Prometheism

Prometheism or Prometheanism (Polish: Prometeizm) was a political project initiated by Józef Piłsudski,
statesman of the Second Polish Republic from 1918 to 1935. Its aim was to weaken the Russian Empire
and its successor states, including the Soviet Union, by supporting nationalist independence movements
among the major non-Russian peoples that lived within the borders of Russia and the Soviet Union.[1]

Between the World Wars, Prometheism and Piłsudski's other concept, that of an "Intermarium federation",
constituted two complementary geopolitical strategies for him and for some of his political heirs.[2]

Contents
Sources of Prometheism
Principles
First period (1918–1921)
Second period (1921–1923)
Third period (1923–1926)
Fourth period (1926–1932)
General Promethean affairs
Ukrainian affairs
Caucasus affairs
Idel-Ural and Turkestan affairs
Cossack affairs
Fifth period (1933–1939)
World War II and since
See also
Notes
References

Sources of Prometheism
Piłsudski's elaboration of Prometheism had been aided by an intimate knowledge of the Russian Empire
gained while exiled by its government to eastern Siberia. The term "Prometheism" was suggested by the
Greek myth of Prometheus, whose gift of fire to mankind, in defiance of Zeus, came to symbolize
enlightenment and resistance to despotic authority.[3]

A brief history of Poland's Promethean endeavor was set down on February 12, 1940, by Edmund
Charaszkiewicz, a Polish military intelligence officer whose responsibilities from 1927 until the outbreak of
World War II in Europe in September 1939 had included the coordination of Poland's Promethean program.
Charaszkiewicz wrote his paper in Paris after escaping from a Poland overrun by Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union.[4]
 The creator and soul of the
Promethean concept [wrote
Charaszkiewicz] was Marshal
Piłsudski, who as early as
1904, in a memorandum to the
Japanese government, pointed
out the need to employ, in the
struggle against Russia, the
numerous non-Russian nations
that inhabited the basins of the
Baltic, Black and Caspian
Seas, and emphasized that the
Polish nation, by virtue of its
Józef Piłsudski—father of
history, love of freedom, and
the Promethean strategy
uncompromising stance
toward [the three empires that
Prometheus, by Gustave
had partitioned Poland out of
Moreau, tortured on Mount
political existence at the end of
Caucasus
the 18th century] would, in
that struggle, doubtless take a
leading place and help work
the emancipation of other
nations oppressed by
Russia. [5]

A key excerpt from Piłsudski's 1904 memorandum declared:

Poland's strength and importance among the constituent parts of the Russian state embolden us
to set ourselves the political goal of breaking up the Russian state into its main constituents and
emancipating the countries that have been forcibly incorporated into that empire. We regard
this not only as the fulfilment of our country's cultural strivings for independent existence, but
also as a guarantee of that existence, since a Russia divested of her conquests will be
sufficiently weakened that she will cease to be a formidable and dangerous neighbor.[6]

The Promethean movement, according to Charaszkiewicz, took its genesis from a national renaissance that
began in the late 19th century among many peoples of the Russian Empire. That renaissance stemmed from
a social process that led in Russia to revolution. Nearly all the socialist parties created in the ethnically non-
Russian communities assumed a national character and placed independence at the tops of their agendas:
this was so in Poland, Ukraine, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan. These socialist parties
would take the lead in their respective peoples' independence movements. While all these countries
harbored organizations of a purely national character that likewise championed independence, the socialist
parties, precisely because they associated the fulfilment of their strivings for independence with the social
movement in Russia, showed the greater dynamism. Ultimately the peoples of the Baltic Sea basin—
Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — won and, until World War II, all kept their independence.
The peoples of the Black and Caspian Sea basins — Ukraine, Don Cossacks, Kuban, Crimea, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Northern Caucasus — emancipated themselves politically in 1919–1921 but then lost
their independence to Soviet Russia during the Russian Civil War.[7]
In 1917–1921, according to Charaszkiewicz, as the nations of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea basins
were freeing themselves from Russia's tutelage, Poland was the only country that worked actively together
with those peoples. In these efforts, Poland met with opposition from the western coalition; the latter
backed the (anticommunist) "White" Russians in their endeavor to rebuild the erstwhile Russian Empire. At
the same time, according to Charaszkiewicz, Germany, with her occupation forces, strengthened her
influences in Lithuania and Latvia, manipulated Ukraine's Lt. Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky toward Ukrainian
federation with a possible future non-Bolshevik Russia, and attempted a German hegemony in the
Caucasus against the political interests of Germany's ally, Turkey. Germany's true intentions were at last
made manifest in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded with the Bolsheviks in 1918.[8]

During Skoropadsky's period in power in Ukraine, Germany was at war with both Bolshevik and Imperial
Russia. Germany did, however, have an alliance with the Cossack territories of Don and Kuban; these
declared their independence from Russia, and Skoropadsky channeled German armaments aid to them. The
western Allies, however, chiefly France and Britain, did not want to see Russia lose territory and, following
Germany's collapse in 1918, forced Skoropadsky to propose Ukrainian federation with Russia — thereby
causing his fall from power and eventual Bolshevik victory in Ukraine, much as also happened in Georgia
and Azerbaijan.

Immediately after the loss of independence by the peoples of the Black and Caspian Sea basins and the
annexation of those lands in 1921 by Soviet Russia, Poland was the only country in Europe that gave
material and moral support to the political aspirations of their Promethean (pro-independence) émigrés.
Only after Hitler's accession to power (January 30, 1933), states Charaszkiewicz, would Germany begin
showing a strong interest in the Promethean question. Likewise Japan and Italy evinced some interest,[8]
and France and Great Britain lent moral support.[9] Nevertheless, German propaganda and competition
with Poland here notwithstanding, Germany's approach departed from the basic ideological tenets of
Prometheism; the German approach essentially constituted, in Charaszkiewicz's words, "an elastic,
opportunistic platform for diversion, amenable to exploitation for current German political purposes in any
direction." He emphasizes that in this field there were never any organizational or ideological ties between
Poland and Germany. The legitimate national representatives of the Promethean émigrés allied with Poland
showed a marked political loyalty to Poland.[10]

Principles
Throughout the years 1918–1939, according to Charaszkiewicz, the Polish Promethean leadership
consistently observed several principles. The purpose of the Promethean enterprise was to liberate from
imperialist Russia, of whatever political stripe, the peoples of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea basins and
to create a series of independent states as a common defensive front against Russian aggression. Each
Promethean party respected the political sovereignty of the others. Any disputes between Promethean
parties were placed in abeyance pending the liberation of the several parties from Russia. By mutual
consent of the Polish and Ukrainian Prometheans (if occasionally less than whole-heartedly on the
Petlurists' part), largely Ukrainian-populated areas of southeastern Poland were treated as an internal Polish
sphere of interests and were off-bounds to Ukrainian Promethean organizing.[11]

The Polish Promethean leadership, writes Charaszkiewicz, regarded the other Promethean nationalities as
equal partners in the common struggle against Russian imperialism. Contrary to what has sometimes been
thought, according to Charaszkiewicz the Polish General Staff did not treat the various Promethean émigré
communities merely as political instruments to be exploited for ad hoc purposes of diversion.[12]

Prometheism had no organizational or political backing in any Polish political party of the left, right or
center. Within the Piłsudskiite camp [obóz Piłsudczyków] itself, Prometheism found many opponents.
Paradoxically, among young people in Poland's National Democratic Party—arch-rivals of the Piłsudskiites
[Piłsudczycy]—and some other opposition youth organizations, the Promethean question was
spontaneously taken up and gained advocates.[12]

The history of Poland's interwar collaboration with the "Promethean peoples" falls into five periods.[12]

First period (1918–1921)

In the first period (1918–21), Poland established her new eastern
boundaries in wars with Soviet Russia and Ukraine; her borders
with Germany, in the Poznań and Silesian uprisings, and in
plebiscite operations in Warmia and Mazury; and her southern
borders in plebiscite operations and a brief war with
Czechoslovakia over disputed areas of Cieszyn Silesia, Spisz and
Orawa.[12]
Symon Petliura Tytus Filipowicz
In the Baltic basin, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia
emerged as independent states. Poland was among
the first countries to extend them recognition,[12]
although Polish-Lithuanian relations were strained
following the Polish-Lithuanian War.

In the Black and Caspian Sea basins, this period

saw the emancipation of Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Don, Kuban and Northern Caucasus.
Signs of national renaissance also appeared in Idel-
Ural and Turkestan; there, however, it was limited to
the calling of "National Assemblies."[13]
Walery Sławek
Poland's role in the Promethean process was marked
Henryk Józewski
by the conclusion of a Polish–Ukrainian political
and military alliance (the Warsaw Agreement, April 1920) with Symon
Petlura's Ukrainian People's Republic, Piłsudski's expedition to Kiev (begun
April 25, 1920), the designation (February 1919) of Bohdan Kutylowski as
Polish minister to the Ukrainian People's Republic, the accreditation of a Polish
minister to Caucasus, the naming of a military mission to Caucasus, and the
Crimean Republic's motion at the League of Nations (May 17, 1920) that Crimea
be made a protectorate of Poland.[14]

Marshal Piłsudski's immediate collaborators in this period included Witold Jodko,

Tytus Filipowicz, Gen. Julian Stachiewicz, Col. Walery Sławek, Col. Tadeusz
Schaetzel, a Maj. Czarnecki, August Zaleski, Leon Wasilewski, Henryk
Józewski, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Hołówko, Marian Szumlakowski, Jan
Dąbski, Mirosław Arciszewski, Maj. Wacław Jędrzejewicz and Roman Knoll.[15]
Juliusz Łukasiewicz

Second period (1921–1923)

During Poland's second Promethean period (1921–1923), after the Treaty of Riga that ended the Polish-
Soviet War, Poland went forward with her independent life within established eastern borders alongside the
Baltic states. The states of the Black and Caspian Sea basins, however, lost their independence, being
absorbed by the Soviets. What Charaszkiewicz terms the "legitimate" governments and political
representatives of these Promethean countries emigrated:
 1. the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to Poland,
France and Czechoslovakia;
2. the government of Georgia, to France;
3. the government of Azerbaijan, to Turkey and France;
4. the governments of Kuban and Don, to Czechoslovakia;
5. the Northern Caucasus' Mountain National Center, to Turkey;
6. the Armenian National Center, to France;
7. the Tatar National Centers (Crimea, Idel-Ural, Turkestan), to Turkey,
France and Poland.[16]
Stanisław Haller
During this period, Marshal Piłsudski still remained in power, first as Chief of
State (Naczelnik Państwa), later transitionally as chief of the General Staff (Sztab
Główny).
Promethean affairs now also involved the successive chiefs of the
General Staff, Gen. Władysław Sikorski and Gen. Stanisław Haller, and the
chief of the General Staff's Section II (Oddział II: intelligence), Col. Ignacy
Matuszewski.[16]

Poland worked together with Promethean political émigrés who were in official
contact with Poland's Foreign Ministry, with Polish diplomatic offices in
Istanbul, Bucharest, Prague, Tehran and Paris, and with the Polish General Staff.
As early as 1922, the first group of Georgian officers, recommended by the
Georgian government, were accepted into the Polish Army.[16]

Third period (1923–1926)

In the third period (1923–1926), after Piłsudski had removed himself from
Władysław Sikorski
power, successive Polish governments eliminated the Promethean question from
their agendas. The Soviets realized Joseph Stalin's nationalities program in the
Soviet Union's non-Russian areas by inaugurating the Autonomous National
Republics, while suppressing the last impulses toward independence on the part of
those Republics' populations.[17]

Polish contacts with the Promethean émigrés were continued, without the knowledge
or consent of the Polish government: in military matters, by Col. Schaetzel, Maj.
Czarnecki and Captain Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki, chief of the Nationalities
Department (Wydział) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and at the Foreign Ministry,
by the chief of the Eastern Department, Juliusz Łukasiewicz. An exception to the
Polish government's official attitude pertained to Georgian Prometheism, which Joseph Stalin
enjoyed support with both the foreign minister, Aleksander Skrzyński, and the chief
of the General Staff, Gen. Stanisław Haller.[17]

Fourth period (1926–1932)

The fourth period (1926–1932), from Piłsudski's return to power in the May 1926 Coup to the conclusion
of the 1932 Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, was the period of the most determined, organized and active
collaboration with Promethean organizations.[17]

In 1927 the Promethean problem was given official organizational form at the Polish Foreign Ministry and
General Staff. In the previous periods, Prometheism had been treated at various high echelons but had
possessed no single official home. Now a close coordination was established between Poland's Foreign
Ministry and General Staff, as politically representing the Promethean question, and with the ministries of
Military Affairs and Internal Affairs, as indirectly involved with it (the Military Ministry, with foreign
contract officers; the Internal Ministry, with internal Polish-Ukrainian affairs).[17]

Important events in this period included:

General Promethean affairs

1. the creation of an Eastern Institute in Warsaw, with a program in Near and Far Eastern
studies, the Institute being treated as a political instrument for general Promethean matters;
2. the establishment, at the Eastern Institute, of an Orientalist Youth Circle, a youth
organization dedicated to general Promethean affairs, with offices in Kraków, Vilnius and
Harbin;
3. the founding of a quarterly, Wschód (The East), devoted to Promethean affairs;
4. the establishment of academic scholarships for Promethean students at Warsaw, Vilnius,
Poznań, Kraków, Paris, Berlin and Cairo;
5. the founding of four Promethean clubs, in Warsaw, Paris, Helsinki and Harbin;
6. the founding, in Paris and Helsinki, of the propaganda monthlies, Promethee and
Prometheus;
7. the establishment of collaborative links with France-Orient in Paris.[18]

Ukrainian affairs
1. the organization of a military staff for the Ukrainian People's Republic, including an
organizational-operational section (subordinate to Poland's Gen. Julian Stachiewicz), an
intelligence section (subordinate to Poland's Section II), and a propaganda section
(subordinate to the Polish General Staff's Office Z);
2. the recruitment of Petlurist Ukrainian officers as contract officers for the Polish Army;
3. the creation of three separate press agencies: in Warsaw ("A.T.E."), Paris ("Ofinor") and
Bucharest ("Ukraintag");
4. the founding of a Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin;
5. the creation in Warsaw of a Ukrainian Institute of Learning;
6. the founding of a General Ukrainian Council coordinating Petlurist émigré centers in
European countries.[18]

This period saw two fundamental political events in Ukrainian Promethean affairs:

the May 26, 1926, assassination, in Paris –– according to Charaszkiewicz, at Soviet

instigation –– of Otaman Symon Petlura; and
the 1930 trial, in Kiev, of Serhiy Yefremov, which demonstrated the existence of a secret
national organization in Ukraine that was in contact with the Government of the Ukrainian
People's Republic.[18]

Caucasus affairs
1. organization, in Turkey and Iran, of offices for contacts with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the
Caucasus Mountains (the Georgian organization carried out about 20 expeditions to their
country, and the Caucasian Mountain organization kept up regular contacts with their
country on at least a monthly basis);
 2. creation of a Caucasus National Committee and the
elaboration of a constitution for a Caucasus Confederation;
3. recruitment into the Polish Army, as contract officers, of a
further group of Georgian officers, and of Azerbaijanis and
Caucasus Mountaineers, upon recommendation by their
legitimate national representatives.[19]

This period saw the following notable political events in Caucasus affairs:

the December 7, 1930, assassination in Paris, by the Soviets,

of the Georgian minister Noe Ramishvili; and
pronouncements by Shalva Eliava, the "Soviet governor of
Caucasus," at the 1930 Georgian communist congress in
Tiflis, that the national movement in the Caucasus was under
the influence of the Caucasus National Committee.[20]
Noe Ramishvili
The growing revolutionary ferment in the Caucasus, especially in
Azerbaijan, collaboratively engaged all the Caucasus national
elements.[20]

Idel-Ural and Turkestan affairs

1. the development of pro-independence propaganda in Idel-Ural, Crimea and Turkestan, and
intense Soviet polemics against the Promethean press;
2. the establishment of ties with these countries;
3. direct participation in the World Moslem Congress in Jerusalem (1931), whose political
aspect, due to the participation of Promethean representatives (Said Shamil, a Caucasus
Mountaineer and grandson of Imam Shamil, and Ğayaz İsxaqí, a Kazan Tatar intellectual),
turned against the Soviet Union. In this period, the world Moslem press, especially of Egypt
and Arabia, conducted an intense anti-Soviet campaign. Said Shamil Bey was chosen as
secretary of the Congress' executive center.[20]

Charaszkiewicz notes the occurrence, in Crimean political actions, of "Wallenrodism," revealed at the trial
of Veli Ibrahim, who was sentenced to death by the Soviets. Likewise the trial of Soltanğäliev (a direct
collaborator of Joseph Stalin's during Stalin's tenure as commissar for nationalities affairs) disclosed
methods used by the Volga Tatars and the peoples of Turkestan in fighting the Soviet government.[21]

Cossack affairs

A successful campaign was waged that helped stimulate a separatist movement among many Cossack
émigré groups. This injected a substantial political diversion into White Russian émigré ranks.[22]

This Prometheist period also witnessed a development that was independent of the movement, but which
would ultimately play a role in regard to it. There was heightened diversionary activity in Poland by the
OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), supported by both Germany and Czechoslovakia and even
by Lithuania. There were many acts of expropriation and sabotage against the Polish community and
government by members of OUN combat units in southeastern Poland. This in turn led to "pacification"
operations by the Polish authorities against the Polish-Ukrainian community.[22]
The pacifications, Charaszkiewicz emphasizes, were never discussed in advance with Polish Promethean
officials. Those at the Foreign Ministry and at the General Staff were not pleased with these operations,
which made Promethean activities that much more difficult.[22]

A greater shock to the Prometheists, Polish and Ukrainian, however, was the death of Tadeusz Hołówko,
murdered by OUN members on August 29, 1931, at Truskawiec.[22]

Charaszkiewicz is far from blaming all of Poland's difficulties with her minorities, especially the Ukrainians
(who in most of southeastern interwar Poland were the majority), on external, especially German,
influences. He argues that Poland had "no planned, consistent and constructive internal policy" with regard
to her minorities. This lack could not bode well for the Promethean effort, when every fifth Polish citizen
(that is, six million people) were Ukrainian.[23]

Moreover, the Soviet Union sought to an equal degree to exploit Poland's internal disarray — indeed, in
1921–31, to a greater degree than the Germans. Soviet communist propaganda in Poland's Eastern
Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie), combined with a pro-Ukrainian Soviet attitude toward Soviet Ukraine,
created strong pro-Soviet sentiment among Polish Ukrainians. This sentiment would persist until the
subsequent mass Soviet resettlements, arrests, executions and famines of 1933–1938.[24]

The period 1926–1932 was marked by the participation of a large number of Poles in the Promethean
endeavor:

1. at the Foreign Ministry: Tadeusz Hołówko, Tadeusz Schaetzel, Stanisław Hempel, Adam
Tarnowski, Mirosław Arciszewski, Roman Knoll, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, Marian
Szumlakowski, Stanisław Zaċwilichowski, Jan Gawroński, Zygmunt Mostowski, Władysław
Zaleski, Kazimierz Marian Wyszyński, Karol Dubicz-Penther, Władysław Pelc, Ksawery
Zalewski, Władysław Wolski, Piotr Kurnicki, Wacław Knoll;

1. at the General Staff: Brig. Gen. Julian Stachiewicz, Col. Tadeusz

Schaetzel, Col. Tadeusz Pełczyński, Col. Józef Englicht, Maj.
Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Maj. Włodzimierz Dąbrowski, Maj.
Stanisław Gliński, Maj. Jerzy Krzymowski, Maj. Karol Krzewski-
Lilienfeld, Capt. Stefan Nowaczek, Capt. Jan Rybczyński, Lt. Jan
Helcman, Józef Skarżyński, Aleksander Eugeniusz Piwnicki,
Stefan Sipa, Lt. Antoni Zaręba;
2. at the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki,
Stanisław Łaniecki, Emil Miśkiewicz;
3. at the Ministry of Education: Aleksander Kawałkowski,
Franciszek Salezy Potocki, Zdzisław Meyer, Juliusz Znaniecki,
Adam Miłobędzki;
Tadeusz Schaetzel
4. in the socio-political sphere: Senator Stanisław Siedlecki
(president of the Eastern Institute), Wacław Sieroszewski,
Stanisław Trzeciak, Antoni Wincenty Kwiatkowski, Antoni Około-
Kułak, Prof. Olgierd Górka (general secretary and director of the
Eastern Institute), Stanisław Korwin-Pawłowski (general secretary of
the Eastern Institute), Bolesław Bielawski, Stanisław Józef Paprocki
(director of the Institute for Study of National Minority Affairs), Leon
Wasilewski, Włodzimierz Bączkowski, Feliks Ibiański-Zahora,
Wacław Wincenty Łypacewicz, Władysław Wielhorski (director of the
Institute for Study of Eastern Europe, in Vilnius), Marian
Świechowski, Prof. Jan Kucharzewski, Prof. Marceli Handelsman,
Prof. Stanisław Poniatowski, Prof. Ludwik Kolankowski, Prof. Oskar
Tadeusz Pełczyński
Halecki, Prof. Stanisław Franciszek Zajączkowski, Prof. Józef
Ujejski, Prof. Stanisław Szober, Andrzej Strug, Marian Malinowski,
 Alfred Szczęsny Wielopolski, Wojciech Stpiczyński, Józef Łobodowski, Prof. Marian
Zdziechowski, Władysław Woydyno.[25]

Additionally, thanks to Tadeusz Hołówko's exceptional leadership in Promethean

matters, a number of Polish government ministers participated indirectly or directly:
Walery Sławek, Aleksander Prystor, August Zaleski, Janusz Jędrzejewicz, Wacław
Jędrzejewicz, Bronisław Pieracki, Adam Koc, Stefan Starzyński, Marian Zyndram-
Kościałkowski.[26]

A separate category of Promethean ideological endeavor comprised the work of

Adam Skwarczyński.[27]

In this period (1926–1932), favorable political circumstances within and without

Wacław
Poland, adequate financing and, above all, full mutual confidence among all the
Jędrzejewicz
participants, led to an exceptional level of Promethean activity — in the conduct of
propaganda within the Promethean countries, in the political efforts of the
Promethean émigrés, and in propaganda outside Poland.[27]

Regular conferences were held, usually involving Tadeusz Hołówko, Brig. Gen.
Julian Stachiewicz,
Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki, Maj.
Edmund Charaszkiewicz, and an official from the Foreign Ministry. Charaszkiewicz
would present an extensive report on work accomplished, and this would be
followed by discussion of various Promethean topics.[27]

The Promethean project was entrusted to Office 2 only in late 1927 or perhaps in
1928. Before that, it had never been a domain of the Polish General Staff's diversion
unit (Office A.1, later Office U); thus Charaszkiewicz's predecessor, Col.
Puszczyński, had not been encumbered with this responsibility. Puszczyński, Aleksander
Charaszkiewicz explains, had not initially attached importance to Prometheism, due Prystor
to an overoptimistic assessment of the new Soviet Union; but in time he came to
support the Promethean concept.[28]

Fifth period (1933–1939)

The last, fifth period of prewar Polish Prometheism (1933–1939) was, in
Charaszkiewicz's words, one of "seven lean years." A number of
developments contributed to this:

Stefan Starzyński
 1. The Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact (1932) stopped Polish policy-makers from
continuing Promethean work in the field. It was felt that in the Soviet Union a process of
national renewal was to some extent taking place spontaneously in the Promethean
countries, thanks to the existence of autonomous republics, to Soviet support of general
education in the national languages, and to natural reactions of protest among local peoples
to economic, religious and cultural phenomena; and so activity on the ground could be
dispensed with for the moment. The solidarity and strength of the political émigré
communities should, however, continue to be maintained. The conclusion of the Polish-
Soviet pact led to the Polish Foreign Ministry and all Polish governmental authorities
distancing themselves from external Promethean undertakings. This substantially reduced
the effectiveness of those endeavors and created a view in international Promethean circles
that Poland was slowly moving away from Prometheism. Henceforth the whole Promethean
question, including the administration of funds, became concentrated within Office 2 at the
General Staff's Section II (intelligence).
2. The deaths of Ramishvili and Zaćwilichowski (1930) and of Hołówko (1931), the most active
promoters of Prometheism, were an irreparable loss to the movement.
3. The worldwide economic crisis, and resultant austere government budgets, suddenly
reduced available funds by nearly 50%, bringing all Polish efforts down to merest
maintenance levels.
4. The death (May 12, 1935) of Marshal Piłsudski, founder of Prometheism, was yet another
powerful blow. In Charaszkiewicz's view, it left Prometheism — "a political idea of rare
visionary power... that required prophetic [powers of] political prediction" — lacking a patron
of comparable authority. Piłsudski's death was experienced as a personal loss by the
Promethean peoples. Henceforth the movement's efforts continued more by virtue of inertia
than by encouragement from new Polish decision-makers.
5. Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the creation of an anticommunist bloc in the Berlin-
Rome-Tokyo axis, and its eagerness to collaborate with national Promethean movements,
created a difficult, complicated situation for the Promethean organizations that remained in
Poland's political orbit. While the Promethean political forces aligned with Poland were of
higher quality and potential, the Germans' relentless propaganda created a dangerous rival
to Polish Promethean efforts. The latter in this period, according to Charaszkiewicz, "were
utterly devoid of activity, character and plan."
6. The rise of danger on Poland's west fostered a view in many Polish minds that the country's
eastern border should be quieted.[29]

Until Piłsudski's death in 1935, little changed in respect to personnel on the

Polish Promethean side, apart from the official distancing of government
leaders, especially in the Foreign Ministry, due to the concluded Polish-Soviet
pact. With the shift in government leadership beginning in June 1935, there
ensued a clear decline in Polish Promethean leadership. The "group of
colonels" lost their influence; Col. Tadeusz Pełczyński took a much less active
role; and his successor, Col. Marian Józef Smoleński (generally known as
"Józef Smoleński"), and Charaszkiewicz's immediate superior, Col. Jan
Kazimierz Ciastoń, did not embrace Prometheism. Tadeusz Kobylański, Col.
Schaetzel's successor as chief of the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department,
though inclined to support Prometheism, lacked a deep enough political
foundation and faced substantial financial impediments. The attitudes of Wacław Stachiewicz
Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and the chief of the General Staff, Brigadier
General Wacław Teofil Stachiewicz, remained to the last uncertain.[30]

World War II and since

The Promethean agenda continued, during World War II, to interest other countries, including Germany
(especially in regard to Ukraine), Finland (struggling with the Soviet Union), France and the Soviet Union's
neighbor, Turkey.[31]

Edmund Charaszkiewicz concluded his February 12, 1940, Paris paper with the observation that "Poland's
turning away from these [Promethean] processes can in no way halt [them], while leaving us sidelined and
exposing us to enormous losses that flow from the age-old principle that 'those who are absent, lose.'
[Poland]'s central position in the Promethean chain dictates to us readiness and presence at any
disintegrative processes in Russia, and a leading Polish participation at their accomplishment."[32]

After World War II, the Government of Poland was effectively a puppet state of the Soviet Union and was
in no position to resume an acknowledged Promethean program. Despite this, the Polish people, through
Solidarity, played a major role in the breakup of the Soviet Union. The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet
Union largely vindicated the predictions of those Poles and others who had anticipated the event and, in
some cases, had worked for it.

On November 22, 2007, at Tbilisi, Georgia, a statue of Prometheus was dedicated by Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili and Polish President Lech Kaczyński. Erected in the land where, according to Greek
myth, the Titan had been imprisoned and tortured by Zeus after stealing fire from Olympus and giving it to
man, the statue celebrates the efforts of Poles and Georgians to achieve the independence of Georgia and of
other peoples from the Russian Empire and its successor state, the Soviet Union.

See also
Alliance of the periphery - similar political tactics used by Israel
Demographics of the Soviet Union
Edmund Charaszkiewicz
Giedroyc Doctrine
Historical demographics of Poland
History of Polish intelligence services
Kultura
Lenin's national policy
Intermarium (Międzymorze)
Polish–Georgian alliance
Predictions of Soviet collapse
Treaty of Warsaw (1920) (also known as the Polish-Ukrainian alliance)
URSAL
Volhynia Experiment

Notes
1. Richard Woytak, "The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland," East European Quarterly,
vol. XVIII, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 273–78.
 2. "Pilsudski hoped to build not merely a Polish nation state but a greater federation of peoples
under the aegis of Poland which would replace Russia as the great power of Eastern
Europe. Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine were all to be included. His plan called for a
truncated and vastly reduced Russia, a plan which excluded negotiations prior to military
victory." Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,
1918–1992, Google Print, p. 59 (https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0773508287&id
=gQfUB0CXBO4C&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59&vq=excluded+negotiations&dq=0773508287&sig
=9NMfQrVB6Hqy6Jow-Ii3G4yld2U), McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7.
3. In ethics, "Prometheism" is an individual's voluntary subordination of self to the good of a
larger social group or even all mankind. This altruistic concept relates to the myth of
Prometheus, and denotes rebellion against divine decrees and natural forces, and self-
sacrifice for the sake of the general good. In literature, the Promethean stance is exemplified
by Kordian in Juliusz Słowacki's Romantic drama Kordian (1834); by Konrad in Part III of
Adam Mickiewicz's Forefathers' Eve (Dziady); by Dr. Judym in Stefan Żeromski's Homeless
People (Ludzie Bezdomni, 1899); by the Biblical Adam in Jan Kasprowicz's Dies irae (Latin
for Day of Wrath); and by Dr. Rieux in Albert Camus's The Plague (1947).
4. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 14–16, 56, 76, 81.
5. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 56.
6. Quoted in Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 56.
7. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 56–57.
8. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 57.
9. Snyder, 2005.
10. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 57–58.
11. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 58–59.
12. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 59.
13. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 59–60.
14. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 60.
15. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 60–61.
16. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 62.
17. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 63.
18. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 64.
19. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 64–65.
20. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 65.
21. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 65–66.
22. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 66.
23. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 66–67.
24. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 67.
25. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 67-74.
26. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 75.
27. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 76.
28. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 76–77.
29. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 77–78.
30. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 78–79.
31. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 79–80.
32. Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 80.
References
Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Zbiór dokumentów ppłk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza,
opracowanie, wstęp i przypisy (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund
Charaszkiewicz, edited, with introduction and notes by) Andrzej Grzywacz, Marcin
Kwiecień, Grzegorz Mazur (Biblioteka Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego,
tom [vol.] 9), Kraków, Księgarnia Akademicka, 2000, ISBN 978-83-7188-449-8.
Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Przebudowa wschodu Europy" ("The Restructuring of Eastern
Europe"), Niepodległość (Independence), London, 1955, pp. 125–67.
Etienne Copeaux, Le mouvement prométhéen. (http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/ce
moti/textes16/copeaux.pdf) Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde
turco-iranien, n° 16, juillet–décembre 1993, pp. 9–45.
M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 1918–1922, Stanford,
Hoover Institution, 1979.
Jonathan Levy, The Intermarium: Madison, Wilson and East Central European Federalism,
2007, ISBN 978-1-58112-369-2.
Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Prometheism in the Policies
of the Second [Polish] Republic), Warsaw, Książka i Wiedza, 1971.
Włodzimierz Bączkowski, O wschodnich problemach Polski. Wybór pism (Poland's Eastern
Problems: Selected Writings). Opracował (Edited by) Paweł Kowal, Kraków, Ośrodek Myśli
Politycznej, 2000, ISBN 978-83-7188-405-4.
Włodzimierz Bączkowski, Czy prometeizm jest fikcją i fantazją (Is Prometheism a Fiction
and Fantasy?) <http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?
module=subjects&func=printpage&pageid=7&scope=all>
Zaur Gasimov, "Zwischen Freiheitstopoi und Antikommunismus: Ordnungsentwürfe für
Europa im Spiegel der polnischen Zeitung Przymierze", Jahrbuch für Europäische
Geschichte, no. 12, 2011, pp. 207–22.
Zaur Gasimov, "Der Antikommunismus in Polen im Spiegel der Vierteljahresschrift Wschód
1930–1939", Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung, 2011, pp. 15–30.
Zaur Gasimov, José María Faraldo Jarillo: Las alianzas desde arriba: los nacionalismos
antirrusos y antisoviéticos (1914–1939) De la Liga de los Pueblos Alófonos de Rusia a la
Liga Prometeo, in: Patrias diversas, ¿misma lucha?: Alianzas transnacionalistas en el
mundo de entreguerras (1912–1939) / Enric Ucelay Da Cal (ed. lit.), Xosé M. Núñez Seixas
(ed. lit.), Arnau Gonzàlez i Vilalta (ed. lit.), 2020, ISBN 978-84-7290-990-8, pp. 173–195.
I.P. Maj, Działalność Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 1926–1939 (The Work of
Warsaw's Eastern Institute, 1926–1939), Warsaw, 2007.
Timothy Snyder, Covert Polish Missions across the Soviet Ukrainian Border, 1928–1933
(p.55 (https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN8849812760&id=TQR5YSY-b1QC&pg=PA
55&lpg=PA77&sig=Wl4yypcxmLb8qcHAnT2tYmdtPZA), p.56 (https://books.google.com/boo
ks?vid=ISBN8849812760&id=TQR5YSY-b1QC&pg=PA56&lpg=PA77&sig=GbZTRk2b-RS
4ZH2t3ACOOQUayJc), p.57 (https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN8849812760&id=T
QR5YSY-b1QC&pg=PA57&lpg=PA77&sig=h0O7n586kusn5R1lcEYg6Rr2aeg), p.58 (http
s://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN8849812760&id=TQR5YSY-b1QC&pg=PA77&lpg=P
A77&sig=4caX_oMm1TLCtmRTOCFtnf9PvvM), p.59 (https://books.google.com/books?vid=I
SBN8849812760&id=TQR5YSY-b1QC&pg=PA78), in Confini, Silvia Salvatici (a cura di),
Rubbettino, 2005). Full text in PDF (https://web.archive.org/web/20080227130119/http://ww
w.sissco.it/fileadmin/user_upload/Pubblicazioni/collanasissco/confini/confini_snyder.pdf)
Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet
Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-300-10670-X (p.41 (https://books.google.com/
books?vid=ISBN978-0-300-10670-1&id=LkZlidUKEl8C&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41), p.42 (https://
books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN030010670X&id=LkZlidUKEl8C&pg=PA42&lpg=PA41&
sig=N_AL-wnlV0LiacmtW0hF6XU5N3k), p.43 (https://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0
 30010670X&id=LkZlidUKEl8C&pg=PA43&lpg=PA41&sig=4vb9zLlSd_Wl1BRP2EWcF-3jC
vI)) Describes the careers of Henryk Józewski.
Richard Woytak, "The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland," East European Quarterly,
vol. XVIII, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 273–78. Woytak cites extensively from Edmund
Charaszkiewicz, "a key figure and an expert on the Promethean movement in Polish
intelligence circles."
David X. Noack: Die polnische Bewegung des Prometheismus im globalgeschichtlichen
Kontext 1918–1939, in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Bd. 52, H. 2 (2014), S. 187–
192.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Prometheism&oldid=1104334243"

This page was last edited on 14 August 2022, at 08:28 (UTC).

Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0;

additional terms may apply. By
using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.