Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Study

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS
Hazards and Operability ( HAZOP ) Study
PTS 16.71.03
June 2017
© 2017 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form
or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright
owner. PETRONAS Technical Standards are Company’s internal standards and meant for authorized users only.
PTS 16.71.03
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY June 2017
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FOREWORD
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) has been developed based on the accumulated knowledge,
experience and best practices of the PETRONAS group supplementing National and International
standards where appropriate. The key objective of PTS is to ensure standard technical practice
across the PETRONAS group.
Compliance to PTS is compulsory for PETRONAS-operated facilities and Joint Ventures (JVs) where
PETRONAS has more than fifty percent (50%) shareholding and/or operational control, and includes
all phases of work activities.
Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers who use PTS are solely responsible in ensuring the quality of
work, goods and services meet the required design and engineering standards. In the case where
specific requirements are not covered in the PTS, it is the responsibility of the
Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers to propose other proven or internationally established
standards or practices of the same level of quality and integrity as reflected in the PTS.
In issuing and making the PTS available, PETRONAS is not making any warranty on the accuracy or
completeness of the information contained in PTS. The Contractors/manufacturers/suppliers shall
ensure accuracy and completeness of the PTS used for the intended design and engineering
requirement and shall inform the Owner for any conflicting requirement with other international
codes and technical standards before start of any work.
PETRONAS is the sole copyright holder of PTS. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, recording
or otherwise) or be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever, without the prior
written consent of PETRONAS.
The PTS shall be used exclusively for the authorised purpose. The users shall arrange for PTS to be
kept in safe custody and shall ensure its secrecy is maintained and provide satisfactory information
to PETRONAS that this requirement is met.
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Table of Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 4
1.1 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................ 5
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS ................................................................................................ 5
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES ........................................................................................... 6
2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT ................................................................................... 7
2.1 TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION .................................................................................... 7
2.2 HAZOP STUDY LEADER .............................................................................................. 7
2.3 HAZOP STUDY SCRIBE ............................................................................................... 8
2.4 HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS ............................................................................... 9
3.0 THE TECHNIQUE OF HAZOP STUDY ...................................................................10
3.1 HAZOP STUDY IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE ................................................................. 10
3.2 HAZOP STUDY IN EXISTING OPERATING FACILITY .................................................. 10
3.3 INTERFACE WITH THE HAZARD AND EFFECT REGISTER (HER) ................................ 11
3.4 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 12
3.5 HAZOP STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING ......................................................... 17
3.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP................................................. 18
3.7 OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE ........................................................... 18
4.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................20
APPENDIX 1 – HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS ...........................................21
APPENDIX 2 – DETAILS OF HAZOP STUDY TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE .......................23
APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS .............................................25
APPENDIX 4 – TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET ......................................................26
APPENDIX 5 – HAZOP STUDY REPORT CONTENT...........................................................27
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This PTS provides the minimum technical requirements for Hazards and Operability
(HAZOP) study. This PTS complement GHSE through HSEMS (refer PTS 18.00.01), HEMP
(refer PTS 18.04.02) and PHA (refer PTS 18.53.04).
HAZOP study is a structured hazard identification tool using deviation analysis by a

multi-discipline team for the identification of process hazards in the design and operation
phase of a facility.
The objective of a HAZOP study is to carry out a rigorous and systematic evaluation of
process systems with respect to operational safety and potential hazards with foreseeable
upsetting conditions. This can be summarized as follows:
i. To identify/analyse potential hazards and operability issues due to deviations

from normal process or operating conditions or intended design in a systematic
manner.
ii. To evaluate the adequacy of the existing safeguards with respect to safety and
operations to address the causes and / or the consequences.
iii. To identify additional safeguards required for the system under study to
address the causes and minimise the consequences of deviation.
iv. To recommend ways to mitigate the Consequences of deviations and return to
normal and safe operations.
HAZOP study represent one of the methods available to be applied in the Hazard
Identification phase of HEMP, which is the methodology employed to achieve
demonstrably the HSE objectives which are defined in, and to be managed by the HSEMS.
The relationship between this document and its component parts and HSEMS is shown
schematically in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: HSEMS Relations with HAZOP study

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1.1 SCOPE
This PTS shall be applied to the development, planning, implementation, follow up, auditing
and reviewing of HAZOP study within PETRONAS new and existing facilities covering
upstream and downstream.
HAZOP study can be applied for the following situations.

i. Greenfield developments
ii. Brownfield projects
iii. PHA
iv. MOC
v. OP
1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations
Refer to PTS 00.01.03 for PTS Requirements, General Definition Of Terms, Abbreviations
& Reading Guide.
1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms
None
1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations
No Abbreviation Description
1 ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
2 CIMAH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards
3 CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
4 DOSO Demonstration of Safe Operation
5 FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis
6 HAZID Hazard Identification
7 HER Hazard and Effect Register
8 HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process

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No Abbreviation Description
9 HSEMS Health, Safety and Environment Management System
10 LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis
11 LOC Loss of Containment
12 MOC Management of Change
13 PEFS Process Engineering Flow Schemes
14 PFS Process Flow Schemes
15 PHA Process Hazard Analysis
16 PRD Pressure Relief Device
17 PSI Process Safety Information
18 QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
19 SDV Shut Down Valve
20 SDS Safety Data Sheet
21 TOR Terms of Reference

Table 1.1: Specific Abbreviations
1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES
This PTS 16.71.03 (June 2017) replaces PTS 16.71.03 (May 2014).
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2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT
2.1 TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION
2.1.1 Design review shall be conducted prior to HAZOP study. The comments and agreed actions
must be incorporated into the design in order for the HAZOP study to be effective.
2.1.2 HAZOP study shall be included in the Project Schedule on the critical path, with the
availability of PSI (refer to PTS 18.53.03).
2.1.3 The HAZOP study team shall consist of multi-disciplinary personnel due to the
brainstorming methodology relies on the broad experience of the team to identify potential
hazards and operability problems (refer to section 2.4).
2.1.4 HAZOP study Leader shall be independent of the specific facility / project under study to
ensure impartial assessment.
2.1.5 Facility/Project owner shall approve the HAZOP study final report.
2.1.6 The relevant Facility/Project Owner for each HAZOP Study shall be accountable for the
implementation of the HAZOP study recommendations. Responsible action parties (e.g.
designer, operation, engineers) shall be responsible for the closed out of the action items.
2.1.7 Each Facility/Project Owner should develop their site specific HAZOP study TOR/procedures
based on this PTS.
2.2 HAZOP STUDY LEADER
2.2.1 Roles & Responsibilities
The main role of the HAZOP study Leader can be broken down into the following sections:
i. Preparation
ii. Facilitate the HAZOP study
iii. Produce HAZOP study report
iv. Clarification of HAZOP study recommendations (if required)
2.2.2 Competency
HAZOP study Leader shall be certified by PETRONAS or its approved equivalent certification
by relevant risk management service provider with minimum competency requirement as
follows:
i. Experience
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a) Has work and acquire skills in the oil, gas and petrochemical industry,
both in theoretical and practical application of the design and
operation of oil and gas production/processing facilities.
b) Adequate knowledge of equipment, procedural and human failures
that can lead to major incidents, with a sound appreciation of process
design and safeguarding.
c) Adequate knowledge of process, equipment, procedural and human
failures that can lead to major accidents, with a sound application of
process design and operation.
ii. Training
a) Attended recognized HAZOP study leadership course, which meets the
requirements of this PTS.
b) Undergone mentoring with subsequent recommendation from a
competent HAZOP study Leader.
c) Appreciation of other risk assessment techniques (e.g. LOPA, HAZID,
QRA)
iii. Facilitation skills

a) Hazard identification skill.
b) Suitable application of the HAZOP study methodology to identify
significant hazards and issues.
iv. Time management skills

a) Ability to plan the study in depth and estimate the time required for
the HAZOP study. This includes maintaining the pace and momentum
of study and suitable allocation of time for deliberation of issues.
v. Communications/motivation skills
a) Able to keep the team’s focus and working together and motivate all
members of the team.
b) Form a good working relationship with the Scribe and supervise the
Scribe's work to ensure that adequate minutes are recorded.
2.3 HAZOP STUDY SCRIBE
The role of HAZOP study Scribe is to record discussions during the HAZOP study. The record
shall be complete, clear, and accurate. This includes a complete record of points discussed
and not just a record of recommendation.
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2.3.2 Competency
HAZOP study Scribe should have training and experience similar to that required by the
Leader. The Scribe should also be able to take minutes in a concise and accurate manner.
2.4 HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS
HAZOP study team members are responsible for providing essential information and input
through active involvement in workshop and contribute their skills, knowledge and
experience to the process.
2.4.2 Competency
HAZOP study team member shall have minimum competency requirement as follows:
i. Minimum requirement of senior engineer or senior technician with sufficient

experience and knowledge of respective area and discipline both in theoretical
and practical application of the design and operation of the facility / unit under
study.
ii. Team member shall have sound knowledge in codes, standards.
iii. Adequate knowledge to anticipate potential equipment, procedural and

human failures operational with a sound appreciation of process design and
safeguarding.
Detail description of function for individual discipline for HAZOP study team member is
summarized in Appendix 1.
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3.0 THE TECHNIQUE OF HAZOP STUDY
3.1 HAZOP STUDY IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE
During a project lifecycle, different types of HAZOP studies are applied at different stages
during course of the project as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. The sequence of HAZOP studies
should be planned, varying in scope from conceptual to detail. Details of each type of
HAZOP study in a project lifecycle (based on PETRONAS Project Management System,
PPMS) are described in Appendix 2.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of HAZOP Studies throughout a Project Lifecycle
3.2 HAZOP STUDY IN EXISTING OPERATING FACILITY
3.2.1 Facility in Operation
Existing facilities have an inherent hazard potential and may undergo modifications or
debottlenecking several times. Whilst, older facilities may never been subjected to any
HAZOP study or other comprehensive safety studies. Therefore to demonstrate adequate
management of hazards for existing facilities, PHA study is required and HAZOP study shall
be the main methodology.
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3.2.2 Revamp/modification projects (brown-field developments)
HAZOP study shall be conducted on relevant MOC to ensure that the proposed modification
is safe and operable. Interfaces between the modification and the existing facilities must
not jeopardise the original design basis of the facilities.
The requirements when preparing for a HAZOP study on a brown-field project are:
i. Sufficient information shall be available to the HAZOP study team to assess the
simultaneous operating mode risks. The design must clearly identify and
address simultaneous operating modes whilst the new facility is being
constructed and commissioned
ii. The physical interfaces of the new with the existing installation shall be clearly
shown on the HAZOP study drawings. Prior to the study the process engineer
shall analyse the extent to which the process parameters change within the
existing facilities due to the modification (including those that have to be made
to other systems to accommodate the new facilities, e.g. changes in relief valve
sizes).
iii. Nodes should include all parts of the existing facilities where a change in
process conditions is caused as a result of the modification. Likewise the
operator shall analyse the applicability of existing procedures to the
modification and the applicability of any modified procedures to the
modifications as well as to the existing facility.
iv. The selection of the nodes for a modification HAZOP study should reflect the
interfaces with, and allow analysis of, the effects on the surrounding systems.
v. The HAZOP study should focus on ensuring that the philosophy is consistently
applied across the modifications to achieve a safe design.
vi. Sufficient design and operating information must be available for all common
systems (vents, drains, etc.) as well as the existing facility local to the tie-in
points liable to be affected by the new development.
vii. The interfaces between the new and existing facility (tie-in points, etc.) must
be sufficiently understood and documented so that the team can establish if
any hazards can cross the boundary.
3.3 INTERFACE WITH THE HAZARD AND EFFECT REGISTER (HER)
The HER shall provide information of the HSE hazards pertinent to the facility/project to
the HAZOP study team as part of the information package for the HAZOP study. Once the
HAZOP study completed, the HAZOP study final report shall provide the reference to the
HER for detail scenarios and safeguard of process hazards in the facility/project.
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3.4 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY
3.4.1 PREPARATION
Activities that shall be carried out prior to HAZOP study sessions to ensure effectiveness of
the HAZOP study is described below:
Team Selection
HAZOP study Leader shall identify the balanced team members to provide an appropriate
level of project/process knowledge coupled with independent members providing relevant
expertise based on the scope of HAZOP study stated in the TOR. Appendix 1 provides a
guideline on selecting HAZOP study team members.
Resource Planning and Scheduling
HAZOP study Leader shall ensure the following are available;
i. Update and finalized information package (e.g. PEFS, SDS, plot plan, Cause and
Effect Diagram)
ii. Tools (e.g. briefing package, software)
iii. Administrative requirements (e.g. room, refreshments, meeting notification)
HAZOP study Leader shall plan and schedule the HAZOP study based on the node identified
to optimize time and resources.
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3.4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP STUDY

The HAZOP study work flow is summarized in Figure 3.2 below. The work flow is also
applicable for other HAZOP study techniques e.g. Batch Process, Activity Base and
Procedural.
Figure 3.2 HAZOP study work flow

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Establish Scope of HAZOP study
HAZOP study Leader shall establish the scope of the study stated in the TOR, appropriate
HAZOP study technique and the assumptions with agreement with team members to be
applied throughout the studies. Basis of HAZOP study is as follows;
i. Only single failure results in hazard – no double jeopardy.
ii. Facilities are well maintained and operated with acceptable standard and in
accordance with applicable Operating Procedure.
iii. Operators have been trained to perform the Operations as per Operating
Procedure and HSE requirements.
iv. Maintenance Technician have been trained to perform the maintenance as per
Maintenance Procedure and HSE requirements.
v. Piping, valves and equipment are well designed, with proper material selected,
installed, maintained and inspected regularly under a wall thickness/corrosion
monitoring program.
vi. Equipment, valves and piping have been given adequate design pressures and
adequate maximum and minimum design temperatures, reflecting start-up,
operation, capacity changes and shutdown conditions.
vii. Safeguards (e.g. PRD, SDV, etc.) failure is not a cause of a process deviation
since it is expected to function and maintained according to its performance
criteria.
viii. Piping and instrumentation diagrams reflect actual field conditions.
ix. Fire protection and mitigation equipment is installed, adequately sized,

functional, and tested as necessary to ensure reliability.
x. Over-pressuring and exceeding design specifications have the potential for loss
of containment (LOC), and any LOC of hydrocarbons may cause a fire or
explosion should it reach a source of ignition.
xi. Electrical classification of equipment is correct for the hazardous material in

the unit.
xii. Check valves associated with this unit will likely prevent reverse flow, but not
necessarily reverse pressure.
xiii. External forces, such as tidal waves, hurricanes, tornadoes, acts of sabotage,
etc. will not be considered in this HAZOP study.
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Careful consideration should be taken when applying these assumptions so that significant
hazard will not be overlooked.
Divide System into Node
HAZOP study Leader and with agreement with team members shall determine the selection
of the node sizes and the route through the systems before starting the study. HAZOP study
Leader shall select and mark up the nodes in the document for differentiation and assist
the study.
The HAZOP study Leader shall select the nodes based on;
i. Manageable segment of system which has distinct design intent. The node,
typically comprise one major equipment (vessels, etc.), associated minor
equipment (pumps, valves, etc.), instrumentation, and other ancillary
equipment
ii. Direction of Process flow
iii. Start and end at an isolation point (valve or equipment item) of where the line
enters or leaves the PEFS
Define a Node and Design Intent
HAZOP study Leader with assistant with team member shall define and record the node
and its design intent. The design intent should provide specific information on how the
node will be operated under all system operating conditions (described parameters such as
pressure, temperature, flow rate, level, etc.).
HAZOP study team member should give a brief description of the design intent and also
specific hazard at the beginning of each node and give a brief step by-step description of
start-up and shutdown actions.
Select Parameter and Deviation
HAZOP study Leader shall select and record the parameter and deviation relevant to the
nodes, mode of operation and HAZOP study technique applied.
Appendix 3 shows the list of parameters and guidewords normally used in various types of
HAZOP study technique.
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Identify all Possible Causes
HAZOP study team shall identify and record all possible causes of a node guided by the
parameter and deviation selected.
The possible causes shall be within the node (Except for nodes at interfaces, battery limit
or beginning of a system), credible and specific in the description. Avoid double jeopardy
scenarios but not to be mistaken with latent failure. Brainstorm and list all the possible
cause before proceeding with the consequence.
Assess all Credible Consequences
HAZOP study team shall assess and record the credible consequences of each cause by
assuming there is no safeguard in place.
The consequence statement shall consist of the initial system response to the worst
credible consequence. Consequence also can be upstream or downstream of the node
under study but not as detail as within node. Consequences should consider the effect to
People, Environment, Asset or Reputation.
Identify Existing Safeguard
HAZOP study team shall identify and record the existing safeguards. The safeguards can be
within or outside the node (upstream or downstream). Safeguard shall be able to address
causes and consequences. The number of independent safeguards required shall be
determine to ensure the risk is ALARP.
Safeguards can be categorized into these three types:
i. Prevention - prevents deviation from happening (e.g. check valves, relief, trip
system)
ii. Detection - detects causes or consequences (e.g. alarms, gas detectors)
iii. Mitigation - control or reduce the consequences (e.g. fire fighting system, tank
bund )
Credit to operator intervention in responding to alarm can be considered only if operator:
i. Is aware of the process deviation (i.e. alarm to DCS panel).
ii. Has a simple obvious possible response.
iii. Has sufficient time to respond to an alarm (for analysis, decision and response
time). In this case, the alarm would be considered as a safeguard, as the
opposite of the operator response which is not considered independent;
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iv. In the case of a manual work, operator training can be taken as a safeguard for
a manual activity with the presumption that the operator is physically there to
monitor the manual work and hence can respond to any deviation from
normal.
Propose Recommendations
HAZOP study team shall propose and record recommendations when they feel that existing
safeguarding system is not adequate to protect the system under study. The HAZOP study
recommendation shall address the cause and/or the consequences.
HAZOP study team shall propose recommendations and the underlying rationale.
Recommendations should be presented in the form:
i. What is required to be done
ii. Where the recommendation applies
iii. Why the recommendation should be implemented (to avoid what)
Risk ranking of recommendation is not required for HAZOP study other than for existing
facility cyclic PHA study. HAZOP study Leader shall identify action party for any
recommendation(s) issued.
Recommendations can generally come in two forms:
i. Definitive – Recommendations that are implementable as they stand.
ii. Initiating – Recommendations that initiate further work to clarify the required
Actions
3.5 HAZOP STUDY RECORDING AND REPORTING
HAZOP study discussion shall be recorded in HAZOP study worksheet (see Appendix 4 for
typical HAZOP study worksheet). The record shall be complete and accurate. This includes
recording all deviation discussed even though the deviation does not cause significant
consequences and no recommendation generated.
HAZOP study Leader shall prepare the HAZOP study report after completion of a study. The
HAZOP study report is an important document describing the objectives and success of the
whole study and is used to compile and preserve the results of the study for future
reference.
HAZOP study final report format shall contain the follow reporting contents as shown in
Appendix 5. The draft final report shall be reviewed by relevant parties prior to the formal
and, timely issue. HAZOP study final report shall be distributed to relevant parties affected
by the HAZOP study.
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3.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS AND FOLLOW UP
The recommendations arising from the HAZOP study shall be presented to the
Facility/Project Owner by the HAZOP study Leader or representative. This provides an
opportunity to challenge the recommendations and to agree on actions, assign
responsibilities and define priorities for implementation. Where the priority of a
recommendation is downgraded or the recommendation is rejected, this shall be
supported by a sound justification, verified by Technical Authority and formally
documented. All HAZOP recommendations shall(PSR) be implemented.
3.7 OTHER TYPE OF HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE

Other variation of HAZOP study technique for special cases or situations are;
i. Batch Process
ii. Activity Based
iii. Procedural
3.7.1 Batch Process HAZOP Study
The HAZOP study method for batch processes deals with each part of the facility in exactly
the same manner as the more familiar method for continuous processes. Differences occur
when the team examines the changes in facility configuration as the steps in the batch
process are progressed.
The status of the system changes frequently and in order to perform an adequate study,
the valve positions and process conditions must be adequately described for each separate
stage. As these are normally cyclical operations, it may be necessary to prepare diagrams
showing the status of each line and vessel throughout the process.
Operating instructions, including logic diagrams or instrument sequence diagrams, are

essential in understanding the steps. Time-dependent concepts (sooner/later) are added
to the guide words.
3.7.2 Activity Based HAZOP Study
The activity based HAZOP study technique consists of the systematic critical search for
deviations and hazards applied to activities and the facilities involved in operations. The
technique examines sequences of mechanical and manual handling operations. Such
activities may be:
i. Drilling
ii. Unloading at a jetty

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iii. Well workover
iv. Shutdown
The basic technique is the same as other HAZOP studies. Specific activity guide words, etc.
are used. These include incorrect activity and the time/movement elements of movement
and early/late operation. Additional parameters included are: time, decision and position.
The recommendations from an activity based HAZOP study are not necessarily limited to
the operating procedures. Changes both to the design of the equipment and the operating
procedures may be suggested.
3.7.3 Procedural HAZOP Study
Procedural HAZOP study can be perform to evaluate each steps during development of
procedure and also a structure methodology for revising/modifying procedures. They are
usually conducted on the activities such as:
i. Commissioning
ii. Inspections
iii. Start-up
iv. Maintenance
v. Facility testing
vi. Shutdown
vii. Emergency
viii. Abnormal
The standard guide words of No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse and Other Than
take slightly different meanings. The results will specifically affect the procedures and in
some cases may have an impact on the design of the equipment.
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4.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY
In this PTS, reference is made to the following Standards/Publications. Unless specifically

designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any
supplements / revisions thereto:
PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Index to PTS and Guideline PTS 00.01.01
PTS Requirements, General Definition of Terms & PTS 00.01.03
Reading Guide
Health, Safety and Environment Management PTS 18.00.01
System (HSE MS)
Hazards and Effects Management Process PTS 18.04.02
Process Safety Information (PSI) PTS 18.53.03
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) PTS 18.53.04
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process (CCPS)

Risk Assessment, October 2001
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APPENDIX 1 – HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBER FUNCTIONS

Type of HAZOP
Team Member ROLE Activity
Coarse Detail Mini Final Batch Procedural
Based
Process Engineer Provide expertise on the
process design and
intended operation of the
facility. Has a full
knowledge of the design
history of the part of the
C C C C C C C
facility being studied as
well as a deep overall
understanding of the whole
facility.
Project Engineer Provide the commercial as

well as technical
constraints on the project. P P P P
Operations Provide expertise

Personnel information on intended
work practices as well as
experience of operating
issues on similar
equipment. If the study is
undertaken during a
C C C C C C C
contractor’s design phase,
the Facility/Project Owner
shall supply the
operational input rather
than the Contractor.
Maintenance Provide expertise

Personnel information on
maintenance issues on
similar equipment and
C C C C C C C
constraint in performing
maintenance on the
equipment.
Instrument Provide expertise on

(Control Systems) instrumentation control
Engineer and automatic protection
C C P C P
devices and their
application.
HSE Engineer/ Provide expertise on

specialist consequence assessment
(flame length, etc.),
historical failure P P P P P P P
probabilities and specific
regulations or standard.
Machinery Provide expertise on

specialists machinery and packaged
P P P P P
equipment.
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Type of HAZOP
Team Member ROLE Activity
Coarse Detail Mini Final Batch Procedural
Based
Vendor’s Provide expertise on
representatives vendor designs while the
package is studied. The
level of representation will P P P P P
depend on the size and
complexity of the package.
Civil/ Structural Provide expertise on

Engineers civil/structural and specific
sections of the facility, e.g.
P P P P
drainage routing.
Specialist Provide expertise on

Engineers specific discipline.
(piping, Examples would be the
instrumentation, need for electrical
electrical, engineers when
corrosion, etc.) considering the interface P P P P P P P
between power utilities
and the facility, and the
potential for common
mode failures.
NOTE(S): C = Core team member, P = Part time team member

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APPENDIX 2 – DETAILS OF HAZOP STUDY TYPES IN PROJECT LIFE CYCLE

HAZOP Study
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types
It is intended to be The requirement of the coarse The Coarse HAZOP study is This project stage
used early in a HAZOP study is typically at the performed on PFD showing is the most
project's life where end of the development of all the major line of the appropriate time
there is still the ability the project’s basis for design. equipment. The key to call for
to change the design, The documents required are: objective is to make the detailed QRA
operating and facility inherently safe, studies or other
maintenance policy.  Process Flow Schemes (PFS) optimise the design and supporting
The facility is divided  Full mass balance minimise any significant investigations.
into a small number of information rework, which would cause
large nodes  Plot layout slippage of the schedule. This
appropriate for an  Process description study presents the best
early stage in the including all operating opportunity to challenge
COARSE HAZOP design development. modes many of the basic process
STUDY  Project definition including assumptions used in the
life-cycle issues and planned design.
facility flexibility
 HSE Safety Policy/
Philosophy
 Preliminary operating and
maintenance philosophy
and product off-take
constraints.
This is the primary This study should be held at The Detail HAZOP study is The detailed
HAZOP study for any the end of the project performed on the Approved report of the
project using the full specification phase (front end For Design (AFD) Process study should
technique and engineering phase) of a Engineering Flow Schemes catalogue all the
addressing all the project (PEFS) signed off by the hazards identified
details of the facility. It The documents required are: Project Manager. Any and all areas
is the most  Process Engineering Flow changes to the PEFS where there was
comprehensive study Schemes (PEFS) following this HAZOP study insufficient
in the project and  Process Flow Schemes (PFS) should be covered by formal information or
examines in great  Plot Plans Management of Change. Its gaps in the
detail all aspects of the  Cause and Effect Diagrams objective is the assurance of knowledge of the
design  Process Safeguarding the HSE safety of the current team.
Drawings design (‘Will it Work?’)
 Interconnection Diagrams rather than making radical
and old PEFS recommendations for
DETAIL change.
 Legend details
HAZOP STUDY
 Local population densities
and infrastructure, areas of
particular sensitivity (local
rivers, marshes, etc.).
 Operating Philosophy
 HSE Safety Policy/
Philosophy
 Evacuation Philosophy
 Previous HAZOP study final
report/action lists
PTS 16.71.03
Page 24 of 28
HAZOP Study
Description Timing & Documentation Scope & Purpose Results
Types
The technique is the This study is held at the end of The concept is to extend the At the end of this
same as the Detail the detailed design stage Detail HAZOP study, picking meeting the
HAZOP Study except when drawings are ready to up on details that were not design should be
that the study focuses Approve for Construction The available at the last meeting, finalized and the
on changes since the PEFS should be of pre- and concentrating on the HAZOP Study
Detail HAZOP Study. Approved For Construction changes to the design, and exercise
(AFC) standard and signed off the additional vendor details. complete. The
The final study is as agreed for the HAZOP AFC drawings
FINAL HAZOP
required to look at study. Any changes to the PEFS should be
STUDY
changes made to the following this study should be finalized once the
Approved For Design covered by formal recommendation
(AFD) drawings Management of Change. s of this study
resulting from the have been
contractor’s detailed reviewed and
design effort and the incorporated.
availability of vendor’s
information.
The methodology is This study, linked to a The HAZOP studies is carry The detailed
similar to that of a Management of Change, can out for minor changes to the report of the
HAZOP study for a be applied at any stage in the drawings following the Detail study should
brown-field design development or HAZOP study to confirm that catalogue all the
development. subsequent operation of the the changes in the design it hazards identified
MINOR
facility to assess proposed does not affect the safety of and all areas
CHANGE MINI-
changes. The documents the main facility. where there was
HAZOP STUDY
require are similar to Detail insufficient
HAZOP study but focus on the information or
change. gaps in the
knowledge of the
team.
PTS 16.71.03
Page 25 of 28
APPENDIX 3 – LIST OF PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS
DEVIATION HAZOP TYPE

PARAMETER GUIDEWORDS CONTINUOUS BATCH PROCEDURAL COARSE
PROCESS PROCESS / ACTIVITY
FLOW NO  
MORE  
LESS  
REVERSE/MISDIRECT  
PRESSURE MORE  
LESS  
LEVEL MORE  
LESS  
TEMPERATURE MORE 
LESS 
TIME NO  
MORE  
LESS  
WRONG  
SAME  
STEP TOO LATE 
TOO EARLY 
LEFT OUT 
BACKWARD 
ACTION NONE  
REVERSE (WRONG)  
MORE  
LESS  
SEQUENCE OTHER THAN  
INFORMATION NONE 
REVERSE (WRONG) 
MORE 
LESS 
RELIEF OTHER THAN  
CONTAMINATION AS WELL AS   
COMPOSITION PART OF   
IGNITION / STATIC OTHER THAN  
UTILITY FAILURE OTHER THAN  
ABNORMAL OPERATION OTHER THAN  
SAMPLING OTHER THAN  
MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN  
CORROSION/ EROSION OTHER THAN   
FACILITY SITING OTHER THAN  
HUMAN FACTOR OTHER THAN   
PTS 16.71.03
HAZARDS AND OPERABILITY STUDY - HAZOP June 2017
Page 26 of 28
APPENDIX 4 – TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY WORKSHEET
HAZOP Study Worksheet Project Title Company Name

Project Contract No.
Meeting Date: Leader: Node : 1.01
Node Details: Scribe: PEFS:
PROTECTION /
GUIDE WORD PARAMETER DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES RECOMMENDATIONS BY
SAFEGUARDS
No Flow No Flow
More Flow More Flow
Less Flow Less Flow
Reverse Flow Reverse Flow
More Pressure More Pressure
Less Level Less Level
Other Than Sampling Other Than
Sampling
PTS 16.71.03
Page 27 of 28
APPENDIX 5 – HAZOP STUDY REPORT CONTENT
The HAZOP study report should contain the following sections:
1.0 Introduction
The introduction to the HAZOP study report should contain short descriptions of the
following:
 The background to the project and the scope of the HAZOP study.
 The purpose and achievements of the meeting should be described.
 The terms of reference given prior to the HAZOP study and other safety studies
or HAZOP study reports used for reference.
 Schedule of the meeting
 The composition and affiliation of the team including the attendance of part-
time members at each session.
 Methodology of HAZOP study adopted stating any variations from normal

HAZOP practice for the study.
 Facility areas not covered because they were outside the scope of the study or
documentation or key personnel were not available.
 Description of the facility.
2.0 Quality of the Study
An objective assessment of the quality of the study and the reliance, which may be placed
on the results based on team composition, experience and their performance. The main
study findings should be discussed in the report. A list of the (top ten or so) major issues is
helpful to the response co-ordinator in expediting the important ones first.
3.0 Areas of Potential Weakness
Highlights potential weakness of the study such as a lack of specialist knowledge or

incomplete drawings.
4.0 HAZOP Study Recommendations
List of all agreed HAZOP study recommendations and action parties
5.0 Further Studies Required
Additional risk assessment studies that may be required to further analyse the hazardous
scenarios e.g. FMEA, LOPA, QRA.
PTS 16.71.03
Page 28 of 28
6.0 Appendices
The appendices should contain the following information:
 List of guide words used
 Node list
 Worksheets
 Drawings (master set)
 List of background reference documents.

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PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

Hazards and Operability ( HAZOP ) Study

© 2017 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

HAZOP study is a structured hazard identification tool using deviation analysis by a

i. To identify/analyse potential hazards and operability issues due to deviations

Figure 1.1: HSEMS Relations with HAZOP study

HAZOP study can be applied for the following situations.

1.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

1.2.1 General Definition of Terms & Abbreviations

1.2.2 Specific Definition of Terms

1.2.3 Specific Abbreviations

1 ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

2 CIMAH Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards

3 CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

4 DOSO Demonstration of Safe Operation

5 FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis

6 HAZID Hazard Identification

7 HER Hazard and Effect Register

8 HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process

9 HSEMS Health, Safety and Environment Management System

10 LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis

11 LOC Loss of Containment

12 MOC Management of Change

13 PEFS Process Engineering Flow Schemes

14 PFS Process Flow Schemes

15 PHA Process Hazard Analysis

16 PRD Pressure Relief Device

17 PSI Process Safety Information

18 QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

19 SDV Shut Down Valve

20 SDS Safety Data Sheet

21 TOR Terms of Reference

1.3 SUMMARY OF CHANGES

2.0 GENERAL REQUIREMENT

2.1 TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION

2.2 HAZOP STUDY LEADER

2.2.1 Roles & Responsibilities

ii. Facilitate the HAZOP study

iii. Produce HAZOP study report

iv. Clarification of HAZOP study recommendations (if required)

iii. Facilitation skills

iv. Time management skills

2.3 HAZOP STUDY SCRIBE

2.3.1 Roles & Responsibilities

2.4 HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

2.4.1 Roles & Responsibilities

i. Minimum requirement of senior engineer or senior technician with sufficient

ii. Team member shall have sound knowledge in codes, standards.

iii. Adequate knowledge to anticipate potential equipment, procedural and

3.0 THE TECHNIQUE OF HAZOP STUDY

3.1 HAZOP STUDY IN A PROJECT LIFECYCLE

Figure 3.1: Sequence of HAZOP Studies throughout a Project Lifecycle

3.2 HAZOP STUDY IN EXISTING OPERATING FACILITY

3.2.1 Facility in Operation

3.2.2 Revamp/modification projects (brown-field developments)

3.3 INTERFACE WITH THE HAZARD AND EFFECT REGISTER (HER)

3.4 HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY

Resource Planning and Scheduling

HAZOP study Leader shall ensure the following are available;

ii. Tools (e.g. briefing package, software)

iii. Administrative requirements (e.g. room, refreshments, meeting notification)

3.4.2 CONDUCTING HAZOP STUDY

Figure 3.2 HAZOP study work flow