2, 1992. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum
of Agreement was signed by the complainants and respondents which provides:
‘Whereas the union staged a strike against management on January 2, 1992

grounded on the dismissal of the union officials and members;
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‘Whereas parties to the present dispute agree to settle the case amicably once
and for all;
‘Now therefore, in the interest of both labor and management, parties herein
agree as follows:
‘1. That the list of the names of affected union members hereto attached
and made part of this agreement shall be referred to the Hacienda payroll of
1990 and determine whether or not this concerned Union members are
hacienda workers;
‘2. That in addition to the payroll of 1990 as reference, herein parties will
use as guide the subjects of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and
between the parties last January 4, 1990;
‘3. That herein parties can use other employment references in support of
their respective claims whether or not any or all of the listed 36 union members
are employees or hacienda workers or not as the case may be;
‘4. That in case conflict or disagreement arises in the determination of the

status of the particular hacienda workers subject of this agreement herein
parties further agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;
‘5. To effect the above, a Committee to be chaired by Rose Mengaling is

hereby created to be composed of three representatives each and is given five
working days starting Jan. 23, 1992 to resolve the status of the subject 36
hacienda workers. (Union representatives: Bernardo Torres, Martin Alas-as,
Ariston Arulea Jr.)”
“Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and the Minutes of the
Conciliation Meeting showed as follows:
‘The meeting started at 10:00 A.M. A list of employees was submitted by Atty.
Tayko based on who received their 13th month pay.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion in upholding the NLRC’s conclusion that private respondents
were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor
practice, and that the union be awarded moral and exemplary
damages.”
HELD: The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor
practice. It ruled as follows:
“Indeed, from respondents’ refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic

inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union,
the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal
of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did
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not want a union in their hacienda—a clear interference in the right of the
workers to self-organization.”
We uphold the CA’s affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of
labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court. Verily, their
conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported
by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into
the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that
these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.
The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction
of moral and exemplary damages.
ARTICLE 252
UFE-DFA-KMU vs. Nestle Phils. INC.

March 3, 2008
FACTS:
Before the expiration of the CBA between Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU, the
latter informed Nestle of their intent to “open new collective bargaining
negotiation” for the year 2001-04.
Nestle reiterated its stance that “unilateral grants, one-time company
grants, company initiated policies and programs which include, but are not
limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay
Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA Negotiations and
therefore be excluded therefrom.
Dialogue ensued. Nestle requested preventive mediation proceedings
mediation proceedings. Found it ineffective. UFE-DFA-KMU filed a notice to
strike, twice, predicated on Nestle alleged ULP, bargaining in bad faith by
setting preconditions in the ground rules and/or refusing to include the issue of
the Retirement Plan.
ISSUE:
WON Nestle failed to perform its duty to bargain collectively in good faith.
RULING:
The purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement
resulting in a contract binding on the parties; but failure to reach an agreement
after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not establish a
lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a collective bargaining
contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the
obligation to reach an agreement.
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In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with UFE-
DFA-FMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the retirement plan from
the issues to be taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such
was in the nature of a unilaterally granted benefit.
UST-FU vs. UST

April 7, 2009
FACTS:
There are two groups claiming to be the UST-FU: Gamilla Group and the
Mariño Group.
During the convocation attended by members of Faculty of the University,
an election of officers was conducted the group called Reformist Alliance,
wherein to Gamilla group were elected as the President and Officers, Members
of UST-FU walked out, but the UST administration did not participate.
Subsequently, Gamilla group entered into a CBA with UST, representing
themselves as elected officers of UST-FU.
UST-FU led by Mariño filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against
UST for entering CBA with UST-FU led by Gamilla, alleging that their election is
not valid.
ISSUE:
WON UST committed a ULP by entering CBA with UST-FU and By Gamilla.
RULING:
The Gamilla group represented by itself to respondents as the duly
elected officials of the UST-FU. As such, respondents were bound to deal with
them.
Art. 252 – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
As such, there was no reason not to recognize the Gamilla Group as the
new officers and directors of UST-FU. And as stated in the above-qouted
provision, the UST is obligated to deal with the UST-FU, as the recognized
representative of the bargaining unit, through the Gamilla Group. UST’s failure
to negotiate with he UST-FU would have constituted ULP.
It is not the duty or obligation of the respondents to inquire into the
validity of the election of the Gamilla Group. Such issue is properly an intra-
union controversy subject to the jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE.
Respondents could not have been expected to the stop dealing with the Gamilla
Group on the mere accusation of the Mariño Group that the former was not
validly elected into office.
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ARTICLE 253-A
FVCLU-PTGWO vs. SAWAMA-SIGLO

November 27, 2009
FACTS:
FVCLU-PTGWO was the bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of
FVC Phil. Corp, singed a 5 year CBA with the company. After the 3 year period,
FVCLU-PTGWO and the company renegotiated the CBA, extending the 5 year
period of the CBA by 4 Months.
9 days before the the expiration of the original CBA, SAWAMA-SIGLO filed
a petition for certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by
FVCLU-PTGWO.
FVCLU-PTGWO move to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
certification election petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside the
60-days before the expiration of the CBA.
ISSUE:
WON the extension of the CBA term also change the unions exclusive
bargaining status.
RULING:
Art. 253-A – terms of collective bargaining agreement - any collective
bargaining agreement that the parties may enter into, shall, insofar as the
representation aspects is concerned, be for a term of 5 years. Xxx
Sec. 14 (b), Rule VIII of Omnibus Rule – Denial of the petition; grounds- the
med-arbiter may dismiss the petition on any of the following grounds:
Xxx
b.) Petition was filed before and after the freedom period of a duly
registered CBA; provided that the original CBA shall not be affected by any
amendment, extension or renewal of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is held that FVCLU-PTGWO position to be correct, but only with respect
to the original 5-year term of the CBA which, by law, is also the effective period
of the union’s exclusive bargaining representative status. While the parties may
agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other
provisions, any such amendments or term in excess of five years will not carry
with it a change in the union’s exclusive bargaining status. By express provision
of the above-quoted Art 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go
beyond 5 years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the
workplace partied to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for CBA
with a life more than 5 years, either as an original provision or by amendment,
the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for 5 years
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and can be challenged within 60 days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first 5
years.
ARTICLE 254
ANDO VS. CAMPO

FEBRUARY 16, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services,
Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor contractor. Respondents were hired by PACSI
as pilers or haulers tasked to manually carry bags of sugar from the warehouse
of Victorias Milling Company and load them on trucks. In June 1998, respondents
were dismissed from employment. They filed a case for illegal dismissal and
some money claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City. The labor arbiter and NLRC
ruled in favor of the respondents employees, and upon finality respondents
moved for execution. To answer for the monetary award, NLRC Acting Sheriff
Romeo Pasustento issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property
over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140167 in
the name of "Paquito V. Ando x x x married to Erlinda S. Ando."
This prompted petitioner to file an action for prohibition and damages with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the
property belonged to him and his wife, not to the corporation, and, hence, could
not be subject of the execution sale. Since it is the corporation that was the
judgment debtor, execution should be made on the latter’s properties.
On December 27, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the prayer for a TRO,
holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The
RTC ruled that, pursuant to the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment,
petitioner’s remedy was to file a third-party claim with the NLRC Sheriff. Despite
lack of jurisdiction, however, the RTC went on to decide the merits of the case.
The CA affirmed the ruling RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Issue: whether the regular courts has jurisdiction to restrain the

implementation of the writ of execution issued by the Labor arbiter
Held: NO. The Court has long recognized that regular courts have no jurisdiction
to hear and decide questions which arise from and are incidental to the
enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards rendered in labor cases by
appropriate officers and tribunals of the Department of Labor and Employment.
To hold otherwise is to sanction splitting of jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.
Thus, it is, first and foremost, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment
73 | P a g e
that governs any question on the execution of a judgment of that body.

Petitioner need not look further than that. The Rules of Court apply only by
analogy or in a suppletory character.
Consider the provision in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on third-party
claims:
SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.—If the property
levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the
officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee,
on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the
third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on.
In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the
court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing
of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his
claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from
claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required,
and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the
levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor,
the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
On the other hand, the NLRC Manual on the Execution of Judgment deals
specifically with third-party claims in cases brought before that body. It defines a
third-party claim as one where a person, not a party to the case, asserts title to
or right to the possession of the property levied upon. It also sets out the
procedure for the filing of a third-party claim, to wit:
SECTION 2. Proceedings. — If property levied upon be claimed by any person
other than the losing party or his agent, such person shall make an affidavit of
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such
right or title and shall file the same with the sheriff and copies thereof served
upon the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ and upon the prevailing
party. Upon receipt of the third party claim, all proceedings with respect to the
execution of the property subject of the third party claim shall automatically be
suspended and the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ shall conduct
a hearing with due notice to all parties concerned and resolve the validity of the
claim within ten (10) working days from receipt thereof and his decision is
appealable to the Commission within ten (10) working days from notice, and the
Commission shall resolve the appeal within same period.
74 | P a g e
There is no doubt in our mind that petitioner’s complaint is a third- party claim
within the cognizance of the NLRC. Petitioner may indeed be considered a "third
party" in relation to the property subject of the execution vis-à-vis the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. There is no question that the property belongs to petitioner
and his wife, and not to the corporation. It can be said that the property belongs
to the conjugal partnership, not to petitioner alone. Thus, the property belongs
to a third party, i.e., the conjugal partnership. At the very least, the Court can
consider that petitioner’s wife is a third party within contemplation of the law.
Note: petitioner should have filed a third party complain before the NLRC, wrong
choice of remedy but nevertheless the SC granted the petition kasi sobrang
tagal na nung kaso.
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS

ARTICLE 263 - 264
EDEN GLADYS ABARIA et.al. vs NLRC METRO CEBU COMMUNITY

HOSPITAL, INC., et.al.
G.R. No. 154113 December 7, 2011
Facts: The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining

representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI, presently known as the
Visayas Community Medical Center VCMC. Nava, President of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) signed the Proof of Posting. In 1995 the
Union expresses their desire to renew the CBA in 1995 through a proposal letter
signed by 153 members. Nava requested a one day union leave with pay of
some of its officers but but the proposal was returned by MCCHI and ordered
Nava secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official
bargaining representative. By January 1996, the collection of union fees (check-
off) was temporarily suspended by MCCHI in view of the existing conflict
between the federation and its local affiliate. Thereafter, MCCHI attempted to
take over the room being used as union office but was prevented to do so by
Nava and her group who protested these actions and insisted that management
directly negotiate with them for a new CBA. MCCHI referred the matter to Atty.
Alforque, NFL’s Regional Director, and advised Nava that their group is not
recognized by NFL. MCCHI contended in a letter that the union of Nava violated
the constitution and By-laws by establishing a pro-KMU faction. The group of
Nava was given 5 days to submit a written explanation. MCCHI granted the one
day union leave with pay request of NFL for their members. The group of Nava
picketed outside the hospital. NFL contended that the group of Nava was not
sanctioned by their group. MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to
submit within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated
for having engaged in illegal concerted activities amounting to strike, and
75 | P a g e
placed them under immediate preventive suspension. Nava denied that there
was a stoppage of work and that they only wear armband as a sign of protest.
DOLE found out that there is nothing in their records which shows that
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union
submitted only a copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995. On March
13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed
not filed for want of legal personality on the part of the filer. . Despite denial of
their notice of strike for want of personality, Nava and her group still conducted
a strike vote on April 2, 1996 during which an overwhelming majority of union
members approved the strike. The group of Nava faced disciplinary action and
more than 100 members were dismissed. They continued their strike blocking
the ingress and egress of the hospital. MCCHI filed a petition for injunction in the
NLRC which was granted. The terminated employees filed a case for illegal
dismissal and ULP. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and was affirmed by
the NLRC. An MR was also denied. A petition for certiorari reversed the
case.
Issue: WON the strike conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL was valid
Ruling: No. Strikes; Art. 264 of the Labor Code makes a distinction between
workers and union officers who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary
striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.—
The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers
who participate in an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that
he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
The illegal dismissal case filed by the members of the union who did not
commit illegal act during strike was affirmed.
YSS EMPLOYEES UNION - PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL

WORKERS ORGANIZATION, Petitioner,
vs.
YSS LABORATORIES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 155125 December 4, 2009
YSS Laboratories engaged in the pharmaceutical business. YSSEU is a duly

registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories. YSS
Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11
employees4 purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards
established by the company. 9 employees are officers of YSSEU. Claiming that
YSS Laboratories was guilty of discrimination and union-busting in carrying
76 | P a g e
out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a strike after
conducting a strike vote. The Secretary of Labor intervenes in order to put an
end to a prolonged labor dispute. Secretary of Labor declared that continuation
of the labor dispute was inimical to national interest. A return to work order was
issued by the NLRC. YSS refused to comply and filed an urgent MR contending
that the 9 union members participated in the illegal strike. YSSEU moved
to cite YSS in contempt. Secretary of Labor ruled in favor of YSSEU. YSS filed a
petition for certiorari which the CA granted, hence this petition.
Issue: WON the employees are entitled to readmission to work
Ruling: Art. 263 (g) xxxxxxx If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
After martial law was lifted and democracy was restored, the assumption of
jurisdiction in Art. 263(g) has now been viewed as an exercise of the police
power of the State with the aim of promoting the common good19:
[I]t must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been
enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as
the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits,
to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. The
police power, together with the power of eminent domain and the power of
taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly
conferred by the Constitution.
In order to effectively achieve such end, the assumption or certification order

shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike
or lockout. Moreover, if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall
immediately return to work, and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to
no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter,
affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order
is issued in the exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration, and
therefore must be obeyed until set aside.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT AND

ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO
CHAPTER, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE
77 | P a g e
HOTELIERS INC., owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or

CHIYUKI FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V. ALVEZ, respondents.
The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file

employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko. Union submitted its Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. Due to the bargaining
deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike and
conducted a strike vote. Union members decided to shave their head. The Hotel
prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated
the Hotel's Grooming Standards. Union members picketed and reason the Hotel
experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease
operations in three restaurants. Hotel issued a notice of suspension to picketing
employees for (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket;
(3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5)
illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike.
Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the
premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members
unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises. Union filed its
third Notice of Strike with the NCMB this time on the ground of unfair labor
practice and union-busting. Secretary, assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Secretary
issued a return to work order directing some of the employees to return to
work, while advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll
reinstatement. Union moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Union filed a
petition for certiorari with CA but it was denied. NLRC issued an order to the
Hotel to execute a CBA after 30days of such receipt of order. Hotel contended
that the employees violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA,
and that the strike was illegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory
30-day cooling-off period10 and the seven-day strike ban as the strike
occurred only 29 days after the submission of the notice of strike. NLRC ruled
that the strike was illegal because it was attended by illegal acts by the officers
and members. Union filed an MR but it was denied.
Issue: WON the Strike is illegal
Ruling: Yes. The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an
economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and
lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding. The violation of
the Hotel's Grooming Standards is a violation Union's duty and responsibility to
bargain in good faith. Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day
cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the
strike on January 18, 2002. Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its
strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the
pictures21 presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed
human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel.
78 | P a g e
Regarding the Union officers and members' liabilities for their participation in
the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides
that "[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status x x x." The law makes a distinction between union
officers and mere union members. Union officers may be validly terminated
from employment for their participation in an illegal strike, while union members
have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment
status.25 Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof of the
participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts during
the strikes.
JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 171618-19 March 20, 2009
Due to the adverse effects of the Asian economic crisis on the construction
industry beginning 1997, petitioner Jackbilt Industries, Inc. decided to
temporarily stop its business of producing concrete hollow blocks,
compelling most of its employees to go on leave for six months. The union
immediately protested the shutdown. Because its collective bargaining
agreement with petitioner was expiring during the period of the shutdown,
respondent claimed that petitioner halted production to avoid its duty to bargain
collectively. The shutdown was allegedly motivated by anti-union sentiments.
Union conducted a strike and blocked the entrance of the compound. Employer
filed for injunction before the NLRC which was granted but the union
violated the order. The employer issued a memoranda directed to the union to
explain why they should not be dismissed for the illegal act. The union filed
complaints for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages, 11 unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal. . It argued that there was no basis for the temporary
partial shutdown as it was undertaken by petitioner to avoid its duty to bargain
collectively. Employer contended that they conducted a strike without observing
the procedural requirements provided in Article 263. Employer validly dismissed
respondent’s officers and employees for committing illegal acts in the course of
a strike. Labor arbiter ruled in favor of the Union. NLRC affirmed the decision
with modification. Both parties filed an MR but it was denied.
Issue: WON the Strike is illegal
Ruling: Yes. The principle of conclusiveness of judgment, embodied in Section

47(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, holds that the parties to a case are bound
by the findings in a previous judgment with respect to matters actually raised
and adjudged therein. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person
engaged in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the
employer’s premises. Since respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision
of the NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from
79 | P a g e
petitioner’s compound, respondent’s officers and employees clearly committed

illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike.
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. 26
Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9,
1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike
illegal was thus unnecessary.
Consequently, we uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondent’s officers

and employees. Article 264 of the Labor Code27 further provides that an
employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts in the
course of a strike.28 Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate
respondent’s officers and employees.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The July 13, 2005 decision and
February 9, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65208 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 65425 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, (ALPAP)

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 168382 June 6, 2011
ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all
commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor
practice, ALPAP filed on December 9, 1997, a notice of strike 7 against
respondent PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Upon
PAL’s petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with
public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute per Order8 dated December 23, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at
the Philippine Airlines, Inc. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended.
Accordingly, all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether
actual or impending, are hereby strictly prohibited. The parties are also enjoined
from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.
Despite the order ALPAP proceed to conduct a strike. DOLE issued a return-to-
work order but PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to
comply immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP filed a case for illegal
lockout before the LA . ALPAP contend that the order was received late which
justified their non-compliance. The case was consolidated and DOLE assumed
jurisdiction. DOLE ruled that the strike was illegal in defiance of the return to
work order. The complaint for illegal lockout was dismissed. ALPAP moved for
fair determination of who must suffer the consequences of the illegal
80 | P a g e
strike. DOLE ruled that the NCMB is bereft of authority to reopen an issue that
has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.
ALAP filed a petition for certiorari before CA. Pal contended that the case ALPAP
violated the principles governing forum shopping, res judicata and multiplicity of
suits. The petition was denied.
Issue: WON the petition of ALPAP should be given due course
Ruling: NO. DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUGMENT Settled in law is that

once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable,
thus can no longer be modified in any respect
We agree with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from the time
the return-to-work order was issued until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002
resolution dismissing ALPAP’s petition, no ALPAP member has claimed that he
was unable to comply with the return-to-work directive because he was either
on leave, abroad or unable to report for some reason. These defenses were
raised in ALPAP’s twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306
reached finality in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It has been
held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to
the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give
way to vicious and vexatious proceedings. 44 ALPAP was given all the
opportunities to present its evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain
that it was denied due process
JAILE OLISA et.al. , AND MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

SA BALANCED FOODS
vs.
DANILO ESCARIO et.al., PINAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, DR. SY LIAN
TIN, AND DOMINGO TAN
G.R. No. 160302 September 27, 2010
Petitioners were members of the UNION and employees of PINA. At 8:30 in the
morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the
Union walked out of PINA’s premises and proceeded to the barangay office
to show support for Cañete, an officer of the Union charged with oral
defamation by Aurora Manor, PINA’s personnel manager, and Yolanda Fabella,
Manor’s secretary.3 It appears that the proceedings in the barangay resulted in
a settlement, and the officers and members of the Union all returned to work
thereafter. PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the
March 13, 1993 incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a
month. PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and damages. LA
ruled that the incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and that all the
Union’s officers, except Cañete, had thereby lost their employment. Union filed
a notice of strike and conducted a strike vote, claiming that PINA was guilty of
union busting through the constructive dismissal of its officers. PINA retaliated
81 | P a g e
by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment of work, stating that
they had violated provisions on strike of the CBA. NLRC issued a TRO against
the union. LA ruled that the strike was illegal which was affirmed by the NLRC
but reversed the LA’s ruling that there was abandonment. CA affirmed
the decision of NLRC upon appeal.
Issue: WON the dismissed employee are entitled to backwages
Ruling: Art. 264. Prohibited activities. – (a) xxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an

unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during
a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status; Provided, That
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike.
Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful
lockout; and (b) participation in an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article
264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages only when the termination of
employment is a consequence of an unlawful lockout. On the
consequences of an illegal strike, the provision distinguishes between a union
officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his
employment status, but a union member who is merely instigated or induced to
participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the explanation
for the benign consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating
rank-and-file workers who are misled into supporting illegal strikes, absent any
finding that such workers committed illegal acts during the period of the illegal
strikes.18
The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be
illegal. The NLRC ordered their reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the
payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-file
workers whom the Union’s officers had misled into joining the illegal
strike. They were not unjustly dismissed from work. Based on the text and
intent of the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain
that Article 264(a) is the applicable one. WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision
dated August 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals, subject to the modification to
the effect that in lieu of reinstatement the petitioners are granted backwages
equivalent of one month for every year of service.
82 | P a g e
JUST AND ATHOURIZED CAUSES FOR TERMINATION
ARTICLE 282
LOLITA S. CONCEPCION, Petitioner, vs. MINEX IMPORT

CORPORATION/MINERAMA CORPORATION, KENNETH MEYERS, SYLVIA P.
MARIANO, and VINA MARIANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153569 January 24, 2012
• Concepcion was a sales lady promoted as supervisor assigned in SM

Harrison.
• Vina Mariano Assistant Manager of Minex
• Calung and Baquilar sales lady under supervision of Concepcion
• On a Sunday Concepcion Calung and Baquilar conducted a cash count of
their sales amounting to P39,194.50
• They included the sales on Friday and Saturday totalling an amount of
P50,912.00
• Concepcion petitioner wrapped the amount in a plastic bag and deposited it
in the drawer of the locked wooden cabinet of the kiosk
• The following day they found out that cabinet were in disarray and the
money was missing.
• Concepcion reported the incident and she was placed under arrest and
detention for one day
• Concepcion filed a case for illegal dismissal
• The prosecutor found a probable cause against Concepcion for the charge of
qualified theft
• Concepcion contends that she together with Calung closed the shop at 8:00
and they left the shop after
• Calung executed a sinumpaang salaysay that Concepcion was left alone to
close the shop because she has to her clothes that night
• Mariano contended that Concepcion violated the S.O.P. of the company when
she failed to report for pick-up the sales on Sunday which exceeds P10,000
• Concepcion appealed before the DOJ but the same was denied
• LA ruled that the dismissal of Concepcion was illegal but it was reversed
upon appeal to the NLRC and was sustained by the CA
Issue: WON there is just cause for the dismissal (YES); WON respondent need
not afford the petitioner due process to petitioner. NO.
Ruling: YES. To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just
and valid cause. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination by the employer: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by
the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter’s representative
in connection with the employee’s work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
83 | P a g e
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized

representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In its1941 ruling in National Labor Union, Inc. v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company,
the Court expressly stated thus:
xxx The conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not
indispensable to warrant his dismissal by his employer. If there is
sufficient evidence to show that the employee has been guilty of a
breach of trust, or that his employer has ample reason to distrust him,
it cannot justly deny to the employer the authority to dismiss such
employee. All that is incumbent upon the Court of Industrial Relations (now
National Labor Relations Commission) to determine is whether the proposed
dismissal is for just cause xxx. It is not necessary for said court to find
that an employee has been guilty of a crime beyond reasonable doubt
in order to authorize his dismissal.
To our mind, the criminal charges initiated by the company against
private respondents and the finding after preliminary investigation of
their prima facie guilt of the offense charged constitute substantial
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the Labor Tribunal of the
existence of a just cause for their termination based on loss of trust and
confidence.
The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee
who commits an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the employer. Neither
a criminal prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is
a requisite for the validity of the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal for a just
or lawful cause must still be made upon compliance with the requirements of
due process under the Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is liable to pay
nominal damages 30k as indemnity to the dismissed employee.
Escobin, et.al vs. NLRC
Facts:Seventy security guards were assigned to UP-NDC Basilan Plantation.

When placed under the agrarian reform program, the plantation had to reduce
the number of security guards. Fifty-seven of them were placed on a “floating
status”. While in that status they were instructed to report to PISI head office at
San Juan, M.M. for posting to clients in Metro Manila. The guards did not reply
nor comply. PISI reiterated the instruction and threatened the guards with
disciplinary action. Still no reply or compliance. PISI terminated their
employment on ground of insubordination or wilful disobedience. Late in the
day, they wrote the PISI that they had no intention to abandon their
employment nor to defy fair , reasonable and lawful orders. They complained
illegal dismissal by way of constructive dismissal.
Issue: whether or not the refusal to comply with the Order constitute the
proximate cause of the dismissal.
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Ruling: No. first, it was grossly inconvenient for the petitioners, who were
residents and heads of families residing in Basilan, to commute to Manila.
Second, petitioners were not provided with funds to defray their transportation
and living expenses. Third, although private respondents argues that it sent
transportation money to petitioners, the recipients of such funds were not
parties to this case. Fourth, no reason was given by private respondent
company explaining why it had failed to inform petitioners of their specific
security assignments prior to their departure from Basilan.
DANDY V. QUIJANO vs. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner DANDY V. QUIJANO was a warehouseman at the central

warehouse of respondent MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION in Libis, Quezon City,
since 1983. During his 8-year stay in the company, he received high
performance ratings and a corresponding 15% increase in salary per annum.
Through the years, the company has also recognized and commended him for
his dedication to his work. He has actively articulated the employees' concerns
and, since 1990, has written to the management about the malpractices
committed by some officers of the respondent company. He exposed the
existence of a "five-six" loan system in their workplace operated by some of its
officers. He incurred the ire of respondent's manager Mr. Antonio Altavano who
operated the usurious transactions.
Respondent charged petitioner with four (4) violations of company policies, all
allegedly committed on March 19, 1991. It started at about 11:00 a.m. when
petitioner allegedly left his workplace without permission. He was charged with
loafing and abandonment of work. Then, between 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. of
the same day, petitioner allegedly entered the warehouse employees' locker
room and angrily uttered in a loud voice : "Niloloko tayo ng kalbong yan.",
referring to the warehouse manager, Mr. Altavano. He was charged with
disrespect to his superiors. Thirty minutes later, at about 1:00 p.m., petitioner
allegedly grabbed the public address system at the central warehouse without
permission and angrily announced: "Wala kay Mrs. Azcona ang incentive natin,
na kay Mr. Concepcion. Niloloko lang tayo (ng superiors natin)." He was charged
with disrupting the work of his co-employees. Finally, after an hour and a half, at
about 2:30 p.m., petitioner allegedly saw Mr. Simon peeping through a rack
divider, and shouted: "Anong tinitingin-tingin mo?" He was charged with using
abusive language in company premises.
Consequently, in April 1991, four (4) notices of corrective/disciplinary action

were served on petitioner for the above four offenses. After the management
conducted its investigation, the petitioner was cleared of the four charges.
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Petitioner was served another notice of corrective action for serious misconduct
for allegedly challenging his superior to a fistfight and uttering death threats to
the manager, Mr. Altavano, on April 25, 1991, or about seven (7) months earlier.
Petitioner's behavior was allegedly the off-shoot of the four (4) memoranda
earlier sent to him.
The next day, November 19, 1991, a Special Investigating Committee, found the
petitioner guilty not only of challenging his superior to a fistfight and issuing
death threats to the manager, but also guilty of the four (4) charges of
misbehavior earlier hurled against him. On November 19, 1991, respondent sent
petitioner a notice of termination of employment. The dismissal was to take
effect the next day, November 20, 1991. Left without further recourse,
petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against respondent before the labor
arbiter.
On the basis of the position papers and evidence submitted by the parties, the
labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from service for lack of
just cause.
On May 1, 1995, respondent reinstated petitioner in the payroll. Respondent

then appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to

reinstatement.
Ruling:Yes. Well-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is

entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. Over the years, however, the case
law developed that where reinstatement is not feasible, expedient or practical,
as where reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained
relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the employer
and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable
differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a
managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order
payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. Some unscrupulous
employers, however, have taken advantage of the overgrowth of this doctrine of
"strained relations" by using it as a cover to get rid of its employees and thus
defeat their right to job security.
To protect labor's security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of

"strained relations" should be strictly applied so as not to deprive an illegally
dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost
always results in "strained relations", and the phrase cannot be given an
overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can
never be reinstated.
LORLENE A. GONZALES
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY, and ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY
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Facts: Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher in the

Elementary Department of private respondent Ateneo de Davao University
(hereafter ATENEO) since 1974. Sometime in 1991 Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo
Grade School Headmaster, sent a letter informing petitioner Lorlene A. Gonzales
of the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use of corporal punishment on
her students. Petitioner claimed that she was not informed of the identity of the
parents who allegedly complained of the corporal punishment she purportedly
inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise claimed that she was not
confronted about it by private respondent ATENEO in 1991 and that it was only
two (2) years after the complaints were made that she discovered, through her
students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting complainants to lodge
written complaints against her. Petitioner refused to take part in the
investigation unless the rules of procedure laid down by the Committee be
revised, contending that the same were violative of her right to due process.
Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which stated: . . . 3) Counsel for
Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly participate in the investigation but will
merely advise Ms. Gonzales . . . (par. 3).
On 10 November 1993 private respondent served a Notice of Termination on

petitioner pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the Committee.
Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the president of ATENEO
demanding her voluntary resignation a week from receipt of the letter,
otherwise, she would be considered resigned from the service. Petitioner filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found
the dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis. The reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioner’s dismissal valid and legal.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process.
Ruling: Yes. The NLRC, in our view, appears to have skirted several important
issues raised by petitioner foremost of which is the absence of due process.
Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to demand compliance
with the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin
requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity
must be afforded the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with
assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to cross
examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due
process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on a
sound legal foundation.
It is precisely to demand compliance with these requirements that petitioner at

the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down
by the Investigative Committee. The adamant refusal of the Committee to
accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront and cross-examine her
accusers. This is not "harping at technicalities" as wrongfully pointed out by the
NLRC but a serious violation of petitioner's statutory and constitutional right to
due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation.
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CATHEDRAL SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY and SR. APOLINARIA TAMBIEN,

RVM
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TERESITA VALLEJERA
Facts: Private respondent Teresita Vallejera sought admission as an aspirant to

the Congregation of the Religious of Virgin Mary (RVM). Private respondent had
a change of heart in later years and confessed to the sisters that she was no
longer interested in becoming a nun. She pleaded, however, to be allowed to
continue living with the sisters for she had no other place to stay in, to which
request the sisters acceded and, in exchange therefor, she voluntarily continued
to assist in the school library. Private respondent formally applied for and was
appointed to the position of library aide with a monthly salary of P1,171.00. It
was at around this time, however, that trouble developed. The sisters began
receiving complaints' from students and employees about private respondent's
difficult personality and sour disposition at work.
Before the opening of classes, or more specifically on June 2, 1989, private

respondent was summoned to the Office of the Directress by herein petitioner
Sister Apolinaria Tambien, RVM, shortly after the resignation of the school's
Chief Librarian, Heraclea Nebria, on account of irreconcilable differences with
said respondent, for the purpose of clarifying the matter. Petitioner also
informed private respondent of the negative reports received by her office
regarding the latter's frictional working relationship with co-workers and
students and reminded private respondent about the proper attitude and
behavior that should be observed in the interest of peace and harmony in the
school library.
Private respondent resented the observations about her actuations and was
completely unreceptive to the advice given by her superior. She reacted
violently to petitioner's remarks and angrily offered to resign, repeatedly saying,
"OK, I will resign. I will resign." Thereafter, without waiting to be dismissed from
the meeting, she stormed out of the office in discourteous disregard and callous
defiance of authority.
Petitioners sent at least three persons to talk to and convince private

respondent to settle her differences with the former. Private respondent,
however, remained adamant in her refusal to submit to authority. On June 15,
1989, Sister Apolinaria sent a letter formally informing private respondent that
she had a month from said date or until July 15, 1989 to look for another job as
the school had decided to accept her resignation. Private respondent then filed
a complaint for illegal deduction and underpayment of salary, overtime pay and
service incentive pay.
The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent, holding

that she was illegally dismissed for lack of due process. The NLRC affirmed the
labor arbiter's decision, with the modifications stated at the outset of this
opinion, on the rational that while petitioners had valid reasons to terminate the
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services of private respondent, the dismissal was nonetheless illegal for lack of
due process.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: No. An evaluative review of the records of this case nonetheless

supports a finding of a just cause for termination. The reason for which private
respondent's services were terminated, namely, her unreasonable behavior and
unpleasant deportment in dealing with the people she closely works with in the
course of her employment, is analogous to the other "just causes" enumerated
under the Labor Code, as amended:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate

an employment for any of the following just causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of

the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual breach by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in

him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the

person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
KAMS INTERNATIONAL INC., ESVEE APPAREL MFG. INC., and/or

THANWARDASH JESWANI and KAMLESH JESWANI
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST DIVISION, and
MERCEDITA T. TORREJOS
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Facts: Petitioner Kams International, Inc. (KAMS), and petitioner Esvee Apparel
Manufacturing, Inc. (ESVEE), are sister companies engaged in garments
manufacturing. Petitioner ESVEE hired private respondent Mercedita T. Torrejos
as a utility worker in the factory. Torrejos performed her assigned task dutifully,
and the Jeswanis were very much pleased with her work. Sometime in
December 1993 management discovered a shortage in the inventory of KAMS.
Consequently, stricter security measures were implemented and each employee
was thoroughly inspected before leaving company premises. Private
respondent's personal travails started in August of 1994 when she bought six
(6) yards of fabric from petitioners. In order to bring the purchased fabric out of
the factory she had to secure a gate pass and present it to the security guard on
duty at the gate. When security guard Nena Blancaflor inspected the fabric and
measured it using her arms, she estimated the length to be eight (8) yards
instead of six (6) yards as indicated in the gate pass. No disciplinary action was
ever taken by management against Torrejos with regard to the purported
pilferage.
Thus, Torrejos continued performing her duties and responsibilities even after
the alleged misdemeanor. But on 3 October 1994 she failed to report for work
because she had "sore eyes." She instructed her sister Antonia, who also
worked for petitioners, to inform the Jeswanis that she would be absent that
day. When Antonia arrived from work later that day, she told private respondent
that management had decided to terminate her services. To verify this, Torrejos
called up Kamlesh Jeswani at his office. The latter instructed her to talk to his
father instead. It was Thanwardash Jeswani who later confirmed through the
telephone that she had indeed been terminated because of abandonment of
work. Torrejos filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision holding that Torrejos was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed that of
Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not Torrejos abandoned her work as the employer should not
be held liable for illegal dismissal.
Ruling: For abandonment to exist, it is essential that (a) the employee must
have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and, (b) there must have been a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. In De Paul/King
Philip Customs Tailor, and/or Milagros Chuakay and William Go v. NLRC we
held —
Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for dismissal means the

deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. The burden of proof is on the employer to show
unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue
employment. The intent cannot be lightly inferred or legally
presumed from certain ambivalent acts. For abandonment to be a
valid ground for dismissal, two elements must be proved: the
intention of an employee to abandon, coupled with an overt act
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from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more intent
to resume his work.
However, in the case before us, petitioners failed to adduce evidence on any
overt act of Torrejos showing an actual intent to abandon her employment. In
fact, the evidence on record belies this contention. Petitioners cannot deny the
fact that Torrejos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against them on 24
November 1994. This alone negates any intention on the part of the employee
to forsake her work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an
employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to
have abandoned his work.
ARTICLE 284
VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6B’S TRUCKING CORPORATION, and
SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME
SAHOT, respondents.
G.R. No. 142293 February 27, 2003
• Shot was a truck driver of family business of trucking of the petitioner for 36
years
• When sahot was already 59 year old he was incurring absences due to an
ailment which affects his performance in work
• Upon inquiry to SSS he found out that his payment for premium was not
remitted by his employer
• Sahot filed for a week long leave due to his arthritis, hypertension and heart
enlargement
• Sahot filed for an extension of leave but his employer threatened him that his
employment will be terminated if he refuse to go back to work
• Sahot was no longer able to report back to work because of his ailment and
he was dismissed without pension
• Sahot filed an illegal dismissal case before the NLRC
• Petitoner contends that they never hired a driver and that Sahot was their
industrial partner hence no illegal dismissal and he voluntary resigned
from the company
• LA rulled that there was no illegal dismissal but was reversed by the NLRC in
declaring that Sahot was an employee and that he did not abandon his work
but was terminated on account of his illness. The same was affirmed by CA
Issue: (1) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between

petitioners and respondent Sahot; (2) Whether or not there was valid dismissal
91 | P a g e
Ruling: 1.YES. A computation of the age of complainant shows that he was

only twenty-three (23) years when he started working with respondent as truck
helper. How can we entertain in our mind that a twenty-three (23) year old man,
working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence we rule
that complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the
time complainant started working for respondent. The four elements of
employer-employee relationship are present
2.NO. While it was very obvious that complainant did not have any intention to
report back to work due to his illness which incapacitated him to perform his
job, such intention cannot be construed to be an abandonment. Instead, the
same should have been considered as one of those falling under the just
causes of terminating an employment. The insistence of respondent in
making complainant work did not change the scenario.
In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial
evidence that the termination was for lawful cause and validly made. Article
277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of an
employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without
distinction whether the employer admits or does not admit the dismissal. For
an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a
valid cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.
However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule
I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a
disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his
health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority
that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured
within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the
disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not
terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The
employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon
the restoration of his normal health. In the case at bar, the employer clearly
did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahot’s
dismissal was effected.
The employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before
the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a
charge; and (2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued
after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be
heard on his defense. These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record
purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal,
then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because
of private respondent’s painful left thigh. All told, both the substantive and
procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahot’s
dismissal is tainted with invalidity.
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ARTICLE 285
ELSA S. MALIG-ON, vs. EQUITABLE GENERAL SERVICES, INC.,

G.R. No. 185269 June 29, 2010
• Elsa was hired as a janitor of the respondent for 9 hours of work P250 per
day for 6 years
• She was advised by her supervisor that she will be assigned to another
client but she was never assigned despite her follow-up
• After 8 months the company told Elsa that she would have to file a
resignation letter first before she will be assigned which she did but the
respondent did not assign her prompting her to file an illegal dismissal
case
• Respondent contend that Elsa jus stop reporting to work without any
reason and that they wrote two letters asking Elsa to explain her absence
and after more than one month Elsa showed up at the company and
submitted resignation letter
• LA ruled the Elsa’s resignation was valid but it was reversed by the NLRC
in ruling that respondent constructively dismissed Elsa and ordered them
to reinstate her. CA reversed the decision of NLRC reinstating the decision
of LA
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner Malig-on

abandoned her work and eventually resigned from it rather than that
respondent company constructively dismissed her.
Ruling: YES.The rule in termination cases is that the employer bears the
burden of proving that he dismissed his employee for a just cause. And, when
the employer claims that the employee resigned from work, the burden is on the
employer to prove that he did so willingly. Whether that is the case would
largely depend on the circumstances surrounding such alleged
resignation. Those circumstances must be consistent with the employee’s
intent to give up work.
Here, the company claims that Malig-on voluntarily resigned, gave a letter of
resignation that she wrote with her own hand, used the vernacular language,
and signed it. But these are not enough. They merely prove that she wrote that
letter, a thing that she did not deny. She was quick to point out that she wrote it
after being told that she needed to resign so she could be cleared for her next
assignment.
The company of course claims that it gave Malig-on notices on August 23, 2002
and September 2, 2002, asking her to explain her failure to report for work and
informing her that the company would treat such failure as lack of interest in it,
respectively. But these notices cannot possibly take the place of the notices
required by law. They came more than six months after the company placed her
93 | P a g e
on floating status and, consequently, the company gave her those notices after
it had constructively dismissed her from work.
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and
reinstatement.7 Still, the Court has held that the grant of separation pay,
rather than reinstatement, may be proper especially when the latter is no
longer practical or will be for the best interest of the parties, as in this
case.Here, after her last work, Malig-on did not appear persistent in getting
rehired. Indeed, she did not file any action for constructive dismissal after being
placed in a floating status for more than six months. If she were to be believed,
it was only eight months later that she showed keen interest in being taken back
by following an advice that she first tender her resignation in order to clear up
her record prior to being rehired.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals
SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (SURNECO) AND/OR

EUGENIO BALUGO/CIRIACO MESALUCHA, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (5TH DIVISION) AND ELSIE ESCULANO
G.R. No. 125212 June 28, 1999
• Quinto, a former employee of the SURNECO sent a resignation letter to
General Manager Balugo furnishing the Board of Directors stating therein the
she was requesting to be entitled to separation pay and other benefits
• Escolano, the Personnel Officer of SURNECO sent a report Balugo indicating
therein that the termination of sevice of Quinto was not accorded with due
process and recommending the company to grant her separation pay
otherwise Quinto would be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and benefits.
• SURNECO did not take any action over the letter of Quinto hence she file a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer of reinstatement based on the
report of Esculano to Balugo
• Quinto's case was, however, dismissed on October 22, 1992, for being barred
by prescription.
• Balugo wrote a letter to Esculano ordering her to explain did she commit
such unauthorized action to review the case of Quinto and why she should
not be subjected to disciplinary action
• Esculano submitted a written explanation in apologetic form stating that such
review is inherent upon her job
• Balugo wrote another letter to Escolano directing her to adduce additional
evidence if the was any and her failure to reply within 3 days will submit her
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case for resolution

• Esculano filed a reply in the 3rd day that she had no idea that she had a
"case" and requesting for information thereon.
• Board of Directors, proceeded to act on the case of resolving to terminate the
services of Escolano through a Board Resolution, due to violation of Section 9
of their Code of Ethics and Discipline for such unauthorized review of the
case of Quinto
• Escolano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and LA ruled in favour of the
validity of the dismissal but ordered SURNECO to pay her P3,000.00 as
financial indemnity for not having provided private respondent with a
hearing to air her side and for not complying with the one month
notice requirement provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.
• NLRC dismissed the appeal of Escolano for having been filed out of time. A
motion for reconsideration was granted and NLRC ruled that the dismissal
was illegal
Issue: WON SURNECO was guilty for illegal dismissal in terminating the services
of Escolano for serious misconduct due to unauthorized review of a case and
loss of confidence for breach of rules
Ruling: YES. First, there is no basis for petitioner cooperative's charge of
serious misconduct on the part of private respondent. Misconduct is improper or
wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
Escolano, Personnel Officer, holds a managerial position. As such, her authority
is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires independent judgment.
Indeed, those occupying managerial positions are considered vested with a
certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.
Escolano functioned within the sphere of her job when she acted on Quinto's
request and drew recommendations thereon. Stated simply, private respondent
was merely doing her job. We fail to see any transgression of established and
definite rule of action, any forbidden act, any dereliction of duty, willful in
character, nor wrongful intent on the part of private respondent as to hold her
liable for serious misconduct.
Petitioners' basis for claiming loss of confidence is private respondent's
alleged act of furnishing Quinto a copy of her internal memorandum. We have
searched the records and found no direct proof that private respondent did
furnish a copy of her report to Quinto. On the other hand, We agree with the
NLRC that Quinto could have very well obtained her copy from other sources. In
other words, that private respondent allowed Quinto to obtain a copy of her
report has not been clearly established. As such, petitioners cannot validly rely
on loss of confidence as a ground to dismiss private respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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ANTONIO B. MOLATO, RENATO ALEJAGA and ESMERALDO B. MOLATO, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER RICARDO
C. NORA, REACH OUT BIBLICAL HOUSE and ILDEFONSO P. BARCELO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 113085 January 2, 1997

• Barcelo, the manager of the Biblical House send letters to the petitioners
informing them of their dismissal from work due to grave misconduct,
insubordination and inefficiency which greatly affected the operations and
security of the company, to be effective immediately.
• Petitioners filed an illegal dismissal case and underpayment and non-
payment of some benefits
• LA ruled in favour of the validity of the dismissal based on the affidavit of 6
employees proving their misconduct but they ordered the employer to
indemnify petitioners P5,000.00 each for failure to observe the twin
requirements of notice and hearing in effecting their termination.
• NLRC sustained the decision of LA, hence, this petition
Issue: WON the dismissal based on the affidavits of co-employees was valid
Ruling: NO. The petition is meritorious. To constitute a valid dismissal from
employment two (2) requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of
the causes provided in Art. 282 of the Labor Code; and, (b) the employee
must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Unfortunately, both requirements were not satisfied.
Both public respondents Labor Arbiter and NLRC found just and valid causes in
terminating the services of petitioners on the basis solely on the affidavits
executed by External Auditor Emmanuel Tiongson and the six (6) co-employees
of petitioners. However, a perusal of the aforesaid affidavits readily reveals that
the acts allegedly committed by petitioners were merely general allegations
which were not adequately substantiated
Quite obviously, affiants failed to cite particular acts or circumstances when
petitioners were disrespectful to their employer. Affiants merely alleged that
petitioners would raise their voices and utter unpleasant remarks at their
employer during their meetings without however pointing in detail when, where
and how the incidents transpired. The same is true with the affidavit of
Emmanuel Tiongson. He merely stated that he witnessed the arrogance,
misconduct, grossly abusive language, serious disrespect and uncalled-for
remarks of petitioners towards their employer.
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal the same
must be related to the performance of the employee's duties and must show
that he has become unfit to continue working for the employer. 4 The affidavits
of private respondents' witnesses are insufficient to warrant such findings. It is
grave abuse of discretion for public respondents Labor Arbiter and NLRC to rule
96 | P a g e
that petitioners were guilty of serious misconduct and insubordination based on

those affidavits alone.
DIVINE WORD HIGH SCHOOL AND REV. VIC TIAM, SVD. DIRECTOR, vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LUZ MALLBO
CATENZA,
G.R. No. 72207 August 6, 1986
• Luz, a high school teacher of Divine Word went to a vacation and when
she tried to report back to work she was not allowed anymore because of
misdeeds" and "immoral acts" of her husband Pablo Catenza, then the
principal of petitioner school.
• Luz filed a case for illegal dismissal and petitioners contend that the
reason for the termination of her service is the contemporaneous and
subsequent conduct of covering up and concealing the immoral acts
of her husband coupled with threats to kill made by said respondent on
the person of student Remie Ignacio, the victim of her husband's immoral
acts.
• LA ruled in favor of the illegality of the dismissal and ordered the school to
reinstate Luz
• NLRC modified the decision ruling that Luz was not denied of due process
for her failure to attend the 4 hearings, hence this petition
Issue: WON Luz was denied of due process and should be reinstated by the
School
Ruling: NO. Likewise devoid of merit is petitioners' contention that they were
denied due process of law when the Labor Arbiter considered the case
submitted for decision notwithstanding the fact that petitioners had not yet
rested their case. Scrutiny of the records shows that petitioners were afforded
every opportunity to present their evidence but they repeatedly failed to appear
at the four (4) consecutive hearings scheduled for the purpose. It is settled that
there is no denial of due process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity
to present his case. (Municipality of Daet v. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., 138 SCRA
265).
Nonetheless We hesitate ordering the reinstatement of private respondent Luz
Ballano Catenza as a high school teacher in the petitioner high school, which is
a Catholic institution, serving the educational and moral needs of its Catholic
studentry. While herself innocent, the continued presense of Mrs. Catenza as a
teacher in the school may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by
some sectors in the school community.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners are hereby ORDERED to pay complainant-appellee
separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, plus her
backwages (not to exceed three years) from the time of the dismissal up to the
time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.
97 | P a g e
EVELYN CHUA-QUA, vs. HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as

Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL,
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990
• Everlyn was a teacher in Tay Tung High School and the class adviser of the 6 th
grade where Bobby Qua was enrolled
• Everlyn, 30 years of age fell in love with Bobby, 16 years of age and got
married
• The School filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at
Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of
petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued
employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade
the high moral values, of the school."
• Everlyn was suspended by the Labor Arbiter and required to submit position
paper and supporting evidence
• The clearance to terminate the employment of Everlyn was granted by the
LA
• Everly contend that she did not receive a copy of the affidavit of the School
which the LA relied in ruling the case, hence, she appealed the case before
the NLRC for denial of due process and that there is nothing immoral on her
conduct
• NLRC reversed the decision of LA and ordered the reinstatement of Everlyn
• The Minister of Labor reversed the decision of NLRC, hence, Everlyn appealed
the case before the office of the President which reversed the decision of the
Minister of Labor. A Motion for reconsideration was granted in favour of
the school.
Issue: WON the dismissal based the marriage of Everlyn was illegal; WON
Everlyn was denied of due process when the alleged hearsay affidavit was
admitted by the LA; WON there was no sufficient proof to prove the misconduct
of Everlyn
Ruling: YES. The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we
declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however,
that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been
inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the
interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her
reinstatement.
NO. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved
98 | P a g e
based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is

recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not
do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a question of
law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the
proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.
YES. With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed
immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing
school teachers would have no basis. The School utterly failed to show that
petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels,
this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own
which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal
emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public
respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner
backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification,
and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.
STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC., vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and HENRY TRINIO
G.R. No. 74187 January 28, 1988
• Henry is the security coordinator of Stanford assigned to supervise all the
guards assigned to Stanford
• Henry was dismissed from employment upon an investigation alleging that
he committed a serious breach of company rules when one night around
11pm he allowed two lady guards, Gina and Vicky to come with him inside
the office to drink liquor and allowed the guard on duty, Marcelino to join
them and having sexual intercourse with Gina on the top of the desk while
Vicky was pretending to be a sleep.
• Henry filed an illegal dismissal case and unfair labor practice against
Stanford
• LA ruled dismissing the complaint for ULP but the complaint for illegal
dismissal was decided in favor of Henry and the proper penalty for him was
suspension only and not dismissal
• The appeal of Stanford before the NLRC was denied
Issue: WON Henry should only be suspended and the dismissal was improper
Ruling: NO. The issue does not theretofore lie in the facts, or the sufficiency of
the evidence in proof thereof. The issue posed, rather, is whether or not under
the established facts, the penalty of dismissal is merited, instead of merely that
of suspension for not more than 30 days — which is what the company rules by
99 | P a g e
their literal terms indicate. The respondent Commission, in the Comment

submitted in its behalf by the Solicitor General, concedes that the formulation
and promulgation by an employer of rules of conduct and discipline for
its employees, inclusive of those deemed to constitute serious
misconduct, cannot and should not operate to altogether negate his
prerogative and responsibility to determine and declare whether or not
facts not explicitly set out in the rules may and do constitute such
serious misconduct as to justify the dismissal of the employee or the
imposition of sanctions heavier than those specifically and expressly
prescribed. The concession is dictated by logic; otherwise, the rules, literally
applied, would result in absurdity: grave offenses, e.g., rape, would be penalized
by mere suspension; this, despite the heavier penalty provided therefor by the
Labor Code, or otherwise dictated by common sense.
The offenses cannot be excused upon a plea of their being "first offenses," or
have not resulted in prejudice to the company in any way. No employer may
rationally be expected to continue in employment a person whose lack of
morals, respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer's rules, and
appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office, has so plainly and
completely been bared.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated

March 10, 1986 and that of the Labor Arbiter dated September 30, 1983 are
annulled and set aside, and the complaint of Henry Trinio against the petitioner
for unfair labor practice and illegal termination of employment, dismissed for
lack of factual and legal basis. The judgment is immediately executory, and no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration thereof will be
entertained.
100 | P a g e
101 | P a g e

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LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS 2012

TEST TO DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER AND

Facts: Sometime in 1995, petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during

Issue: whether there exist an employer-employee relationship

SONZA vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

Issue: whether an employer-employee relationship exist in the case

Independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills,

JAVIER VS. FLYACE CORP

Issue: Whether an Employer-employee relationship exist

SMCEU-PTGWO vs. BERSAMINA

Issue: Whether there exist an employer-employee relationship between san

DEFINITION OF LABOR DISPUTE

ARTICLE 217 JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER

Facts: Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of Philippine

HELD: Yes. A Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by the employer

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s POEA approved employment contract falls

Atlas Farms v NLRC, J. Dela Pena

Facts: Dela Pena employed as veterinary aide by petitioner Atlas Farms. He

In order to constitute a valid dismissal the requirements must concur: 1) due

PERPETUAL HELP v. FABURADA

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch-DOLE for

ISSUE: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship thus conferring

To establish employer-employee relationship the requisites must be present to

1) The power of selection/ hire

Facts: Private respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the

Austria worked with SDA for 28 years.He started as a literature evangelist in

On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several

against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for

(Nakakainis ‘tong part na ‘to dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)

2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent

3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor

4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of

Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.

church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and

DFA VS. NLRC

Issue: whether the labor arbiter has jurisdiction

Facts: In late 1998, Florence Cabansag arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She

Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a

Florence O. Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. Barely 3

Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and

However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O.

More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:

Respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist status in Singapore, by the

The Philippine government requires non-Filipinos working in the country to first

a branch office in Singapore. Significantly, respondent’s employment by the

Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads:

“For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality

As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against

Respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal,

As a regular employee, respondent was entitled to all rights, benefits and

BANEZ VS. VALDEVILLA

Issue: Whether RTC has Jurisdiction

SANTOS VS. SERVIER PHILIPPINES

Facts: employee filed a complaint (money claim) for incomplete retirement

Issue: whether the NLRC can decide on the legality of deduction

PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS VS. GALANG

granted on February 6, 1989. On July 6, 1989, however, the respondent judge,

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEVERINO LISTANA,

Ruling: The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. JAN CARLO GALA

Facts: Gala was employed by Meralco as probationary lineman. He initially

NATIONWIDE SECURITY and ALLIED SERVICES, INC.,

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL