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Performance Standards Enhance Asset Integrity Assurance

Article · April 2012

DOI: 10.2118/151160-MS

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Performance Standards Enhance Asset Integrity Assurance
Steven J. Cooke, SQME, ADGAS

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Middle East Health, Safety, Security, and Environment Conference and Exhibition held in Abu Dhabi, UAE, 2–4 April 2012.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). The material does not necessarily
reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper MUST include full author
attribution/acknowledgment.

Abstract

Plans are ultimately only as good as their execution. Without proper and timely execution, even the best safety
measures and procedures will be ineffective. To improve the effective execution of critical safety processes and
equipment a concise definition of expectations must be linked to the task and equipment performance
measurements. This is accomplished through the development of Asset Integrity Performance Standards, which
will be described in this paper.

ADGAS has developed a set of Performance Standards for Health, Safety and Environment Critical Equipment
and Systems (HSE-CES) in compliance with a larger mandate in the ADNOC group of companies to assure the
safety and integrity of its assets. These standards are grouped according to the common designations of barriers
used in the “Bow-tie” diagrams for process safety. This assures the managers that all aspects of preventive and
mitigation barriers are in place. The Performance Standards themselves are a compilation of references forming
a continuous link from the design standards employed to achieve the stated objectives of the barrier to the final
audit functions and document locations used to assure their proper implementation.

The use of these Performance Standards greatly improves the understanding of the processes and the asset
criticality throughout the organization and provides a high level of transparency to the activities performed to
assure continuing reliability and integrity of the assets. The integration of the entire lifecycle and purpose of
critical assets into a single document (for each barrier type) is a best practice development from the previous
independent collections of design, maintenance, inspection and audit specifications and records.
2

Performance Standards Enhance Asset Integrity Assurance

Focus and alignment on Critical Equipment and Systems through the bow-tie diagram correlation.

Following the tragedy of the Bhopal Incident in 1984 the chemical industry realized that an integrated approach to
process safety was needed beyond that which was assumed in place through existing Health, Safety and
Environmental (HSE) programs. Governments also recognized the need to protect the public welfare through
more detailed attention to the process safety of plants. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration of the
United States (OSHA) published a regulation in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations in the Federal Register on
24 February 1992 (Hazard Communication Standard (29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)1910.1 It was
accompanied by the “Process Safety Management - Guidelines for Compliance” (OSHA 3133).

Since then companies worldwide have applied Process Safety Management principles to their operations in
addition to personal health and safety practices. To further underscore the importance of specific equipment and
processes in maintaining effective process safety, this developed into a comprehensive examination of how the
integrity of assets is maintained, from the design phase through the lifecycle to decommissioning.

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) was established by the American Institute of Chemical
Engineers in March 25, 1985 following the Bhopal disaster as well. 2 An international effort comprised of over 100
companies, the CCPS developed a key set of leading and lagging indicators for process safety that are applied
generally to Asset Integrity Management. The bow-tie technique was developed by the petrochemical business
Shell to address and integrate the requirements of classical probabilistic risk assessment together with ideas
about how accidents happen (Wagenaar et al. 1994; Vd Graaf et al. 1996)4. The “Layers of Protection Analysis
(LOPA)” was published by the CCPS, outlining a process of Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) barriers utilizing the
“Bow-tie” diagram.3

This mechanism provides a clear graphical outline of a complete safety system design that is easy to understand
at all levels of an organization. For this reason it was adopted as an outline of the Health, Safety and
Environment Critical Equipment and Systems (HSE-CES) in ADGAS. Using the Bow-tie diagram categories,
ADGAS has reinforced the understanding of not only the critical role of equipment in the plant, but also how that
equipment fits into the overall strategy for the prevention of process safety incidents. The essential functions of
Prevention, Detection, Control, Mitigation and Escape, Evacuation and Rescue are easily-remembered links in the
safety barrier sequence. Recognizing the place a type of equipment has in that sequence helps the operator to
focus his efforts and attentions on the most critical items first for the most efficient application of his skills.

This also allows us to effectively align all design, operations, inspection and maintenance tasks to a common
focus on the highly critical equipment in the facility. This is done through the use of Performance Standards
specific to each type of equipment in a “Bow-tie” barrier designation. (Figure 1.)
It is the Performance Standards that define the purpose and use of each type of critical equipment. They contain
the design standards, inspection requirements and maintenance activities required to maintain acceptable
integrity and reliability of the equipment throughout its life cycle.
 3

1
HAZARD
HSECESPerformance
2 Standards

3
P01- 12
Prevention
4

D01 – 03
DetectionSystems

C01 – 05 5
Control

M 01– 09
Mitigation

E01 - 05
Escape, Evacuation & Rescue CONSEQUENCE

Figure 1. Performance Standards in the Bow-Tie Diagram

Highlighting Functional Importance through Safety Objective statements

The tens of thousands of equipment found in a typical gas processing plant make it easy for an operator to lose
sight of the key equipment (still numbering in the thousands) that are essential for plant safety and continued
operation. Exacerbated by the fact that all equipment does need to be maintained or replaced at some point, the
huge array of inspection and maintenance routines can swallow up the importance of the critical equipment in the
plethora of daily scheduled activities.

It is the Performance Standards that provide a clear reference and focal point for operators and technicians in all
disciplines. Relatively few in number and related directly to the clear bow-tie graphic, the critical equipment that
must be maintained before all else are easily recognized in the Performance Standards. The Maintenance
Management System also contains indicators identifying an HSE-CES and sets priority codes accordingly.

The process of identifying and including the HSE-CES in the Performance Standards and the work schedules is
necessarily more complex and detailed. But for the operators and engineers alike, the established Performance
Standards clearly indicate the functional importance of each type of equipment. This is done through two levels of
description in the standards. The first is a very short checklist that identifies the specific place in the Bow-tie
diagram that the equipment fills. (Figure 2) This helps to clarify the dependencies to other equipment in the bow-
tie chain as well. The second is a statement of the Safety Objective of the specific type of equipment within the
larger general framework of the Performance Standard equipment types. These statements succinctly highlight
the reason the equipment is in place and what it is intended to accomplish. This is the focus that is too often lost
when looking at a general plant equipment list. Understanding why a piece of equipment is required to maintain
the overall safety and operation of the plant is the best motivator for good operator performance. (Figure 3)
4

HSECES: HC Gas Detectors (IR Type) Performance Standards Ref.: Fire & Gas Detection Systems - D01
Site: Das Island Performance Standards Owner: HOM (S)
Plant: Storex Signed off:
System: Fire and Gas Revision No.: 0
Package / Skid: Trains 1, 2, 3, OAG, IGD and Storex area. Date: 11 August 2011

Risk Reduction Measure: Prevention Control Mitigation

HSECES Group:
HSECES Reference No.:
HSECES Criticality:
Structural Integrity Detection Systems Shutdown Systems
Ignition Control Protection Systems Emergency Response
Process Containment Life Saving

HSECES Goal: To provide an early warning of drifting flammable gas clouds in the Storex Tank farm area.

Figure 2. Performance Standard Header

Function No. Function Functional Criteria / Guidance

1.1 Provide warning of presence of 1.1.1 Fixed toxic and flammable gas detectors,
flammable gas. which will monitor H2S over a wide concentration
1.2 Gas detector heads to detect therange are provided at the boundary limit affecting
presence of flammable gas at 10% of the
the ADGAS Plant area and they will be liked to
lower explosive level (LEL) of methane or
alarm/siren system.
other combustible gases. 1.1.2 ADGAS sites have multigas detectors.
1.3 System to provide a response to low
Detectors will be of the infra red type sensor
and high gas detection signals. calibrated for methane.
1.4 System to automatically activate1.3.1 Flammable gas detectors shall alarm at
visual and audible alarms. multiple points. The first alarm shall be initiated at
1.5 Detector design in accordance with
10% of the lower flammability limit (LFL). The
accepted codes and standards. .
sensor system shall be designed to alarm again at
1 40% of LFL.
1.4.1 The audible and visual alarm devices shall
be actuated automatically in the event of
flammable gas release being detected.
1.4.2. Control Room Operator shall confirm the
authenticity of the alarm.
1.5.1 Existing HC detectors (cataytic type) are
replaced with IR type detectors based on best
industry practice per IR detector design in
accordance with accepted codes and standards;
CSA C22.2 #152, FM 6310 / 6320, ANSI / ISA-
12.13.01
1.5.2. Detector has self diagnostics feature (at
Figure 3. Performance Standard Functional Description

The performance itself is defined in the standards, as their title implies. The specific tasks required to be done to
maintain the equipment integrity and reliability are defined in detail in “Written Schemes of Examination” (WSE)
and maintenance routines in a Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) along with their
required frequencies. But, the reason for the specifications and timing of the routines is regulated by a set of
broader government, shareholder and international standards. These primary standards are stated in each
Performance Standard along with key metrics that are required to assure continuing asset integrity. (Figure 4)
 5

Assurance Verification
Task / Confirmation Doc Ref. Task
1.3.1. ADGAS Maintenace to calibrate the detector on 1.1.1.1. SC-100-A4J-0-09841, 1.1.1.1 Calibration log records
quarterly basis using calibration kit. SC-100-A4J- 0-02823, SC-100- 1.2.1.1. Alarm confirmation/cross
1.4.2. Field Operator shall confirm the authenticity of the A4Z-99974, ADGAS ERP. BP- check records.
alarm by hand held gas monitors and the correct ETP GIS 30-851, IEC 61511, 1.3.1.1. Maintenance alarm
setpoints of the sensors. GOP 2.6. response records. DCS Historian
1.4.1. Records of any alarm (including detector failure 1.2.1.1. OEM Manual Server.
alarms) initiated by the system shall be verified by 1.3.1.1. Alarm history record. 1.4.1.1. Review Control Room Log
Maintenance Team. Detection and actions initiated are DCS Historian server. book entries.
logged in F&G detction system (Honeywell Safety 1.3.1.2. Set points (10%LEL) as 1.5.1.1. Functional diagnostics test
Manager Sequence of Events) and are recorded in DCS per existing detector data sheets. record.
(Historian Sever). 1.4.1.1. Control Room Log
1.5.1. Diagnostic and response function test. (BP-ETP books. Refer to Sections 7.5 and
GIS 30-851) 7.8 of Fire Protection Basis of
Design. Refer to Section 2 of
Specification for Fire and Gas
System. 1.4.2.1.
Control Room Operator Log book
entries.
1.5.1.1. CSA C22.2 #152, FM
6310 / 6320, ANSI / ISA-12.13.01

Figure 4. Performance Standard Tasks

There has been a development of “Behavioral Safety” from “Rules-based Safety” programs over the last decade 5,6
to address repeating incidents of safety rule violations. A key component of behavioral safety systems is getting
the individual to recognize the personal benefits of safe actions instead of simply demanding compliance to a list
of items that are known to promote safety. The Performance Standards achieve this objective by emphasizing
both the smaller number of critical systems (from the overall plant equipment list) and the consequences of their
failure. Describing them graphically through the bow-tie diagram clearly displays the importance of the first barrier
level - that of prevention through proper equipment maintenance and use. If it never fails, the others are really
just for insurance. Similarly, the escalation of an incident through the barrier levels highlights the relative criticality
of the overall list of critical equipment. This helps to internalized the understanding of the critical equipment that
reinforces the individual’s attention to their operation and maintenance.

The required tasks and often the timing as well are detailed in the Performance Standards, allowing operations
personnel to anticipate and accommodate the maintenance and inspection teams as well as providing a short
summary of those tasks for the maintenance and inspection personnel. The location of all records related to the
performance of the preventive and repair tasks are indicated to assure that the information is properly archived
and available for use and review. (Figure 4)

Easy Audit Trail from Fundamental Standards documents to final Record Documents
The Performance Standards not only identify the governing primary standards for safe and effective equipment
use, they provide an auditable trail from those documents to the final records of compliance. This serves as a
quick reference guide to operators and technicians as well, since the specific location or record name for all
documents is specified in the Performance Standard itself.

After all, the knowledge of the critical equipment and the routines necessary to maintain them in an effective and
safe condition are only useful if they are diligently applied. But where the operators, maintenance and inspection
personnel had difficulty in focusing on the truly critical elements of their plants, the auditors are faced with the
equally difficult task of knowing whether the samples they obtain are useful. Not only must audit sampling be
representative of the desired population - in this case the critical equipment - it must measure conformance
against company standards and procedures.

If the equipment is poorly characterized the probability of less-significant equipment being surveyed is greater. If
there is no consistent definition of why a particular standard is used for a piece of equipment, the auditor must rely
on the company procedures. The combination of potentially invalid samples and ineffective or irrelevant
procedures (to the objective of process safety) can result in an audit report that does not reveal any cause for
 6

concern while serious deficiencies continue to grow.

The consolidated Performance Standard ensures that the only critical equipments are examined in the audit
process, and the design criteria as well as specific international standards are readily apparent. The Performance
Standard then clearly identifies the specific routines, procedures and critical points of examination or test that are
required by those standards. The final step in audit verifications is contained in the “Supporting Documents”
section of the Performance Standard. The auditor knows exactly which records need to be examined to
determine the compliance of the execution of the critical activities with the requirements of the standards. (Figure
3)

These references are updated, appended or modified by the Performance Standard Owner if any new document
is added or an existing one is changed in any way. References are also made to the specific Written Schemes of
Examination or other maintenance activity that are used in the actual execution of the defined tasks.

Transparency of the process is essential to the understanding of why certain tasks need to be done, and how to
ensure that they are done correctly. The Performance Standards provide this transparency with a simple format
linking all of the critical functions and activities to the safety and operational requirements of the Design intent and
standards. This also makes the process of auditing the compliance at any level much more direct, consistent, and
understandable to the auditee.

Using the Performance Standard essentially as the audit checklist, an integrity auditor can easily confirm the
existence of the relevant primary and secondary standards and their accessibility to the users. The associated
work instructions or departmental procedures are identified in the standards, allowing a rapid check of their
agreement with the primary standard specifications. Finally, the documents of completion, certificates or other
evidence of compliance to the design and operating intent of the equipment are listed in the Performance
Standard.

Throughout the audit process, the continuous chain of knowledge from the principle safety concerns to the
verification of the equipment integrity is demonstrated in the Performance Standard design and use. This not only
simplifies the audit process, but it reinforces the importance of the operators’ and technicians’ jobs to their own
continuing safety and well-being. That may also transform an audit from a necessary inspection to a welcome
indication of management’s concern for the employees’ welfare.

Better understanding by personnel of the inter-relationships between Departments and the Asset Integrity
assurance process.
A key benefit of the Performance Standard approach to integrity and reliability assurance is the visible
interconnection between departmental activities, including Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Inspection.
At the front-line employee level particularly, it is often difficult to understand the impact that your activities have on
another department, and how their activities impact your ability to do your job as well. The sequence of tasks is
primarily undertaken by the inspection and maintenance personnel, but the overall objectives are usually the
primary concern of the operations personnel. The Performance Standards illustrate how the achievement of the
operation’s goals is dependent on the proper and timely execution of the inspection and maintenance activities.
This includes the description of Performance Standard interdependencies as shown in Figure 5.

Inter Dependency

List other equipment that depends on the continuing operation of this equipment to function safely and correctly. List other equipment that THIS
equipment requires to be operating for this equipment to function properly.

System Reason
Emergency Response E03 The confirmed detection of fire will initiate emergency response actions as defined in the Emergency Response Plan (ERP).
Emergency Shut Down C01 The confirmed detection of fire will initiate emergency shut downs and alarms.
Emergency Alarms E04 The confirmed detection of the fire will initiate emergency alarms.
Emergency Communications E01 The release of sour gases will be communicated for various emergency actions such as response, control or evacuation as necessary.
Certified Electrical Equipment & High Voltage Supply P10
The flame detectors shall be certified to be used in hazardous areas.
Figure 5. Performance Standard Interdependencies Example

Greater cooperation and coordination have been realized between departmental scheduling and communication
with the mutual understanding of the importance of the HSE-CES to their own safety and the efficient operation of
the plant.
 7

Referring again to the behavioral safety implications of the Performance Standards, the integrated approach and
presentation of the activities required to assure a safely operating piece of equipment promotes an awareness of
departmental interdependencies. No longer are the maintenance or inspection personnel interfering with the
operator’s ability to meet production targets, but they are essential to the long-term and even short-term success
of their own duties. A more proactive approach to equipment availability for inspection and maintenance is
created with coordinated planning that includes criticality parameters as well as production schedules.

Different people pay attention to different forms of feedback and by using several different mechanisms people
may better perceive they are part of the safety improvement process, not the problem. More feedback also
transmits the message that safety is important and taken seriously by the company. “Although feedback alone
reduces injuries and changes behavior, processes incorporating explicit goals and/or training about the behavioral
targets were between one and two times more effective, suggesting these designs helped to maximize the
benefits of the process. However, participative goals were superior to assigned goals, which produced non-
significant injury reductions.7 The likely reason participative goals are more effective is that employees jointly work
out the best ways to achieve their goals8 (Locke & Latham, 2002), which induces commitment to goal
achievement…”9,10 (Cooper, 1992; Ludwig & Geller, 1997).

Management/Stockholder Confidence in PSM implementation.

Finally, a major driver in the development of the HSE-CES Performance Standards has been the need for
corporate management to have a way to understand whether the designed safety systems are adequately
implemented and maintained. The safety implications of a critical equipment failure are all too well-known in the
industry, with unfortunate reminders continuing to occur. Corporate management cannot monitor every detail of
the work that must take place daily to operate the plant safely, but it can have a mechanism that informs it about
the compliance to the known requirements for a safe operation.

Management personnel can easily get distracted or overwhelmed by the myriad of activities, budgets and goals
that make up the overall corporate structure and purpose. Without a clear and concise indicator of the systems
that are truly critical to the safety and success of the corporation, those distractions could lead to serious errors.
The Performance Standards and their associated audits provide that clarity for improved risk assessment and
mitigation. Deficiencies in critical equipment systems are quickly and clearly recognized, allowing for a
prioritization of resources to maintain the necessary levels of safety and production.

Most importantly, the use of the Performance Standards as the consolidated repository of functional risk
management information provides a confident assurance to the corporate managers and the shareholders that
their investment is secure. The simplified audit trail of activities and references makes it easier for top managers
to understand how the integrity of the facility is assured when everything is performed according to the standard
requirements. It also prompts them to corrective action when the indication is one of a deficiency in a particular
system. The demonstration of compliance to the Performance Standards is the best leading indicator of a safe
and successful plant operation.

References
1
Process Safety Management (OSHA 3132) 2000 (Reprinted), U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
2
The History of CCPS, retrieved from http://www.aiche.org/CCPS/About/History.aspx, 30 October 2011.
3
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), American Institute of
Chemical Engineers,2001, NY, NY.
4
Van de Graaf, G. C., Milne, D. & Primrose, M., HSE cases—some lessons learned. Exploration and Production
Newsletter. Shell International,1996.
5
http://www.behavioral-safety.com/free-behavioral-safety-resource-center/about-behavioral-safety/a-brief-overview
6
Atkinson, William (2005). "Behavior-based safety." MC (Manufactured Concrete) Magazine May/June.
7
Cooper, M. Domnic,(2009) Behavioral Safety Interventions - A Review of Process Design Factors, Professional
Safety, February pp36-45
8
Locke, E.A. & Latham, G.P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal-setting and task motivation: A 35-
8

year odyssey. American Psychologist, 57(9), 705-717.

9
Ludwig, T.D. & Geller, E.S. (1997). Assigned versus participative goal-setting and response generalization:
Managing injury control among professional pizza deliverers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 253-261.
10
Cooper, M.D. (1992). An examination of assigned and participative goal-setting in relation to the improvement of
safety on construction sites. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Manchester Institute of Science & Technology, U.K.
 9

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