Republic of the Philippines SANDIGANBAYAN Quezon City FOURTH DIVISION /PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, CRIM. CASE NO, 26548 For: Violation of RA 3019, Section 3 (e) CRIM. CASE NO. 26549 ~versus - For: Violation of Art. 226, par. 1, RPC Present: ONG, Ji: Chairman HERNANDEZ and PONFERRADA, J]. BARBARA P. TAN, Accused. Promulgated on: DECISION Hernandez, J. “Justice delayed is justice denied” is an oft-repeated maxim. Any delay in the administration of justice results in depriving the litigant his right to a speedy disposition of his case. A delay in the disposition of cases amounts to a denial of justice, brings public office into disrepute, and erodes public faith and confidence in the government. Inability to decide a case within the required period or unreasonable delay in resolving a pending incident constitutes gross inefficiency and subjects the public officer to sanctions. * im Re Judge Rosete, A.M. No, 04-5-118-MTCC, July 29, 2004 Y whFor this reason, the accused faces charges for having allegedly interfered with another person's constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of his case. Accused Barbara P. Tan (“accused”), Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjucicator (“PARAD") of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (“DARAB") Cavite, stands charged in two (2) informations. i In Criminal Case No. 26548, the accused is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (“RA 3019”), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed as follows: ‘That on or about August 24, 1998, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Sta Cruz, Laguna, committing the crime charged in relation to and taking advantage of her official functions, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did _.. then and. there wilfully, unlawéulty and-criminally ‘fail to forward~ the records of DARAB Case No. R-403-0119-97 which is in her custody, to DARAB, Quezon City after an appeal of her decision was prefered (sic), thus, causing undue injury to Pablito delos Reyes as his appeal remains pending with DARAB Quezon City due to the non-transmitial of said records, CONTRARY TO LAW. In Criminal Case No. 26549, the accused is also charged with having committed the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents, as defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code (“RPC”), allegedly committed in the following manner: ‘That on or about August 24, 1998, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Sta Cruz, Laguna, and as such received the records of DARAB Case No. R-403-1109-97 in her capacity as Provincial Adjudicator, committing the offense in relation to her office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously remove, destroy and/or conceal the aforementioned case, to the serious damage of one Poblete delos Reyes, and the public interest. VwCONTRARY TO LAW. Upon her arraignment on September 3, 2001, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. On the same date, pre-trial was likewise conducted. Joint trial of these cases commenced on November 14, 2001. Summary of Evidence | Prosecution’s Evidence During tial, the prosecution presented five (6) witnesses, namely: (1) Rogelio delos Reyes, son and attorney-in-fact of the private complainant, (2) Arnold Arrieta, Regional Adjudicator (“RARAD”) of Region VII, (3) Conchita C. Mitias, RARAD of Region IV, (4) Eufracio M. Domingo, Jr, Clerk of DARAB Laguna, and (5) Virgilio M. Sorita, PARAD of Laguna. The prosecution also offered in evidence Exhibits “A” to “B a”, inclusive. The prosecution witnesses’ testimonies and documentary exhibits show that on March 6, 1997, Pablito delos Reyes (“delos Reyes”), represented by Manuelito delos Reyes, filed a case for Maintenance, Possession and Cultivation with DARAB Laguna against Teodoro Ramiro-Panganiban, Jose Panganiban and PCIB Properties, Inc. (“respondents”), later docketed as DARAB Case No. R-403-0119-972 and assigned to the accused. The accused then took custody of its records and, after the hearings, rendered a decision dated December 4, 1997, dismissing it for lack of merit. Delos Reyes then filed a Notice of Appeal with DARAB Quezon City on March 2, 19983 Prosecution witness Arnold Arrieta (“Arrieta”), then Executive Director of DARAB Secretariat from January 1998 until November 1999, indorsed the Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee to the accused.$ On August 11, 1998, prosecution witness Virgilio M. Sorita (“Sorita”), PARAD of Laguna, released an Order, declaring the appeal filed by delos Reyes to have been perfected and mandated the Clerk of the Board to transmit the records of the case to DARAB Quezon City. Subsequently, prosecution witness Eufracio M. Domingo, Jr. (“Domingo”), Clerk of DARAB Laguna, turned over ? Pre-Trial Order dated September 3, 2001, p. 1 3 td,p.2 “TSN, February 27, 2002, p.6. TSN, February 28, 2002, p. 50. RASthirteen (13) case folders of Laguna cases to the accused, including the case of delos Reyes, on August 24, 1998,” After thal, prosecution witness Rogelio delos Reyes (“Rogelio”), son of complainant delos Reyes, went to DARAB Laguna to verify the status of the case and learned that the accused took its records to her station in ‘Trece Martires City, Cavite (“Trece Martires”)# On January 21, 1999, Rogelio went to DARAB Cavite and spoke with the accused, when the accused herself showed him a copy of the Order? issued by PARAD Sorita. More importantly, Rogelio testified that the accused admitted to him that she was going to transmit the records, but she just had so many things to do." Despite having received various orders and memoranda on the transmittal of the case records of delos Reyes, the accused failed to forward them. This left delos Reyes with no other recourse but to file a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (“Ombudsman”) for violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (f)."5 On November 29, 2001, the accused finally turned over the records to RARAD Miias."4 The failure of the accused to transmit the records caused delos Reyes to spend around one hundred, thousand pesos (Php 100,000) in monitoring the developments of the case. Delos Reyes and his family were forcefully dispossessed of the land, subject property of said case. This dispossession resulted in the loss of their family’s income from the land in the approximate amount of three hundred thousand pesos (Php 300,000) annually." Defense Evidence On the other hand, the accused presented her own testimony and that of Fe Arche-Manalang (’Manalang”), RARAD of Region IV from 1994 until 1998, and offered Exhibits “1” to “14”, inclusive, in evidence. The crux of the accused’s defense lies in her position that delos Reyes’ appeal was never perfected in accordance with the DARAB °° TSN, November M4, 2001, p. 23 "id, p24 © TSN, February 28, 2002, p. ie atean “CTSN, February 28, 2002 p. 11 "= TSN, November 14, 2001 = Pp. 41-43. ie “TSN, February 26, 200, p. 4. / Y hy ANew Rules of Procedure (“DARAB Rules”), which took effect on June 22, 1994.17 Rule XIII, Sec. 3 of the said rules provides: SECTION 3. Where to file. The notice of appeal shall be filed with the Adjudicator concerned in three (3) legibly written copies.*8 Moreover, Rule XIII, Sec. 5 further states: SECTION 5. Requisites and perfection of the Appeal. a) ‘The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule, It shall state the date when the appellant received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice of the adverse party; and. b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. A pauper litigant shall, however, be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee Non-compliance with above-mentioned requisites shall be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. ‘The accused argued that delos Reyes’ appeal was not perfected in accordance with the DARAB Rules, since it was filed with DARAB Quezon City and not with the accused herself, as the adjudicator of the case. Being so, the accused posited that she was under no duty to transmit the records. In fact, even the prosecution witnesses concurred during their respective cross-examinations that delos Reyes’ appeal was not filed in accordance with the DARAB Rules." Further, there was a pending incident that the accused needed to resolve. A day after delos Reyes filed a Notice of Appeal with DARAB Quezon City, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution (“Motion”) with DARAB Laguna.” When Rogelio came to see the accused, she told him that she needed to see delos Reyes’ counsel regarding respondents’ Motion. However, delos Reyes’ counsel never came to the accused’s office.» Thus, when she got hold of then Executive Director Arrieta’s indorsement® of delos xh. "Exh. da; emphasis ours wha br 2°FSN, September 12, 2002, p. 16. 2. TSN, February 27, 2002, 9p. 24-25; February 28, 2002, pp. 50-51; May 6, 2002, pp. 45. 7 Exh, 8" ® TSN, October 6, 2003, pp. 11-12. Beh] x aReyes’ Notice of Appeal, she ignored it since she had previously discussed it with Rogelio. Moreover, when the accused received a Memorandum” from Arrieta sometime in August 1999, she went to DARAB Central Office and brought along with her the records of the case to personally take up the matter with Arrieta. The accused showed Arrieta the pending Motion and proposed that she keep the records in the meantime. Arrieta concurred with her recommendation and allowed the accused to retain possession of the records.” Similarly, when the accused received another Memorandum, this time from RARAD Minas sometime in October 1999, she also discussed the pending incident with Minas? RARAD Mifas also confirmed this in her cross-examination.** ‘The accused likewise tried to negate the presence of some elements of the violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e) in her case. First, the accused claimed that she could not have committed manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence considering that she even issued a Temporary Restraining Order* in delos Reyes’ favor a day after delos Reyes filed a case with DARAB.® Second, the accused also maintained that she ‘did ‘not’ chase “any ‘injiiry’ t6 delos Reyes. Prosecution witness Rogelio admitted during cross-examination that they were no longer in possession of the subject property even before the DARAB case was filed. Rogelio likewise acknowledged that it was not the decision rendered by the accused that ejected them from the property. The Facts On February 15, 1995, defense witness Manalang issued RARAD Special Order No. 01, Series of 1995, assigning the accused as the PARAD of Laguna and Cavite, with official station at Trece Martires.* » fap. 15 ® Exh. “13" » id, p16 2 exh 14" ® tap. 7. 2 TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 9-10 ” Byh, 6" > Accused’ Formal Offer of Evidence dated September 22,2004, p. 4; TSN, September 1, 200 R TSN, November 15, 2001, pp. 16-17. nyOn March 6, 1997, delos Reyes filed a case for Maintenance, Possession and Cultivation with DARAB Laguna against respondents Teodoro Ramiro-Panganiban, Jose Panganiban and PCIB Properties, Inc., later docketed as DARAB Case No. R-403-0119-97% and assigned to the accused. The next day, or on March 7, 1997, the accused issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of delos Reyes, mandating, the latter's peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the subject property.3* On May 13, 1997, DARAB Deputy Executive Director Isabel M. Florin issued a letter to the accused, addressing the latter's query with respect to the extent of her jurisdictional competence. The Executive Director affirmed that the accused then had jurisdiction over Cavite, Laguna and Western Batangas.” On August 1, 1997, RARAD Manalang released a Memorandum, reducing the accused’s assignment to Cavite and Western Batangas. In the same Memorandum, prosecution witness Sorita was likewise assigned as the PARAD for Aurora, Laguna, Marinduque and Romblon.? On December 4, 1997, the accused rendered a decision and dismissed the abovementioned case for lack of merit? Delos Reyes then filed a Notice of Appeal with DARAB Quezon City on March 2, 1998.1 The then Executive Director Arrieta of DARAB Secretariat? indorsed the Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee to the accused.* On March 31, 1998, the accused received the indorsement of the Notice of Appeal at her station in Trece Martires."* The following day, or on April 1, 1998, respondents in the DARAB case filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with DARAB Lagunas> Subsequently, the accused went to DARAB Laguna to include said indorsement she received at her station in Trece Martires with the records of the case.6 ® Pre-Trial Order dated September 3, 2001, p. | TSN, February 27, 2002 p. 6 © TSN, February 28, 200 “TSN, September 12, 2002, p. 16. Srna “TSN, September 12, 2002, p. 18, Yo beOn August 11, 1998, PARAD Sorita released an Order, declaring the appeal filed by delos Reyes to have been perfected and ordered the Clerk of the Board to transmit the records of the case to DARAB Quezon City.” On August 24, 1998, Domingo, Clerk of DARAB Laguna, turned over thirteen (13) case folders of Laguna cases to the accused, including that of delos Reyes’ case.* Sometime in the latter part of August 1998, Rogelio went to DARAB Laguna to inquire on the status of the case and learned that the accused took the records of the case to her station in Trece Martires° Thus, on January 21, 1999, Rogelio went to DARAB Cavite to follow up the status of the case” and was able to speak with the accused. On said incident, the accused directed delos Reyes’ counsel to see her since there was a pending incident that was due for resolution >! Subsequently, Rogelio went to DARAB Quezon City to verify the developments in the case and found out that the case folder had not yet been transmitted..2 ‘Thus, on February 17, 1999; delos Reyes, through Rogelio, his attorney-in-fact, wrote a complaint-letter to Undersecretary Lara and requested for assistance on the matter? ‘The complaint-letter having been referred to then Executive Director Arrieta, he then indorsed it to the accused on March 16, 1999 for the latter’s comment or appropriate action. On March 30, 1999, the accused received the indorsement,>> but took no action on it.56 This prompted Rogelio to seek the assistance of Rep. Beratio. Rep. Beratio then wrote a letter addressed to Undersecretary Lara.” Executive Director Arrieta again indorsed said letter to the accused on May 3, 1999, who received it on May 17, 1999,5* but likewise did not act on it.? Byh. “A-4" TSN, September 12, 2002, p. 20; October 6, 2003, pp. 34 © Beh, “A, p.2. © rid 51 TSN, October 6, 2008, p11 21d, p24 ahs, “A-6” & “10 SBxh “AT” % TSN, October 6, 2003, p 15 2 Bhs. “A-8" & 12". pia ® TSN, October 6, 2003, p. 15. a. ieSometime in August 1999, the accused received a Memorandum®? for the accused to forward the delos Reyes case to the DARAB Quezon City from then Executive Director Arrieta. In response, she went to DARAB Central Office and brought along with her the records of the case to personally take up the matter with Arrieta. The accused showed Arrieta the pending Motion and suggested that she keep the records in the meantime. As recommended, Arrieta allowed the accused to retain possession of the records. On October 12, 1999, delos Reyes filed a Motion to Transmit Record with DARAB Cavite. Similarly, this did not merit any action from the accused. On January 18, 2000, delos Reyes wrote a letter addressed to the Director of DARAB Region IV, requesting that the records of his case be immediately forwarded to DARAB Quezon City. Acting on delos Reyes’ letter-complaint, RARAD Mifias released a Memorandum to the accused on January 21, 2000, giving her a period of five (5) days to comment on the complaint. The accused then dis: ed the matter with RARAD Minas and informed the latter of the pending Motion. On July 12, 2000, delos Reyes filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (f). On August 1, 2001, RARAD Miitas issued a Memorandum to the accused and implemented the _ three-month-suspension ordered by _ the Ombudsman.‘” On November 29, 2001, the accused inhibited herself from adjudicating delos Reyes’ case, indorsed it and turned over its records to RARAD Miifias.* The Issues Two issues require resolution in these cases, to wit:(1) Whether or not the accused is guilty of having violated RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e); and (2) Whether or not the accused is guilty of having committed the ctime of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents, as defined and penalized under Art. 226, par. 1, RPC The Court’s Ruling A. Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which the accused is charged, provides: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions or public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful 2x. XXX Xxx () Causing any undue injuzy,to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply t» officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. In the recent case of Librado Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan,® the Supreme Court enumerated the elements that comprise a violation of RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e), thus: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.” A close scrutiny of the facts of this case would reveal that the above elements are present. © GR. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004. / Epic ior rere / YL wv MéAccused is a public officer. The prosecution and the accused stipulated during pre-trial that, at the time material to this case as alleged in the Information, the accused was a public officer, being then the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB assigned in Laguna and Cavite.”! Accused acted with gross inexcusable negligence. In the Information, the accused was charged of having violated RA 3019 through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. It is well settled that these three modes are distinct and different from each other and that proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under Section 3 (e) should suffice to warrant conviction.” In the present case, the pertinent facts point to the violation of RA 3019 through gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the accused. Gross inexcusable negligence has been defined as: . negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference (o consequences as far as other persons are concerned The accused's failure to forward the records to the DARAB Central Office, or to otherwise act accordingly on delos Reyes’ case, for three (3) years bares the focal point of her negligence. The accused admitted having received the indorsement of delos Reyes’ appeal and appeal fee on March 31, 19987 but deferred any action on it. A year after, or on March 30, 1999, the accused received another indorsement, this time with regard to delos Reyes’ letter to Undersecretary Lara,’® and categorically admitted to having ignored it Several months later, on in August 1999, the accused received a Memorandum” from then Executive Director Arrieta. The accused’s only action to the Memorandum was to discuss the pending incident with Arrieta.7* However, after having been allowed to retain ® Prestrial Order, p. 1 » Fonacier vs. Sandiganbo'van, 238 SCRA 655, 688 (1994). ® Mendoza-Arce vs. Omiuilsman, 380 SCRA 325, 136-337 (2002) * TSN, September 12,200, . 16 Y ff we eo ** TSN, October 6, 2003, p. 15. 7 hs. “A-10” & 13”, "TSN, October 6, 2003, p. 10,possession of the records for the purpose of resolving the pending incident, the accused nonetheless failed to resolve it, Delos Reyes then filed a Motion to Transmit Record with DARAB Cavite on October 12, 1999.” Similarly, this did not merit any action from the accused. A few months after, or on January 21, 2000, RARAD Mifias released a Memorandum to the accused regarding delos Reyes’ letter- complaint However, the accused only discussed the pending incident with RARAD Minas. The accused would like this Court to believe that she had legal bases for not forwarding the records in that: (1) delos Reyes’ appeal was not perfected’? and (2) there was a pending incident for resolution.*? However, these reasons do not suffice to justify her unexplainably long period of inaction on delos Reyes’ case Foremost of all, this Court will not brazenly rule on the question of whether or not delos Reyes’ appeal was perfected pursuant to the DARAB Rules, in recognition of DAR’s primary jurisdiction over the interpretation of its rules. In any case, even if this Court adopis the accused’s view and assumes arguendo that delos Reyes’ appeal was not perfected, the accused’s theory still does not absolve her from her inaction. The accused did not have any ~ justification to simply-ignore the-appeal altogether. The-accused still had the obligation to act on the appeal accordingly - whether it implied having to forward the records to the DARAB Central Office or merely having to promptly explain in writing the circumstances that ensued in delos Reyes’ case. Instead, the accused had to wait for more than a year after she received the indorsement of the appeal before taking her first action on it. Worse, except for giving oral explanations of the situation to her superiors, the accused took no other action on the matter. If the accused truly believed that delos Reyes’ appeal was not perfected, she should have taken any measure that she deemed appropriate for the case and not simply refuse to act’on it. After all, as PARAD, she is authorized under the DARAB Rules to adopt any appropriate measure or procedure in any given situation or matter not covered by the rules, on the lone condition that such special measure employed should be reported to DARAB.* ” Bxhs. “A-l © Bhs. “A138 14", "TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. &-1D; October 6, 2003, p17 ® TSN, September 12, 2002, p. 16 © Exh “8” , Rule I, Sec. 3, DARAB New Rules of Procedire i Y wn whFurther, the accused's stance that she had a pending incident to resolve was, at best, a lame excuse. While it may be true that the accused had to resolve the respondents’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, this did not give the accused justification to continue deferring any action on delos’ Reyes appeal. Moreover, under the DARAB Rules, motions are required to be resolved “within a period of not more than ten (10) days from receipt thereof with or without a hearing.”* In fact, notwithstanding the accused’s reiteration that she had yet to resolve the pending incident, there is nothing in the records to show that she resolved it at all. It is clear that the accused had the duty to act with dispatch on delos Reyes’ appeal. Without doubt, her duty notwithstanding, she deliberately chose to ignore the indorsement of the appeal and the subsequent memoranda on the matter. Considering her experience as PARAD, the accused very well knew that her refusal to forward the records to the DARAB Central Office, or to otherwise act one way or the other on delos Reyes’ case, virtually caused the paralysis of his case. All these circumstances sufficiently establish that the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence in this case. Accused’s inaction caused undue injury to private complainant The case of Judge Sidro vs. Sandiganbayan® gives an explanation of the nature of undue injury: Undue injury refers to injury that is "more than necessary, not proper, or an illegal wrong or damage done to another, either inhis person, rights, reputation or property." The accused's inaction on delos Reyes’ case brought it to a standstill. Because of this, delos Reyes was deprived of the opportunity to have his appeal resolved and, consequentially, all other subsequent remedies for more than three years. Delos Reyes filed his Notice of Appeal on March 2, 1998.” The accused only turned over the records on November 29, 2001, or more than three years after the Notice of Appeal was filed.* During those long years, delos Reyes was left with no recourse but to wait for the accused to act on his case. Delos Reyes even went to the extent of seeking other public officials’ intervention; unfortunately, to no avail. © Rule IX, Sec, 1, DARAB New Rules of Procedure, GR. No, 149685, April 78, 2004 ® iia. “TSN, February 28, 2002, p11; October 6, 2003, pp. 18 & 31 ae Yu pre‘The accused denied having caused undue injury to delos Reyes and interposed that delos Reyes was no longer in possession of the subject property even before the DARAB case was filed. She also argued that delos Reyes’ son, Rogelio, even acknowledged that it was not the accused’s decision that ejected delos Reyes from the property. The accused’s contention, however, is beside the point. While it is true that delos Reyes was already dispossessed of his property when the DARAB case was filed, it is actually his being deprived of the opportunity to seck further remedies from the dispossession that constitutes undue injury against him. Otherwise stated, it is of no importance that delos Reyes was already dispossessed of his property at the time of the filing of the DARAB case. The reality is he was robbed of his right to have his appeal heard by the DARAB and to seek other remedies because of the accused's deliberate refusal to take any measure on delos Reyes’ case. The unreasonable delay that plagued delos Reyes’ case-was more than necessary, improper and represented an actionable wrong that was done to his person and his rights, : oo Moreover, it bears noting that, “causing undue injury” to a party is not confined to positive acts only. Even passive acts, as the accused’s inaction on delos Reyes’ case, can be deemed as the cause of undue injury. “What is essential is that undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from the questioned official act or inaction.” The facts of this case more than sufficiently establish that the accused's inaction resulted in undue injury to delos Reyes. During those three years that the accused refused to take any action, delos Reyes’ case was left to age in the hands of the accused, leaving delos Reyes uncertain of the end result of his suit. Such undeniably constitutes undue injury to delos Reyes. B. Infidelity in the Custody of Documents The crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents is punished in Art. 226 of the RPC: ART, 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. — Any public officer who shall remove, destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer: © TSN, November 15, 2001, pp. 16-17. * Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandigavibayan, 287 SCRA 382, 105 (1998)1, The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage shall have been cansed thereby to a third party or to the public interest 2. The penalty of prision correecionat in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever the damage caused to a third party or the public interest shall not have been seriou: In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification shall be imposed For this crime to be deemed committed, the following elements must concur: 1) that the offender be a public officer; 2) that there be a document abstracted, destroyed or concealed; 3) that the document destroyed or abstracted be entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office, and 4) that damage or prejudice to the public interest or to that of a third person be caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document. Examination of the facts points to the absence of an essential element of this crime - that the documents were abstracted, destroyed or concealed. The accused did not remove delos Reyes’ case records as, in fact, they were duly turned over to her? Neither did she destroy them as she also surrendered custody of the case records on November 29, 200128 The question, then, boils down to whether or not the accused “concealed” the case records. “Concealment” is defined as: To conceal. A withholding of something which one knows and which one, in duty, is bound to reveal... “Conceal” is also described thus: To hide, secrete, or withhold from the knowledge of others. To withhold from utterance or declaration. To cover or keep from sight. To hide or withdraw from observation, or prevent discovery of. People v, Eddington, 201 Cal App.2d 574, 20 Cal.Rptr. 122, 124.8 Based on these definitions, the act of concealment implies an intent to withhold the knowledge of the location of the public % Pajelga vs. Excareal, G-R Nos. L-61017-18, January 14, 1988. ° TSN, September 12, 200°, p. 20; October 6, 2003, pp. 3-4; Exh. “A-a™ © TSN, October 6, 2003, p. I. % Black’s Law Dictionary 6" ed, p,289 (1997)document from others or to prevent its discovery. On this premise, the accused cannot be considered to have concealed delos Reyes’ case records. The accused never hid the fact that she had custody of the case records. In fact, she categorically admitted in some occasions that she had the case records. The evidence on hand supports the finding that several persons knew of the accused’s custody of the case records. First, the accused herself testified on direct examination that, on August 24, 1998, the Clerk of DARAB Laguna turned over thirteen case folders to the accused, including, that of delos Reyes’ case. A receipt duly signed by the accused also evidenced the turnover of case folders.” Second, Rogelio learned that the accused took custody of the records when he inquired with DARAB Laguna in August 1998. Third, the accused even brought with her the case records when she met with then Executive ctor Arrieta at the DARAB Central Office. The accused only retained possession of the records on Arrieta’s order. - oe Fourth, RARAD Minas also knew of the accused’s custody of the case records. She issued a Memorandum to the accused® and had a discussion with the accused on the matter.'0 All these circumstances clearly illustrate that the accused never withheld the fact that she had delos Reyes’ records. The officers and even the private complainant were all aware that the records were with the accused. Being so, there could not have been concealment as embodied in the law, especially considering the fact that the custody was well known to other persons. Having concluded that the accused did not actually conceal the case records, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other elements of this crime. “Defer not till to-morrow to be wise To-morrow’s sun to thee may never rise.” - William Congreve, Letter to Cobham. ACCORDINGLY, the accused BARBARA P. TAN is ACQUITTED of the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Documents. TSN, September 12, 2002, p. 20; October 6, 2003, pp. 3-4 *” Exh. Exh “A’ Bxhs “ALI & “14 "TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 8-10; October 6, 2003, p. 17. ce oe & WKHowever, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated RA 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum and nine (9) years as maximum and perpetual disqualification from public office. Costs against the accused. SO ORDERED. Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines Associate Justice WE CONCUR: Me. GREGORY 8. ONG RODOLFO AYPONFERRADA. Associate Justice ssociate Justice ChairmanCriminal Cases Nos, 26548-49 People vs. Barbara P. Tan Decision Page 18 oo ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above-decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to _y of the opinion of the Court’s Division. St. GREGORY S. ONG Chairman, Fourth Division CERTI ¥ Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. nye TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Presiding Justice