PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA

F. LLORENTE, respondents

FACTS:
Lorenzo N. Llorente (now deceased) was an enlisted serviceman of
the United States Navy. Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as "Paula") were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. In 1943,
Lorenzo was then admitted to United States citizenship, and a Certificate of
Naturalization was issued in his favor. Upon the liberation of the Philippines
by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife in the Philippines. And there he discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. With this, Lorenzo refused to
forgive Paula and live with her so, they drew a written agreement to the effect
that:
(1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part
of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily
maintenance and support would be suspended;
(2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and
(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully.
The said agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized
by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. In 1951, Lorenzo returned to the US and
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego.
In the same year, the Superior Court of the State of California, found
all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce which after a year, became final. Lorenzo then returned to the
Philippines and there he married Alicia F. Llorente, herein respondent, who
apparently had no knowledge of the first marriage contracted by Lorenzo.
For 25 years, they lived together as husband and wife and produced 3
children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament which was
notarized by a Notary Public, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. In 1983,
Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed
Special Administratrix of his estate.
It was first denied for the reason that he was still alive that time.
However, finding that the will was duly executed, the RTC admitted the will
to probate. But in 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo
died. In the same year, Paula filed with the same court a petition to
administer Lorenzo’s estate in her favor contending: (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various properties were acquired
during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in
favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property.
Alicia then filed for the administration of the estate. However, without
terminating the testate proceedings, the RTC gave due course to Paula’s
petition and found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo
Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato in Manila is likewise void and not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour.
The Court declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente as void and declared Paula as the conjugal partner and entitled to
one-half of their conjugal properties. Paula Llorente was appointed the legal
administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo.
Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. On appeal,
it affirmed the decision of the RTC but with modification declaring Alicia as
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during their 25 years of cohabitation.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the foreign divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo is valid.
2. Whether the will executed by Lorenzo is valid.

RULING:
1. Yes. Before the court proceeds as to the succession to the estate
of the decedent Lorenzo, the VALIDITY OF THE FOREIGN
DIVORCE must first be resolved.
In Van Dorn case, it was held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces and aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Also,
as the Court held in Quita v. CA, it cited that once proven that respondent
was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner,
the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him. And in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the
Court recognized that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In sum, the Court upheld the divorce obtained by Lorenzo Llorente
from his first wife valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity, the effects of which (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the RTC.
2. Yes. In resolving the VALIDITY OF THE WILL left by Lorenzo, the
Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution." (underscoring ours)
 The clear intention of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second
wife and children is shown in the will he executed. And since he was a
foreigner, he was definitely not covered by our laws on “family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity.” The will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required, by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, it was duly probated.
Congress did not intend to extend the systems of legitimes to the
succession of foreign nationals. It specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent’s national law.
HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D.
ORENDAIN, vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOÑA
MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died in Manila,
leaving a last will and testament. On September 23, 1960, the will was
admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila.
At the time of her death, the decedent had no compulsory or forced
heirs and wad completely free to dispose of her properties, as provided for
in her will. Some of Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her
properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will. The Supreme
Court previously held, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
that Clause 10 of the will does not violate Article 870 of the Civil Code, with
regard to the first twenty-year period.
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the
estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
Four decades later, herein petitioners, who were mentioned in Clause
24 of the will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate which had
been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 867 and
870 of the Civil Code. The RTC held that while the prohibition of the
disposition under clause 10 shall be void after the lapse of the twenty-year
period, clauses 12, 13, and 14 is not affected and neither will it be voided,
and as such, the permanent trust established under the aforementioned
clauses remains to be valid for its express purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether the trusteeship over the properties left can be dissolved applying
articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes, it can. The Supreme Court held that the trust can only be upheld only
insofar as the twenty-year period is concerned. The Supreme Court had
previously voiding Clause 10 as the twenty-year period had not yet lapsed at
the time.
Thus, at present, there appears to be no more argument that the trust
created over the properties of the decedent should be dissolved as the
twenty-year period has, quite palpably, lapsed. intestacy should apply as the
decedent did not institute an heir therefor. Article 782, in relation to
paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides:
“Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by
the provision of a will or by operation of law.
xxxx
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
xxxx
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all
the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession
shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator
has not disposed;
x x x”
The RTC’s application of paragraph 4, Article 1013 of the Civil Code to
establish a perpetual trust is erroneous, as the article is among the Civil Code
provisions on intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a
decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this article, the
allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property
inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession.
The trust on the testatrix’s properties must be dissolved and this case
remanded to the lower court to determine the following:
1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the
perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been
disposed of as yet; and
2. The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of
the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

Seangio vs. Reyes , G.R. Nos. 140371–72. November 27, 2006.
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of
the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner
Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition contending
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2)
the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she
is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for
cause.
A petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-
A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pagiisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang
mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay
naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng
masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio
labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na
ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim
siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit
ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at
kanya asawa na si M erna de los Reyes sa China Bangking
Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng
 babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga
may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking. At ikinagalit ko pa rin
ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng
Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si
Virginia. Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng
anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si
Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana. Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod
ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal on the ground that the
document does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
Also according to them, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance
by the decedent (of Alfredo-eldest son),that all other compulsory heirs were
not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is
preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into
the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for
probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending
that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a
determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents
question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4)
the rule on preterition did not apply because Segundo’s will did not constitute
a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings: the will clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not
being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
 Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there was Maltreatment caused by Alfredo to be a
sufficient cause of disinheritance?
(2) Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will and should be probated.
(3) Whether there was preterition.
RULING:
1. The Court held in the affirmative.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that
the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor
shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were
stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents,
taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 919 The following shall be sufficient causes for
the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well
as illegitimate:
XXX
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the
child or descendant;
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir
to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo.
2. The Court also held in the affirmative.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must
be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come
across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand
of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. It is only when the intention
of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
The Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as
Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the
form of a holographic will.
3. There was NO preterition. The Court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.

Therefore, the RTC should have allowed the holographic will to be probated.
It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA
GR no. 174489 April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled “Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala”
(Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. Childless and without
any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa and his wife Corazon F. Laxa, and to their
children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa. Lorenzo was the
nephew of Paciencia and she treated him as her own son. In the same year
that she made her will, Paciencia went to the USA and lived with Lorenzo
and his family until her death in January 1996.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pamgpanga for probate proceedings and
for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. Antonio Baltazar
opposed the petition, alleging that the subject properties should belong to
Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. On September 26,
2000, petitioners asked the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on
the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally
incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution, that she was forced to
execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the
signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature
to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia
did not intend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed
an Opposition and Recommendation reiterating their opposition to the
appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for
the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
Rosie Mateo, one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to
as “magulyan” or forgetful, because she would sometimes leave her wallet
in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later, hence she was mentally
incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition and disallowing the
notarized will of Paciencia Regala. The trial court gave considerable weight
to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed
the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of
mind to have testamentary capacity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of
the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s
conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will.
It ratiocinated that “the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person
mentally unsound so as to render Paciencia unfit for executing a Will.
Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to
overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no
concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that
Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
W//N Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and
testament for having been forgetful (NEGATIVE)
W/N the authenticity and due execution of the Notarial Will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate (AFFIRMATIVE)
HELD:
Besides the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there
is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On
the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s testimony as
to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
house and voluntarily executed the Will. The state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As
provided under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or un shattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time
of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
Furthermore, Rosie’s conclusion that Paciencia was “magulyan” was only
based on her personal assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpin’s testimony as
to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing
witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to
great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.
Moreover, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners as per
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was
not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who
opposes the probate of the will, but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains
the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval. Furthermore, The Supreme Court is convinced that Paciencia was
aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act.
Lastly, Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether
the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are enshrined in Articles
805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In the present case, a careful
examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on
the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will
in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In
fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will
may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
Remedios Nuguid, petitioner and appellant, vs. Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, oppositors and appellees.
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died without any descendants, legitimate or illegitame,
leaving only her legitimate parents Felix and Paz Nuguid and her six
legitimate siblings, namely, Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes
and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. A year after, Remedio filed for probate
and letters of administration before the CIF a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario 11 years before her death. This was opposed by the
parents of Rosario on the ground that being compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line, they were illegally preterited by virtue
of the institution of petitioner as the universal heir of the deceased. The court
dismissed the petition and ruled that the will is null and void hence intestacy
of the estate of the deceased is created. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the holographic will executed by the deceased is void
RULING:
AFFIRMATIVE. The SC held that Article 854 of the Civil Code states that the
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x x x”
Here, the deceased left no descendants but only ascendants—her parents
now the oppositors who are clearly omitted from the will depriving them of
their legitime and leaving only petitioner Remedios as the universal heir.
However, the oppositors were not disinherited. Nothing in the will stated of
such disinheritance. The SC held that this is a clear case of preterition and
pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, the nullification of such institution
of universal heir—without any other testamentary disposition in the will—
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. However, Article 854
does not suggest that the mere institution of universal heir in a will void
because of preterition and would give the heir so instituted a share in the
inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to
such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies
apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Here, since there is
no other provision in the will except the institution of petitioner as universal
heir. The entire will is null and intestate succession ensues.
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG CARMELITA
JUGO, Respondents.
Facts:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will in the presence of three witnesses, who
in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of
each other and the Notary Public.
In the said Will, the testator appointed petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno
as his sole executor of his estate. It is stated in the Will that the testator was
legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate
children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from
his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife. It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and Sofia J.
Nepomuceno contracted a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
Victoria, Tarlac. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal
wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate
and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads
"Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter
Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and
properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from
my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was legally
married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons
and justifications known fully well by them;
"Art IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one
Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to may love
and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the
past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and
consent, did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and
in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy
bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage;"
 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the CFI. 1975, the legal wife of
the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and
improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that
- at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already
very sick and
- That petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the
testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
CFI denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952
until his death, the Will’s admission to probate will be an idle exercise
because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions
is evident.
CA, The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that
the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article
739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Contention of petitioner: Even if the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article
739 were applicable, the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the
proper court in a separate action brought by the legal wife for the specific
purpose of obtaining a declaration of the nullity of the testamentary provision
in the Will in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedly guilty
of adultery or concubinage.
Contention of Respondent: The fact that the last Will and Testament itself
expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship
between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself
initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
civil status of the testator. Respondents also submit that the admission of the
testator of the illicit relationship between him and the petitioner put in issue
the legality of the devise
Issue:
whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
Ruling:
Supreme Court Agrees with the respondent Court. The general rule is
that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is
expressed thus, Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary
provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document
and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution."
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all,
the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in
such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the
will.
Exception to this rule:
cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A
will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
(Nuguid v. Nuguid 17 SCRA 449)
Furthermore, as correctly stated by the Respondent Court, If the case
were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained, in the
event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case
will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity
or nullity of the will. Result. waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that
we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of
the will in question.
- Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
"The following donations shall be void
 (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same

criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and

ascendants, by reason of his office.
"In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity
may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt
of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides

"The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations

inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions."
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also no dispute that
the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship
for 22 years until his death.
As to the contention of good faith by Sofia Nepomuceno, the records
do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith.
- First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on
its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and
petitioner, the devisee.
- Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her
alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led
private respondents to present contrary evidence.
Such evidence are as follows:
- The secrecy of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in
a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there
was nothing to hide from, why the concealment?
 - Petitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when they were
still both single.
- The fact that petitioner broke off from Martin Jugo in 1923 is by itself
conclusive demonstration that she knew that the man she had openly
lived for 22 years as man and wife was a married man with already two
children.
- Having admitted that she knew the children of respondent Rufina
Gomez, is it possible that she would not have asked Martin Jugo
whether or not they were his illegitimate or legitimate children and by
whom? That is un-Filipino.
- Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the
deceased testator, is it possible that she would not have known that
the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and Carmelita Jugo was
respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents
of Martin and that of respondent Rufina Gomez were just a few meters
away?
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the
properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.

Facts:
1. Adoracion Campos died, leaving her father petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.

2. Eleven months after, respondent Paguia filed a petition for the

reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, allegedly
executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

3. It was also alleged that the deceased was an American Citizen at

the time of her death and that the will was made in accordance with
the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. and that said will was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.

4. Petitioner filed an opposition for the reprobate of the will on the

ground that it was forged. Later, however, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating
that he "has been able to verify the veracity of the will. Petitioner
also filed a manifestation confirming that the withdrawal of the
opposition was his voluntary act and deed.

5. Petitioner suddenly moved that the reprobate of the will be

dismissed arguing that his withdrawal of the opposition was secured
through fraudulent means. The trial court allowed the reprobate of
the will. Meanwhile, petitioner Campos died and was replaced by
herein petitioner Cayetano, the executrix of Hermogenes’ will.

6. Petitioner instituted the instant petition arguing that Hermogenes

was divested of his legitime which is reserved by law for him.
Issue:
WON Hermogenes was divested of his legitime which is reserved by
Philippine law for him.
Ruling:
No. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, the law which governs
Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for
legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply
because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of
Bellis v. Bellis wherein it was ruled that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.

ROSA K. KALAW v. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA

Facts:
On September 1, 1971, Gregorio K. Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his
deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic
Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, Rosa K. Kalaw
opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic will contained
alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by
the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
Rosa Kalaw claims that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given
effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
Respondent Judge denied the probate.
Gregorio moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or
insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will
would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration
was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article
814 of the Civil Code being, clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for
interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the
Order dated November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, Rosa filed this
Petition for Review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix, should be probated.
Held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made
by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature,
the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only
one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir
with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in
the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as first
written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because
she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such
insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which
affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not
the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the
erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
FACTS:

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto,
and the private respondents Panfilo and Felino Maloto. Believing that the
deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) for the
settlement of the estate.

Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an extrajudicial settlement

of Adriana's estate. They agreed to divide the estate into four equal parts
which the trial court approved.

Sometime in March 1967, Atty. Palma, a former associate of Adriana's

counsel, claimed to have found a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN," dated January 3, 1940, purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana.

In the will, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will,
Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable
shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received. The will likewise
gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the
petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor. Thus, they filed a motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will.

When the trial court denied their motion, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court. The petition was
dismissed and they were advised that a separate proceeding for the probate
of the alleged will would be appropriate.

Significantly, after investigation, the appellate court found that the will was
allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de
Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted
itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated
that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had,
nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. There is no doubt as to the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana Maloto.

RULING:

NEGATIVE. A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or the

intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical act. Art. 830. No will shall
be revoked except in the following cases: xxx

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the

intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled,
or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the
testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in
accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of
its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court.

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is
coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative
that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in
the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be

conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical
act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express
direction.

There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements.

For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was
not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in
her presence. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the
burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his
testimony on this point is double hearsay.
On the argument that the same is already barred by res adjudicata, the Court
ruled that it finds no application in the present controversy. For one, there is
yet no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will
is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736,
although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana.
As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with
respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent.
After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a
will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something
which cannot be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate
proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no
will.

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT

OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents
Succession; Wills; Holographic Wills; Probate Proceedings; The
grounds enumerated in the Civil Code and Rules of Court for the
disallowance of wills are exclusive; Issues in a petition to admit a holographic
will to probate.—Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides the cases
in which wills shall be disallowed. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New
Civil Code enumerates the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are
exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition
to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1)
whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the
execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
FACTS
The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie
Sand. Petitioner Spouses Ajero instituted the special proceeding for the
allowance of the holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,
fraud, or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose
of her estate by will.
Respondent Sand opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent’s
holographic will to probate. It found that: based on the testimony of 3
witnesses, the will was written in the decedent’s handwriting; based on
respondent Sand’s own testimony, decedent was of sound mind; and that
the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper
pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the probate.
It found that the will failed to comply with Art. 813 and 814 of the NCC. Thus,
this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the will should be disallowed.
RULING: NEGATIVE (will should be allowed). SC Held:
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides the cases in which wills
shall be disallowed. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code
enumerates the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are
exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition
to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:
1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law;
3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed; and
4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts
of the decedent.
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
Art. 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Art. 814.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes
and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and
814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810). This separation and distinction
adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Art. 10—and
not those found in Art. 813 -814 —are essential to the probate of a
holographic will.
Constantino Acain v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-72706. October 27, 1987.
FACTS:
 In May 1984, Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain on the premise that the latter died testate and
instituted his brothers and sisters as his heirs. Said will was executed in Feb.
1960, written and Bisaya w/ an English translation. This was submitted and
no objection was raised. In the disposition of the property, it was stated that
all his shares shall be given to his brother, Segundo, and if he pre-deceases
Nemesio, it will be given to his children.
Since Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio, the former’s children now
claim to be his heirs. This was opposed by Virginia, the adopted child of
Nemesio and his widower, Rosa, on the grounds that he is merely a universal
heir and that the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
WON the private respondents have been preterited
RULING:
Only the adopted daughter had been preterited. Art. 854 provides that
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
However, such provision does not apply to the widow because though she
is a compulsory heir, she is neither a descendant nor an ascendant of the
testator. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the
direct line.
As regards to Virginia, her adoption made her a legal heir of the
adopter, Nemesio. Per Art. 39 of PD 603, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. Hence,
this is regarded as a preterition of the legally adopted child.
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will
in RTC-Makati, Branch 61. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that
he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named
executrix, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On February 16, 1996, Judge
Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. Dr. De
Santos died 10 days later.
On April 3, 1996, Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming
that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr.
De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance
of letters of administration in his name.
On the other hand, Phillips, the will’s designated executrix, filed a motion for
the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, she
moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was
required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said
court still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. Meanwhile,
Phillips, who withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary,
refiled a petition for the same with the Makati RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343, assigned to Branch 65.
Upon Phillip's motion, Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order,
dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special administrator of Dr. De
Santos's estate. Petitioner sought to intervene in M-4343 and to set aside
the appointment of Phillips as special administrator.
He reiterated that he was the nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to
know of the existence of M-4343 only by accident; that the probate
proceedings in M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still pending;
that Phillips misdeclared the true worth of the testator's estate; that Phillips
was not fit to be the special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner
should be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of M-4343 to
Branch 61, on the ground that it is related to the case before Judge Gorospe
of RTC Branch 61. It appears, however, that in M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
denied on August 26, 1996 petitioner's motion for intervention.
Petitioner brought this matter to the CA which upheld the denial of petitioner's
motion for intervention. Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated
Sep 4, 1996, returning the records of M-4343 to Branch 65.
The order states that there is no related case involving the ESTATE OF
DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending before Branch 61; there is,
however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76
for the Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as M-4223 which
was already decided on 16 Feb 1996 and has become final; after it became
final, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn after
Branch 61 ruled that the motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78, and movant withdrew her motion
and filed M-4343; Octavio de Santos Maloles II filed a MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION before M-4223 and this was already DENIED likewise for
the same grounds that the matter is for a separate case to be filed under
Rule 78.
Initially, Judge Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that it would be
improper for Branch 65 to hear and resolve M-4343, considering that the
probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered the
transfer of the records back to the latter branch.
However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case to
expedite the proceedings: Considering the refusal of the Hon. Gorospe of
Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said
branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and
must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and
distributed as per Order dated 23 Sep 1996, Branch 65 shall take cognizance
of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that
the Makati RTC is but one court. On Nov 4, 1996: Judge Abad Santos
granted petitioner's motion for intervention.
Phillips’ MFR denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA which set aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner
had not shown any right/interest to intervene in M4343.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a right to intervene.
HELD:
NO.
Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the
nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is
material and direct.
In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the proceedings before
Branch 65, the CA held that Maloles’ claim to being a creditor of the estate
is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the
opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not
supported by evidence; the opposition must come from one with a direct
interest in the estate or the will, and Maloles has none.
Moreover, the ground cited that the executrix has deliberately misdeclared
the true worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her
competency to act as executor.
Rule 76, sec 2 requires only an allegation of the probable value and
character of the property of the estate. The true value can be determined
later on in the course of the settlement of the estate. Rule 79, sec 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration.
Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors,
or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for
letters of administration with the will annexed.
Under this provision, "interested person" is one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental
or contingent. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos,
he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator.
It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Nor does
he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased.
Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent
upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
As stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: The choice of his executor is a precious
prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of
his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should
desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out
his wishes in the disposal of his estate.
The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to
dispose. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or
fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.
Maninang vs CA

Facts:

• Clemencia Aseneta died single at the age of 81 in a hospital. She left

a holographic will wherein it stated that all of her personal properties
will be left only to one person who is Soledad Maninang and did not
left anything to the alleged adopted son, Bernardo Aseneta.

• After sometime, Soledad Maninang then filed a petition for probate of

will with CFI. A month after, Bernardo instituted intestate proceedings
and claimed that he is the sole heir of Clemencia. After knowing of the
existence of the probate of will, Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the
testate case on the ground that the will is null and void as the
compulsory heir was preterited.

• In response to this, Soledad contended that in case of probate of will,

the court is limited to the examination of the extrinsic validity and what
happened to Bernardo is a valid disinheritance and not preterition. CFI
ruled in favor of Bernardo and dismissed the testate case.

• A motion for reconsideration was filed however it was denied. The

matter was then raised to CA through certiorari but still the petition was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Bernardo was validly disinherited and not preterited

Ruling:

It cannot be determined because the testate proceedings was dismissed

and the court ordered that the probate of the will should continue.

Preterition ‘consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

While Disinheritance, in turn, ‘is a testamentary disposition depriving any

compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
Disinheritance is always, ‘voluntary’, preterition, upon the other hand, is
presumed to be ‘involuntary.

Bernardo cited 2 cases, Nuguid and Balanay Cases to bolster his argument
but the Supreme court held that these cases are the exception rather than
the rule.

The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before
probate because “practical considerations” so demanded. Moreover, for the
parties in the Nuguid case, the “meat of the controversy” was the intrinsic
validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case “shunted aside the question
of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate.” Not so in the case
before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and
a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.

In this case, due to the dismissal of the probate of the holographic will, yhe
determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion that Bernardo has been preterited cannot be
clearly established.
GONZALES VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
FACTS:
Benito Legarda Y De La Paz, son of Benito Legarda Y Tuason died and was
survived by his widow, Filomena Roces and their seven children: Beatriz,
Rosario, Teresa, Filomena, Benito, Alejandro, and Jose. The real properties
left by the deceased were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita and the heirs of his deceased son Benito.
Filomena one his children also died intestate leaving a sole heir, her mother
Filomena Roces who subsequently extrajudicially adjudicated to herself the
properties inherited from her daughter. Thereafter, Mrs. Legarda executed
two handwritten identical documents disposing some of the properties she
inherited from her daughter to her 16 grandchildren (children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose). The properties left by his husband were likewise
partitioned among her and the 6 surviving children.
Mrs. Legarda later on died and her will as admitted to probate before the CFI
and it was affirmed by the CA. In the testate proceeding, Beatrix, filed a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother’s estate properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter Filomena on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which be inherited by Filomena’s three
sisters and three brothers and not by the 16 grandchildren (children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose). This was opposed by the administrator Benito.
However, the lower court dismissed the motion filed by Beatrix. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties were reservable properties under
Article 891 of the Civil Code
RULING:
AFFIRMATIVE.
The SC held that Article 891 of the Civil Code states that: “ART. 891. The
ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.”
Here, Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of
her estate.
The reservor cannot make a disposition Mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. Article 891 clearly
indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the
six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should
be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the
reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be
allowed.
The reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of
whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservoir. The reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda’s
death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and stillare) reservees
belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not
lose their reservable character.
The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva truncal and not in accordance with the
reservor’s holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda’s estate. This being the case, the holographic will is void.