The Role of Caste and Religion in Shaping Indian Muslim Identity-Challenges

-Prof. Muzaffar Assadi

The stereotypes about Muslims:

Firstly, we need to understand what are the stereotypes that are operating about the
Muslims of India and then we have to see whether they are stable or whether they are
taking different forms.

Secondly, we have to ask, where do we locate Muslims? Can they be located as subaltern
classes? The left has projected Muslims as a community rather than subaltern classes in
Indian context. Hardly anyone has talked about the caste among Muslims. New Socialist
Movement has to take it up if they want to address the issue of Muslims in Indian context.

Thirdly, we have to ask, what is the major concern among Muslims? Is it poverty or is it
security? Is ghettoisation the major concern?

Next, it is important to understand the difference between South Indian Muslims and North
Indian Muslims and where do we locate the All India Muslims as such.

Let us first look at the stereotypes:

1. One stereotype is that of accusing Muslims for dividing India based on their religion.

This stereotype is constructed again and again and it stigmatizes the category saying, ‚You
are accountable for the partition of India‛. First of all partition is not the actual experience of
South Indians at all. Moreover partition was demanded by the North Indian Muslim elite
classes; bureaucrats, Zamindars and Industrialists, not by the subaltern Muslim classes.

2. Another stereotype is saying that Muslims have too many demands.

This is simply not correct. Muslims have very few demands. What are the demands of
Muslims? We will see that later.

3. It is said that article 370 reflected the psychological feelings of all Muslims but it did
not.
4. Similarly Kashmir is not the issue of all Muslims.
 5. The autonomy to Aligarh University was made the issue of all Muslims and at the
same time Sir Sayyad Ahmad Khan was accused of being a separatist and the entire
community was accused of being supportive of him.
6. Now let us take the case of triple talak. The issue came up again and again. Let us
take the case of Shah Bano. Shah Bano moved the court for alimony after her divorce.
Triple talak was portrayed as the major issue of the Muslims but it was not.

When we think of it, we see that the percentage of the Muslim women affected by it is very
little. Even though I stood by it, the problem is ‚Who is making it an issue?‛ If whoever
making it an issue are feminists, then it is fine. But it is the Indian right wing that is talking
about Triple Talak!

And again it was used to construct a narrative, condemn the community and stigmatize them
saying Muslims are backward and are anti-modern and they are not in favor of changes to
their personal law.

7. Medieval history constructs another stereotype. The memories of the medieval period
are again and again reconstructed, beginning with Ghori down to Tippu. Medieval
history is said to be full of pillages and forcible conversions.

Russian scholars like Pavlov and Ulyanovsky call the Moghul empire and Tippu kingdom as
top down feudal states not looking at the transformations that were taking place in agrarian
structures and in other areas. Marx also called it a stagnated economy.

It is not what anyone said, the strange thing is, Muslims of the present day are becoming
accountable to everything that has happened in the medieval past:

1. First they become accountable to the misery, pillage and conversions of medieval
period.
2. Then they become accountable to the partition of India.
3. Next become accountable to the deeds that they haven’t even done.

These stereotypes are not only reconstructed but they are universalized. This is the reason
why I am using a category called ‚neo-untouchable‛ category.
Two things are quite apparent in the case of Indian Muslims:

1. First one is subalternity.

2. The second one is untouchability.

Even though neo-untouchability is part of subalternity, we have to differentiate them.

Subalternity is not just the idea of ‘being’, it is also the idea of ‘the position of the being’ the
community has undergone over the years. They are untouchable categories in social life in
terms of socio- economic relations and in terms of location. There is a perceptible shift that
has taken place in their position over the years and they are the ‚neo-Dalits‛ of the
contemporary period.

In this context we need to understand the following things:

1. Do we see Muslims as a single homogenous lot? Culturally infused?

2. Do we see them as an exclusive category that is not prepared to open itself to the
other world?
3. Is it a closed subaltern class category which has not been able to co-opt the social
relations and social structures of the other?

The major stereotype of colonial writers is that ‚Muslims are conservatives, religious bigots,
orthodox and full of hatred‛. This is exactly how the subaltern and untouchable categories
get constructed.

Who constructed the subalternity of Muslims in India? We have to understand that this
subalternity is not the construct of Colonial state alone. Post independence Indian state also
has a role in it. It always talked about only four or five issues as belonging to all Muslims. In
Sachar and Ranganath Mishra committee reports followed by other reports, Indian state
suddenly realizes that Muslim community is backward; socially, politically and economically
downtrodden!

Now let us see when did the subalternity of north Indian Muslims begin. It began in 1857. Till
then Muslims were the ruling class. Whether it is the regime or in the social structures like
Jagirdars, Zaminders, etc. They were in institutions like judiciary and political administration.
Till then they were part of both Moghul and colonial ruling class. After the power gets
transferred to British, the policies that were introduced affect them and after 1857 those
effects speeded up.
In Hyderabad they were the ruling class.

In Karnataka the subalternity begins much earlier, in 1799, when the Srirangapatna collapsed
and Tippu Sultan lost power. They had to hand over the power to the Royal chieftains or the
Princely state. Between 1799 and 1883 they lost power consistently in Karnataka. By 1884
their decline was such that they were categorized as backward classes by Mysore state.

Colonial Policies:

Hutton report in 1881 and other reports say that the decline of Muslims was mainly because
of the colonial policies:

1. Making land a private property,

2. Abolishing Muslim judges (Qazi),
3. Introducing English after Thomas Macaulay,
4. Changes in revenue and currency.

Inability of the Muslim ruling classes to adopt to the changing situation makes them
marginalized. The main example is that of education. In 1830 when the Britishers introduced
English as the medium of instruction replacing Sanskrit and Persian as the court and
administrative languages, Muslims did not adopt to it arguing that English was a satanic
language and learning it is against the basic principles of their religion. Because of this
attitude they became the losers. We can see that Muslim representation in different
structures of power was the lowest in Bengal compared to the other provinces by 1885 and
1905.

Even though it cannot be denied that colonialists consistently stigmatized the Muslim
community, it was also a fact that they consistently denied the dialogue that existed between
the Indian and Islamic knowledge systems. They even denied the knowledge production by
Islamic tradition. Be it a scholar like Ibn Sinah, who introduced Aristotle and Plato to the
western world or any other.

But paradoxically Aristotle, who was appropriated by the Church and later by colonialism was
introduced to the west by Islam. Western Europeans received them from Islamic world,
Christianized them and projected Aristotle and Plato as their own. They also exported the
Aristotlism to the other parts of the world. They went on to advance their argument that
everyone should have a city state and democracy like Greece. They thought that they were
the precursors of democracy. In the process they completely marginalized Islamic knowledge
system as if it did not exist.

When the state denied it as a knowledge system and stigmatized the community consistently
as bigots and intolerants, Muslims lost everything and after that they did not regain their
position. One section that demanded a separate state left the country but the majority of the
Muslims who did not demand a separate state and did not leave the country became
suddenly backward.

The structure of Indian Muslim population:

In this context we have to understand:

1. What is the structure of Indian Muslim population?

2. Are there any caste identities in them?
3. Do they speak in terms of a single community?

It is important to understand it because today Muslims are projected as a single

homogeneous category. We can see this in various Government reports like backward class
report, etc.,

In all those, Muslims are understood as:

1. Aas belonging to a single community, and

2. As part of a single Ummah.

A narrative that is constructed like this is carried forward by both non-left and left alike.

Along with that there are new narratives that are being created which again demoralize
Muslims. A consistent argument is being made on Ambedkar’s views of Muslims and has
been used to construct a new narrative. It is constructed to prevent the larger alliance
between Muslims and Dalits from taking place. It is said that Ambedkar was against the
partition of India and after partition he was for sending all Muslims to Pakistan. This has
become part of the Dalit argument that says Muslims should go to Pakistan.

But the book ‘Partition of India’ which I consider a pamphlet that deals with partition, is a
well researched program that tries to understand nationalism in Indian context. He says that
an exchange of people who live on the either sides of the border of India and Pakistan will
make the partition peaceful. But this is interpreted as advocating mass exodus of Muslims
from all the other places. He said women wearing burkhas do not grow mentally. When he
thinks Islam emerged out of mercantile trade he is doing all that as a researcher.

Arguments for Muslim caste:

Colonialism:

Now let us see whether Indian Muslim category has caste. The categorization,
documentation, classification and re-classification of Muslims started during colonial period.
1871 census was the first census which identified caste among the Hindu social order. There
is one argument that says colonialism is responsible for constructing ‘caste’ as such.

Colonialism has advanced seven theories to account for caste and one of them is ‚Aryan
Invasion theory‛. In 1830s William Jones began to argue that ‚two important languages of
India‛ came from ‚Syria‛ and one of them was identified with Muslims. In fact it was wrong
to identify Persians as Muslims. Classical Persian was the language of Zoroastrians which was
later on appropriated by Islam when Muslim rulers appropriated Iran or Persia.

But the argument was that Persian was the court language of north India, Marathas and
Mysore States and was largely identified with Muslims. Sanskrit was Aryan language and
Aryans also came from Syria. This theory of Aryan invasion or arrival was projected as one of
the reasons why Hindus witnessed caste formation.

Brought from East Asia:

Arrival of Muslims from various parts of East Asia is thought to have created castes among
Muslims. This theory has not been explored much. For example it is said that Sheiks, Sayyads,
Pathans and Moghals brought with them the hierarchical social structure and other
categories with them. They brought in slaves, dancing girls, and others. The social factors
that were in Persian world later on became part of the caste system in India. The Aryan
invasion argument and the argument of upper class Muslim arrival from Persia were made to
explain the caste in Hindus and Indian Muslims.

Trade:

Now let us see how trade necessitated the formation of caste. Malabar, particularly Zamorins
is one example. Zamorins had trading business with Arab world. Their problem was that they
had no man power to look after Arabian ships. It is said that Zamorin issued a firman asking
for one person from a fisheries community known as Cherumal community to be a Muslim
and take care of Arab ships. Cherumal was an untouchable or degraded caste. Once a
Cherumal was converted into Islam for trade purpose, he gained the ‘ability’ to do trade with
Arabs. To do trade with Arabs entire Cherumal community became Muslims. That’s how
Cherumal became a Muslim caste.

In Malabar and Bhatkal, Karnataka, Arab traders married women from local population. That
became a hybrid community. Mappilas are the progeny of Arab and local population.
Similarly trade led to the marriages of Arabs and Jains in Karnataka. This has happened in
other places also. This led to the argument that trade created caste in Muslims.

Conversion of Hindus: Via Sufi or Forcible?

The next argument that colonials made was caste was the result of conversion of Hindus:

1. Hindu social order has an imagined past which is the beginning of the caste and it
goes to Vedic period.
2. Caste formation in Indian Muslims began in 7th century with the arrival Sufis and
foreign military forces.

Given its nature of syncretism, advocacy of harmony, dialogue between religions and
tolerant society, Sufi is more convincing as a successful force of conversion. Sufi was seen as
a deviant culture in Islamic world but in India it was seen as legitimate Islamic culture. Their
tolerance, practical nature, simplicity, frugal life style, their narratives, their lyrics their
miracles and all such things attracted huge Hindu crowds. That crowd was from backward
classes of the society. Trading classes like Khojas, Bohras were converted by Sufis. They
initially created fuzzy communities with obscure identities. They were neither Muslims nor
Hindus.
Take Meos of north India, which is a Rajput community. They say that they are Muslims but
their family God is Krishna. Muslim castes have all communities like Rajputs, Jhats, Ahivs.
There were political reasons too for conversions. They also converted to retain their property.
We can see this issue getting reflected in 1857 census, where the census board says, in one
category, one person in the family became a vidhrohi and joined the enemy force and the
other joined the British forces. Whoever wins they will retain the property.

Colonial census:

There is another narrative that says British census created castes. But one thing is clear, even
a small mistake done in the report created a new caste. An extra dot put in the name of a
Muslim community written in Urdu created a new caste called Mer. Lot of such mistakes
were committed. Of course colonialism documented a large number of castes, but caste did
exist much before colonialism and it does not get talked about.

A Hyderabad state census of 1881 identified that there were many castes among the
Muslims; Badhvegas, Sonars, Pinjyars, Boharas, Kambolis, Kaapeek, Kasai, Khoja, Memon,
Momeen. There were certain castes that were both Hindu and Muslim; Badhvegas, Dhon,
Bagban, Kamboli, Sonar, Theli, Medha. Medhas caste is both Sikh and Muslim. Kalikaars are
both Jains and Muslims.Thambolis hold Hinduism, Islam and Jainism as their religions. 1919
census added a new caste called Julaha, a weaving caste. It is a north Indian caste that is also
seen in Hyderabad but not in Travancore or old Mysore.

These are not only castes, they are also occupational categories. And both are not the same
in all cases. Suthar is a carpenter but his caste is not a carpenter caste. There is no consistent
methodology that is used by British to document Muslims. Many lower caste Hindus came
under Muslim category. Some time it came under foreign origin and sometimes it came
under Asiatic origin. Sometimes local conversion was considered and sometimes the
hybridity of the caste was considered. This happens in all their census reports about Bengal,
Madras, Bombay, Baroda and Kashmir.
New categories created by Colonialism:

1. For example criminal tribes. A large number of criminal tribes were documented in
Punjab and Bombay presidencies under criminal tribes act. When a person is a habitual
offender, his entire tribe is castigated as criminal tribe. There are similar Hindu tribes.
There are also instances were one group became a tribe and the other group became a
caste. Pindaris became a caste like this.
2. There is another category called nomadic tribes. A large number of nomadic tribes were
identified in Kashmir and other places.
3. In Lakshadweep all are Muslim tribes.

Like this multiple categories and names were constructed by the British. Caste was pre-
colonial and their mistakes in documentation created many new castes. They went on
classifying and reclassifying castes.

There is a question whether Colonial caste categorization followed Hindu practices?

In Muslim castes we can see both flexibility and upper mobility as against rigidity which is
the characteristic of Hindu castes. When a Hindu was co-opted and when he came from a
backward caste, he could claim a higher caste status in Muslims like Sheikhs. Sheikhs,
Sayyads, Moghuls and Pathans were considered higher castes/classes. But they are not pure
castes or homogeneous classes.

Sheikhs, Sayyads, Moghuls and Pathans are of non-Indian origin:

These four classes are of non-Indian origin but:

1. They married local population and

2. A large number of OBCs, backward castes and others appropriated the titles of
Sheikh, Sayyad, Pathan, Moghuls along with other classes

It is argued now that nine Muslim categories do not to come under OBC list on the grounds
of being original classes. They are considered pure castes. But my argument is that none of
them are pure. Take the category of Nabais, they are the hybrids of Arabs and Jains. Skeikhs
are the hybrid class of local backward castes including dalits called Dudekulas. They were
converted and appropriated. Also anyone who was rich could claim the status of Sayyad,
Pathan, etc. As a result, we can see a flexibility Muslim castes as compared with Hindu social
structure.

Moreover there is no caste hierarchy as such in Muslims social order.

Vanishing castes:

There were categories that did not get enlisted and they simply vanished. That is the paradox
of the census reports as a whole. For example in 1931,many castes that were enlisted
(sometimes the number went beyond 3 hundred) and identified as sub-castes. Even when
their original castes were identified, they became a new caste. For example Khoja came from
Kumbi caste, and a large number of castes came from Rajput or Jhat castes but they claimed
they were not related.

Census provided the statistics and numbers, social structure and social history of the castes,
it also provided the imagined history and constructed its own argument and also reclassified.
There was reclassification not only of categories, there was reclassification of caste also. For
example in 1932, in Hyderabad area, Kasab caste demanded that they should be enlisted as
Kasab-Kasai. Similarly Julahas wanted to be categorised as Sheikhs.

Are they only Muslims or are they castes?

After the enlisting, many castes disappeared, particularly in 1921. Then there came an
argument saying Muslims should be projected only as Muslims and not as castes. Does it
mean that the castes disappear in the political documentation and public policies?

Here lie the contradictory positions:

1. One is that the state stopped census in 1931 and from then onwards caste
information was coming from ethnographic studies, gazetteers, police records, and
other sources. Castes were defined in terms of criminality, nomadic nature, etc.
 2. On the other hand there is the argument of homogeneity of the religion, community
and difference between the communities.

This colonial project itself was a contradictory project, but the same project was carried
forward by the Indian state also. This is the problem with academics and left intellectuals too.
They also tend to see the homogeneity argument as the authentic argument and as the
representative argument rather than seeing the differences.

But the moment we agree to the fact that there is diversity, we can see the same argument
was made by many Islamic scholars including Baladuri, Alberuni, Barani, Sahriyar and others.
No one is referring to them at all. Even though the diversity is an accepted fact, even though
the original Islamic text makes references to the differences, diversities and also to the
inverse conversions along with other things, we tend to look at Muslims as a homogeneous
group without paying attention to any of these.

Muslim community is a subaltern community:

This stereotyping is applied to everyone even after the entire community has become a
subaltern community. I will claim that after 1947, the process of subalternisation intensified.
Sachar committee report of 2005 tried to find out the differences between the north Indian
Muslims and south Indian Muslims and argued that south Indian Muslims are far better than
north Indian Muslims. Fortunately Sachar committee report is one report that identified
‘caste structures’ in Muslims.

But in terms of the social policies, Muslims are still projected as a single homogeneous class.

Sachar committee report says that there are three important categories among the Muslims:

1. Ashrafs; those without any social disabilities or the upper class.

2. Ajlafs; those who are equivalent to OBSs, occupational castes who retained their
occupation and social practices even after conversion.
3. Arzals, equivalent to Hindu BCs, for example Halalkors, they are seen as the most
backward, Dalits among the Muslims.
When the Ranganath Mishra committee report was talking about reservation for Dalit
categories, it was also talking about reservations to Muslim Dalits.

What is the public narrative about Muslims?

The whole question is that identification of castes by commissions and committees is not the
major concern in the public narrative. In public narrative community becomes the major
catch. Generally asked questions are:

1. Whether the caste has been able to create its own space within the Muslim
community?
2. Does these caste fit into the frame of subalternity?

I think the number of castes that assert themselves is very few. Let us take the example of
Chabbars, a criminal tribe in Karnataka that is demanding to be considered as scheduled
caste. They want to reposition themselves a SC’s. Also Pinjyars, Patmandlars asking for
repositioning for education and other issues. Byaris of coastal Karnataka, the most backward
merchant class is demanding more amenities for their class. The problem is that the number
of castes asserting themselves as castes instead of asserting themselves as a class or
community is far less.

But the paradox is:

1. The community is marginalized and is pushed to the corner and is stigmatized again
and again. What we need to understand is, the community is far more secure in south
India compared to north India.
2. Second thing is now the entire community is getting transformed into a neo-
untouchable category.

Why south India is comparatively batter than north India? It is because of certain
historical reasons:

1. One of them is that south India never witnessed the partition. South Indians do
not have the memory or actual experience of the partition. South Indians only
had what I call the ‘textual experience’, whatever experience we derive, we derive
 it from the texts, like those of Amrita Pritham, Sadath Hassan Manto, Khushwant
Singh, and others where it becomes a reference point for understanding the
memory and the pain of partition.
2. Hence, south India doesn’t have this historical baggage of pain. This prevented
this Muslim community from becoming a prey to communal frenzy. That way
south India is far better.
3. It also doesn’t have the memories of severe pillage and destruction that get
reproduced and get constructed and reconstructed today.
4. Another thing is a synchretic culture that was created in south India where every
village has got the memories of Sufis and their healing tradition.
5. Next one is the Bhakthi movement which created a secular space. Sufi and Bhakti
are the two categories that brought the two religions together. Sufism created
syncretism and Bhakthi movement created common spaces for a rapport and
dialogue between them on the issues of living together and on the issues of
tolerance.
6. Last important difference is we had the tolerant and benevolent regimes.
Travancore, Kolhapur and Old Mysore were one of the first states to introduce
affirmative action, the reservation policy. There was Mulki system brought in by
the Hyderabad state. These became very inclusive states that accommodated
many social categories into the political system.

This had an effect in education movement also. For example when Mandal commission
report was accepted, south India was literally burning whereas north India was absolutely
silent. This is because south Indian states have a history of accommodating caste categories,
providing affirmative action, providing reservations, providing places for different categories
among the Muslims and among the Hindus and among the Dalits.

Here Muslims were treated as a socio-economic category, not as a religious category.

Muslims were able to participate in the political process and also became a part of the
dominant narrative. When we read Sachar committee report we can see that south Indian
Muslims fare far better than North Indian Muslims.

Neo-untouchability:

Now under the project of constructing a Hindu state, they suddenly become neo-
untouchable category. The project says:
 1. One should not bargain with Muslims,
2. One should not shop with Muslims,
3. One should not sit with Muslims (in coastal belt),
4. One should not to go to shops for hair cutting,
5. One should not to provide spaces for Muslims to trade in festivals and fairs,
6. One should not buy Halal cut meat, not buy mutton from Kasai.

This untouchability is not confined only to economic issues, but gets translated into political
issue. Identity markers like Topis, Dhadis, Sherwanis become anathema to the public gaze
The moment they are seen in a meeting, convention or a rally, they get branded and the
process becomes counter-productive.

Neo-untouchability and new forms of ghettoisation are taking place. Space of Muslims is
shrinking due to ghettoisation. Sachar committee talks about the concentrated areas and its
new forms in urban localities. Exclusive flats for Muslims and denial of flats for Muslims. This
way they become the ‘other’ in political narratives. In the discourse they are portrayed as
suffering from developmental deficit and economic deficit, and poverty.

I say this is a contradiction, because developmental deficit or even poverty are not the major
concerns under the circumstances. Muslims live and die in poverty and it is everyday reality
for them. The most important issue for them is security.

Physical security:

Physical security and untouchability are the challenges Muslims are facing now. The baggage
of history is a challenge to overcome. Each communal riot makes Muslims more and more
marginalized and more and more physically insecure. Even their food culture becomes
questioned and as a result, ghettos become places that provide a sense of security.

But now:

1. What are the possibilities for Muslims?

2. Is it possible to re-construct the whole narrative of Muslims?
 3. Is it possible to make them part of the larger narrative of Indian state, where in they
have possible spaces?
4. Will they again occupy the spaces that are lost in terms of representation and
location? That is a major challenge for the Muslims in India, because the spaces are
either closed or being negated.
5. Is it possible to change the paradigm?
6. Is it possible to bring in new language of politics?

Given the fact that Muslims are 14% , given the fact that they have lived in India after
partition, given the fact that the logic of caste that is operating in them says they literally
belong to this country, they are not outsiders at all. Only 1% of them are of foreign origin
and 99% of them are the Muslims of India and belong to India. They do practice caste and
they do engage with the social system, they also have practices that go to pre-conversion
period.

Muslims are indigenous:

When we look at them, we see that they are indigenous and they are local. Is it possible to
create a space for them? Not only a political space, it should be social and cultural space. The
paradigm shift has to be from seeing them as homogeneous lot asking for the
representation of their whole community to things that are beyond that.

There is one more issue that is most important is identity issue. The moment someone says
that he is a Muslim, he is castigated. Is it possible to reconstruct a new identity? In terms of
caste? In terms of ethnicity? In terms of tribalism?

The new left has to take it up. It is not enough to see them as a class alone, they need to be
seen as a subaltern class which is made of ‘Jaathi’ (caste) Muslims and the whole analysis has
to begin with understanding the differences. There are arguments of Multiple Islam, folk
Islam, tribal Islam, and what I would call ‘Jaath’ Islam or caste Islam.

So, that should be the basis for understanding the issues of identity and historical memory.
Otherwise Muslims in Indian context will get marginalized again and again. They will remain
as the most unrecognizable categories and most importantly they will remain as the ‘other’
both from within and without.
Q&A:

Bhargava:

In post independence India, when political parties try to organize Muslims, how do they go
about it? As a community or as a group of identities?

Prof.Assadi:

Political parties have recognized the multiplicities in the social structure of Muslims. For
example, immediately after Akhlaq case, Mayavathi tried to give tickets to lower caste
Muslims thinking that they are the authentic voices of Muslims and they constituted a
majority. Her idea did not succeed but she recognized the importance of the diversity in
Indian Muslims. Congress and BJP look at Muslims only as a homogeneous category.

What happens in Hyderabad? There, Owaisi, tries to project himself as ‘the voice’ of the
community. That means he, at any cost, is trying to expand his social base. In subalternist
argument, we say, he wants to be the agency between the state and the community. I do not
think he goes into the intricacies of the caste. Because his project is different, given the fact
that he can never capture the power, he simply tries to represent the community.

There was a time when Gandhi also acted as the agency of the community. Mohammad Ali
Jinnah was also the agency of elite Muslims. When we look at the social bases of parties like
Welfare party, SDPI and others, they are marginalized categories; rag pickers, rickshaw
pullers and others. There too they try project themselves as the representatives of the
community, not as the representatives of each caste. That is why the narrative of all of them,
whether it is Owaisi, SDPI, Indian Union of Muslim League (who control Khoyas, Dangals, etc.)
is Muslims are a community, not castes. This is why the caste doesn’t get the representation
even in the party. Caste issues do not get reflected in the party.

Look at their political agenda or manifesto. It never speaks about the caste differences. It
never speaks about the diversity. It never speaks about the ethnicity. Muslim caste narratives
are absent in India except for the Lakshadweep. In Lakshadweep it is tribal narrative as all of
them are scheduled tribes.

In Kashmir, nomadic tribe narrative may be part of their narrative. But that doesn’t mean that
caste gets into their political narrative. Projecting Muslims as a monolithic community when
they are actually castes is the paradox. There are exceptions to this in Kashmir and
Lakshadweep where the narrative becomes specific to the locality.

Roja Ramani:

In recent years, we are witnessing Hindutva politics rising day by day. Because of that, the
previously liberal educated Muslims are becoming religious day by day.

Prof Assadi:

There is a difference between becoming religious and becoming communitarian.

Roja Ramani:

In my bank, there are two sub-staffs. One is SC and one is Pathan. They hate each other. How
can we bring them together?

Prof Assadi:

What you are asking is instead of falling back on their community, why are they becoming
more and more ‘Muslims’? This is because of the moment they fall back on their community
it becomes religious narrative, not an ideological narrative.

This gets expressed in the symbolism of Hijab. The issue of Hijab which started in Karnataka
in 1990s, when people started wearing Hijab as a reaction against modernity. It became a
new identity marker. But it was also part of opposition against western civilization that
attacked Islamic world. Keeping Hijab as a marker of protest, they appropriated modern
knowledge and became doctors, engineers, etc. But the larger society projected Hijab as the
mark of revivalism, obscurantism, un-civilization. They never understood that Hijab was also
a mark of protest.

In India large number of Muslims are becoming communitarian rather that religious.
‚Religion is under threat‛ is a false narrative, because it is not the religion that is under
threat, it is the Muslim community which is a social category that is under threat. It is my life
as a Muslim that is under threat. It is my family that is under threat. It is my cultural practice
that is under threat. But that doesn’t mean my cultural practice is homogeneous.
When we talk about culture, what exactly is Islamic culture? Does it have a dress code? No.
Does it have homogeneous practices like Halal? No. Because Halal can be many things to
many people. Even vegetarianism can be Halal. My culture is not just Islamic culture alone, it
is local culture also.

My existence as a Muslim is under constant threat and surveillance. That is the reason why I
try to fall back on the community. Religion is a much larger category as it is worldwide and it
is not under threat.

Now let us come to the question: ‚Is it possible to have a negotiation between the Dalit and
the Muslim who are economically on the same footing?‛ Drawing the same salary doesn’t
mean economic and social equality. Economic parity is not the final solution of the problem
either. It is the issue of our deep perception of exploitation, perception of primary
contradictions, perception of the dominant ideology. These are the issues that distance the
communities and individuals from having a dialogue.

There is an ideological perception that Muslims have segregated Dalits historically, before
colonialism, and are responsible for Dalitisation of Dalits and so they cannot have a dialogue.
But if they realize that at present both the communities are subaltern and are the victims of
the present day system, both are exploited by the system and both are historically, equally
suppressed and marginalized by the system, then the dialogue can take place, otherwise it is
not possible.

Do Muslims and Dalits have icons which can draw them to dialogue? Dalits have Ambedkar
as their icon. Who is the Muslim icon? Moulana Azad? Yes and no. Azad is not accepted by
all Muslims. He has not been projected as the icon of Muslims, he is projected as the icon of
liberal nationalism. Larger Muslim community is not liberal.

Azad is post independence state builder and Ambedkar is post independence nation builder.
Despite the fact that both belong to different streams, if we can bring both of them together
the dialogue becomes a possibility. But there has not been any such effort from any of the
side.
Khan Yazdani:

BJP was trying to divide Muslim fraternity in the past through using the categories of Shiyas
and Sunnis. Now they are wooing the Muslims in the name of Pasmandha. Will this strategy
yield results in 2024?

Prof Assadi:

Modhiji has used the word Pasmandha. It has been interpreted. He said that ‘we should
include them in our politics’ which says, ‚We should reach out to the marginalized
communities‛. Newspaper articles appeared saying he was referring to Pasmandha. Actually
in Hyderabad there is no category called Pasmandha. It is a Bihar category. BJP has reached
out to Shiyas and a large number of them are supportive of BJP. But Indian majority Muslims
are Sunni and they are not with them.

Including Pasmandha all of a sudden is not possible. It does not work like that. Moreover,
BJP has not given a single ticket to Muslims in the last election. Why? It simply does not
need Muslim votes to win elections.

Its agenda is polarization. First between Hindus and Muslims and then between Muslims.

Do you break you head to reach out to marginalized Muslims to consolidate their votes or
do you use them to consolidate Hindu votes? Let a Muslim candidate like Owaisi to come
and give speeches to Muslims and Hindu votes get consolidated against it. That is the
strategy that is being employed here. Same thing happened in UP and Bihar. You do not
have to reach out to the marginalized categories.

Bhargava:

Jews as a persecuted community went through some kind of an enlightenment keeping their
religion intact. Is there such a possibility among Muslims?

Prof. Assadi:

This debate is going on among Indian Muslims. It goes like this: ‚Why there are no noble
laureates in Muslims? Why no inventions and patents by Muslim inventors? No studies by
Muslim scholars?‛ Why all persecuted communities do not become successful? Or Why
persecuted communities like Pharisees, Sindhis became successful in business while other
communities like Gypsies and Indian Muslims remained marginalized?
Who got international attention? Persecution of Jews was projected as the problem of the
universe, whereas the Romas, the Gypsies were never heard of, never got documented, were
never brought to the center stage of the narratives.

Between the 8th and 12th century, Spain was treated as a period of renaissance in Islam. That
contribution was either negated or kept in dark by the colonial states. After the
disintegration of Turkey, the Islamic contribution came down. The large number of states
that emerged were either orthodox, conservative or namesake liberal.

It was not simple even in Christian world. Church did not allow scientific temper to flourish. It
persecute many scientists. It supported Adam and Eve theory because it belonged to the
holy text. When we talk about west, orthodox history operates in liberal argument. Anyway,
the spaces created by Christian renaissance are much larger than the spaces created by
Islamic renaissance.

The debate of renaissance took place between five schools of Islam, Hanbali, Maliki and
others. Now take the difference between Shiyas and Sunnis. The difference is not just
sectarian, it is also ideological. Take the liberation theology that Asghar Ali engineer. Inside
Islam there are spaces for liberalism and for conservatism also. Middle east is a paradox
where capitalism is operating as a feudal structure. But they are sending astronauts to the
orbit.

Clash of the civilizations, war of Christian world on Islamic world is the major hurdle in
creating the spaces for Islamic science, because as a result of the worldwide attack, Muslim
regimes fall back on to the memories of crusades. In a common Muslim’s mind,
confrontation with west comes to the fore. Developing spaces for scientific temper,
progressive, liberal and secular ideology among Muslims takes backseat.

We are seeing that a hardcore tribal state like Saudi Arabia, providing support to both
scientific temper and liberal arts. But UAE doesn’t support liberal arts saying it has no
utilitarian value.

As we are under the shadow of western hegemony, we have reverted back to conservatism
and we can see that in the multiplicity of Islamic systems. Some central Asian countries are
still in the memories of Russian past. Development of Islamic countries will happen wherever
there are liberal societies than in conservative societies.
TV:

Why the strategy of Muslims contributes to the strengthening of right wing forces?

Prof. Assadi:

Because they do have a clear analysis of the situation. Not having a clear analysis of the
situation is their problem. For example, what is the primary contradiction you are dealing
with? Who is your primary or larger enemy? What is the fundamental issue that the
community faces?

What will happen in the case of Muslim parties when they contest elections? Do they have an
analysis? If they have made the analysis, then obviously they will desist from contesting the
elections. Because, when they are unable to win, they will have to allow the space to others
who have a chance against the larger enemy. Otherwise they will allow the enemy to
conquer. If they allow the enemy to conquer, that will be the end of the community.

Why? BJP is our biggest enemy because it has the agenda of converting the country into
Hindutva state. So Hindutva is the primary enemy. If it has a program, that program will be
converted into pogrom. So, we need to back off politically and allow the secular space to TRS
in Andhra Pradesh.

This is precisely the analysis that is absent in Owaisi. If he had made the analysis, for the
good of his community, he will withdraw clearing the space to TRS at least for the time
being. At least till the secular forces dominate the political scene. At least till liberalism
triumphs.

Otherwise you will weaken the liberal and secular space: you will be used for castigating the
Muslims and it will consolidate Hindu votes and divide the Muslim votes. When Owaisi is not
doing this, he helps in creating the ‘otherness’ of his community.

When the liberal intellectuals are neither recognized nor consulted by the state on important
issues like Shaw Bano, but the likes of Bukhari are consulted, treating him as the
representative of Muslims, the voices of people like Asghar Ali Engineer, become de-
legitimized voices. These voices become scattered voices.
But intellectuals are hardly connected to the grass root politics and they do not get the
legitimacy to speak on behalf of Muslims. But Owaisi will win them with thumping majority.

Madhavi:

As we are talking about the disconnect between intellectuals and common man, it is said
that common Muslims are under the strong influence of Jamath. They think and act under
the instructions of Jamath leaders. That is one thing because of which liberal ideas are not
spreading among them. Is it true?

Prof. Assadi:

I fully agree. It is not only Jamath, but also the religious leaders, the Moulvis and others. Here
I will give you an example. Let us see who are talking about Triple Talaque. There are five
schools that talk about triple Talaque.

1. Muslim personal law board

2. Shia personal law board
3. Sunni personal law board
4. Women’s personal law board
5. Deobandhi personal law board

All of them talk differently about it. But when we go to the Mosque and ask the Moulvi, he
gives an interpretation to it quoting from the sacred text. He will not tell you what exactly is
the meaning of the text. It is like Mantras in Temples. No one knows their meaning but they
have the legitimacy.

The problem here is that when all other Muslim categories try to reach out for a solution of
an issue, the solution provided by the Moulvi based on the interpretation of the text is
accepted.