SUCCESSION Case No.
5 Page |1
G.R. No. 167109. February 6, 2007.*
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA,
ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, respondents.
Evidence; Courts; While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of a case, there are, however, exceptions to this
rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting,
or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based.—While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case, there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like
when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.
Divorce; Marriages; A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.—Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be
proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Marriages; Parties; A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be
based on a cause of action.—True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of the marriage
of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. for petitioner.
Nolan Evangelista for private respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground
of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988.5
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since
Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against
Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as
petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the
merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and
against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is
declared null and void ab initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of
moral damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00,
including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the
property donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan
Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.”10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise
DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.”11
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION
THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE
QUESTIONED MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12
Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and
the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13
The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual
issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become
naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been judicially granted a
divorce decree.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |2
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when
the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.15
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando
were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April
1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other than the
allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records are bereft
of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:
“In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and
testimonial evidence she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and
Felicitas are American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured
their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with
Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil
Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who
are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x
x”16
Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to
refute or contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando
were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient
to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner
who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that
respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.19
Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.21 However, before
it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |3

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law
may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.23 In such
case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for
being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other,
in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
“Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has
any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that
the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the
validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x”26
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did
not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition
to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Case remanded to trial court for proper disposition.

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003,
now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.—

(a) Who may file.—A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.*
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,**
respondents.
Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.—We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon
by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws; Divorce; If there is a question
as to whether a wife was still a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her
husband—the decedent—the trial court should conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship.—We note that in her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent
raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit
from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is
that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez
v. Escaño.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law; Once proved that a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce
from her husband, then she could very well lose her right to inherit from the latter.—
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion
but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant
private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |4
Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding
on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was
not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce,
Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; There is no forum shopping where one petition
deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before other
courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of the decedent.—As regards the motion of private
respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that
the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the same lacks merit. For forum
shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter
and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner’s
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.
Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Puruganan, Chato, Tan and Geronimo Law Offices for petitioner.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment
of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of

administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo
Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
op-positors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the
19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would
be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño1 which held that “a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,”2
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the
view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it
consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage
existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with
her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
19874 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the
two intestate heirs.5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in
their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 19886 partial reconsideration
was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-
half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.7
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |5
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of
the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs
of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision
and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares
in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which
can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and admissions of
the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs
of Arturo Padlan;10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the
parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of
estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice

remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite
of the divorce they obtained.12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her
claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion
but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.15 The trial court did not
grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion
with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married
in the Philippines.”16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding
on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was
not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce,
Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner’s citizenship;17 it did not
merit enlightenment however from petitioner.18 In the present proceeding, petitioner’s
citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the
Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing
for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate of title as well as
the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When
asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since
1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in
the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase
the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue
requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |6
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be
limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.
Private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping,21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue.22 The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare
the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan
as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo’s brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should
be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss
the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.

G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996.*
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES
and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Recognition; Family Code; Words and Phrases; The phrase
“vested or acquired rights” under Article 256 is not defined by the Family Code, leaving
it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to
them.—The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256, is not defined by the
Family Code. “The Committee did not define what is meant by a ‘vested or acquired
right,’ thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue
is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question
that may arise in the future.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; An action for compulsory recognition and
enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family
Code must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code.—Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench.
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition
and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family
Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect
insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right
of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the
Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once attached, cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case.—Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never
lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the
Family Code of the Philippines. Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be
ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |7
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Delia L. Hermoso for petitioners.
R.O. Acebedo & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint1 for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by
the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F.
Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named
defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the
deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P.
Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had
an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March
30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego
on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for an
Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate
children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to
recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children” as stated in paragraphs 6
and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
“6. The plaintiffs’ father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein
plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs’ and their mother’s family friends,
as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the
following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family
rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate)
children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with the continuous
and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.”2
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered—
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz
Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz
Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to 1/2 portion of share of the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the
illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in
the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiff’s (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of
P10,000.00 as atty.’s fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.”3
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |8
of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise known
as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion
was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on
the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for
Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a minute resolution,
dated October 13, 1993.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following
grounds:
A
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO
PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE
OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT
THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER
DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO
CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED, OR AT LEAST
MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS’ REMEDY IS THAT OF AN
APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.4

Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285
thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation,
to wit:
“Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority; x x x x x x.”
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent
on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in
relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for
compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the “open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” must be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by
prescription. The law cited reads:
“Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
“Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during
the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.”
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 Page |9
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year
after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly
prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further,
maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family
Code which provides:
“This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be: Should
the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the
application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the
private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular
case?
The phrase “vested or acquired rights” under Article 256, is not defined by the Family
Code. “The Committee did not define what is meant by a ‘vested or acquired right,’
thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is
submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that
may arise in the future.”5
In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,6 a case which involves a similar complaint denominated
as “Claim for Inheritance” but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an
illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of
the minor child, and based also on the “open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child,” we had occasion to rule that:
“Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,7 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
xxx xxx
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 10

vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct
in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private
respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.”

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant
case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to
her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding
from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already
deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never
lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., I also believe that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the petition
before it did not involve a question of jurisdiction and cannot thus be a substitute for
a lost appeal.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.


G.R. No. 96296. June 18, 1992.*
RAFAEL S. DIZON, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the
Deceased JOSE P. FERNANDEZ, REDENTOR MELO, ELIODORO C. CRUZ, PIER
8 ARRASTRE & STEVE-DORING SERVICES, INC., COMPAÑIA MARITIMA,
PASIG STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC., and WESTERN PACIFIC
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PROTACIO
C. STO. TOMAS, Judge, RTC, Branch 14, Ligao, Albay, and JOSE BALDE,
respondents.
Actions; Intestate Succession; Effects of defendant’s death in a civil suit depends on
(a) nature of action; and (b) time of his demise.—The effects of the death of a
defendant in a civil suit are dependent upon the nature of the action: whether (a) the
action is a personal one for “recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,” or (b) is not
for said purpose, i.e., it is a real action, or one for recovery of personal property “or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal.” The effects of the defendant’s death are dependent, as
well, on the time of his demise.
Same; Same; Same.—The law says that “(w)hen the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in these rules.”
Same; Same; Same.—If the defendant dies after final judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, the action (for money, debt or interest thereon) is not dismissed, and an appeal
may be taken by or against the administrator; but if that judgment against the
deceased becomes final and executory, it shall be enforced, not by execution under
Rule 39, but in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 86, i.e., by presenting the same as a
claim against the estate.
Same; Same; Same.—If, on the other hand, the claim against the defendant is other
than for “money, debt or interest thereon”—i.e., it is a real action, or one for recovery
of personal property “or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal,” supra—and the defendant dies, the
claim against him is not thereby extinguished, and the action will not be dismissed but
continue against the decedent’s legal representative.
Same; Same; Trial court should have dismissed the action for damages when defendant
died before judgment.—The first point raised by petitioners is well taken. As already
stated, the law is quite explicit and leaves the Trial Court with no choice: “When the
action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), it shall be
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 11
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.” It was
therefore error for the Trial Court to decline to dismiss the suit as against the deceased
Fernandez and to insist on continuing with the action as to Fernandez by ordering his
substitution by his administrator.
Same; Motions; Interlocutory Orders; Judgments; A second motion for reconsideration
of a mere interlocutory order is not prohibited. What is banned is a second motion to
reconsider a final order or judgment.—It was error, too, for the Trial Court to deny
Atty. Dizon’s motion dated November 21, 1989 for reconsideration of the Orders of
April 24, October 17, and October 25, 1989, on the ground that it was in effect a second
motion for reconsideration and “the rules does (sic) not allow a second motion for
reconsideration without first securing leave of court xx.” There is no such rule as
regards interlocutory orders like those sought to be reconsidered. The Trial Judge might
possibly have had in mind Section 4, Rule 37, of the Rules of Court, governing a “second
motion for new trial, based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion
was made,” but the section clearly applies only to final judgments, not to interlocutory
orders. The Trial Judge might have had in mind Section 1, Rule 52 pertinently providing
that “(n)o more than one motion for re-hearing or reconsideration shall be filed without
express leave of court,” but again, it is clear that the proviso applies only to final
judgments of the Court of Appeals, not to interlocutory orders or resolutions. The Trial
Judge might have had in view Section 11 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) which inter alia decrees that “no second motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained,” or paragraph 4 of the Interim or Transitional
Rules relative to the implementation of said B.P. Blg. 129, promulgated by this Court,
declaring that “(n)o party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a
final order or judgment;” but again these provisions obviously have reference not to
interlocutory orders but to final judgments or orders. A second motion attacking an
interlocutory order might possibly be denied on the ground that it is a “rehash” or mere
reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the Court;
it cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is forbidden by law.
Same; Same; Certiorari; Refusal to dismiss an action which ought to be dismissed, not
mere error of judgment but jurisdiction. Certiorari proper.—In adamantly refusing to
dismiss the action against the deceased Fernandez so that the claim against him might
be filed in the special proceedings for the settlement of his estate, it is clear that His
Honor was refusing to apply an explicit mandate of the Rules of Court although well
aware of it, and of the fact that no reason existed in the record for excepting the case
at bar from the operation of the rule. Such a refusal in other words, may not be deemed
to constitute “merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction,” as the Court of
Appeals characterizes it, but as an outright defiance of the plain provisions of the Rules
of Court which had been insistently brought to his attention; an act therefore, executed

without any justification in law, whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively; an act, in
short, done with grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Jurisdiction; Labor Law; Claim for damages for alleged illegal dismissal under
Labor Arbiter’s exclusive jurisdiction.—The claims in question do not involve “wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment.” They do
constitute, however, a “termination dispute,” and are actually “claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations,”
unaccompanied by a prayer for reinstatement. As such they are, as the law clearly
says, within the “original and exclusive jurisdiction” of Labor Arbiters. In other words,
whether under the law at present in force, or that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Jose Balde’s cause falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters and not of the Regional Trial Court (formerly, Court of First Instance).
Appeal; When non-assigned errors may be resolved on appeal.—This omission is of no
moment. Excepted from the general rule that in appellate proceedings in the Court of
Appeals or this Court, “no error xx will be considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors and properly argued in the brief” (or otherwise raised as an issue), are (1)
errors which “affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter,” (2) “plain errors,” and (3)
“clerical errors.”
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rafael S. Dizon for petitioners.
Delfin De Vera Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In the original action which has given rise to the proceedings at bar1—instituted in
1975 by the plaintiff Jose Balde (private respondent herein) principally for the recovery
of damages resulting from the allegedly illegal termination of his employment from the
so-called “Fernandez Companies”2 effected by herein petitioners—one of the
defendants, Jose P. Fernandez, denominated the “principal” one, died before final
judgment of the Trial Court. The legal consequences of that party’s death are what are
now chiefly in issue.
The complaint filed in the Court a quo3 named as defendants the six (6) petitioner
corporations herein, as well as (1) Jose P. Fernandez “in his own personal capacity
and/or as Chairman of the Board, President, or Director” of said firms; (2) Redentor R.
Melo, “in his own personal capacity and/or as Chief Legal Counsel of Pier 8 Arrastre &
Stevedoring Services, Inc.;” and (3) Eliodoro C. Cruz, “in his own personal capacity
and/or as a legal assistant” in the same company. It alleged that Balde was “summarily
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 12
ousted and dismissed” from his job as Chief Accountant and Credit & Collection
Manager of Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services xx (since) 1973 and Chief
Accountant of Western Pacific Corporation xx (since) 1974.”
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, which was essentially a “ ‘money claim’ arising
from an employer-employee relationship” exclusively cognizable by the National Labor
Relations Commission, and that no official decision had yet been reached regarding
termination of Balde’s employment.4 The defendants also filed a supplemental motion
urging dismissal of the action because venue had been improperly laid.5 After
oppositions were filed to both motions, the Court issued an Order holding “in abeyance
the resolution xx (thereof) until pre-trial is conducted and evidence is presented xx
without prejudice to dismissing the case when the ground for dismissal becomes
apparent.”6
The defendants thereafter presented their “Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,”
which contained specific denials and qualified admissions of the averments of the
complaint; alleged as affirmative defenses the same grounds alleged in their motions
to dismiss, and the fact that they had acted entirely in accordance with law and in all
good faith in discharging Balde from employment, he having “done acts prejudicial and
inimical to their interests and (which) have caused damage;” and seeking recovery of
moral, actual and exemplary damages resulting from Balde’s “completely unfounded
and baseless action.”7 Pre-trial and trial ensued after Balde filed his answer to the
counterclaim and a reply to the answer.
Balde’s presentation of his evidence-in-chief was concluded upon the admission by the
Court of his exhibits over the defendants’ objections, by Order dated October 21, 1987.
Some two weeks afterwards, or more precisely on November 7, 1987, defendant Jose
P. Fernandez died. Notice thereof was given to the Court by his counsel, through a
manifestation dated November 16, 1987.
As intimated in the opening paragraph of this Decision, the death of Fernandez brought
up the question of the legal consequences of that demise, and the action that the Trial
Court should properly take in view thereof. For the sake of clarity, and the better to
gauge the propriety of the action actually taken by Trial Court, the narration of the
material facts is interrupted at this point, so that a brief exposition of the applicable
law may be made.
The effects of the death of a defendant in a civil suit are dependent upon the nature
of the action: whether (a) the action is a personal one for “recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon,”8 or (b) is not for said purpose,9 i.e., it is a real action,10 or one for
recovery of personal property “or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover

damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal.”11 The effects of the
defendant’s death are dependent, as well, on the time of his demise.
The law says that “(w)hen the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon,
and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules.”12
The “especial” manner of the prosecution of said money claims against the decedent
is set forth in Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,13 in connection with the judicial
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. “The reason for the
dismissal of the ordinary action,” as a noted commentator stresses, “is that upon the
death of the defendant a testate or intestate proceeding shall be instituted in the proper
court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which shall be paid
proportionately out of the property left by the deceased. It is, therefore, to avoid
useless duplicity of procedure that the ordinary action must be wiped out from the
ordinary courts.”14
If the defendant dies after final judgment of the Regional Trial Court, the action (for
money, debt or interest thereon) is not dismissed, and an appeal may be taken by or
against the administrator;15 but if that judgment against the deceased becomes final
and executory, it shall be enforced, not by execution under Rule 39, but in accordance
with Section 5 of Rule 86,16 i.e., by presenting the same as a claim against the estate.
If, on the other hand, the claim against the defendant is other than for “money, debt
or interest thereon”—i.e., it is a real action,17 or one for recovery of personal property
“or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal,” supra18—and the defendant dies, the claim against him
is not thereby extinguished, and the action will not be dismissed but continue against
the decedent’s legal representative. Section 17, Rule 3 specifies the procedure to be
followed, viz:
“x x. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed
by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 13
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.”
The record discloses that the Court did not dismiss the action as against the deceased
defendant, Fernandez, conformably with Section 21, Rule 3. What it did was: (a) to
require the defendants’ new counsel, former Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon,
by Order dated November 21, 1987, “to effect the substitution of said deceased
defendant within thirty (30) days xx,”19 (a requirement it reiterated in another Order
dated October 4, 1988); and (b) on later learning that said Justice Dizon was the
Administrator of the Fernandez Estate, to require the latter, by Order dated January 2,
1989, to appear before it on February 4, 1989 (later reset to March 6, 1989) “to be
substituted as party defendant for and in behalf of the deceased Jose P. Fernandez.”
The Trial Judge was obviously proceeding in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3; and
it was doing so quite erroneously, since the action against the deceased and his co-
defendants was clearly one for the “recovery of money, debt or interest thereon” which,
by direction of Section 21 of the same Rule, should “be dismissed to be prosecuted in
the manner especially provided in these rules,” at least in so far as concerned the
deceased defendant.
Justice Dizon was unable to appear at the hearing of March 6, 1989, on account of the
poor state of his health at the time. This he alleged in a telegram to the Court, and in
a subsequent formal motion, seeking on that account a resetting of the hearing to
“either April 17, 18 and 28/89 or May 1, 2 and 3/89.”20 Unfortunately, neither the
telegram nor the motion was received by the Trial Court in time. Hence, by Order dated
March 6, 1989, the Court directed plaintiff Jose Balde to formally move in writing to
have the case submitted for decision by reason of the defendants’ failure to appear
despite notice.
When the defendants received notice of the Order of March 6, 1989, they promptly
moved for reconsideration through Atty. Rafael Dizon, under date of March 18, 1989.21
By Order dated March 31, 1989, the Trial Court, without referring to its earlier Order
of March 6, 1989, re-scheduled the hearing on April 24, 1989, but required that “if and
when Atty. Arsenio Dizon shall still be indisposed during the next hearing, one of the
associates of the law firm shall appear for the defendants in order to avoid further
delay in the disposition of this case xx (considering that) this case was filed since 1975
and this case could not be disposed of because of continuous postponement by the
parties.”22 However, notice of the Order of March 31, 1989—resetting the hearing on
April 24, 1989—sent from Ligao, Albay, was not received by the defendants in Metro
Manila until the very day of the hearing, April 24, 1989. Atty. Rafael Dizon immediately
dispatched a telegram to the Court that same day, reading as follows: “RECEIVED COPY
MARCH 31, 1989 ORDER SETTING HEARING OF CIVIL CASE, 528 APRIL 24 ONLY
TODAY APRIL 24, 1989. REQUEST RESET TO MAY 2, 14, 25, 31, JUNE 1, 2, 1989.
FORMAL MOTION TO FOLLOW.” The telegram evidently came too late. What the Court

had before it when the case was called at the appointed hour on April 24, 1989 was
Atty. Dizon’s motion dated March 18, 1989 for reconsideration of the Order of March
6, 1989, which had already been granted (the Court having on March 31, 1989, reset
the hearing on April 24, 1989). The Court then proceeded to declare said motion of
April 18, 1989 “moot and academic” and, in view of the defendants’ absence at the
hearing of April 24, 1989, to consider the case submitted for decision. These
dispositions it made in the following Order, to wit:
“When this case was called for hearing this morning, the court received the Motion
seeking for reconsideration of the order dated March 6, 1989 considering this case
submitted for decision, for failure of counsel for the defendants to appear on the
said setting. The record shows that the order sought to be reconsidered by
defendants has already been reconsidered by this court, when the court ordered
on March 31, 1989 to set this case for today.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Rafael S. Dizon, now appearing as
counsel for the defendants, is hereby considered moot and academic.
In view, however, of the fact that the defendants and counsel failed to appear
today without justifiable cause, on motion of plaintiff, this case is hereby ordered
submitted for decision based on the evidence so far presented.”
According to the petitioners, notices of the Orders of April 24, 1989 and March 31, 1989
were never served on them or their counsel.23 This is why, under date of October 19,
1989, they filed a “Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration dated March 18, 1989
and to Set Case for Hearing.”24 This last motion was resolved by the Trial Court—now
presided over by Hon. Protacio C. Sto. Tomas—in an Order dated October 17, 1989. In
said Order the Court quoted verbatim the Order of April 24, 1989 of “Hon. Salvador D.
Silerio, then Presiding Judge of this Court;” pointed out that said order of April 24, 1989
“has not been reconsidered and set aside;” and directed the immediate transmittal,
“pursuant to an existing Administrative Order issued by the Supreme Court, xx (of) the
records xx xx to Judge Salvador D. Silerio, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 8, Legazpi
City for him to render the corresponding decision.”25
The petitioners received copy of the Order of October 17, 1989 on November 7, 1989.
On the same day, they also received a copy of another Order of the same Court dated
October 25, 1989,26 dealing with their motion of October 19, 1989 and reading as
follows:
“The records disclosed that the Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration dated
March 18, 1989 and to Set Case for Hearing filed by Atty. Rafael S. Dizon dated
October 19, 1989 has already been resolved and acted upon, in the sense, that
this case was already submitted for decision as of April 24, 1989 signed by Hon.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 14
Salvador D. Silerio, presiding Judge, copy of which was furnished Atty. Rafael
Dizon. Atty. Dizon appears not to have a fixed address as the order of the court
sent to him addressed at 5th Floor, Strata Building, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas
Commercial Complex, Pasig, Metro Manila has not been claimed by said counsel.
Examining the instant motion, we find that it does not conform with the mandatory
requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the motion is denied.”
On November 21, 1989, the petitioners once again filed a motion for reconsideration,
this time directed against the Orders of April 24, October 17, and October 25, 1989. In
that motion, denominated “Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss,”27 the
petitioners—
1) averred that they had failed to appear at the hearing on April 24, 1989 at 8:30
a.m., as directed in the Order of March 31, 1989, because they received notice
thereof” ONLY ON THE VERY SAME DAY AND PAST THE TIME OF THE SCHEDULED
HEARING,” as stated in their telegram on April 24, 1989; and
2) argued that, “due to defendant Jose P. Fernandez’ death on November 7, 1987”
and in light of “Rule 3, Sec. 21,” the case “must necessarily be dismissed and
prosecuted pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.”
The petitioners set the motion for hearing on December 6, 1989 at 8:30 A.M., furnishing
copy thereof on adverse counsel by registered mail. In anticipation of his attendance
at the hearing of his motion, Atty. Rafael Dizon booked passage on the PAL flight from
Manila to Legazpi City on December 5, 1989 and from Legazpi to Manila on December
6, 1989.28
Events however made it impossible for Atty. Dizon to appear at the sala of Judge Sto.
Tomas on December 6, 1989. These events, specified by Dizon, were those resulting
from the aborted coup d’ etat on December 1, 1989, i.e., “the closure of the Manila
Domestic Airport, the indefinite cancellation of all domestic airline flights and the
unavailability of public transportation going out of Metro Manila.” Alleging these as
basis, Atty. Dizon sought a resetting of the hearing on his motion to December 20,
1989, through a telegram,29 and an “Urgent Motion to Reset” dated December 4,
1989.30
The Court denied the telegraphic request for postponement, in an Order dated
December 6, 1989, viz.:

“When the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss dated November 21,
1989 was called for hearing, the movant Rafael S. Dizon failed to appear
notwithstanding that this is the date set forth by him. However, a telegram has
been received wherein said movant prays for a postponement of the hearing of
said motion alleging that a formal motion will follow.
Examining the records, we find that the first motion for reconsideration dated
March 18, 1989 was already resolved and denied by this Court in its order of
October 25, 1989. This being the case, and considering that the rules does not
allow a second motion for reconsideration without first securing leave of court, the
instant motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1989 is DENIED.”
In view of the foregoing development, the petitioners felt constrained to institute, as
they did institute in the Court of Appeals a special civil action of certiorari to annul and
set aside the Trial Court’s five (5) Orders just mentioned, of April 24, May 29, October
17, October 25, and December 6, 1989.31 Their action failed. The Appellate Tribunal
declared that upon the facts, it was “not prepared to rule that respondent Court’s
issuance of the assailed orders is tainted with grave abuse of discretion calling for the
application of the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari,” and accordingly dismissed their
petition. More particularly, it ruled that—
1) “the alleged error committed by respondent Court in not dismissing the
complaint against the deceased defendant Jose Fernandez, if at all, is merely an
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction,” and hence, not correctible by the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65;
2) “even if the claim against the deceased xx Fernandez may be dismissed, it does
not necessarily follow that the complaint in Civil Case No. 528-LV should be
dismissed in toto, considering that there are other defendants in the case, and
considering further that some of the defendants, the principals at that, are
corporate entities with separate juridical personalities;” and
3) “if petitioners did not receive copies of the orders issued by respondent Court,
it was for the reason that they have been continuously changing their address.”
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, by Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated November 21, 1990, the petitioners have appealed to this Court. Here
they contend that:
1) “The Rules of Court mandate the dismissal of the case and not substitution of
the deceased defendant;” and
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 15
2) They “had a valid/justifiable cause for failing to appear in the scheduled
hearing.”
The private respondent’s two-page comment dated February 16, 1991 submitted in
response to the Court’s requirement therefor, does nothing except to assert, basically,
that “there is no showing at all that the Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion,” contrary to the petitioners’ claim of “patent excess of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion” on the part of the Appellate Court.”32
By this Court’s Resolution of April 15, 1991, the petition was given due course and
memoranda required of the parties, which have since been submitted.33
The first point raised by petitioners is well taken. As already stated,34 the law is quite
explicit and leaves the Trial Court with no choice: “When the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted
in the manner especially provided in these rules.”35 It was therefore error for the Trial
Court to decline to dismiss the suit as against the deceased Fernandez and to insist on
continuing with the action as to Fernandez by ordering his substitution by his
administrator.36
It was error, too, for the Trial Court to deny Atty. Dizon’s motion dated November 21,
1989 for reconsideration of the Orders of April 24, October 17, and October 25, 1989,
on the ground that it was in effect a second motion for reconsideration and “the rules
does (sic) not allow a second motion for reconsideration without first securing leave of
court xx.” There is no such rule as regards interlocutory orders like those sought to be
reconsidered. The Trial Judge might possibly have had in mind Section 4, Rule 37, of
the Rules of Court, governing a “second motion for new trial, based on a ground not
existing nor available when the first motion was made,” but the section clearly applies
only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders. The Trial Judge might have had in
mind Section 1, Rule 52 pertinently providing that “(n)o more than one motion for re-
hearing or reconsideration shall be filed without express leave of court,” but again, it
is clear that the proviso applies only to final judgments of the Court of Appeals, not to
interlocutory orders or resolutions. The Trial Judge might have had in view Section 11
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) which inter alia
decrees that “no second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained,” or paragraph
4 of the Interim or Transitional Rules relative to the implementation of said B.P. Blg.
129, promulgated by this Court, declaring that “(n)o party shall be allowed a second
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment;” but again these provisions
obviously have reference not to interlocutory orders but to final judgments or orders.
A second motion attacking an interlocutory order might possibly be denied on the
ground that it is a “rehash” or mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already

passed upon and resolved by the Court; it cannot be rejected on the ground that a
second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law.
The question that now arises is whether these errors amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Trial Judge. The first does. In adamantly refusing to
dismiss the action against the deceased Fernandez so that the claim against him might
be filed in the special proceedings for the settlement of his estate, it is clear that His
Honor was refusing to apply an explicit mandate of the Rules of Court although well
aware of it, and of the fact that no reason existed in the record for excepting the case
at bar from the operation of the rule. Such a refusal in other words, may not be deemed
to constitute “merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction,” as the Court of
Appeals characterizes it, but as an outright defiance of the plain provisions of the Rules
of Court which had been insistently brought to his attention; an act therefore, executed
without any justification in law, whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively; an act, in
short, done with grave abuse of discretion.37
What has just been stated makes inconsequential the failure of Atty. Dizon to appear
before the Court on December 6, 1989, the date set by him for the hearing of his
motion for reconsideration of November 21, 1989—in which he asked that said hearing
be reset because fortuitous events precluded his appearance, and reiterated the prayer
that the action be dismissed as against defendant Fernandez because of the latter’s
demise. For even assuming that Atty. Dizon’s failure to receive notices of, and
consequent omission to appear at, the hearings of February 4, 1989, March 6, 1989
and April 24, 1989 were inexcusable, because the failure to receive said notices was
due to his “continuously changing his address,” as the Court of Appeals points out, that
circumstance did not make unmeritorious the motion for dismissal of the suit as against
deceased Fernandez. It must be mentioned, however, in fairness to Atty. Dizon, that
he had as a matter of fact made preparations for presenting himself before the Trial
Court at the hearing of December 6, 1989, booking passage on Philippine Airlines on
December 5, 1989, and that the closure of airports and cancellation of domestic flights
on account of the aborted coup d’etat of December 1, 1989—of which the Court takes
judicial notice—had indeed made impossible his intended appearance before the Trial
Court on the appointed day, December 6, 1989.
Not to be overlooked in this case is the nature of the complaint instituted by Jose Balde
in the Trial Court,38 which upon sufficient reflection is disclosed as pertaining to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment
and not the regular courts of justice. That complaint alleged that Balde was “summarily
ousted and dismissed” from his job as “Chief Accountant and Credit & Collection
Manager of Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services xx (a job he had held since) 1973
and Chief Accountant of Western Pacific Corporation xx (held since) 1974.” It averred
that despite his having worked efficiently and caused an increase in the profitability of
the companies, and allegedly on evidence known by defendant Cruz to be sham—that
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 16
he (Balde) was implicated in some anomaly in the procurement of supplies and spare
parts—said defendant Cruz unceremoniously relieved him of his duties and sealed and
searched his personal belongings; that on his (Balde’s) insistence, an investigation was
eventually conducted by defendant Melo, the Chief Legal Counsel, ostensibly to
ascertain the truth but which was actually nothing but an “inquisition” characterized by
“malice, bias, prejudice and partiality,” at which he was not accorded full opportunity
to defend himself; and that Fernandez, the highest corporate official in the
corporations, turned a deaf ear to Balde’s pleas for a “speedy and impartial
investigation.” Upon these factual assertions, the complaint prayed for the payment by
the defendants to Balde of actual, moral, and exemplary damages in the aggregate
amount of P1,100,000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00, and “such other
reliefs equitable in the premises.” It did not include reinstatement as a specific relief.
The complaint, in other words, set forth claims for money arising from employer-
employee relations. Now, at the time that the complaint was filed, in 1975, exclusive
jurisdiction over such “money claims arising from employer-employee relations”39 as
well “all other cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations,”40 was
vested by the law in the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission.41
That jurisdiction remained substantially unaffected by subsequent amendments of the
Labor Code up to 1989,42 when Republic Act No. 6715 became effective, except that
for a time, about three (3) years, Labor Arbiters were divested of competence to
“entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.”43
Under Republic Act No. 6715,44 embodying the latest amendments to the Labor Code
of the Philippines, the following cases inter alia fall within the “original and exclusive
jurisdiction” of Labor Arbiters, to wit:
“x x x
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relations;
xxx
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those persons in domestic or household services, involving an amount
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 17

not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) whether or not accompanied with
a claim of reinstatement.”

The claims in question do not involve “wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment.” They do constitute, however, a “termination
dispute,” and are actually “claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations,” unaccompanied by a prayer for
reinstatement. As such they are, as the law clearly says, within the “original and
exclusive jurisdiction” of Labor Arbiters. In other words, whether under the law at
present in force, or that at the time of the filing of the complaint, Jose Balde’s cause
falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and not of the
Regional Trial Court (formerly, Court of First Instance).

To be sure, this jurisdictional defect in the proceedings has not been explicitly put at
issue in the appeal at bar, although references appear in the pleadings to the various
motions filed by Fernandez and his co-defendants with the Regional Trial eliminated
the interdiction relative to “claims for moral or other forms of damages”.

Court to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction over the nature of the suit instituted
by Jose Balde. This omission is of no moment. Excepted from the general rule that in
appellate proceedings in the Court of Appeals or this Court, “no error xx will be
considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief”
(or otherwise raised as an issue), are (1) errors which “affect the jurisdiction over the
subject matter,” (2) “plain errors,” and (3) “clerical errors.”45

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 20, 1990 and
its Resolution dated November 21, 1990, in CA-G.R. SP No. 19602, as well as the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 14) at Ligao, Albay in Civil Case No. 528-LV dated
May 9, 1989, October 17, 1989, October 25, 1989 and December 6, 1989 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and said Civil Case No. 528-LV is ORDERED DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter and, as regards the deceased Jose P.
Fernandez on the additional ground set forth in Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., On leave.

Decision reversed and set aside.


G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006.*
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO
MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors,
KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother,
REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; The certification of non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.—Rule 7, Section 5
of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement
shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is
proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals, 345 SCRA 673 (2000), we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed
where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.
So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an
intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons
to temper the strict application of the rules.
Same; Succession; Waivers; A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.—As regards Remedios’
Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right
or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this
case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of
Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters “by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.” Considering
that the document did not specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in
the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents and guardians may not repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.—Even assuming that Remedios
truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides: ART. 1044. Any person having
the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any
inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents
or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 18
belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and
distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030.
(Emphasis supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance
of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of
Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting
their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there
is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest—ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact; One who is yet to prove his status as acknowledged
illegitimate child of the deceased cannot possibly waive his successional right.—It must
be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private
respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are
yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his coheirs. It
would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner’s invocation of
waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate children who were still minors at
the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age.—We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo, 374 SCRA 180 (2002), that
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition
for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; Pleadings and Practice; The court
before which a petition for letters of administration is not precluded from receiving
evidence on a person’s filiation—its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate, including the determination of the status of each heir; Two causes of action,
one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint.—While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for
letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on
private respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral

to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of action,
one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oliviano D. Regalado for petitioner.
Ericson T. Velasquez for private respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002
and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc.
Case No. 4549 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case
was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a.
Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children
of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs
are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed
that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as
Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents’ petition was a
Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled
without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 19
status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of
the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the
certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents
and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the
certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner
and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by
Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of
her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal
application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner’s objections on the
certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its
assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED.
Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the
illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei
and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate
of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.”10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, this
petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification
against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios
released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or

liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute
the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the
lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel’s certification can be considered
substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that
the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents’ petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping;
2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply
with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served.
In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed
where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as
compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states
that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
“by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.”15 Considering
that the document did not specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in
the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 20
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to
their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property16 which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as
heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver
of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be
established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents’ filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents
have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law
on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case
the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear
of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of
the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority
are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the
Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded
Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 21
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws,
it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type
of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it
would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception
of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only
by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private
respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including
the determination of the status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint
is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
“The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at
the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present
in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that
the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted
to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to
the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 22

have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled,
that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of
the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5; Tiamson vs.
Tiamson, 32 Phil. 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs.
Fabella, 8 Phil. 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil.
855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff
to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedings.”

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner’s motion
to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. Records remanded to trial court for
further proceedings.

G.R. No. 140422. August 7, 2006.*
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA
CRISTOBAL SIKAT, petitioners, vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO
CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before
the RTC is denominated as “Annulment of Title and Damages,” the Court finds it
practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the rules of
succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the
complaint, not the title are controlling.—While the title of the complaint alone implies
that the action involves property rights to a piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in
the complaint reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves hereditary or
successional rights of petitioners to their deceased father’s estate solely, composed of
the subject property. Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the
RTC is denominated as “Annulment of Title and Damages,” we find it practicable to
rule on the division of the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed
for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title are
controlling.
Appeals; Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court; Exceptions.—Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme
Court’s power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
and binding on the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule,
namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Since
exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Words and Phrases; “Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 23
admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.—
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: Art. 172.
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record
of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
“Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s
name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to
prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.—The baptismal
certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate
is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January
1909, she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear
and tear.
Succession; Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Without the participation of all persons
involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said
persons.—As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed
by the private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the
applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof. (Italics supplied) Under the said provision, without the participation
of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding
on said persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s
estate. The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind
the petitioners since petitioners were excluded therefrom.

Extrajudicial Partition of Estate; Prescription; The action for partition is
imprescriptible.—As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents
in February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also inherit from the estate
of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that
petitioners’ right to challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense
of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article
494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.” In Budlong v. Bondoc, 79 SCRA 24 (1977), this Court
has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code
explicitly declares: “No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”
Filiation; Where both parents’ deaths occurred before the enactment of the New Civil
Code in 1950, all the children of the first marriage and the children of the second
marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code.—It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property
of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. Upon the deaths of Buenaventura
in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment of the New
Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four children of
the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the
Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will
and testament, the subject property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to
Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each receiving
66.875 square meters thereof.
Laches; Doctrine of Stale Demands; Words and Phrases; Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it; The doctrine of stale
demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.—Respondents’ defense of laches
is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time,
but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has
become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In our view, the
doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Elisa’s
knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been transferred to the
private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage
of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to
settle the case among themselves and private respondents, but since no settlement
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 24
was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul private
respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on
their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale
demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Same; Same; In the absence of any strong or compelling reason, the Supreme Court
is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an
owner.—Absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply
the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation
of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be
used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used
to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another.
Damages; Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.—Considering
that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in the partition
of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3)
undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact amount of which, unfortunately,
was not proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal damages.
Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Where these are allowed,
they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages should at
least be commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioners considering the
concept and purpose of said damages. Such award is given in view of the peculiar
circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the present case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rolando K. Javier for petitioners.
Virgilio C. Papa for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, “Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo

A. Cristobal and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose
Cristobal, Heirs of Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, San Juan, M.M.”
Facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other
hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed
Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second
marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of
535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed
an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them
and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint2 for
Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. In their
prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed by respondents
on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134
and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning
of the subject property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment of
P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages;
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa,3 Anselmo,4 and the late Socorro5 were presented. In the case of
Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a certification6 issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact
that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948
were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
“Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only
one year and seven months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 25
latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister
Socorro lived with their father and the latter’s family in the subject property at P.
Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo
stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister,
Mercedes, who was then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the
second marriage lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal.
Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San
Juan, Metro Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been
living in the said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other houses in
the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers and sisters which
were now converted into factories.
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she
occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the subject lot.
She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among
themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share. She said that she was
offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land
in question or money because one of the children of defendant Jose Cristobal
wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask
the opinion of her other brothers and sisters.
Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she
found out that the property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had
been transferred to the defen-dants as evidenced by transfer certificates of title
issued under the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit “E”), Norberto Cristobal
(Exhibit “F”), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit “G”) and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit “H”).
She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property
belonging to her father had been transferred to her half brothers and sisters with
the exclusion of herself and the other children from the first marriage.
She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however,
no settlement was reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to file the
present case.
On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was
aware that the subject property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal

even before the latter died. She likewise stated that the [private respondents] are
the ones paying the real estate tax due on the lot.
Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her “Sinumpaang Salaysay” she
claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that
she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s first marriage and the Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s
second marriage.
The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived
right across where she stayed.
Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact
that Martina Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of
Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were
taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s second wife, Donata
Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal
together with Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then
married.
Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they
finished high school at the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.
When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care
of Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.
Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived
together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.
When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located
at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family
lives in the said vicinity. Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the
second marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their houses
and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura
Cristobal had a harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when [petitioners]
and Elisa Cristobal’s grandchildren were called “squatters” by the [private
respondents] and their grandchildren for residing in the subject parcel of land.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 26
On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the
first wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married
although she is not aware of the date when they were married.
[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers
and sisters of the [private respondents].
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his
brothers and sisters was when he lived with their aunt Martina.
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to
Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the [private respondents] want her to have a
piece of property of her own and is not an admission that she is their sister.
[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first
witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata
Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal
were born.
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a
certain property containing five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters.
Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980
leaving his wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr.
The witness presented marked as Exhibit “33” for Norberto, Exhibit “34” for
Florencio, Exhibit “35” for Eufrosina and Exhibit “36’ for Jose the birth certificates
of her brothers and sisters.
On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial
Partition (Exhibit “D-4”) with her brothers and sisters of the property left by their
parents.
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo
never asserted their alleged right over the property subject of the present
litigation.
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on
the parcel of land and that title to the property has been subdivided under their
respective names.

On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were
taken care of by their aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified
that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as “Kaka” and that since the time they were
kids, she had known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and sisters.”7
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment8 on 11 July 1997,
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have
scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts
to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision9
dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws,” but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share
of the subject property because of laches.
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that:
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES
TO THE CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY
WHICH ARE EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH
PRINCIPLE10
The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the claim of private respondents that
they acquired ownership of the entire subject property and that the claim of petitioners
to the subject property was barred by laches.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint filed by
petitioners before the RTC was denominated as “Annulment of Title and Damages”;
nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the following:
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO
CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE
CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as null and void for being fraudulent contrary
to law on succession.
2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal to wit:
(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married
to MAURA RUBIO;
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 27
(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married
to PAULINA IBANEZ;
(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married
to FORTUNATO DELA GUERRA; and
(d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to
ADELAIDA IBANEZ and/or TCT No. 3993—(if TCT No. 165035 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof to ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA,
JOSELITO and NELIA, all surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE
CRISTOBAL, one of the defendants.)
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA
CRISTOBAL according to the law on succession applicable at the time of his death.
4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful
portions in the inheritance.
5.Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the follow-ing sums of money,
to wit:
a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
c. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees
d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages11
While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property rights to
a piece of land, the aforequoted prayer in the complaint reveals that, more than
property rights, the action involves hereditary or successional rights of petitioners to
their deceased father’s estate solely, composed of the subject property.
Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated
as “Annulment of Title and Damages,” we find it practicable to rule on the division of
the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint,
considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.12
To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment of error
therein, the following need to be resolved first: (1) whether or not petitioners were
able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or
not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed
by the private respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners’ right to question the Deed
of Partition had prescribed; and (4) whether or not petitioners’ right to recover their
share of the subject property is barred by laches.

Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been
established. Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.13 Since exceptions (4) and (11) are
present in the case at bar, this Court shall make its own determination of the facts
relevant for the resolution of the case.
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
“Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
“Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,” may consist of the
child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s
name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 28
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa,15 Anselmo,16 and the late
Socorro17 were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In
the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to
1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners
enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being the
children of Buenaventura Cristobal with his first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were
also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the status as a legitimate
child.19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any
proof to refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura
Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the
private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable
rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
“The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has
not participated therein or had no notice thereof.” (Italics supplied)
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.20 In the case
at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of
the subject property, the partition thereof by the private respondents already amounts
to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the
subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since
petitioners were excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of
Partition executed by private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa
became aware of the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of
private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 29

to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as one of the children “ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not
of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion
property.21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate
She learned afterwards that the title to the subject property had been transferred to children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
the names of private respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of
herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall
Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also have the usufruct of the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant
entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were not to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving spouse, the whole
able to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an title is merged in him.”
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal by private
respondents, such settlement is not binding on them.22 As the extrajudicial settlement Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.
executed by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for Accordingly, the pro indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight children and their
the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to challenge the said heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in 1930, are as follows:
settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner (1) Mercedes Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime (2) Amselmo Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.” In (3) Socorrro Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
Budlong v. Bondoc,23 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the (4) Elisa Cristobal-Sikat — 66.875 square meters
action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article (5) Norberto Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: “No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner (6) Florencio Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.”24 (7) Eufrocina Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
(8) Jose Cristobal — 66.875 square meters
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right
of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to The Court will now determine whether petitioners’ right to their shares in the subject
divide the subject property between petitioners and private respondents, as the rule property can be barred by laches.
on succession prescribes.
Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or
It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve
purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage.25 Upon the deaths of mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or
Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before the enactment enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or
of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four unfair to permit.28
children of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in
accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon
Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject property shall be divided into eight petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been
equal parts pursuant to Articles 92126 and 93127 of the Old Civil Code on intestate transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from
succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof. the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with
their barangay to settle the case among themselves and private respondents, but since
At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only entitled to no settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to
the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides: annul private respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or
neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 30

doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, (5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. (P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.

Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply Costs against private respondents.
the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner.29 Laches is a
creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches SO ORDERED.
cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its
application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Aus-tria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,
has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.30 JJ., concur.

Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set aside; petitioners recognized and
the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged on for more than a declared children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia
decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but the exact amount of Cristobal; Deed of Partition declared not binding upon petitioners who were not notified
which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioners’ or did not participate in execution thereof; and subject property ordered partitioned
favor nominal damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the and distributed.
plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered.31 Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong
but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained by
the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such award is
given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the
present case.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late

Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;

(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not

binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the
execution thereof;

(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and
No. 165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters
is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs
of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and

G.R. No. 181132. June 5, 2009.*
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA
PANGILINAN MARAMAG, petitioners, vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Cause of Action; A cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another; Elements of a Cause of Action.—A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint
states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action—
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these
elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Test of Sufficiency of a Cause of Action; Well-Recognized
Exceptions to the General Rule.—When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground,
the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court
must resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true.
The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting
the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if: 1. the falsity of the
allegations is subject to judicial notice; 2. such allegations are legally impossible; 3. the
allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence; 4. by the record or
document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or 5. there is evidence
which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in the course of
the hearings related to the case.
Civil Law; Insurance Law; Article 2011 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws; i.e., the Insurance Code; The
only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive
or the beneficiary if the insured is already deceased upon the maturation of the policy;
Exception is where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who
are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity.—It is
evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that
insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section
53 of the Insurance Code states—SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 31
exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it
is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the
only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still
alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the
policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of
favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and
claim from the insurer.
Same; Same; Same; No legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children
of illicit relationships by the insured.—The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one
policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that
the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies
remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance
proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under
Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has
not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by
law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the
benefit of the estate of the insured.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mario R. Benitez for petitioner.
Gan, Panganiban, Manlapaz & Associates for respondent Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation.
Cayetano, Sebastian, Ata, Dado and Cruz for respondent Insular Life Assurance
Company.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, seeking to reverse
and set aside the Resolution2 dated January 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85948, dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The case stems from a petition3 filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or
inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction.

The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto
Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de
Guzman Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the
latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian,
and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate
children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian
and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could
not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged,
among others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor
of Odessa, while the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and
Trisha Angelie, both minors, upon the appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners
also prayed for the total amount of P320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and
attorney’s fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed
their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it
ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary
and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the
remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa’s share as she was of
age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie
pending submission of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or
petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the
designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in
Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as
it sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie,
considering that no settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective
shares of the heirs been determined. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor
the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries
pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not
designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due
to a misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936
and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; that the
case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto; and
that the law on succession does not apply where the designation of insurance
beneficiaries is clear.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 32
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to
petitioners, summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of
Loreto failed to file their answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
declared them in default in its Order dated May 7, 2004.
During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the issues
raised in their respective answers be resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners
to comment within 15 days.
In their comment, petitioners alleged that the issue raised by Insular and Grepalife was
purely legal—whether the complaint itself was proper or not—and that the designation
of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or a donation and, therefore, subject to the
provisions of Articles 7528 and 7729 of the Civil Code.
In reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong
exclusively to the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the
heirs of the insured. Grepalife also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a beneficiary
when it ascertained that Loreto was legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan Maramag.
On September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads—
“WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants
Insular Life and Grepalife is granted with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian
and Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with respect to the other defendants
Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.
SO ORDERED.”10
In so ruling, the trial court ratiocinated thus—
“Art. 2011 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of insurance is governed by
the (sic) special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall
be regulated by this Code. The principal law on insurance is the Insurance Code,
as amended. Only in case of deficiency in the Insurance Code that the Civil Code
may be resorted to. (Enriquez v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 41 Phil. 269.)
The Insurance Code, as amended, contains a provision regarding to whom the
insurance proceeds shall be paid. It is very clear under Sec. 53 thereof that the
insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person
in whose name or for whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the
policy. Since the defendants are the ones named as the primary beneficiary (sic)
in the insurances (sic) taken by the deceased Loreto C. Maramag and there is no

showing that herein plaintiffs were also included as beneficiary (sic) therein the
insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them. This is because the
beneficiary has a vested right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the
right to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, 48
Phil. [sic] 63).
Neither could the plaintiffs invoked (sic) the law on donations or the rules on
testamentary succession in order to defeat the right of herein defendants to collect
the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of insurance is not the donee
spoken in the law of donation. The rules on testamentary succession cannot apply
here, for the insurance indemnity does not partake of a donation. As such, the
insurance indemnity cannot be considered as an advance of the inheritance which
can be subject to collation (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534). In the case of Southern
Luzon Employees’ Association v. Juanita Golpeo, et al., the Honorable Supreme
Court made the following pronouncements[:]
“With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds to the Life Insurance
Policy belongs exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate
property, we agree that the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively
to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured,
and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the
beneficiary and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the
doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains in these
Islands by virtue of Section 428 of the Code of Commerce x x x.”
In [the] light of the above pronouncements, it is very clear that the plaintiffs has
(sic) no sufficient cause of action against defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie Maramag for the reduction and/or declaration of inofficiousness of
donation as primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) of the late Loreto C.
Maramag.
However, herein plaintiffs are not totally bereft of any cause of action. One of the
named beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C. Maramag
is his concubine Eva Verna De Guzman. Any person who is forbidden from
receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life
insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him, according
to said article (Art. 2012, Civil Code). If a concubine is made the beneficiary, it is
believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity must
go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited
under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. In such case, the action
for the declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee,
and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence
in the same action (Comment of Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 33
page 897). Since the designation of defendant Eva Verna de Guzman as one of
the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C.
Maramag is void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code, the insurance indemnity that
should be paid to her must go to the legal heirs of the deceased which this court
may properly take cognizance as the action for the declaration for the nullity of a
void donation falls within the general jurisdiction of this Court.”11
Insular12 and Grepalife13 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing,
in the main, that the petition failed to state a cause of action. Insular further averred
that the proceeds were divided among the three children as the remaining named
beneficiaries. Grepalife, for its part, also alleged that the premiums paid had already
been refunded.
Petitioners, in their comment, reiterated their earlier arguments and posited that
whether the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action must be
determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, such that the
defenses of Insular and Grepalife would be better threshed out during trial.
On June 16, 2005, the trial court issued a Resolution, disposing, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motions for
Reconsideration filed by defendants Grepalife and Insular Life are hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the portion of the Resolution of this Court dated 21
September 2004 which ordered the prosecution of the case against defendant Eva
Verna De Guzman, Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case
against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.”14
In granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial court
considered the allegations of Insular that Loreto revoked the designation of Eva in one
policy and that Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the
entire proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant
to Section 53 of the Insurance Code. It ruled that it is only in cases where there are no
beneficiaries designated, or when the only designated beneficiary is disqualified, that
the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured. As to the claim that the
proceeds to be paid to Loreto’s illegitimate children should be reduced based on the
rules on legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance proceeds is
governed primarily by the Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code are
irrelevant and inapplicable. With respect to the Grepalife policy, the trial court noted
that Eva was never designated as a beneficiary, but only Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie; thus, it upheld the dismissal of the case as to the illegitimate children. It further
held that the matter of Loreto’s misrepresentation was premature; the appropriate

action may be filed only upon denial of the claim of the named beneficiaries for the
insurance proceeds by Grepalife.
Petitioners appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. The
appellate court also noted that petitioners did not file within the reglementary period a
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s Resolution, dated September 21, 2004,
dismissing the complaint as against Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus, the
said Resolution had already attained finality.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
a. In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action, may the Court consider matters which were not alleged in the Complaint,
particularly the defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer?
b. In granting a motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action, did not the Regional Trial Court engage in the examination
and determination of what were the facts and their probative value, or the truth
thereof, when it premised the dismissal on allegations of the defendants in their
answer—which had not been proven?
c. x x x (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of
the insurance for the concubine?15
In essence, petitioners posit that their petition before the trial court should not have
been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because the finding that Eva was
either disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that her designation
was revoked by Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was raised only in the answers
and motions for reconsideration of both Insular and Grepalife. They argue that for a
motion to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint
should be considered. They further contend that, even assuming Insular disqualified
Eva as a beneficiary, her share should not have been distributed to her children with
Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured
deceased, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the
petition failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the
Rules of Court, which reads—
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 34
“SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any
of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.”
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause
of action—(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right.
If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.17
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be
based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on
the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a
cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the
complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded;
or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case.18
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although
petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in
the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is
that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from
being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with
Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 35

policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Eva’s
share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought
about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the
shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate
heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio,** Corona*** and Peralta, JJ., concur.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a Petition denied.
favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides
that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—

“SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy.”

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance
proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation
where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties
to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third
parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.21

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and,
thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners.
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children
as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal
proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the
insured,22 the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court
in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the
insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to
the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,23
or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24
that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the
insured.

In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld.
In the same light, the Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained.
Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the
issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there
being no findings of fact in the first place.25

G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999.*
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON,
ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO
VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Res Judicata; It is an indispensable
requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first and second action, identity
of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.—It is an indispensable requirement
in res judicata that there be, between the first and second action, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action. A perusal of the records leads us to conclude
that there is no identity of parties and of cause of action as between Civil Case No.
1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by Leoncio in his
capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true that upon his death,
Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter the fact that Victor’s
participation in the case was in representation of the interests of the original plaintiff,
Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative of the estate, or his heir, as in this case, for which no
court appointment is required. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that there is
substantial identity between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and
successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Civil Law; Property; Succession; Legitime; A claim for legitime does not amount to a
claim of title.—Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not
amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, we
declared that what is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the
value of the property at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any
increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.
Same; Same; Prescription; Prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an
inofficious donation.—What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction
of an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction
or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance,
recognition or adoption of a child; (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions
of the donation; and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives
entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support.
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, the reduction of which hinges upon the
allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive
period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 36
Same; Same; Same; Actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues.—Under Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to
the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil
Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
Same; Same; Same; The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death
of the donor-decedent.—From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case
of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a
donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime
accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the
net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Joaquin “Bobby” Yuseco for petitioner.
De Leoz, Madarieta & Nieva Law Offices for private respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
31976,1 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,2 which
rendered inofficious the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein
petitioner, to the extent that it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering
petitioner to convey to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that
portion of the donated land proportionate to Victor Imperial’s legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral
Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and
proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit
that despite the contract’s designation as one of “Absolute Sale,” the transaction was
in fact a donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the
then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner
herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November
3, 1961,3 under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the

rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated
1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof
in a bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio’s death, it was
agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial
costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died,
leaving only two heirs—the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and
an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of
Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of
judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue,
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of
the disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving
as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue
of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case,
Civil Case No. 7646, for “Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession” with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit
and inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused
Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter’s physical
weakness and mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of
petitioner impaired the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and
predecessor-in-interest.4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to
Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito,
Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata; and (3) raised the additional defenses
of prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending in the
Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio,
Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther
H. Villalon.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 37
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the
basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio’s death, he left no property other than
the 32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC
went on further to state that petitioner’s allegation that other properties existed and
were inherited by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence.5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half of that
or 16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio which could be
absorbed in the donation to defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square
meters is where the legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the adopted child)
in relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the
acknowledged natural child getting 1/2 of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted)
child, in accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides:
“The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each
of the legitimate children or descendants.”
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken)
plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while defendant gets
5,420 square meters.6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code,7 reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of
execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the
original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In
addition, the trial court regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived,
this not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision of December 13, 1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise known
as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial file of
Pompeyo B. Calleja which is considered a donation, is hereby reduced
proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which
share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered
to be given by defendant a portion of 10,940 square meters thereof.

In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs should
include the portion which they are presently occupying, by virtue of the extended
lease to their father Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other portion
that may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a
commissioner to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his legitime
and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED.8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Before us, petitioner questions
the following findings of respondent court: (1) that there was no res judicata, there
being no identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case and Civil Case
No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to question the donation; (3) that
private respondents’ action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; and (4) that
the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first and
second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.9 A perusal
of the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and of cause of
action as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177
was instituted by Leoncio in his capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it
is true that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does
not alter the fact that Victor’s participation in the case was in representation of the
interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution
of parties is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate,10
or his heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is required.11 Petitioner’s
argument, therefore, that there is substantial identity between Leoncio and private
respondents, being heirs and successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio’s cause of action as donor of the property was fraud, purportedly
employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation. While the same
circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private respondents’ complaint, it also
raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and could
not, form part of Leoncio’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 38
cause of action may arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the donation
will then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased.12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full of the
donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two alternative causes of
action. First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncio’s
complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court
correctly dismissed because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served
as a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness
and consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation. The second cause
of action is the alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of
Victor’s legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but only of
that portion diminishing the legitime.13 It is on the basis of this second cause of action
that private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation.
Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and
their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious
donations. x x x
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who
was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest
the donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even
moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be
remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the
compromise agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the
execution of the compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise
agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under
Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument,
or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or
intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter’s death,
his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an

act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his
right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner’s other assignment of errors. Having
ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot
sustain the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable
prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of
both courts that this case is a “real action over an immovable” allots undue credence
to private respondents’ description of their complaint, as one for “Annulment of
Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property,” which suggests
the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over the
disputed land.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim
of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals,14 we declared that what
is brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property
at the time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious
donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of
donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child;16 (2) four years, for noncompliance with conditions of the
donation;17 and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives
entitled to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their
support.18 Interestingly, donations as in the instant case,19 the reduction of which
hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular
prescriptive period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of
prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-
year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations,
required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime
of compulsory heirs.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 39
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29
SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter
nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the
death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may
be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case.
The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court’s holding that the defense of prescription had been waived, it not
being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to say that while the terms
of the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it would
be the height of injustice for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of
prescription is manifest in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact
of the lower courts.20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in, private
respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died
on January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo
Villalon, who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of
any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed
earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to
a renunciation of his inheritance and does not preclude him from bringing an action to
claim his legitime. These are matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware of,
considering that he is a lawyer.21 Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a portion of the
donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole heir of his natural son,
or at the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of counterclaim in an
ejectment case22 filed against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private
respondents’ cause that five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981
before they filed their complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length
of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined
to assert it.23 We find the necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by
laches in this case, in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC
computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in
its dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as
Victor’s legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 40

Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to
a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net
estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; (2) the value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it.24

Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property
itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found
inofficious and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor’s legitime, private
respondents will not receive a corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in
this case where the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1)
an equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality;25
(2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or
marketable securities;26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so
much of such other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction.27

We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of

prescription and laches.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976,

affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is
reversed and set aside. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Actg. C.J.), Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Reviewed decision reversed and set aside.


G.R. No. 141501. July 21, 2006.*
ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN DE RIVERA,
TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA** represented by MELCHOR VILLANUEVA,
ANGELINA VILLANUEVA, VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURAL
BANK, INC. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondents.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.”—We resolve
the first issue in the negative. Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It sets forth
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits and without
fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.
Res Judicata; Elements for res judicata to apply.—For res judicata to apply, the
following elements must be present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there, must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.
Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Evidence; A record of birth is merely a prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein; It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness
of the statements made there by the interested parties.—It is well-settled that a record
of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in
SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her
birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
Property; Co-ownership; No co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous
relationship; In such a relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his
or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim
to any portion of it.—Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927
to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not
governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together
is not in any way incapacitated from getting married. According to the doctrine laid
down by Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306 (1979), no co-ownership exists between parties
to an adulterous relationship. In Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340 (1997), we
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 41
expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.
Land Titles; The fact of registration created a conclusiveness of title in favor of the
person in whose name it was registered.—There is only one parcel of land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-26670, registered solely in Gonzales’ name,
which was acquired between 1927 and 1963. This fact of registration created a
conclusiveness of title in favor of the person in whose name it was registered. In SD-
857, although Villanueva sought to prove that he alone had purchased the properties
and that only he could have done so during the period of cohabitation (since he was
the sole breadwinner), he never actually challenged the validity of the registration in
her name. Thus the efficacy of the title in Gonzales’ name remained unrebutted. As
Gonzales’ sole property, this should accrue entirely to her heirs.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Guillermo C. Bumanlag for petitioners.
Ireneo G. Calderon and Rafael E. Villarosa for respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 from a decision2 and a resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 touches upon questions of filiation,
presumptions of coequal acquisition and res judicata.
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-in-law
(Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and
Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings,
full and half-blood of Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).4 They are
denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They were
allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.5 The remaining respondents,
Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna,
are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva.
From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the
benefit of marriage because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who died
on April 20, 1963.6 In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties
including the properties contested in this case. The disputed properties are:

(a) Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446 [in the names of Villanueva
and Gonzales], together with the residential house erected thereon and other
improvements;
(b) Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of Title No.
NT-21446], with an area of 5,353 square meters, more or less, situated at
Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(c) [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in the names
of Villanueva and Gonzales], with [an] area of 15.400 hectares, more or less,
situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;
(d) [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the names
of Villanueva and Gonzales], with an area of 4.0019 hectares, more or less,
situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(e) [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in the
names of Villanueva, Gonzales and one Soledad Alarcon vda. de Rivera], with an
area of 3.8718 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(f) [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in the name
of Gonzales], with an area of 3.5972 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera,
Nueva Ecija;
(g) Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 106813 to 106931, inclusive, although the land covered
by TCT No. NT-106827 … was already sold to one Pastor Barlaan;
(h) Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an approximate
value of at least P100,000; and
(i) Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount of
P118,722.61.7
Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will.
On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale,8 that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales’ estate
comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva,
for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 42
Petitioners (Gonzales’ half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales’ estate
and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santo
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 37. It was docketed as Civil Case No. SD-857 (SD-857).
In dismissing the complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never
married to Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by
Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.9
Not satisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioners appealed to the CA which
affirmed it. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was
Gonzales’ illegitimate daughter despite the RTC’s ruling in another case, Special
Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD-144), entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the
late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C. Rivera, petitioner, v. Romualdo Villanueva,
oppositor, in which the trial court appointed Epifanio Rivera as administrator of
Gonzales’ estate.10
They argue that the trial court’s decision in SD-144, to the effect that respondent
Angelina was neither the adopted nor the illegitimate daughter of Gonzales, should
have operated as res judicata on the matter of respondent Angelina’s status.
The first issue here is whether or not the findings regarding respondent Angelina’s
filiation in SD-144 are conclusive on SD-857 and therefore res judicata. The second is
the determination of her real status in relation to Gonzales. Finally, there is the question
of whether or not the real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally
owned by them.
We resolve the first issue in the negative. Res judicata literally means “a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment.” It sets forth the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on
the merits and without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.11
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there, must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.12
A number of factors militate against the existence of res judicata. First, the parties in
the two cases are different. Epifanio C. Rivera, who incidentally is not a party in this
petition, filed SD-144 seeking letters of administration over his dead sister’s estate.
Villanueva was his lone opponent. On the other hand, although both Villanueva and
respondent Angelina were parties in SD-857, Epifanio Rivera was not. Petitioners never
alleged that Epifanio represented their interests, and vice versa.
Furthermore, in SD-144, the trial court never actually acquired jurisdiction over
respondent Angelina’s person. She was not even a party there, given that Villanueva
did not represent her interest when he opposed Epifanio Rivera’s petition.
Finally and most significantly, there was no identity of cause of action between the two
suits. By their very nature, they were entirely distinct from each other. SD-144 was a
special proceeding while SD-857 was an ordinary civil case. The former was concerned
with the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Epifanio Rivera while the latter
was for partition and annulment of titles, and damages.
Clearly, then, there was no res judicata. Nevertheless, this still begged the question of
whether or not it was proven, as the CA held, that respondent Angelina was the
illegitimate daughter of the decedent Gonzales. On this issue, we find merit in the
petition.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed
decision, “the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of
Angelina Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated
therein as her father.”13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent
Angelina was Gonzales’ illegitimate child. However, a closer examination of the birth
certificate14 reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as “adopted” by both
Villanueva and Gonzales.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.15 However, one of the
exceptions to this rule is when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension
of facts.16 We believe this to be just such an instance.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,17 Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove
that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, submitted a certificate of live
birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for
membership in the Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 43
as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been reared
and continuously treated as Vicente’s daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua’s alleged parents had
been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez-Badua’s supposed father were
able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was
counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian,
unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived
and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the
child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even
amounts to simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth
certificate, which is a public document. (emphasis ours)18
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein.19 It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the
statements made there by the interested parties.20 Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence
of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however,
are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too
compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted
birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents
relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged
parents had lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case
which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales’
daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua’s alleged
mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of
menopause21 at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married
to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva
for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently established
that respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological daughter, nor even her adopted
daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales’ estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with
Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.

Finally, we come to the question of whether or not the properties acquired by Gonzales
and Villanueva during their cohabitation were equally owned by them. According to the
trial court in SD-857,22 Gonzales and Villanueva lived together without the benefit of
marriage and therefore their property relations were governed by Article 144 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
However, the contending parties agreed that the relationship of Villanueva and
Gonzales was adulterous, at least until the death of Amanda Musngi, Villanueva’s legal
wife, on April 20, 1963. In their appeal brief, petitioners made the following admission:
From 1927 until her death, Pacita [Gonzales] lived together with defendant
Romualdo Villanueva (“Romualdo”) as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Earlier, or sometime in 1913 or 1914, Romualdo was married to Amanda
Musngi (or “Amanda”). Amanda died on April 20, 1963.23 (emphasis supplied)
Respondent Angelina, in her memorandum in SD-857, actually agreed with petitioners
on the nature of Villanueva’s relationship with Gonzales:24
While Romualdo Villanueva claimed that he and Pacita C. Gonzales lived as husband
and wife and that they were married, it turned out that he was not legally married to
the latter, for then, his marriage in the year 1927, was still subsisting with one Amanda
Musngi. (emphasis supplied)
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was
adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article
144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way
incapacitated from getting married.25 According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza
v. Jose,26 no co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In
Agapay v. Palang,27 we expounded on this doctrine by declaring that in such a
relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion
of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
In Agapay, Miguel Palang and his paramour Erlinda Agapay bought a parcel of riceland
in Pangasinan which they registered in their names. However, because Agapay failed
to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, she could
not rightfully claim co-ownership over the same.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 44
Here, the records show only four properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales
between 1927 and 1963 which they registered in both their names.28 Following
Agapay, these can only be apportioned according to the actual contributions of each.
Unfortunately, the records are devoid of any evidence that Gonzales contributed
anything to the acquisition of these properties. Petitioners merely asserted that she
acquired these properties through her own industry29 without a shred of evidence to
support the allegation. On the other hand, it was clearly demonstrated that Villanueva
was the municipal treasurer of Talavera for many years and therefore the lone
breadwinner. In accordance with Agapay, none of these four parcels of land should
accrue to petitioners.
There is only one parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-
26670,30 registered solely in Gonzales’ name, which was acquired between 1927 and
1963.31 This fact of registration created a conclusiveness of title in favor of the person
in whose name it was registered.32 In SD-857, although Villanueva sought to prove
that he alone had purchased the properties and that only he could have done so during
the period of cohabitation (since he was the sole breadwinner), he never actually
challenged the validity of the registration in her name. Thus the efficacy of the title in
Gonzales’ name remained unrebutted. As Gonzales’ sole property, this should accrue
entirely to her heirs.
The only property acquired after Musngi’s death in 1963 and registered in the names
of both Villanueva and Gonzales was Lot 3-A covered by TCT No. NT-51899.33 This
was governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Half of it should pertain to Gonzales’ heirs and the other half, to Villanueva.
The rest of the properties registered solely in Gonzales’ name were also acquired after
the death of Amanda Musngi in 1963. The records show that the subdivision lots
situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija covered by TCTs Nos. 106813 to 106931 were
acquired in 1971.34 These properties were governed by co-ownership under Article
144 of the Civil Code. Again, half should accrue to Gonzales’ heirs and the other half,
to Villanueva.
Significantly, the trial court in SD-857 did not establish the exact relationship between
petitioners and Gonzales, a relationship defendants therein (now respondents)
vigorously denied. In view of this, there is a need to remand the case to the court of
origin for the proper determination and identification of Gonzales’ heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51449 are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING the case to
the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales’ heirs and
the corresponding partition of her estate.
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 45

SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Note.—The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to the same parties but also to
their successors-in-interest. (Fernandez vs. Esidto, 395 SCRA 1 [2003])

——o0o——

No. L-14530. April 25, 1962.
LEONA AGLIBOT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANDREA ACAY MAÑALAC,
ET AL., defendants-appellant
Succession; "Reserva troncal," Obligation to reserve property inherited from daughter
in favor of wife's sisters.—A parcel of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of A.M.
and M.A. They had a daughter, J.M. M.A. died, leaving two sisters and her daughter.
Her one-half portion of the conjugal property was inherited by her daughter. A.M.
married A.A., with whom he had six children. J.M. died intestate without any
descendant, thus leaving to her father, A.M., the property she inherited from her
mother. Years later, A.M. died. All these incidents occurred before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code. Query: Who is entitled to the land which A.M. inherited from his
daughter, J.M., as between the sisters of M.A., first wife of A.M., on the one hand, and
A.M.'s second wife, A.A., and their children, on the other. Held: The land is reservable
property in accordance with the provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art.
891 of the New Civil Code). A.M. was obliged to reserve the portion he inherited from
his daughter, J.M., for the benefit of the sisters of M.A., aunts of J.M. on the maternal
side and who are, therefore, her relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which said property came.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nemesio B alonso for plaintiffs-appellees.
Ruperto G. Martin & Associates for defendants-appe lants.
DIZON, J.:
Leona and Evarista Aglibot commenced the present action (Civil Case No. 1482) in the
Court of First Instance of Zambales on July 31, 1952 to recover from Andre a Ac ay
Maña lac and her chil d ren—Ramona. Gregorio, Felix, Angela, Juanita and Purisima,
all surnamed Mañalac—the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in
barrio Namanaan, Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales, more particularly- described
in paragraph 2 of their complaint, and damages.
Briefly stated, the allegations of the complaint are that the Aglibots inherited the
property subject matter thereof from their deceased niece Juliana Mañalac; that upon
the death of Anacleto Mañalac, father of Juliana, the defendants took possession of
said property, claimed it as their own and, had since then appropriated for themselves
all the palay annually harvested therefrom amountin g to 30 cavan es; that notwithsta
nding d made upon said defendants by the Aglibots, they had refused to surrender the
property to the latter.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 46
In their answer, after denying some material averments of the complaint, appellants
alleged substantially the following as affirmative defense: that the land in question was
purchased from Esteban Garcia by the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot for
P1,000.00; that when Maria Aglibot died, only P300.00 of this amount had been paid;
that the remaining P700.00 was paid to the vendor during the marriage of Anacleto
Mañalac and appellant Andrea Acay; that Juliana Mañalac, the only daughter of
Anacleto and his first wife, died in 1920, while Anacleto died in 1942; that upon his
death, his widow, Andrea Acay, and their children acquired the property in question as
his sole legal heirs. Their answer likewise claimed the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees by way of counterclaim.
After due trial, upon the issue thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as
follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders
judgment declaring the plaintiffs owners pro-indiviso of one half (1/2) of the land
covered by Original Certificate No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the amended
complaint; ordering the defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of
the said one-half (1/2) of the property covered by said title; ordering the
defendants jointly and severally to deliver to the plaintiffs 15 cavanes of palay
yearly as the share of the plaintiffs from the produce of the land or its equivalent
value at P10.00 a cavan from the date of the filing of the complaint until the said
one-half (1/2) portion of the property described in Original Certificate No. 10 is
delivered to the plaintiffs and ordering the defendants to pay the costs."
From the above judgment Andrea Acay and her children took the present appeal.
The evidence shows that, originally, the land in question belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and Maria Aglibot, and was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10 of the Register of Deeds of Zambales in the name of
Anacleto Mañalac, married to Maria Aglibot; that said spouses had an only child named
Juliana Mañalac; that Maria Aglibot died on October 2, 1906; that on April 25, 1910,
Anacleto Mañalac married appellant Andrea Acay with whom he had six children (the
other appellants herein); that Juliana Mañalac died intestate on October 22, 1920,
leaving no other relatives except her father, Anacleto Mañalac, and her half brothers
and sisters already mentioned; that upon the death of Anacleto on June 2, 1942, his
widow, Andrea Acay, and her six children took possession of the parcel of land in
controversy and since then have refused to surrender the ownership and possession
thereof to the appellees,; that the land produces thirty cavanes of palay yearly.
On May 18, 1951, appellees Leona and Evarista Aglibot filed a verified petition in the
Court of First Instance of Zambales for the summary partition or distribution of the
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 47

properties left by the deceased Juliana Mañalac among her rightful heirs (Special indicates that said spouses had acquired full ownership thereof during the lifetime of
Proceeding No. 594). The court, after proper proceedings, issued an order dated Maria Aglibot.
October 30, 1951, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
A Secondary question raised by appellants is to the effect that the lower court erred in
"Wherefore, the Court declares that the applicant Leona Aglibot and Evarista ordering them, jointly and severally, to deliver to appellees fifteen cavanes of palay
Aglibot are the only heirs within the third degree of Juliana Mañalac, and belonging yearly or pay their equivalent value of P10.00 a cavan, from the date of the filing of
to the same line from which these properties originally belonged, that is, from the complaint. Considering the belief of appellants that the property in controversy
Maria Aglibot, being the sisters of the latter; that the value of these properties formed part of the estate of Anacleto Maña- lac and that upon the latter's death
does not exceed six thousand pesos (P6.000); and that each of the applicants is ownership thereof was transmitted to all his heirs, subject to the usufructuary rights of
entitled to receive and enter into possession of one-half of the first five parcels the surviving spouse, Maria Acay, their contention—not sufficiently rebutted—that only
and onefourth of the last two, after paying such debts of the estate—if there be the latter enjoyed possession of the property since her husband's death and received
any—and the proportionate expenses of this special proceedings, subject to the the annual share pertaining to the landlord seems to be reasonable and logical. She
provisions of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court." (Page 10, Rec. on App.). should be the only one, therefore, sentenced to pay the fifteen cavanes of palay yearly
from the date of the filing of the complaint.
After securing the decision abovequoted appellees made the unsuccessful d emands u
pon appellants for the survender of the property in question to them, and subseuently The remaining contention of appellants that the lower court should have ordered
filed the present action. appellees to refund to them 50% of the annual realty tax paid on the property cannot
be sustained, this, matter having been raised by them for the first time on appeal.
The main question to be resolved now is: Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto
Mañalac inherited from his daughter, Juliana. as between appellees (sisters of Maria WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
Aglibot, first wife of Anacleto Mañalac). on the one hand, and appellants (Anacleto's costs.
second wife and their children) on the other?
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera
It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable property in and Paredes, JJ., concur.
accordance with t he provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 891 of the
New Civil Code). Both parties now admit that the entire parcel covered by Original Decision modified.
Certificat e Title No. 10 belonged to the c onjugal partnership of the spouses Anacleto
Mañalac and Maria Aglibot; that upon the death of the latter on October 2, 1906. their
only daughter, Juliana Mañalac, inherited one-half of the property, the other half
pertaining to her father as his share in the conjugal partnership : tha t up on the de at
Juliana Mañalac on October 22, 1920 without leaving any descendant. her father
inherited her one-half portion of said property. In accordance with law. therefore,
Anacleto Mañalac was obliged to reserve the portion he had thus inherited from his
daughter r. for the benefit of appellees. Leona and Evarista Aglibot, aunts of Julian on
the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative within the third degree belonging
to the line from which said property came.

Appellants' contention that the major portion of the purchase price of the land in
question w as pa id t o the original owner. Esteban Garcia, after the death of Maria
Aglibot is rendered clearly untenable not only by the lack of sufficient evidence t o this
effect but also by the very significant circumstance that the property was titled in the
name of Anacleto Mañalac "married t o Maris A g- libot"—circumstance that strongly

[No. 13386. October 27, 1920.]
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, plaintiffs and
appellants, vs. MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants and
appellees.
RESERVABLE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY; INHERITANCE BY RELATIVES WITHIN THE
THIRD DEGREE; ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES.—Article 811 of the Civil Code which
provides that "any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired
by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came," does not apply to illegitimate relatives.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas. Abreu, J.
The facts, are stated in the opinion of the court.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's complaint,
without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Juliana' Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo,
inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X
of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two
parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by
intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant
Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant
herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the
defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim
that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab
intestate, from his deceased father.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 48
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural
daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purpose of
recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described
in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the
Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an
acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property
here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the
reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the
record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March
29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown
father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate) ; that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and
reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother
until the latter was.married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the
plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero
Gala, pp. 5—6; Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27,
sten. notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in the case
of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this court in that
case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing here the law and legal
principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural
daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or not an
illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided
for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as follows:
"Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came."
The property here in question was inherited, by operation of law, by Francisco
Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same
manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
is the natural sister of Alf eo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which
the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said

property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree
of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the
defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the
plaintiff's action must fail.
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil Code,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate
daughter of Juliana Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in said article 811 the
legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without
specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer
to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy
and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any
court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have
devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that
may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now
before us, and are unanimous in the opinion on on that the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. One of such commentators,
undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better
than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In
determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under article 811, he says:
"Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the
natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother
or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other
hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family
exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring
to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation
to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
"Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or
does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only
the bond established by acknowledgment between the father or mother who
acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be stated
as an indisputable truth, that 'in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the
general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why,
as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of children or parents,
of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of course made to those
who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural
mother; it does not say child, but natural child; it does not speak of ascendants,
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 49
brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural brothers or
natural parents. (See, for example, articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935 to 938,
944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
"Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be
maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They
evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced
heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811,—and as we will see also article
812,—continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and
children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section
and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in
articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the
Code is proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any
doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of article 938, which states that the
provisions of article 811 applies to intestate succession, which is just established
in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945,
which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles
840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly
or indirectly to that provision.
"Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the
right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision
is due to the desire that the properties-should not pass, by reason of new
marriages, out of the f amily to which they belonged, or is directly derived from
the system of the so-called 'reserva troncal,' and whether the idea of reservation
or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended
to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and
descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the
danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special
laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with
respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants
does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
"The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants
may be raised just as the question whether it would be pref erable to suppress it
altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy
but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other hand
be strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate ascendants."
(Manresa, Código Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is
established, says:
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 50

"Persons in whose favor the reservation is established.—This is one of the most Mapa, C. J., Araullo, Malcolm, Avanceña, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the
reservation is established in favor of 'the parents who are within the third degree Judgment affirmed.
and belong to the line from which the properties came.

"It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession,

according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship
by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by
marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of
the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends
to prevent.

"It also treats of legitimate relationship. ,The person obliged to reserve is a

legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds
from the same legitimate f amily, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family
and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have
already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family,
following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article
943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child and
viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have the
right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited establishes a barrier
between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by
operation of law to the natural family." (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the same
conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del artículo 811 es privilegio de la familia
legítima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate family.)"
(See Scævola, Código Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 301-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:,

"A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall
such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child."

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alf eo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant violation of the express provisions
of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed,
without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

No. L-28032. September 24, 1986.*
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and
JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO,
PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
Succession; In reserva troncal, the successional rights of the relatives of the
praepositus within the 3rd degree are determined by, and subject to, the rules of
intestate succession; so as to exclude uncles and aunts of the descendant from the
reservable property by his niece or nephew.—That question has already been answered
in Padura vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and
nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half
blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary
property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and
nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews
and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same.—Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when
there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it
subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a
reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
Same; Same.—Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they
are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they
are related to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs.
Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and
applied.
Same; Same.—Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews
and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,
etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 51
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A.
386).
Same; Same.—We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and
nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
Same; Same.—Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus,
there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
different result should obtain simply because “the transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;” i.e., the property took a “detour” through
an ascendant—thereby giving rise to the reservation—before its transmission to the
reservatario.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the
following “Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise”:
“1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisca Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said defendant’s grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as
a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of
Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached hereto as Annex ‘A’
and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four
(4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which
parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165,
64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached
to this stipulation as Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’, and ‘B-2’.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the
afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children
in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his
estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached
hereto as Annexes ‘C’ and ‘C-1’, were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late
Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three
(3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without
issue, leaving his one-half (½) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land
above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who
received the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was subsequently
annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’, ‘B2’, ‘C’ and ‘C-
1’.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights
and interests in the parcels of land above-mentioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived
his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-
half (½) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance
from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the
other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the
laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her
said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half proindiviso
interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from
Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their
being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the
legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as
third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said
defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 52
Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of
said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven (7) parcels of
land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels
of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs’
share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted
upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and
preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all their claims
against each other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs’ share in the
rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the respective parties.”1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
“* * *. Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the court
holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled
to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (½) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of
the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are,
likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected
by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels
of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs’
share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly waived all
their claima against each other for damages including attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs’ share in the rentals, the
court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of
the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165,
T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of
all rents received by her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose
of determining the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their
shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED.”2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the
lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the
reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came. (811)”,
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to,
and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino,3 where the
reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line
of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also made
that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be
controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled
to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance
with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
“The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva troncal,
where the only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging
to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are
nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should
the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?
“* * *
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish commentators on
the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that the position of the
appellants is correct. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated
into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
“* * *
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 53
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved
to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no
further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer;
wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the
jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of
the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the
reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol.
20 March 1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino
vs. Florentino, supra).
“Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding
it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same
as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as
the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal
and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree
of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
“In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part
of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. * *
*.” (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Italics supplied) See also
Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary
intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for
immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. In other
words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios)

to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual
right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate
succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its
application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose
of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
“* * * creándose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino más bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo la
excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposición, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentals del Código en
materia de sucesión, en aquellos extremos no resueltos de un modo expreso,
y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de acción de la reserva que se crea.”
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code’s
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression
of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and
968-980).”
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as
aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded
from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related
to him within the same degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4
where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
“Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy,
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles,
first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as follows:
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
“Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.”
“Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent’s brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.”
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 54
“Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.”
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force
(R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
“Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.”
“Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.”
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of
the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces
and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.”
“* * *.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent’s
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. * * *”
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to
the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from
the descendant praepositus:
“* * *. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are
the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 55

reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Yap, J., took no part. Justice Paras was designated to sit in the First Division.
Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310)* * *.”
Judgment reversed and set aside.
To the same effect is Cano vs. Director of Lands5, where it was ruled that intestacy
proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final
decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva troncal identifies the reservatario and there are no other
claimants to the latter’s rights as such:

“The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property
from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista’s
successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista’s
estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from
which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista’s lifetime.
The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservista, the matter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest
in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the
reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As
already stated, that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does
not even answer for the debts of the latter. * * *.”

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant
under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should
obtain simply because “the transmission of the property was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva;”6 i.e., the property took a “detour” through an ascendant—
thereby giving rise to the reservation—before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-
appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and
the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.


G.R. Nos. 68843–44. September 2, 1991.*
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT
COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and
DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO, respondents.
Succession; Reserva troncal; Petitioners not innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith.—Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value,
xxx xxx The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an
affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the
properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards the subject
matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as
regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that
said affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry
of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. xxx xxx.
Same; Same; Property registration decree; Constructive notice of reservable character
of property.—It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in
question show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the
sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature
thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice
to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree.
Same; Same; Same; Obligation to annotate reservable character of property in the
Registry of Property.—Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person
obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry
of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor
(the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited
from another ascendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate
also. The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the
right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529,
which provides that: “The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned x x x.” (italics supplied)
Same; Same; Prescription; When cause of action commenced.—The respondent
appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private respondents
did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 56
death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the
reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third
degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or
of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor; Only when
the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the reserved
property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A, G.R, No. CV-01292–93, which affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna in the
consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561 and Civil Case No. SC-957.2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is summarized
as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of
properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of
land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of the complaint
in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who died on January 28? 1945; and
2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered lands
described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his
mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described
properties in an Affidavit entitled “Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo”
which provided, among others:
“I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo, he
tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.

“II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952, en la
Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minoria de edad sin dejar testamento alguno,”
“III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente alguno.
“IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo
y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
“V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
“VI. Que el finado ed morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes inmuebles
situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
“VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia abuela
Luisa Bautista.
“x x x,” (Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda de. Balantakbo sold the property
described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by
a deed attached as Annex “C" to the complaint. The same property was subsequently
sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December
30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and
assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of Deeds
of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The properties are
presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the
remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the properties
described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the
properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which
properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties
do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 57
all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another
brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover
the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject
to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the subject
matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the
same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the Balantakbos, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
“1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
to convey to the plaintiffs—
“a.) In Civil Case No. SC-956—the one-third (1/3) interest and ownership,
pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in paragraph three
(3) subparagraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of this decision;
“b.) In Civil Case No. SC-957—the one-seventh (1/7) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land described
in paragraph three (3), subparagraph 2, of pages two (2) and three (3)
of this decision;
“c.) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein
ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs Luisa,
Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-third (1/3) of
the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
“2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to account
for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the properties
herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said accounting and payment
of income being for the period from January 3, 1968 until date of
reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
“3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are e to pay
plaintiffs—
“a. One Thousand (P1 ,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses

“b. Two Thousand Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney’s fees.
“4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and
957.
“x x x” (p. 46, Rollo.)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the
court a quo in toto, The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the
appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition, before Us was filed on November 12,1984 with the petitioners assigning
the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent purchaser for
value and in good faith of the properties covered by certificates of title subject of
litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the reservable interest
of the reservee in the properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that ‘the cause of action of the plaintiffs (private
respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor of the
plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo, which the
appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for value. According
to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from the reservor (also called
reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of
their family consultant who found that there was no encumbrance nor any lien
annotated on the certificate of title covering the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo,
the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of
self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., as regards ds the subject matter of
Civil Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards
the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said
affidavit was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of
Deeds of the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit
clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to Raul
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 58
Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited from other
ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show
that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact
remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating
the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the
whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree
(formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
“SEC. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION.—Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.”
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712–713,
cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226–27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v.
CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both dated January 22,1980,
95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
“When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice
of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. , .
“Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise,
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant
of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts
which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. x x x”
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down that the
mere entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the certificate of title is
not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in the’
later six cases of Levin v, Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in Garcia v. C.A., et al., G.R.

Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing
doctrine in this jurisdiction,
‘That ruling was’ superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass,
91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary
registration, such as the registration of an attachment, levy upon execution, notice
of lis pendens, and the like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof
in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
“On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in case of
voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for value of registered
land becomes the registered owner, and, in contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate of title, the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid
deed of sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time he
surrenders or presents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title covering the land
sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done lies not
within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty bound to perform it.”
(See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with
the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable
character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of the
reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from Consuelo.
This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit “C") executed by Consuelo in favor
of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956,
as follows:
“xxx”
“That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the one-third
(1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue of the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated
December 10, 1945 and said portion in accordance with the partition above-
mentioned was adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited
after his death and this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any
nature or kind whasoever, x x x.” (p. 42, Rollo)
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 59
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no
such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of
the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of selfadjudication executed
by Consuelo and registered with the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind
them.
Moreover, the court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were
long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its
successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family
corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the properties
litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his
maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these
properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.” (italics supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that there is no
need to register the reservable character of the property, if only for the protection of
the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was suggested as early as the case
of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main
issue submitted for resolution therein was whether the reservation established by
Article 811 (now Art. 891 of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of
‘the relatives’ within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from
whom the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in
favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned,
without distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status
of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated therein:
“The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the
ascendant reservor’s right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon
the ascendant reservor’s death there are relatives having the status provided in
Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this
special order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them,
which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be determined. But
if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in
accordance with the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment

of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the
acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing
to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title
to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to afford to the
persons entitled to the reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the
reservor, which may make it ineffective x x x.” (p. 292, ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14,1926, 48 Phil. 601,
603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on
a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva
viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878,
September 13, 1913, 25 Phil. 295).
“Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third persons, Vicente
Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now register nor record in the
Registry of Deeds their reservable character; neither can he effect the fee simple,
which does not belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado,
who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was
made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he
remarked, Why, did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?’ Aside from
the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914,
that is, before or after the sale, it does not signify that he had any knowledge of
the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente Galang had
inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact that, by operation of law,
the son had inherited it from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far
as the record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to
acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason
that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no question raised in
regard thereto.”
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the
widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the
reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant
who inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another
descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right
reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code. This rule is
consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529,
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 60
which provides that: “The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey of
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned x x x.” (italics supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless
the registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or constructive), no third
persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the
private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not
commence upon the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but
upon the death of the reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives
within the third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title
of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the
reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire
the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third
degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89).
The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a right
of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can ‘bring a reivindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may
prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v, De Paz,
G.R. No. L-22601, October 28,1966,18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article
1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was
brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents’ cause of action has not
prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1 ,000.00) for actual litigation expenses
and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney’s fees is proper under Article 2208(2)
of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were compelled to go to court to recover
what rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to annotate
the reversable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.

No. L-12957. March 24, 1961.
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Succession; Reserva troncal; Reservor has legal title over property subject to a
resolutory condition.—In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion
over the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate the
same but subject to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the transferee are
revoked upon the survival of reservees at the time of death of the reservor.
Same; Eight of reservee is alienable, subject to a resolutory condition.—The reserva
instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came constitutes a real right which the reservee may
alienate and dispose of, although conditionally, the condition being that the alienation
would transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
reservor.
When reservee becomes exclusive owner.—-Upon the death of the reservor, there
being a surviving reservee, the reservable property passes in exclusive ownership to
the latter.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. Rosal, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void
the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to
appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental
Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants
the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees
disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made on April
20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was
made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose
of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had
never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that appellees, as owners, had
been in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of
affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951,
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 61
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a
public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by
Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased;
that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that
the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses
Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for
by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor
of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void,
and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in
question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone
surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs."
From the above decision the Sienes spouses interposed the present appeal, their
principal contentions being, f irstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368
of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling
the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that
Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he
had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral
records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death—the date of
which does not clearly appear of record—were left to his children as follows: Lot 8366
to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to
Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the
name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered
the property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs. A & A-1),
and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May
29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole
heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00, she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original
Certificate of Title No. 10275—which was in their possession—the latter refused, thus
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 62

giving rise to the filing of th£ corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. to a similar resolutory condition. The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs
The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8&9). within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang,
and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and the person obliged to reserve, died, Thus the former became the absolute owner of
thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made
(Exhs. 5 & 5-A). by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence
of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation o£ law from Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees—the Esparcia spouses—did not appeal
his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, therefrom.
it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to WHEREFORE, the appealed decision—as above modified—is affirmed, with costs, and
the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against
connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
Bengzon, Actg, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
In connection with. reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.
creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree Decision modified.
belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez
Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista
has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory
condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservista, the rights acquired by the
transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the
death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 PhiL 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil.
279).

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. Inasmuch as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still
alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former
in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject
matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject

No. L-29901. August 31, 1977.*
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of
the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Civil law; Succession; Settlement of estate; Requisites for reserva troncal to arise.—
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property
was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property
is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. In the
case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by
his mother, Consolacion de la Torre by operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre,
died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of “reserva troncal”, there is a gratuitous transfer
when the recipient does not give anything in return and it matters not that the property
is subject to prior charges, such as an order of the court imposing the payment of a
certain sum owed by the deceased.—As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted
with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, ‘The transmission is gratuitous or
by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.” It matters not
whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality
of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient;
and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return. x x x. It is
true that there is the order (Exh. “D”) of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which states in express terms x x x. But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil
Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and
Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and
testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No. 4816 dated
January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from
any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure
generosity, it-is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs,
in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 63
P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the
property to him.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the decedent’s last will and testament was never
probated may not be a bar to transmission of the estate where a partition agreement
was entered into which was based on the will itself.—It is easy to deduce that if the
Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for
the testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very
will itself could be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did
in their project of partition with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by
inheritance as a son of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter’s second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The cause of action of the reservees of a piece of
property subject to reserva troncal does not arise until the reservor dies.—It must be
remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees of the property in
question and their cause of action as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor,
Consolation de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their
complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time
to do so.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Fernandez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.
MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the
complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled “Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs.
Susana de la Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre.”
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy
Quio, he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias
Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first
marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 19311 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua’s widow, Consolacion de la

Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second
marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio
Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483)2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register
of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners
pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without
any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-
indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week’s time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la
Torre executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share
of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion
de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending
line except her brother and sisters.
In the “Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre”, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-
A, the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and Dominador and
Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua,
also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo3 (subsequently segregated as a
distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7889-A) on May 11, 1966 before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias Chua
but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter’s death, be declared as a
reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserva troncal
pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code. Private respondent as administratrix of
the estate of Consolacion de la Torre and the heirs of the latter traversed individually
the complaint of petitioners.4
On July 29, 1968, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
of petitioners. Hence this instant petition.
The pertinent provision on reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
“ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line from which said property came.”
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property
was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 64
gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue: (3) that the property
is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.5 In the
case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by
his mother, Consolacion de la Torre by operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the
petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisite of reserva
troncal—whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his
father, Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point the respondent Court
said:
“It appears from Exh. “3”, which is part of Exh. “D”, that the property in question,
was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously
but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees wore to pay the interest and
cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is
undeniable that the lot in question is not subject to a reserva troncal, under Art
891 of” the New Civil Code, and as such the plaintiffs complaint must fail.”
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court’s conclusion that the lot in
question is not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is,
As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, “The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.” It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making
it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent
Filipino commentator,6 “the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation.” It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father
Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It
is true that there is the order (Exh. “D”) of the probate Court in Intestate Proceeding
No. 4816 which states in express terms:
“2.—Se adjudicada por el presente a favor de Consolation de la Torre, viuda, mayor
de edad, y de su hijo, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residentes de San
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 65

Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F., como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within
estas propiadades: the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are
the petitioners herein.
14483
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399
La parcela de terreno conocida por Lote No. 399 del Catastro de la Carlota, Negros which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the
No. 11759, en partes equates pro-indiviso; por con la obligation de pagar a las petitioners herein are claiming as reservees of the property in question and their cause
Standard Oil Co. of New York la d-euda de P3,971.20, sus intereses, costas y of action as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre,
demos gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5800 de este Juzgado.” died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20
is imposed upon Consolation de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared
the Testate Proceeding No. 4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros
of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering
and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate
later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias
Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 This does not change the Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. As far as the deceased portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Jose Frias Chua is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous.
This being the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891 of SO ORDERED.
the New Civil Code.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz-Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
It is contended that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to
the respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of Decision set aside.
partition based on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim
that the supposed Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The
fact that the will was not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents’
answer.7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
7839A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931
of the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private
respondents’ brief, that the Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been
probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last Will and Testament
has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the testamentary heirs
to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made
the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition
with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a son of the
deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter’s second marriage.

According to the records, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any
issue. After his death his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-
indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property

[No. 6878. September 13, 1913.]
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner and appellant, vs. PABLO and BASILIO
SABLAN, opponents and appellees.
1. ESTATES; DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DECENDANT, TO
RESERVE THE PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE.—
Property which an ascendant inherits by operation of law from his descendant and
which was inherited by the latter f rom another ascendant of his, must be reserved by
the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the inheritance
proceeded, who are his father's brothers, because they are relatives within the third
degree, if they belong to the line whence the property proceeded, according to the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF PERSONS FOR WHOM SUCH PROPERTY IS RESERVED.—Since
the reservation does not imply coöwnership of any kind between the reservor and the
reservees, that is, between the ascendant who is the immediate heir of the person
from whom the inheritance proceeded and who is the actual owner of the property to
be reserved and the relatives within the third degree of such person, who are merely
in their turn and eventually his possible heirs in second place, if they outlive the heir
who .must make the reservation, such reservees, with only the expectation of
inheriting, are not in law entitled to act and be regarded as though they actually
participated in the ownership of the property to be registered by taking part or
pretending to take part in the application for registration which the reservor presents;
the fact being that with such expectation of inheriting, which is neither a real nor a
personal right, but at most a legitimate expectation of a right, they cannot be better
off than a mortgagee who has a real right to the property that his debtor attempts to
register, and yet the Land Registration Act (No. 496, sec. 19 b) only grants him the
right that the application of the mortgagor cannot be presented without his consent in
writing.
3. ID. ; ID. ; RIGHT OF ASCENDANT TO DISPOSE OF OR REGISTER THE PROPERTY
IN His OWN NAME.—The heir of real property who has beyond any doubt the rights of
using and enjoying it, and even of alienating it, is not prevented from himself alone
registering the title to the property he has inherited, merely because to his right of
disposal there is annexed a condition subsequent arising from the expectation of a
right, when the reservees who have that expectation of a right agreed thereto, provided
that, in accordance with the law, the reservable character of such property in their
favor be entered in the record.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration. George, J.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 66
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Francisco Dominguez, for appellant.
Crispin Oben, for appellees.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as
required by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance
of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of
Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other of 1 hectare 6 ares
and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard
and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September
22,1882. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1,
1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on
July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land
passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan—that is, two uncles german of Pedro
Sablan—appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things:
Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by
law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11,12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the applicant appealed
through a bill of exceptions. Registration was denied because the trial court held that
the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of
error), and denies that the lands which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved—a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan,
likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance
f rom his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been
adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his
brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code,
for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a
very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree
of blood relationship.
"The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister,
is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded."
(Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration—that is, by inheritance
from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of
law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or
relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria
Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake
of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question
have been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a
valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to be reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first
instance, but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that
"Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement
orcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be
reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and,
finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they,
had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superfluous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried
and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection
on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his
mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article
935 of the Civil Code: "In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the
deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals."
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of
these lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 67
case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrates any transfer of property
from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal
presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by
operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore
been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his
property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only
what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
"The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the
hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly
dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836." (Civil
Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be
reserved, because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all
that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested
party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free
disposal of her son.
Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be
admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by
operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired
by operation of law—that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was
acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignment- of error admissible—that the trial court failed to sustain
the renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant
attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The
appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the f ollowing
statement of hers at the trial:
"The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan died and was buried, his brother came
to my house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked
about making delivery of them" (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is "Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the f act
that Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered
to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved
in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really
belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignment of error sets up the defense of prescription of the right of action.
The appellant alleges prescription of the opponents' right of action f or requiring f
ulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the
right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribes in the time fixed in No. 2
of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to be reserved
by force of law has not been invoked." (Eighth allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law
are. Nor did she do so in first instance, where she says only the f ollowing, which is
quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law
to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those
who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking .that guaranty, for to those
who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time f or recording
it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for
seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that
the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing
in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of
the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed f or requiring the
applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing
the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved; but because that right of
action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property
required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 811 of
the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippines in December, 1889, and not by
virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July
14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811
of the Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was
such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive
legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the
country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the
Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of
action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require
of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for
the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 68
guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation
and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean
loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which
the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has
prescribed, the only thing to be determined in this appeal is the question raised in the
first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be
registered, not in the property registry established by the Mortgage Law, but in the
registry newly organized by Act No. 496. . But as there have slipped into the allegations
quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this
of the rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief digression on
the most essential points may not be out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one
of the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the
Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
"The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the
modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the
Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of
the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit."
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the
eighth day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil
Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
"Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a
second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the
first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have acquired from the
deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a
valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right
reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code.
In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of
the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother
contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain,

for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
"That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure
the right required to be reserved in the property ref er especially to the spouses who
contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the
right established in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same
in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set f orth in the chapter that deals with
inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968, which
heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved,
makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be
contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions
not to hold them applicable to that right."
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the
supreme court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in articles 977
and 978 for the rights required by law to be reserved to which said articles refer, are
applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle
exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they
are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July,
1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons
entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who
must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles
977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who
has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of
the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such
right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the
guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the
value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the
Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the
applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and
guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision
of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read
thus:
"The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved,
if they are of age; if minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 69
represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property
must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding
articles (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father"
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article
199 quoted, so that said article 168 reads thus:
"Legal mortgage is established:
"1. * * *
"2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obligated to reserve it."
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the
period of ninety days fixed f or the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require
the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be
reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it
should be noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days
fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the persons
entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who
must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the law reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting
in court the proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves
may demand fulfillment, etc., * * * applying, accord-ing to said article 199, to the
person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case
of article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be
instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of
the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has
elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they
are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by
prescription of the period for the exercise of this right of action by the persons in whose
favor the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, and enables
them to exercise it at any time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of
the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be
made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now

institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise
of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action
for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and
as. the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of
action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to
instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the
property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two
opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because
of this finding set forth in its decision:
"Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the
two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except
in the name of all of them in common." (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose
of, and recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or
complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the rights to use and
enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery
the direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct
has the first two rights of using and enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee
simple—that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after
the usufruct expires, will come into f full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
"What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?"
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title
belonging to the persons in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the
person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in
whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem
to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court
of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22,
1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 70
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points—the usufruct and
the fee simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but
become obscured in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out
two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep
what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be
maintained—that is, that the-surviving spouse (the person obligated by article 968 to
make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants
immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid.,
238.)
The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him
exclusively—use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is
inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within
the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should
be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and
scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights
that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in
reducing the ascendant heir to the condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of
the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it
does not have, according to the opinion that has been expressed in speaking of the
rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference
between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as
usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in
article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the
slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner
and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right
of usufruct in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any
act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the f orm prescribed in article 486 of
the Code itself, because he totally lacks the f ee simple. But the ascendant who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father or mother required
by article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they inherit itself, the
former from his descendant and the latter from his or her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor
the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever
of disposal or of recovery.

Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 968 to reserve
the right may dispose of the property itself:
"Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under
a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his
alienation thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do
so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the
alienation subsists (to subsist is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
"The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties
interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration."
In such case, the child or legitimate descendant of the first marriage in whose favor
the right is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long- as the
condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must
reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must
reserve the right should outlive all the persons in whose favor the right is reserved and
then there would be no reason f or the condition subsequent that they survive him,
and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in every way absolutely
effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be
reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon
a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease
to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to
the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving
spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants
of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendant
must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading,
"Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be
reserved," in these words:
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 71
"During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required
by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree,
after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an
expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit
that.expectation to their heirs.
"The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things
according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting
upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
"But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the
owner in fee simple of the property, he can .dispose of it in the manner provided in
articles 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Dirección
General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and
975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal
in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives
within the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article
811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that
the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the
property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article
109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the
condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
"The ascendant acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or
not there exist at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendant from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such
relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendant,
If they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it,
the ascendant may alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will
alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong
to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives
within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the
ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these
are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the
right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to
be reserved and they will acquire it and all the rest that has the same character in
Complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been
terminated by the death 61 the usufructuary." (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes
reservables, P304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has,
beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct He has, moreover, for the
reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the
property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition'. He has
the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and
have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine
owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is in no way, either actually,
constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no
title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that
is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of
aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is
reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of
even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be
null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30,
1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative
at the time he exercised the right, because in view of. the nature and scope of the right
required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even
become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter
vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in
whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights
inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the
third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring
a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act
of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree
of the descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited
to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside
a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise
have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to
the condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved
SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 72
cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law
requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the applicant has made of the
two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that
is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by
article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during
his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be
transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual and positive,
as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the
owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent
in ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to
usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under
a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to be reserved, merely because a
condition subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the
ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the
reservation must be made agree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in
the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the
vendor:
"The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions." (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he
has once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a
condition subsequent annexed—that the alienation the purchaser may make will be
terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:
"Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the
right to recover the thing sold: with ;the obligation to comply with article 1518, and
whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by
repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this
condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register
his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged—that is to say, the latter
with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows very well from the title entered in
the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more
 SUCCESSION Case No. 5 P a g e | 73

certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in
whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The
purposes of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make
the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more powerf ul and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio,
eadem legis dispositio.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and
declare that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of
land which are the subject matter of the application, recording in the registration the
right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special finding as to costs.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed; registration ordered.