World Development, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 607-622, 1993. 0305-750x/93 $6.00 + 0.

00
Printed in Great Britain. 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd

Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural

Development: Opportunities with Diminishing
States and Expanding Markets

NORMAN UPHOFF
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

Summary. - This article undertakes to deal systematically with nongovernment organizations

(NGOs) and grassroots organizations (GROs). usually treated as a residual category. Ten levels
for development decision making and action are identified in the tradition of central place theory.
Three of these are considered “local” or “grassroots” because of their collective action
possibilities. Then, three sectors are delineated, instead of the usual two. NGOs arc part of the
collective action sector which differs from the public and private sectors in theoretically
consistent ways. A careful distinction is made between institutions and organizations. usually
conflated in the literature. Examples of accelerated rural development through grassroots
organizations and NGOs are discussed from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

1. INTRODUCTION While other papers examine the state vis-ci-vis

market institutions, this one focuses on so-called
The 1960s were dubbed the first “development civil institutions, particularly those that are clos-
decade ,” and the 1970s managed to qualify as the est to rural people, at the metaphoric grassroots.
second, though less confidently. The 1980s might These institutions and the opportunities they
better have been called the “decade of debt and present for rural development need always to be
disillusionment.” How will the 1990s be charac- assessed in relation to both state and market
terized? As the decade of deregulation, democra- institutions, since the strengths and weaknesses
tization, and decentralization? Or will a drearier of all three sets of institutions are complementary
designation be appropriate - the decade of and interrelated. Unfortunately, the term “non-
disorder, disinvestment and decline? governmental organizations” treats NGOs as a
Avoiding the latter outcomes will depend in residual category (Uphoff, 1987). one which
large part on creating positive synergy among the includes market (private, for-profit) enterprises
state, the market, and civil institutions. We need if taken literally. One of the tasks of this paper is
to understand how these alternative channels for to delineate for NGOs a place within the overall
raising economic, social and political productivity scheme of a country’s institutional capabilities
can be made to function better, respectively and such that these organizations are regarded as
collectively. All three sets of institutions are more than a residual set.
human rather than divine creations. Their scope Considering GROs together with NGOs can
and operations evolve in response to our ideas best be justified by noting that both have been
and our aspirations, reflecting at the same time overlooked in most state vs. market debates,
our apprehensions and our limited imagination. which ignore self-help collective action. Other-
Certainly, state and market institutions are not wise, it should be recognized that these two sets
today what they were 10 or 20 or 50 or 100 years of institutions are different, GROs being defined
ago. The same is true of grassroots organizations in terms of levels while NGOs are designated
(GROs) and nongovernmental organizations according to some conception of sectors. These
(NGOs), which are the focus of this paper. They criteria for distinguishing institutions are elabor-
are shaped more by what people expect of them ated in sections 2 and 3 below. They enable us to
and will accept than by material investments and work with analytical rather than simply descrip-
constraints. So what we think about them is itself tive categories.
important. After presenting in section 4 a carefully drawn
607
608 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

distinction between institutions and organiza- thorough study of local institutional development
tions. commonly treated as interchangeable (Uphoff, 1986, pp. l&14).
terms, we look in section 5 at how grassroots and We asked the question: What are the common-
nongovernmental organizational channels offer ly understood levels at which decision making
opportunities for accelerating rural development. and activity affecting development take place?
Section 6 takes a concluding and comparative Ten such levels were identified, ranging from the
look at development efforts from below at a time international to the individual level. These are
when “the long arm of the state” is shortening shown in Figure 1. with the three that are
and when the reach of market forces is being commonly regarded as “local” grouped together
extended but unevenly. by a solid line. The first subdivision of a nation
To suggest that GROs and NGOs can make is designated by different names - region, state,
important contributions to rural development in province - but these entities are functionally
the 1990s and beyond does not mean that they similar. The next subdivision. usually called a
are inherently or invariably superior to state or district, has crossnational similarities, as does the
market alternatives. The “populist” fallacy is as next level. the subdistrict. Both the district and
mistaken as the “paternalist” fallacy when it subdistrict are essentially administrative entities,
comes to assessing the virtues of grassroots or defined by political superiors rather than by the
nongovernmental organizations (Uphoff and Es- people themselves.
man, lY74). GROs/NGOs are limited, often
flawed channels for promoting development. Yet
International level
they deserve more attention than they have
received. I
National level

I
Regional level
2. ANALYZING LEVELS TO CLARIFY Alternatively referred to as the state or
THE CONCEPT OF “GRASSROOTS” provincial level

References to “grassroots organizations” are I

District level
more rhetorical than rigorous. GROs are distin-
guished generally from national or regional orga- I
Subdistrict level
nizations, which are relatively remote from the I
people who are supposed to be involved in and
Locality level
benefitted by development. We associate GROs
A set of communities having social and economic
with “bottom-up” development rather than with relations. usually with interactions centered
the “top-down” style of decision making and around a market town; this level can correspond
implementation that is undertaken at national or to the Subdistrict level where a market town is
regional levels. the subdistrict center
A better designation for GROs is local organi-
zations, provided that the term “local” is used Community level
rigorously. Too often one hears expatriates An established socioeconomic residential unit,
referring casually to the Government of Bangla- often referred to as the village level
desh or to the Government of India as ‘the local
government.” Such references should be to the Croup level
national government, which is quite different A self-identified set of persons with
from the punchnyar councils that are forms of some common interest. such as occupational,
local government in those countries. age, gender, ethnic or other grouping;
The term “local” is defined simply in the may be persons in a small residential area
Oxford Pocket Dictionary (1988) as meaning “of like a neighborhood
or affecting a particular place or small area.” I
There should be no mistaking a local government
Household level
or organization with one operating at the
national level. But there is little consensus about I
what constitutes ‘the local level.” Perhaps this is Individual level
because there are, analytically speaking, three
local levels, not just one. This was the conclusion Source: Uphoff (1986). p.11
of the Rural Development Committee at Cornell
when it was commissioned by the US Agency for
International Development (USAID) to do a
 GROs and NGOs 609

This lo-tier model of organization for develop- here. Grassroots organizations are any and all
ment planning and implementation encompasses organizations at the group, community or locality
the levels that Streeten (1991) described: “the level, though usually one is referring to member-
structure of government decision making consists ship or voluntary organizations as will be discus-
of many departments, ministries and agencies, sed below. Technically speaking, a village-level
and many layers from central government via bank branch or an administrative office of the
provinces (or states in a federation) to village or central government is a “grassroots organiza-
town councils.” The theoretical basis for this tion,” since ‘*grassroots” refers to the organiza-
model is what regional scientists call “central tion’s level. not to any other characteristics.
place theory” as applied by Johnson (1970), Other features need to be specified to refine our
Mosher (1969) and Owens and Shaw (1972). understanding of GROs. One generalization is
The uppermost limit of what is “local” is likely that grassroots (local) organizations have more
to be the area served by a rural market town, social content and function compared to admini-
commonly referred to as a locality. It includes a strative or political orientation.
set of communities that have trading, inter- Distinguishing among levels deserves policy
marriage and other cooperative links with one analysts’ and planners’ attention because differ-
another, where people have some possibility of ent kinds of economic and social development
personal acquaintance, and usually some experi- activity are better undertaken at one level or
ence of working together. It is the area rural another. We find primary schools usually at
people refer to when asked where they come community level, secondary schools at locality
from if they think their questioner will not know level. and postsecondary schools at subdistrict or
the village where they reside. district level.’ Savings clubs are most effective at
The community or village level is what people the group or community level, while bank
usually think of as “local.” There is less distance branches are located in market towns (which
and distinction between this and the locality level function as centers of localities), and bank offices
above it than between the locality and the in subdistrict towns. It is important to think
subdistrict above it, unless the latter is small and spatially and in terms of levels, considering the
headquartered in a market town, in which case implications of different functional socioecono-
the locality and subdistrict levels can coincide. mic areas hierarchically organized which create
Groups are generally at a lower level, i.e. more different behavioral settings (Fox, 1990). De-
elementary in social organizational terms, than a velopment promotion needs to have a deliberate
community, though groups can cross village spatial dimension.
boundaries. If groups become larger than com-
munities, needing formal organization and legal
recognition they become supralocal parts of the
“middle” sector discussed below, e.g., regional 3. DELINEATING SECTORS ACCORDING
cooperatives or provincial associations. TO INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
The basic characteristic of what is “local” from
a socioeconomic perspective is that most people There is growing recognition of what is being
within a locality, community or group have face- called “the third sector,” operating between what
to-face relationships and are likely to have we refer to as the public and the private sectors.’
multistranded connections - as members of a But this category, without refinement, puts self-
common church, as buyers at the same market, help membership associations in the same categ-
as relatives through extended families, etc. This ory with paternalistic, philanthropic organiza-
provides a better basis for “collective action” tions. Such heterogeneity lumps together a
than found above or outside these levels. say at village savings club in Peru and the Rockefeller
district or subdistrict levels. There, people have Foundation, which might study or subsidize this
been grouped mostly for administrative purposes association.
(convenience) and have little acquaintance with This third sector, rather than representing a
one another and little sense of common interest compromise, can be delineated in qualitatively
or fate. While households and individuals are distinct terms with theoretical foundations. It has
found at local levels, they are not considered to some characteristics in common with each of the
be local levels since they do not present the same other two sectors but it is also different from each
problematic issues of “collective” action found in meaningful ways. It can be designated various-
with groups, communities and localities (sets of ly as the voluntary sector, the membership
communities). sector, the self-help sector, the participatory
What are the “grassroots” then? This express- sector, or the collective action sector. For our
ion applies to the three local levels identified purposes here, it is most appropriate to use the
610 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

latter term, as it is the most theoretically interest- others. Each also can be seen as having dimi-
ing. nishing returns.
The main thing distinguishing the three sectors To take a concrete example, if one were trying
is the incentives used to get cooperation or to stop overgrazing of common pastures, to
compliance (Hunter, 1969). The first sector relies prevent *&the tragedy of the commons” that
on bureaucratic mechanisms and seeks enforced Hardin was concerned about (1968):
compliance with government decisions. made by
experts according to technical principles and - With the first approach, one would deter-
criteria following policy objectives set by top mine by technocratic means the carrying
officials. The second sector uses market mechan- capacity of the pasture. Some maximum herd
isms to promote desired behavior, such as size would be set for herders, quotas or
investment or increased labor effort, using price licenses would be issued. and they would be
incentives. Decisions are left to individuals to fined or jailed for any infractions. “Excess”
calculate private advantage without reference to cattle would be confiscated or shot if com-
broader interests or the public good. The third pliance were still not forthcoming. This
sector depends more on voluntaristic mechan- approach has the advantage for such a task of
isms, involving processes of bargaining, discus- being fairly quick and certain, but it could be
sion, accommodation and persuasion. Decisions costly in terms of personnel and resentment.
are taken with reference both to group and - With the second approach. a price would
individual interests. Neither state authority nor be set which should induce herders to sell off
profit maximization determine choices, though “excess” cattle. This would be cheap in terms
members’ decisions can activate both regulatory of not requiring many personnel, but it could
and price inducements. These three approaches be costly to maintain a subsidized price (which
are presented summarily in Table 1. would be an interference with current equili-
These are obviously ideal types, and they are brium market prices and thus a violation of
not mutually exclusive. They are alternatives market methods at a higher level). In addi-
only with respect to a particular activity and a tion, a market approach could have the
certain set of persons whose compliance is perverse effect of encouraging herders to
sought. These different methods of seeking and increase overstocking, so it might simply be
gaining compliance can be, and indeed should unsuitable for this task.
be, combined to compose an overall strategy of - With the third approach, one would try to
rural development. Each has limitations as well organize and educate herders to control herd
as advantages, and each is better suited for size, sharing quotas among themselves and
certain kinds of development tasks than for enforcing limits upon their members. This

Table I Airernalive approaches IO rurul developnwr~

I 11 III

Principal mechanisms Bureaucratic Market proccssea Voluntary

organization associations

Decision makers Administrators and Individual producers. Leaders and mcmbcrs

experts consumers. savers and
investors

Guides for behavior Regulations Price signals and Agreement5

quantity adjustments

Criteria for decisions Policy - and best Efficiency - Interest5 of members

means to implement it maximization of
profit and/or utility

Sanctions State authority Financial lo55 Social pressure

backed by coercion
Mode of operation Top-down Individuali5tic Bottom-up

Source: Adapted from Esman and Uphoff 1984. p. 20.

 GROs and NGOs 611

would spare the government from using coer- wrote about three types of power - condign,
cion. but it could be slow and possibly compensatory, and conditioned - which corres-
unreliable. Normatively it is attractive but pond almost exactly to the distinctions made by
practically it might not be acceptable if there Boulding and Etzioni, though he made no con-
were urgent need to reduce herd size.j nection between his categories and theirs.
These classifications parallel some basic dis-
These three approaches, respectively identi- tinctions made in game theory, which provide a
fied with the public sector, the private sector, and basis for some of the more theoretically powerful
the third sector, whatever it is called, rest on propositions in social science. The first of these
different theoretical bases for compliance or three types of compliance is negative-sum, the
cooperation. A number of leading contributors second zero-sum, and the third positive-sum.
to social science over the last 30 years, as seen Another way of contrasting them is to compare
below, have arrived independently at essentially the relationships they postulate among people’s
the same three-fold distinction discussed here. I utility functions. In the first kind of exchange,
will present the parallel conceptualizations be- there is negative interdependence, i.e., one
cause they put the so-called third sector on an person’s loss is considered as another person’s
equal theoretical footing with the public and gain, while in the second category, there is
private sectors. independence of utility functions. In the third
The third sector should not be seen as a situation, there is positive interdependence, with
residual sector and it is more than a subdivision people regarding others’ gains as also their own.
of the private sector (as being nonprofit rather Most economists have assumed in their analy-
than for-profit). An expanded conceptualization sis, for convenience’s sake, that people’s utility
and classification of sectors helps us think more functions are all separate from one another,
proactively about a role for this sector in the representing any mutuality of interests as inde-
1990s and beyond, overcoming what Streeten pendent payoffs to the respective players. In fact,
calls “the poverty of our institutional imagina- all three possibilities exist in the real world, with
tion.” Fortunately, there are numerous theoreti- negative interdependence represented by the
cal components in the social science literature green-eyed monster of envy and positive inrerde-
which offer support for more than a residual pendence by the multiple examples of altruism
conception of this third sector, focussing on and charity we can observe around us.’
different compliance relationships and incen- A further paradigm now widely appreciated
tives. in the social sciences which parallels this set of
Organization theory was initially more in the behavioral alternatives is that of Hirschman
domain of sociologists. Etzioni some years ago (1970) - exit, voice, and loyalty. The first
(1961) identified three ideal types of organiza- option, exit, breaking off all relationships. is
tions based on alternative means for gaining preferred where game outcomes are negative-
compliance: coercive, remunerative (or utilita- sum or when utility functions are negatively
rian), and normative. Respective examples interdependent, though exit may be prevented by
would be a prison, a business, and a service the use of coercion. Voice stands for a bargaining
organization such as the Rotary Club. These situation where exchanges can take place on a
corresponded, though Etzioni did not make the quid pro quo basis, while loyalty reflects an
connection, to the kinds of power that French interdependence of utility functions and positive-
and Raven (1959) had delineated in their un- sum outcomes that integrate persons with one
usually rigorous analysis of the subject: coercive another. These sets of distinctions are summar-
power, reward power, and referent power, the ized in Table 2.
latter similar to what they called legitimate These parallel distinctions suggest why a. sim-
power. ple public vs. private sector breakdown is not
Meanwhile, economists were constructing dis- very apt. The “private” sector exhibits the
tinctions paralleling, without apparent connec- characteristics of column II in Table 2. while the
tion, those which sociologists had proposed. “public” sector, because its decisions are unique-
Boulding (1964) suggested three alternative types ly backed by the threat or exercise of coercion,
of social systems based on different principles for has features of column I (though as discussed
getting cooperation: threat systems (where below it has some features of all three columns).
“bads” were exchanged for “bads,” the opposite The “third” sector which includes NGOs and
of goods), exchange systems (where goods are particularly GROs is linked particularly with the
exchanged for goods), and integrative systems motivations and dynamics represented by column
(where goods are given without requiring some- III.
thing in return).4 Galbraith subsequently (1983) These three sets of organizational and behavi-
612

Types of organizations Coercive Remunerative Normative

(Etzioni, 1961)
Types of power Coercive power Reward power Referent power
(French and Raven, 1959) Legitimate power
Kinds of systems Threat systems Exchange systems Integrative systems
(Boulding 1964. 19X9)

Kinds of power Condign power Compensatory power Conditioned power

(Galbraith, 19X3)

Game theory outcomes Negative-sum Zero-sum Positive-sum

(e.g.. Rappoport. 1969)
Relationship of Interdependent Independent Interdependent
utility functions (negative) (positive)
Behavioral alternatives Exit (desired: but Voice (criticism Loyalty (acceptance
(Hirschman, 1970) may be prevented) and bargaining) of some disutilitics)

oral principles are not mutually exclusive (Bould- identifies it particularly with column I.” This
ing, 1989). Even armies. the quintessential exam- suggests a continuum, using Etzioni’s terms to
ples of_ threat systems, have exchange and integ- represent the respective columns in Table 3.
rative aspects, and social or service clubs, exem- This gives a theoretical foundation for the
plifying the third category can have a few commonsense notion of a sectoral continuum,
coercive features. We should not seek to reduce with the collective action sector located between
all policy or action to any one of these three the market and state sectors.
clusterings of differentiated norms and behaviors When considering institutional alternatives for
as they are complementary sets within human promoting rural development, we should think in
society. terms of the continuum of sectors shown in
It is worth noting a kind of stepwise relation- Figure 2. Each of the three sector alternatives, it
ship among the three sectoral alternatives - turns out, has two particular types of local
state, market, and collective action (member- institutions associated with it. All of these are
ship. voluntary. self-help, participatory) - as “grassroots organizations,” according to the dis-
this suggests some possibly evolutionary relation- tinctions made above among levels of organiza-
ships. The market sector is most fully repre- tion for decision making and action.
sented by a single set of principles. those in The bottom row in Figure 2 characterizes the
column II of Table 2. The collective action sector relationships that people have to these different
is best characterized by principles in column III, kinds of “GROs.” In the first set, people as
while also having some attributes of column II citizens and voters have some rights and influ-
but not column I. The state sector has features of ence concerning which services will be provided
all three compliance systems, but it is distin- and how. But it is indirect control if exercised
guished from the other two sectors by being able through representatives, who are generally rc-
to enforce decisions by use of coercion, which mote from local administrative units, compared

Sector Principles of Organization and Behavior

Market Sector (1st) Remunerative

Collective Action Sector (1st) Normative (2nd) Remunerative

State Sector (1st) Coercive (2nd) Normative (3rd) Remuncrativc

 GROs and NGOs 613

Public sector Collective action Private sector

sector

Local Local Membership Cooperatives Service Private

administration government organizations organiz8tloas buslnesses

--------------- Oricntotions of local institutions ____-------__

Bureaucratic Political Self-help Self-help Charitable Profit making

(common (resource (non profit (business
interests) pooling) enterprise) enterprise)

-------- Roles of individuals in relation to different kinds of local institutions ------.

Citizens or Voters and Members Members Clients or Customers or

subjects constituents beneficiaries employees

Source: Adapted from Uphoff (1986). p.5

Figure 2. Continuum of types of local institutions by sector.

with those in local government bodies who are some better than others. Each of these channels
more proximate. for planning and carrying out activities that
Service organizations are grouped together further rural development has some strengths
with private businesses because in organizational and some weaknesses. The spirit of voluntarism
terms, there is little difference between being a can lower operating costs of a member-operated
client or beneficiary of the first and being a pharmacy, but its services may lapse if there is
customer or employee of the second. Those who internal factionalism or loss of leadership. A
make decisions in either kind of organization are government pharmacy can be located where
not accountable to those who receive the goods people’s incomes are too low to attract a private
and services provided. Clients and beneficiaries dispensary. But it may run out of medicines
may receive more benign treatment from a toward the end of the budget year or maintain
charitable organization that assists or hires them stocks that don’t match local needs. A private
than do customers and employees of a business. drug store may provide medicines efficiently and
But none of these has a right to take decisions responsively, but its profit motive can tempt it to
about the goods and services or jobs provided. dilute solutions or to give inferior quality drugs.
Patients in a private hospital, for example, will Or it may be open only during hours or on days
pay for services while those in a charity hospital when it can maximize its profits. Will there be
may not, but both clients and customers are in a enough idealism, supervision or competition to
“take-it-or-leave it” relationship with the organi- maintain high standards of service in these
zation that provides them goods, services or respective kinds of institutions? There is no
employment. They are free to go elsewhere if guarantee of any of these. Even having more
they don’t like what they are being given or are than one private pharmacy does not guarantee
paying for. Neither nonprofit nor profit-making competition as we know the frequency of collu-
enterprises regard those who receive their goods sion in less-developed countries (LDCs).
and services as members with any associated The main conclusion of a comparative study of
rights (or duties). On the other hand, members rural development in 16 countries of Asia,
of organizations such as a farmers’ association or ranging from China and Japan to Turkey and
a cooperative have some rights that can be Yugoslavia, was that countries which had the
invoked, because their contributions brou ht the best linkage between central government and
organization into being and maintain it. 5 rural communities through a network of local
The purpose of distinguishing these kinds of institutions had the best performance in agricul-
local institutions (all of which are literally GROs ture and in social indicators. The more organized
and most of which are NGOs) is not to judge countries raised their total agricultural produc-
614 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

tion per capita by 47% during 1952-77, com- 4. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN

pared with an increase for the less organized INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
countries of only 13% in this period. Similarly
impressive differentials were found for nutrition. In the discussion thus far, as in most of the
health, and education improvements.” social science literature, no explicit distinction
The two main aspects of networks which has been made between “institutions” and “orga-
provide linkage between national and local levels nizations.” The two words are usually used
are: first, having organizations/institutions (the interchangeably, though if they mean exactly the
distinction is discussed in the next section) at same thing, we would not need to have both
many levels, not just concentrated at, say the terms. Confusion arises because they refer to
district or the community level. and second, different but overlapping sets of social phenom-
having organizations/institutions of different ena, worth distinguishing from one another.
kinds. that is, representing all three sectors, as Institution is the broader and more encompas-
these can balance and complement one another, sing term, but it should be used carefully, even
the strengths of one sector compensating for the sparingly, because it has qualitative aspects
weaknesses of another. which are essential and should not be taken
Competition to keep private businesses honest lightly. The subtle but important distinction
and efficient can come from cooperatives or between the two concepts is spelled out in the
state enterprises, and vice versa. Those not following set of definitions, which are consistent
well served by the private sector can look to with most if not all of the social science literature,
government programs or to self-help organiza- which is itself not consistent.” Institutions,
tions. (Unfortunately, “free” public sector goods whether organizations or not, are complexes of
and services are likely to undermine other norms and behaviors that persist over time by
sector alternatives.) For some activities, decision serving collectively valued purposes, while orga-
making and implementation based on authority nizations, whether institutions or not, are struc-
are generally most effective (e.g., building tures of recognized and accepted roles.
roads), while for others, collective action (e.g., These definitions are consistent with the fol-
distribution of water among irrigation users) lowing categorizations with examples. The first
or private channels (e.g., supply of agricultural and second columns in Table 4 follow Knight’s
inputs) are generally more efficient and pre- distinction between two types of institutions, one
ferable. “created by the ‘invisible hand’ (for which)
One way of appreciating this is to use what deliberate action hardly figures,” and the other
Streeten calls “institutional imagination,” com- “deliberately made.” His examples were lan-
bining the analysis of levels (Figure 1) with that guage and the Federal Reserve system (cited in
of sectors (Figure 2), to produce a matrix of Ruttan 1978, p. 328). The overlap between
institutional possibilities ranging from the inter- institutions and organizations is shown in Figure
national down to local levels as shown in Figure 4. Since there has never been a complete enu-
3. Grassroots organizations (GROs) are those meration of either category, we cannot know
at locality, community and group levels, in which is the larger set.
Figure 1. NGOs are those in the middle column This representation reflects our way of think-
of Figure 2. The two sets overlap in the center of ing and talking about institutions and organiza-
Figure 3, with examples being a wholesale tions as if they were one or the other or both.
cooperative society, a village dike patrol, or a They can be spoken of (and reified) as discrete
mothers’ club. economic, social or political phenomena. But in
At local levels, organizations may be informal fact, institutions, like organizations should be
rather than formal and yet still be important for understood as matters of degree. Marriage, for
meeting people’s development needs. What is example, may become more or less of an “institu-
called “the informal sector” refers mostly to tion” depending on the scope and intensity of its
private sector (for-profit) organizations at group, recognition and acceptance by people as a legiti-
community and localitv levels. BY the time an mate complex of norms and behaviors, one which
enterprise-gets large enough to be operating at people feel obliged to accommodate and comply
the subdistrict or district level. it is usuallv with. This is true of any institution, whether or
formal, i.e. registered with the government, not it has organizational form. “Institutionaliza-
paying taxes and duties, etc. The “informal tion” is a process, and organizations can become
sector” of the economy includes organizations more or less “institutional” over time to the extent
which operate at various levels of decision that they enjoy special status and legitimacy for
making and action as analyzed here, with higher having satisfied people’s needs and for haviT(g
levels subsuming lower ones. met their normative expectations over time.
 GROs and NGOs 615

Sectors

Levels Public Collective Private

action

International United Nations Society for Multinational

agencies; multilaterrl International corporations; external
and bilateral donor Development private voluntary organizations
agencies (PVOS)

National Central government National cooperative National corporations;

ministries; pnrastatal federation; national national PVOs; PVO
corporstions women’s association coordinating bodies

Regional Regional administrative Regional cooperative Regional companies

bodies; regional federation; watershed regional PVOs; PVO
development consultative assembly councils
authorities
District supply District firms;
District District council; district
cooperative; soil charitable organizations
administrative office
conservation
educational forum

Subdistrict Subdistrict council; Subdistrict marketing Rural enterprises;

subdistrict cooperative; *rea sports private hospitals; bank
administrative offices club branch office

Locality Division council; health Wholesale cooperative Market town

clinic; secondary society; forest business; service
school; extension office protection association clubs (e.g., Rotary)

Community Village council; post Primary cooperative Village shops; mosque

office; primary school; society; village dike committee for village
extension worker patrol; parent-teachers welfare
association (PTA)

Group Caste panchayat; ward Tubeweil users Microenterprises

or neighborhood association; mothers’
assembly club; savings group

Roles of Citizen/voter/taxpayer Member Customer/client/

individuals /partaker of services beneficiary/employee

Figure 3. Examples of institutional channels and roles for decision making and aciion by secmr and level.

Why is this distinction and dynamic relevant command respect and other resources that raise
for our concern with rural development in the the level of compliance. Conversely, the less of
1990s and beyond? Because the process of these resources it receives, the less institutional
institutionalization is an essential aspect of de- status and influence it will have (Uphoff and
velopment, the more keenly felt now that we see Ilchman, 1972).
institutional retrogression in a number of coun- Whether organizations, roles, practices or pro-
tries, particularly in Africa. Institutionalization is cedures acquire such status and influence
not an invariable or irreversible trend, as thought depends particularly on their performance and
in previous, more optimistic decades. The more on meeting needs and expectations, as noted
legitimacy an institution enjoys from various above. Complexes of norms and behaviors that
sectors of the public, the more it will be able to have enjoyed a certain stability and productivity
616 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

Institutions that Institutions that are Organizations that

are not organizations organizations. and vice versa arc not institutions

Money The Central Bank A local bank

The law The Supreme Court A new law partnership

Marriage “The family” A particular lamit]

Land tenure The Land Registrar’s Office A surveying company

Higher education Oxford University A tutoring scrvicc

Technical assistance The World Bank A consulting firm

Institutions that are Institutions

not organizations
(e.g., money)

Institutions that are Orgnnlzations

organizations
(e.g.. Central Bank)

Organizations that are.

not institutions
(e.g.. local bank branch)

can decline, for lack of economic resources, since compliance is thereby achieved and they
political support, social and cultural congruence, share in the state’s institutionalized power.
or disruption and disappointment of many kinds. NGOs in some cultures and in some countries
This is not the place to go into an extended are denied legitimacy and thus have no institu-
discussion of the process of institutionalization tional status ipsofucto. But this is changing. One
and its reverse. But this discussion should be of the most interesting trends in less-developed
enough to disabuse readers from equating any countries is the increasing institutionalization of
and all organizations automatically with institu- NGOs as a category. quite apart from whether
tions. Some are, but most are not. individual nongovernmental organizations be-
Many social scientists have blurred or neg- come institutions (Berg, 1987). That the World
lected the difference between institutions and Bank and United Nations bodies have granted
organizations, casually assigning even rules or NGOs observer status and other special recogni-
procedures “institutional” status.” NGOs and tion has enhanced their ability to affect policy
GROs are properly designated as “organiza- pronouncements and resource allocations over
tions.” They may or may not enjoy institutional and above their respective abilities to exercise
status. That is an empirical question. Some do power or influence. GROs may enjoy legitimacy
and others do not. Some have been respected in the eyes of local people and be institutions for
previously but have lost some of their legitimacy them but not for higher level decision makers.
as institutions, while others are gaining in public Helping GROs grow into GRIs as established
regard and are acquiring institutional standing in “institutions” is a process now being nurtured.
the public eye. Governmental organizations
claim to be institutions by virtue of their attach-
ment to the state, which asserts that they are 5. ACCELERATING RURAL
legitimate claimants of people’s acquiescence and DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GROsiNGOs
support in all matters. If this claim is accepted, it
makes no difference on what basis it is accepted, It would be good if each developing country
 GROs and NGOs 617

had a full set of institutions/organizations such as - In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank, work-
shown in Figure 3. Such a structure, to be sure, ing through small saver-borrower groups and
may be as much a result as a cause of develop- federations of these, has made loans to over
ment. Not just lack of material resources but also 1.2 million of the poorest of the rural poor.
lack of experience and habits of working together Repayment rates are near loO%, while incomes
contribute to the incomplete institutional mat- have been raised by 50% or more through
rixes we find in most LDCs. What is to be small loans averaging about $70. Savings have
mobilized through such a structure is not just been doubling every year, with a marginal
material contributions and labor but also ideas, savings rate as high as 50% among previously
management skills and a sense of social responsi- impoverished people, mostly women. Their
bility. State institutions by themselves are inade- deposits have reached $20 million (Fugelsang
quate for this as are market institutions alone. and Chandler, 1986; Counts, 1YYl).
There is growing evidence that working with - The Bangladesh Rural Advancement
and through collective action organizations at Committee has 600,000 members in the
local levels can produce improvements in produc- groups of landless it has sponsored for self-
tivity and well-being more far-reaching than the help activities. Its Women’s Health and De-
stereotype that local efforts benefit only a few velopment Programs expect to reach three
communities or a few families (Uphoff, lY88). million people, and its 6.000 nonformal pri-
mary schools already cover 180.000 children
- In Malawi. a rural self-help program has from poorer households who had dropped out
brought clean water to over a million people of school or were not enrolled before (Abed.
now at a cost of around $10 per person, lYY2).
mobilizing community labor and management - In Lima. Peru, community organizations
skills and employing local people as parapro- planted half a million trees, built 26 schools,
fessionals for construction and maintenance 150 daycare centers and 300 community kitch-
(Glennie, 1983). ens, training hundreds of health workers to go
- In Haiti, an agroforestry outreach project door-to-door improving public sanitation and
with USAID support, drawing on anthropo- basic health (Durning. 1989, pp. 23-24).
logical expertise and engaging NGOs and - The Iringa rural nutrition program in
GROs. instead of getting farmers to plant Tanzania in four years’ time with a structure
three million trees during four years got over of organization at the regional, district, divi-
20 million trees planted (Murray, 1986; 1YYl). sional, ward (locality) and community levels
The program has continued to enlist the was able to reduce malnutrition from 56 to
cooperative efforts of tens of thousands of 38X, and severe malnutrition from 6.3 to
farmers under quite unfavorable conditions. 1 .X% by involving parents and village commit-
- In northern Pakistan, in remote areas tees (Pelletier. 1991).
where government personnel hardly traveled, - A soil conservation and agricultural de-
the Aga Khan Rural Support Program has velopment project in the Ciamis district of
improved the lives of over half a million Indonesia, by mobilizing vast amounts of
villagers through their village organizations “social energy”” was able to construct ter-’
given some outside assistance on the condition races at one-twelfth the cost of government
of making their own self-help efforts (World programs and to improve 48,000 hectares of
Bank, 1987). In the slums of Orangi on the farmland for participating villagers compared
outskirts of Karachi, lane committees have with the 4,000 originally planned (Craig and
provided self-help sewerage and water supply Poerbo, 1988).
with little outside financing in an area serving - The tcS movement in nine countries of
over 100.000 people, showing that participa- West Africa has similarly mobilized social
tory methods can also work in urban areas energy from half a million people through
(Gafoor, 1987). peasant federations in over 2,000 communities
- The Kenya Tea Development Authority, to combat the hardships of the long dry season
by working with grower committees. was able in the Sahel (LeComte. 1986. pp. 148-155;
to promote peasant production of a crop Harrison, 1987, pp. 279-284).
thought “too difficult” for small farmers.
Their share of exports went from zero to one- Still other examples could be cited. A common
third of the national total within 15 years, element of success is that most adopted what
producing premium quality tea that fetched Korten (1980) characterizes as a learning process
top prices in the world market and improving approach, inductively developing appropriate
rural incomes substantially (Lamb and Muel- technologies and organizational models that
ler, 1982; Paul, 1082, pp. 51-62). achieve a good “fit” between technology and
618 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

organization in terms of their incentives. man- That GROs and NGOs have become more
ageability, sequences of expansion, etc. They numerous in recent years reflects a freeing up
must become effective and efficient before they over time of individual and personal resources
can be expanded. for locally initiated activities. A general move-
ment toward democratization is occurring. Re-
turning to a high degree of state control is not
feasible. But this only creates opportunities for
6. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL AND expansion of collective action: it does not deter-
TIME PERSPECTIVES ON GROs/NGOs mine or ensure such an outcome.
Collective action has functioned for centuries
GROs and NGOs are increasingly seen as at local levels in Third World countries. Its
channels for promoting economic and social present uneven performance is partly a conse-
development, also contributing to democratiza- quence of “state penetration” that has often dis-
tion of the economy, society and polity. The role placed, constrained or distorted the informal
of the state is being rethought and generally institutions that met a variety of people’s needs
retracted, though there is growing consensus that before - for agricultural production, consump-
the pendulum swing away from its overextended tion guarantees, constructing public facilities,
condition in many countries should not proceed etc. The penetration to local levels of commercial
too far. The scope of market-driven activities is market forces has also disrupted many local
increasing partly because of deregulation policies voluntary activities, as working for cash income
and partly by default, as state institutions in has taken on more importance.
LDCs cannot manage as broad a range of We see in the contemporary Third World a
functions as was thought previously. There is recovery of interest in collective action solutions
nonetheless a need for a well-functioning state as state institutions are proving less capable of
for market and GRO/NGO institutions to meeting people’s needs and as markets do not
achieve their potential.13 meet all expectations for adequate or fair provi-
One needs to assess the impacts on GROs and sion of goods and services. Where local people
NGOs of changes that occur in the state and can get the state or private entrepreneurs to bear
market sectors - liberalization. structural ad- the cost of providing health care, agricultural
justment. privatization, parallel markets. con- inputs, bridges and roads. clean water. etc., this
tracting services, etc. - as the collective action is likely to be welcomed. Collective action
sector is more vulnerable than the other two. It is functions now usually as a default mode for
not undergirded by the staying power of author- meeting development needs, whereas previously
ity or by the tangibility of material motivations. it was a more “normal” or “natural” mode.
Voluntary activities tend to be volatile, subject to This is true both for the United States and for
changes in the public mood and in climates of LDCs. The health care sector is an interesting
opinion as well as in material incentives that may case in point. A collective action strategy gets
decline in amount or value. Moreover, private adopted only where public and private providers
entrepreneurs can mount tough competition with are not available or satisfactory. In developing
the collective action sector because when times countries. locally sponsored health care facilities
get tough. there is a tendency to give more are found where it is too difficult or too
weight to self-interest. expensive for the government to deploy doctors.
Conditions of scarcity, however, can be fertile or where there is not enough purchasing power
ground for collaborative, altruistic behavior. The for private practitioners to be attracted. In the
concept of interdependent utility functions is not United States, cooperative health maintenance
hard to grasp, and when resource constraints organizations (HMOs) such as the Group Health
become more pervasive. pooling resources and Plan emerged interstitially. Such organizations.
risks takes on more meaning. In the United however, seem to last only as long as state and
States, an older generation still talks about how market institutions are inadequate. Once the
much more solidarity and generosity was performance of public and private institutions
observed during the lean time of the Great improves. they replace collective action for
Depression. Whether people adopt more indi- health care.
vidualistic or more cooperative strategies to Collective action is better at creating facilities
meet their own needs and those of persons than maintaining them. Maintenance activities
whose welfare they most care about depends very require regular and repetitive efforts that are
much on the examples and values emanating better done on a paid or for-profit basis than by
from local and national leaders. reliance on voluntary efforts. In the United
A time perspective is important on all this. States, with supportive government policies,
 GROs and NGOs 619

much of our rural electrification was carried out among NGO members. To the extent that
by cooperatives on a collective action basis. Most members get some satisfaction from improve-
have been superseded now by private enterprises ments in the welfare of fellow members. any
or have changed from cooperatives into private advances achieved produce multiple and thus
enterprises. Input supply cooperatives played greater total satisfactions (Uphoff, 1992, pp.
important roles in the development of US agri- 285-289, 326-355).
culture earlier in this century, but most have now While collective action has been a major force
given way to private enterprise or been converted in LDCs in earlier decades and centuries. it is
into businesses. presently undermined by new “traditions” ema-
This perspective suggests that collective action nating from the state and market sectors. Pater-
institutions should be regarded positively as nalistic pronouncements and practices by govern-
opportunistic. The state, like the market, is ment agencies discourage previously reasonable
always with us. But self-help organizations of expectations of self-help, and preoccupations
different sorts are more variable. It is instructive with personal profit can deter people from
to see “neighborhood watch associations” spring- pooling resources to create public goods. The
ing up in American cities as public police forces disrepair into which many roads and irrigation
are unable to provide the desired level of security canals have fallen in developing countries reflects
for people and property and as the costs of either or both of these influences.
private provision of such security are judged too To revive and expand collective action will
great. Volunteer patrols and communication require public policies that capitalize on comple-
networks can add much-valued. low-cost incre- mentary relationships this third sector can have
ments of security, though they are most often with state and market institutions, filling in gaps
(maybe only) effective in association with public between the public and the private sectors and
police forces. We also see “cooperative” daycare helping each of them become more effective.
on the rise, as the cost or unavailability of public Exhortation is not likely to elicit voluntary efforts
and private alternatives gives impetus to collec- on a scale or for a duration desired. The principle
tive action. of “assisted self-reliance” (Uphoff. 1988). despite
In conclusion, we need to think analytically as its paradoxical sound, should be explored. It
well as critically about GROs and NGOs. Grass- represents a pump-priming approach to mobiliz-
roots organizations are defined by their geo- ing local resources in a positive-sum way, with
graphic level of organization, while nongovern- external funds and technical assistance offered on
ment organizations are categorized according to acceptable matching bases.
some concept of sector. These two principles of Economists are likely to favor “block grants”
organization intersect in the case of neighbor- with the fewest possible conditions as a matter of
hood watch associations and cooperative daycare disciplinary conviction. But we know that present
centers, for example, which are NGOs that are power imbalances at local levels can distort
also GROs. We should be concerned with other beneficial uses of resources coming from above,
kinds of grassroots organizations which are not especially given the propensities of politicians to
NGOs. State and market sector institutions at dispense them in dependency-creating ways and
local levels are also GROs. to try to strengthen patron-client bonds. It is
Both GROs and NGOs bring different advan- defensible to have restrictions on use and to
tages to our quest for poverty alleviation and allow for bargaining over terms for grants. The
multifaceted development. GROs offer closeness legitimating purpose and criterion for matching
to the people, knowledge of local conditions, grants is to spread government (and private)
responsiveness to local needs. NGOs represent resources in an optimizing, positive-sum way. to
different principles of motivation - both for meet as many needs as possible - for infrastruc-
creating goods and services and for receiving ture, for job creation, for public health facilities,
them - from those that animate state or market and so forth. The goal is to combine outside and
institutions. The collective action sector is moti- local funds, personnel and expertise as well as to
vated by self-interest but also by common in- regulate and energize behavior in ways that
terest, which can be described in terms of the government programs alone and the workings of
degree of interdependence of utility functions the market cannot.

NOTES

I. Daycare is most often found at the group level. seen in the Iringa rural nutrition program in Tanzania
though it can be organized at the community level. as (Pelletier. 1991).
620 WORLD DEVELOPMEN’I

2. Streeten (IYYI) writes of “a large third sector. in the Encyclopedia to zero-sum analysis, not even
neither private nor public, that consists of non- making reference to positive-sum alternatives.
governmental. nonprofit organizations. that draws on
the voluntary energies of its members.” Examples 6. The most widely accepted definition of the state is
given include churches. colleges. universities, Oxfam. that of Max Wcber. as a territorially defined organiza-
Bread for the World, orchestras. hospitals, museums. tion “that successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly
the Red Cross, Friends of the Earth, Amnesty Inter- of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforce-
national. charities. cooperatives. the Gramecn Bank, ment of its orders,” (1947. p. 154). A technical
neighborhood organizations, local action committees. definition of “coercton” is that of physical force used
all of which “draw on people’s voluntary efforts and with a claim (or acccptancc) of its legitimacy. Force
contribute often highly efficiently not only to the gross used without such a claim (or acceptance) is called
national product but to a nourishing civil society, “violence.” See Uphoff (IYYO) on this and other related
essential for a democracy.” This concept of a third analytical questions concerning power. authority and
sector, operating between business and government. legitimacy.
featured prominently in the report of the US Commis-
sion on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (Doug- 7. Hirschman’s distinctions among exit. voice and
las, 1983). loyalty as classified in Figure 3 wcrc presented in terms
of alternative systems of organizations. From an indi-
3. One could suggest a fourth approach, using legal vidual, hottom-up perspective, the alternatives look
means to enact a new structure of property rights that different. One might identify voice with the public
defines privileges and obligations of the users/owners of sector. and exit with the p&ate sector. Loyalty is
the commons (Platteau. 1990). This would still have to sought in the collective action sector. but it is a variable
be implemented in one of these three ways. however. rather than a given.
using administrative means to ensure cooperation with
the new property regime, letting market forces reward X. For any given rate of per capita income, more
or penalize individuals, or having groups take responsi- organized countries had lower rates of population
bility for enforcing the reassigned rights and obligations growth. It might be thought that various differences arc
among themselves. attributable to differentials in per capita income. In
lY7S. aggregate per capita income for the more
organized cases (China, Egypt. Israel. Japan. South
4. These have been analyzed at greater length in Korea. Sri Lanka. Taiwan and Yugoslavia) was $740,
Boulding’a recent book (1980). His designation of the compared with $185 for the less organized cases
second type of system as an “exchange” system is (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia. Malaysia, Pakistan.
unfortunate, because all three types are exchange Philippines, Thailand and Turkey). But in lYS3 they
systems literally, involving the trading of different were all about the same level - $74 for the more
kinds of goods or bads. These systems are discussed as organized cases and $7X for the less organized ones
they apply generally in Streeten (1YXY. pp. 1353-1354). (Uphoff and Esman, 19X3. pp. 22-25). Correlations do
not prove causation, but these are large enough and the
5. Game-theory analysis has been preoccupied with substantive connections between local capacities and
zero-sum analysis, where the gains of some equal the agricultural, economic and social progress great
losses of others, with less evident interest in “positive- enough, that the inference of some association between
sum” games, at least until recent years. The latter the two has been widely accepted. The methodology
concept was not in the initial game theory prcscntations and case studies are given in Uphoff (10X2-X3).
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (lYS3). Lute and
Raiffa (1957) or Rappoport (1YhY). Ordeshook’s com- 9. These definitions and the rationale behind them
prehensive review of game theory (19X6) lists 10 arc discussed in Uphoff (IYX6, pp. X-IO). Institutions
headings under “zero-sum” in the index and none for arc conccivcd here along the lines proposed by
“positive-sum.” He devotes only four pages out of 500 Sclznick. Huntington. Crozier and others who work
to nonzero-sum games, which can include positive-sum more from a sociological pcrapectivc. An alternative
games. Von Neumann and Morgenstern acknowledged school, following the institutional economics tradition
at the outset that: “The zero-sum restriction weakens of Commons. is represented by the work of Ruttan.
the connection between games and economic problems Ostrom. North and others. Though I am personally
quite considerably [by emphasizing] problems of closer to the latter. more economic persuasion. I find
apportionment to the detriment of problems of ‘pro- the first view of institutions more fruitful, being better
ductivity’ proper” (lYS3, p. 504). Yet their discussion informed by organization theory. The two conceptions
of nonzero-sum games (pp. 504-586) focused mostly on arc compatible, even if the first focuses more on “roles”
what happens when the number of players is changed and the second on “rules.”
rather than when potential payoffs are expanded
through cooperation or through valuing each others’ IO. Huntington describes this dynamic well when hc
gains. Morgenstern, writing in the lnrerna/ionul Encyc- writes that “institutions arc stable. valued. recurring
loprdiu of the Social Sciences, observed that “applica- patterns of hchavior. Organizations and procedures
tions of game theory to economic or political problems vary in their degree of Institutionalization (which) is
require the study of these [nonzero-sum] games” the process by which organizations and procedures
(1YhX. p. 63). yet he still devoted almost all of his essay acquire value and stability” (1965, p. 37X).
 GROs and NGOs
11. An example would be the way Fields and Wan
(1989) treat the subject of "'wage-setting institutions.'"
They lump together as ~'institutions': (a) minimum
wage laws, which can change from one week to the next
and which seldom command enough compliance to
demonstrate that they have any real legitimacy or
respect; (b) labor unions, which often qualify as
institutions because they survive even when not confer-
ring broadly based benefits on society; (c) pay policy,
which is often ephemeral and hardly institutional by
anyone's definition, though it may emanate from
institutions; (d) multinational corporations, which cer-
tainly are organizations but not all evidently institu-
tions, especially given the frequency of mergers; and
(e) labor codes and protective labor legislation, which
are much like (a). To consider all of these to bc
"'institutions" deprives the term of much of its content
and meaning.
REFERENCES
Abed, F. A., "Promoting popular participation: Some
Issues." Paper for Workshop on Popular Participa-
tion (Washington, DC: World Bank, February 25-
28, 1992).
Berg, Robert J., Non-Government Organizations: New
Forces in Third World Development and Politics.
CASID Distinguished Speakers Series No. 2. (East
Lansing: Center for Advanced Studies in Internatio-
nal Development, Michigan State University,
1987).
Boulding, Kenneth, Three Faces of Power (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1989).
Boulding, Kenneth, "On the pure theory of threat
systems," American Economic Review, Vol. 53
(1964), pp. 424-434.
Counts, Alexander M., "'Bangladesh: Help the poor,
not the rich," Washington Post (May 14, 1991).
Craig, J. G., and H. Poerbo, "'Food security and rural
development: The case of Ciamis, Indonesia," Jour-
nal of Rural Cooperation, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2 (1988),
pp. 111-124.
Douglas, James, Why Charity? The Case for a Third
Sector (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983).
Durning, Alan B., Action at the Grassroots: Fighting
Poverty and Environmental Decline, Worldwatch
Paper No. 88 (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Insti-
tute, 1989).
Esman, Milton J. and Norman Uphoff, Local Organi-
zations: Intermediaries in Rural Development
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
Esman, Milton J., and Norman Uphoff, "Introduc-
tion," in N. Uphoff led.), Rural Development and
Local Organization in Asia. Vol. I: Introduction and
South Asia (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 1-32.
Etzioni, Amitai, A Comparative Analysis of Complex
Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961).
Fields, Gary S., and Henry Wan, Jr., "'Wage-setting
institutions and economic growth," World Develop-
ment, Vol. 17 (1989), pp. 1471-1483.
Fox, Karl A., The Eco-Behavioral Approach to Surveys
and Social Accounts to Rural Communities (Ames,
IA: Iowa State University Press, 1990).
621
12. This concept has been proposed by Hirschman
(1984, pp. 42-57) and is elaborated in Uphoff (1992,
pp. 357-387).
13. Leonard writes: "qn a decentralized administra-
tive structure, the center needs to be every bit as strong
as in a centralized one, but the orientation required is
one of [providing] technical services rather than of
hierarchical control" (1977~ p. 213). Power should not
be regarded in zero-sum terms. It is always relative and
depends on the purposes for which it would be used. If,
following Weber's definition, power is the ability to
achieve one's goals, to the extent that national decision
makers at the center want lk~r rural people what those
people want for themselves, decentralization which
enhances local capabilities to mobilize, allocate and
manage resources will enhance, rather than diminish,
the power of the center to achieve what it wants.
French, John, and Bertram Raven, "'The bases of social
power" in D. Cartwright led.), Studies in Social
Power (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1959), pp. 150--165.
Fugelsang, Andreas, and Dale Chandler, Participation
as Process: What We Can Learn J?om Grameen
Bank, Bangladesh (Oslo: Norwegian Agency for
International Development, 1986).
Gafoor, Abdul, "A social engineering experiment in
Pakistan: A study of Orangi,'" Regional Development
Dialogue, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1987), pp. 1112-118.
Galbraith, John K., The Anatomy o[" Power (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 19831.
Glennie, Colin, A Model for the Development o['a Self-
Help Water Supply Program, Technology Advisory
Group Working Paper No. 1 (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 1983).
Hadden, Susan G., ~'Controlled decentralization and
policy implementation: The case of rural electrifica-
tion in Rajasthan'" in M. Grindle led.), Politics and
Policy Implementation in the Third World (Prince-
ton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1980).
Hardin, Garrett, "'The tragedy of the commons,"
Science, Vol. 168 (1968), pp. 124_3-1248.
Harrison, Paul, The Greening of A¢?ica: Breaking
Through in the Battle fi)r Land and Food (New York:
Penguin Books, 1987).
Hirschman, Albert O., Getting Ahead Collectively:
Grassroots Experiences in Latin America (New
York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty:
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1970).
Hunter, Guy, Modernizing Peasant Societies (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Huntington, Samuel P., "'Political development and
political decay," World Politics, Vol. 17 (1965), pp.
378-414.
Johnson, E. A. G., The Organization of Space in
Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970).
622 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Korten, David C., "~Community organization and rural
development: A learning process approach," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 4(I, No. 5 (198(I), pp.
480-51 I.
Korten, Frances F., and Robert Y. Sly, Jr. (Eds.),
Bureaucratic TransJormation: The Case o/" the
National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines
(West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1988).
Lamb, Geoff, and Linda Mueller, Control, Account-
ability and Incentives in a Succes~sJ~d Development
Institution: The Kenya Tea Development Authority,
Staff Working Paper No. 550 (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 1982).
LeComtc, Bernard J., Project Aid: Limitations and
Alternatives (Paris: OECD Development Center,
1986).
Leonard, David K., Reaching the Peasant Farmer:
Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya (Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. Games uttd
Decisions: Introduction and Critical SurvQ, (New
York: John Wiley, 1957).
Morgenstern, Oskar, "Game Theory" in International
Eno,clopedia ~" the Social Sciences, Vol. 6 (New
York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), pp. 62-69.
Mosher, A. T.. Creating a Progressive Rural Structure
to Serve a Modern Agriculture (New York: Agricul-
tural Development Council, 1969).
Murray, Gerald, ~"I'he tree gardens of Haiti: From
extraction to domestication" in Social Forestrv:
Communal and Private Management Strategies Com-
pared (Washington, DC: School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1991),
pp. 35-44.
Murray, Gerald, "'Seeing the forest while planting the
trees: An anthropological approach to agroforestry
in rural Haiti" in D. W. Brinkerhoff and J. C.
Garcia-Zamor (Eds.), Politics, Projects and People:
Institutional Development in ttaiti (New York:
Praeger, 1986).
Ordeshook, Peter C., Game Theory and Political
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986).
Owens, Edgar, and Robert Shaw, Development Recon-
sidered: Bridging the Gap Between Government and
People (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1972).
Paul, Samuel, Managing Development Programs: The
l,essons oJ'Success (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1982).
Pelletier, David, The Uses and Limitations of lnJ?2rma-
tion in the lringa Nutrition Program, Tanzania
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy
Program, 1991).
Plattcau, J. P., Land ReJ~rm and Structural Adjustment
in Sub-Saharan Ajrica: Controversies and Guidelines
(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 199(I).
Rahman, Md. Anisur, "'The small farmer development
programme in Nepal" in M. A. Rahman (Ed.),
Grass-Roots Participation and Se([:Reliance: Experi-
ences in South attd Southeast Asia (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1984).
Rappoport, Anatol, Two-Person Game Theory: The
Essential Ideas (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 1969).
Ruttan, Vernon W., "'Induced institutional change" in
H. Binswanger and V. Ruttan (Eds.), Induced
Innovation: Technology, Institutions and Develop-
ment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978), pp. 327-357.
Steeten, Paul, "~Markets and States" Paper prepared
for a conference on "'The State and Market in
Development," Brown University (Providence, RI:
March 1991).
Streeten, Paul, "~Global institutions for an interdepen-
dent world," World Development. Vol. 17, No. 9
(1989), pp. 1349-136(I.
Uphoff, Norman, Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities
for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian
Social Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1992).
Uphoff, Norman, "'Distinguishing power, authority and
legitimacy: Taking Max Weber at his word by using
resource-exchange analysis," Polity, Vol. 22 (1990),
pp. 295-322.
Uphoff, Norman, ~'Assisted self-reliance: Working
with, rather than lk3r, the poor" in John P. Lewis
(Ed.), Strengthening the Poor: What Have We
Learned? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books,
1988).
Uphoff, Norman, "Relations between governmental
and non-governmental organizations and the promo-
tion of autonomous development" Paper for Inter-
national Consultation on Autonomous Development
(Ocgstgeest: November 1987).
Uphoff, Norman, Local Institutional Development: An
Analytical Sourcebook. With Cases (West Hartfl)rd,
CT: Kumarian Press, 1986).
Uphoff, Norman (Ed.), Rural Development and Local
Organization in Asia, 3 w)ls. (New Delhi: Macmil-
lan, 1982-83).
Uphoff, Norman, "Comparative analysis of Asian
experience with local organization and rural develop-
ment" in N. Uphoff (Ed.), Rural Development and
Local Development in Asia. Vol. 3 (New Delhi:
Macmillan), pp. 263-338.
Uphoff, Norman, and Milton J. Esman, Local Organi-
zation jor Rural Development: Analysis of Asian
Experience (Ithaca, NY: Rural Development Com-
mittee, Cornell University, 1974).
Uphoff, Norman, and Warren F. llchman, The Political
Economy of Development (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1972).
von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953).
Weber, Max, The Theory of" Social and Economic
Organization, trs. A. M. Henderson and Ta[cott
Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947).
World Bank, Aga Khan Rural Support Program in
Pakistan: An Interim Evaluation (Washington, DC:
Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank,
1987).