G.R. No. 198774. April 4, 2016.

*
 
TEOFILO ALOLINO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO FLORES and ANASTACIA MARIE
FLORES, respondents.
Local Government Units; Patrimonial Properties; Properties for Public Use; Properties of Local
Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or patrimonial property.—There
is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-sari store on government property. Properties of Local
Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or patrimonial property. Article
424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications: Article 424. Property for public use,
in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads,
_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any
of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws. (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino’s house is property of
public dominion devoted to public use.
Same; Same; To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the Local
Government Unit (LGU) to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian
members, permanently closing the road.—To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law
requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members,
permanently closing the road. In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a
resolution. The difference between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance
is a law but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body.
Same; Properties Devoted to Public Service; A barrio road is outside the commerce of man and as a
consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to prescription;
(4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (5) it is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary easements.—Properties of the local government
that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress.
Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these properties unless specifically authorized by
Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply
with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress. The Sanggunian’s failure to
comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the barrio road. As a barrio road, the
subject lot’s purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the commerce of man
and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; (2) it is not subject to registration under
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; (3) it is not susceptible to
prescription; (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract;

 
 
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94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
(5) it is not subject to attachment and execution; and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easements.
 Civil Law; Easements; Words and Phrases; An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an
immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a
community, or of one (1) or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.—An easement
is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong. Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years. Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous
ones can only be acquired by virtue of a title. Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification for
the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract.
Same; Same; Easement of Right-of-Way; An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot
be acquired through prescription.—An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot be
acquired through prescription. On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through
prescription counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining
lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had
not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction
in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through prescription. Thus, only
easements created by law can burden the respondents’ property.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right-of-way.—The
provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code whose specific
coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience. Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal
easements of right-of-way. Article 649 creates a legal easement in favor of an owner or any person entitled
to use any immovable, which is landlocked by other immovables pertaining to other persons without an
adequate access to a public highway. Article 652 creates a legal easement in favor of an isolated piece of
land acquired by sale, exchange, partition, or

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor.  Article
653 grants the same right-of-way, in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor when his property
is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an estate, after payment of indemnity, a
right-of-way to carry materials through the estate of another when it is indispensable for the construction
or repair of a building in his estate. Finally, Article 657 governs right-of-way easements for the passage of
livestock.
Same; Same; Nuisance; Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance.—Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an
easement of right-of-way over the respondents’ property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not
mean, however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrio road and blocking the
rear of Alolino’s house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance. Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents’ house is
evidently a nuisance: Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or
offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs
the use of property.
Same; Nuisance; The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use
constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.—A barrio road is designated for the use of
the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on
these roads, such as the respondents’ illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and
convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use
constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.
Same; Same; Demolition; Urban Development and Housing Act; Section 28 of the Urban
Development and Housing Act itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on public roads and
sidewalks because these nuisances are injurious to public welfare.—The CA
  
 
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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
clearly erred when it invoked Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act as a ground to
deny the demolition of respondents’ illegal structure. The invoked provision reads: Sec. 28. Eviction and
Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however,
may be allowed under the following situations: a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such
as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places
such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; x x x x (c) When there is a court order for eviction
and demolition. x x x (Emphasis supplied) The invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal
structures on public roads and sidewalks because these nuisances are injurious to public welfare.
Evidently, the respondents have no right to maintain their occupation and permanent obstruction of
the barrio road. The interests of the few do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety,
good order, and general welfare.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Gordon, Dario, Reyes, Hocson, Viado and Blanco for petitioner.
  Gilbert C. Layun for respondents.
BRION, J.:
 
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed from the July 8, 2011 decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 94524.1 The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC)
decision2 in Civil Case No. 693203 and dismissed peti-
_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 277-286. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L.
Guariña III and Japar B. Dimaampao.
2  Id., at pp. 225-232. RTC of Pasig City, Branch 153. 
3  Id. Penned by Judge Briccio C. Ygaña.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
tioner Teofilo Alolino’s complaint against the respondents for the removal of their illegally
constructed structure.
 
Antecedents
 
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen.
Luna Street, Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 784
and 976. TCT No. 784 was issued on August 30, 1976 covering an area of 26 square meters;
while TCT No. 976 was issued on August 29, 1977, with an area of 95 square meters.
Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a
second floor to the structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property.
There are terraces on both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3)
on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their
house/sari-sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear
perimeter wall of Alolino’s house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the
respondents could not secure a building permit. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3)
inches away from the back of Alolino’s house, covering five windows and the exit door. The
respondents’ construction deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed
and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused.
Thus, he complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of
Taguig. He also filed a complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan.
Acting on Alolino’s complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction
against the respondents on
 
 
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98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
February 15, 1995, directing them to immediately stop further construction.4
Sometime in 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second floor to their
structure, again without securing a building permit. This floor was to serve as residence for their
daughter, Maria Teresa Sison. The construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with
the Building Official of Taguig.
The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents on
May 6, 2002, directing the respondents to desist from their illegal construction.5
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that
no settlement was reached between the parties relative to Alolino’s 1994 complaint.6
The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. This prompted
Alolino to send them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal of their illegally
constructed structure.
Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14,
2003, Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal
of the encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and
(3) the payment of damages. Alolino claimed that the respondents’ encroaching structure deprived
him of his light and view and obstructed the air ventilation inside his house. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 69320.
In their answer,7 the respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of action against
them. They alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their
_______________

4  Id., at p. 123.
5  Id., at p. 124.
6  Id., at pp. 110, 122.
7  Id., at pp. 127-130.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that
plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of
his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their
house facing Alolino’s does not violate the latter’s alleged easement of light and view because it
has no window.
The respondents also admitted to them that they did not secure a building permit because the
property was constructed on a municipal/barrio road. They claimed, however, that on March 1,
2004, the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig (the Sanggunian) reclassified the property as a
residential lot from its prior classification as a barrio/municipal road.8
During the trial, both parties moved for an ocular inspection of the premises. Consequently, on
November 19, 2007, the RTC ordered the branch clerk of court, the deputy sheriff, and the
stenographer to conduct the inspection. The ocular inspection was conducted on December 6,
2007.
In their report dated January 30, 2008,9 the inspection team confirmed that the respondents’
property blocked the entry of light and air to Alolino’s house.
On April 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to remove their
illegal structure obstructing Alolino’s right to light and view.
The RTC found that Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of light and view
and that the respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their construction. It held that
the respondents’ illegal construction was a private nuisance with respect to Alolino because it
prevented him from using the back portion of his property and obstructed his free passage to
the barrio/municipal road.
_______________

8  Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15, Series of 2004; id., at p. 182.

9  Id., at pp. 96-106.

 
 
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100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
The court farther held that the respondents’ house was a public nuisance, having been illegally
constructed on a barrio road — a government property — without a building permit.
The respondents appealed the decision to the CA and was docketed as C.A.-G.R. CV No.
94524.
On July 8, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
The CA held (1) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view because he never
gave a formal prohibition against the respondents pursuant to Article 66810 of the Civil Code; (2)
that Alolino was also at fault, having built his house up to the edge of the property line in
violation of the National Building Code;11 (3) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of right-
of-way to the barrio Road; and (4) that the respondents’ house was not a public nuisance because
it did not endanger the safety of its immediate surroundings.
The CA concluded that the Government had already abandoned the barrio road pursuant to the
2004 Sanggunian resolution. It further held that the respondents’ property could
_______________

10  Art. 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the
window is through a wall on the dominant estate.
11  Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to
the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil Code of the Philippines,  shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
 not be demolished, citing Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act.12
Alolino moved for reconsideration on July 28, 2011.
On September 28, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration and maintained that
Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view.
Thus, on November 15, 2011, Alolino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
 
The Petition
 
Alolino insists (1) that he acquired an easement of light and view by virtue of a title because
the respondents constructed their house on a barrio road; (2) that the provision of Sec. 708 of the
National Building Code and Article 670 of the Civil Code prescribing the setbacks is inapplicable
because the property is adjacent to a barrio road; (3) that he has a right-of-way over the lot
occupied by the respondents because it is a barrio road; and (4) that the respondents’ house/sari-
sari store is a nuisance per se.
In its comment, the respondent counters (1) that Alolino has not acquired an easement of light
and view or an easement of right-of-way, by either prescription or title; (2) that Alolino is at fault
for constructing his house up to the edge of his property line without observing the setbacks
required in Article 670 of the Civil Code and Section 702 of the National Building Code; and (3)
that their house/sari-sari store is not a nuisance because it is not a serious threat to public safety
and the Sanggunian has already reclassified the lot as residential.
_______________

12  An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program, Establish the
Mechanism for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes [Urban Development and Housing Act], Republic Act No. 7279,
Section 28 (1992).

 
 
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102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
Our Ruling
 
We find the petition meritorious.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari-sari store on government property.
Properties of Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or
patrimonial property.13 Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications:

Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities,
or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.14 (Emphasis supplied)
 
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino’s house is property of public dominion
devoted to public use.
We find no merit in the respondents’ contention that the Local Government of Taguig had
already withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a residential lot.
The Local Government Code15 (LGC) authorizes an LGU to withdraw a local road from public use
under the following conditions:
 
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.—
 (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or
temporarily close or
_______________

13  Art. 423, Civil Code.

14  Art. 424, Civil Code.
15  An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991 [Local Government Code], Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction; Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate
substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without
making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus
permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
lawfully used or conveyed. x x x
 
To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an
ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing
the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The
difference between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law
but a resolution is only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body.16
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are
under the absolute control of Congress.17 Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these
properties unless specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the
LGC.18 In exercising this authority, the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the
limitations prescribed by Congress. The
_______________

16  Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 354 Phil. 684, 693; 292 SCRA 678, 689 (1998).
17  Macasiano v. Diokno, G.R. No. 97764, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 464, 469.
18  Id.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
Sanggunian’s failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of
the barrio road.
As a barrio road, the subject lot’s purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It
is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; 19 (2) it
is not subject to registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a
Torrens title;20 (3) it is not susceptible to prescription;21 (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise
be the object of a contract;22 (5) it is not subject to attachment and execution;23 and (6) it cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easements.24
An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.25 Continuous and apparent
easements may be acquired by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
years.26 Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones can only
be acquired by virtue of a
_______________

19  Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 520 Phil. 753, 799; 486 SCRA 229,
269 (2006).
20  Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, 150-A Phil. 806, 813; 45 SCRA 418, 425 (1972).
21  Arts. 1108, 1113 Civil Code:
Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men [man] are susceptible of [to] prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription. (Emphasis supplied)
22  Arts. 1347, 1409, Civil Code.
23  Id.; see also Villarico v. Sarmiento, 484 Phil. 724, 729; 442 SCRA 110, 115 (2004), citing Tolentino II, Civil Code,
pp. 31-32 (1992 ed.).
24  Id., Villarico v. Sarmiento, id.
25  Arts. 613, 614, Civil Code.
26  Art. 620, Civil Code.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
 
title.27 Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical justification for the acquisition of a right. It
may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract.
We must distinguish between the respondents’ house and the land it is built on. The land itself
is public property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be
burdened with voluntary easements. On the other hand, the respondents’ house is private
property, albeit illegally constructed on public property. It can be the object of prescription and
can be burdened with voluntary easements. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the respondents
have not voluntarily burdened their property with an easement in favor of Alolino.
An easement of a right-of-way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through
prescription.28 On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through
prescription counting from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the
adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.29
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the
respondents prior to their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of
light and view through prescription. Thus, only easements created by law can burden the
respondents’ property.
 The provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code
whose specific coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience.
Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right-of-way. Article 649 creates a
legal easement in favor of
_______________

27  Art. 622, Civil Code.

28  Id.; Ronquillo v. Roco, 103 Phil. 84, 89 (1958); reiterated in Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil.
350, 357; 193 SCRA 333, 338 (1991).
29  Art. 668, Civil Code.

 
 
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 Alolino vs. Flores
an owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked by other
immovables pertaining to other persons without an adequate access to a public highway. Article
652 creates a legal easement in favor of an isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange,
partition, or donation when it is surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner,
or donor. Article 653 grants the same right-of-way in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner,
or donor when his property is the one that becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an
estate, after payment of indemnity, a right-of-way to carry materials through the estate of another
when it is indispensable for the construction or repair of a building in his estate. Finally, Article
657 governs right-of-way easements for the passage of livestock.
None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino’s property with respect to the barrio road
where the respondents’ house stands on.
On the other hand, Section 5 of Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code (Articles 667-
673) governs legal easements of light and view. These seven provisions are:
 
SECTION 5
Easement of Light and View
 
Article 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the
party wall any window or aperture of any kind.
Article 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and
view shall be counted: (1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a
party wall; or (2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the
adjoining land or tenement, if the window is through a wall on the dominant estate.
Article 669. When the distances in Article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall
which is not party wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another,
 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
can make in it openings to admit light at the height of the ceiling joints or immediately
under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square, and, in every case, with an
iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the
openings are made can close them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no
stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall
thereon contiguous to that having such openings, unless an easement of light has been
acquired.
Article 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which
afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without
leaving a distance of two meters between the wall in which they are made and such
contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had,
unless there be a distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription.
Article 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in
cases of direct views from the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from
the outer line of the latter when they do, and, in cases of oblique view, from the dividing
line between the two properties.
 Article 672. The provisions of Article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated
by a public way or alley, which is not less than three meters wide, subject to special
regulations and local ordinances.
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views,
balconies or belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the ser-
 
 
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108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alolino vs. Flores
vient estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of three meters to be measured in
the manner provided in Article 671. Any stipulation permitting distances less than those
prescribed in Article 670 is void.
 
However, none of these provisions actually create a legal easement of light and view which
can only be acquired through prescription or a by virtue of a voluntary title.
From the foregoing, we agree with the respondents that Alolino does not have an easement of
light and view or an easement of right-of-way over the respondents’ property or the barrio road it
stands on. This does not mean, however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying
the barrio road and blocking the rear of Alolino’s house. Every building is subject to the easement
which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance. 30 Under Article 694 of the
Civil Code, the respondents’ house is evidently a nuisance:
 
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or
any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. (Emphasis supplied)
 
A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and
unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respon-
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30  Art. 682, Civil Code.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
dents’ illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The
occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use constitute public
and private nuisances and nuisance per se.31
The CA clearly erred when it invoked Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act
as a ground to deny the demolition of respondents’ illegal structure. The invoked provision reads:
 
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following
situations:
 a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
x x x x
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
 
The invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on public roads and
sidewalks because these nuisances are injurious to public welfare. Evidently, the respondents have
no right to maintain their occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road. The interests
of the few do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and
general welfare.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 94524 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
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31  Sitchon v. Aquino, 98 Phil. 458, 464-466 (1956); Dacanay v. Asistio, Jr., G.R. No. 93654, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA
404, 408, citing Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. II, p. 59, 6th ed.

 
 
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Alolino vs. Flores
Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 153 in Civil Case No. 69320 is REINSTATED.
The respondents, and all persons claiming rights under them, are ORDERED to remove and
demolish their illegal structure. The respondents are also ORDERED to pay the petitioner the
sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney’s fees. Costs against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—It must be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the
obligations imposed on the servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the
property rights of the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all preconditions before his claim for
easement of right-of-way may be granted. (Dichoso, Jr. vs. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495 [2011])
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of
the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. (Republic vs. Cortez, 715 SCRA 416 [2014])