REGALADO, J.

In the criminal justice systems of modem civilized nations, insanity

is invariably recognized as a valid defense against punishment for

crime. The proverbial bone of contention, however, is in the

ascertainment of the veracity of the claimed affliction and the

determination of the degree of mental aberration, as a ground for

acquittal or a basis for extenuation of criminal liability. We have

such a situation before us in the present appeal.

Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide

before the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 57 in

San CARLOS City, Pangasinan, under the following information, to

wit:

That an or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in

barangay Poblacion, * province of Pangasinan, New Republic of

the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,

the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did

then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual

intercourse with one Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen', against her

will, and on the on thereof the said accused did then and there,

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with the use of stone

which directly cause (sic) the death of Carmelita Morado alias

'Carmen' to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.

Contrary to Art. 335 in relation to Art. 249 of the Revised Penal

Code. 1

In a motion dated June 26, 1987, counsel for appellant moved for

the indefinite suspension of the trial and asked for the commitment

of the accused to the National Mental Hospital. 2In its order dated

July 1, 1987, the trial court granted the motion and held in

abeyance the arraignment of the accused and the trial of the case. 3

On January 26, 1988, the National Center for Mental Health

submitted the clinical case report on the mental and physical

condition of appellant. 4 He was later returned to the custody of the

court for trial and was arraigned on April 27, 1988. 5

The material and established facts of this case, as well as the

points in dispute between the parties, having been succinctly but

thoroughly summarized by the Solicitor General, we are minded to

quote at length therefrom.

On the night of February 13, 1987, Armando Frias, while on duty as

member of the Integrated National Police of Urbiztondo,

Pangasinan, received a report that there was a victim of a crime in

the clinic of Dr. Padlan in the poblacion. He proceeded to the clinic

and found the victim lying down with her head bleeding. He asked

her how she felt and when she replied that she was weak, he took

her ante-mortem statement (TSN, November 4, 1988, pp. 3-5). The

victim, Carmelita Morado, 18 years old, told Frias that she was

raped and struck with a stone by Juanita Aquino, appellant herein.

Frias took down her statement which was duly witnessed by

attending physician Dr. Padlan and Capt. Eddie Ramos. The written

statement was also thumbmarked by Carmelita Morado (TSN, pp.

3-5, 8, 10, November 4, 1988, Armando Frias). Pat. Jaime Datuin

and Pat. Renato Solomon were also among the people who were

present when Frias took the statement of the victim. After the victim

gave her statement she shouted that she be taken to the hospital

because she was weak. (Id., p. 9). Carmelita Morado was taken to

the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center in San Carlos City and

admitted at 11:35 p.m. of that same evening in serious condition.

Dr. Saturnino Posadas, director of said Medical Center, testified

that Carmelita Morado sustained the following injuries;

1. lacerated wound about 10 cm. at the front of the head;

2. skull fracture located on the front portion of the skull;

3. hemorrhage or bleeding on the left eye;

4. laceration of the brain;

5. laceration perineum; (sic)

6. laceration of the urethal (sic)

(TSN pp. 2-3. November 18, 1988; Dr. Saturnino Posadas; Medico

Legal Certificate, Exhibit 'C')

She died the following morning before surgical operations could be

performed (TSN, p. 4 November 18, 1988, Dr. Saturnino Posadas).

A team of police officers was sent out to arrest Juanita Aquino. He

was found and arrested inside the town auditorium at around 11:00

that same evening of February 13, 1987 attending a Valentine

dance (TSN, pp. 7-8, September 15, 1988).

Appellant was detained at the municipal jail in Urbiztondo,

Pangasinan. However, it was only on February 17, 1987 that the

statement of appellant was taken as the police officers waited for

the parents of appellant (TSN, pp. 3, 13-14, August 24, 1988).

Before appellant's interrogation begun, he was asked if he had a

lawyer. As he had none, Armando Frias and the Station

Commander Captain Ramos fetched Atty. Liliosa Rosario of the

Citizens Legal Assistance Office to assist appellant during the

investigation. Atty. Rosario, upon arrival at the office of Frias where

the investigation was to take place, interviewed appellant (supra at

pp. 14-16).
At the start of the investigation, Armando Frias informed appellant

of his constitutional rights, of his right to remain silent and to

counsel. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Rosario throughout the

investigation (TSN, p. 10, August 23, 1988; p. 18, August 24,

1988). After appellant signed his statement, Frias took appellant

and his counsel to the office of Judge Juan C. Austria, of the 5th

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, who called the Interpreter and the

Clerk of Court to read the statement and translate the same to

appellant to ensure that appellant understood what was written.

Judge Austria made appellant sign the statement in his presence

(TSN, pp. 21-23, August 24, 1988).

However, after the complaint was filed but before appellant could

be arraigned, a Motion to Commit appellant to the National Center

for Mental Health, as earlier mentioned, was filed by appellant's

counsel as appellant was allegedly manifesting unstable behavior

with fits of violence. Appellant was duly committed sometime in

July, 1987. He was released in 1988 whereupon he was duly

arraigned. Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the defense of

insanity.

To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a

psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health who was in

charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed. After Juanita

Aquino was admitted to the mental hospital in July 1987, he

conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and

found him to be suffering from mental disorder classified under

organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN, pp. 4-5, 7, May 23,

1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when appellant Juanita

Aquino committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of

mind (supra at pp. 15-16).

Patricio Aquino, appellant's father, also testified that his son was

already mentally HI even when he was still young. Appellant was

suspended from school because he was very playful, overactive

and naughty especially with his classmates (TSN, p. 4, May 24,

1988); that appellant was cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his
mother's jewelry which he sold for a low sum, wandered sometimes

naked, and oftentimes not coming home for extended periods of

time (supra at pp. 5, 8). Appellant was previously confined at the

Mental Hospital in 1985 when he was caught wandering around

naked (supra at p. 10).

Sgt. Raymundo Lomboy, the police officer charged with appellant's

custody and who transferred appellant for commitment to the

National Center for Mental Health, recalled that while appellant was

in his custody, appellant acted abnormally by singing, shouting,

dancing and generally disturbing the other inmates (TSN, p. 7, July

21, 1988). After appellant was treated and released from the

National Center for Mental Health, he acted queerly by singing and

shouting whenever he failed to drink his medicine (supra at p. 15).

Appellant himself was also presented as witness, the doctor having

certified that he could withstand trial. However, the gist of

appellants' testimony was to deny any knowledge of the crime, the

persons, things and events connected with it. He admitted he knew

that he has some mental illness and had undergone treatment like

electric shock (TSN, pp. 5-7, 18-19, July 14, 1988).

On the other hand, the prosecution presented an array of witnesses

to prove that appellant was lucid before and after the crime was

committed and that he acted with discernment.

Armando Frias testified that from the time of appellant's arrest and

during the investigation, appellant acted normally, and gave

responsive answers to all the questions propounded to him (TSN,

pp. 5, 9, 13-15 August 23, 1988). Frias knew appellant even prior to

the incident because he worked as a laborer in the construction of

the theatre in the town proper. He believed appellant to be normal.

Angel Baysic, another member of the Integrated National Police in

Urbiztondo, Pangasinan whose house is located near the theatre

being constructed, also knew appellant who worked there as a

laborer and sometimes cooked the laborer's meals. Baysic became

closely acquainted with appellant and sometimes they drank

together with other laborers after work. During these times, he

observed appellant to act normally and was responsive to

conversation (TSN, pp. 4-7, September 6, 1988).

Carlos Sabangon, one of the police officers who arrested appellant

at the town auditorium, testified that when appellant was arrested

during the valentine dance, he was appropriately dressed and

behaved normally and in fact was just about to sit down after

dancing when they arrived to arrest him (TSN, pp. 8-9, 17

September 15, 1988).

Eduardo Fernandez, a jail guard, was one on duty when appellant

escaped from prison on May 3, 1987. While appellant was confined

in the provincial jail, Fernandez did not observe any queer behavior

from appellant (TSN, pp. 34- 35, 41, 43, September 15, 1988). 6

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict

convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide and

sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs

of the deceased in the amount of P35,000.00 as damages. 7

Appellant, through counsel, manifested his intention to appeal the

judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. 8 The case was,

however, brought to us for review, with appellant taking the court

below to task on the following assignment of errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AC,

CUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE

COMMISSION OF THE CRIME;

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL

CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH AS TO THE INSANITY OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT;

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 9

The controversy boils down into one issue, that is, whether or not

appellant, who has invoked insanity as his defense, has overcome

the presumption of sanity.

Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the

prosecution may proceed in the first instance upon the presumption

that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act was

committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the

burden of proof of insanity is on the defense. 10The basis for the

presumption of sanity is well explained by the United States

Supreme Court in the leading case of Davis vs, United States, 11 in

this wise: "If that presumption were not indulged, the government

would always be under the necessity of adducing affirmative

evidence of the sanity of an accused. But a requirement of that

character would seriously delay and embarrass the enforcement of

the laws against crime and in most cases be unnecessary.

Consequently, the law presumes that everyone charged with crime

is sane and thus, supplies in the first instance the required proof of

capacity to commit crime."

As we have done in a prior case, for purposes of disposing of

appellant's defense it is well to restate and keep in mind certain

basic principles in law, viz: that a person is criminally liable for a

felony committed by him; that a felonious or criminal act (delito

doloso) is presumed to have been done with deliberate intent, that

is, with freedom, intelligence and malice because the moral and

legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the

normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the

contrary; that one of the causes which will overthrow this

presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity in which

event the actor is exempt from criminal liability as provided for in

Article 12, Paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 12

It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed

by appellant clearly reveals how the crime charged against him was

perpetrated. This confession is, however, being assailed as

inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was executed without

the assistance of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that

he did not understand nor was he informed of his constitutional

rights. 13
We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession

is admissible in evidence. Atty. Liliosa Rosario, a lawyer from the

then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted appellant

when he was placed under custodial investigation. The same

lawyer represented him during the early part of the trial. In People

vs. Layuso, 14 we strongly denounced the widespread

misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the right to

counsel provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused

from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to

counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead

the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should

never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the

truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open

court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. As

explained in Gamboa vs.Cruz, etc., 15 the person being interrogated

must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of

extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips

of persons undergoing investigation for the commission of an

offense.

The presence and assistance of Atty. Liliosa Rosario adequately

precluded the possibility of extracting from appellant any false or

coerced confession or admission. Furthermore, it was shown that

the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant was explained to

him in his dialect when he was brought before Judge Juan C.

Austria where such confession was subscribed and sworn to by

appellant. 16 The records also show that the validity of the

extrajudicial confession is not being questioned. Only the reliability

of its contents is being placed in doubt, ostensibly because of the

main submission of the defense that appellant was insane when the

crime was committed. 17 Moreover, the CLAO attorney would not

have affixed her signature in the extrajudicial confession had she

known of any legal infirmity in its execution.

Coming now to his principal submission, appellant relies heavily on

the clinical case report regarding his mental and physical condition.
He stresses in his brief that the testimony of Dr. Nicanor L.

Echavez, Physician-In-Charge, Male Court Case Pavilion of the

National Center for Mental Health, has explicitly shown that

appellant was supposedly insane immediately before, during and

after the commission of the crime and that the evidence adduced

explicate that the mental illness of appellant is incurable and that he

has no lucid intervals. 18He explains that the normal appearance

and behavior of appellant while testifying in court is not surprising.

He says that it is due to the fact that, during that time, he was

undergoing medical treatment and his mental condition during the

trial of the case where he had been regularly taking medicine

should not be confused with his mental status at the time of the

commission of the offense. 19

Appellant is clutching at straws of argument, a clear indicium of a

dearth in plausible explanations. Nor was the trial judge, who had

the opportunity to observe and evaluate his demeanor on the

witness stand, including his manner of testifying and the answers

he also gave in his extrajudicial confession, the least bit impressed

by appellant's defense of insanity as vividly explained in his

decision. And well must it be so, for the rule is that insanity must be

positively proven. The presumption, we repeat, is in favor of sanity.

The rule has consistently been that when a defendant in a criminal

case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of

establishing that fact rests upon him. 20

Now, it has long been settled that the period to which an inquiry into

the mental state of the accused should be directed is that

transpiring immediately before and/or at the very moment of the act

or acts under prosecution. 21 In the eyes of the law, insanity exists

when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing

the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without

the least discernment because there is complete absence of the

power to discern, or there is total deprivation of the freedom of the

will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude

imputability. The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes

insanity as an exempting circumstance and must prove it by clear

and positive evidence. 22

Insanity itself is a condition, not a thing. It is not susceptible of the

usual means of proof and to this fact is due the unusual difficulty of

making proof of its existence and measuring its effect, when once

proven to exist. As no man can look into the mind of another, the

state of such mind can only be measured as the same is reflected

in the actions of the body it is created to govern. Thus, we have

held that mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby we

read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come

to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of

sound mind. 23 In interpreting these physical manifestations,

scientific knowledge and experience have been resorted to by our

judicial agencies.

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the

victim. After consummating his lustful desire, he violently struck the

victim on the head with a stone for fear that the victim would report
him, and thereafter he left her in the belief that she was already

dead. 24 The victim did not immediately die. In the clinic of Dr.

Serafin Padlan in the poblacion, Pat. Armando Friars saw the victim

with her head bleeding. He took the statement of the victim in the

local dialect. 25Thereafter, he translated the statement to English

and reduced it into writing. 26The statement disclosed the Identity of

appellant. That same evening, the victim was still brought to the

Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center where she was treated. She was

serious but still conscious, and was able to narrate to Dr. Saturnino

Posadas what happened to her. She died the following morning. 27

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane

immediately before or at the very moment the crime was committed

is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr. Nicanor

L. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health described the

mental illness of the accused as "organic mental disorder with

psychosis" 28 he admitted that a person suffering from insanity may

know that what he is doing is wrong. 29 The same witness also

testified that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid

intervals, 30 but he, however, also observed that the mental illness

of appellant came on and off. 31

The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when

interviewed upon his admission to the mental institution, recalled

having taken 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consumed

about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the crime.

32
This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial

confession that he was under the influence of marijuana when he

sexually abused the victim and, on the occasion thereof, killed her.
33
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had some

form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence.

The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to

exercise sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid

matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity of appellant

when he committed the dastardly felonies. The annals of crime are

replete with documented records, and we are not without our share
in this jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and

invoked to provide a defense for the accused in a criminal

prosecution.

One more thing. The trial court imposed the penalty of life

imprisonment on appellant. In a judgment of conviction for a felony,

the court should specify the appropriate name of the penalty, which

in this case should be reclusion perpetua and not life imprisonment,

since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code the

principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and

corresponding accessory penalties, unlike those generally provided

for crimes in special laws.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the principal penalty

imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, and the reduction of

the civil indemnity to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing

jurisprudence, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED