G [4] 

The denial was on the ground that a Certificate of Divorce issu

the Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the existence of a
divorce decree.

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001
Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in
Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children.[5]

Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorc
the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate[6] issue
Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated[7] by an
authentication officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs.[8]

She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate Gen
in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by reason of certai
administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philipp
report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate
for judicial recognition of divorce.[9]

She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since the
no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department
Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that s
needed the proper court order. She was also informed by the Nati
Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the
Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her
remarry.[10]

She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and

secured a Japanese Law English Version of the Civil Code of Japan
Edition.[11]

On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination a

Declaration of Capacity to Marry[12] with the Regional Trial Court,
Piñas City.

On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City
rendered a Decision,[13] finding that Racho failed to prove that Tan
legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to pro
Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent
evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself.[14]

Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[15] arguing that under

Japanese law, a divorce by agreement becomes effective by oral
notification, or by a document signed by both parties and by two
more witnesses.[16]
In an Order[17] dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial Court den
the Motion, finding that Racho failed to present the notification o
divorce and its acceptance.[18]

On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review on

Certiorari[19] with this Court. In its January 18, 2012 Resolution, th
Court deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce

Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation,[21] stating that a dul

authenticated acceptance certificate was not among the documen
presented at the Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability
petitioner during trial. She also pointed out that the Divorce Certi
issued by ,the Consulate General of the Japanese Embassy was
sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.[22] She also manifested that
Tanaka had secured a marriage license on the basis of the same D
Certificate and had already remarried another Filipino. Neverthel
she has endeavored to secure the document as directed by this Co

On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance,[24] attac

duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divo
that she obtained in Japan.[25] The Office of the Solicitor General
thereafter submitted its Comment[26] on the Petition, to which
petitioner submitted her Reply.[27]
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by
agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or
written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She co
that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitam
Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she
her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effect
notification of the divorce.[28]

She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving
divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fa
its acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificat
maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayam
whom the Department of Foreign Affairs certified as duly appoint
qualified to sign the document. She also states that the Divorce
Certificate has already been filed and recorded with the Civil Regi
Office of Manila.[29]

She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Artic
of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.[30]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that t
Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not prop
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24[31] of the Rules of Court.
However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce submitted by
petitioner in compliance with this Court's January 18, 2012 Resolu
[32]

It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she an

husband obtained a divorce by agreement and only mentioned it
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
petitioner failed to prove that she is now capacitated to marry sin
divorce was not obtained by the alien spouse. She also failed to p
a specific provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows persons
obtained a divorce by agreement the capacity to remarry. In any c
divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 2
the Family Code.[33]

In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence, including the D

Certificate, was formally offered and held to be admissible as evid
by the Regional Trial Court.[34] She also argues that the Office of th
Solicitor General should not have concluded that the law does no
contemplate divorce by agreement or consensual divorce since a
discriminatory situation will arise if this type of divorce is not
recognized.[35]
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional T
Court erred in dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Capacity t
Marry for insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of Comm
however, the issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate o
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact
divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and responden
Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his
national law.
I

Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigne

a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was va
obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this coun
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 3
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is va

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spous
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[36] (Emphasis
supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation w
a Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even afte
validly obtained divorce abroad.[37] The addition of the second
paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have th
marriage considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or
the capacity to remarry.[38]

Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the va

of remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any other liability, wheth
or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to remarriage.

Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is

insufficient.[39] In Garcia v. Recio,[40] this Court established the prin
that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdicti
separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do no
judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our law
require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreig
spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before tria
courts.[41] Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:[42]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgmen
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a r
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judg
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the f
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our r
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to s
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for th
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign de
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.[43]
II

Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Tria

Court. Petitioner presented "a copy [of] the English Version of the
Code of Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the
Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee."[44] Arti
728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan reads:
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divo
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of Japan on January 18, 20
which stated in part:
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the
of the Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued b
Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Accep
Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce
decree itself. The Regional Trial Court further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce, name
judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement.

Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes effective

notification, orally or in a document signed by both parties and tw
more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the provisions of F
Registration Law of Japan.[47]
Thus, while respondent's national law was duly admitted, petition
failed to present sufficient evidence before the Regional Trial Cou
a divorce was validly obtained according to the national law of he
foreign spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred in
dismissing her Petition.
III

Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certifi

of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce,[48] certifying that the divo
issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefectu
has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the docum
was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.[49]
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within th
Court's ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiora
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court[50] are limited to questions of l

In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to the Region

Trial Courts for the reception of evidence and for further proceed
[51]
 More recently in Medina v. Koike,[52] this Court remanded the c
the Court of Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign
spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. T
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, wh
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fac
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled th
appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixe
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appea
(CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appea

above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which pro
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - . . .
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regi
Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of
Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall
final.[53]
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve
factual issues.[54] Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General n
posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of Accepta
the Report of Divorce[55] nor argued that the Petition presented
questions of fact. In the interest of judicial economy and efficienc
Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
IV

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility

official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it m
be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy o
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or an
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that fo
country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documen
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for an
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or b
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certifi
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul ge
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the forei
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accom
by an Authentication[56] issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of th
Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazuto
Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japa
an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified th
was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 13
Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner a
respondent.

The Regional Trial Court established that according to the nationa

of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by
notification."[57] Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between
petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.
V

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce b

agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Fa
Code, which provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this coun
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 3
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is va

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spous
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.[58] (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly ob
abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General po
that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.

In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by the Philippin

Statistics Authority, it was found that "marriages between Filipino
brides and foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while
between Filipino grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8
percent of the total marriages outside the country."[59] It also foun
"[a]bout four in every ten interracial marriages (2,916 or 35.1%) w
between Filipino brides and Japanese grooms." Statistics for forei
marriages in 2016 shows that there were 1,129 marriages betwee
Filipino men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages between Fil
women and foreign men.[60] Thus, empirical data demonstrates th
Filipino women are more likely to enter into mixed marriages tha
Filipino men. Under Philippine laws relating to mixed marriages, F
women are twice marginalized.

In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the b

of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Arti
Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-buil
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of wom
and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more active application th
the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of A
III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is
to men must also be given to women. It does not require the Stat
actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriar
that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensu
women's disempowerment."[61]

In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW
[62]
 Under Articles 2(f) and S(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a st
party, is required:
Article 2

....

(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modi

abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;

....

Article 5

....

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men a

women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices an
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyp
roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State
committed to ensure and to promote gender equality.

In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Ca

Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matter
relating to marriage and family relations."[63] This necessarily inclu
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Artic
should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abr
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly obt
and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status sho
given to the Filipino spouse.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse fro
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her ow
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disrega
any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that th
Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the m
bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are
protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some
marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill
against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedin
opt for, if the national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more
convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity betw
the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and
extended families, and less financial burden for the family.

Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid

20th century. The Philippines had divorce laws in the past. In 1917
No. 2710[64] was enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in
of concubinage or a husband to file in cases of adultery.[65]

Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was ena
during the Japanese occupation, provided for 11 grounds for divo
including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slande
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an ex
as to make further living together impracticable."[66]
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared
and Act No. 2710 again took effect.[67] It was only until the enactm
the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in our
jurisdiction.

It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more

progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be
intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the
Constitution guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should n
tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule th
foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only
contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages une
partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships.[68]

In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been res
in Republic v. Manalo,[69] where this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." B
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does n
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its in
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis n
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" sho
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actu
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the lett
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of th
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statut
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such end
purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELE
al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a ve
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or inj
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid t
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipin
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anom
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whe
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating h
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino wh
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in l
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recogn
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whos
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter's national law.[70] (Emphasis in the original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may
recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, rega
of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.

The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouse
initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by
petitioner and respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of di
in Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by agreement. Petitioner an
respondent's divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement, w
is a valid divorce according to Japan's national law.[71]

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petiti
was able to prove that the national law of Japan allows absolute
divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific provision of the
Japan[ese] Civil Code which states that both judicial divorce and d
by agreement will allow the spouses to remarry."[72]

To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General cites Rep

v. Orbecido III,[73] where this Court stated:
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his f
wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, th
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated t
enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2

Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. N
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has be
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the pres
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, w
unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divor
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made prop
upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his fa
The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that in Orbec
the respondent in that case neither pleaded and proved that his w
had been naturalized as an American citizen, nor presented any
evidence of the national law of his alleged foreign spouse that wo
allow absolute divorce.

In this case, respondent's nationality was not questioned. The Reg

Trial Court duly admitted petitioner's presentation of respondent
national law. Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as quoted by th
Office of the Solicitor General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:

1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.

2. The same shall apply also if after the death of either husband o
the surviving spouse declares his or her intention to terminate the
matrimonial relationship.[75]
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains n
other qualifications that could limit either spouse's capacity to rem

In Garcia v. Recio,[76] this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's

finding of the Filipino spouse's capacity to remarry since the natio
law of the foreign spouse stated certain conditions before the div
could be considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a law
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of differ
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first k
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which typ
divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a

conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the s
a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce m
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under so
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under som
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, th
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adul
may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restric

that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree be
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establ
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we
no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assum
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capac
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.[77]
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matri
relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptanc
the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that would
restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no othe
interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and
respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital ti

Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the
marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry. T
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invo
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the Nation
Statistics Office having found no impediment to the registration o
Marriage Certificate.[78] The validity of respondent's subsequent
marriage is irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case.
existence of respondent's Marriage Certificate, however, only ser
highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in the 1985
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:[79]
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Artic
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the pol
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to o
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, prov
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the div
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the ma
...

....
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longe
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the ca
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over co
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court,
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he doe
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said C
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private responden
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of th
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live toget
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discrimina
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second para
of Article 26 of the Family Code through the issuance of Executive
No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive equal rights to the Filipi
spouse was broad enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quit
Court of Appeals,[81] "hinted, by way of obiter dictum"[82] that it co
applied to Filipinos who have since been naturalized as foreign citi
In Republic v. Orbecido III,[83] this Court noted the obiter in Quita a
stated outright that Filipino citizens who later become naturalized
foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino sp
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, on
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divor
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its ex
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contraven
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the liter
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or inte
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under ou
laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's
newfound companionship with another cannot be just.[85] Justice
better served if she is not discriminated against in her own countr
[86]
 As much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and
devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitm
within the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court Ju
2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second para
of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Repor
Divorce dated December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Rac
declared capacitated to remarry.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ

concur.

September 27, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 25, 2018 a Decision, copy attached
hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled
the original of which was received by this Office on September 27
at 2:11 p.m.
Very truly y

(SGD)
WILFREDO
LAPITAN
Division Cle
 
Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-31.

[2]
 Id. at 32-37. The Decision, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 10-0032, w
penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub.

[3]
 Id. at 38-39. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Bu
Aglugub.

[4]
 Id. at 40-48.

[5]
 Id. at 33.

[6]
 Id. at 50.
[7]
 Id. at 51.

[8]
 Id. at 33.

[9]
 Id. at 6.

[10]
 Id. at 33.

[11]
 Id. at 33-34.

[12]
 Id. at 40-48.

[13]
 Id. at 32-37.

[14]
 Id. at 36.

[15]
 Id. at 53-63.

[16]
 Id. at 56-57.

[17]
 Id. at 38-39.

[18]
 Id. at 39.
[19]
 Id. at 3-31.

[20]
 Id. at 64-65.

[21]
 Id. at 66-72.

[22]
 Id. at 67.

[23]
 Id. at 69-70.

[24]
 Id. at 82-86.

[25]
 Id. at 87-89.

[26]
 Id. at 126-151.

[27]
 Id. at 176-197. All notices to respondent Tanaka were returned
unserved (rollo, pp. 216-217).

[28]
 Id. at 14-15.

[29]
 Id. at 16-17.
[30]
 Id. at 22, as cited in the Petition:
TERMINATION OF MATRIMONIAL RELATIONSHIP

Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divo

....
[31]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132 sec. 24 provides:

Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documen

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for an
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or b
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certifi
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul ge
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the forei
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

[32]
 Rollo, p. 138.

[33]
 Id. at 138-147.
[34]
 Id. at 182-183.

[35]
 Id. at 188.

[36]
 As amended by Exec. Order No. 227 (1987).

[37]
 See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melenc
Herrera, First Division] and Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108 (
[Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[38]
 See Corpuz v. Sto, Tomas, 642 Phil. 420 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Thi
Division].

[39]
 See Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Th
Division].

[40]
 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

[41]
 See Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprud
2016/july2016/215723.pdf> 3 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division

[42]
 642 Phil. 420 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
[43]
 Id. at 432-433, citing II REMEDIAL LAW, Rules 23-56, 529
(2007); Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisum
First Division]; Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Pangan
Third Division]; and Bayot v. Court of Appeals, 591 Phil. 452 (2008
J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].

[44]
 Rollo, p. 36.

[45]
 Id. at 22.

[46]
 Id. at 50.

[47]
 Id. at 39.

[48]
 Id. at 88-89. The original Japanese document and an English
translation by Byunko Visa Counseling Office, Tokyo, Japan are
attached.

[49]
 Id. at 87.

[50]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring

appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution o
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or o
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Co
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise o
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis sup

[51]
 See also Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568 (2007
J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division] and San Luis v. San Luis, 543 Ph
(2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division] where this Court
remanded the cases to the trial courts to determine the validity o
divorce decrees.

[52]
 G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprud
2016/july2016/215723.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]

[53]
 Id. at 5, citing Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Manor H
Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, 433-435 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,
Second Division]; Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. Peo
721 Phil. 760, 766-767 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; and R
OF COURT, Rule 56, sec. 6.

[54]
 See Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna Metal Multi-purpose
Cooperative, 738 Phil. 37 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] wh
this Court resolved the issues of the case despite being factual in
due to the sufficiency of the court records. In this case, the record
the Regional Trial Court were received by this Court on November
2014 (rollo, p. 214).

[55]
 Rollo, p. 138.

[56]
 Id. at 87.

[57]
 Id. at 39.

[58]
 As amended by Exec. Order No. 227 (1987).

[59]
 Philippine Statistics Authority, Foreign  Marriages of Filipinos:
March 11, 2011
<https://psa.gov.ph/old/data/sectordata/sr11566tx.html> (last
accessed June 1, 2018).

[60]
 See Philippine Statistics Authority, Number of Nationalities of B
and Groom, Philippines:
2016 <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/crd/sp
lease/Table%206.pdf> (last accessed June 1, 2018).

[61]
 Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No
221029, April 24, 2018
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprud
2018/april2018/221029_leonen.pdf> 2 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

[62]
 The Philippines became a signatory on July 15, 1980. The treaty
ratified on August 5, 1981.
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en>.

[63]
 Rep. Act No. 9710 (2008), sec. 19.

[64]
 An Act to Establish Divorce (1917).

[65]
 Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery o
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband comm
in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirtysev
the Penal Code, cited in Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 948 (1920)
Street, En Banc].

[66]
 Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461, 462 ( 1946) [Per J. Ozaeta,
Banc].

[67]
 Id. at 462-463.
[68]
 See Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen, Republic v. Manalo, G.R. N
221029, April 24, 2018
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprud
2018/april2018/221029_leonen.pdf> 4 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

[69]
 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
<http://sc.judieiary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprud
2018/april2018/221029.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

[70]
 Id. at 11-12, citing Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Fer
Inc., 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993) (Per J. Quiason, First Division]; Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992) [
Romero, En Banc]; Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 2
268 (1994) (Per J. Quiason, En Banc]; Enjay, Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil.
656 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division]; Pioneer Texturizing Cor
NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, En Banc]; Nati
Food Authority v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 251
(2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Rural Bank of San M
Inc. v. Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007) [Per J. Corona, Firs
Division]; Rep. of the Phils. v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007) [Per
Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Phil. Amusement and Gaming C
(PAGCOR) v. Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. 5
553 (2009) (Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Mariano, Jr. v
COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 (1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; League
Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., 623 Phil. 531, 564-565
(2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc]; and Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phi
555 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

[71]
 Rollo, p. 39.

[72]
 Id. at 142.

[73]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005) (Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[74]
 Id. at 116-117.

[75]
 Rollo, p. 142.

[76]
 418 Phil. 723 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban. Third Division].

[77]
 Id. at 735-736, citing 27A CJS, 15-17, §I, 611-613, §161 and 27A
625, §162.

[78]
 See Rollo, pp. 69-70.

[79]
 223 Phil. 357 ( 1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].

[80]
 Id. at 362-363, citing Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956) [Pe
Concepcion, En Banc]; I PARAS, CIVIL CODE 52 (1971); SALONGA,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (1979).

[81]
 360 Phil. 601 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

[82]
 Republic v. Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 114 (2005) [Per J. Quisum
First Division].

[83]
 509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J. Quisumbing, First Division].

[84]
 Id. at 114-115, citing Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
Phil. 850, 855 (1957) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].

[85]
 See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melenc
Herrera, First Division].

[86]
 See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J. Melenc
Herrera, First Division].
© Supreme Court E-Library 2019
This website was designed and developed, and is maintained, by
Library Technical Staff in collaboration with the Management
Information Systems Office.
.R. No. 243722 (Formerly UDK-16060)
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPI
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Ru
of the Rules of Court against the Decision2 dated February 27, 201
(assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated September 29, 2017 (as
Resolution) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950, rendered by the Court of A
(CA), Eleventh Division and Former Eleventh Division, respectively
The assailed Decision and Resolution reversed the Decision4 date
3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sto. Domingo, N
Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-417, which
recognized the foreign divorce decree obtained by Cynthia A. Gala
(Cynthia) and her spouse Noh Shik Park (Park), a Korean national.
The Facts
The antecedents, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
[Cynthia], a Filipina, and [Park], a South Korean national, got mar
the City of Manila, Philippines on [February 27, 2012. Unfortunate
their relationship turned sour and ended with a divorce by mutua
agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed on [Ju
2012 by the Cheongju Local Court, [Cynthia] filed before the [RTC]
Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce [(Recogn
Petition)].
The [RTC], finding the [Recognition] Petition sufficient in form and
substance, issued an Order dated [November 11, 2014 setting the
for hearing. The said Order was then published once a week for th
(3) consecutive weeks in The Daily Tribune. Meanwhile, the Office
[the] Solicitor General [(OSG)] filed a Notice of Appearance as cou
for the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija was also deputize
assist the OSG.
During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon [(Abigail)],
[Cynthia's] sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in court. Abigail
identified and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the conten
thereof and her signature thereon. Furthermore, Abigail averred t
[Cynthia] could not personally testify because the latter's Korean
expired upon her divorce with Park. Nevertheless, Abigail [alleged
she] has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the [Recogniti
Petition and claimed, among other things, that Park intended to m
his former girlfriend [and that Cynthia] was forced to agree to the
divorce because Park made a threat to her life x x x.5
RTC Ruling
On July 3, 2015, the RTC issued a Decision6 granting the Recogniti
Petition. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the [Recognition Petition] is
hereby GRANTED and the Divorce Decree obtained in Seoul, Kore
between [Cynthia] and [Park] on [July 16, 2012 is hereby RECOGN
The Civil Registrar General and [the] Office of the Manila Civil Reg
are hereby DIRECTED to RECORD the said divorce decrees (sic) up
presentation of a duly authenticated copy thereof and payment o
appropriate fees, if any. [Cynthia] is now legally capacitated to re
under Philippine Laws pursuant to [Article] 26, [Paragraph] 2 of th
Family Code of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, the Office of th
Registrar General-National Statistics Office, the Office of the Civil
Registrar of the City of Manila and the Embassy of the Philippines
Seoul, Korea through the Department of Foreign Affairs.
SO ORDERED.7
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The arguments there
summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
1. The [Recognition Petition] should [have been] filed in the RTC o
Manila because the marriage was celebrated and was recorded in
City Civil Registry of Manila. Citing the case of Fujiki vs. Marinay8 
the (OSG] argued that [the recognition] of foreign divorce judgme
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correctio
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. T
the venue of such proceedings is laid on the appropriate RTC whe
civil registry is located;
2. Absolute divorce is not allowed in this jurisdiction. Considering
the divorce x x x was obtained not by the alien spouse alone but b
both spouses, x x x [Cynthia] is not qualified to avail of the benefi
provided by [Article] 26 of the Family Code.9 (Italics supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC through it
Resolution10 dated March 17, 2016.
Foremost, the RTC held that while the Court, in Fujiki v.
Marinay,11 ruled that the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
be made in a special proceeding, the use of the permissive word "
was intentional so as not to foreclose the option of seeking such
recognition through a special civil action for declaratory relief und
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, as in the case of Republic v. Orbecid
III12 (Orbecido).13 Expounding further, the RTC held that since th
are no specific rules governing petitions for recognition of foreign
divorce, it applied by analogy Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Cou
(Rules) which requires personal actions to be filed at the place wh
either the plaintiff or defendant resides.14
In addition, the RTC found that the requisites for the application o
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code [Article 26(2)] concur.
First, there was a valid marriage celebrated between Cynthia and
as shown by the Certificate of Marriage issued by the National Sta
Office.15
Second, a valid divorce was obtained abroad by Park capacitating
to remarry, as shown by the Certification16 issued by the Cheong
Local Court stating that he and Cynthia were divorced on July 16,
While the RTC recognized that the divorce decree in question was
obtained by mutual agreement, it ruled that such fact does not pr
its recognition in this jurisdiction since the testimony of Abigail Ga
(Abigail) confirms that Park merely coerced Cynthia to agree to th
divorce.17
Not satisfied, the OSG appealed to the CA via Rule 41.
CA Ruling
On February 27, 2017, the CA issued the assailed Decision18 granti
the OSG's appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant [a]ppeal is GRANT
The Decision dated [July 3, 2015 and Resolution dated [March 17,
issued by Branch 88, [RTC] of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
[are] REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Petition filed by [Cynthia] is hereby DISMISSED, f
of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
The CA found no merit in the OSG's contention that the RTC erred
it acted on the Recognition Petition since venue was improperly la
While Section 1, Rule 108 requires petitions for judicial recognitio
foreign divorce decrees to be filed with the RTC where the civil en
the marriage in question is registered, the CA held that courts
cannot motu proprio dismiss an action on the ground of improper
venue.20 Hence, the CA found that the RTC did not err in taking
cognizance of the Recognition Petition since the OSG failed to mo
its dismissal on the ground of improper venue at the first instance
Nonetheless, the CA held that the divorce decree in question cann
recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned sinc
was obtained by mutual agreement.22 Said the CA:
To be sure, it is crystal clear from pertinent law and jurisprudence
the foreign divorce contemplated under the second (2nd) paragra
Article 26 of the Family Code must have been initiated and obtain
the foreigner spouse. Thus, the Supreme Court had made it also c
that in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad wou
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divo
the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a v
divorce is obtained.
There can be no dispute that [Cynthia] was a Filipino citizen when
obtained the divorce decree with her foreign spouse and, in fact,
remains to be so up to the present. Clearly, since the divorce unde
consideration was jointly applied for and obtained by a Filipino an
foreigner spouse, it was incorrect for the [RTC] to apply the provis
the second (2nd) paragraph, Article 26 of the Family Code. Owing
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, Phil
nationals, like [Cynthia], are covered by the policy against absolut
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of pu
policy and morality.
Notably, the [RTC] took as gospel truth the assertion of Abigail th
[Cynthia] was merely acting under duress when she agreed to the
demand of Park to sever their marriage, lest something bad woul
happen to her. Said allegation was used by the [RTC] as basis to
conclude that the divorce was initiated by Park alone and that the
was actually no divorce by mutual agreement that took place.
This was obviously a serious error on the part of the [RTC].
For one, the very evidence relied upon by [Cynthia] clearly show t
the divorce between [Cynthia] and Park was obtained by mutual
agreement, in accordance with Section 5, Article 834 of the Korea
Code. If [the CA follows] the [RTC's] conclusion, then it is with mo
reason that the [Recognition] Petition should be denied since it
becomes evident that the divorce obtained by Park is contrary to,
violation of, [the Korean Civil Code], which clearly requires a divo
mutual agreement. It is not amiss to point out x x x that the divor
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines
when the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
For another, [Cynthia] herself was not presented in court while he
sister, Abigail, testified on matters not derived from her own perc
but from what [Cynthia] allegedly told her. x x x Verily, the person
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.
x23
On September 29, 2017, the CA denied Cynthia's subsequent Moti
Reconsideration through the assailed Resolution.24
Cynthia received the assailed Resolution through counsel on Octo
10, 2017.25
On October 24, 2017, Cynthia filed a Motion for Extension of Time
File Petition for Review with Application for Authorization to Litig
Indigent Party.26 Therein, Cynthia moved for an additional period
thirty (30) days, or until November 24, 2017 to file her petition fo
review. In addition, Cynthia alleged that she remains in Korea "un
questionable alien status," and is suffering from an illness which
requires immediate medical attention. Because of these circumsta
Cynthia prayed that she be granted authorization to litigate as an
indigent party, for while her counsel on record has agreed to conti
handling her case pro bono, she has no sufficient means to pay th
required filing fees.27
Cynthia filed the present Petition on November 20, 2017.
On January 31, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution28 granting Cyn
prayer for extension, and requiring Cynthia to submit proof of her
indigency within five (5) days from notice. The Court also directed
OSG to file its comment on the Petition.
Upon submission of the required proof, the Court granted Cynthia
application to litigate as an indigent party.29
Meanwhile, the OSG filed its Comment30 on the Petition on April
2018. In turn, Cynthia filed her Reply31 on September 25, 2018.
In this Petition, Cynthia avers that this case calls for the exercise o
Philippine courts' power of "limited review" over a foreign judgm
Cynthia argues that by reversing the RTC Decision, the CA erroneo
delved into the merits of the divorce decree in question, and
substituted its judgment for the judgment of the Korean courts w
respect to matters relating to the status, condition and legal capa
Park who is a Korean national.32 Further, Cynthia claims that the
assailed Decision and Resolution would result in the unjust situati
Article 26(2) is meant to prevent.33
In her Reply, Cynthia further argues that all doubts as to the appli
of Article 26(2) to foreign divorce decrees obtained by mutual con
of the Filipino citizen and the alien spouse have been laid to rest i
recent case of Republic v. Manalo34 (Manalo).35
The Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in
denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthi
her foreign spouse, Park.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is granted.
The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26(2)
applied to divorce decrees obtained jointly by the foreign spouse
Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance w
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those proh
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is val
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spou
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emp
supplied)
In Orbecido, the Court laid down the elements for the application
Article 26(2), bearing in mind the spirit and intent behind the prov
as reflected in the Committee deliberations. The Court held:
x x x [The Court states] the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a F
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacita
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the tim
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the la
remarry.
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as a
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized
wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to rem
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of A
26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the "divorced" Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.36 (Emphasis and undersco
supplied; italics in the original)
Here, the CA anchored the assailed Decision on the absence of the
second element set forth in Orbecido. According to the CA, the fa
the divorce decree had been obtained by mutual agreement of Cy
and Park precludes the application of Article 26(2), since the langu
of the provision requires that the divorce decree be obtained sole
the foreign spouse.
Adopting the same view, the OSG argues that the divorce decree
question is not one "obtained x x x by the alien spouse alone[,] bu
obtained] at the instance of both [spouses]."37 Hence, the OSG in
that Article 26(2) simply cannot apply to Cynthia.38 In this connec
the OSG claims that Abigail 's testimony to the effect that Cynthia
been merely forced to agree to the divorce should not be given
credence for being hearsay.39
The CA and OSG are mistaken.
In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the sco
Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is
obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court's ruling states, in
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtaine
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." B
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
be a divorce valid l y obtained abroad. The letter of the law does n
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound
words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its in
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis n
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" sh
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actu
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the lett
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of th
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statut
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such end
purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELE
al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a ve
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or inj
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid t
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipin
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anom
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whe
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating h
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino wh
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in l
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recogn
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whos
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter's national law.40 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to
marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign
spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; an
obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree
mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency
evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divor
decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was n
in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient to esta
the authenticity and validity of the divorce in question:
x x x [T]he records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the o
and translated foreign divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity. She also offered into evidence
copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated through a Lette
Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embas
the Republic of Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence
have been sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of t
divorce obtained by the estranged couple abroad but [the CA agre
with the OSG that the divorce cannot be recognized in this jurisdi
insofar as [Cynthia] is concerned since it was obtained by mutual
agreement of a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse.41 (Emphasis
underscoring supplied)
In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibilit
probative value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had b
constrained to consent to the divorce. As confirmed by Manalo, t
divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia's confor
falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits recognition in thi
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 27, 2017 and Resolution dated Septembe
2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and For
Eleventh Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950 are REV
and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regiona
Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedi
No. SD(14)-417 is REINSTATED. By virtue of Article 26, paragraph 2
the Family Code and the Certification of the Cheongju Local Court
July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A. Galapon is declared capacitate
remarry under Philippine law.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, J
concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 8-19.
2 Id. at 20-29. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now
Member of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales.
3 Id. at 30-31.
4 Id. at 58-62. Penned by Presiding Judge Anarica J. Castillo-Reyes
5 Id. at 21-22.
6 Id. at 58-62.
7 Id. at 62.
8 712 Phil. 524 (2013).
9 Rollo, p. 63.
10 Id. at 63-70.
11 Supra note 8.
12 509 Phil. 108 (2005).
13 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
14 See id. at 65-66.
15 Id. at 66.
16 Id. at 35.
17 Id. at 66-67.
18 Id. at 20-29.
19 Id. at 28.
20 Id. at 23-24.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Id. at 26.
23 Id. at 26-27.
24 Id. at 30-31.
25 Id. at 2.
26 Id. at 2-5.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 84-85.
29 Id. at 120.
30 Id. at 96-113.
31 Id. at 127-131.
32 Id. at 10-12.
33 Id. at 13.
34 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 580.
35 Rollo, p. 127.
36 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 12, at 115-116.
37 Rollo, p. 99.
38 Id. at 100.
39 Id. at 101-102.
40 Republic v. Manalo, supra note 34, at 606-608.
41 Rollo, pp. 25-26.

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834 Phil. 317

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 194455. June 27, 2018 ]
SPOUSES AVELINA RIVERA-NOLASCO AND EDUARDO A.
NOLASCO, PETITIONERS, V. RURAL BANK OF PANDI,
INC., RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,
[1]
 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision, dated 25 June 2010,[2] and the Resolution,
dated 26 October 2010,[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 105288, through which the appellate
court[4] reversed and set aside three issuances of the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792'08, namely:
the Order, dated 20 June 2008; the Resolution, dated 15
July 2008; and the Order, dated 11 August 2008. In fine,
the CA ruled that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) had no jurisdiction over the
Complaint filed in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792'08.
We required the parties to submit their Comment[5] and
Reply.[6] They complied.[7]
THE FACTS
On 23 February 1995, the spouses Reynaldo and
Primitiva Rivera (the spouses Rivera) obtained a Two
Hundred Thousand Peso loan from the Rural Bank of
Pandi, Inc. (respondent bank). The loan was secured with
a mortgage over a parcel of land measuring 18,101
square meters, located at Barangay Bunsuran II,
Municipality of Pandi, Province of Bulacan, and
registered in the spouses' names under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-304255.[8]
The spouses Rivera failed to pay their loan, prompting
respondent bank to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage.[9] At the resultant auction sale, the bank was
declared the highest bidder for the property. When
Primitiva (Reynaldo had by then died) failed to exercise
the right of redemption,[10] respondent bank filed
an Affidavit of Consolidation with the Register of Deeds.
TCT No. T-304255 was then cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-512737 (M), was issued in
respondent bank's name.[11]
The spouses now solely represented by Primitiva, refused
to vacate the property, prompting the bank to seek relief
from the Regional Trial Court in Malolos City (RTC).[12] On
14 January 2008, said court issued a writ of possession in
favor of the bank, directing its sheriff to eject the
spouses. The next month, by virtue of the writ, the bank
was placed in possession of the property.[13]
The Case before the DARAB
On 10 April 2008, herein petitioners, the spouses Avelina
Rivera-Nolasco and Eduardo Nolasco (petitioner spouses),
filed a Complaint[14] before the DARAB denominated as
"For: Maintenance and Peaceful Possession of
Landholding and Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
and docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792'08.
Petitioner spouses alleged, in the main, that they were
tenants of the subject property.
The spouses narrated that the property was part of a
larger landholding, spanning 36,000 square meters,
which was then owned by the Sarmiento Family of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. The land was tenanted by Ireneo
Rivera, the father of petitioner Avelina Rivera-Nolasco
(Avelina).
When Ireneo died in 1974, Reynaldo Rivera, the eldest of
his children, continued Ireneo's tenancy with the
assistance of his siblings. In 1981, Reynaldo became
financially distressed[15] and sold his tenancy rights to
Avelina for P50,000.00. From then on, Avelina became
the Sarmiento Family's sole agricultural tenant of the
landholding.
In 1986, the Sarmiento Family sold half of the
landholding to a certain Boy Salazar; as disturbance
compensation, the family transferred the remaining half,
about 18,101 square meters, to Ireneo's heirs, his
children, who then agreed that the land be registered
solely in the name of Reynaldo, in deference to his being
the eldest. The siblings acknowledged that they were co-
owners of the land, and that they would partition it in
the future. TCT No. T-304255 was thus issued in Spouses
Rivera's name. The siblings further agreed that Avelina
was to continue as their sole and exclusive tenant; every
year, she was to give her siblings a portion of the harvest
corresponding to their respective one-eighth (1/8th)
undivided shares in the property.[16]
As earlier narrated, on 23 February 1995, Spouses Rivera
mortgaged the property to respondent bank. Petitioner
spouses claim that this was without their and the other
siblings' prior knowledge.[17] After the RTC issued the
aforementioned writ of possession, the bank had the
entire property fenced and forthwith denied Avelina
entry. She and her workers were thus prevented from
tending to their palay crop which by April 2008, was
ready for harvest.[18] Avelina's counsel[19] wrote
respondent bank, requesting that she be allowed entry
so she may conduct the necessary harvest. The bank
verbally responded that it would agree, on the condition
that Avelina and her husband renounce their tenancy
rights over the property.[20] Thereafter, petitioner
spouses filed the subject complaint.
Conversely, respondent bank filed an Answer (with
Motion to Dismiss) (Answer),[21] contending that the
DARAB had no jurisdiction over the complaint as
petitioner spouses were not tenants at the property. The
bank claimed that in 1999, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer[22] had certified[23] that the property was
neither tenanted nor covered by the Operation Land
Transfer of the agrarian reform program; in 2007, the
Chief Agrarian Reform Program Officer[24] at Baliuag,
Bulacan, issued a similar certification.[25] The bank further
argued that even if it were to be assumed that the
spouses had planted the palay on the property, they
were not entitled to its harvest or to indemnification for
its loss as they had not been planters in good faith.
Finally, the bank insisted that it had been a mortgagee in
good faith, and that it had acquired possession of the
property pursuant to an order of the RTC. The bank
insisted that the DARAB respect this order.
The Ruling of the PARAD
Acting pursuant to his delegated jurisdiction,[26] Joseph
Noel C. Longeoan,[27] the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) tasked to resolve the Answer, found
the motion to dismiss to be of no merit. He maintained
the jurisdiction of his office to resolve the complaint. The
PARAD's 20 June 2008 order pertinently reads:[28]
xxxx
Without delving into the merits of the case, a judicious
examination of the complaint will tell us that the relief
being prayed for calls for the application of agrarian
reform laws. As such, this Forum is clothed with the
power and authority to hear and decide the issue or
issues raised in the case at bar without encroaching into
the issues already passed upon by the Regional Trial
Court.
In the case of TCMC, Inc. v. CA, 316 SCRA 502, the
Supreme Court said:
"Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence,
the court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or motion to dismiss."
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the
instant motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent bank moved for reconsideration. Pending its
resolution of this motion, however, the PARAD approved
the application for preliminary injunction and ordered
respondent bank to accord petitioner spouses with the
peaceful possession of subject property during the
pendency of DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792'08.[29] In
response, respondent bank filed a second motion,
a Motion to Quash Writ of Injunction, which petitioner
spouses duly opposed.
On 11 August 2008,[30] the PARAD issued an Order
denying the two aforementioned motions; on even date,
he issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[31]
The Case before the CA
Through a petition for certiorari,[32] under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, respondent bank sought relief from the
CA, contending that the PARAD had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying respondent bank's motion to
dismiss despite lack of jurisdiction over the complaint. [33]
The Ruling of the CA
As previously noted, the petition before the CA was
granted. To conclude that the DARAB had no jurisdiction
over the subject complaint, the appellate court zeroed in
on petitioner spouses' averment, made in the same
complaint, that they were co-owners of the property.
"Ownership," the court a quo aphorized, "is the
antithesis of tenancy." We quote the appellate court's
pertinent discussion of this decisive point, so that the
decision under review may speak for itself:[34]
In their complaint, the private respondents alleged,
among others, that they became owners of the subject
land, together with Reynaldo Rivera, the registered
owner, and the other Rivera siblings when the Sarmiento
Family, the original owners of the land, transferred the
ownership of the land to them as disturbance
compensation. They further claimed that the land was
only registered in trust in the name of Reynaldo Rivera
for convenience and in deference to his being the eldest
of the Rivera siblings and that the mortgage of the
subject property, which eventually led to its foreclosure
by the petitioner bank, was without the knowledge and
consent of the other owners, the private respondents
and the other Rivera children. Private respondents'
contention that they are co-owners of the subject
property and, at the same time, tenants of the same
defies logic. Tenancy is established precisely when a
landowner institutes a tenant to work on his property
under the terms and conditions of their tenurial
arrangement. The private respondents cannot
anomalously insist to be both tenants and owners of the
subject land. Ownership is antithesis of tenancy.
Co-ownership is a manifestation of the private ownership
which, instead of being exercised by the owner in an
exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is
exercised by two or more owners and the undivided
thing or right to which it refers is one and the same. It is
not a real right distinct from ownership but is a mere
form or manifestation of ownership.[35] Co-owners are
therefore owners of an undivided thing. [36]
On the other hand, tenants are defined as persons who—
in themselves and with the aid available from within
their immediate farm households—cultivate the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or
paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable
in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancy system.[37]
Based on the foregoing discussion, the allegations in the
complaint filed by the private respondents before the
PARAD shows that the parties in the present case have
no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relationship
that could bring their controversy within the ambit of
agrarian reform laws and within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. The private respondents cannot thereafter force
a tenancy relationship between them and the successive
owners of the land.
All told, the PARAD clearly committed a jurisdictional
infraction when he took cognizance of the private
respondents' complaint. The allegations of the complaint
failed to show that the private respondents are
agricultural tenants of the land and that the instant case
involves an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB. To
reiterate, the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to
agrarian disputes or controversies and other matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Program (CARP) under Rep. Act
No. 6657, Rep. Act No. 3844 and other agrarian laws. An
allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in
question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. All
the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship
must be alleged in the complaint. The private
respondents' allegation that they are co-owners of the
subject land clearly removes the present case from the
DARAB's jurisdiction.
With regard to the other issues raised by the petitioner
bank, we see no need to resolve the same in view of our
finding that the DARAB did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the present case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
petition filed in this case is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Order dated June 20, 2008, Resolution dated July
15, 2008 and Order dated August 11, 2008 of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Joseph
Noel C. Longboan in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792-08
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner spouses filed a motion for reconsideration,
[38]
 but it was denied; hence, the present petition before
this Court.
The Petition for Review
The petition at bar imputes abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA, ostensibly stemming from serious,
reversible error committed with the following acts: first,
in failing to appreciate the "substantial and peculiar
circumstances" of the case which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; second, in delimiting
the meaning and applicability of the term "agrarian
dispute" within the four comers of the traditional
definition of a tenancy relationship; third, in failing to
rule with equity, considering that petitioner spouses had
lived on the subject property for twenty-nine years.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE CA REVERSIBLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE PARAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
TAKING JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT IN DARAB
CASE NO. R-03-02-5792'08.
Two Questions
Such issue pivots on two questions. The first is whether
the complaint had sufficient averments as to confer
subject matter jurisdiction unto the DARAB. The second
is capable of several articulations. It is whether petitioner
spouses' averment of co-ownership of the land subject of
the complaint sufficiently negates their claim of tenancy
thereon, such that, as a matter of course, the PARAD
cannot be conferred with jurisdiction in DARAB Case No.
R-03-02-5792'08. Another articulation is whether the
averment of co-ownership is sufficient reason for the
complaint's dismissal, such that, consequently, petitioner
spouses can no longer obtain the reliefs they seek.
OUR RULING
The CA ruling is set aside.
The material averments of
the subject complaint
sufficiently convey
jurisdiction unto the
PARAD.
We resolve the first question in the affirmative. In so
ruling, we turn to the rules on jurisdiction reiterated
in Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora Talara v. Heirs of
Alberto Cruz.[39] It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a
tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government
agency such as the DARAB and the PARAD, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether
the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs.[40] Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where
the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the
nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be
acquired through or waived by any act or omission of the
parties.[41] Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal
is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the
defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss.
At the time the subject complaint was filed,[42] the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure[43] governed the proceedings
of the board and its adjudicators. Section 1, Rule II of said
Rules provides, among others:[44]
RULE II
JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD AND THE ADJUDICATORS
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.
The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following
cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether
natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by
R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), as amended, and other
related agrarian laws; x x x x
xxxx
We go now to the subject complaint to assess, without
delving into its merits, its allegations and the reliefs. Do
these pleas dovetail with the subject matter jurisdiction
of the administrative board of its chosen refuge? The
complaint pertinently pleads:
xxxx
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFFS, through counsel, to this Honorable Board,
most respectfully state:
xxxx
3. That the parcel of Riceland of 18,101 square meters
located at Bunsuran III, Pandi, Bulacan, which is the
subject of this case was originally part of a bigger
parcel of Riceland of about 36,000 square meters,
more or less, which was owned by the Sarmiento
Family of Meycauayan, Bulacan but tilled and
 tenanted by Ireneo Rivera (deceased father of
plaintiff Avelina Rivera-Nolasco.)
4. That when said Ireneo Rivera died on October 12,
1974, Reynaldo Rivera being the eldest of Ireneo's
eight (8) children (including herein Avelina Rivera
who was then still single) continued as tenant of the
aforementioned landholding of the Sarmiento
Family, but with the assistance of his other siblings.
5. That in 1981 Reynaldo Rivera and his wife Primitiva
became financially distressed and/or bankrupt and
in order to raise funds and pay their unpaid matured
loans with the defendant Bank, the said couple
sold/transferred all their tenancy rights over the said
landholding for P50,000.00 to herein plaintiff Avelina
Rivera-Nolasco.
6. That as a result thereof, plaintiff Avelina Rivera-
Nolasco became the sole and exclusive agricultural
tenant starting 1981 of the said landholding of
36,000 square meters of the Sarmiento Family with
the valuable assistance of her husband Eduardo
Nolasco.
7. That in 1986 the Sarmiento Family sold the one-half
(1/2) portion of the tenanted landholding of 36,000
 square meters to a certain Boy Salazar of Balagtas,
Bulacan. In consideration of, and as disturbance
compensation of the late Ireneo Rivera and later of
the plaintiff Avelina Rivera-Nolasco, the portion of
18,101 square meters was ceded and transferred by
the Sarmiento Family to the Rivera children.
However, by mutual agreement of all the Rivera
children and with the prior knowledge of their
respective spouses, the said 18,101 square meters
was placed and registered only in trust under the
name of Reynaldo Rivera for convenience and in
deference to his being the eldest of the eight (8)
Rivera children. Hence, TCT No. T-304255 was issued
on August 27, 1986 in the name of Spouses Reynaldo
Rivera and Primitiva Rivera, copy of which is
attached as Annex "A" hereof with the
corresponding Tax Declaration as Annex "A-1"
hereof.
8. However, under the aforesaid agreement the 18,101
square meters as considered a co-ownership of the
eight (8) Rivera children subject to their future
partition at the appropriate time while plaintiff
Avelina Rivera-Nolasco continued as the sole and
exclusive tenant thereof but giving every year to her
 other siblings a portion of the harvest which pertains
to their respective 118 undivided shares in the
property.
9. That since 1981, Reynaldo Rivera and/or his wife
ceased to have any participation in the cultivation of
the subject landholding of 18,101 square meters.
Since then, however, plaintiff Avelina-Rivera-Nolasco
has continuously and publicly taken possession and
cultivation of said landholding with the assistance of
her husband as its sole and exclusive tenant and
even paying to the National Irrigation Administration
the irrigation fees for said landholding as evidenced
by the attached copy of the NIA official receipts from
1983 to 2008 marked as Annexes "B" to "Z" and "AA"
to "JJ," inclusive, hereof.
10. That plaintiff Avelina-Rivera-Nolasco is likewise
duly recognized by the Department of Agrarian
Reform and duly registered therein as the tenant-
tiller of the subject landholding as evidenced by the
Certification of MARO Juan J. Salvador of Pandi and
Balagtas, Bulacan dated April 4, 2000, copy of which
is attached as Annex "KK" hereof. She is likewise
known and recognized publicly as the sole and
 legitimate tenant of the said landholding as
evidenced by the following:
a) Certification by the Irrigators' association dated
September 24, 1999 (Annex "LL'' hereof);
   
b) Certification by Barangay Captain Carlito Concepcion
of Bunsuran III, Pandi, Bulacan dated September 1,
1999 (annex "MM" hereof);
   
c) Certificate of BARC Chairman Alvino Anastacio of
Bunsuran III, Pandi, Bulacan dated September 1,
1999 (Annex "NN" hereof);
   
d) Joint Affidavit of four (4) boundary owners/farmers
dated March 25, 2000 (Annex "OO" hereof);
   
e) Joint Affidavit of Barangay Captain Carlita
Concepcion and BARC Chairman Albino Anastacio, of
Bunsuran III, Pandi, Bulacan dated March 25, 2000
(Annex "PP" hereof).
xxxx
14. That over the objections of the herein plaintiff,
the defendant Bank caused the fencing of the entire
landholding with concrete posts and barbed wire. As
a result thereof, plaintiff was prevented from
entering the property and to perform the usual care
of her palay crop especially so that the defendant
Bank has engaged the services of the local Barangay
Officials and Barangay Tanod to watch the property
and prevent any entry thereto. In fact, the defendant
Bank also refused/denied the written request of the
plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Venustiano S. Roxas, dated
March 3, 2008 to allow entry into the property by
the plaintiffs and their farm workers to continue
attending to the standing palay crop and avoid its
destruction. Two (2) copies of photograph taken on
February 2, 2008 and the letter dated March 3, 2008
are hereto attached as Annexes "RR," "SS," and "TT"
hereof.
15. That when the present palay crop on the subject
landholding was already fully ripe and ready for
harvesting within the first week of April 2008,
plaintiff Avelina Rivera-Nolasco, through her counsel
Atty. Venustiano S. Roxas, sent a formal letter to the
defendant Bank dated April 1, 2008 requesting that
 plaintiff Avelina Rivera-Nolasco be permitted to
enter the subject landholding and to undertake the
necessary harvesting with the use of her rice
thresher and vehicle with a promise to restore to its
original position any portion of the fence that would
be temporarily opened for that purpose. Copy of
said letter is attached as Annex "UU" hereof. In
response to said letter the defendant Bank verbally
agreed to grant the plaintiffs request provided that
the plaintiffs would renounce in writing any tenancy
rights over the property.
16. That in a clear and patent abuse of rights over
the subject landholding and despite the earlier
written statement of plaintiff Avelina Rivera-Nolasco
that "she is only concerned with her own righs over
said property as its lawful tiller-tenant," the herein
defendant Bank failed and refused, and still fails and
refuses to at least accompany the plaintiffs or to
issue or give any written authorization to the
plaintiffs to enter the landholding and harvest the
standing palay crop thereon. With such unjustified
and repeated refusal of the defendant Bank and
considering that the landholding is under the
watchful eyes of the local Barangay officials and
 Barangay Tanods of Bunsuran III, Pandi, bulacan who
were so engaged by the defendant Bank to guard
the property, plaintiffs were discouraged/ prevented
from harvesting the subject palay crop for fear of
being molested, harassed, or even charged
criminally for such offenses as Theft, Trespass or
Malicious Mischief. As a result thereof, subject palay
crop is in extreme danger of being
damaged/destroyed for which plaintiffs will suffer
actual losses of approximately P80,000.00. Copy of
two (2) photographs of the palay crops taken on
April 7, 2008 are attached as Annexes "VV'' and
"WW" hereof.
17. That the aforesaid actuations of the defendant
Bank violate the rights of plaintiff Avelina Rivera-
Nolasco as the sole and legitimate tenant of the
subject landholding and are designed to ultimately
eject or remove her as such tenant of the subject
landholding. x x x x
xxxx
22. That defendant Bank is doing, threatens, or is
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
 some acts in violation or the rights of the plaintiffs
respecting the subject of the action.
xxxx
Following these allegations, the complaint seeks these
reliefs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed:
1. That upon the filing of this complaint, a Temporary
Restraining Order be immediately issued ex parte
directing the defendant Bank or any of its officers
and employees and/or all persons acting for or in its
behalf to desist from stopping, obstructing,
molesting, or otherwise harassing the herein
plaintiffs and all other persons acting for or in their
behalf in entering into the subject landholding,
harvesting the present palay crop thereon,
cultivating or tilling said landholding or otherwise
performing any act or acts as tenant thereof.
2. That after proper hearing, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued directing the defendant Bank,
its officers and employees and any or all persons
acting for or in their behalf to desist from stopping,
molesting, obstructing, harassing or otherwise
 ejecting or removing the herein plaintiffs from the
subject landholding as tenant thereof during the
pendency of this case.
3. That after trial, judgment be issued as follows:
(A) Declaring or making the injunction permanent.
   
(B) Declaring and maintaining the herein plaintiff Avelina
Rivera-Nolasco as the sole and lawful tenant of the
subject landholding.
   
(C) Ordering the defendant Bank to pay to the plaintiffs
the following:
1. Actual damages of approximately P80,000.00
representing the peso value of the lost, damaged or
destroyed palay crop currently planted on subject
landholding.
2. Attorney's fees of P50,000.00 plus appearance fees
of P2,500.00 per hearing and other litigation
expenses of at least P20,000.00.
3. Moral damages of P200,000.00.
4. Exemplary damages of P50,000.00.
PLAINTIFFS also pray for such other reliefs as may be just
and equitable under the premises.[45]
xxxx
These averments and prayers amount to an issue
cognizable by the DARAB and its adjudicators. In fine,
petitioner spouses assert that they are tenants of
agricultural land and pray that their tenancy be
respected by respondent bank. What results is an
agrarian dispute, a controversy over which the PARAD
has jurisdiction. To recall, an agrarian dispute is any
controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over
lands devoted to agriculture.[46] Here, the controversy
raised squarely falls under that class of cases described
under Paragraph 1.1, Section 1, Rule II of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In this regard, we note that the specific elements of
tenancy are sufficiently averred in the subject complaint,
these being: first, that the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; second, that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; third,
that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; fourth, that the purpose of the relationship
is to bring about agricultural production; fifth, that there
is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and sixth, that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.[47] Averments corresponding to each of these
elements are easily seen, demonstrable in the face of the
subject complaint.
True, it cannot be said that respondent bank and
petitioner spouses had directly consented to an
agricultural leasehold relationship given that, per the
subject narration, such pertinent consent had been
formed between Avelina and her siblings. All the same,
in Bautista, et al. v. Vda de Villena, the Court observed:
x x x. [J]urisdiction does not require the continuance of
the relationship of landlord and tenant—at the time of
the dispute. The same may have arisen, and oftentimes
arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly,
before the controversy and the subject matter thereof is
whether or not said relationship has been lawfully
terminated; or if the dispute otherwise springs or
originates from the relationship of landlord and tenant,
the litigation is (then) cognizable only by the [DARAB].[48]
With respect to the certifications respondent bank
secured from the MARO and the CARPO, ostensibly
proving that the subject property was not tenanted or
covered by agrarian reform, these documents are
irrelevant to the task at hand. We reiterate, the
determination of whether a tribunal has subject matter
jurisdiction in a case is not affected by the defenses set
up in an answer or motion to dismiss. In any case, it
bears reiterating that certifications of municipal reform
officers as to the presence or absence of a tenancy
relationship are merely provisional; in one case we even
ruled that they do not bind the courts.[49]
Given the averments of the subject complaint, we rule
that the PARAD already obtained a jurisdictional foothold
in this Case. As an incidence, it could take on all the
issues of the case, including the defenses raised by
respondent bank; petitioner spouses are allowed to
present their case in full, which must then be decided on
the merits.
We proceed to the second inquiry. Which may be
articulated in several ways. From yet another standpoint,
the question is whether the averment of co-ownership in
the complaint should be reason enough to thwart the
jurisdiction already conferred unto the PARAD by the
complaint's other material averment, such that
petitioner spouses can no longer seek recognition as
tenants of the subject property, endowed with the
appurtenant rights of agricultural tenants. The appellate
court opined that such averment was enough, the main
reason being that ownership was antithetical to tenancy.
The Court, however, is unable to affirm the overarching
application of such a view in this case for several reasons,
chiefly: first, the ownership in this case, a co-ownership
at that, remains an unconfirmed claim; and second, as
the dismissal of the subject complaint had effectively
prevented petitioner spouses from fully presenting their
case, the assailed ruling risks summarily ejecting
agricultural tenants. Absent administrative findings on
the particularities of Avelina's claimed tillage, we believe
that such risk should not be taken.
Outright dismissal of an
action is not proper where
there are factual matters in
dispute requiring the
presentation and
appreciation of evidence.
The present petition poses no factual questions, as is
ideal in cases filed under Rule 45. This is certainly due in
no small part to the dismissal of petitioner spouses'
complaint at the PARAD level. Consequently, the parties'
respective factual claims did not go through the wringer
of administrative fact-checking, and so there is a paucity
of adjudicated facts in this case, which gives rise to
certain musings.
We recall that the subject agricultural land was
registered solely in the name of spouses Reynaldo and
Primitiva Rivera, per TCT No. T-304255. We are also
aware that said spouses were not impleaded in DARAB
Case No. R-03-02-5792'08. While such non-impleadment
may have been par for the course, considering the nature
of the action filed with the PARAD and also because
ownership of the land had by then transferred to
respondent bank, a question arises nevertheless. Do the
spouses Rivera not dispute petitioner spouses' claim of
co-ownership? Avelina says the co-ownership arose from
a mere verbal agreement. Are the spouses Rivera even
aware of such a claim? More to the point, is the co-
ownership true?
As far as TCT No. T-304255 is concerned, the owners of
the subject land prior to its acquisition by respondent
bank were its registered owners Reynaldo Rivera and his
wife, not Reynaldo and his siblings. Parenthetically, we
are mindful of previous cases wherein this Court stated
that the Torrens titles were conclusive evidence with
respect to the ownership of the land described therein.
[50]
 If we are to abide by the recitals of TCT No. T-304255
and ascribe sole ownership to the spouses Rivera, where
does that leave Avelina? Avelina narrates years of tillage
of the land, beginning in 1974. Would this not also
indicate that she was the spouses Rivera's tenant? If
Avelina were not a co-owner with the rest of her siblings,
then, at the very least, should she not be considered as
the tenant of her sibling Reynaldo? Accordingly, would
not such tenancy subsist even after the land's ownership
was transferred to respondent bank?
The questions continue if we are to accept without a
doubt the truthfulness of the asserted co-ownership.
What were the particularities of Avelina's harvest-sharing
and/or profit-sharing agreement with her siblings?
Avelina claims that as the only sibling tilling the property,
her annual obligation was to give her co-owners a
portion of the harvest corresponding to their respective
1/8th undivided share in the property. How much have
the harvests that Avelina kept for herself changed when
ownership of the property transferred from the
Sarmiento Family to the Rivera family? In other words,
how has Avelina's share changed from her tenancy to co-
ownership?
The numerous questions surrounding the averred co-
ownership are worth pondering. The averment was the
appellate court's sole basis for dismissing the subject
complaint. Incidentally, respondent bank did not even
include said basis as part of its defenses before the
PARAD. Certainly, the question of whether the particulars
of the arrangement between Avelina and her siblings
preponderate to an agricultural leasehold relationship or
to a co-ownership should form part of an administrative
inquiry, in order to properly address the larger question
of whether an agricultural leasehold relationship among
co-owners may co-exist in their civil co-ownership. It is in
view of these questions that we deem the dismissal
under review to have been premature. In Ingjug-Tiro v.
Casals,[51] we held that a summary or outright dismissal
of an action is not proper where there are factual
matters in dispute that require presentation and
appreciation of evidence. We so rule in this case.
The theory on the co-
existence of agricultural
tenancy and co-ownership
merits a closer look.
In this case, we are presently ill persuaded that co-
ownership ipso facto, or at the very least the mere
averment thereof, should be enough to thwart a co-
owner's suit for recognition as tenant. While the
appellate court's aphorism on the mutual exclusivity
between land ownership and tenancy may hold true
when the ownership involved is reposed in a single
entity, should the same be deemed as automatically true
for co-ownerships, as well?
Petitioner spouses plead a likely narrative and argument
on this point:
Clearly, the Court of Appeals grossly ignored the fact that
the former landowner (Sarmiento Family) gave the
18,101 square meters to the eight (8) Rivera children by
way of Disturbance Compensation in recognition of the
long years of tenancy relationship between the
Sarmiento Family and the deceased Ireneo Rivera; that
since Renaldo [sic] Rivera is the eldest among the eight
(8) siblings, and some of them were then still minors,
they all agreed that the title for 18,101 square meters
(TCT No. T-304255) would be placed only in the name of
Reynaldo Rivera but only "intrust" and subject to its
future partition by the eight (8) co-owners at the
appropriate time; that as a result thereof, Petitioner
Avelina Rivera-Nolasco, therefore, became the co-owner
of the 1/8 undivided portion of the 18,101 square meters
and at the same time the sole tiller and tenant of the
entire 7/8 undivided portions of her seven (7) siblings to
whom Avelina regularly gave the latter's rental as
Landowner or Lessor from the annual palay harvest.
That kind of "temporary arrangement" as to the
"ownership" or "tillage" of a piece of real property which
is owned in common by several brothers and sisters is a
common practice in the rural areas especially if some of
the co-owners are still minors (as in the instant case) or
the co-owners are financially incapable to subdivide the
whole parcel and have a separate titling for the share of
each and every co-owner. It is neither illegal nor
immoral.[52]
Without prejudice to the eventual findings of the
administrative agency concerned, we deem petitioner
spouses' proposition to be within the realm of possibility.
It is thus worthy of examination by the DARAB and its
adjudicators, which has the expertise to undertake such
an examination. We so rule in line with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, viz:
In San Miguel Properties, Inc. v. Perez, we explained the
reasons why Congress, in its judgment, may choose to
grant primary jurisdiction over matters within the
erstwhile jurisdiction of the courts, to an agency:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly
called into play on matters demanding the special
competence of administrative agencies even if such
matters are at the same time within the jurisdiction of
the courts. A case that requires for its determination the
expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of some
administrative board or commission because it involves
technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief
must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction
of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not
call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for
its suspension until after the matters within the
competence of the administrative body are threshed out
and determined.[53]
The assailed ruling risks
granting imprimatur to an
extrajudicial eviction of
agricultural tenants.
To recall, what prompted the filing of the subject
complaint were the acts of respondent bank in
preventing petitioner spouses and their workers from
entering the subject property and from tending to their
alleged agricultural harvest thereon. If we set the
agricultural tenancy of petitioner spouses as a basic
postulate, then these acts essentially amount to their
eviction from the land. Subsequently, the dismissal of the
subject complaint before the PARAD lent judicial
imprimatur to a summary extrajudicial eviction of
agricultural tenants.
The law, however, has set careful parameters before an
agricultural tenant may be ejected. In Natividad vs.
Mariano,[54] the Court put a spotlight on how the law set
these careful parameters:
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 ordains that once the tenancy
relationship is established, a tenant or agricultural lessee
is entitled to security of tenure. Section 36 of R.A. No.
3844 strengthens this right by providing that the
agricultural lessee has the right to continue the
enjoyment and possession of the landholding and shall
not be disturbed in such possession except only upon
court authority in a final and executory judgment, after
due notice and hearing, and only for the specifically
enumerated causes. The subsequent R.A. No. 6657
further reiterates, under its Section 6, that the security of
tenure previously acquired shall be respected. Finally, in
order to protect this right, Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844
rests the burden of proving the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee on the
agricultural lessor.
The specifically enumerated causes for terminating a
leasehold relationship mentioned in Natividad are set in
Sections 8, 28, and 36 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844,
[55]
 to wit:[56]
SEC. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relation.—The agricultural leasehold relation established
under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
   
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be
 served three months in advance; or
   
(3) Absence of the persons under Section Nine to
succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or
permanent incapacity of the lessee. x x x x
SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee
During Agricultural Year.—The agricultural lessee may
terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for
any of the following causes:
(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the
agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate
farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of
the lessor;
 
(2) Noncompliance on the part of the agricultural lessor
with any of the obligations imposed upon him by the
provisions of this Code or by his contract with the
agricultural lessee;
 
(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member
of his immediate farm household by the agricultural
 lessor to do any work or render any service not in any
way connected with farm work or even without
compulsion if no compensation is paid;
 
(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or
his representative against the agricultural lessee or
any member of his immediate farm household; or
 
(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more
advantageous to him and his family.
xxxx
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school
 site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years
rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except
when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may
be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are
filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three
years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion
within one year after the dispossession of the tenant,
it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession
of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred
by him because of said dispossessions;
   
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply
with any of the terms and conditions of the contract
or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure
is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
   
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
   
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm
practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;
   
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through
the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
   
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due; Provided, That if the non-payment
of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent
of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the
rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
   
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding
in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section
twenty-seven.
In the 1993 case of Bernas v. CA and Deita, the Court
held that the grounds for the ejectment of an agricultural
leasehold lessee are an exclusive enumeration; no other
grounds could justify the termination of an agricultural
leasehold.[57]
On the postulate that petitioner spouses are agricultural
tenants, or at the least allowed to proceed with their suit
to be recognized as agricultural tenants, we observe that
respondent bank had evicted petitioner spouses
extrajudicially. But the law sets that the burden of
proving the existence of a lawful cause for ejectment of
an agricultural tenant rests on respondent bank. Co-
ownership, however, does not appear to be one of the
legislated causes for the lawful ejectment of an
agricultural tenant; certainly, it is presently not a
recognized mode of extinguishing such relationship.
In fine, absent administrative findings on the
particularities of Avelina's tillage, this Court cannot
ascribe to the view that the averment of co-ownership
should disallow petitioner spouses from pressing on their
suit to be recognized as agricultural tenants. To reiterate,
absent the conduct by the PARAD of the proceedings in
DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5792'08 and the resolution of
said case on the merits, the assailed CA ruling risks
judicially approving the summary and extrajudicial
eviction of agricultural tenants. Parenthetically, the Court
is also mindful of the dangers of reifying as doctrine a
practice where unscrupulous landowners would offer
their tenants co-ownership of a portion of their
agricultural land in order to terminate the latter's
tenancy rights. Given the material averments in the
subject complaint, the PARAD had already gained a
jurisdictional foothold in DARAB Case No. R-03-02-
5792'08, and should have been allowed to exercise the
agency expertise in resolving the issues and problems
presented.
We recall our ruling in Bernas v. CA and Deita:[58]
The Court must, in our view, keep in mind the policy of
the State embodied in the fundamental law and in
several special statutes, of promoting economic and
social stability in the countryside by vesting the actual
tillers and cultivators of the soil, with rights to the
continued use and enjoyment of their landholdings until
they are validly dispossessed in accordance with law.
At this stage in the country's land reform program, the
agricultural lessee's right to security of tenure must be
"firmed-up" and not negated by inferences from
facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in
the courts below.
Hand in hand with diffusion of ownership over
agricultural lands, it is sound public policy to encourage
and endorse a diffusion of agricultural land use in favor
of the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil.
It is one effective way in the development of a strong and
independent middle-class in society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The Decision, dated 25 June 2010, and the
Resolution, dated 26 October 2010, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105288 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
is DIRECTED to proceed with DARAB Case No. R-03-02-
5792'08.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen,
and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

July 19, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 27, 2018 a Decision, copy
attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in
the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on July 19, 2018 at 11:15 a.m.
Very truly yours,

  (SGD.) WILFREDO
V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of
Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 9-28.
[2]
 Id. at 33-48.
[3]
 Id. at 50-51.
[4]
 The First Division, then composed of Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Chairperson, Associate Justice Isaias
Dicdican, who penned said issuances, and Associate
Justice Stephen C. Cruz.
[5]
 Rollo, p. 227.
[6]
 Id. at 424.
[7]
 Id. at 422 and 442.
[8]
 Id. at 34.
[9]
 Pursuant to the provisions of Act 3135, as amended by
Act 4118.
[10]
 Rollo, p. 54.
[11]
 Id. at 34.
[12]
 Id., Branch 14.
[13]
 Id. at 34-35.
[14]
 Id. at 52-59.
[15]
 Id. at 52-53.
[16]
 Id. at 53.
[17]
 Id. at 54.
[18]
 Id. at 55.
[19]
 Atty. Venustiano S. Roxas.
[20]
 Rollo, p. 56.
[21]
 Id. at 96-108.
[22]
 Id. at 99, Juan Saldevar, Department of Agrarian
Reform, Region III, Pandi, Bulacan,
[23]
 Certification dated 22 January 1999.
[24]
 Rollo, p. 99, Oscar M. Trinidad, Department of
Agrarian Reform, Baliuag, Bulacan.
[25]
 Id. Certification dated 20 September 2007.
[26]
 As provided for under the DARAB Rules of Procedure,
cf. Soriano v. Bravo 653 Phil. 72, 87-90 (2010).
[27]
 Rollo, p. 118.
[28]
 Id. at 117-118.
[29]
 Rollo, pp. 123-132, Resolution dated 15 July 2008.
[30]
 Id. at 133-135.
[31]
 Id. at 136-137.
[32]
 Id. at 152- 178, dated 15 September 2008.
[33]
 Id. at 42-43.
[34]
 Id. at 46-48.
[35]
 Pasong Bayabas Farmers v. DARAB, 473 Phil. 64-99
(2004); citing Almuete v. Andres, 421 Phil. 522-532
(2001).
[36]
 Rollo, p. 46.
[37]
 Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De Villena, 481 Phil. 591, 601
(2004).
[38]
 Rollo, pp. 207-219 dated 22 July 2010.
[39] 
512 Phil. 389-407 (2005); citing Soriano v. Bravo, 653
Phil. 72-96 (2010).
[40]
 Soriano v. Bravo, 653 Phil. 72, 89-90 (2010).
[41]
 Id. at 90.
[42]
 Rollo, pp. 52-59, see note 14 at p. 55 of Complaint
dated 10 April 2008.
[43]
 Adopted on 17 January 2003.
[44]
 Section 1, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, reads:
RULE II JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD AND THE
ADJUDICATORS
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original Jurisdiction.
The Adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive original
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate the following
cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether
natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered by
R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), as amended, and other
related agrarian laws;
1.2 The preliminary administrative determination of
reasonable and just compensation of lands acquired
under Presidential Decree (PO) No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP);
1.3 The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or
deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under
the administration and disposition of the DAR or Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
1.4 Those cases involving the ejectment and
dispossession of tenants and/or leaseholders:
1.5 Those cases involving the sale, alienation, pre-
emption, and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARL or other agrarian laws;
1.6 Those involving the correction, partition, secondary
and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents
(EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority;
1.7 Those cases involving the review of leasehold rentals;
1.8 Those cases involving the collection of amortizations
on payments for lands awarded under PO No. 27, as
amended, RA No. 3844, as amended, and R.A. No. 6657,
as amended, and other related laws, decrees, orders,
instructions, rules, and regulations, as well as payment
for residential, commercial, and industrial lots within the
settlement and resettlement areas under the
administration and disposition of the DAR;
1.9 Those cases involving the annulment or rescission of
lease contracts and deeds of sale, and the cancellation or
amendment of titles pertaining to agricultural lands
under the administration and disposition of the DAR and
LBP; as well as EPs issued under PO 266, Homestead
patents, Free Patents, and miscellaneous sales patents to
settlers in settlement and resettlement areas under the
administration and disposition of the DAR;
1.10 Those cases involving boundary disputes over lands
under the administration and disposition of the DAR and
the LBP, which are transferred, distributed, and/or sold
to tenant-beneficiaries and are covered by deeds of sale,
patents, and certificates of title;
1.11 Those cases involving the determination of title to
agricultural lands where this issue is raised in an agrarian
dispute by any of the parties or a third person in
connection with the possession thereof for the purpose
of preserving the tenure of the agricultural lessee or
actual tenant-farmer or farmer-beneficiaries and
effecting the ouster of the interloper or intruder in one
and the same proceeding; and
1.12 Those cases previously falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian
Relations under Section 12 of PO No. 946 except those
cases falling under the proper courts or other quasi-
judicial bodies; and
1.13 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or
concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
[45]
 Rollo, pp. 52-59.
[46]
 Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 74, 82 (2010);
citing Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 298-A Phil. 481, 490
(1993).
[47]
 Bumagat v. Arribay, 735 Phil. 595,607 (2014).
[48]
 481 Phil. 591, 607 (2004); citing David v. Rivera, 464
Phil. 1006, 1017 (2004), Latag v. Banog, 122 Phil. 1188,
1194, (1966), and Basilio v. De Guzman, 105 Phil. 1276-
1277 (1959).
[49]
 Bautista et al. v. Vda de Villena, 481 Phil. 591,606
(2004); citing Nisnisan v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 605,
612 ( 1998), Oarde v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 457, 469
( 1997), and Cuaño v. Court of Appeals, 307 Phil. 128, 146
(1994).
[50]
 Sampaco v. Lantud, 669 Phil. 304, 316 (2011).
[51]
 415 Phil. 665, 674 (2001).
[52]
 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[53]
 717 Phil. 244,262-263 (2013).
[54]
 Natividad v. Mariano 710 Phil. 57, 73 (2013).
[55]
 An act to ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code
and to institute land reform in the Philippines including
abolition of tenancy and channeling of capital into
industry, provide for the necessary implementing
agencies, appropriate funds therefor and for other
purposes.
[56]
 Verde v. Macapagal, 571 Phil. 251, 259 (2008).
[57]
 296-A Phil. 90, 111 (1993); Sta. Ana v. Sps. Carpo 593
Phil. 108, 130 (2008).
[58]
 Id. at 106.
© Supreme Court E-Library 2019
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11988            February 1, 1918
JACINTO MOLINA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellant.
Mariano Escueta for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal present for resolution the question of
whether or not fish are an agricultural product.
FACTS.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is the owner of
various fish ponds (pesquerias) in the municipality of
Bulacan, Province of Bulacan. Between January 1 and
September 30, 1915, plaintiff consigned to a commission
merchant in Manila quantities of fish which sold for
P5,264.89. The commission merchant paid the
merchant's percentage and fixed taxes due under the
Internal Revenue Law. Plaintiff, however, had not
previously paid the merchant's tax, although from August
1. 1904, the date when the first Internal Revenue Law
became effective, until October 26, 1915, plaintiff had
been engaged in this business, Plaintiff had been paid the
real estate tax on the land upon which the fishponds are
located. On the date last mentioned, on demand of a
representative of the Bureau of Internal revenue, plaintiff
paid under protest P71.81, the total internal-revenue tax
on the gross sum received for the first three-quarters of
the year 1915. The ground of the protest was that
plaintiff is an agriculturist and not a merchant and
therefore exempt from the taxes imposed by the Internal
Revenue Law upon the gross sales of merchants. The
protest was denied by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
who held that the plaintiff was a merchant. Suit to
recover this amount of P71.81 was thereupon instituted
in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the defendant as collector of internal revenue. After trial
on an agreed statement of facts, the Honorable Jose
Abreu in a carefully prepared decision ordered defendant
to refund the P71.81 paid by plaintiff as internal-revenue
taxes and penalties under protest, with legal interest
thereon from November 26, 1915, the date of such
payment under protest. Defendant appealed making four
assignments of error, all of which, however, with the
exception of the last, which need not be considered,
center around the question which we set out in the
beginning of this decision. Both appellee and appellant
have further favored the court with an exceptionally able
presentation of their respective contentions. We are
given to understand that this is in the nature of a test
case, concerning not alone the comparatively small
amount involved but affecting the taxes of numerous
other persons in an amount which will run up into
thousands of pesos.
In addition to the foregoing statement of the case, we
must note the nature of the fishponds and of the fish. As
to the first, before the lands are suitable for use as
fishponds, it is necessary for the land to be prepared by
the erection of dikes and cleaning out and deepening the
bottom. The presence of caretakers is necessary to see
that the fishponds do not become damaged and to
regulate the entrance and exit of water through the
floodgates. The fish are of the species known bañgus.
These fish are obtained from small fishes (semillas),
which are placed in the fishponds. These small fishes are
first put in a comparatively small compartment,
surrounded by walls of earth, which is found within the
fishery itself. Afterwards when they get to be about the
size of a cigarette, they are let loose into the other
compartments of the same fishery. This compartment
for semillas  is allowed to dry and is cleaned well before
the semillas  are placed therein; it is even plowed to kill
all the bugs that may eat up the fish. In order to make
marine plants grow, a small amount of sea water is
allowed to enter. When the fish have become large an
endeavor is made to fill the fishery with water. From
time to time the water contained in the fishery is
renewed to avoid the killing of the fish. The walls of a
fishery are constructed to preserve and to retain the
water and the fishes inside the fishery. These walls are
constructed on a swampy lands and in some cases on rice
fields bounded by a river or the sea.
The food of the bañgus includes marine plants. These
algae are of seven classes, their scientific names being
cladophora, chaetomorpha, oscillatoria, oedogonium,
lyngbya, enteromorpha, and najas. One of these plants is
rooted. Some of the others are very loosely attached to
the ground, but not rooted. Generally the algae float in
the water.
LAW.
The provisions of the law which it is necessary to
construe are not extensive. The different internal-
revenue laws have provided for a merchant's tax.
"Merchant," as used in the law, "means a person
engaged in the sale, barter, or exchange of personal
property of whatever character." (Act No. 2339, sec. 40;
Administrative Code [1917] sec. 1459.) The succeeding
section (Act no. 2339, sec. 41; Administrative Code
[1917], sec. 1460) is entitled "Sales not subject to
merchant's tax." The section provides:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the
following commodities shall be excluded: . . . .
(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or
owner of the land where grown, whether in their original
state or not."
With the facts and the law before us, we return to the
question first suggested.
QUESTION.
Are fish an agricultural product within the meaning of the
exemption provisions of the Internal revenue Law?
OPINION.
Different methods of approach to this question are
possible. For example, all argument could disposed of
peremptorily with the bald statement that in accordance
with the rule of stare decisis, the decision of this court in
The United States vs. Laxa  ([1917], 36 Phil. Rep., 670) is
decisive. Justice Araullo, in his opinion, held that fish are
not an agricultural product, that the owner of a fishpond
who sells the fish at the fishpond is a merchant, that such
a merchant is not entitled to the exemption provided by
the Internal Revenue Law, and that the said owner is
guilty of violation of the Internal Revenue Law. We prefer
not to take such a stand, although we are confident that
it could be defended, because of the vigorous objection
to a decision in a criminal prosecution becoming a
precedent in a civil action for the recovery of taxes.
As opposed to the Laxa decision, counsel for plaintiff
invites special attention to the cases of Mapa vs. Insular
Government ([1908] 10 Phil., 175) and Mercado vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue  ([1915] 32 Phil. Rep., 271).
In the first case, the Supreme Court said —
The question before us is not what is agricultural land,
but what definition has been given to that phrase by the
Act of Congress.
The Philippine Bill, it was found, classified land as
agricultural public land in order to distinguish such land
from timber or mineral land. Neither Congress nor the
court gave any definition of agricultural land as such or of
the products of the land. Moreover, the court made the
observation that, "The land in question in this case,
which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind
of crops raised thereon." If the case can be considered as
an authority, it must be that the court recognizes that
agricultural land, as the term is used in the Act of
Congress, may be devoted to other than agricultural
purposes, and that using agricultural land for a fishpond
is a use other than agricultural. In the second case
of Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue,
following Mapa vs. Insular Government  (supra), the
Court said —
It is, then unquestionable that bakawan firewood is an
agricultural product, differing from other kinds of
firewood obtained from the forest trees because the
bakawan plant grows only on land subject to overflow,
which require clearing and care by workers skilled in
agricultural pursuits, in order that it may thrive. It is also
to be noted that up to the present time mangrove
swamps have been found suitable for no other useful
crop.
But it is plainly a far cry from holding that bakawan,
planted and grown through the culture of the soil, is an
agricultural product, to finding that fish are in similar
sense planted and grown as a result of the culture of the
soil. Whatever comfort can be derived from these
decisions are persuasive authority is more than nullified
by the later case of The United States vs. Laxa  ([1917] 36
Phil. Rep., 670)."
Just, therefore, as the facts and the law are indisputable,
so do we prefer to forget these three cases for the time
being and to rest our decision on the plain and ordinary
meaning of the law disclosed by the elementary rules of
statutory construction.
And first, in order to dispose of the question, is the
owner of a fishpond, such as the plaintiff, who sells fish
taken from a fishpond, a "merchant" as defined in the
Internal revenue Law? Recalling this definition of a
"merchant," it would appear undeniable that the plaintiff
is properly included in such classification. To paraphrase
the law, he is a person engaged in the sale of fish. Under
our law, whatever may be the usual conception of a
merchant, buying and selling are not essential; to sell
only is sufficient. (See also In re  Cameron Town Mut. Fire,
Lightning and Windstorm Ins. Co. [1899], 96 Fed., 756.)
If such a man is a merchant, does his sale of fish place
him under the exemption of the Internal Revenue Law?
We know the meaning of "fish." In the authoritative work
by Dr. C. L. G. Gunther on the Study of Fishes, we find the
following:
According to the views generally adopted at present, all
those vertebrate animals are referred to the class of
fishes, which, living in water, breathe air dissolved in
water by means of gills or branchiae; whose heart
consists of a single ventricle and single atrium; whose
limbs, if present, are modified into fins, supplemented by
unpaired median fins; and whose skin is either naked, or
covered with scales or osseous plates or bucklers . . . .
We then have left to define merely the words
"agricultural products."
"Agriculture" is defined by Webster as "the art or science
of cultivating the ground, including the preparation of
the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting
of crops, and the rearing, feeding, and management of
live stock." Let us test our facts by this definition. The
ground of the fishpond is cultivated. The soil is prepared.
We, however, greatly doubt that seeds (of fish) are
planted or that crops (of fish) are raised and harvested.
Certainly, the seeds of fish are not sown in the ground as
one would sow corn, while as distinguished from the
rearing, feeding, and management of live stock, which
consumes the products of the farm, the fish living in
water depending upon water for life, only receive
nourishment from marine plants most of which have
little or no connection with the land.
To proceed. The equivalent of "agriculture" in
"husbandry." And "husbandry" is defined by Webster as
"the business of a farmer, comprehending agriculture or
tillage of the ground, the raising, managing, and fattening
of cattle and other domestic animals, the management of
the dairy and whatever the land produces." Again, we
are far from confident that a farmer is generally
understood to be a fisherman, and that the land can be
said to produce fish. In a case in which these definitions
were considered, the supreme court of Tennessee said
that "agriculture" means "in its original sense, the
cultivation of the ground for the purpose of procuring
vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast, or the
act of preparing the soil, sowing and planting seeds,
dressing the plants, and removing the crops. In this sense
of the word includes gardening or horticulture, and also
the raising and feeding of cattle or stock; but in a more
common and appropriate sense is used to signify that
specie of cultivation which is intended to raise grain and
other field crops for a man and beast." (Simons vs. Lovell
[1872], 54 Tenn. [7 Heisk.], 510; see also In re  Drake
[1902], 114 Fed., 229.)
To proceed. "Agricultural products," the supreme court
of Georgia has held, "in ordinary usage," is confined to
the yield of the soil, as corn, wheat, rye, hay, etc. (Davis
and Co. vs. Mayor and Council of Macon [1879], 64 Ga.,
128.) The court had here to determine if beef cattle were
exempt from taxation as "an agricultural product." The
court asked —
"And when it is thought of closely, would it not be rather
an unusual application of the phrase 'agricultural
products' to make it comprehend beef cattle? In ordinary
usage, is not the phrase confined to the yield of the soil,
as corn, wheat, rye. oats, hay, etc., in its primary form?
When there has been conversion of the fruits of the soil
into animal tissues are still to apply the phrase? And
suppose we are to disregard the change in its first stage,
and call a cow or a steer an agricultural product, must we
carry the name forward to the steak or roast which the
butcher sells us from the slaughter animal? If cattle fall
under the denomination, so do hogs; and if beef, so does
bacon." (See also State vs. Patterson [1887], 4 S. E., 47.)
Another case, coming from the supreme court of the
District of Columbia, gives a much broader meaning to
the phrase. (District of Columbia vs. Oyster [1885], 4 Am.
Rep., 275.) The court said —
The common parlance of the country, and the common
practice of the county, have been to consider all those
things as farming products or agricultural products which
had the situs  of their production upon the farm, and
which were brought into condition for the uses of society
by the labor of those engaged in agricultural pursuits, as
contra-distinguished from manufacturing or other
industrial pursuits. The product of the dairy or the
product of the poultry yard, while it does not come
directly out of the soil, is necessarily connected with the
soil and with those who are engaged in the culture of the
soil. It is, in every sense of the word, a part of the farm
product. It is depended upon and looked upon as one of
the results and one of the means of income of the farm,
and in a just sense, therefore, it may be considered
produce.
To indicate further the wide sweep of the term
"agricultural products," and to show how such
terminology influences those who disagree with us,
"agricultural products" has been held to include swine,
horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay,
poultry, vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, butter, and lard.
(See Mayor vs. Davis, 6 W. and S., 279.) But never by any
court to include fish.
Like everything else in the world, it must be that there is
a limit to the things which can be included in the term
"agricultural products." The District of Columbia case,
much relied upon by the plaintiff, gives the clue.
Agriculture is but one pursuit. Agriculture and what it
includes is contradistinguished from other occupations
and professions, as manufacturing — and we believe,
fishing. Thus, of fisheries the Encyclopedia Britannica (p.
429) says —
For the most part the operations of fishing have been
comparable with those of primitive hunting rather than
with agriculture.
Fisheries, while possibly in concomitance with the soil,
are even more certainly concerned with the water in
which the fish live and have their being, If fishing is
farming, then conversely farming must be fishing.
Waiving all the technical definitions, does the ordinary
man when he speaks of agriculture and farming think of
a farmer as a fisherman, and when he speaks of fisheries
does he think of a fisherman as a farmer?
One other word in the law, "grown" is necessarily
included and must be considered in finding the proper
meaning. The law provides that "agricultural products"
must be "grown." Again referring to Webster, "grown"
means "to cause to grow; to cultivate; to produce; as, to
grow a crop; to grow wheat, hops, or tobacco." The fish
taken from the fishponds and sold are certainly not the
natural products of such land. They are retained therein
by the construction of artificial dykes. They are
animals farae nature, They have none of the
characteristics of the natural products of the soil. Fish are
not "grown" as wheat, hops, or tobacco are grown."
The question as to whether or not a similar exemption in
favor of agriculturists contained in the Internal Revenue
Law of 1904 operated to exclude from the merchant's
tax, receipts from the sale of fish, arose shortly after the
passage of that Act. The Attorney-General in an opinion
rendered on March 14, 1906 (3 Op. Atty. gen., 65), held
in effect that the culture of the soil was determining
factor in considering what products are or are not
agricultural products. As to quarrymen and fishermen.
the Attorney-General observed —
The occupation of the lumberman and the stockman, in
the historical development of these industries, as well as
in present day practice, has never been confused with
that of the agriculturist; while as to quarrymen and
fishermen it may be observed that tillers of the soil are
not wont to plow the fields in quest of rock or in
anticipation of a crop of fishes or of pearls.
This opinion of the Attorney-General was concurred in by
the then Governor-General and Acting Secretary of
Finance Justice, who had helped draft the law. The
Collector of the Internal Revenue thereupon published
the opinion in full in Bureau of Internal Revenue Circular,
No. 106. This official ruling of the executive officials is
now entitled to consideration by the courts. Courts will
and should respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statue by the executive officers whose
duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is
clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.
(In re  Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630, following
Pennoyer vs. McConnaughy [1890], 140 U. S., 363;
Government of the Philippine Islands Ex Rel.  Municipality
of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan [1916], 34
Phil. Rep., 518.)
We have thus far considered the etymology of the words.
We frankly admit to a slight doubt of exact interpretation
by this method. We, however, believe that viewed from
the standpoint of the most elementary of all rules of
statutory construction there is but one possible result. In
other words, our sole duty is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the lawmaking body. We can best
discover this intention through the medium of the action
taken by the Legislature in the enactment of other laws.
The first Internal revenue law (Act No. 1189) was enacted
by the Philippine Commission. It is plain that the
Commissioners must have had in mind agriculture as
known to them in the United States. The organization of
the American Government includes a "Department of
Agriculture," the "Bureau of Fisheries" is under the
Department of Commerce. Agriculture and fishing are
therefore separate and distinct. In Great Britain there is a
"Board of Agriculture and Fisheries." Moreover, the same
Philippine Legislature which provided an exemption from
taxation for agricultural products was also interested in
establishing a Bureau of Agriculture. In enumerating the
functions of this Bureau, not one word is said of fish or
fisheries. We rather doubt if the experts in agronomy in
the Bureau of Agriculture would consider themselves
competent to advise as to piscatology. On the contrary,
you find a section of fisheries established not in the
Bureau of Agriculture but in the Bureau of Science.
Instead, also, you find special laws unrelated to
agriculture dealing with the granting of fishery privileges.
The purpose of the Legislature in exempting agricultural
products from taxation under the Internal Revenue Law
was to encourage farming and not fishing. This court has
herefore held, and we reiterate, that "where language is
plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give
them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful." (Yangco vs. Court of
First Instance of Manila and Yangco [1915], 29 Phil., 183.)
Chief Justice Marshall in the historic case of
Gibbons vs. Ogden, ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) said:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment,
generally employ the words which most directly and
aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and
the people who adopted it must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have
intended what they have said.
The answer to our question are — A person engaged in
the sale of fish is a merchant. Fish are not an agriculture
product. This merchant is not entitled to exemption
under the Internal Revenue Law.
The further objection is made that the particular tax
would constitute double taxation. It is sufficient to note
in this respect that this court in Gil Hermanos vs. Hord
([1908] 10 Phil., 218) said:
It is very apparent that tax under discussion is not a tax
upon property. It is rather a tax upon the occupation or
industry in which a person is engaged.
The internal-revenue tax is also uniform for all of a class.
In opposition to such a contention, it could be advanced
if necessary that the burden is on plaintiff to establish
that the surrender of the taxing power is manifested by
words too plain to be mistaken. "When exemption is
claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist."
(Farrington vs. Tennessee [1877], 95 U. S., 697, 686.)
"The presumption is always against any surrender of the
taxing power." (Tennessee vs. Whitworth [1885], 117 U.
S., 129, 136.)
We have permitted our discussion of the question raised
by this appeal to proceed much farther than is really
necessary for the decision of the case. If we have fallen
into the mire of proximity, it has been because we
approached the subject with a desire to accede, if
possible, to the request of the plaintiff. We are as much
interested in upholding legislation which will assist in the
commercial development of the Islands as any one. We
cannot, however, step outside the settled and ordinary
meaning of the law and by judicial legislation give to the
law a meaning not intended. If redress is proper, under
these circumstances, complainants must look to the
Legislature and not to the courts.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
defendant is absolved of the complaint, with the costs of
the first instance against the plaintiff, and without special
finding as to costs of this instance. So ordered.
Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
JONHSON, J., with whom concurs
ARELLANO, C.J., dissenting:
The only important question presented by this appeal is
whether or not the products of a "vivero de peces"
should be considered as an agricultural product and as
such relieved from the internal-revenue tax in
accordance with paragraph (c) of article 41 of Act No.
2339.
The Court of First Instance, in a very well-reasoned
opinion, held that said products were exempt from the
internal-revenue tax under said Act. This court, by a
majority opinion, held that said products were not
exempt from the payment of the internal-revenue tax
and reversed the judgment of the lower court.
We think the majority opinion misses both the spirit and
purposes of the law, and woks a great imjustice and a
severe hardship upon thousands of the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who are engaged in purely agricultural
pursuits. Said decision places a great burden upon those
who are least able to bear it. By reason of the very small
profits of the agriculturist, earned by the hardest of
labor, every intendment of the law should be, at least,
liberally construed in his favor.
Paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 provides that
the tax imposed under said law shall not be imposed
upon "agricultural products when sold by the producer
or owner of the land where grown, whether in their
original state or not." Under the interpretation given in
the majority opinion, the Collector of Internal Revenue
may collect taxes upon every grain of rice produced by
the farmers of the Philippine Islands, unless he sells the
same "where grown." Such an interpretation, in our
opinion, was never intended by the lawmaker.
The majority opinion has fallen into error, in our opinion,
in not distinguishing a "pesqueria" from a vivero de
peces." no contention is made that the products of a
"pesquera," as the terms is generally used, should be
relieved from the internal-revenue tax. Our contention is
simply that the products of a "vivero de peces" should be
relieved from the internal-revenue tax, upon the theory
that they are as much of an agricultural product as any
other product of the farm by reason of the method
employed in producing them. The majority opinion
admits [that] whether a particular product is or is not an
agricultural product depends upon the methods used in
producing it.
A "pesqueria," as distinguished from a "vivero de peces,"
may be defined as a specie of trap  placed upon the farm
in which fish are caught from time to time. While a
"vivero de peces" may be defined as apart of the same as
is done in the production of corn, sugar cane, rice,
bananas, coconuts, ducks, chickens, eggs, milk, butter,
lard, hay, wood, cattle, horses, sheep, or any other great
variety of products produced by the farmers in the
Philippine Islands, the only difference being one of
degree of the care and labor necessary for production.
The error which the majority opinion has fallen into may
best illustrated by an example:
A is the owner of a farm. A portion of the same is dry
land capable of producing sugar cane, or corn, or other
varieties of farm products which can only be produced
upon dry land. A portion of said farm, by virtue of its
location with reference to water, sunlight, and air may be
used for the production of abaca, bananas, or some of
the various classes of fruits. Another portion of the farm
is low land, upon which rice or certain classes of
vegetables only can be produced profitably. Still another
portion of the farm is swamp land, covered by water and
incapable of being properly drained. Another portion of
the farm is mountainous so that it cannot be cultivated at
all. Upon the mountainous portion of said farm the
owner raises cattle, sheep, goats, horses, hogs, chickens,
turkeys, eggs, lard, butter, wool and hides. Another
portion of the farm can most profitably be devoted to
the production of bacauan which was held to be an
agricultural product. (Mercado vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 32 Phil. Rep., 271.) The swamp land of his farm
is of such a character that it can not profitably be
devoted to the production of rice or any of the cereals,
and is too swampy upon which to raise cattle, sheep,
horses, goats, etc. The farmer, therefore, utilizes that
portion for the production of geese, ducks, and other
domestic fowls, as well as for the production of eggs.
There comes a time when the swamp land ceases to be
profitable for the production of rice as well as for the
production of said fowls and eggs. All of said farm,
including the various classes of land as above
described, is taxed as agricultural land; and it is a matter
of common knowledge that the "vivero de peces" are
taxed as agricultural land, and equally as high, if not
higher, than other lands devoted to the production of
rice, corn or sugar cane, etc.
A great demand may arise for fish in the country. The
farmer, in order to reap the advantage of said demand,
ceases to produce eggs, or ducks, or geese upon the
swamp lands of his farm and turn the same into a
"vevero de peces." He, thus, wisely utilizing the different
portions of the farm for the production of all of the
products which farmers generally produce, is greatly
increasing the wealth of the State.
The majority opinion admits that domestic fowls —
chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys — and eggs, butter, lard,
milk, vegetables, fruit, etc., are agricultural products, but
argues that nothing is, or may be considered, an
agricultural product which does not result from a
cultivation of the soil. To admit that eggs, butter, lard and
milk are agricultural products, and to argue that nothing
is an agricultural product which does not result from a
cultivation of the soil presents a consistency in argument
and conclusion which we are unable to understand. It is
admitted  that the land for the "vevero de peces" is
specially prepared. A certain cultivation and preparation
is necessary for the creation of a "vivero de peces." It is
difficult to understand what special preparation of the
soil is necessary for the production of hen's eggs, butter,
lard, milk, or cattle, or sheep or horses or hogs, or goats
which makes those products agricultural products. It is a
matter of common knowledge that land may be specially
prepared for the production of rice this year and then
changed into a "vivero de peces" next year and vice
versa. Under what interpretation of the law and under
what definition of agricultural products may we conclude
that the year in which the same parcel of land produces
rice produces an agricultural product while in the year it
is producing fish is not also producing an agricultural
products? Of course, as we stated above, a "vivero de
peces" must not be confused with a "pesqueria" which is
used as a trap for the purpose of catching fish. No
contention is made that the products of the latter is in
any sense an agricultural product any more than the
product of a trap placed in the fields for the purpose of
catching wild animals, which from time to time pass upon
the land, is an agricultural product.
It is admitted in the majority opinion that the land for a
"vivero de peces" must be specially prepared by first
building dykes and cultivating the land preparatory to the
planting of the fish. the only difference, therefore,
between the preparation of a "vivero de peces" and the
preparation of a rice paddy is one in extent of labor
employed. In both cases the land is specially prepared for
the particular purpose to which the farmer desires to
devote it. Forgetting for a moment the stereotyped and
the lexicographer's definition of agricultural products,
and forgetting for a moment that there is no more
difference, so far as the method of production is
concerned, between the production of corn and the
production of ducks and eggs, we will find ourselves
driven to the conclusion that from the standpoint of
method of production there is no difference between the
production of fish in a "vivero de peces" and the
production of ducks upon land which is recognized as
agricultural lands. The majority opinion has fallen into
error by trying to make a 15th century definition apply to
20th century conditions. The judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed with costs.