Diambrang v. Comelec and H.

Hamim Sarip Patad 805 SCRA 608

G.R. No. 201809, October 11, 2016 
digested by: Jennifer D. Fementira

Facts:
Petitioner H. Sohria Pasagi Diambrang (Diambrang) and respondent H. Hamim Sarip Patad (Patad) were
candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte in the 25 October
2010 Barangay Elections. Patad obtained 183 votes while Diambrang obtained 78 votes. However, the
Barangay Board of Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed Diambrang as the duly elected Punong Barangay
based on the assumption that Patad was disqualified for being a fugitive from justice. The BBOC’s
assumption was, in turn, based on the recommendation of the Provincial Election Supervisor that was
not yet final and executory because the COMELEC had not issued any ruling on the matter.

Patad filed a petition to annul Diambrang’s proclamation.

On August 11 2011, the COMELEC Second Division annulled Diambrang’s proclamation. The COMELEC
Second Division ruled that the BBOC of Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in proclaiming Diambrang as the duly elected Punong
Barangay based solely on the recommendation of the Provincial Election Supervisor.

In its Resolution promulgated on 30 January 2012, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the proclamation of
Diambrang and ordered the first ranked Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Kaludan to succeed as the new
Punong Barangay.

In its 14 November 2011 Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc granted the Petition to Disqualify and/or
Deny Due Course to the Certificate of Candidacy of Patad on the ground that he is a fugitive from justice
and thus disqualified from running for public office.

The COMELEC En Banc ruled that despite Patad’s disqualification, Diambrang, who garnered the next
highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay. Having lost the
elections, Diambrang is not entitled to be declared elected. Instead, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that
the vacant position should be filled by the first ranked Kagawad pursuant to Section 44(b) of the Local
Government Code.

Issue:
Whether Diambrang can be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay in view of Patad’s
disqualification.

Ruling:
Yes, Diambrang being the first-placer among the qualified candidates, should have been proclaimed as
the duly elected Punong Barangay. However, due to supervening events (election of a new Punong
Barangay during the subsequent October 28, 2013 Barangay Elections), Diambrang can no longer hold
office.

Effects of Void Ab Initio Certificate of Candidacy as ruled in Jalosjos vs Comelec

On 9 October 2012, this Court promulgated its ruling in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections where
the Court held:
 Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-
placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate
of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law that took effect, or a legal impediment that took effect,
after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void  ab initio, then
legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the
elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be
counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy
void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate
should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning.
This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate
to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Ruling in Maquiling vs Comelec

The Court held in Maquiling, as ruled in recent cases of Aratea vs COMELEC and Jalosjos vs COMELEC,
that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.

xxx When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

xxx

The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate's disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Prevailing rule if the COC is void ab initio:

Clearly, the prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of candidacy is void  ab initio, the candidate is not
considered a candidate from the very beginning even if his certificate of candidacy was cancelled after
the elections.

In this case
Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice. It does not matter that the
disqualification case against him was finally decided by the COMELEC  En Banc only on 14 November
2011. Patad's certificate of candidacy was void  ab initio. As such, Diambrang, being the first-placer
among the qualified candidates, should have been proclaimed as the dulyelected Punong Barangay of
Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. However, due to supervening events as we previously
discussed, Diambrang can no longer hold office.
Aldovino Jr. vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009
digested by: Jennifer D. Fementira

Facts:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during
his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with
a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension
order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. 

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon
B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course
to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served
for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. 

The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

Issue:
Whether Asilo’s preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4th term.

Ruling:
No, Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in
2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions on the Three-term Limit Rule

1. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

2. Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in
wording does not assume any significance in this case.

First Branch of the Three-term Limit Rule

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Second Branch of the Three-term Limit Rule

The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the
limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary
renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected." This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the
first branch.

The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based
on the surenderee’s own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice.
In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is
presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.

Interpretation and purpose of the term “voluntary renunciation”

The framers’ intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-
term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of
defeating the three-term limit rule. 

Relevant Jurisprudence on the Three-Term Limit Rule

1. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on
the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the
proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a
final and executory judgment. The Court ruled that the two requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms) were not present.
xxx intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title,
that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable. xxx the intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is
severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable.

2. In Ong vs Alegre, the Court, despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to office (and thus was
never validly elected) concluded that there was nevertheless an election and service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.

In Rivera, the Court rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest was merely a
"caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer." xxx Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he
exercised the powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they
directly imply. Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to
the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service
for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule.
Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather
than its exception. 

3. Adormeo v. Commission on Elections dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit
disqualification. The case presented the question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost
in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a recall election covering that term.
The Court upheld the COMELEC’s ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms.
The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity
of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the election for the third term.
4. In Socrates vs Commission on Election, after three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like
a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like
a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term
as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election
mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate
reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive
fourth term.

5. In Latasa vs Commision on Elections, should a municipal mayor who had fully served for three-
consecutive terms, be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and
inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the
Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

6. Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,
where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of
law. xxx The Court ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor.  Xxx
The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated
the office of councilor and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he
ceased to be councilor – an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the three-term
limit rule.

“Interruption”
"interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his
office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. 

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered
an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his
office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service.

Preventive Suspension
Preventive suspension – whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, or the Ombudsman Act – is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who
have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence preliminarily indicates the
likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Effect of preventive suspension
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to
his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Xxx While a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. 

Term limitation vs preventive suspension

Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken
term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the
term.

Preventive Suspension and Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the
part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act
that became the basis of the charge against him. 

Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is
disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode
of circumventing the three-term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should
therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

In this case
Asilo’s 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in
2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official’s term. Thus, the COMELEC
refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course
to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to
perform a positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the
contemplation of law.
 Avendula v. Comelec and Pamaos v. Comelec (Consolidated) 809 SCRA 36
G.R. Nos. 209415-17 | November 15, 2016
digested by: Jennifer D. Fementira

Fact:
During the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections, the petitioners and private respondents vied for the local
elective positions in the municipality of Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte.

For the position of Vice Mayor, respondent Avendula was proclaimed the winner over petitioner Castil.
For the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, private respondents Calapre, Cinco, Salas, Dalugdugan,
Japon, Santiago, Malubay, and Bungcag were declared winners as they received the eight highest
numbers of votes. Petitioners Pamaos, Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr. and Victor Ramada, were
candidates for positions in the Sangguniang Bayan who got the lower numbers of votes.

The petitioners contested the election results before the RTC of San Juan, Southern Leyte.

Having received the RTC decision on the same day of its promulgation, petitioners Lim-Bungcaras,
Castil, Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr., and Victor Ramada jointly filed a Notice of Appeal before the
RTC and paid the appeal fee on November 22, 2010. Petitioner Pamaos filed his Notice of Appeal and
paid P1,020.00 as appeal fee to the RTC on November 23, 2010 as he allegedly received the trial court's
judgment only on November 18, 2010. On December 7, 2010, all the petitioners manifested that they paid
an appeal fee of P3,550.00 to the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by
postal money order.

The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petitioner’s appeals for failure to pay the appeal fee payable
to COMELEC within the reglementary period.

COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioners Pamaos, Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr. and Victor
Ramada timely filed their notices of appeal and paid the appeal fee to the RTC. As to their payment of the
COMELEC appeal fee, the First Division noted that only petitioner Pamaos paid the same on December
7, 2010, which payment, however, was beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners Avendula, Domingo
Ramada, Jr. and Victor Ramada allegedly failed to pay the said fee to the COMELEC.

Essentially, the consolidated petitions assail the Orders dated February 1, 2011 of the COMELEC First
Division as the petitioners herein insist that they duly perfected their appeals within the reglementary
periods required by law. They alleged that they paid the appeal fee of P3,550.00 to the COMELEC
through postal money order on December 7, 2010 - well within fifteen (15) days from the filing of their
notices of appeal to the RTC pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. 

COMELEC countered that the petitioners paid the COMELEC appeal fee beyond the reglementary period
for doing so. According to the COMELEC, a party who desires to appeal the trial court's decision in an
election contest must file a notice of appeal and pay the appeal fee of P1,000.00 with said court within
five days from the promulgation of the decision. Also, the aggrieved party is mandated to pay the
COMELEC appeal fee of P3,000.00 under Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-130. The COMELEC points out that this fee shall be
deposited with the COMELEC Cash Division within the period to file the notice of appeal, i.e., within
five days after the promulgation of the RTC decision, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.

Issue: Whether the petitioners perfected their appeals by timely paying the required appeal fees.
Ruling: Court finds that not all the petitioners in this case properly complied with COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486 regarding the payment of the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC.

For municipal election contests, A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC superseded A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.

To appeal the trial court's decision in a municipal election contest, Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M.
No. 10-4-1-SC require the filing of a notice of appeal and the simultaneous payment of a 1,000.00 appeal
fee to the trial court that rendered judgment. 

With respect to the payment of the COMELEC appeal fee, an appellant is also required to pay an
additional amount of P3,200.00 under Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130.

Formerly, under Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the appeal fee payable to
the COMELEC "shall be paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within a
period to file the notice of appeal." Said period refers to the period stated in Section 3, Rule 22 of the
aforesaid Rules, which is within five days after the promulgation of the decision of the court. The
promulgation of the decision is understood to mean the receipt by a party of a copy of the decision.

Thereafter, on July 15, 2008, the COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 in order to
clarify the implementation of the rules on the required appeal fees for the perfection of the appeals of
election cases decided by the trial courts. The Commission resolved as follows:
1. That if the appellant had already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or lower courts within the five-day period,
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
07-4-15) and his Appeal was given due course by the Court, said appellant is required to pay
the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the Commission's Cash Division through the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal money order payable to the Commission
on Elections through ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of
the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period,
the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
2. That if the appellant failed to pay the P1,000.00 appeal fee with the lower court within the five (5)
day period as prescribed by the Supreme Court New Rules of Procedure but the case was
nonetheless elevated to the Commission, the appeal shall be dismissed outright by the
Commission, in accordance with the aforestated Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.

Plainly, COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 allows an appellant to pay the COMELEC appeal fee at the
COMELEC's Cash Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the COMELEC
within a period of 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, for all intents and purposes, extended the period provided for the filing
of the COMELEC appeal fee under Section 4, Rule 40 in relation to Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Thus, in Batalla v. Commission on Elections, the Court confirmed that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486 effectively amended Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

xxx
That Comelec Resolution No. 8486 took effect on July 24, 2008 or after a party had filed a notice of
appeal, as in the case of petitioner, does not exempt it from paying the Comelec-prescribed appeal fees.
The Comelec merely clarified the existing rules on the payment of such appeal fees, and allowed the
payment thereof within 15 days from filing the notice of appeal.

In the recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec, the Court harmonized the rules with the following ratiocination:

The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's decision in election contests
involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day
reglementary period. The nonpayment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of
P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC
Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are
not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action
or the proceeding. In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal
or not. x x x.

xxxx

Aguilar has not, however, diluted the force of Comelec Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance
with the Comelec-required appeal fees. To reiterate, Resolution No. 8486 merely clarified the rules on
Comelec appeal fees which have been existing as early as 1993, the amount of which was last fixed in
2002. The Comelec even went one step backward and extended the period of payment to 15 days from the
filing of the notice of appeal.

Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486,
and to further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through the
specific guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Court NOW DECLARES, for the guidance of the
Bench and Bar, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the
matter of nonpayment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are  no longer
excusable.

Xxx
To reiterate, petitioners Lim-Bungcaras, Castil, Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr., and Victor Ramada
received the Consolidated Decision dated November 17, 2010 of the RTC on the same day of its
promulgation. They jointly filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee of 1,000.00 to the RTC
on November 22, 2010, which was within the five-day reglementary period. In like manner, petitioner
Pamaos received the trial court's judgment on November 18, 2010. He filed his notice of appeal and paid
1,020.00 as appeal fee to the RTC on November 23, 2010. Clearly, the petitioners' filing of their notices
of appeal and the payment of the appeal fees to the RTC complied with Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M.
No. 10-4-1-SC.

Anent the filing of the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC, the records of this case support the factual
findings of the COMELEC First Division that only petitioners Lim-Bungcaras and Pamaos paid the said
fee.

With respect to the appeal of petitioner Lim-Bungcaras in EAC (AE) No. A-57-2010, she paid the
COMELEC appeal fee on December 7, 2010, i.e., the fifteenth day from the filing of the joint notice of
appeal with the RTC. Said payment was evidenced by postal money orders issued in her name amounting
to 3,550.00 and the official receipt issued therefor. As to the appeal of petitioner Pamaos in EAC (AE)
No. A-59-2010, he likewise paid the COMELEC appeal fee on December 7, 2010, which was the
fourteenth day from the filing of his notice of appeal to the trial court. His payment was likewise
evidenced by postal money orders issued in his name amounting to 3,550.00 and the official receipt
issued therefor. Clearly, the aforesaid payments complied with COMELEC Resolution No. 8486.

Each individual must pay the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC
As regards the appeals of petitioners Castil, Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr., and Victor Ramada,
however, the Court finds that they indeed failed to remit the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC. In said
petitioners' Manifestations/Notice of Appeal before the COMELEC, they merely attached the photocopies
of the postal money orders issued in the names of petitioners Lim-Bungcaras and Pamaos as proof of
payment. Unfortunately, this is insufficient as Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
as amended by COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130, expressly requires that each individual
appellant must pay the appeal fee payable to the COMELEC. The failure of petitioners Castil, Avendula,
Domingo Ramada, Jr., and Victor Ramada to remit their respective payments of the COMELEC appeal
fee was a valid ground for the dismissal of their appeals.

Accordingly, the assailed COMELEC Order dated February 1, 2011 in EAC (AE) No. A-57-2010, which
involved the appeal of petitioner Lim-Bungcaras, and the COMELEC Order of even date in EAC (AE)
No. A-59-2010, insofar as it involved the appeal of petitioner Pamaos, had been issued with grave abuse
of discretion such that the same should have been given due course.

As for the appeal of petitioner Castil docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-58-2010 and the appeals of
petitioners Avendula, Domingo Ramada, Jr., and Victor Ramada in EAC (AE) No. A-59-2010 that were
not duly perfected in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the particular circumstances of
this case compels this Court to likewise take cognizance of the same.