Choose a positive or negative case and analyze the effect that regime type has had on the

outcome (or not) of violence – Macedonia and Bosnia(Srebrenica)

(3,750 words)

Introduction

Macedonia is situated at the focal of Southern Balkan, the northern piece of old Hellas

(Greece), west of Thrace, and east of Illyria. Macedonia is quite possibly one of the most

established name held in the Europe mainland. Individuals of Macedonia have a particular

etymology, ethnicity, and socially remarkable contrasted with their adjoining nations of the former

Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Srebrenica in Serbian Cyrillic is a town and municipality in the far

eastern region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a tiny mountain village where salt mining and a

neighboring spa make up the majority of the local economy.

More than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim minority groups were killed in Srebrenica during the

Bosnian War in 1995, and the ICTY and the International Court of Justice later classified the

massacre as an act of genocide. Contrary to this and despite the presence of high-risk factors and

similar context, Macedonia didn’t break into civil war after its independence, a context that made

it stand out from its neighboring rowdy states. This article briefly juxtaposes the two cases of

Macedonia and Srebrenica, while explaining an overview of the contextual changes and why and

why nots that has led to bloodshed in Srebrenica on one hand, and successful reconciliation in

Macedonia on the other.

Conceptual Analysis

Genocide is a recognized crime committed when actions are taken with the purpose of completel

y or partially destroying a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group including; killing, causing ph

ysical or mental suffering, causing complete or partial destruction, controlling or stopping procre

ation and taking custody of group’s children (Brown, S., et al. 2022). The link between violent c

onflict and widespread atrocities is a really complicated topic that is still poorly understood. The

two phenomena have a strong empirical correlation, which suggests a causal relationship. Althou

gh, not mass atrocities result from all armed engagements, and numerous atrocities happen when

there is no military conflict. Genocide is often perpetuated by a ruling class with rational yet pre

meditated intent and to understand it, we must first understand the motives of the perpetrators (Fe

in, H. 2017). In the case of Srebrenica, this is widely interpreted as elite groups who want to rede

fine new political mode or consolidate powers using violence. In the case of Bosnia, after the elec

tions in late 1990, a coalition government headed by the Bosniak Alija Izetbegovic was formed,

with parties from the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) represented (roughl

y in proportion to their respective populations). Far from seeking independence for Bosnia, Bosni

an Serbs wanted to be part of a dominant Serbian state in the Balkans — the “Greater Serbia” tha

t Serbian secessionists had long envisaged. In early May 1992, two days after the United States a

nd the European Community (the precursor to the European Union) honored Bosnia’s independe

nce, Bosnian Serb forces with the backing of Milosevic and the Serb- dominated Yugoslav army

launched their descent with a hail of Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo (Michèle Picard, & Asta M. Zinb

o, 2012). They attacked Bosniak- dominated municipalities in eastern Bosnia, including Zvornik,

Foca, and Visegrad, forcefully expelling Bosniak civilians from the region in a brutal process tha

t latterly was linked as “ethical sanctification.” (Ethnical sanctification differs from genocide in t
hat its primary thing is the expatriation of a group of people from a geographical area and not the

factual physical destruction of that group, indeed though the same styles including murder, rape,

torture, and forcible relegation — may be used.) (Brown & Smith, Stephen D. , 2021)

Minority Muslim Bosniaks in this case were marginalized prior to the Srebrenica massacre

not due to their ethnic composition as they were apparently part of the government but because of

the Bosnian Serbs elites dire want to join the greater Serbia. This created an alluding ideology

Bosniaks Muslim minority do not belong to the ‘whole’ which translated the Serbians and Croats

combined, who were majorly Christians. In contrary Kiro Gilgorov the Macedonian president

reached out to all ethnic minorities i.e., the Albanians, to reconcile their differences, despite

coming from the dominant Macedonian community. The net effect of this was that ethnic groups

created a collective identity as Macedonian nationals than affiliation to their respective ethnic

identities while learning from the mistakes made by their neighbors whose inter-ethnic competition

led to dire consequences (Ackermann, A. 2000). Kuper, L. (1981) suggest that mass atrocities

occurs when a recognizable minority is turned into a pariah group by elites who work with social

forces within the society creating a minority against majority scenario. Whereas Bosnia has shown

clear parameters of such classification, it can be concluded that Macedonia has skipped such

predicaments through consensus building between the ethnic groups.

It is critical to examine instances when the fragility of the victims was amply demonstrated,

as well as the circumstances that created vulnerability in the minds of the perpetrators, in order to

comprehend the beginning of the Srebrenica Massacre (Midlarsky, M. I. 2005). This is often

characterized by loss of territory as envisaged by the constant claim of the Bosnian Serbs who had

unwavering affiliation to Serbia, while emulating the intent that, Bosnian territories belongs to the

Serbs. In the absence of severe repercussions for offenders (by merely perpetuating such repugnant
agenda), the vulnerability feelings were validated across the Serbian nation, this adequately

explains the UN’s failure to preventing the Massacre. In a purely pragmatic sense, the deaths were

‘justified’ by the tacit consent of the Serbian Army from the lack of response by the UN, the

disarmament of the Bosniaks and the creation of the ‘safer zones’ by the UN that made people to

seek safety only to get murdered by the Serbs, all these, accumulatively led to the Srebrenica

Massacre. On the other hand, the Macedonians, despite magnificent risk factors have treated ethnic

territories with care and allowed minority Muslim Albanians to practice freely and have say in the

governance and running of the state even though acrued grievances would take the country back

to the brinks of war in 2001(Ackermann, A. 2002). The UN’s timely intervention in Macedonia

which was not the case for Bosnia was also a determinant factor. Ethnic Macedonians possess a

strong feeling of group identity. They are separated based on social, religious, and cultural grounds.

Particularly ethnic Albanians have remarkable group cohesiveness. They tend to be more

traditional, hierarchical, and deferential to leaders because they are primarily a rural community.

Except in locations with mixed populations, when interaction may be forced, there is little

interaction between the two groups. Instead of easing tensions, it can exacerbate them. There are

many false impressions of "the other," which are partly fueled by ignorance but also contribute to

a lack of engagement.

People frequently view interactions in terms of groups rather than individuals. In mixed-race

communities, ties frequently appear tense. Preliminary results from a poll that is still being

conducted indicate that ethnic Macedonians in mixed-race towns feel threatened and are not

friendly toward Albanians. While clearly in the minority, Albanians are more receptive to such

communication. Ethnic Macedonians typically exhibit greater openness in mixed-race areas where

they make up the majority because they don't feel as intimidated. The main obstacle to greater
interaction is language. The question of which group must assimilate and which group must learn

which language is crucial to inter-group relations. Neither party is interested in picking up the

other's language.

While assessing the risks of genocide and Politicide Harff, B. (2003), made a chronology

of mass atrocities between 1995-2003, where mass atrocities often targeted political groups. She

developed a pattern where preconditions led to upheavals and ultimately to violence. From her

deduction, it starts with discrimination, isolation from international scrutiny to avoid

accountability then creating risks and turning them into real time violent action. In light to the

Srebrenica case, this is can be explained using Stanton, G. (2013)’s ten stages of genocide. In terms

of classification in Srebrenica case, the Serbs created a universalistic institution within the army,

clergy and public that transcended ethnic or racial divisions whereas Macedonia used similar

tactics to actively promote tolerance and understanding, and promote classifications that transcend

unity. Stanton, G. (2013), further explains that, classification and symbolization are universally

human and, unless they lead to dehumanization, do not always result in genocide. When combined

with hatred, symbols can be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for

Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for Khmer Rouge Cambodians from the Eastern Zone. Harff,

B. (2003), has demonstrated how nearly all genocides and politicides of the most starkly diverse

groups were preceded by mobilization by elites to eliminate real or hypothetical problems using

ethnically inclined symbolic discrimination or perpetuating that the target community poses a

threat to the ruling class.

It is worth mentioning that, the Serbs of Bosnia are one of the three constitutive nationalities (stat

e-forming nations) of the nation, primarily located in the political-territorial entity of Republika S

rpska. Historically, Orthodox Serbs in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina were frequently pers
ecuted by the Ottoman Empire's authorities from the 15th through the 19th centuries. Prior to the

Bosnian War, the bulk of the Serbs resided throughout much of Bosnia-Herzegovina; today, they

are concentrated in Republika Srpska. Consequently, Muslim Slavs have always been a major so

urce of frustration for Serbian nationalists. They were unmistakably descended from other Slavic

tribes, but in their midst, they professed the religion of the accursed "Turks," who were the prima

ry source of Serbian national consciousness (KHAN, M. R. 1997). The very fact that this South S

lav Muslim population existed cast doubt on and challenged Serbian nationalism's fundamental cl

aims to truth. By crossing fictitious borders, European Muslims and Jews embodied an existentia

l problem that could be resolved by expulsion and extermination (KHAN, M. R. 1997). While in

Macedonia, despite the existence of perennial challenges and outcry by Muslim minorities, sustai

ned dialogue between ethnic groups made significant contribution to country’s restraining from b

reaking into civil war (Kelleher, A., & Ryan, K. 2012). In terms of discrimination, the Serbs pro

moted monopolization or expansion of power which validates the victimization of Bosniaks Musl

im minorities. The ruling political elites utilized exclusionary ideologies which were frequently y

et charismatically put to portray an image of addressing existential threats to the Serbs expressing

the resentments of their followers and attracting mass support. Macedonia however, Gilgorov al

lowed ethnic minorities to keep their territorial power while forming the government.(Illuminatin

g the 10 Stages of Genocide through Rywka’s Diary | Jewish Museum Milwaukee, n.d.)

The minority would be led by the protection of equality of rights in a nation with

democratic elections and a democratically elected government, while the members of the

majority would each be led by the defence of their individual interests. Under normal conditions,

this would imply that any election result, regardless of whether it would be represented by one or

several parties, would be much more influenced by a minority with 15% of the vote as it would
inevitably be a part of the ruling coalition. Even if it were a two-party system, the outcome

would not be influenced by the election system.

Examining Bosnia and Herzegovina next . Everyone would benefit from having the power to

make decisions at the national level rather than on the level of their own ethnic territories, even if

everyone behaved as if they were minorities and cared more about ethnic rights than specific

interests because any combination would be possible in a majority coalition, even if there was no

political pluralism within the ethnic groups. The Croatian community, despite being the smallest,

would really have more power because it would be an essential component of any ruling

coalition.

Another critical stage discussed by Stanton, G. (2013), is the dehumanization of the target

group. He stipulates that dehumanization overcomes the natural human aversion to murder. The

mistreatment of the Muslim minority in Bosnia brainwashed the Serbs into believing that "we are

better off without them. Even it is less documented Macedonians combated dehumanization, by

curbing hate speech while seeking immediate and timely intervention from the UN, this has

compelled Leaders to fear repercussions or consequences of their actions. The Serbian

government was at the heart of the Srebrenica massacre as used to its machinery to organize

decentralized Bosnian Serb forces. It essential to note that special army units or militias were

frequently trained and equipped by the Serbian forces. Additionally, arms were purchased by

states and militias to facilitate the genocide, often in violation of UN Arms Embargos. Secret

police were organized by the Serbian regimes to spy on, arrest, torture, and murder Bosniaks

Muslim minorities. The Serbian army separated the male, boys and women, blindfolded them

and killed over 8,000 Bosniaks.

Some victims were denied food and water are purposefully withheld from them in an effort to
gradually annihilate them. Explaining extermination stage, Stanton urges that the perpetrators

term it as extermination in the view that the victims are not human. During the Srebrenica

Massacre, rape was employed as a weapon of war to genetically change and eliminate the

opposing group, and already dead victims were mutilated (Leidesdorff, S. 2015). This was

coupled by the use of the destruction of religious and cultural artifacts so that Muslim history is

completely erased. Civilians and combatants have not been distinguished in the civil wars that

have broken out since the end of the Cold War. They lead to numerous war crimes. All

contemporary genocides now have the trait of mass rapes of women and girls. In some

genocides, all men of fighting age are killed. In complete genocides, every member of the

targeted group is wiped out.PAPACOSMA, S. V. (1996). NATO IN THE POST-COLD WAR

BALKANS. Journal of Political & Military Sociology, 24(2), 233–252.

The final phase of genocide is Deprivation (Denial). It is one of the surest signs of

additional horrific massacres. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia (ICTY), the 1995 slaughter at Srebrenica became genocide in 2001. The Appeals

Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The

Hague, reiterated that the Srebrenica massacre was genocide in its unanimous decision Prosecutor

v. Krsti, with Presiding Judge Theodor Meron writing: The Bosnian Serb troops perpetrated

genocide by attempting to exterminate a portion of the Muslim population in Bosnia. They planned

to exterminate the 40,000 Bosnian Muslims who lived in Srebrenica, a population that served as a

symbol for all Bosnian Muslims. All of the male Muslim prisoners—military and civilian, old and

young—were robbed of their personal items and identity, and they were all purposefully and

methodically executed based only on their religious and ethnic affiliation. The Serbian army dug
up graves to conceal evidence of the atrocities while frequently placing the blame for what

happened on the victims whilst contend that they did nothing wrong. Interestingly, despite the

existence International Criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia way before the massacre, it

took the ICC 21 years to provide justice to the victims of the massacre (Smith, R. Jeffrey. 2022).

In Macedonia, in the aftermath of independence, each of Macedonia’s diverse ethnic and

religious groups was able to uphold its own integrity, which is recognized by the others as being

inescapably unique. The benefit of accepting ethnic and religious variety came from the long

history of cohabitation and is correlated with the largely stable informal links between the various

populations. The concept of "otherness" was embraced calmly and without prejudice, as something

recognized, as a familiar strangeness (Ivanov, P. (n.d.). “To Write in Macedonian Means to

Fight!”: Introduction to the Macedonian Literary Canon. ) , which blended into daily experiences

and is therefore not viewed as dangerous. Thus, democracy, which was created and governed by

people who live in the contact zones, which happened to be the most distinctive feature of the

Macedonian ethnic model.

The role of local capacities for peace in Macedonia

In light to what worked in Macedonia and could not work in Bosnia, it is important to analyze th

e role played by local capacities for peace. The goal of peacebuilding is to change the structural

and cultural factors that lead to violent or destructive conflict and to find peaceful solutions to inj

ustice. It focuses on fostering positive interpersonal, social, and political ties across racial, ethnic,

and socioeconomic divides. Before, during, and after each instance of violence, the process com

prises conflict management, resolution, or transformation; post-conflict reconciliation; and traum

a recovery. In order to create and maintain relationships between people locally and globally, pea

cebuilding is a multidisciplinary, cross-sector methodology or strategy that becomes strategic wh

en it does so over the long term and at all levels of society. Strategic peacebuilding initiatives tar

get the underlying or prospective causes of violence, foster a culture of peaceful conflict resoluti

on, and stabilize the political and social landscape of society.(Local Peacebuilding - What Works

and Why, n.d.).

The Ohrid Framework Agreement(OFA) that put an end to the civil war that had been raging in

Macedonia throughout the first half of 2001 is a clear manifestation of the existence of cohesive

yet restraining actors in Macedonia. One unique aspect is also the creation of the culture of peace

through peace education. For instance, the Nansen Integrated Primary and Secondary Schools pr

oject received approval and had its format impacted by significant sections of the OFA that dealt

with language and education. Others in Macedonia have taken notice of their achievements and i

nnovative active learning and multilingual education methodologies. Primary schools in five mor

e towns used the Nansen Schools method in 2012. More than 500 kids participated in the integrat

ed bilingual learning activities that followed. The perceived necessity to deal methodically with e

scalating intolerance and racially motivated violence in Macedonia created an outstanding focus

on peace education due to the need to systematically address the country's rising intolerance and

ethnic violence, which primarily affects young Macedonians and Albanians. (Peace Education fo

r the Culture of Peace in Macedonia — Peace Insight, n.d.)

With pre independence latent conflict based Gilgorov, the founding president viewed that,

prejudice, stereotypes, and ignorance, can be even more harmful than the overt conflict that is

experienced in multiethnic areas. The objective of education for peace was thus, to develop a

model for peacebuilding education that would be applicable in any school setting in Macedonia.
Analysis of Risk factors

The toughest obstacle to overcome is probably the assumption that an escalation

is a symptom of a conflict. Contrary to common assumptions, escalation strategies are

used in a range of situations to address potential issues. We must constantly remind

ourselves not to "destroy bridges" just because we elevated a problem to a boss.

Escalation becomes essential when it's necessary to address important issues that depend

on someone else—someone who decides not to comply with your request. If this issue is

not resolved right away, it could lead to a major injury, missed deadlines, expense

overruns, and clientele loss. Macedonia as a regime, saw opportunities in the escalations

as a necessary step to defuse tension and initiate dialogue. Gilgorov’s diplomatic relation

with Serbia saved the situation but still without the support of ethnic groups, things

would still fall apart. In Srebrenica, none of the parties, particularly the Serbian were

willing to negotiate. The UN peace keeping forces were also overrun as their capacity

was limited compared to the Serbian army.

In terms of managing crisis, Gligorov’s (former president of Macedonia) role in

pulling Macedonia from the brink of collapse, Versus UN’s non-partisan and partisan

role in Srebrenica has sparked discussion in recent times

In an effort to strike a balance between Serbia, which under President Slobodan

Milosevic was determined to re-centralize the disintegrating federation under Belgrade's

control, and the increasingly pro-independence initiatives of Croatia and Slovenia,

Gligorov's Macedonia attempted to do so alongside Bosnia and Herzegovina during the

disintegration of Yugoslavia. A compromise plan put up by Macedonia and Bosnia would

have maintained a loosely coupled confederation of Yugoslav republics with a shared

armed forces, monetary system, and foreign policy.

However, Gligorov's plan was disregarded. He came to the conclusion that if Macedonia

was to avoid becoming into a Serbian satellite country, it had no choice but to follow

Croatia and Slovenia when they declared their independence in June 1991. In April 1992,

the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) withdrew from Macedonia after the country's citizens

overwhelmingly approved independence in a referendum that September. Gligorov had

negotiated an agreement with the JNA, which was becoming increasingly dominated by

Serbs.

Milosevic essentially agreed to Macedonia's withdrawal from the federation

because he did not want to engage in a two-front war. He was set to become involved in

Bosnia while already involved in Croatia.

 Mitigation versus escalation

How prolonging and termination of violence shaped up in both cases?

As we have seen, changing the regime type from one based on the absolute monarchy to

democracy drastically lowered violence levels in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, the change didn’t lead to a sudden end to violence; it took about 25 years for

these countries to revert back to conflicts again.

The key takeaway is that just because democracies perform better than monarchies in terms

of fighting violent conflicts, doesn’t mean that they are always more peaceful. It all comes

down to how well governments handle cases such as ethnic tensions and social instability.

The outcomes of violence in both cases are shocking. In Macedonia, regime type was a

major reason that led to the massacre while in Bosnia it didn’t have any impact. The fact

that prolonging and termination of violence had such different effects raises many

questions about what can be done to end the conflict at a faster pace.

What can we learn from these two cases? How we handle conflict can make all the

difference when it comes to ending it quickly or not. Sometimes, awareness campaigns can

help people become more aware of how violence affects society for generations.

It is worth noting that the conclusions of violence-free eras in Macedonia and Bosnia are

very different.

In Macedonia, constitutional reforms and peaceful elections brought stability after years of

turmoil. However, it came at a cost of human rights abuses against minority groups like

Albanians. Meanwhile, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prolonging the conflict led to a

sustained genocide against Bosniaks (Muslims) as well as other ethnicities. In both cases,

termination or prolonging violence had profound effects on the outcomes we see today –

not only with regard to violence but also in terms of social peace.

Conclusion
The massacre at Srebrenica marked the worst crime against humanity since World War II.

People of different ethnicities, religions, and walks of life were brutally murdered by the

then Bosnian Serb army in this town. The case was a shocking reality that shattered all

hopes people had in this peaceful region. As we have seen, not even a seemingly peaceful

location can be immune to violence if it is allowed to run its course uninterruptedly for

long periods of time – one could say that it takes just ONE bad apple to spoil the barrel!

What could stop such atrocities from happening again? Only when people fight against

injustice and oppression becomes their mission instead of blindly accepting what’s being

said around them.

Despite the fact that Macedonia and Bosnia are so far apart geographically, their histories

have an uncanny similarity. Both of these countries were founded by expanding empires

after experiencing numerous wars in different centuries. Let’s see how various regime

types affected violent outcomes.

In Macedonia, the bloody battle between Macedonian Emperor Alexander and Thracian

king Philip II is what resulted in the formation of a new nation-state called Macedonia.

However, in Bosnia, it was the mass beheading of 803 Bosniaks who had stayed behind

when Srebrenica fell that led to its present statehood too!

It is a fact that the case-by-case scenario results indicate both cases have experienced

different circumstances. However, it is also true to say that each successive event has made

a slant towards one of the two scenarios.

The Bosnian Serbs were able to create an atmosphere conducive to violence in Srebrenica

due to their sheer power and control over such a large area of the region. On the other hand,

Macedonia’s peaceful nature took away the opportunity from these radical groups to

escalate violence there. In this way, both countries have been safe ever since they

recognized their autonomy – except when it came to recognition by larger powers like

NATO and European Union (EU).

The main difference between the two cases is that in Macedonia, violence has been on a

decline since the 1990s. In Srebrenica, however, there has never been an incidence of

violence like genocide at this scale in over 20 years since its establishment as an

independent state. The reasons behind such a difference are easy to guess: whereas

Macedonia’s ethnically diverse population and economic prosperity brought down the

instances of violent crime and extremism, Bosnia’s circumstances left it with little hope for

change for generations.

In both cases, some factors led to a more positive turn than others – whether due to good

or poor governance and social development by political parties at all levels provided

enough opportunities for peace to thrive in these countries – but one thing is certain: both

regions have seen their share of adversity before making way towards stability.

The outcome of the cases is quite clear – in Macedonia, the violent regime had a negative

effect on the level of violence. It didn’t create any riots or destruction but it also didn’t lead

to improvements like better security and laws. On the other hand, military action by

Serbians after Srebrenica led to much more improvements on all fronts than what happened

in Macedonia.
 The similarities and differences between Serbia’s response to Srebrenica and Macedonia

are an example that there is no one-size-fits-all answer for violence management. Only if

we see each case individually can we identify our strengths and weaknesses when it comes

down to managing violence against human rights defenders (HRDs).

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