Bayot vs CA G.R. No.

155635
G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:

Vicente Bayot, a Filipino, was married to Rebecca, an

American, in Muntinlupa.

In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican

Republic, ordering the dissolution of the marriage.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity,

docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of

the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for
support for her and her daughter Alix.

On 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds

of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by
the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil

Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders.
According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses
is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for

Issue:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in

Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican

Republic is valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce

was an American, and was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when

she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a
Filipino citizen by force of affirmation by the DOJ Secretary
in 1995 will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in
1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

Van Dorn v Romillo

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines

while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong and
established their residence in the Philippines. In 1982, the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States. The
petitioner remarried, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking

that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of
her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.
Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner

and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
Yes. the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines. As to
Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American
Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. The divorce is
likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent

Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision
of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Catalan vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married

respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America
and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38
years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16,
1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of
Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-
interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has legal personality to file the

petition for nullity of marriage between Orlando and
Merope

RULING:

Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the

nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same. The case was remanded to the trial court for its
proper disposition.
Llorente v. CA
G.R. No. 124371
November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

Facts:
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente, both Filipinos, were married in
1937. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo
departed for the United States, leaving his wife in the
Philippines. After some time, Lorenzo became a citizen of
the United States. When he came back to the Philippines, he
found out that his wife, Paula, was living with his brother
and that the two had a child together. Lorenzo then
returned to the United State and filed for divorce, which was
then deemed to be final.

Lorenzo was remarried Alicia Llorente, a Filipino, in Manila.

They were married for 25 years, producing three children.
Before Lorenzo's death, he executed a last will and
testament, giving all his properties to Alicia and their three
children. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. Paula filed for a
petition to be the administrator of Lorenzo’s property,
contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.
Issue:
WON Paula Llorente is correct in saying that she is the
surviving spouse of Lorenzo and therefore should have a
part of the latter’s properties.

Ruling:
No. Lorenzo Llorente had become a United States citizen
long before his divorce from Paula, his marriage to Alicia,
the execution of his will, and his death. The divorce granted
to him in the United States is binding in the Philippines.
Therefore, he is no longer bound by marriage to Paula.

PILAPIL
vs.
IBAY-SOMERA,

G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS:

The Petitioner, Pilapil a Filipino citizen, was married in

Germany to private respondent Geiling, a German national.
Geiling obtained a divorce in a German court on the ground
of failure of marriage.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce

decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against
petitioner alleging that, she had an affair with two different
men while their marriage subsisted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a

complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce decree.

HELD:

No. Since Geiling's divorce decree in Germany was valid, and

is recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. Thus, Geiling ni longer have a
legal standing to commence the adultery case.

Article 16

Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki;

GR No. 205487; November 12, 2014

Facts: Suzuki, a Japanese National, and Kang, a Korean

Nation, made a Deed of Absolute Sale covering a
condominium unit and Parking Slot in Mandaluyong City.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to
deliver the

titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in

possession of

Alexander Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer, for safekeeping.

Despite

several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the

documents. Suzuki verified

the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City

Registry of Deeds and for the protection of his interests,
then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and demanded
the delivery. Orion, (through

Perez, however, refused to surrender the titles, and citing

that the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is
null and void. They argued that Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the
consent of both spouses.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in

favor of Suzuki is null and void.

Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that all matters

concerning the title and

disposition of real property are determined by what is

known as the lex

loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
title can pass

from one person to another. Accordingly, matters concerning

the title and disposition of real property

shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining

to the conjugal

nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean

law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the

South Korean

law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely

attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic
of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient. Therefore, the
petition is denied.
BELLIS vs BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas when he died, he made

two wills in the Philippines, first, disposing his Texas

properties, second, disposing his Philippine properties. His

distributed of states are divided to his first

wife, recognized illegitimate children, and to his seven

surviving children by his first and second wife.

Petitioners filed their respective oppositions to the project

of partition on the ground that they

were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,

therefore, compulsory heirs of the

deceased.

ISSUE:

1. Whether such illegitimate children of the deceased be

entitled to successional rights.

2. Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine

laws.
RULING:

1. No, under Texas law there are no compulsory heirs. Under

Civil Code of the Philippines,

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is

subject to the law of the country where it is

stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with

respect to the order of succession and to

the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity

of testamentary provisions, shall be

regulated by the national law of the person whose

succession is under consideration, whatever may be

the nature of the property and regardless of the country

wherein said property may be found.

2.Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should

govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore answer
the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since the law
of Texas was never proven, the doctrine
of processual presumption was applied. Hence, SC assumed
that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which upholds
the nationality rule. Renvoi doctrine is not applicable
because there is no conflict as to the nationality and
domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a resident
of Texas. So even if assuming the law of Texas applies
the domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because
his domicile (the place where you intend to return) is Texas.

Fullido vs Grilli

Facts:

Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot from her

parents which was registered in her name. On the said
property, they constructed a house, which was funded by
Grilli. Upon completion, they maintained a common-law
relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was on vacation
in the Philippines twice a year. In 1998, Grilli and Fullido
executed a contract of lease, to define their respective rights
over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among
others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot,
registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50)
years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty (50)
years upon its expiration in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and
that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling,
donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written
consent of Grilli. Their harmonious relationship turned sour
after 16 years of living together. Both charged each other
with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave the
common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido
demanding that she vacate the property, but these were
unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction against Fullido before the MCTC.

Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own
lot based on the contract of lease and the MOA because
those documents were null and void for being contrary to
the Constitution, the law, public policy, morals and customs;
that the MOA prevented her from disposing or selling her
own land, while the contract of lease favoring Grilli, a
foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a
period of fifty (50) years, and, upon termination, was
automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years.

Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not

question the validity of the said contracts in the present
ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for
annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is confronted with
the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a
summary action of unlawful detainer.

The MCTC dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could
not be ejected from their house and lot. The MCTC opined
that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to
it by supervising its construction. The RTC reversed and set
aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli
had the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot
by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties.

The CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in

an ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be
the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of
the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA and the
contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of
the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial
admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of
physical possession.

Issue:

Can patently null and void contracts be a basis of an

ejectment order?
Held:

No. A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one

which lacks, absolutely either in
fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are
essential for its validity. It is one which has no force and
effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been
entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against
or in favor of anyone. Quod nullum est nullum producit
effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states
that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the
right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void
or inexistent contract.

A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court

did not hesitate to set aside a void contract even in an action
for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, which
involves an action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners
therein raised a defense that the subject land was already
sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected
their defense and held that the contract of sale was void
because the agent did not have the written authority of the
owner to sell the subject land.
Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary
action for unlawful detainer because, precisely, void
contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the
source of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not
be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court
proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that
must be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease
contract and MOA are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Renvoi Doctrine - The Renvoi Doctrine is a legal doctrine

which applies when a court is faced with a conflict of law
and must consider the law of another state, referred to as
private international law rules. This can apply when
considering foreign issues arising in succession planning and
in administering estates

Domicile is a legal term used to refer to the permanent or

legal address (place or country) of an individual.

Following the principle that every natural person should

have a domicile, once a person is born, he or she assumes
the legal domicile of his father or mother. In a case where
the child born is considered to be legitimate, he or she
assumes his or her father's domicile.
Generally, there are three kinds of domicile: domicile of
origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law.

At birth a person acquires a domicile of origin, almost always

that of his father. If the father is deceased or a child is born
out of wedlock, the domicile is that of his mother. Most
people possess a domicile of choice, usually established by
voluntary physical presence at the place where domicile is
claimed; presence by reason of compulsion (e.g.,
imprisonment) usually is not sufficient. If a person claims a
place as a home but is not residing there, he must prove an
intent to make the place a home. Persons who lack the legal
capacity to acquire a domicile of their own possess domicile
by operation of law. The prime example is minor children
whose domicile is usually that of the father. Traditionally, the
domicile of a married woman was that of her husband as
long as she lived with him.
Aznar vs Garcia

Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York,

migrated to California where he resided and consequently
was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years
to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country, he had always
considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted

an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged
natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under
Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied,
the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that
Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of
Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other
hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear
under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the
deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of
California on the matter. Under California law, there are no
compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should

apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more

successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect
that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s

outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California

domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the

California Civil code States that “if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed
by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his

domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is

remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition
be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Hasegawe vs Kitamura

Summary:
Petitioner Nippon entered into an Independent Contractor
Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese
national permanently residing in the Philippines, wherein
respondent was to
extend professional services to Nippon for a year and he was
assigned as project manager of the STAR Project of the PH
Government. Nearly a year later, Hasegawa, the general
manager of
Nippon, informed respondent that his ICA will no longer be
renewed. After failed negotiations, he filed this complaint.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, contending that the ICA had been perfected in
Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals.
Issue: WON the complaint for jurisdiction contending that
the Independent Contractor Agreement had been perfected
in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals
holds ground.

Ruling:
No. The Court denied the petition, ruling that the issue in
this case is jurisdiction over subject-matter, but the grounds
asserted by the petitioners lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus and state of the most significant relationship rule
are make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, and
are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law.
Furthermore, they have not yet pointed out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and ours. Accordingly, the RTC is
vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil
case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by
petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate.

Doctrine:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding
is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes
and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law,
and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions:

• Where can or should litigation be initiated? (Jurisdiction)

• Which law will the court apply? (Choice of Law?

• Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

(Enforcement)

believed, would be more convenient to defendant

corporation as its principal office is located in the
Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses
would be readily available and entail less expenses in terms
of legal services."

Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in

the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent
documents in relation to its business would be available in
its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and employees
who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia
could most likely also be found in the Philippines. Thus, it is
unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather
engage this civil suit before Malaysian courts. Our courts
would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and,
ultimately, to dispense" in this case against petitioner. Also,
petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger
that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and the
foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.

FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Del socorro vs Van Wilsen

Facts:

The Petitioner, Del Socorro, and the respondent, Van Wilse

contracted marriage in Holland and had a son.
Unfortunately, their marriage ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home to the
Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to

provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).[7] However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and

remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have
been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality... of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.

On 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a

complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support
his minor child with... petitioner.[13] Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.[14] Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an... information for the crime charged against
herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and

raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more

or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and... deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein

assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the respondent who is an... alien, the dispositive part of
which states:

Issues:

whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to

support his minor child under

Philippine law

Ruling:
Thw petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 15[35] of the New Civil Code
stresses the... principle of nationality. In other words, insofar
as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their... national
law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls

under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do
so.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not

obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign

law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law.[40] In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by... such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.[41] While respondent pleaded the laws
of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the

national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of

the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local
or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which...
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that

respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
to petitioner's son, to wit:... n addition, considering that
respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner's claim that the Territoriality Principle
in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that:"[p]enal... laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score,
it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of...
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein
are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is... likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his
arrest.