Guidance on Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant

North Sea SPU (UK)
Site Technical Practice
Guidance on Practice for

Safe Isolation and
Reinstatement of Plant
Issuing Adrian Luckins Document Brian Howell

Authority: SPU EA Authority: Operations Manager
Document Janet Ross Applicability: North Sea SPU (UK)
Administrator: OMS Advisor
Issuing Engineering Control Tier: 2
Department:
First Issue Date: May 2009 Revision No: Issue 1/AM02
Revision Date: December 2009 Review Required By: September 2010
Revision Summary: Addendum 6 Assurance Protocol added.
For further information contact DCC at ODL on 01224 628018 or dcc@odl.co.uk.
Document Location: BP ETP Library
NSSPU-GP 44-40-1
Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant NSSPU-GP 44-40-1
Contents
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1
2 Use of Language 1
3 Scope 2
4 Roles and Responsibilities 2

4.1 Head of Operations 2
4.2 OIM/Site Controller 2
4.3 Area Authority 3
4.4 Isolating Authority 3
4.5 Performing Authority 3
4.6 Technical Authority 4
5 General 4
5.1 Self-regulation and Audit 4
5.2 Isolating Authority Training and Competency 4
5.3 Modifications and New Facilities 5
6 Isolation Standards and Planning 6

6.1 Isolations Policy 6
6.2 Isolation Planning 6
6.3 Isolation Methods 7
6.4 Isolation Standards 8
6.5 Precautions when Breaking Containment 10
6.6 Risk Assessment of Non-compliant Isolations 11
6.7 Isolation for Confined Space Entry 11
6.8 Hazards Associated with Mechanical Machinery 12
May 2009 Issue 1 i

NSSPU-GP 44-40-1 Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant
Contents (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
7 Isolation Implementation and Control 13

7.1 Security 13
7.2 Identification Methods 14
7.3 Flange Tagging for Breaking Containment 14
7.4 Control of Isolations 14
7.5 Control of Isolations for Well Operations Activities 15
7.6 Boundary Isolations 15
7.7 Long-term Isolations 16
7.8 Locked Open/Locked Closed Valves 17
7.9 Personal Isolations 17
7.10 Testing Isolation Integrity 17
7.11 Monitoring Isolation Integrity 19
7.12 Subsea Isolations 19
8 Plant Preparation for Breaking Containment 19

8.1 Potential Hazards 19
8.2 Depressurising and Draining Containment Systems 20
8.3 Cleaning and Gas-freeing Methods 21
9 Confined Space Entry 24

9.1 Definition of Confined Space 24
9.2 Planning 25
9.3 Procedure for Entry into Confined Spaces without Breathing
Apparatus 30
9.4 Work Activity Affecting Entry without Breathing
Apparatus Status 31
9.5 Additional Procedure for Entry into Confined Spaces with
Breathing Apparatus 31
ii May 2009 Issue 1

Contents (cont’d)
Paragraph Page
9.6 Removal of Sludge, Scale and Hard Deposits 32
9.7 Removal of Trapped Oil or Vapour 32
9.8 General Ventilation 33
9.9 Artificial Lighting 33
10 Plant Reinstatement and Leak Testing 33

10.1 De-isolation of Plant 35
10.2 Selection of Test Pressure 35
10.3 Definition of Pressure Envelope 36
10.4 Selection of Pressuring Medium 36
10.5 Nitrogen Leak Testing 37
10.6 Leak Testing Acceptance Criteria 38
10.7 Test Equipment 40
10.8 Planning 40
10.9 Preparation 41
10.10 Access Restrictions 41
10.11 Control of Leak Testing and Test Procedures 42
10.12 Pressure Buildup and Test Monitoring 43
10.13 Depressurising 43
10.14 Service Testing 44
10.15 Return to Service 45
10.16 Post-test Integrity Checks 45
10.17 Records (Certification) 45
10.18 Use of Specialist Testing Contractors 46
10.19 Shift Handover 46
10.20 Reverse Integrity Testing of Individual Joints 46
May 2009 Issue 1 iii

Contents (cont’d)
Table Page
1 ETP/STP Approval Levels for Non-conformance 1
2 Minimum Recommended Isolation Standards for Predetermined
Risk Levels 9
3 Permitted Limits for Confined Space Entry and Work 28
Figure
1 Leak Testing Checklist 34
Addendum 1 Definitions
Addendum 2 Typical Valve Isolations Integrity Tests
Addendum 3 Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant Flowchart
Addendum 4 TAR and Planned Intervention Pre-startup
Assurance Checklist
Addendum 5 Workplace Assessment Plan Template
Addendum 6 Assurance Protocol
iv December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

1 Introduction
This is the first issue of Site Technical Practice (STP) 44-40-1. This Guidance on Practice (GP) is
based on Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant (UKCS-SSW-001).
The purpose of this document is to define BP operating policy and procedures for the safe
isolation and reinstatement of plant or equipment from sources of hydrocarbons and other fluids.
A glossary of the terms used in the document is given in Addendum 1.
This document satisfies the requirements of BP Integrity Management (IM) Standard Element 6
Practices and Procedures; minimum requirements 6.1 and 6.2.
2 Use of Language
BP Group ETPs and North Sea STPs make use of should and shall terminology to communicate
the requirements of the practice. A non-conformance (or deviation) from these requirements
requires approval in accordance with Table 1 below.
There are 81 Defined Group, Segment and Strategic Performance Unit (SPU) ETPs, all of which
are represented as STPs. This STP is classed as a Segment Defined STP.
Each operating unit or project is required to maintain a register of approved deviations from ETPs
and North Sea STPs as described in North Sea SPU STP Development, Conformance and Control
(NSSPU-GP 00-0001).
Deviation Approval Deviation Approval Deviation Approval

Category Not to Use as a from ‘Shall’ from ‘Should’
‘Whole’ Requirements Requirements
Group Defined Group Engineering E&P VP Engineering SPU EA
ETPs director via E&P VP
Engineering
E&P Segment E&P VP Engineering SPU EA Local EA
Defined ETPs (SPU EA informed)
or Function EA
SPU Defined ETPs SPU EA or SPU EA or Local EA
Function EA Function EA (SPU EA informed)
or Function EA
All Other ETPs and SPU EA or SPU EA or Local EA
STPs Function EA Function EA (SPU EA informed)
or Function EA
Table 1 ETP/STP Approval Levels for Non-conformance
May 2009 Issue 1 1

All the requirements in the parent ETP are addressed in this STP, with exceptions recorded in the
ETP Change Register.
All text displayed as italic and coloured blue is termed commentary text and is supplementary
guidance to the requirements of the standard.
3 Scope
This practice applies to the preparation for isolation, mechanical isolation, reinstatement and leak
testing of process utility and drilling systems. It shall be followed at all BP UK upstream operated
sites, both onshore (excluding Grangemouth) and offshore, and applies to all process systems
including subsea pipelines and facilities.
For Drilling Operations, making and breaking of drill string and OCTG connections are
exceptions to this practice.
Special requirements for subsurface isolation of the hydrocarbon reservoir are detailed
in Breaking Containment (NSSPU-GP 10-36-1) and Zonal Isolation (NSSPU-GP 10-60-1).
This means that for any work on a xmas tree valve, the upstream isolation requirements (well)
shall be governed by NSSPU-GP 10-36-1, NSSPU-GP 10-60-1 and the downstream (topsides)
isolation requirements by this document.
For the isolation and reinstatement of plant and equipment from sources of electrical energy refer
to Electrical Procedures (UKCS-SSW-003).
4 Roles and Responsibilities

4.1 Head of Operations
The Head of Operations or Operations Manager is responsible for operating in accordance with
this document and for the self-regulation of compliance.
4.2 OIM/Site Controller

The Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) or Site Controller shall ensure that those performing the
roles of Area Authority (AA), Isolating Authority (IA) and Performing Authority (PA) are
competent to do so. The OIM or Site Controller shall authorise any deviations from the isolation
standard through the risk assessment process and in accordance with Table 1. In doing so, he/she
may choose to defer the activity and seek further technical guidance.
The OIM or Site Controller shall ensure that plant and equipment isolations and reinstatement are
subjected to the appropriate level of self-regulation and audit.
The OIM shall be responsible for approval of the pre-startup assurance checklist.
2 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

4.3 Area Authority

The AA shall approve the isolation design, providing assurance that the design achieves the
highest quality of isolation reasonably practicable. He/she can delegate the detailed isolation
design to a competent process Isolating Authority. The AA shall then be responsible for
authorising the work to proceed under the appropriate controls.
This includes approval of any preparatory work and, on completion of the task, the work required
to complete reinstatement including leak testing and verifying line-up of critical valves in line
with the locked open/locked closed valve registers.
The AA is responsible for specifying the requirements for dynamic risk review as part
of the work control procedure. For plant isolation and reinstatement this shall be
a requirement just prior to breaking containment. The AA shall brief the PA on the dynamic risk
review requirements and assign an IA to provide support and guidance.
An appropriate set of pre-startup checks shall be specified by the AA, to be completed by the AA
or his delegate, after deisolation is complete and prior to recommissioning
of plant. This pre-startup assurance checklist shall include any points where integrity was broken
or equipment was attached for plant preparation or leak testing.
A recommended pre-startup assurance checklist proforma is included in Addendum 4.
Plant line-up checks should then be completed to ensure the plant is ready for the reintroduction
of process fluids.
4.4 Isolating Authority

The IA is responsible for design of process isolations when requested by the AA.
The IA is then responsible for isolating specific sections of plant or items of equipment to the
highest quality and security of isolation which is reasonably practicable. Immediately prior to
breaking containment, the IA nominated by the AA shall attend
the dynamic risk review and demonstrate the integrity of the isolation to the PA,
proving the system is depressured. The relevant IA shall also witness the insertion
of spades to achieve positive isolation when required. The IA is also responsible for monitoring
the integrity of isolations whilst they are in force.
4.5 Performing Authority

The PA is the person charged with the responsibility of carrying out the work and has the
responsibility to verify the integrity of isolations before work starts. Immediately prior
to breaking containment, the PA shall carry out a dynamic risk review with an IA to check it is
safe to proceed and to identify precautions to be taken by the work party.
The PA shall stop the job and contact the AA if the dynamic risk review concludes
it is not safe to proceed.
May 2009 Issue 1 3

4.6 Technical Authority

Strategic Performance Unit (SPU) Technical Authorities (TAs) are responsible for technical
advice to the OIM in the approval of any deviations from the isolation standard including the use
of non-standard isolation devices and leak testing procedures
for specialist contractors. This accountability can be delegated to the ACE Engineers
or Installation/Site Support Engineers where deemed appropriate. The ACE Engineers
or Installation/Site Support Engineers are responsible for carrying out periodic checks
on the long term isolations in place to ensure plant integrity is maintained and that, where
required, long term isolations are replaced by plant modifications.
5 General
5.1 Self-regulation and Audit
Periodic review of isolation-related activities including review of individual isolations
and review of overall isolation processes shall be undertaken. Such reviews may also include:
 General compliance with this document and any local procedures
 The assessment of non-compliant isolations and the extent of any approved deviations
 Registers of competent Area and Isolating Authorities
5.2 Isolating Authority Training and Competency

A training programme providing initial and refresher training and trainee assessment
on the contents of this document shall be carried out involving all personnel responsible for the
specification, approval, application and recording of process isolations.
There are two types of theoretical training available in the Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of
Plant (SIRP):
 Classroom-based training – initial training
 Computer-based training (CBT) – refresher training
Both of these courses involve a formal assessment.
Additionally for IAs there is a practical workplace assessment which shall be completed through
Competence Management Assurance System (CMAS).

The competency requirements for process isolations for the key positions within this document are
as follows:
Area Authority, OIM/Site Controller, Department Heads

Initial training Classroom-based training and practical (2 days) in SIRP
Refresher training As defined in CMAS
Isolating Authorities
Initial training Classroom-based CBT and practical (2 days) in SIRP
Workplace Assessment: Before being deemed competent
to carry out process isolating duties, the IA shall have been assessed at
the workplace by a qualified CMAS Assessor.
The IA shall demonstrate by practical example that he is competent in
defining and implementing process isolations.
The process for carrying out workplace assessments is described in the
Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant Workplace – Assessment
Plan (refer to Addendum 5)
Refresher training As defined in CMAS
In special circumstances such as drilling operations, individuals can be assessed as competent

Isolating Authorities for specific items of equipment providing that they have completed the
formal training and have been assessed as competent on the specific tasks. Site management shall
ensure that this is recorded so that it is clear which tasks these individuals are competent to
undertake.
5.3 Modifications and New Facilities

In relation to existing Installations and sites:
 The design of all modifications and new facilities shall include a review of the provision of
means of isolation for maintenance to ensure compliance with this document
 Such reviews shall address both isolations within the modified/new facilities and any
opportunities to upgrade existing isolation facilities where these are inadequate
 New valves supplied as part of a modification or as a replacement shall be provided with a
facility to lock off in the open or closed position
May 2009 Issue 1 5

6 Isolation Standards and Planning

6.1 Isolations Policy
The highest quality and security of isolation which is reasonably practicable in the prevailing
circumstances shall always be used.
The minimum recommended isolation standard for entry into a vessel or confined space is positive
isolation from all connected sources of process and utilities fluids.
Any isolation which does not meet the minimum recommended isolation standard, including the
application of the mandatory safeguards, shall be assessed using the
Level 2 Risk Assessment process before the isolation is approved. A permanently engineered
solution should be evaluated for any non-compliant isolation repeatedly justified by risk
assessment.
All key participants in the implementation of the Isolations Policy shall be trained and assessed as
competent to the appropriate level in the safe isolation and reinstatement of plant.
An audit programme shall be established at each site to ensure that regular checks are made on
isolations to provide assurance that the isolations policy and standards are being applied and that
lessons learned are communicated effectively.
6.2 Isolation Planning

Isolation of any piece of equipment shall be planned such that the risk of removing
it from service and then reinstating it on completion of the work is minimised.
The Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant Flowchart (Addendum 3) should be referred to
when planning any isolation. All isolations shall be designed according to the standards set out in
Paragraph 6.4 and Table 2. The following key points should also
be considered:
 Plant and equipment isolation requirements should be identified early in the work planning
cycle for the Installation or site so that adequate time can be made available for formal risk
assessment, if necessary
 A boundary isolation may be put in place to cover several planned activities in an area of plant.
The Isolation Certificate shall describe the scope of work planned and the Work Control
Certificates (WCCs) for these jobs shall be cross-referred to the same Isolation Certificate
(refer to Paragraph 7.6)
 The need for good access and egress to allow isolations to be effected shall be taken into
account
 Isolations shall be as close to the vessel or worksite as possible, to assist in security and ease of
monitoring
 Preparation for isolation involving draining, flushing, purging and venting of process pipework
shall be conducted under the Integrated Safe System of Work (ISSOW).
A procedure for the task shall be developed and included, or referred to, in the WCC. The task
procedure shall identify purging and venting points; critical valves should be controlled by the
referenced procedure and personal isolation unless the IA requires an Isolation Confirmation

Certificate (ICC)
 Amendments shall not normally be made to isolations in place other than to allow testing of
equipment prior to return to service. Amendments may be made to improve the integrity of the
isolation with the approval of the AA. The reason for the amendment shall be recorded and the
PA advised of the change
 Pressure relief valves shall only be isolated following the provision of an alternative means of
pressure relief
6.3 Isolation Methods

The highest quality of isolation which is reasonably practicable shall be applied to every
individual isolation point. The methods of isolation normally available are detailed in Paragraphs
6.3.1 to 6.3.4, listed in decreasing order of security and effectiveness.
6.3.1 Positive Isolation

Positive isolation may be affected by either of the following:
 Spool removal – removal of pipework section and bolting/clamping blank flanges rated for full
line design pressure onto live ends
 Spade isolation – witnessed insertion between bolted or clamped flanges of a blind plate or the
swinging of a spectacle plate. Any such insertion shall be rated to
the pipe design specification. The insertion of spades shall be witnessed by the competent IA
6.3.2 Double Block and Bleed

Double Block and Bleed (DBB) consists of the closure of two block valves in series with an
intermediate bleed valve. The integrity of both valves shall be tested separately and the bleed
valve will then be left in the closed position between periodic integrity checks. The AA shall
specify how frequently this bleed valve is opened to check for pressure buildup; as a minimum
this shall be at the start of every work period.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valves may be used as part of a DBB isolation, providing they can
be reliably immobilised.
Single valves of a type which provide a double seal in a single body and with a bleed between the
seals are also acceptable. Examples of such valves are suitably specified double wedge gate,
parallel expanding gate, double seating ball valves etc.
Double piston seal ball valves, where the cavity pressure provides the downstream positive seal,
should not normally be used and require SPU Mechanical Static Equipment TA approval.
(‘Standard’ ball valves do not provide a double seal.)
In such cases it is important to note that the integrity of the isolation is critically dependent upon
the security of a single valve operating stem. Also, it is not normally possible to perform a full
integrity test as the two seals cannot be applied independently.
Any valve used shall be capable of providing a reliable seal. Non-return valves, flow control
valves and other valves not designed to provide isolation should not be used.
May 2009 Issue 1 7

6.3.3 Single Valve Isolation

Single Valve Isolation (SVI) consists of the closure of a single block valve. A measure of
additional security can be achieved by closing several valves in series but the absence of a bleed
or vent in the intervening volume means that this method shall be classified
as SVI. The hazard of trapped pressure due to thermal expansion may be created in this case.
Any valve used for SVI shall provide a reliable seal. Non-return valves, flow control valves and
other valves which may not provide tight shut-off shall not be used.
If a globe valve is to be used for Single Valve Isolation (SIV) where breaking of containment is
required and the pressure to be isolated is acting against the bottom of the valve disc, a Level 2
Risk Assessment shall be completed to address the potential failure of the valve top-works and
drive train to hold the disc against the seat.
In addition the valve top-works and visible sections of the drive train may be inspected for signs
of drainage, and the valve may be stroked to confirm that it operates correctly.
This requirement has been introduced as a consequence of a globe valve top-works failure which
resulted in loss of isolation.
6.3.4 Other Isolation Devices

Devices such as mechanically expanded plugs, stopple bags or frozen plugs shall not be used as
primary forms of isolation, except where the application has been properly engineered, risk
assessed and approved by the appropriate Technical Authority.
Conventional mechanical plugs or stopple bags may be used as a vapour or liquid seal
to contain and direct to vent any small amounts of vapour. Flammable vapour monitors shall be
used where the presence of vapour could create a hazard.
In all cases, contingency measures against injury or damage caused by sudden ejection of the
isolation device shall be put in place.
6.4 Isolation Standards

Positive isolation is regarded as the most secure method and shall be considered when planning
maintenance work. It is mandatory for entry into confined spaces and recommended in the
following situations, in view of the additional security it offers:
 Long duration breaking of containment tasks, eg more than one week
 Isolations left in place when NUIs are unmanned
 Where equipment is to be mothballed
 Where naked flame hot work is to be undertaken
 For process fluids at or above auto-ignition temperature
Minimum recommended isolation standards have been developed and shall be referred to when
designing a process isolation where it is not reasonably practicable to achieve positive isolation
(refer to Table 2). The minimum standard also identifies mandatory safeguards which the AA is
responsible for putting in place to reduce the risk level to
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

For short-term operational tasks such as corrosion coupon retrieval or filter replacements, where no
positive isolation is practicable or where the job duration is shorter than the time to install positive
isolation, then the ‘V’ value from Table 2 can be considered as
the minimum recommended isolation standard. These tasks shall be conducted using
a WCC and a local operating procedure.
Operating Pressure
Fluid Type
10barg >10barg <55barg 55barg
Process fluids and V = SVI V = SVI+B V = DBB+A
hazardous utilities I = SVI+A I = DBB+B I = DBB+B
Non-hazardous utilities V = SVI V = SVI+A V = SVI+B
I = SVI I = SVI+B I = SVI+B
Note: Pipework, including instrument lines of 3/4in nominal bore and below, can be treated
as for pressures less than 10barg.
V Valving required to permit the installation of blank flanges and spades (positive
isolation)
I Valving required to permit carrying out intrusive maintenance without positive
isolation (where positive isolation presents a greater risk)
A Use mandatory safeguards as on List A
B Use mandatory safeguards as on List B
SVI Single valve isolation
DBB Double block and bleed
Category A Category B
Mandatory Safeguards
(Low Risk) (High Risk)
Continuous gas monitoring (for hydrocarbon y y
systems only)
Pressure buildup to test valve integrity y y
Regular monitoring of isolation integrity y y
Control and prevent nearby work y y
Isolating Authority in attendance1 y y
Radio link to control room when breaking y
containment
Develop contingency plan against leakage y
Identify backup isolation valves, shutdown y
systems etc
Minimise task time y
Portable firefighting equipment available y
(for hydrocarbon systems only)
Minimise possibility of plant disturbance y
Table 2 Minimum Recommended Isolation Standards for Predetermined
Risk Levels
1
For Drilling system isolations the Rig Toolpusher or delegate shall perform this role.
May 2009 Issue 1 9

6.5 Precautions when Breaking Containment

Immediately prior to breaking containment, a dynamic risk review shall be carried out
by the PA and the IA designated to be onsite for the breaking containment using the WCC toolbox
talk form. The IA shall confirm that the system has been successfully depressured and prove the
integrity of the isolation. The dynamic risk review shall consider the precautions outlined below.
The key safeguards for both low-risk and high-risk isolations (Categories A and B respectively)
are the pressure buildup tests on the integrity of each valve immediately prior to breaking
containment, together with the appropriate level of regular monitoring of the isolation integrity.
The AA shall control and prevent nearby work and ensure continuous gas monitoring at the
worksite. An Operations Technician (competent Isolating Authority for the system) shall be
present during breaking containment and any other critical phases of the task.
Isolations with Category B safeguards require additional control and contingency measures. The
key additional safeguards are to minimise the task duration, ensure plant stability and to develop a
contingency plan against leakage.
The contingency plan shall consider the following:
 How to respond to a leakage
 Identifying additional isolation valves and the expected action if the isolation fails
 Knowing the position of the local ESD facilities
Firefighting equipment shall be readily available and the work party shall be in radio contact with
the control room.
Other precautions to be considered when breaking containment are as follows:
 To minimise the task duration, all materials for the job should be available at the job site and
consideration may be given to hot bolting flanges prior to the operation
 Bolts are to be slackened off in the correct sequence. No bolts shall be removed until they have
all been slackened and the joint cracked, and until it has been confirmed that the line contents
will not be released in an uncontrolled manner and any appropriate gas testing has been carried
out
 Particular care shall be taken with clamp lock type fittings. With nuts slackened, the fitting
should be physically dislodged to confirm there is no residual pressure, before final
disassembly
 The person who opens the flange shall do so in such a way as to minimise the possibility of
contact with the contained fluids and of sudden escape of large quantities. Suitable Personal
Protection Equipment (PPE) shall be worn
 Where there is a danger of Hydrogen Sulphide (HS) being present, full HS procedures covered
in the BP Hydrogen Sulphide Procedures shall be followed
 The Area Classification procedure used for the selection of electrical equipment in hazardous
areas does not consider abnormal operations when breaking containment. Consideration shall
be given to restricting the use of electrical (and other) equipment during breaking containment
due to the risk of releasing flammable gas

6.6 Risk Assessment of Non-compliant Isolations

In the event that the minimum recommended isolation standard cannot be achieved,
a Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment shall be carried out according to the following guidelines:
 The assessment team shall specify appropriate safeguards which may replace or be in
addition to those listed in Table 2. The team shall be satisfied that these safeguards shall
reduce the risks to an acceptable level before the task requiring isolation is permitted to
proceed
 Consideration shall be given to the overall risk exposure to personnel involved
 When risk assessing non-compliant isolations, consideration shall be given to the risks
associated with swinging large spades compared with the risk associated with the lower level
of isolation
 Consideration shall be given to: extended monitoring periods prior to breaking
containment, reducing the duration of the tasks, provision of a permanent standby man,
development of a contingency plan for isolation failure
 Full consideration shall be given to the alternatives including partial or full production
shutdown or deferral of the work
 The recommendations from the Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment shall be approved by
the OIM/Site Controller who may also recommend further review and approval by TAs or
management before taking the decision on whether to proceed with the work
Certain routine operational tasks such as Duplex filter changeouts may not fully comply with the
minimum recommended isolation standard. These tasks shall be conducted
in accordance with a local operating procedure which has been developed based on an isolation
risk assessment.
6.7 Isolation for Confined Space Entry

Positive isolation shall be effected on all live lines for any task requiring entry to a vessel or
confined space. Spool removal is to be preferred, although spade isolation may be used where it is
not reasonably practicable to remove pipework sections.
It is recognised that in some cases it may not be reasonably practicable to comply with this
requirement, eg in making entry to mud tanks, pump pits, ballast tanks, or other utility systems.
For confined space entries where positive isolation cannot be effected on all live lines, a Level 2
Isolation Risk Assessment shall be undertaken on the isolation and approval obtained from the
OIM or Site Controller before entry can be permitted under work control.
For Drilling Operations whereby Confined Space Entry is required to mud pits the following
minimum criteria apply:
 For mud and utility transfer lines less than 10bar only single valve isolation shall
be required
 Mud mix transfer pumps and pit agitators shall be electrically isolated and locked out as a
requirement of the ISSOW
Note: All work to be carried out in a confined space requires a Level 2 Risk Assessment (note
this is not the same as a Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment).
May 2009 Issue 1 11

Vessel nozzles should normally be left open to assist with free ventilation. Air movers or ducted
fans may also be used to create a flow of clean air through the vessel. If there is any likelihood of
fumes, water or other contaminant entering the vessel from sources other than the isolated
pipework while persons are inside, the need to blank off any affected nozzles shall be considered.
Blanks used for this purpose do not need to be pressure-rated. However non-pressure rated blanks
shall be clearly identified by either
a tag, painted circumference or other marking. In the case of tanks with ‘swan necks’, mechanical
plugs may be an option to prevent ingress of fumes etc.
The manway doors on a vessel being prepared for entry shall be removed last and reinstalled first
to reduce the risk of unauthorised entry.
Further details on confined space entry are given in Paragraphs 9.1 to 9.4.
6.8 Hazards Associated with Mechanical Machinery

Any inadvertent movement of machinery or sudden release of potential energy in mechanical,
electrical or pressure form is a hazard to workers.
Hydraulic, pneumatic and process powered machinery need to be isolated by utilising the
appropriate isolation valves. The supply and return pipes shall then be disconnected or otherwise
made safe to prevent any possibility of movement of the machinery.
Engine driven machinery needs to be isolated by shutting off the engine fuel supply and then
isolating all the starting systems. Electrically driven machinery shall be made safe by switching
off the power supply to the motor and then isolating all electrical supplies.
Any residual mechanical, electrical or pressure energy shall be safely released
as follows:
(1) Mechanical  high and low speed-rotating elements need to be run down, springs shall be
released.
(2) Electrical  capacitors shall be discharged and batteries shall be isolated.
(3) Hydraulic  accumulators and pressurised pipework shall be depressurised.
Note: For Drilling Operations the rig pump pulsation dampener (pre-charged to circa 900psi
with Nitrogen) should not be bled down when work is required to take place on the rig
pump fluid ends. To manage the risk of unexpected diaphragm rupture the pulsation
dampener diaphragm shall be changed out annually
during continuous drilling operations. Warm stacked rigs shall change out these
diaphragms every 2 years.
(4) Pneumatic  the system shall be depressurised.
(5) Services  steam, gas or fuel may need to be depressurised, vented, purged or drained.
After machinery power systems have been disconnected, or engines/motors prevented from
starting, there may still be a foreseeable risk to people working on the machinery
if it were to move. If so, fit a device such as a properly engineered check or scotch to lock the
machinery in a safe position.

7 Isolation Implementation and Control

7.1 Security
Any isolation shall achieve and maintain effective containment of the relevant fluid for
as long as required. Valves shall be locked or otherwise immobilised to prevent unauthorised
operation. It may be necessary to apply additional immobilising devices under certain
circumstances.
Where valves are required to be locked (open or closed) as part of an isolation, only the following
methods are acceptable:
 The use of wire locking loops requiring considerable effort to force the valve from the locked
position
 Padlock and chains which likewise would take considerable effort to force the valve from the
locked position. Where this method is used, padlock keys shall be held by the AA
 Specifically designed valve isolation devices where wire locking loops or chains are ineffective
 The use of specifically designed tamper-proof valve interlocks. The activation of the interlock
shall be controlled by the AA utilising the master key held at the site
When isolating any valve that cannot be locked and may inadvertently be opened by accidental
contact, the valve handle shall be removed where practicable.
Electrically operated valves shall have the power supply positively isolated and any handjack
shall be manually locked. If the valve cannot be physically immobilised it shall not normally be
used for isolation purposes.
Pneumatically and hydraulically operated valves which fail closed shall have their control lines
isolated and physically disconnected unless fitted with a DBB valve arrangement in the hydraulic
or pneumatic supply line and adheres to minimum recommended Isolation Standards (refer to
Table 2).
Note: Care should be taken to ensure that the supply lines are isolated and not the return lines.
Pneumatically and hydraulically operated valves which fail open should not normally
be used for isolation purposes. If no other alternative is reasonably practicable, the valve shall be
prevented from moving. Under this situation the isolation shall be considered as non-compliant
with SIRP and a Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment carried out under ISSOW.
It is not necessary to lock bleed valves in a DBB arrangement as they are required to be opened
periodically to check the integrity of the isolation.
Personal isolations (refer to Paragraph 7.9) shall be secured to the same standard to prevent
unauthorised operation of the valves.
7.2 Identification Methods

All valves, spades and blank flanges used for isolation purposes shall be identified by means of
labels. A sequential number shall be allocated to each individual isolation point and be clearly
marked on:
 The ICC
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 The drawing showing the location of each isolation point

 The label applied at the isolation point
The label shall also show the ICC number. Bleed points shall also be labelled in
this way.
Where padlocks are used, the individual key number shall be listed on the ICC and a means of
referencing the correct key to the isolation point included. Keys should be held centrally in a secure
fashion and controlled by the AA either by using a master key cabinet or individual key safes.
Where there are overlapping isolations where some of the isolation points are common
to more than one isolation then these points shall have a separate locking device and
tag from each isolation. Each isolation shall be registered and controlled by its own individual ICC.
7.3 Flange Tagging for Breaking Containment

Flanges used in breaking containment should be identified as an aid to ensuring that they are
reinstated and their integrity is confirmed once all work is complete. A tagging label shall be used
as the method of identification. The label is applied when a joint has been tightened. Both halves
of the label are completed by the person who has tightened the joint and the details recorded on a
Breaking of Containment Register (Form JI1 within Guidance on Certification (UKCS-TI-020)).
When the flange or connection has been leak tested, the lower half of the tag is removed and
recorded on the register (refer to Paragraph 10.15). The upper half is left to allow the integrity of
the reinstated joint to be monitored during leak startup. The upper half is removed when the plant
is back up to its normal operating conditions and kept in place for a minimum of 2 days after
startup.
Consideration should be given to tagging critical neighbouring joints which have not been broken
but which could be affected by the reinstatement activity.
7.4 Control of Isolations

The ICC, cross-referenced to all relevant Work Control Certificates, shall be the principal means
of control once isolations are in place. The ICC performs the following functions:
 Identifies the plant concerned and the reasons for isolation
 Authorises isolation by disciplines
 Records the complete list of isolations and valve tag numbers used for a
particular task

 Records bleed points for checking valve integrity. The operation of the bleed valves
to check integrity need not be recorded as an amendment on the ICC
 Confirms that the isolations have been effected
 Authorises any temporary de-isolations and isolations necessary for testing
 Authorises and records de-isolation on completion of the task
The ICC shall show a complete list of isolations and valve tag numbers. A marked-up Piping and
Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) or other suitable drawing shall be attached to the ICC, together
with a record of the Level 2 Isolation Risk Assessment where required.
7.5 Control of Isolations for Well Operations Activities

During well operations the isolation of the xmas tree from the process plant shall be controlled via
an ICC. This isolation should be used in conjunction with a Well Handover Certificate to manage
the handover to well operations. The recommended practice is to include the appropriate flowline
isolation valves, the wing valve and the hydraulic supplies to the Upper Master Valve (UMV) and
Downhole Safety Valve (DHSV), on the ICC, thus documenting the isolation from the process.
The Well Handover Certificate details the status of all tree valves at handover and confirms valve
integrity and depressurisation details thus documenting the isolation from the reservoir. During the
wireline operations, the swab valve, upper and lower master valves and DHSV are under the
control of the Wireline Supervisor and the appropriate detailed operating procedure which will
cover removal and reinstatement of the swab cap. Consequently, the UMV and DHSV will be
under Sanction to Test (STT) for the well operations. On completion of the wireline work the
Wireline Supervisor
will use the Well Handover Certificate to document the tree status for handover to Operations.
During production logging operations where it is necessary to flow the well a specific WCC will
be raised for the wireline work that requires the well to be online and this will be cross-referenced
to the ICC described above and run under STT.
7.6 Boundary Isolations

Where an area of plant is isolated such that several activities can safely take place within this
common set of strategically placed isolation points then this can be termed as a ‘Boundary
Isolation’. It shall be clearly identified that the isolation is appropriate for all the individual tasks
to be carried out against the Boundary Isolation. An Isolation Certificate is raised and identified as
a Boundary Isolation and all individual Work Control Certificates are cross-referenced to this
Boundary Isolation.
If any of the proposed tasks requires a level of isolation or implementation of control measures
greater than that covered by the Boundary then a separate Isolation Certificate should be raised
for this task.
Thorough planning and preparation is essential when planning a Boundary Isolation.
A team, including the AA and IA and any additional technical support required, may be set up
away from the workplace to properly review and agree the scope of a Boundary Isolation and the
tasks to be carried out.
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Once work is in progress and subsequent Work Control Certificates are applied
for within the recognised framework of the Boundary Isolation, they can be added providing it is
clearly established that the existing isolation is appropriate for the task. However, this should be
avoided if possible and it is preferable to identify all activities when the Boundary Isolation is
being planned. Integrity of isolations within the boundary cannot generally be proven and, if this
is the case, the ICC should record this eg valve integrity not proven, this document is a record of
the valve status only.
Entry to a confined space within a Boundary Isolation requires separate Isolation and Entry
Certificates to be raised, and the implementation of additional security measures.
Boundary Isolations shall not be removed until all applicable WCCs have been cancelled.
If for any reason work on a particular piece of plant within the Boundary Isolation needs to be
suspended (eg whilst awaiting spares) then a separate isolation shall be implemented and an ICC
raised before the Boundary Isolation can be cancelled.
Where the de-isolation of Boundary Isolations is proposed, the AA shall ensure that all associated
WCCs have been cancelled and that equipment within the Boundary Isolation is in a safe
condition or adequately isolated.
7.7 Long-term Isolations

Long-term Isolations (LTIs) are defined as those that no longer have work performed against
them. Each site shall maintain a detailed register of LTIs.
LTIs shall be subject to two levels of review:
 A quarterly review of the register by the AA to check the status of the isolations
in place and confirm that they are still required
 An annual review by the OIM supported by the relevant discipline Engineers to determine
whether any isolation should be replaced by a plant modification.
This review should assess the isolation of any mothballed equipment.
Where practicable mothballed equipment should be disconnected or positively isolated from
live plant
Before any work is recommenced against a LTI, a full integrity check of the valved isolation shall
be carried out. LTIs may only be removed when either the equipment
is deisolated or the isolated equipment status is captured on the relevant drawings
eg recording of spades/blanks on P&IDs.

7.8 Locked Open/Locked Closed Valves

(For further information please refer to Guidance on Locked Open/Locked Closed Valves (UKCS-
TI-031).)
For integrity reasons, certain process and drain valves will be in the normally locked open or
locked closed position. It is vital that the position and security of these valves is carefully
controlled. A register shall be maintained of all locked open/locked closed valves to record
current position against normal position and a regular audit shall be carried out to confirm the
security and position of locked open/locked closed valves.
It is important that these valves are in their correct position, particularly after de-isolation where
they have been part of an isolation (refer to Paragraph 10.1.4). If locked open/locked closed valves
are moved from their normal position for operational reasons or as part of an isolation then this
shall be recorded in the register to maintain a record of the current plant status.
7.9 Personal Isolations
Personal isolations are intended for short duration tasks of relatively low risk; for example
replacing pressure gauges, filters or small valves, or other such tasks where the completion of an
ICC is considered to add no significant value in terms of risk reduction. The rules for approval of
a personal isolation are as follows:
 The task and isolation are performed by one person within one shift; the person may receive
assistance from others but he shall be present at all times when work is in progress
 The IA is in radio contact with the control room, as determined by the Area Authority
 Before approval, the AA shall be satisfied with the competence of the PA to both carry out the
isolation and execute the work. Personal isolations shall only be carried out by those deemed
to be a competent IA. Where an isolation involves competency in more than one discipline eg
electrical, mechanical, instrument or process, personal isolation is only permissible if the PA
has all the appropriate isolating competencies
 The same isolation standards apply to personal isolations other than the completion
of the ICC
 The isolation points shall be labelled with a personal isolation label and locked
 If the worksite is left unattended, the plant shall be left safe, including capping
or plugging of any open ends
An ICC shall be raised whenever these conditions are broken.
7.10 Testing Isolation Integrity

All isolations shall be tested and shown to be effective before containment is broken. Integrity
tests shall be conducted for a minimum of 10 minutes using reliable pressure gauges with the
correct range to confirm integrity of the isolations. Longer duration tests are required for larger
volumes.
Sufficient and appropriate test equipment shall be available to ensure that all isolations and de-
isolations can be safely completed. Test equipment shall be fully rated for the system under test
and shall be routinely tested, and also tested before and after use.
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When using a low-pressure gauge (<10 barg) to accurately measure Pressure Buildup (PBU) on an
isolation on a high-pressure system, a snubber (also referred to as a gauge saver) should be fitted
between the gauge and the system. Thus, if there is an unexpected pressure build-up, there is no
risk of overpressuring the gauge.
Typical valve isolation integrity tests for DBB and single valve isolations are described
in Addendum 2. It is important that all bleeds (vents/drains) are checked free from obstruction
prior to testing. It is also important to realise that a bleed which is hard-piped to a closed drain or
flare line will only provide single valve isolation from the drain/flare line (refer to Addendum 2).
On completion of checking valve integrity, a bleed valve should be left in the closed position,
unlocked to allow regular monitoring. A pressure gauge may be fitted to the bleed valve to
monitor for pressure buildup.
An isolation can only be considered to be of DBB standard if the integrity of both valves has been
proven.
If zero pressure buildup is not achievable when checking integrity of a valved isolation,
consideration shall be given to carrying out an assessment of risk to determine whether it is
acceptable to proceed. Additional precautions such as including additional isolation valves,
maintaining or exercising isolation valves or installing positive isolation may be required to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
Alternative methods of valve integrity testing may be considered where there are practical
difficulties in using the conventional method, providing that they have been endorsed by the
relevant Technical Authority.
Once the AA is satisfied with the integrity of the valved isolation and that the system is
depressurised, drained and purged if necessary, containment may be carefully broken either to
effect positive isolation or to perform the required task (taking into account all precautions
regarding HS, pyrophoric scale, Low Specific Activity (LSA) scale, Naturally Occurring
Radioactive Material (NORM) and residual nitrogen).
The extra security of untested but witnessed positive isolation, in addition to the valved isolation
used to effect it, is normally acceptable for most confined space entry tasks. However, for longer
term positive isolations (eg a week or more), or where the valved isolation used to effect the
positive isolation needs to be removed for operational reasons, then integrity testing of the positive
isolation is required. This shall be done by service leak testing or formal leak testing of the joint,
depending on the level of risk.
Where a single flare or vent valve forms part of an isolation it may not be possible to fully test
integrity. In this situation the valve cannot be considered as a reliable barrier and therefore an
isolation risk assessment shall be carried out to determine whether the task should proceed. In
some situations, carrying out a pressure fall off test on
the process side of such valves can help in assessing valve integrity depending on the valve type.
On sites where single valve isolation to the flare system is a common occurrence,
the OIM/Site Manager may chose to approve a generic risk assessment that outlines
the conditions and precautions required.

7.11 Monitoring Isolation Integrity

The integrity of each isolation point shall be monitored at suitable intervals to detect
any actual leakage or deterioration in condition caused, for example, by vibration or disturbance
(or changing pressure upstream). This monitoring may involve partial testing of valved isolations
as suggested in Addendum 2. The minimum recommended frequency of monitoring is once per
shift and immediately prior to breaking containment. The results of any monitoring of isolation
integrity shall be recorded and will form part of the shift handover.
This is particularly relevant for shift changes or any periods of extended work-break,
eg awaiting spare parts.
NUIs
It is recognised on NUIs that there may not be a permanent presence on the Installation whilst an
isolation is in place and that it may not be practicable to monitor on a shift basis. In this case on
first return to the NUI the isolation integrity shall be confirmed before continuing work on the
isolated equipment.
7.12 Subsea Isolations

SIRPS applies to all subsea isolation, for pipelines and facilities. Refer to GP 78-14 Subsea
Isolations Group Practice for specific guidance on subsea isolations.
8 Plant Preparation for Breaking Containment

All plant preparation work covering the draining and flushing of vessels or pipework
shall be carried out under a WCC within the ISSOW. For more complex operations
a marked-up P&ID and a specific procedure should be used to support the activity.
8.1 Potential Hazards

Some of the potential hazards that should be considered when planning these activities are as
follows:
 Chemical reactions between cleaning materials and a tank or its fittings (eg acidic cleaning
fluid attacking a blanking spade installed for isolation)
 Leakage or collapse of a tank or its supports caused by reaction with cleaning materials,
excessive weight of wash solutions, or by creating vacuum conditions
 Accidental spillage during draining/flushing (environmental impact)
 Possibility of radiological contamination from LSA scale or NORM
 Pyrophoric scale which can be formed in systems that may contain HS. If these systems are
subsequently opened up and the scale is exposed to currents of air, there is a danger that the
scale could ignite. The pyrophoric scale shall be rendered harmless by constant thorough
wetting until the scale is either removed or the system is again closed up
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 Gaskets containing asbestos which shall be handled and disposed of in accordance with the
guidance identified in Asbestos Management and Work with Asbestos (UKCS-SOP-010)
 Explosions and fires caused by the sudden mixing of water with hot oil, either during steam
cleaning or on the admission of hot oil into systems which have just been steamed or flushed
with water and which have not been thoroughly drained and dried
 Static electricity as an ignition source or electric shock during steam cleaning or high -pressure
water jetting if equipment is not earth bonded
 Possible asphyxiation through personnel exposure to nitrogen
 Accidental spillage and freezing effects of nitrogen
8.2 Depressurising and Draining Containment Systems

For this purpose containment systems may be divided into:
 Pressurised vessels and pipelines/pipework
 Atmospheric tanks and vessels
8.2.1 Pressurised Vessels and Pipelines/Pipework

The precautions for depressurisation and draining of pressurised hydrocarbon and chemical
containment systems include the following:
(1) The system shall be adequately isolated from fluid pressure and inventory for the purpose
of emptying.
(2) The appropriate hazard data and Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH)
assessments shall be studied.
(3) The pressure within the system shall be relieved in a safe manner and the system drained.
The residual pressure within the system shall be substantially atmospheric before
containment is broken.
(4) Systems containing gas shall be depressurised to a closed system or a vent/flare header
designed to accept such gas. If possible, venting to flare is preferred.
(5) Gas systems shall only be depressurised to the atmosphere under strictly controlled
conditions. Persons working downwind of any drainage/venting operation shall be warned
by the AA or his nominee and, if instructed, shall vacate the area. All hot work shall cease
within the potentially affected area.
(6) Where suitable facilities exist, liquid residues shall be drained to a closed system. Where
this is not possible, an estimate shall be made of the quantity of liquid remaining in the
system. Catchment facilities shall then be provided sufficient for at least this quantity.
Liquid can then be drained by carefully opening a flange at a low point in the system.
Precautions shall also be taken to prevent the spread of any accidental spillage.

(7) The existence of possible ‘dead-legs’ in the system should be considered.

Such traps may have to be flushed with water to remove residual liquids if there are no
flanges or connections.
(8) Oil contaminated/soaked lagging material shall be removed from hot equipment
as it is prone to spontaneous ignition.
8.2.2 Atmospheric Tanks and Vessels

When emptying atmospheric tanks and vessels in preparation for either changing their contents,
carrying out inspections, repairs or modifications, or prior to dismantling, the following guidelines
shall be observed:
(1) Prior to emptying any tank/vessel, reference to be made to the as-built engineering
drawings. These drawings show in detail the internals of the tank/vessel which will aid in
the methods to be adopted for draining and isolation, eg a bottom offtake of a vessel from
the outside may lead to the assumption that the offtake is flush whereas the drawing may
show that the offtake is raised internally.
(2) Storage tanks and vessels are to be emptied initially by means of the normal off-take lines,
until suction is lost. The contents are to be transferred to another suitable tank or, onshore,
to a mobile tank, if appropriate.
(3) When emptying and draining, care to be taken to avoid pulling a vacuum.
This may occur if the atmospheric or vacuum vents are blocked, or by excessive lowering
rates through large diameter lines.
(4) Once suction is lost through the normal offtake it may be necessary to remove residual
liquid contents by means of either a portable pump operating through
an open manhole (by the use of the tank water drain valve) or possibly by water-flotation,
taking appropriate precautions against spillage.
(5) The hazards of using portable pumps in an area likely to be contaminated with flammable
vapour to be taken into account. Appropriately sited, air-powered pumps are to be used
where possible.
(6) Residual liquids and sludge shall be disposed of in the correct manner according
to the requirements of pollution-control legislation.
8.3 Cleaning and Gas-freeing Methods

After depressurisation and draining, residual hydrocarbon liquids, vapours and gases shall be
removed before further work can proceed. Various media can be used for this purpose but the
choice is liable to be governed by what is available at the work location.
8.3.1 Water Flooding

Cold water is usually the most readily available cleaning medium. It is reasonably effective at
displacing hydrocarbons, although it does not easily remove sludges or oils trapped in complex
pipework or vessel internal structures.
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Before a tank or vessel is flooded with water, it shall be confirmed that its supporting structure is
capable of sustaining the weight. In addition, adequate run-down and draining facilities shall be
provided, as large volumes of water are usually necessary for these operations.
To avoid a buildup of a static charge when this method is used, water shall be added from the base
of the tank or vessel. If a hosepipe is used, the velocity shall be kept low until the end is
submerged, and the nozzle shall be electrically earthed. Flooding with water shall not be relied
upon to remove all petroleum vapour, liquid or solid residues.
It is possible to carry out hot work on the external surface of a water-flooded tank
or vessel without further removal of internal hydrocarbon residue providing the work is below the
water level and an appropriate level of risk assessment has been conducted.
Water used for displacing and removing liquid hydrocarbons will be heavily contaminated after
use. It shall be disposed of in an environmentally-responsible manner.
8.3.2 Inert Gas

(For further information please refer to Hazardous Gases (UKCS-SOP-018).)
Nitrogen (N), Carbon Dioxide (CO) or combustion gas (N/CO mixture) may be used to displace
hydrocarbon gas and vapour, if available in sufficient quantity. This method may be useful if it is
impracticable to introduce water into a system in case of damage.
Care should be taken to ensure when injecting such mixtures not to induce localised freezing of
valves, gauges etc due to excessive injection rates. For further guidance on the use of nitrogen
refer to Paragraph 10.5.1.
Particular care should be taken with systems which may contain pyrophoric scale
from high-sulphur bearing hydrocarbons. If such scale is subsequently exposed to the air, it may
rapidly burst into flame. Water sprays may be used to prevent this by keeping the scale constantly
wetted.
A quantity of inert gas at least double the volume of the vessel being purged is likely to be
necessary to ensure adequate dispersal of hydrocarbon gases. Introduction of gas at reasonably
high velocity is also helpful in ensuring good mixing. Purge with inert gas until concentration of
flammable vapour is less than 40% LEL (2% by volume) in emerging mixture of flammable/inert
gas.
Normal flammable vapour monitoring devices will not work accurately in atmospheres which are
deficient in oxygen, therefore it is necessary to use specialised equipment to determine the
effectiveness of an inert gas purge.
Following the displacement of hydrocarbon vapour with inert gas, the vessel or tank should normally
be purged again with air to displace the inert gas in its turn. This shall always be done in cases where
man-entry is planned, regardless of any intended use
of PPE.

8.3.3 Steam
At onshore sites, steam may be available in sufficient quantities to permit its use for purging and
cleaning vessels, tanks and pipework. Steam is the most effective of the common media for this
purpose. It should be used at low pressure, not exceeding
1bar maximum.
Two methods of steaming may be employed; open or closed steaming:
 Open steaming is used where the tank, vessel and its associated system is fully open to the
atmosphere
 Closed steaming is used for closed vessels and their associated equipment.
During this operation, the temperature is raised allowing volatile liquids to vaporise and
disperse together with the bulk of the steam via a condensing system. The heavy constituents
can flow freely and be drained off with the condensed steam from the base of the system
For all but the largest vessels and tanks, sufficient steam should be available to raise the external
surface temperature to at least 95°C. Steaming should be continued until the condensate flowing
from the vessel is substantially free of hydrocarbon.
Steam may be used in the case of process vessels, small storage tanks and medium sized insulated
tanks. It is essential that following a period of closed steaming, adequate provision is made to
prevent damage due to a vacuum being drawn by condensation of steam. In large tanks, the rate of
condensation of steam is such that adequate purging is not possible.
After steaming, it is normal practice to cool down the equipment with copious quantities of water,
this gives an additional wash to help remove residual hydrocarbons.
Where residual material is left on the tank or vessel surface after prolonged steaming, such
residual material may still evolve vapour on application of heat, eg burning or welding. In such
cases, cold cutting may be employed or the internal surface kept thoroughly wet during the heating
operation.
All temporary steam hoses used shall be electrically bonded and earthed.
8.3.4 Air
Where it is not possible or practicable to use any of the foregoing methods, it may be necessary to
use air directly to ventilate equipment and remove hydrocarbon vapour.
When a decision is made to use this technique, every effort shall be made to pump out as much oil
and sludge as possible before opening the tank or vessel. Where practicable, forced ventilation shall
be used so that flammable vapour is cleared in the shortest possible time. During this purging
operation, the flammable range will be passed through, presenting an explosion hazard if an ignition
source is nearby. All electrical equipment used shall therefore be suitable for use in a Zone 1
Hazardous Area. Other equipment within the hazard range of flammable vapour shall be effectively
isolated.
May 2009 Issue 1 23

Air movers shall be fitted at the roof or top manhole so as to pull air in at low level. Temporary
trunking may be needed to achieve high-level disposal. In order to minimise the emission of
gas/vapour when the lower manhole door is opened, the air movers shall be started up first to
obtain a slightly negative pressure before the lower manhole is opened.
Vapour issuing from shell manholes may give rise to a dangerous concentration in a bunded or
confined area and, under such conditions, no kind of ignition source is allowed. Removal of
vapour by air movers attached to the roof manhole is the recommended safe practice.
Care shall be taken when using natural draught ventilation during periods of calm weather at
onshore sites, since vapour released from tanks can travel considerable distances without being
dispersed. Due regard shall be taken of wind direction and the risk to adjacent premises or to the
public.
Owing to the possible presence of pyrophoric scale within tanks or vessels which have contained
sour crude or products, provision shall be made for continuous wetting of the internal surfaces by
means of water from one or more water fog nozzles inserted into the roof opening. The nozzles
shall be turned on first and the air movers opened immediately afterwards. A shell manhole shall
be opened after approximately 5 minutes operation, when the internals are thoroughly wet. With
the air movers still in operation, the fog nozzles shall then be removed and loose scale dislodged
with high-pressure water streams.
CAUTION: WHEN THIS METHOD IS EMPLOYED, THE WATER NOZZLES SHALL BE
EARTHED.
9 Confined Space Entry

9.1 Definition of Confined Space
A confined space is a place which is substantially, though not always entirely, enclosed and where
serious injury can occur from hazardous substances or conditions within the space or nearby. This
includes large pipelines, tanks, vessels, separators, silos, ducts, sewers, pits, flues, manholes and
voids between modules and in legs on offshore Installations. It also includes any space in which
dangerous levels of contaminants can accumulate and ventilation is restricted, eg excavations
(normally deeper than 1.2m),
the space above floating roofs on floating roof tanks, open-topped tanks, closed or unventilated
rooms, sumps and culverts, and any other poorly ventilated areas.
The hazards that this document addresses arise through the confined nature of the place of work in
combination with one or more of the following:
 The possible presence of flammable or toxic substances
 An oxygen-deficient atmosphere
 An oxygen-enriched atmosphere
 Ingress of solids or liquids
 The presence of excessive heat

9.2 Planning
9.2.1 Introduction
Prior to planning any confined space entry all alternatives to avoid entry shall be considered.
Planning for confined space entry shall include the following:
 Confined space hazard identification and Level 2 Risk Assessment (mandatory)
 Gas testing and confined space inspection
 Entry Certificate issue and validity
 Procedures for control of work and non-compliance
 Procedures for any non-compliance based on Level 2 Risk Assessment
 Emergency response arrangements
Emergency response arrangements shall cover rescue, resuscitation and treatment of casualties.
Entry into confined spaces shall be strictly controlled to prevent persons being exposed to risks
associated with toxic and/or flammable fumes and vapours in the atmosphere, and with
atmospheres which may be deficient (or enriched) in oxygen.
The number of personnel entering a combined space shall be limited by the resources available to
deal with any potential emergency that may arise.
Prior to any entry into a confined space, the atmosphere shall be tested to determine the
precautions necessary, and an Entry Certificate issued. An Entry Certificate is not
a work permit and for all work a relevant Work Control Certificate is required.
Gas tests required for hot work may be carried out by the same person but shall be carried out
separately (ie the tests done for entry are not valid for the Work Control Certificate).
Access and egress should be considered in the event that a casualty may need to be evacuated in
an emergency. It would require a winch to vertically hoist an average person from a space below.
Wearing a harness and lifeline shall only be considered practicable if the nature of the confined
space is such that the attendant could hoist or drag out the person from the space if the latter were
immobilised, and if the rope would not impede an unassisted exit. Wearing only the harness
should also be considered.
A rescuer could attach the lifeline to effect evacuation of the person.
Procedures for entering confined spaces with and without Breathing Apparatus (BA) are described
in Paragraphs 9.3 and 9.5.
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9.2.2 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

A Level 2 Risk Assessment shall be made to establish whether the proposed confined space entry
can be performed safely. Some of the dangers which should be considered are as follows:
(1) Dangerous concentrations of gases and vapours which can arise from sources inside or
outside a confined space. These include:
 Gas or vapour remaining from the process
 Gas or vapour entering from adjoining plant which has not been effectively isolated
 Gas or vapour entering from utility hoses used during flushing or draining
 Gas or vapour emitted from scale or sludge, particularly resulting from mechanical
disturbance during access or cleaning or due to the heat from welding operations
 Gas, vapour or fumes produced by operations being carried out in the confined space
such as welding and cutting, brush and spray painting and the use of adhesives and
solvents
 Exhaust gases drawn into the confined space from prime movers or heating equipment
(2) Dangers due to:
 Mechanical equipment in the space
 The ingress of steam, hot water or large quantities of liquids which may cause scalding
or drowning
 Communication difficulties
 Poor access and egress restricting movement for normal work and escape
 Poor access and egress for rescue
 Slippery surfaces
 Sources of ionising radiation (eg level gauges, sludge and LSA scale or NORM)
 The relevant procedures shall be followed for disarming or retracting radioactive
sources, for removal of LSA scale or NORM etc
 Vessel boots and sumps full of liquid which could be fallen into
 Pyrophoric scale formed in systems which may contain HS
 Excessive noise
 Inadequate visibility
 Excessive temperature in the confined space (causing heat stress to personnel)
 Possible ingress of fumes from drain systems etc
 Possible collapse of excavations
 Inadequate shoring; appropriate shoring shall be in place prior to entry

(3) Hazards from oxygen enrichment or deficiency.

The special dangers of working in oxygen-enriched atmospheres cannot be over
emphasised. Oxygen enrichment may occur by leakage of oxygen supplies or by buildup of
oxygen during oxygen-rich flame cutting processes.
Enrichment of only a few percent will make materials that will normally only burn slowly
or with difficulty, burn fiercely with catastrophic results for the occupants of the confined
space.
Every precaution shall be taken to avoid oxygen enrichment. In particular:
 Oxygen cylinders shall be kept outside the confined space where practicable
 Oxygen supplies shall be isolated outside the space during work breaks
 Hoses supplying oxygen shall be removed from the space during work breaks
 Oxygen shall never be used to ‘sweeten’ the atmosphere of a confined space
 The space shall be adequately ventilated at all times
There is also a danger of oxygen deficiency due to combustion processes, purging with inert
gas, inert gas welding (Metal Inert Gas (MIG)/Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG)) or oxidation
processes (eg rusting) occurring in steel vessels left completely closed for some time.
9.2.3 Criteria for Confined Space Entry

Table 3 defines the criteria for entry into a confined space both with and without BA, based on the
hydrocarbon vapour levels and oxygen content. The space shall only be classed as fit for entry
without BA if the oxygen and flammable gas levels are as shown in Table 3. Table 3 also defines
occupational exposure limits for toxic contaminants and substances. Sites need to take account of
the likelihood of toxic contaminants specific to their process (eg benzene).
Also, the Authorised Gas Tester (AGT) shall confirm that there are no materials left inside which in
his opinion may give off sufficient quantities of vapour and fumes if disturbed, such that the
atmosphere would cease to be classed as fit for entry without BA.
May 2009 Issue 1 27

Criteria Entry without BA Entry with BA

(refer to Paragraph 9.3) (refer to Paragraph 9.5)
Oxygen Content (%) 20.8 to 22.5% 19 to 20.8%
Toxicity (Workplace <WEL for both STEL
Exposure Limits) (Note 1) (15 minutes) and LTEL
(8 hours) (Note 2)
Hydrocarbon Vapour <1% LEL (Inspection, Hot or 1 to 25% LEL (Inspection
(% Lower Explosives Cold Work Permitted) and Cold Work Permitted)
Limit – measured on a (Note 4)
combustible gas indicator)
(Notes 1 and 3)
Notes: (1) Workplace exposure limits for various toxic substances are defined in Health,
Safety and Environment (HSE) Guidance Document EH40. Some hydrocarbon
monitors will provide a reading in ppm. In the absence of an HSE specified
WEL
for total hydrocarbon vapour, it is recommended that a short-term exposure
limit of 100ppm is used for entry without BA, with the requirement that any
such work shall be subject to a task-specific COSHH assessment which may
then require additional monitoring
(eg benzene), the use of an appropriate organic vapour respirator etc.
(2) If longer work shifts ie 12 hours (offshore), LTEL shall be extrapolated to give
equivalent 12-hour Time Weighted Average (TWA).
(3) Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) synonymous with Lower Flammable
Limit (LFL).
(4) Continuous gas/vapour monitoring shall be performed throughout confined
space occupancy.
Table 3 Permitted Limits for Confined Space Entry and Work
9.2.4 Gas Testing

Gas testing for entry shall only be carried out by approved persons who have been fully trained
and certified in gas testing for confined space entry purposes, ie Authorised Gas Tester (AGT),
Level 1.
The AGT shall request an Entry Certificate from the AA to confirm that the confined space is
isolated and to authorise entry for the AGT (if required). Any special operational conditions
regarding the space will be conveyed to the AGT on the certificate.
The gas test should be carried out from outside the confined space (eg using extension probes).
In some circumstances it may not be possible to sample a representative portion of the space from
the entrance, taking into account ventilation arrangements and the possibility of heavier-than-air
gas remaining in low areas. In this event, the AGT may have to enter the space in order to
complete his tests.

The conditions for the entry of the AGT shall include:

(1) The AGT shall not enter if the conditions at the entrance are outside the criteria for entry
with BA (refer to Table 3).
(2) An Entry Attendant (refer to Paragraph 9.3.1) shall be stationed at the entrance so that he is
able to keep the AGT under effective surveillance and equipped to raise the alarm if the
AGT should get into trouble, and also to warn the AGT of an external emergency.
(3) The AGT shall wear BA. He shall only enter the confined space without BA if he is
updating a valid Entry Certificate which has already certified the space fit for entry without
BA.
(4) The AGT should wear a harness and a lifeline.
(5) Reviving equipment ready for immediate use shall be kept close at hand.
A minimum requirement would be the provision of an air bottle and mask which provided a
constant air supply. Further reviving equipment may be supplied providing that relevant
personnel are competent in its use.
(6) Facilities for the rescue of the AGT should be considered.
(7) The appropriate emergency response personnel shall be advised of the nature and the
location of the work to be undertaken.
9.2.5 Entry Certificate Issue and Validity

When the gas test has been completed the AA shall evaluate the results against Table 3 and,
taking into account the nature of the space, possible contaminants, type of isolations and the type
of work proposed, shall issue the appropriate WCC. The WCC shall be cross-referenced to the
Entry Certificate on which the AA shall specify the period in which he considers it safe to enter
the space. An entry certificate on its own does not authorise entry for any purposes other than
inspection by AGT Level 1.
Entry to the confined space shall commence and continue at any time during the period for which
the certificate is valid. If the space is vacated during the period of validity,
a gas test shall be undertaken before re-entry. Alternatively, if continuous gas monitoring
equipment has been in use throughout the vacated period, entry may proceed without the gas test.
The Entry Certificate shall be displayed at the job site. Entry points shall be barriered off when
the vessel is not manned to prevent unauthorised entry eg using lockable ‘T’ bar.
9.2.6 Training and Familiarisation for Confined Space Entry

All personnel likely to be involved in confined space entry, either as Entrants, Attendants, Rescue
Team Members or Gas Testers, shall undergo suitable training and familiarisation to ensure that
they possess the understanding, knowledge and skills necessary to safely perform their assigned
duties.
AGTs shall be trained, assessed and confirmed competent in accordance with the
BP Authorised Gas Testing Standards.
Entry Attendants shall be formally briefed on all aspects of the proposed entry activities and on
their particular duties, and shall be prepared to demonstrate their competency
to the AA.
Suitable familiarisation for the Attendant should include the following:
May 2009 Issue 1 29

 Awareness of this document and in particular the need to avoid entry into a confined space
whenever possible
 Awareness of the site layout and the site emergency procedures
 An understanding of the work to be undertaken, the hazards and the necessary precautions of
the WCC and associated paperwork. Where practicable all personnel involved in the work
should take part in the Level 2 Risk Assessment
 Familiarisation with the site emergency procedures for the rescue and recovery of Entrants
 Instruction in the communication methods to be used between the Attendant and Entrant
working in the confined space
The AA shall ensure that the Entry Attendant understands his duties and is competent to perform
them.
Entrants shall be briefed by the PA, Supervisor or Entry Attendant to ensure that they understand
the hazards of the task in hand, the signs, symptoms and consequences of exposure to those
hazards, and are aware of the emergency signal to be used by the attendant if evacuation becomes
necessary.
The Rescue Team Members shall receive approved Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and
rescue equipment (including BA sets) and be trained in its use. They should be trained fire team
members.
New personnel shall not be assigned to the above tasks, unless under training and accompanied by
a competent person who is familiar with the hazards of confined space entry.
9.3 Procedure for Entry into Confined Spaces without

Breathing Apparatus
9.3.1 Entry Attendant
A suitably trained Entry Attendant shall be stationed at the designated entrance to the confined
space and shall:
(1) Maintain a record of personnel entering and leaving the space and communicate this to a
central control room where appropriate.
(2) Keep Entrants under effective surveillance by one or more of the following methods:
 Line-of-sight (not always possible)
 Voice contact (allowing for distance and ambient noise)
 Radio with agreed periodicity of contact
 Pre-arranged signals on air-klaxons, whistles etc
 Pre-arranged lifeline signals
 Distress signal unit
(3) Be equipped with a device (eg radio, telephone) to summon assistance rapidly if Entrants
get into trouble.

Note: Such assistance shall consist of readily available rescue and resuscitation
equipment and personnel trained in its use.
(4) Ensure that an adequate supply of respirable air is maintained whilst Entrants are inside the
confined space.
The Entry Attendant has a vital function to perform. Under no circumstance may the Entry
Attendant enter the confined space or leave his post whilst there are personnel inside.
9.3.2 Entrants
Entrants to the confined space shall:
 Wear suitable PPE
 Wear a harness and lifeline, if specified on the WCC
 According to the type of work and the risk, take adequate rest periods out in the open air
 Continuously monitor for oxygen, hydrocarbons and HS
This may be achieved by one of the Entrants wearing a Crowcon Triple meter
(or similar) to warn of hazardous conditions. If this should occur, the space should be vacated,
ventilated and re-tested until conditions have improved to within the limits set out on the Entry
Certificate.
9.4 Work Activity Affecting Entry without Breathing Apparatus Status

Even though a gas test may indicate that a confined space is fit for entry without BA,
if work is to take place within that is likely to generate toxic or flammable vapours
to such an extent that the atmosphere cannot be kept free of contaminants by forced or natural
ventilation (eg application of paint coatings), the space shall be treated as not
fit for entry without BA and the additional precautions listed in Paragraph 9.5 shall
be followed.
9.5 Additional Procedure for Entry into Confined Spaces with Breathing Apparatus
9.5.1 Entry Attendant

The Entry Attendant shall perform the duties listed in Paragraph 9.3.1. Additionally, where the
space contains residual fluids (eg water) into which a person might fall so that his face and BA are
submerged, he shall be assisted by a rescue person who shall
be stationed at the opening, equipped to make an entry wearing BA so as to give immediate help,
if he considers it safe to do so.
May 2009 Issue 1 31

9.5.2 Entrants
Entrants shall perform the duties listed in Paragraph 9.3.2. In addition, they shall wear approved
positive pressure BA and be trained in its use.
Notes: (1) Canister respirators shall not be used in any circumstances. Air-supplied
apparatus shall be used.
(2) All personnel expected to wear BA and carry out work at the same time shall
have passed a face shield fit test with the recommendation that they should be
clean shaven.
9.6 Removal of Sludge, Scale and Hard Deposits

After a tank or vessel has been opened up, as much oil, sludge and scale as possible shall be
removed by means of bailers, squeegees etc, aided, if convenient, by adequately earthed water
hoses. As much removal as possible shall be carried out from the open manhole door but
invariably it will be necessary to enter the tank/vessel to remove all sludge and scale. Rules for
entry as laid down in Paragraph 9.2.3 shall be strictly adhered to.
Earth sumps or suitable containers shall be provided for the reception of oil or oily sludge. This
material shall be removed from site as soon as possible. On land where earth sumps may be used,
they shall be lined with impermeable material, eg plastic sheet liner, to ensure that there is no
contamination of water courses etc.
All pyrophoric scale shall be disposed of in an approved manner. During the time that it is
exposed to the air after removal, it shall be kept wet. Pyrophoric scale is removed from offshore
installations in sealed drums, the scale being ‘slurried’ with water.
Where there are hard deposits, necessitating the use of chipping tools, the WCC shall specify that
the surface being chipped shall be kept thoroughly wetted during the operation.
Where high-pressure water jets are used in the removal of sludge and scale,
only specifically trained operators should be used. Where standard water hose and nozzles are
used to wash out, the nozzles shall be earthed.
When chemical cleaning takes place there is a possibility of toxic gases, including HS, being
evolved. Therefore a closed drain system shall be used for the disposal of effluent from these
operations. Personnel engaged in these operations shall wear suitable chemical protective
clothing/equipment and suitable toxic gas monitoring/warning devices shall be provided.
9.7 Removal of Trapped Oil or Vapour

When repairs are to be carried out within a tank or vessel, care shall be taken to ensure that oil is
not trapped inside internal structural members. Any hollow supports or bracing steelwork exposed
to hydrocarbon shall be carefully drilled at the lowest and highest point to detect the presence of
oil. If it is found, the hollow member shall be purged
by one of the methods discussed above before work on the tank or vessel is allowed to proceed.
Any linings or wear plates attached to the shell of a tank or vessel may trap liquid hydrocarbons
behind them. This liquid can percolate into the vessel or tank by way of minute cracks. Therefore,
the vessel or tank shall frequently be tested to ensure that it remains gas free.

9.8 General Ventilation

When welding (especially MIG/TIG) or other work is to be carried out in a confined space,
precautions shall be taken to ensure that an adequate flow of fresh air is available and that welding
fumes are removed. Great care shall be taken to ensure that the airflow is always away from the
breathing zone of the welder and that contaminated air does not ‘short circuit’ back to the welder.
Where exhaust ventilation is used in a confined space, the extracted air shall be diverted well
away from the confined space so that replacement air shall be fresh.
When adequate ventilation cannot be provided, approved breathing apparatus or a suitable
facemask supplied with fresh air shall be worn. Compressed oxygen shall never be used to
ventilate a confined space.
9.9 Artificial Lighting

Vessels which have been certified gas free may be illuminated by temporary lighting certified for
the area, air-driven (flameproof) or suitably certified battery-powered torches (Exd, Exe or Exde)
or by ELV portable lighting equipment, approved for use in a Zone 1 area. In exceptional
circumstances where equipment above ELV is required to be used, it shall be approved by the
Asset Senior Electrical Engineer and be protected,
as a minimum, using and RCD rated no greater than 30mA.
Supply cables to LV lighting transformers approved for use in Zone 1 areas shall always be
supported above ground and the transformers never taken inside tanks or vessels.
10 Plant Reinstatement and Leak Testing

The reinstatement of plant and equipment requires equal attention to planning and detail as the
initial isolation. Historical data shows that many incidents involving failure of isolation occur
during reinstatement. Reinstatement of process plant is not complete until the section where
containment was broken has been leak tested. Plant line up checks should then be completed to
ensure the plant is ready for the reintroduction of process fluids.
The reinstatement leak test is different from strength tests, which are pressure/strength tests to
prove the structural integrity of the system.
The purpose of reinstatement leak testing is to render the production equipment and piping
systems safe for the introduction of hydrocarbon gases and liquids, and to create an auditable
record to demonstrate the integrity of all hydrocarbon production systems.
An overview of the leak testing process is shown within the main SIRP flowchart
in Addendum 3. A checklist to be used when planning leak tests is provided in Figure 1 as a guide.
May 2009 Issue 1 33

Figure 1 Leak Testing Checklist

10.1 De-isolation of Plant
10.1.1 Integrity Checks

Prior to reinstatement, the integrity of any isolations associated with the removal of spades or
other isolations devices shall be reassessed to confirm that it is safe to proceed with the
reinstatement work.
10.1.2 Sequence of De-isolation

In some cases the sequence of de-isolating plant is critical and requires planning to ensure safe
reinstatement.
10.1.3 De-isolation of Non-manual Valves

Removal of a valved isolation does not necessarily involve any opening or closing of the valves,
just the removal of locking devices and/or other immobilising equipment. Particular care shall be
taken with regard to electrically, pneumatically or hydraulically operated valves, which may open
or close on reinstatement of the operating source/medium.
10.1.4 De-isolation of Safety Critical Valves

Care to be taken to ensure that safety critical valves are returned to their correct position during
de-isolation. These valves are registered as Locked Open (LO) or Locked Closed (LC) and each
site holds a register which records the current position of all LO/LC valves. During de-isolation,
these valves should be returned to their correct position for plant operation and the register
updated accordingly.
10.2 Selection of Test Pressure

Leak testing is performed at 110% of maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP)
or, if a relief valve which has a set pressure below 110% MAWP is included in the system under
test, the test is conducted at 95% of the system relief valve set pressure. (If the relief valve cold set
pressure is not used there is a risk that the relief valve will lift during the test.)
The leak test pressure shall never exceed 110% of the MAWP.
Where the operating pressure is significantly lower than the MAWP, a lower test pressure can be
used providing that a risk assessment has been carried out and approved by the appropriate
Technical Authority. In these situations, the envelope and lower test pressure needs to be fully
documented in the site integrity management system.
May 2009 Issue 1 35

10.3 Definition of Pressure Envelope

Testing shall only be carried out on a single, continuous pressure envelope (ie same pressure
rating as defined by the piping specification) at any one time, as far as is reasonably practicable.
Where it is necessary to test simultaneously two independent and non-connected envelopes
adjacent to each other, careful consideration shall be given to the effects that failure in one
pressure envelope might have on the other.
The volume of the pressure envelope under test shall be kept as small as reasonably practicable to
minimise the amount of stored energy in the envelope.
When defining the pressure envelope, consideration should be given to interfaces with lower
pressure systems or equipment (including exchangers etc) – provision shall be made to ensure that
adjacent systems cannot be overpressured. This shall be managed using an appropriate isolation,
implemented using an ICC.
The leak paths to be tested shall include, but not be limited to, flanged joints; other proprietary
joints including clamp-type connectors (ie Grayloc-type) and hammer-lugged unions; threaded
joints; valve body/bonnet joints; valve stem glands; valve body vent and drains; pig
receiver/launcher door seals; and all piping connections to instrumentation.
The envelope shall include adequate means for the venting of air or process gas from high spots
and dead legs during filling with a liquid pressuring medium.
The envelope shall contain adequate means for draining liquids after the test and for ensuring that
a vacuum is not drawn.
In the case of pneumatic pressure tests the envelope shall contain sufficient vents,
to a safe place, to ensure that depressurising can be undertaken safely and without adverse thermal
effects.
Sufficient venting/draining points shall be provided for preventing pressuring fluids being trapped
behind non-return or check valves, between isolation valves or within dead legs of the envelope.
10.4 Selection of Pressuring Medium

A liquid medium (hydraulic testing) is the preferred means of testing and should be used for leak
testing wherever possible, in order to minimise the stored energy.
The preferred liquid medium is water. However, consideration shall be given to the effect of the
water and, any additives, on the process (eg formation of hydrates), and the effect of any residual
water/additives on the metallurgy of the pressure envelope:
 When testing austenitic stainless steel systems, the water should be distilled or
demineralised and contain <30ppm of chloride ions
 When testing carbon stell systems using seawater, threatment with oxygen scavenger (to
reduce oxygen content below 50ppb) coupled with chlorination and/or biocide injection is
required to minimise corrosion. TROS 6 is a suitable combined product

Selection of liquids other than water should take account of:

 The possibility of explosion resulting from the ‘diesel’ effect
 The boiling point relative to the test temperature
 The flammability of the liquid, the flash point of which shall not be less than 65°C, and at least
10°C above the maximum test temperature
Selection of any hydrocarbon or other flammable or toxic fluid shall only be permitted
if authorised in writing by the appropriate Engineering Authority following a Level 2
Risk Assessment.
Inert gas mixtures such as nitrogen or a nitrogen/helium mix can also be used for leak testing. This
may be the preferred method for large testing or where the use of water could be detrimental to the
process. Gross (preliminary) air leak tests, using instrument air up to a maximum of 8barg, are
often used at an early stage of hook-up/ commissioning as a means of identifying large leaks, prior
to performing the standard pressure tests.
10.5 Nitrogen Leak Testing

Nitrogen leak testing is generally carried out using N 2 quads and/or site nitrogen equipment, or
alternatively a specialist contractor’s nitrogen pumping equipment and bulk tanks. When using a
specialised contractor these tests generally use 99% nitrogen with a 1% helium tracer gas, up to a
maximum of 110% MAWP.
If the system to be leak tested cannot be tested as a single system then testing shall commence
with the highest pressure system to enable decanting to other systems. Every effort shall be made
to conserve nitrogen by decanting to pressurise or partially pressurise other systems.
To avoid background helium readings and to assist in leak detection, flanged joints shall be taped
for nitrogen leak tests. All other joints and valve stems should only be taped as required for
identification numbering, identification on as-built drawings and reference back to the testing
database. The tape shall be removed once testing is complete.
10.5.1 Safety Considerations in Nitrogen Leak Testing

Nitrogen can asphyxiate, therefore great care should be taken to avoid gross leakage of nitrogen
or nitrogen/helium. Particular care should be taken when opening up vessels that have been
nitrogen purged or when the venting of nitrogen is taking place.
Pressure shall be introduced gradually into the system allowing adequate time for temperature
equalisation; in this respect special attention is drawn to the cooling
Joule-Thompson effect which occurs when letting down high-pressure nitrogen into the system to
be tested. Nitrogen leak testing is performed with gases at high pressure. Therefore attention is
drawn to the hazards of a possible release, with explosive
force, of energy stored in the system. Systems under test shall be depressurised prior to bolt
re-tightening, tensioning or other remedial action to improve leaks, the only exceptions to this
being valve glands, which may be adjusted but not re-packed whilst the system is still pressurised.
The possibility of brittle fracture shall be considered when conducting a nitrogen leak test at metal
temperatures near the ductile/brittle transition temperature of the steel. It is recommended that
nitrogen leak testing should not be carried out when the ambient temperature is below 2°C on
May 2009 Issue 1 37

equipment and piping constructed from non-impact tested carbon steel materials with nominal
thickness of >3/4in (19mm),
(ie API 5L, A 106, A 105, A 216, etc). For non-impact tested carbon steel materials
with nominal thickness >3/4in, a Competent Person shall specify the minimum metal
temperatures for leak testing, based on requirements of either RP 42-1 or BS 5500. Sites are
advised to identify any systems containing non-impact tested carbon steel and prepare the
appropriate local test procedures.
Introducing nitrogen to a system introduces a large energy source, far greater than the energy stored
in an equivalent liquid leak test. To minimise this stored energy, vessels which normally operate
with a liquid level shall be water filled (ensure water filling of
the vessel is acceptable with respect to corrosion and scaling) prior to pressurising
with nitrogen.
Full flow pressure relief shall be available via Pressure Safety Valves (PSVs). It is acceptable and
appropriate for the PSVs on the Installation system/plant to be used for this purpose. However, if
full flow pressure relief is not available via a plant system,
then temporary PSVs shall be used. If full flow pressure relief is not provided then
a Level 2 Risk Assessment shall be undertaken to demonstrate that sufficient control
is in place to manage the HP/LP interface.
When a specialist contractor is contracted to carry out nitrogen leak testing rather than leak testing
with nitrogen quads or low volume pumps the following additional measures apply:
 There will be a Pump Operator who will be in radio contact with the Leak Test Supervisor who
will monitor system pressure. The pumping unit will be manually shut down on the instruction
of the Leak Test Supervisor. The leak test crew shall have a written procedure for radio
protocol
 There will be an automatic pump trip (Overpressure Protection Device (OPPD)) that will shut
down the pumping unit. The OPPD will be located close to the injection point so that it can
monitor the highest pressure that will be seen in the Installation system. Where the OPPD is
installed on a vessel, consideration should be given to the effect the vessel internals, ie the
demister pads, may have on the indicated pressure
 If it has been identified that the leak test contractor will have to supply PSVs, consideration
should be given to the location that these PSVs would vent to in an emergency. The vent
location should be surveyed and approved by the Installation AA with guidance from the leak
test contractor on expected nitrogen plume
10.6 Leak Testing Acceptance Criteria

This paragraph defines the allowable leak rates for different test medium and equipment type and
duty.

10.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Hydraulic Testing

For hydraulic testing using water the test should be conducted for a minimum of 30 minutes. A
test should be deemed successful if no significant reduction in pressure is observed over the test
period and all joints and connections have been visually inspected for leakage. In some cases it
may not be possible to maintain a constant test pressure due to trapped air in the system or passing
valves. In this case the visual inspection is vital in confirming an acceptable test.
10.6.2 Acceptance Criteria for Nitrogen Testing

For nitrogen testing, depending on the scope of the test, there are two primary means of
confirming an acceptable test. These are:
 Bubble testing
 Leak rate measurement using a helium tracer
Helium tracer testing is normally used for large scale testing of plant or the installation of new
equipment involving a specialist contractor. Bubble testing is normally applicable when carrying
out smaller scale testing using nitrogen quads.
Bubble Testing Criteria for Hydrocarbons
Bubble Testing Method Acceptance Criteria

Method 1 involves the application of a soap No presence of continuous bubble growth
solution to the joint and monitoring for detected in 60 seconds for flanges up to and
surface bubbles. including 4in Nominal Bore (NB) and 90
seconds for flanges above 4in NB.
Method 2 involves taping the joint and 5 bubbles/min.
inserting a 1/4in diameter tube from the
flange into a water bucket and monitoring the
number of bubbles released.
Note: 5 bubbles/min approximates to 15scf/year from a 1/4in tube.
Helium Tracer Testing

Leak rate measurement in the case of helium tracer testing involves taping of individual flanges
and measurement of leakage using a measurement probe. The following leakage criteria apply:
Leakage Rates (scf/yr)

Acceptance Criteria (scf/year)
Helium Tracer Testing Method Target
Maximum
Closed Module Open Module
Oil 100 200 400
Gas <50barg 50 100 200
Gas 50barg 20 40 100
May 2009 Issue 1 39

Acceptance of leak rates in the range between target and maximum allowable leakage
is by exception only and review by the appropriate Technical Authority. The review shall take
into account fluid type, location of joint and ventilation and subsequent monitoring programme.
If a bolted joint fails a leak test, the procedure and Leak Test Decision Tree in Hydrocarbon
Release Reduction (UKCS-SOP-012) should be followed.
10.7 Test Equipment

Blanking devices such as spades, blinds and screwed plugs etc shall conform to the equipment
specification and be fitted in accordance with Paragraph 7.
Note: For screwed plugs up to 1 1/2in, at least 7 to 8 threads should be engaged. Refer to Piping
Joints Handbook (UKCS-TI-032).
Pressuring equipment shall be provided with suitably calibrated pressure control/ regulator
devices.
A suitably calibrated pressure-indicating device, or devices, shall be provided in a location clearly
visible to the person controlling the pressure. Account should be taken of pressure variation
caused by elevation changes within the pressure envelope.
During any test, if the test pressure is above the MAWP or the pressuring source could exceed
MAWP, a pressure relief valve shall be fitted to the test equipment. The valve should be set to
relieve marginally above the test pressure, and of adequate discharge capacity to relieve the
volume supplied by the pressuring source to a safe area.
10.8 Planning
A checklist summarising the key steps in planning and implementing a test is shown in Figure 1.
All leak testing shall be subject to Level 2 Risk Assessment unless conducted under a risk
assessed and approved Maintenance Routine or Operating Procedure.
When risk assessing the leak testing activity, as a minimum the following should
be considered:
 Any parts inside the proposed envelope which may be adversely affected by the test pressure
(eg the maximum static pressure on a balanced pump seal)
 Any interfaces with lower pressure systems or equipment (positive or double blocks and bleed
isolation shall be used with consideration given to locking open a vent path to prevent
overpressurisation)
 The location and condition of screwed fittings within the test envelope
 The stability of components such as expansion joints and spring hangers
 The ability to control the rate of pressure rise and the ability to depressurise quickly
 Connected high-pressure equipment such as accumulators or pulsation dampers
 Need for additional piping support (and its subsequent removal after reinstatement) when items
are removed

 The implications of Non-return Valves (NRVs) in the system in relation to pressurisation and
depressurisation
 The provision of an emergency depressurisation route for large volume tests. This will ideally
be a remote operated blowdown valve which is an integral part of the leak test envelope and
which will operate automatically on an Installation trip and blowdown event. If this is not
possible, a manual blowdown route shall be identified and both the BP IA and the leak test
contractor shall be aware of its location
Whenever the test envelope extends beyond one site (eg pipelines), effective communication
including formal procedures shall be established between each site.
During turnarounds where a boundary isolation provides the isolation from the process (eg
reservoir and export line) the isolation standard used to carry out nitrogen leak testing within the
boundary may be relaxed to single valve isolation, subject to Level 2 Risk Assessment of the
hazards to work on the adjacent systems.
10.9 Preparation
The site shall be inspected by the PA to confirm that:
 The equipment to be tested is free from any obvious flaws
 All low-pressure attachments have been removed or effectively isolated
 Pressure-indicating and pressure relief devices are secure and online, calibrated and set to the
appropriate pressure as necessary
 Any temporary restraints are in place and sufficient to restrain movement on system failure
 Vent and drain valves are in the correct position
 The pressuring equipment and all associated fittings and connections are secure,
in sound condition and free from contaminants (eg diesel oil)
10.10 Access Restrictions

Protection against unauthorised access to the test area, and other protective measures, shall be
provided by the following measures:
 Cordoning off the area (eg with tape or erection of shields) at an adequate distance from the
equipment to be tested, as specified on the WCC
 Posting warning signs at access ways, other strategic positions and on the equipment to be
tested; or on the door of test workshops or other designated test areas
 Broadcasting warnings that a pressure test is imminent
The area in which the test takes place shall be ‘swept’ beforehand to ensure that no personnel are
present inside the barrier.
A minimum safe practical distance for barriers shall be set at a distance where it is physically
impossible for an individual to touch any part of the system under pressure without crossing the
barrier.
May 2009 Issue 1 41

A maximum safe practicable distance should be maintained in all circumstances given the nature
and location of the pressurising medium.
Access will be prohibited for all personnel during pressurisation periods. Following pressurisation,
access to the test area will be prohibited until the pressure has stabilised. Access for leak detection
shall be restricted to essential personnel (minimum of two),
as specified on the WCC.
10.11 Control of Leak Testing and Test Procedures

The PA (BP or specialist contractor) in charge of the test shall be responsible for the preparation
of a plan covering definition of test category, procedural instructions (including those for
pressurisation and venting) and relevant drawings (P&IDs) showing isolation points, fill and vent
points, valve status etc. A process for recording the pressure of the system during the test at
suitable intervals shall also be included in the plan. For large scale tests conducted by a specialist
testing contractor the work procedure should be checked by the AA and shall be approved by the
Process TA
or delegate.
All tests shall be carried out under a WCC within the Integrated Safe Systems
of Work. Testing carried out by a specialist contractor shall be subject to a Level 2 Risk
Assessment.
Regularly recurring tests may be conducted solely under the control of a routine provided there is
a specific test procedure for the item of equipment being tested. The test procedure shall be Level
2 risk assessed and appointed by the Process TA.
Non-routine tests shall be controlled by a WCC (Permit) in addition to an authorised procedure to
provide additional control of adjacent activities.
For tests involving a specialist contractor, prior to pressurisation, the BP AA or delegate and Leak
Test Supervisor shall walk through the system to be tested with the marked up P&IDs and verify
the following:
 Battery limits are as specified
 Isolations including valve positions are as specified
 Secondary isolations are as specified
 Injection points are as specified
 Overpressurisation protection and monitoring positions are as specified
 Sufficient provision is made for the rapid and safe depressurisation of a system
 The test area is adequately barriered off
 Leak test contractor’s relief valve is online and settings are as specified
 Overpressure protection skid is set to the predetermined setting and any isolation valves locked
open to prevent accidental isolation of the overpressure detection device

10.12 Pressure Buildup and Test Monitoring

Throughout the test, the boundaries of the test area shall be monitored to ensure that no
unauthorised personnel enter the area. During pressurisation all personnel are prohibited from
entering the test area.
Neither the pressurising equipment nor the equipment under test shall be left unattended at any
time during the test.
The pressurising equipment shall be isolated from the pressure envelope (and disconnected, where
practicable) when the test pressure is reached. The pressurising valve shall be locked in the closed
position.
The possibility of a pressure increase due to thermal expansion shall be considered in the case of
an extended test.
Pressure monitoring shall include any adjacent systems which are not positively isolated.
The equipment under test shall not be subjected to any form of shock loading, eg no hammer
testing.
Initial pressurisation of any system shall always be performed in a slow and controlled manner,
stopping initially at 5barg or 25% of the final test pressure if the final test pressure is less than
20barg. The pressure should then be increased in increments equivalent to 25% of the final test
pressure, in order to allow the system to stabilise and to check all joints and flanges for visible or
audible leakage at each step change
in pressure. Pressurisation should be halted at these intervals (ie 25%, 50% and 75%) and visual
and audible inspection checks carried out. Pressure drop time assessments shall be carried out at
each stage to satisfy the BP AA of leak test envelope integrity. Once system integrity is
established then pressurisation will recommence and continue in 25% increments of the final test
pressure, with all checks carried out as previously stated until the acceptable leak criteria has been
met at 100% system test pressure.
If any leakage is detected whilst a system is being pressurised, pressurisation shall cease
immediately and that system shall be totally depressurised via the approved venting point and left
open to atmosphere. Confirmation that the system pressure
is at 0barg shall be confirmed by the BP AA or their delegate prior to any remedial
works commencing.
10.13 Depressurising
On completion of the test, the pressure should be reduced gradually and under controlled
conditions until atmospheric or desired operational pressure is reached.
The pressure shall be recorded following completion of the test and when isolation from the
pressure source and depressurisation/venting has taken place, prior to any other work starting on
the system.
Vents shall be opened at high points before draining liquids, to ensure that a vacuum is not drawn.
May 2009 Issue 1 43

Where possible inert gases should be vented to the Installation flare and vent system or if this is
not practical, to a safe area where they will not affect personnel. Pressuring fluid may sometimes
be decanted into another test envelope in order to conserve pressuring medium. If it is necessary to
vent large volumes to atmosphere, a risk assessment of this activity shall be conducted and a
procedure developed detailing how personnel will be protected during such a depressurisation
event.
Clamps or bolts on bolted flanges shall not be loosened while the system is still under pressure.
Clamps shall only be removed by competent persons who have been trained in the appropriate
procedures.
Checks shall be made to ensure that no part of the envelope retains any trapped residual pressure,
eg behind non-return valves or check valves.
10.14 Service Testing

Service leak tests, using the service fluid rather than 110% MAWP tests, are acceptable methods
of testing for leaks during the post-operations phase on non-hazardous utility low-pressure
systems (≤ 10barg).
For process hydrocarbon and hazardous utility systems, although it is not the preferred means
of testing, under certain conditions it may be considered appropriate
to carry out testing with the service fluid (ie liquid or gas) rather than with water, nitrogen or some
other medium. This shall only be considered where it can be clearly demonstrated that it is
impractical to carry out leak testing due to the configuration
of the system and that the hazards associated with the introduction of high-pressure testing
equipment etc would be greater than the hazards associated with the service testing. Where this
method is proposed, a written justification shall be recorded on a Level 2 Risk Assessment.
The following criteria and precautions shall be considered as the minimum in support
of carrying out service tests on process hydrocarbon and hazardous utility systems:
 The number of joints that have been broken shall be small to guarantee the ability
to control and monitor the test
 A competent technician shall have witnessed the joints being re-made in accordance with the
Guidance on Certification (GOC) Procedure for Critical Joint Installation
 Pressurisation shall be controlled via a designated pressurisation route where possible, eg a
small bore line fitted with a globe valve
 Pressurisation shall be in small incremental steps (5bar max) where possible
 Depressurisation routes shall be specified and if possible both local/manual depressurisation
and remote depressurisation from the control room shall be designed into the leak boundaries
 The boundary isolation valves for the service test shall be controlled under an ICC
Once it has been decided to carry out a service test, a formal procedure shall be developed
including marked-up P&IDs defining the service test and detailing compliance with the above
criteria.

10.15 Return to Service

Prior to returning equipment to service, the hazards of any residual pressuring fluids shall be
assessed and actions taken to eliminate them, eg:
 In the case of water, its effects on products on high or low temperature service may require the
use of special drying methods, such as hot, dry air
 The need to inert (remove oxygen) prior to introducing process fluids
 The need to flush leak test medium from operational dead legs (refer to Practical Application
of Risk-based Inspection Process (UKCS-TI-018) Addendum 4, Figure 3 for examples)
Completion of leak testing and deisolation of plant does not necessarily mean that system
recommissioning can commence. An appropriate set of pre start up checks
shall be specified by the AA, to be completed by the AA or his delegate, after deisolation is
complete and prior to recommissioning of plant. This checklist shall include any points where
integrity was broken or equipment was attached for plant preparation or leak testing. A
recommended pre-startup assurance checklist proforma is included in Addendum 4.
Plant line up checks should then be completed to ensure the plant is ready for the reintroduction
of process fluids.
Consideration shall be given to the normal operating temperature of the process. Where
practicable, the operating temperature should be increased slowly and all broken connections
monitored until a stable operating temperature is maintained.
10.16 Post-test Integrity Checks

After hydrocarbons or hazardous utilities have been introduced, an initial visual check of joint
integrity shall be made for all broken joints and any other joints that may have
been disturbed. Further checks shall be carried out every 12 hours until the plant has reached its
normal operating pressure and temperature. Checks shall be carried out for at least 2 days.
NUIs
It is recognised that for NUIs where a permanent presence does not exist, the ability to monitor
will depend on the length of stay and timing of subsequent visits. The flange tagging process
(refer to Paragraph 7.3) shall still be applied and the monitoring process followed as far as is
practicable, with a final check and removal of the flange tags being made at least on the next
return visit to the site.
10.17 Records (Certification)

All leak tests and service tests shall be formally certificated and recorded, and all certificates
(including chart recordings) included with the relevant equipment records within the
BU/Installation management system.
For leak tests Form SL1 from GOC shall be used.
Service tests and the critical joint installation shall be recorded using Form JI1 from the GOC
guidelines.
Form JI1 from GOC shall be used for recording post integrity checks.
May 2009 Issue 1 45

10.18 Use of Specialist Testing Contractors

In cases where pressure/leak testing is contracted to a specialist third-party the contract shall, as a
minimum, specify the need to observe the requirements of this document, and in addition:
 The roles and responsibilities of the relevant BP and Contractor personnel
 The authority for approval of procedures
 The required competency of the Contractor personnel and the means of controlling compliance
 The keeping of test records
 Shift handover procedures
 Emergency procedures and automatic shutdown of pumping units
 The means of monitoring the adequacy of the Contractor’s safety management system
10.19 Shift Handover

At every shift change the PA will be expected to conduct a verbal and written account of the
previous shift’s operations. If a specialist contractor is performing the leak testing, the oncoming
BP IA for the area of plant under leak test shall attend the shift handover.
The shift handover period shall include a site visit to review the status of the systems under
test.
10.20 Reverse Integrity Testing of Individual Joints

Reverse integrity test methods for individual joints (eg KaMOS) on hydrocarbon systems shall
only be considered where:
(1) They are being used to gain confidence in the integrity of individual joints prior to
a full system leak test.
(2) An internal leak test cannot be performed due to piping configuration (eg flare header).
(3) An internal leak test cannot be performed at the required pressure (eg compressor
discharge).
(4) It can be clearly demonstrated that it is impractical to carry out a system leak test and that
the risk associated with the introduction of large high-pressure testing equipment etc, would
be greater than that associated with potential hydrocarbon leaks from untested joints
elsewhere in the system.

A management of change assessment involving the appropriate TA shall be used to assess the
risks, review and capture deviations from piping specifications, and ensure that the joints are
recorded on a reverse integrity test joints register. Factors to consider in the risk assessment
include:
 The locations of pipe support arrangements and joints adjacent to those being assembled
 Any history of system leak test failures due to leaks from joints other than those for
which the leak test was performed
May 2009 Issue 1 47/48

Addendum 1
Definitions
Term Definition
Blank/Blanking The installation of a piping specification rated device such as a blind flange,
spade (blind) or spectacle blind (reversible spade) for the purpose of
achieving positive isolation.
Boundary Isolations A set of isolations which define the boundaries of a discrete process
envelope.
Breaking Containment The opening up of process/utility systems for any reason, including
inspection, repairs or modifications, where there is a risk from egress of
toxic, flammable or otherwise dangerous materials.
Breathing Apparatus A device which ensures that the wearer has a continuously available supply
of uncontaminated air through a face mask, helmet or mouthpiece.
Canister Respirator Respiratory equipment consisting of a face piece attached to a canister
which contains a filter absorber to remove specific contaminants. It has no
separate supply of air.
Cold Work The carrying out of any task, or the use of any tool or equipment which will
not produce a source of ignition (refer also to Hot Work). It includes the use
of tools for erection, dismantling and cleaning, which are not liable to
produce incendive sparks, and operations such as drilling, tapping and
cutting carried out in such a way as to limit the heat produced and keep the
temperature of the tools and work below 100°C.
Combustible Gas An instrument designed to measure the concentration of
Indicator flammable gas.
Competent Person A person who, by reason of his or her training, knowledge, experience and
judgement is considered by management to be capable of carrying out a
specific task or activity.
Containment Systems Systems (eg transmission pipelines, pipework generally, tanks and vessels)
either pressurised or atmospheric, used for the storage and/or conveyance of
gases, liquids, slurries or mixtures thereof.
Flammable (synonymous Refers to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour, which is
with Inflammable) easily ignited. The addition of the prefix ‘non’ indicates that the
substances are not readily ignited but does not necessarily indicate that they
are non-combustible.
Flammable Limits The limits of combustibility of flammable vapours when mixed with air
(refer to Upper Flammable Limit and Lower Flammable Limit).
Definitions
May 2009 Issue 1 Add 1-1
Term Definition
Flash Point The lowest temperature to which a liquid can be heated to give off sufficient
vapour to form a mixture with air that can be ignited momentarily in
prescribed laboratory apparatus.
Gas Free A tank is considered to be gas free when the concentration of flammable
gases is within safe prescribed limits. The term gas free does not imply
absence of toxic gases or sufficiency of oxygen for vessel entry.
Hazardous Area An area in which there exists, or may exist, a hazardous atmosphere.
Hazardous Atmosphere An atmosphere containing flammable gas or vapour in a concentration
capable of ignition. (The term refers exclusively to hazards arising from
ignition. Where there is hazard from other causes such as toxicity,
asphyxiation or radioactivity, this is specifically mentioned.)
Hazardous Utility Corrosive, toxic or irritant chemical fluid, nitrogen, steam or hot water,
drilling mud, diesel oil, Aviation Turbine Kerosene (ATK) and other fluids
that could have an environmental impact.
Hot Work This includes welding or the use of any flame or electric arc or the use of
any equipment likely to cause heat, flame or incendive spark. It also
includes caulking, chipping, drilling, riveting and any other heat-producing
operation, unless it is carried out in such a way as to keep the temperature
below 100°C and unable to create or ignite a flammable atmosphere (refer
to Cold Work).
Incendive Spark A spark of sufficient temperature and energy to ignite a flammable gas.
Isolation A method of preventing the passage of fluids through connecting pipework
in order to allow safe access to vessels or other intrusive equipment
maintenance.
Leak Testing The application of a pressure differential to detect leakage paths or leakage
rates. The pressure applied, liquid or gaseous, may be much less than the
maximum service pressure eg vacuum tests, search gas tests, air tests, and
water or service fluid tests.
Local Procedures Site-specific procedures which address the arrangements in place for the
implementation of SMS procedures.
Lower Flammable Limit The lowest concentration of flammable gas in air at atmospheric pressure
(LFL) capable of being ignited. The figure is expressed as percentage by volume.
MAWP Maximum Allowable Working (Operating) Pressure should normally be
taken to mean the design pressure. It is the basis for the pressure setting
relieving device.
Non-hazardous Utility Cold water, air.
Definitions
Add 1-2 May 2009 Issue 1
Term Definition
Positive Isolation Isolation by means of a fixed barrier, such as a blank flange (following
spool removal), blind plate or spectacle plate, bolted or clamped in place
and conforming to the pipework specification, which provides an equivalent
standard of containment to the pipework in which it is installed.
Process Fluid Well fluids, live crude, stabilised crude, gas, NGL or any other produced
fluid containing hydrocarbon gas or liquid. H 2S, LSA scale/NORM
(Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) or hydrates may also be present.
Pyrophoric Scale or Usually finely divided ferrous sulphide formed inside a tank, pipeline or
Deposits equipment, in the presence of mercaptans or hydrogen sulphide. It is
capable of such rapid oxidation on exposure to air that heating
to incandescence can occur.
Reasonably Practicable This term implies that an evaluation of costs versus benefits should be
made. Where the cost or difficulty of a precaution is grossly
out of proportion to the reduction in risk likely to be achieved
by implementing the precaution, the precaution can be considered not
reasonably practicable.
Any additional risks which may arise while installing or removing
the precaution shall also be taken into consideration in determining what is
reasonably practicable.
Source of Ignition Naked lights, fires, certain electrical equipment, hot surfaces above ignition
temperature or a spark or flame produced by any other means.
Tanks Within the context of this document, the majority of the tanks referred to
are located onshore and consist of the following types:
(a) Atmospheric fixed roof, normally used for the storage of water,
chemical or heavy oils, ie materials that do not give off vapour at
normal ambient temperature.
(b) Atmospheric floating roof, where the floating roof can be of the pan,
pontoon or double deck design. The roof floats on the tank contents.
These tanks are mainly used for the storage
of materials which have a flashpoint at or below normal atmospheric
temperatures.
(c) Pressure storage tanks, eg for the storage of liquefied petroleum gas
(propane, butane etc). These tanks may also be refrigerated.
Above ground tankage is contained within a bunded area;
ie surrounded by walls of earth, concrete or other impermeable material of
appropriate height so as to completely contain any spillage or rupture within
the bunded area.
Definitions
Term Definition
Test Pressure Except where it is required to meet design code or statutory requirements
for strength testing (ie 150% of design pressure), the test pressure shall be
limited to not more than 110% of Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
(MAWP).
Upper Flammable Limit The concentration of flammable gas in air at atmospheric pressure above
(UFL) which combustion will not occur. The figure is expressed
as a percentage by volume.
Definitions
Addendum 2
Typical Valve Isolations Integrity Tests
Paragraph Page
1 DBB Isolation Integrity Test (Two Valves) 1
2 DBB Isolation Integrity Test

(BP-approved Double Sealed, Single Valve) 2
3 Single Valve Isolation Integrity Test 3

May 2009 Issue 1 Add 2-i/ii
1 DBB Isolation Integrity Test (Two Valves)
Key
V1 First (upstream) isolation valve from live system.
M1 Live side monitoring point (pressure gauge or vent/drain).
V2 Second (downstream) isolation valve from live system.
M2 Monitoring point between valves and break point (pressure gauge or vent/drain).
B Bleed point between the isolation valves.
(1) If possible, ensure that tappings at M1, M2 and B are not blocked and that pressure gauges,
where installed, are operating.
(2) Close downstream valve V2 and secure in closed position.
(3) Note pressure at monitoring points M1 and M2.
(4) Vent/drain section of line to be broken into and monitor at M2 until the pressure
is near zero.
(5) Close vent/drain at break point and monitor at M2 for a minimum of 10 minutes. No
pressure buildup at M2 indicates the integrity of the downstream valve V2.
(6) Close upstream valve V1 and secure in closed position.
(7) Note pressure at M1 and B.
(8) Vent/drain between V1 and V2 (B) and monitor at B until pressure is near zero.
(9) Close vent/drain (B) and monitor at M1 and B for a minimum of 10 minutes.
(No pressure buildup at B indicates integrity of upstream valve V1.)
(10) Leave vent/drain (B) in closed position to allow further monitoring.
Note: The two block valves are now closed and secured. The bleed valve is closed but not
locked. It is possible for pressure to build up between the two block valves therefore
regular monitoring of the isolation is essential; a suitable pressure gauge may be
fitted to the vent to monitor the pressure.

2 DBB Isolation Integrity Test

(BP-approved Double Sealed, Single Valve)
Key
M1 Live (upstream) side monitoring point.
M2 Monitoring point between valve and break point (downstream).
C Cavity drain (between seals).
(1) If possible, ensure that tappings at M1, M2 and C are not blocked and that pressure gauges,
where installed, are operating.
(2) Close isolation valve and secure in closed position.
(3) Note pressure at M1, C (in cavity) and M2.
(4) Vent/drain downstream section of line to be broken into and monitor pressure
at M2 until pressure is near zero.
(5) Close vent/drain at break point and monitor at M2 and C for a minimum of
10 minutes. (No pressure buildup at M2 and no pressure fall-off at C indicates integrity of
downstream seal.)
(6) Note pressure at M1 and C.
(7) Vent/drain off fluid in cavity (between seals) and monitor at C until the pressure
is near zero.
(8) Close cavity vent/drain (C) and monitor at M1 and C for a minimum of 10 minutes. (No
pressure buildup at C indicates integrity of upstream seal.)
(9) Leave vent/drain (C) in closed position to allow further monitoring.
Note: The double sealed, single block valve is now closed and secured. The bleed valve is
closed but not locked. Any fluid passing through the upstream seal will be detected
at the cavity drain (C). Regular monitoring of the isolation
is therefore essential and a suitable pressure gauge may be fitted to the vent to
monitor the pressure.

3 Single Valve Isolation Integrity Test
Key
M1 Live (upstream) side monitoring point.
M2 Monitoring point between valve and break point (downstream).
(1) Ensure that tappings at M1 and M2 are not blocked and that pressure gauges, where
installed, are operating.
(2) Close isolation valve and secure in closed position.
(3) Note pressure at M1 and M2.
(4) Vent/drain downstream section of line to be broken into and monitor at M2 until pressure is
near zero.
(5) Close downstream vent/drain and monitor at M2 for a minimum of 10 minutes.
(No pressure buildup at M2 indicates integrity of single valve.)
(6) Leave downstream vent/drain at break point in closed position to allow further monitoring.
Note: The single isolation valve is now closed and secured, and the downstream
vent/drain is closed. Any fluid passing through the single valve seal would be
monitored by means of the mandatory additional safeguards listed
in Table 2.

May 2009 Issue 1 Add 2-3/4
Addendum 3
Safe Isolation and Reinstatement
of Plant Flowchart
Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant Flowchart

Addendum 4
TAR and Planned Intervention
Pre-startup Assurance Checklist
Pre-startup Checklist
The pre-startup checklist or equivalent shall be used for all plant startups following turnarounds or
extended plant outages. For plant startups within 24 hours the Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) may
decide not to make this a requirement.
The pre-start assurance checklist has been developed to manage risks around plant restart.
This process is not designed to manage the risks of executing the tasks. Execution risks and Management
of Change (MoC) will continue to be managed through existing systems.
TAR and Planned Intervention Pre-startup Assurance Checklist





Locked Valve, Purge, Vent and Bleed Point Checklist

Introduction
This document is part of the pre-startup assurance checks and has been created to ensure that all locked
valves, temporary bleeds, vents and pressure testing tie-in points utilised during
a production shutdown have been identified and are checked for integrity on completion of the work and
prior to plant startup.
The Area Authority should use this proforma throughout the turnaround or planned intervention to build a
list of checks to be carried out prior to startup.
Procedure Sequence
At each of the points identified, the technician must check the following has been carried out:
 All locked valves are returned to the normal operating position and locked
 All temporary bleed arrangements, hoses and gauges must be disconnected and returned
to storage
 All purge, drain, vent, bleed and transmitter vent valves must be closed
 All plugs and caps must be fitted securely
The technician must sign for each point to verify the above.


Addendum 5
Workplace Assessment Plan Template
Paragraph Page
1 Introduction 1
2 Objectives 1
3 Underpinning Knowledge 1
4 Assessment Methodology 2
4.1 Field Assessment Requirements 2
4.2 Observation, Demonstration and Questioning 3
4.3 Simulation 3
4.4 Guidance on the Assessment Process 3
5 Field Assessment Contents 5

May 2009 Issue 1 Add 5-i/ii
1 Introduction
The following assessment plan consists of four components which make up the unit Safe
Isolations and Reinstatement of Plant:
 Process isolations
 Breaking containment
 Confined space entry
 Pressure/leak testing
It provides the framework for the workplace qualified Competence Management Assurance
System (CMAS) Assessor to carry out the assessment.
2 Objectives
This assessment plan sets a common standard for assessing an individual as a competent BP
process isolator. It shall be applied to all candidates, however, the extent of the assessment
process will depend on the previous experience of the individual (refer to Paragraph 4.4).
Successful assessments will be recorded within the CMAS system by a qualified CMAS Assessor
with the appropriate comments.
3 Underpinning Knowledge
Prior to the workplace assessment the candidate shall complete the following training:
 SIRP Training Course (refer to Paragraph 5.2 of the main body of this document)
 Permit to Work or Integrated Safe System of Work (ISSOW) training to at least Performing
Authority level

4 Assessment Methodology
Assessing competence will be carried out by observation, practical demonstration and questioning.
Plant availability and practicality may dictate an element of simulation.
4.1 Field Assessment Requirements

Eight field assessments are provided covering a range of systems, pressures and activities. To be
deemed competent in the unit Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant the candidate shall
complete the following:
 Any two of assessments 1 to 3
 Any two of assessments 4 to 6
 Assessments 7 and 8
For consistency each site/Installation should decide which six field assessments will be applied
and ensure that the CMAS database is edited to reflect that. Guidance on editing the CMAS
database is available from the CMAS Team if required.
Field Activity System Operating

Assessment Description Pressure
1 Process isolation Non-hazardous <10barg
utilities
2 Process isolation Non-hazardous >10barg
Two from here
utilities <55barg
3 Process isolation Non-hazardous >55barg
utilities
4 Process isolation Process fluid and <10barg
hazardous
utilities
5 Process isolation Process fluid and >10barg
Two from here hazardous <55barg
utilities
6 Process isolation Process fluids >55barg
and hazardous
utilities
7 Process isolation Process fluids Any pressure
and confined space
Both entry operations
8 Plant reinstatement Process fluids >10barg
and leak testing

4.2 Observation, Demonstration and Questioning

The qualified CMAS Assessor will accompany the candidate and observe him in the preparation,
application and removal of the assigned isolations.
Prior to, during and after the practical assessment, relevant questions shall be asked to ensure that
all aspects of the job are addressed and that the underpinning knowledge has been fully
understood and is being applied correctly.
In particular, owing to the criticality and importance of process isolations,
any opportunity to demonstrate competence in carrying out effective isolation procedures shall be
taken; this is particularly important with regard to breaking containment and confined space entry.
4.3 Simulation
Where the opportunity does not exist to assess the candidate either by observation
or demonstration on complex isolations, the competence can be assessed by the use of simulated
scenarios.
Simulation can involve:
 Detailed description of all aspects of applying isolations to a specific system or section of
plant and equipment. The exercise shall include all documentation required, marked up
diagrams and the application of locks and tags
 Answering questions or participating in desktop scenarios, which show the depth of
knowledge gained
Note: Complex isolations which cannot be readily applied and therefore lend themselves to
simulated exercises may include such topics as:
 Confined space and vessel entry
 Actions on not being able to obtain integrity of isolation
 Breaking containment, drain flush and purge
 Leak test and reinstate plant and equipment
4.4 Guidance on the Assessment Process

The extent of assessment required will depend on the experience and prior knowledge of the
individual concerned.
Candidate with No Previous Isolating Experience

A candidate with no previous isolating experience shall work through each of the six field
assessments covering all the sections. The qualified CMAS Assessor shall expect them to
demonstrate satisfactorily their understanding and practical application of all aspects of the BP
SIRP policy as defined in each field assessment section.

Candidate with Previous Isolating Experience

For an existing authorised process isolator the assessment process shall be simplified.
The qualified CMAS Assessor shall use his judgement based on his knowledge of the individual
concerned to establish the level of assessment required to confirm their competency. This may
involve taking them through one of the field assessments in detail to confirm their knowledge and
understanding and then focus on any differences for the other assessments. It could involve,
primarily, simulation as an evidence source. This will be at the discretion of the qualified CMAS
Assessor.
Where records exist of Accredited Prior Experience and Learning (APEL) on the application of
practical isolations and where such experience is still valid (meets the new standard), it can be
considered for use as an assessment in support of competence.
For those who have completed workplace assessments for isolations under previous systems, and
where this material is relevant and current (meets the new standard), credit can be given for this.
The qualified CMAS Assessor will still be required to register the candidate as satisfactory against
six field assessments within the CMAS database adding appropriate comments to substantiate the
assessment judgement.

5 Field Assessment Contents
Field Assessment 1 Isolation – Non-hazardous Utility 10barg

Section 1 Design Isolation Establish minimum level required from Table 2 of the
SIRP document. Design to highest standard reasonably
practicable. Obtain correct P&ID and validate – define
isolation points, vent points, bleed points and mark up
P&ID. Power/energy source location – identify
requirement for other Isolating Authority (electrical).
Identify flushing/purging requirements.
Section 2 Preparation and Prepare locks and labels – review procedure/method
Completion of ICC statement/plan of how task is
to be performed – consider future requirements for
Sanction to Test. Complete ICC – cross-reference to
associated documentation – overrides/inhibits register
updated – appropriate signatories in place.
Section 3 Application of Install isolations – locking of valves – physical
Isolations disconnection – tagging – integrity checks – record
status on ICC  update of locked open/locked closed
valve register.
Section 4 Breaking Flushing and purging method followed. Safeguards for
Containment breaking containment in place (Table 2 – Category A +
B). Potential hazards understood – additional
precautions in place.
Section 5 De-isolate and Confirm isolation integrity prior to de-isolation –
Reinstate Plant lock/tag removal – Isolation Control Certificate (ICC)
and Equipment and associated documentation update – removal of
equipment
and return of area to satisfactory level of housekeeping –
final onsite checks.
Overrides/inhibits removed – register updated. Other
associated registers updated (eg LO/LC register).

Isolation – Non-hazardous Utility

Field Assessment 2
>10barg <55barg
Isolations disconnection – tagging – integrity checks –
record status on ICC  update of locked open/locked
closed valve register.
Reinstate Plant lock/tag removal – ICC and associated documentation
and Equipment update – removal of equipment

Field Assessment 3 Isolation – Non-hazardous Utility 55barg

Section 1 Design Isolation Establish minimum level required from Table 2 of
the SIRP document. Design to highest standard
reasonably practicable. Obtain correct P&ID and
validate – define isolation points, vent points, bleed
points and mark up P&ID. Power/energy source
location – identify requirement for other Isolating
Authority (electrical). Identify flushing/purging
requirements.
Completion of ICC statement/plan of how
task is to be performed – consider future
requirements for Sanction to Test. Complete ICC –
cross-reference to associated documentation –
overrides/inhibits register updated – appropriate
signatories in place.
Section 3 Application of Isolations Install isolations – locking of valves – physical
disconnection – tagging – integrity checks – record
valve register.
Section 4 Breaking Containment Flushing and purging method followed. Safeguards
for breaking containment in place (Table 2 –
Category A + B). Potential hazards understood –
additional precautions in place.
Section 5 De-isolate and Reinstate Confirm isolation integrity prior to de-isolation –
Plant lock/tag removal – ICC and associated
and Equipment documentation update – removal of equipment and
return of area to satisfactory level of housekeeping –

Isolation – Process Fluid and Hazardous Utility

Field Assessment 4
10barg
SIRP document. Design to highest standard
reasonably practicable. Obtain correct P&ID and
validate – define isolation points,
vent points, bleed points and mark up P&ID.
Power/energy source location – identify requirement
for other Isolating Authority (electrical). Identify
flushing/purging requirements.
Completion of ICC statement/plan of how
task is to be performed – consider future
requirements for Sanction to Test. Complete ICC –
cross-reference to associated documentation –
overrides/inhibits register updated – appropriate
signatories in place.
Section 3 Application of Isolations Install isolations – locking of valves – physical
disconnection – tagging – integrity checks – record
valve register.
Section 4 Breaking Containment Flushing and purging method followed. Safeguards
for breaking containment in place (Table 2 –
Category A + B). Potential hazards understood –
additional precautions in place.
Section 5 De-isolate and Reinstate Confirm isolation integrity prior to de-isolation –
Plant lock/tag removal – ICC and associated
and Equipment documentation update – removal of equipment and
return of area to satisfactory level of housekeeping –

Isolation – Process Fluid and Hazardous Utility

Field Assessment 5
>10barg <55barg
valve register.

Isolation – Process Fluid and Hazardous

Field Assessment 6
Utility 55barg
valve register.

Isolation for Confined Space Entry and Confined

Field Assessment 7
Space Entry Operations
Section 1 Design Isolation and Obtain correct P&ID – define isolation points. Spool
Entry Plan removal/positive isolations required. Mark up P&ID.
Vent points, bleed points – identify spools for removal.
Identify flushing/purging requirements – medium to
be used.
Section 2 Preparation for Prepare locks and labels – review procedure/method
Isolation and statement/plan of how task is
Completion of ICC to be performed – consider future requirements for
Section 3 Preparation for Entry Attendance at pre-task Level 2 Risk Assessment.
Operations Preparation of Entry Certificate – gas testing
requirements – vessel cleaning requirements – Entry
Attendant requirements – emergency arrangements.
status on ICC. Use of flange tagging witnessing spade
isolation and updating locked open/locked closed valve
register.
precautions in place if appropriate.
Section 6 Confined Space Entry certificate approval + issue, gas testing and AGT
Entry Operations duties, Entry Attendant duties, work party briefed on
duties, Breathing Apparatus (BA) requirements,
emergency response arrangements, ventilation and
cleaning requirements.

Field Assessment 8 Plant Reinstatement and Leak Testing

Section 1 Define Plan Identify extent of pressure envelope – identify
all joints that have been broken – identify any hazard
within envelope with reference to the
SIRP document. Identify material requirements
for test including the figure for 110% of MAWP,
associated PSV settings, pressure ratings and
valid certification for hoses – pressuring medium –
produce method statement/plan.
Section 2 Preparation Ensure all relevant Work Control Certificates are in the
correct stage – ensure correct signatories have signed for
Sanction to Test (if appropriate) – erect barriers at
worksite – make tannoy announcements – follow the
checklist in Figure 1 of the SIRP document. Ensure all
broken joints are correctly tagged and update the broken
joints register.
Section 3 Performance of Test All safety measures undertaken – site patrolled –
recording of pressure of system during test at suitable
intervals – monitoring of system and adjacent system.
Section 4 Depressuring and Recording of test pressure and any pressure fall-off after
Return to Service it is locked in and isolated – gradual and controlled
pressure reduction – correct use of vents and drains –
correct reinstatement of worksite including preparation
of plant pre-startup checklist and plant line-up prior to
reintroduction
of process fluids.
Section 5 Completion of Sign off relevant Work Control Certificates – ensure test
Documentation and is formally certificated and recorded – carry out visual
Post Test Integrity checks as per the SIRP document.
Checks

Addendum 6
Assurance Protocol
For a usable version of the Assurance protocol, please click here.
Assurance Protocol
December 2009 Issue 1/AM02 Add 6-1
Assurance Protocol
Add 6-2 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol
Assurance Protocol

Guidance on Safe Isolation and Reinstatement of Plant

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North Sea SPU (UK)

Site Technical Practice

Guidance on Practice for

Issuing Adrian Luckins Document Brian Howell

4 Roles and Responsibilities 2

6 Isolation Standards and Planning 6

May 2009 Issue 1 i

7 Isolation Implementation and Control 13

8 Plant Preparation for Breaking Containment 19

9 Confined Space Entry 24

ii May 2009 Issue 1

10 Plant Reinstatement and Leak Testing 33

May 2009 Issue 1 iii

iv December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

Deviation Approval Deviation Approval Deviation Approval

Table 1 ETP/STP Approval Levels for Non-conformance

May 2009 Issue 1 1

4 Roles and Responsibilities

4.2 OIM/Site Controller

2 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

4.3 Area Authority

4.4 Isolating Authority

4.5 Performing Authority

May 2009 Issue 1 3

4.6 Technical Authority

5.2 Isolating Authority Training and Competency

4 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

Area Authority, OIM/Site Controller, Department Heads

In special circumstances such as drilling operations, individuals can be assessed as competent

5.3 Modifications and New Facilities

May 2009 Issue 1 5

6 Isolation Standards and Planning

6.2 Isolation Planning

6 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

6.3 Isolation Methods

6.3.1 Positive Isolation

6.3.2 Double Block and Bleed

May 2009 Issue 1 7

6.3.3 Single Valve Isolation

6.3.4 Other Isolation Devices

6.4 Isolation Standards

8 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

May 2009 Issue 1 9

6.5 Precautions when Breaking Containment

10 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

6.6 Risk Assessment of Non-compliant Isolations

6.7 Isolation for Confined Space Entry

May 2009 Issue 1 11

6.8 Hazards Associated with Mechanical Machinery

12 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

7 Isolation Implementation and Control

7.2 Identification Methods

May 2009 Issue 1 13

 The drawing showing the location of each isolation point

7.3 Flange Tagging for Breaking Containment

7.4 Control of Isolations

14 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

7.5 Control of Isolations for Well Operations Activities

7.6 Boundary Isolations

May 2009 Issue 1 15

7.7 Long-term Isolations

16 December 2009 Issue 1/AM02

7.8 Locked Open/Locked Closed Valves