G.R. No.

183517 : June 22, 2010

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

With the issuance of PD 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the
Philippine International Trading Corporation, then President Marcos issued EO 756,
authorizing the reorganization of PITC. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued
Executive Order No. 87. Romero, an officer of petitioner, filed a July 16, 2001 request,
seeking from petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength of Section 6
of Executive Order No. 756. COA Comm. Habitan issued the assailed ruling,stating that
Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of petitioners
employees did not include allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that
Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only for the specific purpose of
reorganizing petitioner corporation. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756
was simply an incentive to encourage employees to resign or retire at the height of
petitioners reorganization, said decision went on to make the following
pronouncements, to wit:"Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance
retirement plan by any government agency and government-owned or controlled
corporation other than the GSIS.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 756 is an additional alternative to existing general
retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or
supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans.

HELD: No.

POLITICAL LAW: interpretation of statute; Executive Order No. 756 as an

additional alternative to existing general retirement law.

Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought
in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. In the absence
of a manifest and specific intent from which the same may be gleaned, Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing
general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or
supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Aside from the fact
that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of
the statute cannot be placed therein by construction, petitioner would likewise do well to
remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and express. Repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full
knowledge of all laws existing on the subject, the congruent application of which the
courts must generally presume. For this reason, it has been held that the failure to add
a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order No. 756, SC find
that the foregoing provision cannot be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent
of the law. Rather than the permanent retirement law for its employees that petitioner
now characterizes it to be, SC stated that the provision of gratuities equivalent to one
month pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including all
allowances was clearly meant as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or are
separated from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization petitioners
Board of Directors was tasked to implement. Again, as a temporary measure, it cannot
be interpreted as an exception to the general prohibition against separate or
supplementary insurance and/or retirement or pension plans under Section 28,
Subsection (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, amended.

Petition is DENIED.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief
Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid
vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving
only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three  days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with
the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right
of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.