Defining, Constructing and Policing a 'New India': Relationship between Neoliberalism

and Hindutva
Author(s): Shankar Gopalakrishnan
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Jun. 30 - Jul. 7, 2006, Vol. 41, No. 26 (Jun. 30 -
Jul. 7, 2006), pp. 2803+2805-2813
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

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 Defining, Constructing and Policing
a 'New India'
Relationship between Neoliberalism and Hindutv
The advance of neoliberalism is seen to have either resulted from or accompanied
the accession to power of repressive and socially reactionary political forces (as seen in th
UK and the US of the 1980s). However, in understanding India of the 1980s and 1990s, th
nature of the links between neoliberalism and the Hindu right does not appear entirely
obvious. This article explores the deeper, common political goals that neoliberalism and
Hindutva share. Such sharing does not represent a complete merger of these forces nor is i
purely opportunistic alliance. On the other hand, such alliances represent common class
interests by articulating shared notions of a bounded, unitary and individual-based
conception of society, as opposed to a community-based society.
SHANKAR GOPALAKRISHNAN

f all the changes that have swept India's polity since Such
the a hegemonic system is neither monolithic nor total; as Jessop
late 1980s, among the most significant is the nearly
(1982:148) puts it, "the maintenance of hegemony involves
taking systematic account of popular interests and demands,
simultaneous rise of Hindutva forces and those favouring
economic 'liberalisation'. Both were once pariahs in India's
shifting position and making compromises.. :to maintain support
and
political scene, and both have now reached the centre stage, with alliances".'
the
latter now regarded as unquestioned by both our national parties. Consequently, to understand such hegemonic projects, it is not
Despite the frequent rhetoric about neoliberalism being enough part to assume that they are either immutable entities, fixed
of the march of 'greater freedoms', it is well known that neoliberal
through time, or to deterministically derive their actions from
policies have often either resulted from or accompanied the the underlying class relations; one must also look at their political
and ideological functioning. If one accepts that Hindutva and
accession to power of repressive and socially reactionary political
forces (witness Reagan, Thatcher or the Latin American dicta- neoliberalism are indeed hegemonic projects, it is these aspects
torships). In this sense, the Indian situation is not unusual.- of their relationship that have received relatively less attention.
However, the nature of the links, if any, between neoliberalism To choose three instances, Vanaik (2001), Ahmad (2002) and
Corbridge and Harriss (2000) all powerfully argue that there is
and social reaction - particularly the Hindu right - is not entirely
obvious. Typically, these forces' simultaneous rise is identifieda Hindutva-neoliberal link, but they largely confine their argu-
either as a reflection solely of common class interests or asmentsthe to the question of the class interests they respectively
result of a one-way causal relationship. For instance, one commonrepresent. Thus, my question could be translated as: is it possible
argument has been that Hindutva's 'emotive issues' have either for an alliance of neoliberalism and Hindutva to have an ideo-
been a conscious diversion from or an unconscious result of the logical and political logic, and if so, can we see such a logic
social stresses caused by neoliberal reforms. at work in recent Indian politics, particularly the NDA period?2
I seek here to explore a different dimension, namely that Indian This article attempts to sketch an answer to this question. I
neoliberalism and Hindutva share deeper, common political goalsdo not attempt to a social or class analysis of these forces, and
and hence also share a potential project of political action. II do not measure or detail their impact on India's polity. I am
explore the possible existence of a political alliance (though not aware that this greatly reduces the scope of any conclusions that
a merger) between neoliberalism and Hindutva, particularly duringcan be drawn, but I approach this fundamentally as a general
the NDA period. exploration of possibilities rather than a conclusive argument.

Conceptual Background Resonances and Tensions

Such a question can have multiple meanings and hence requires Both supporters and opponents of Hindutva and neoli
some clarification. My concern is with neoliberalism and Hindutva frequently argue that they are unrelated or even incom
as hegemonic political projects rather than purely as ideologiesSuch arguments are generally premised on these pro
or policy packages. I understand "hegemony" in the Gramscianparent policy contradictions; for instance, one hears
(2000:235) sense, where the pre-eminence of a "historical bloc" claims that neoliberalism cannot tolerate the effects of Hindutva
of dominant class actors is sustained by "hegemony protectedviolence, while Hindutva cannot tolerate neoliberal globalisation
by the armour of coercion", or the combination of force withand its internationalising effects.
the assertion of "intellectual and moral leadership" that builds However, these contradictions, while all too real, do not preclude
the institutions and value systems necessary to equate this bloc'sthe existence of strong resonances and overlaps between these
interests with the "general interest" of society [Mouffe 1979].projects. In particular, Hindutva and neoliberalism share highly

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similar visions of the relationship between the state, society and the marginality, both ideologies then conclude that 'genuine' society
individual. This section outlines these resonances and tensions.3 has no inherent divisions. Thus D B Thengadi once claimed that
"in our system... (social sectors) form an infinite spiral with no
Resonances inner conflicts and no tensions" [Thengadi 1979:111]. Sangh
leaders frequently draw analogies between society and the 'har-
Reduction of social processes: Both ideologies reducemony'social
of the human body [e g, Golwalkar 1979; Jaffrelot 1998].
processes to purely individual choices and decisions. This neoliberalism
Though is ostensibly rejects the entire notion of
particularly clear for neoliberalism, which relies on 'society', it does in fact assume an autonomous 'social realm'.
neoclassical
economics' reduction of all social behaviour to voluntary
Hence trans-
the frequent invocations of 'civil society' and the creation
of As
actions between rational, utility-maximising individuals. "new forms of action" by which service functions can be taken
Lemke
(2001:197) points out, citing Foucault: "the key element over by in'society'
the [Burchell 1996]. A different example is the
Chicago School's approach is their consistent expansion Americanof 'self-esteem'
the movement, which the California govern-
ment claimed could create a society where "every citizen...
economic form to... the social sphere." Thus racial discrimination
is modelled as individual taste, family relations asrecognises 'marriage the possibility for positively affecting every other
capital' and religious devotion as a method of controlling person in 'free
every situation and relationship" (as quoted in Cruikshank
riders' [e g, Lazear 2000]. 1996:239). In both cases, any social divisions are seen as artificial
In turn, as with most organicist ideologies, Hindutva and/or pathological.
reduces
social processes to questions of individual morality. Thus Division
theof societies into 'internal' and 'external' realms: The
RSS
aims to solve Hindu society's problems by inculcating actual'correct
existence of social divisions is then explained by iden-
values' in upper caste men, as exemplified by M S tifying certain divisions as the boundaries of 'society' itself.
Golwalkar's
declaration that "there is a 'crisis of character' in our Outside those borders lie 'external' entities, which produce
country";
social problems are due to individuals' "demoniac ways" within 'society'. As with most philosophies that
'disharmony'
[Golwalkar 1979:89]. Other Sangh parivar leaderspostulate have made an 'Other', these discourses declare that those 'outside'
countless similar statements. must be 'educated' into the 'understanding' necessary for social
functioning, or, if this is impossible, destroyed.
For both ideologies, wider power relations - such as class, caste
or gender - are entirely elided. Both presume that the only Hindutva clearly uses the term 'foreign' in this fashion to
exclude minorities, the Left, secularists, and so on. As mentioned
meaningful categories of analysis are individuals and, as we shall
see, 'society' as a whole. above, a secondary boundary excludes the state and all things
The state as guarantor of an independent, supreme social prin- 'political'. Hence Hindutva attributes all opposition to 'vote
ciple: Both ideologies understand the state's raison d'etre as the
bank' politicians or malignant foreigners. To halt this 'external'
expression of an independent, supreme 'principle'. Thus,interference,
in Golwalkar asked his cadres to "discourage people
pursuing demoniac ways...[and inspire them] to develop their
neoliberalism, the state's purpose is to create the "legal, insti-
tutional and cultural conditions that will enable an artificial divine nature." Education will not always be enough, though,
competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be played and
to best
"we may have to use sanctions of force also in our endeavour"
effect" [Burchell 1996:27]. 'The market' defines the basis for
(1979:89, 88). 'Outsiders' have a clear choice: they can swear
and the limits of government intervention: "it is more the
allegiance
case to Hindutva and thus join 'society', or they can retain
of the state being controlled by the market than of the market
their beliefs, thereby confirming their 'foreignness' and making
them fit for destruction.
being supervised by the state" [Lemke 2001:200]. 'The market'
Neoliberalism
is rarely clearly defined, allowing it to encompass a variety of has been said to have no such boundaries, as
actual institutions. itclaims that all individuals are already rational. Yet neoliberalism
In Hindutva, 'Ram Rajya' (the rule of Ram), 'Hindu rashtra' nonetheless declares that certain political actors - welfare agencies,
(Hindu rule), 'dharma' and other concepts play a similar role. the bureaucracy, and the state in general - are 'outside' society
Thus Deenadayal Upadhyaya (1979b:44) claimed that Hindutva and responsible for its divisions [Burchell 1996]. Thus, in industrial
believes "the state is brought into existence to protect the nation,nations, the rhetoric of a state-created "dependency culture" is
and to produce and maintain conditions in which the ideals of central to neoliberal discourse. As Hall (1983) evocatively puts
it, Thatcherism created a "new folk devil ...enervated by welfare
the nation can be translated into reality". These ideals constitute
the nation's "soul", and the "laws that help manifest (this soul)state 'coddling', (his or her) moral fibre irrevocably sapped by
are termed dharma." In turn, a "state cannot be without dharma 'state handouts'." The often coercive drive to increase 'self-esteem'
similarly attempts to "vaccinate" individuals against this problem
nor can it be indifferent to dharma, just as fire cannot be without
heat" [Upadhyaya 1979c:53]. Dharma, too, is never defined in
[Cruikshank 1996]. I explore the definition of these neoliberal
these lectures or elsewhere. boundaries in the Indian context in the sections below.
Rhetoric of transformation and a 'new society': Finally, both
In sum, the state is, in an analogy used both by neoliberals
and by Upadhyaya (1979c), a 'watchman'. Its sole purposeclaim
is that their social 'principle' will produce revolutionary
to defend and guarantee 'the market' or dharma. Such conceptions
transformation - if, that is, it is given its true importance. Thengadi
(1979:111) declares, "in our (world) system... every nation will
are deeply anti-democratic,4 but this is only their most obvious
be free to develop according to its own genius...we will be one
aspect. They also imply that any processes related to state power
- usually described as 'political' - are marginal, comparedwith to the whole of mankind and whatever material progress we
the 'real' activities that depend on the 'deeper' principle. This
attain.. .will be offered (to) Humanity." In 1998, the BJP declared
harmonises with long-standing themes in Indian political dis- that "[the party] embodies...a vision to see India, the world's
course, which contrast the profane realm of 'politics' witholdest
the cradle of civilisation, transform itself yet again into a
purer realm of 'culture' [Hansen 1999]. benign global power, contributing her material, intellectual, cultural
Social divisions as unnecessary and/or pathological: Havingand spiritual energies...to save the world from the gathering
reduced social processes to individual decisions and the state civilisational
to crisis" [BJP 1998].

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 Neoliberalism in turn seeks the "utopia of a pure and perfect Movements (NFMs), armed nationalist movements in Punjab,
market", where all will be 'free' and prosperous [Bourdieu 1998]. Kashmir and Assam, movements for dalit rights, and finally, the
Thatcherism has always insisted that it sought not mere policy Mandal and Ayodhya mobilisations at the end of the decade.
changes but revolution and 'freedom' [Hall 1983; Nairn 2001]. Pushed by these movements and driven by its own political
Notions of a new, 'developed' and wealthy society are central collapse, the Congress Party in particular and other political
to neoliberal rhetoric in India, as discussed below. formations as well began giving increasing centrality to the notion
of 'community rights', including allusions to 'Hindu' commu-
All utopian discourses of this fashion define another boundary
- between the their own 'natural', revolutionary dynamism and nities, as the driving force of Indian politics [Vanaik 1990;
Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001].5 Central to this new struggle for
the 'artificial' stasis of the 'old'. Thus the 'old' joins the 'political'
political control was the notion of 'communities' battling for
and the 'external' as impediments to 'natural' social functioning,
impediments whose assimilation or destruction is therefore bothsocial mobility through the use of the state machinery (e g,
necessary and inevitable. subsidies, reservations or even the creation of one's own state),
a struggle exemplified by the Mandal mobilisations. Such claims
Tensions reflected the realities of India's political economy, where, as
Harriss-White (2003) points out, the state is not the sole regu-
Thus, neoliberalism and Hindutva share very similar notions latory force, but is frequently the primary pathway for social
of the relationship between state, society and individual, and mobility
both [also see Kaviraj 2000].
It is as a response to this shifting discourse that the outlines
assume the existence of a supreme social principle. Their frequently
of a possible shared political project between Hindutva and
cited tensions revolve around their sharply opposed views of what
that principle is. Given that these have been widely discussed,neoliberalism become much clearer. After all, these tropes of the
1980s mass mobilisations directly contradicted all the resonances
I will only briefly detail the two most basic ones here. The management
of these tensions is discussed in the following sections. I identified above. The result was that both Hindutva and
Individual autonomy andfreedoms: The most glaring tension is
neoliberalism, if their projects were to succeed, had firs
the value each discourse places on the individual. Neoliberalism's
achieve certain political goals: the definition and articulation
celebration of individual 'freedom' apparently contradicts a 'unitary society', the redefinition of social mobility i
Hindutva's subordination of the individual to 'society' (and individualistic
thus fashion and the displacement of the state from
its corporatist and populist rhetoric). central role in the polity.
Yet this 'contradiction' needs to be qualified. Above I notedBut the mere existence of shared political goals does not cr
that neoliberalism holds 'the market' to be supreme. This 'prin-
an alliance, any more than the existence of contradictions do
ciple' - like its saffron equivalent of dharma - constrains all Creating a shared political project is a historical and stra
one.
action, not just state action. Those whose choices disruptprocess
the of magnifying resonances and minimising tensions.
'market' by creating collectivities, such as trade unions, are apt
possibilities for this to occur became clearer by the end of
to find their 'freedom' sharply curtailed [Bourdieu 1998]. decade, due in part, I would argue, to the political fallout of
largest movement of that period: the Ayodhya campaign.
Neoliberals have little hesitation in crushing those who challenge
the 'market' itself. This campaign had three facets that are of relevance to us. Fi
Role of the 'global': As an essentially transnational projectby claiming to be reclaiming 'rights' that vested interests (nam
reflecting the interests of finance capital, neoliberalism is a "free
politicians eyeing the Muslim 'vote bank') had denied the 'H
trade faith" [Bourdieu 1998]. It advocates the full, and if nec-community, it used the same vocabulary as the other m
essary coerced, opening of every country's economy [Overbeek movements of the time6 [Hansen 1999]. This gave it a foot
and van der Pijl 1993]. Indeed, as in the phrase 'globalisation',
in the existing political discourse. However, at the same t
neoliberalism is often equated with external liberalisation. it exploited the new political terrain created by the boom
Hindutva, with its organic supremacist principles, is deeply consumer goods markets among urban and rural elites, it
uncomfortable with such global integration, and has instead triggered by the combination of high public expenditure
historically invoked swadeshi as a vague form of economicimport liberalisation that was Rajiv Gandhi's hallmark [Raja
1999; Ghosh 2004]. The Hindutva forces utilised the new
nationalism. However, Hindutva does not fully reject integration.
Thus, Thengadi (1979:107) claims that Hindutva transcends the prominence of branding and marketing strategies to promote an
identification of consumption, particularly of a few specific
nationalism-internationalism dichotomy, as "our motto (has always
been)...we are cultured and will strive to share our culture andcommodities like bricks, tridents and Ram stickers, with political
refinement with others...This thought forms the base of our participation and 'Hinduness' [Rajagopal 1999].
positive nationalism." In short, grandstanding aside, integrationThe Sangh parivar refined this dual thrust by including a third
is acceptable so long as Hindutva forces' projects are promoted angle aimed at elites. The BJP, which took on this role, sought
by it. Hence, the peculiar permutations in the Sangh's economic to invoke elite support by projecting this kind of 'participation'
philosophy (explored below and in Hansen (1998)). as the method of reviving the Indian 'nation' [Jaffrelot 1996].
Hence, said the party, the movement had no "sectarian or com-
The Political Context: A Shared Agenda munal colour" but only sought "the vindication of our cultural
heritage and national self respect" [BJP 1991 ]. Notably, of course,
But, as noted in the Gramsci quote above, such political positions
the 'nationalist' rhetoric of the saffron brigade displaced not just
gain their salience not only from themselves but also from the other communities but the state itself from its central position
wider political background. Both Hindutva and neoliberalism as the defining entity of Indian politics. Other movements defied
truly emerged on to the national scene during the 1980s, a decade the state machinery in order to pressure it; the BJP and the VHP,
in accordance with Hindutva tenets, vacillated between demand-
that saw a critical process of change in Indian political discourse.
Behind this process was the rise of many seemingly new mass ing state intervention and claiming that the state itself could
movements and political formations, including the 'New Farmers' simply be replaced.

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 This dual emphasis on state irrelevance and participation- Thus, the BJP's projections probably began to find an increas-
through-consumption was precisely the same vocabulary used ingly interested audience. In addition to redefining swadeshi, the
by economic reformists of the time, and indeed of today [Hansen party now made other efforts to minimise the tensions between
1999; Vanaik 1990]. Elites could now support a movement that Hindutva and neoliberalism. The party's appeal was increased
promised that, partly through a specific form of consumption, by its post-1996 alliances with regional parties, which, paradoxi-
they could be both allied with the 'masses' and secure their own cally combined with its implicit invocations of a 'tough centre',
social position by displacing the state machinery from-political demonstrated its potential for 'managing' the regional forces. The
centrality. This offered a potential bridge between their increas- final step was the abandonment of the three 'contentious issues
ingly liberal economic rhetoric and the Hindutva brigade. of Ayodhya, Article 370 and a uniform civil code.9
But there still remained considerable distance between neoliberal This increasing neoliberal-BJP symbiosis was reflected in both
political discourse and the BJP. Moreover, the Ayodhya strategy forces' descriptions of each other. The largely neoliberal English
could only last so long as the mosque existed; after its demolition, press now described the BJP as 'maturing' into a 'moderate
the Parivar faced a crisis, which was deepened by the liberalisation centre-right' party (by 'accepting' reforms and abandoning the
of the country's economy. three issues), while BJP supporters cheered the wider acceptance
of 'cultural nationalism' [Hewitt 2000: Hanifa 1998: Mitra 1998
BJP's Journey towards Neoliberalism NDA 1999]. Each thus commended the other's acceptance of
the 'historical inevitability' of its own project.
Reflecting the interests of its historical base among traders and After 1996, the BJP consistently won the votes of approximately
petty industrialists, the Jana Sangh had always advocated internal 40 per cent of 'very high class' voters [Heath and Yadav 1999].10
economic liberalism [Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001]. But, while the Election data for 1999 showed that no other party won such
1991 reforms included considerable deregulation, the politicalhigh percentage of these votes, and no other economic sector
focus was on external liberalisation. This squarely trapped thevoted for the BJP as heavily [Heath et al 1999]. With the creation
BJP in one of the tensions noted above, namely, Hindutva'sof the NDA, the economic elite now formed part of a pro-NDA
discomfort with 'uncontrolled' globalism, for it could not now "new social bloc", created "by the convergence of traditional
oppose reforms without risking both its traditional and its elite caste-community differences and class distinctions" (ibid).
support bases. Such changes did not, of course, take place without opposition.
The party's response must be seen at multiple levels, particu- But these uneasy shifts nevertheless created the conditions for
larly because of the intra-Sangh parivar fissures that this issue the formation of a joint political project, a step that was addi
created. However, arguably one key element in its response was tionally facilitated by the NDA's creation.
a deliberate displacement of the debate from the merits of globalism
to the need for 'national transformation' through state rollback, The NDA Regime
an area of resonance between neoliberalism and Hindutva.
An illustrative example of this was the gradual shift inIndeed, the the new alliance itself arguably made some of shared
meaning of swadeshi. As early as 1992, the BJP was stressing Hindutva-neoliberal goals possible. Most of the major NDA
partners drew their support largely, though not solely, from
that "swadeshi is not isolationism but development of confidence
and capability" and that it desired the "swadeshi of a regional
self- propertied classes, the same classes that had driven most
of the 1980s movements [Heath 1999; Desai 2004]. These socia
confident, hard-working modern nation." By 1994, it was includ-
ing "the establishment of Indian companies and Indian brands actors' continued invocation of regional identities and state
in the world market" in the definition of swadeshi, and by patronage
1995 still represented a potential threat to both Hindutv
it was contrasting the Congress government's "faulty andand neoliberalism.
half-
hearted implementation of the reforms programme" with the The BJPNDA formation offered the possibility of deflecting this
approach, for whom "reforms are a matter of conviction"threat [BJP through a tentative, often unstable compromise between
1994. 1995]. In 1998, the BJP subtitled the swadeshi section someof regional elites, Hindutva, and national neoliberal forces.11
its election manifesto "Making India a Global Economic Power" Thus both neoliberals and Hindutva leaders saw the NDA as. a
[BJP 1998].7 Thus, by this point, the BJP projected swadeshi chance
as to 'build a consensus' or to generate "a national com-
economic rejuvenation rather than economic nationalism, makingmitment on the part of all parties" (IE 1999; Seshadri 1998
it an alternative reform policy instead of an anti-reform respectively).
one. This opportunity was arguably particularly impor-
During the same period, financial and pro-neoliberal elites tant with respect to rearticulating social mobility and reducing
were
turning away from the Congress, then India's main neoliberal the state's role in this mobility, areas where these elites could
political force. Between 1991 and 1996 it lost almost 40 per becent
major obstacles to neoliberal and Hindutva efforts.
of its vote share among 'high class' voters [Yadav 2003].8 With The the NDA, long-term structural and discursive changes
party's severe organisational decline undermined elite confi- in this direction could now tentatively proceed. Neoliberal fund-
ing cuts and privatisation had already begun state de-
dence in its abilities, particularly as its consistent anti-coalition
stance pitted it against the rising regional parties, who wereinstitutionalisation
a [Harriss-White 2003]. I end this section with
potential threat to both neoliberalism and.Hindutva (see below).
two illustrative trends that may demonstrate how the NDA took
Moreover, these parties' adoption of neoliberal policies further
was a steps towards these goals.
chaotic and inconsistent process that required a centre capable
of managing their pressures. Thus in 1994 a reformist commen- Redefinition of Education
tator claimed the Congress should now be "a protector of national
The NDA introduced new variations in public education, wh
unity, guarantor of security [and] a minimal level of law and order,
... and a facilitator of globalisation of the Indian economy" (as
is central to any system of social mobility. Higher education
quoted in Jenkins 1999:160). The party's inability to do been
this increasingly privatised [Ghosh 2002]. The 86th const
alienated many of its elite supporters. tional amendment indicated the government's approach when

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placed the onus for primary education on parents [Jha 2003]. terms, neoliberalism defines what it means to be a success in
In keeping with neoliberal policy, the amendment also "promotes Gujarat, while the Sangh parivar defines what it means to be a
privatisation ...[and] franchises parts or whole of districts to Gujarati (or even to be a human being). Other political forces
corporate or religious bodies" [Kaur 2004].12 and the ostensibly democratic and constitutional institutions of
Concurrently, however, the VHP and Vidya Bharati have the state now have little political weight.
expanded their school networks enormously in BJP and NDA- This is not a perfect symbiosis. The Sangh has not managed
ruled states [e g, Sundar 2004]. Since 2000, more than 4,000 to repress caste tensions in Gujarat's deeply unequal society, nor
ekal vidyalayas have begun functioning in adivasi areas alone, has it been able to fully maintain its organisational integrity.
while Vidya Bharati expanded from an estimated 6,000 schools However, Gujarat remains in some senses the model of this shared
in 1996 to 26,000 in 2003 [Dhar 2004; Ramakrishnan 1998; HRW project.
2003]. State support was important: "the Indian government
supports (these schools) through official recognition and finan-
Discursive Management of an Alliance
cial assistance...(they) receive government funds, use govern-
ment buildings, take control of state schools, train state teachers My remaining discussion here focuses on the other area of
and exert considerable influence over state education boards" shared priorities, namely redefining national political discourses.
[HRW 2003]. Vidya Bharati has thus become the largest providerI have chosen three 'case studies': the discussions around the
of private education in the country [Taneja 2001]. Saffronisation 'Pravasi Bharatiya Divas' conventions, the issue of reservations
of textbooks provided another angle to this transformation ofin the private sector, and the controversy over the fee cut at the
education. Indian Institutes of Management (IIM's) during the tenure of
As the state retreats, then, the Sangh parivar and the corporate former HRD minister, Murli Manohar Joshi. Each occupies a
sector have expanded their influence in primary education and space where neoliberal and Hindutva concerns intersect. I use
higher education respectively. Each group thus controls the these as illustrations of how, first, neoliberalism and Hindutva
educational sector that is of greater ideological and social im-defined boundaries through an area of discursive resonance;
portance to them. It is notable that the new UPA governmentsecond, how they responded to contestation of those boundaries;
is only tentatively taking steps towards reclaiming this area, withand the third, how they managed a tension between their social
the exception of the textbook issue. principles.14
The disadvantage of such a selection is that it highlights small
Social Institutions in Gujarat discursive structures and leaves out broader trends during the
NDA period. Some of these include the celebration of brahminical
A much starker example is the situation in Gujarat, where socialHinduism and the projection of Vajpayee as an 'elder statesman'
mobility has been thoroughly rearticulated. Since the 1980s, there and brahminical poet-patriarch. In addition, as the 'new India'
has been a concerted effort to incorporate lower castes and dalits was exalted and consumption celebrated, the 'old' was attacked.
into Sangh parivar formations, while repressing any independent Political leaders described - and continue to describe - public
movements that form [Shah 1998; Puniyani 2003 and e g, Das sector corporations and government employees as selfish, corrupt
2002]. Similarly, Breman (2003) has described how parivar and apathetic. The rhetoric of 'terrorism' has become ubiquitous,
organisations displaced unions in providing security and solidar- and during the NDA period was used as a justification for the
ity to former textile workers. In adivasi areas, Christian insti-Gujarat genocide. Each of these case studies should be viewed
tutions, often historically the only education providers, have beenagainst this broader background of twin efforts at inclusion
attacked, even as parivar schools and institutions have multiplied and exclusion, ironically exemplified by the 'India Shining'
[e g, Bunsha 2003]. All of these processes were greatly accel-campaign: by implication, those without 'shining' lives were
erated during the 2002 pogrom. simply not Indian.
The BJP's split in the late 1990s did not fundamentally chal-
lenge this framework. Indeed, even in directly electoral terms, 'The Nation' and Its Heroes
the tremendous dominance of the Sangh parivar has meant that
much of the effective opposition in Gujarat now comes from In January 2003 and January 2004, the NDA government held
either within the parivar or from former parivar elements. 'Pravasi Bharatiya Divas' (PBD) conventions that aimed to allow
But Gujarat is also India's business 'powerhouse'. For decades,NRIs to 'reconnect with India'. Both conventions were given
state incentives, 'open door' policies and brutal repression ofmassive publicity and government support. These have been
workers created a 'pro-business' climate, which grew after the continued by the UPA, but it is important to note the relative
1991 reforms [Breman 2003; Dholakia 2002]. Conspicuouslack of publicity for the 2005 PBD.
consumption has increased as the growth rate has risen, further The subject of these conventions, NRIs, are a key trope of both
enhancing the importance of wealth in social status [Chandrasekharneoliberalism and Hindutva. For the Sangh parivar, NRI con-
and Ghosh 2001; Vasavi 2002]. It is significant that, in the wakestituencies have been critical for decades; Sangh-linked NRIs are
of the 2002 pogrom, Narendra Modi combined anti-Muslimostensibly carrying out Hindus' "world historic mission" [Rajgopal
hatemongering with business conventions emphasising Gujarat's2001; Bhatt 2000]. For neoliberalism, in turn, NRIs are also a
"unlimited potential, opportunities, talent and energy" [BJP 2003].discursive resource: their 'departure' supposedly proves that
One could thus argue that both political contestation and socialIndia has not given them sufficient opportunities, because of the
mobility have now been mainly limited to this joint Hindutva- "utter failure of the Indian state...(and) its inefficiency and
neoliberal framework. In a state of high economic insecurity, corruption" [Biswas 2003]. The prime minister's welcome speech
Hindutva groups discipline and repress alternative political in 2003 encapsulated the latter concept: "[NRI successes] make
contestation, forcing marginalised sections to accept the continu- us examine why the Indian is so much more innovative, pro-
ing power of Gujarat's overlapping caste and financial elites ductive- and successful abroad.. .They prod us to create a business,
the dominant 'historical bloc', in Gramscian terms.13 In discursive investment and economic climate, which is as conducive to

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success" [Vajpayee 2003]. Thus both these projects see NRIs disregard for individual 'merit' [The Telegraph 2003]. But now
as a vanguard of 'Indian society'. reservation opponents link these claims to the need to maintain
These strong NRI ties also have material grounding. The Sangh Indian industry's supposed 'global competitiveness'. Thus Arun
parivar receives massive amounts of NRI funding [Awaaz-SAW Shourie, the former disinvestment minister, declared, "In a
2004: CSFH 2002]. Neoliberalism's NRI links have been less competitive world,jobs can't be given on the basis of birth instead
direct, but no less important. NRI remittances helped coverof capability" [Mukherjee 2004]. More dramatically, neoliberal
India's expanding trade deficit after 1991 [Corbridge and Harriss proponent Gurcharan Das (2004) proclaimed, "Bajaj, Hero Honda,
2000], and NRI funds have supplied much of India's forex TVS and others will have to shut their Indian factories..:and
reserves. Thus, both political projects have greatly benefited from (start) importing their scooters into India", while the Hindusta
NRI financial flows. Times has claimed that reservations would "kill the golden goose
This material aspect was central to the PBDs, whose main stated that is making India a "global economic powerhouse" [Hindustan
aim is "renew [NRIs] ties with their ancestral land and... explore Times 2004c]. An RSS-authored Organiser article best demon
new avenues of cooperation", particularly through investment strated the melding of neoliberal vocabulary with caste prejudic
[PTI 2003]. Press coverage of the first PBD in the English press It lamented the ostensible neglect of the "economically poor
generally presented the issue as a conflict between NRI's brahmin 'sen- community", who are "surviving by dint of their merit,
timental attachment' to India and their dislike of the 'bad in- diligence and honesty", but also claims that with reservation
vestment climate' [e g, Indian Express 2003; Dhaliwal 2003]. "(multinational) companies may develop second thoughts... (sinc
In other words, 'Indian society' has doubly failed: it has given they) would like to enter the world competitiveness [sic] to th
its best members neither 'opportunities', nor the compensation satisfaction of their customers" [Madhava Rao 2004].
of a 'good investment climate' after they have left. In short, if this 'new India', a homogenous realm of individual
These failures supposedly resulted from Indians' flawed (for the Organiser, specifically brahmins and multinational
values. Thus, The Times oflndia approvingly quoted one Canadian competing on merit, is forced to accept the mechanisms an
NRI saying, "[Canadians] accepted us for our hard work...you, divisions of the 'old India', it will be destroyed. Without 'globa
too [must] become good human beings" [Dhaliwal 2003]. Others competitiveness', its existence has no meaning.
said Indians lacked "integrity, attitude, commitment, ability" Two alternatives to reservations have been frequently pro
[Upadhyaya 2004]. Thus NRIs became ideal Indians, represen- posed. The first is "upgrading skills (of SC/STs and OBCs) an
tatives of what 'India' could achieve if Indians were 'good' giving (them) the right kind of training", reducing the issue t
individuals following correct social 'values'. There could individual 'upgradation' rather than caste discrimination [Th
hardly be any message that neoliberalism and Hindutva agreed Hindu 2004]. The second is economic reservations, given tha
upon more. supposedly "poverty does not recognise caste barriers" [Dail
But, in addition to criticising Indian 'society', the NDAs, PBDs Pioneer 2003]. Thus the 'real' problem is poverty, not discrimi
also carried a clear message about that society's boundaries. nation,This and reservations should assist the poor in overcoming thei
emerged most clearly with the announcement of dual citizenship 'disadvantage'. By conceiving of poverty as an individual 'di
at the 2003 PBD [Jayachandran 2003]. Some critics pointedadvantage' out of birth rather than a collective or class status, thi
the glaring contradiction of giving NRI's citizenship rights while once again erases social power relations and reduces the matt
denying them to Kashmiris, Gujarati Muslims, and others [Bidwai to a paternalistic notion of "uplifting the poor".17 This econom
2003; Hoskote 2003]. But this was precisely the point. The PBD, reservations demand has long formed a part of the Sangh parivar
after all, was a gesture of discursive delimitation. NRIs were to
vocabulary, and neoliberals now increasingly advocate it as wel
be 'welcomed home' even as other communities were driven Thus, Outlook claimed most business leaders feel that "(an
out.15 Thus, this was one more effort to displace the historical quota system) should be on economic and not caste basi
norms of the Indian state and instead redraw Indian society's [Mukherjee 2004].
boundaries around a supposedly unitary community, one whose In sum, opponents of reservations have defined a discourse th
individuals could strive to change their faulty 'values' to thetrue can equally well host Hindutva organicism, casteism and neoliberal
values of neoliberalism and Hindutva. The fact that this had no claims. It defends the boundaries of the 'new India' by insistin
basis in India's political, historical or constitutional institutionsthat it will not recognise the existence of discrimination an
was exactly why it had to take place. divisions either within or outside itself. Entering this 'new Ind
should only be possible through the approved 'meritorious
Defining Pathways for Social Mobility16 channels; anything else would kill 'India' itself.

Such definitions of Indian society naturally have few takers Managing a Tension
in other political formations. One manifestation of opposition,
which began during NDA rule and followed it as well, has been My final case study concerns the ability of these ideologie
the demand for private sector reservations. In our terms, reser- to manage their tensions during the NDA period, using th
vations proponents accept neoliberal notions of the private sector
controversy around the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs
as an example. I focus on how, in this instance, neoliberals
as the arena for social mobility, but claim that it must therefore
follow the same political rules as the earlier state-driven arena.responded to a Hindutva move that threatened their agendas
For Hindutva supporters and neoliberals, this is a direct threat The IIMs are central to Indian neoliberalism, both concretely
to the boundaries I noted above. It threatens to puncture the 'new'in that they train many corporate leaders, and discursively
India's upper caste-dominated 'unitary society' and force it to because of the salience of management as a central neoliber
recognise social divisions and grant a major role to the state. concept.18 In October 2003, however, the human resource
Intense hostility has hence greeted the demand. development (HRD) ministry under Murli Manohar Joshi im
posed a steep fee cut on these 'premier' institutes [Lakshma
This hostility has followed the standard anti-reservations tropes:
reservation advocates are accused of 'vote bank' politics and 2003]. Joshi argued that the IIMs could not take such large sum

Economic and Political Weekly June 30, 2006 2809

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without being accountable to the government and 'the people' responsibility into a description of Modi as a madman. He was
[Indian Express 2004a]. another individual who had failed to realise the BJP's need to
Though at first glance unrelated to the Sangh parivar, the move be 'moderate' [e g, Gupta 2002; Das 2003].-
also reflected parivar sentiments.19 The Organiser said the move But Gujarat could not be erased entirely. The issue continued
was an expression of "the government's concern for social uplift" tobe a source of tension; notably, afterthe elections, someneoliberals
and that opponents were "insult[ing]... Indian society" since they blamed Gujarat for the NDA's defeat [e g, Gupta 2004b].
implied that poor students couldn't perform [Bhattacharya 2004a;
Organiser 2004]. These were standard claims of Hindutva's The Present Day
organic rhetoric, which argues that the wealthy must engage in
charitable 'social uplift' [Golwalkar 1979]. This reflected the The NDAs shock election defeat was a major setback for both
deeper Hindutva-neoliberal tension around individual autonomy neoliberalism and Hindutva. Clearly these projects had, for the
(see above) and also violated the 'division of labour' described moment, failed to achieve hegemony. Indeed, the voting pattern
in the previous section on education. established "a radical shift in the social basis of political power":
The response was a firestorm of outrage in the IIMs, corporate an inchoate "alternative bloc" of socially marginal groups de-
lobbies and neoliberal press outlets. Initial responses included feated the NDA's "new social bloc" [Yadav 2004].
accusations of betrayal and claims that the HRD ministry was Yet the very fact that such polarisation occurred could be a
violating the NDA's election manifesto [Roy 2004; Mitta 2004]. sign of the NDA's partial success. It has shown that it is possible
Other commentators demanded that Joshi should stay with pri- to build a 'historic bloc' of social actors around neoliberal-
mary education, his 'real job' [Majumdar 2004; FE 2004]. Hindutva priorities and to articulate a coherent hegemonic projec
Columnist Tavleen Singh (2004) explicitly asked Joshi to follow for it. To use our terms, the alliance partly succeeded in building
the division of labour by focusing on 'Indianising' primary on these projects' resonances, containing their tensions and
education rather than "wast[ing] time interfering in our finest coopting some of their most powerful potential opponents
institutions." (regional elites).
But, at the same time, such a small issue could not be allowed However, state power was an important factor in this bloc's
to derail BJP-neoliberal links. Therefore, the tension had to be functioning, as is shown by the NDA's and the BJP's severe post-
managed. The first step was to treat the tension as if it was election decline. As well, the UPA - and specifically the Congress
independent of both ideologies' fundamental tenets, in this case- is trying to project itself as the new premier neoliberal formation
by deeming it to be the result of expediency and 'vote-bank With its rhetoric of winning popular support through 'reforms
politics'. Thus the cut was described as a sop for the "whiningwith a human_fe', the new government thus claims that it, unlike
majority" or the "simple voter", who would support "social the NDA, can create a truly hegemonic form of neoliberalism
engineering experiments" [IE 2004b; Mazoomdar 2004; Gupta I would however be cautious about sweeping predictions that
2004a; HT 2004b]. After all, said a neoliberal commentator, Hindutva and neoliberalism no longer share any agendas. The
"social justice is a holy cow" in Indian politics [Indiresan 2004].context that created a possibility of a shared political agenda ar
The parallels between this rhetoric and anti-reservation tropesstill present, and has been given new life through the UPA. The
are not accidental; they helped neoliberals identify the fee cutneoliberal press has showered scorn on any effort to reverse the
with the 'old' state activity that both Hindutva and neoliberalismNDA's steps, even in instances such as the textbook controversy,
opposed. where the same press itself had condemned the NDA. The
Second, the threat was treated as organisationally limited as persistence of such common agendas indicates that the political
well. The entire controversy was equated with Murli Manohar possibility is still very much alive; how the situation evolves,
Joshi's personality (and secondarily with his staff). Thus, of the of course, remains to be seen.
Hindustan Times' two editorials on the issue, one concerned
Joshi's "selectivity with the truth" and the other claimed, "we Conclusions
have come to expect a certain kind of behaviour from Murli
Manohar Joshi" [HT 2004a, b]. The 'real job' criticisms notedThis argument has attempted to sketch the possibility th
above focused on the failure of schools in Joshi's own electoral
is an area of shared political priorities between neoliberal
constituency. Other commentators attacked the HRD ministry'sHindutva, an area that represents neither a complete me
officials as "egomaniacal", "meddlesome mandarins" sufferingthese forces nor a purely opportunistic alliance. Instea
from a "colonial hangover" [Gupta 2004; Bhattacharya 2004b;projects have shared a logic whose validity is not infin
Indiresan 2004]. As a result, the near unanimous recommendation the sense that it will eventually break down under the
was that the BJP should demonstrate its 'moderation' - here, itsof its contradictions - but is also not entirely non-existe
a logic dictated both by the projects themselves and b
acceptance of neoliberalism- by eliminating Joshi [see, e g, Singh
2004; FE 2004]. political context, as is arguably typical of any hegemonic
By reducing the issue to 'vote bank politics' and personal in real politics.
agendas, neoliberal commentators thus actually depoliticised a Such alliances are often dismissed as 'expedient' by jour
potential contradiction between their agenda and the Hindutvaand political analysts, given the 'fundamental' contr
one.20 This reflected the pattern of most 'controversies' betweenbetween the two political forces. This kind of dis
the two projects. A prime though contrasting example, whichhowever, prevents us from recognising the reality that
unfortunately is too complex for me to fully discuss here, was alliances rarely require complete harmony between p
the Gujarat pogroms. After Gujarat, one neoliberal commentatorforces; rather, they are shaped by historical circumstance
called on Vajpayee to forget communalism and now only speakis a large middle ground between complete harmo
of "business, trade, investment" [Baru 2002]. Further, somecomplete dissonance.
neoliberal press outlets converted secularists' emphasis on Recognising such middle grounds allows us to specul
chief minister Narendra Modi as an autocrat with command other possibilities as well. For instance, one might us

2810 Economic and Political Weekly June 30, 2006

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analysis to argue for another dimension to the alliances between associated with the idea of equal rights for communities rather than
neoliberalism and social reaction mentioned in the Introduction for individuals.
6 The notion of vested interests was critical to this shared vocabulary. NFMs,
of this article, namely, such alliances express common class
for instance, frequently argued that farmers were oppressed because the
interests by articulating shared notions of a bounded, unitary and state was pandering to the interests of urban areas [Assadi 1995]. Similarly,
individual-based conception of society. These notions transcend the Assam and Punjab movements argued that they were being discriminated
the usual liberal-conservative divide over individual rights and against by the central government, seen as pandering to Bangladeshi
focus on common opposition to the rights of communities, classes immigrants and Hindus respectively.
and political formations; for if there is one issue on which 7 The actual economic policies the BJP advocated until 1996 remained fairly
constant: a mix ofneoliberal reforms, mainly deficit reduction, privatisation,
neoliberalism, authoritarianism and fascism all agree, it is the
and tax cuts, and non-neoliberal policies such as full employment, subsidies
need to forcibly depoliticise society. The need for defining the and price freezes. Much of this was contradictory - the ballooning deficit
boundaries of such a unitary society - an area where a transnational was vehemently condemned even as the party called for tax cuts and
project like neoliberalism may particularly benefit from domestic restoration of subsidies.

reactionary forces - could be especially necessary where prior8 The definition of 'high class' includes professionals, businesspeople,
popular mobilisations have politicised social divisions and privi- landholders (more than 10 acres), skilled workers, middle and upper level
government staff, and those living in 'pucca' housing. See Heath and
leged the state's role in social mobility, as in India after the 1980s, Yadav 1999 for details.
but also as in Argentina after Peronism, Chile after Allende, or 9 It should be noted that this shift only consolidated the pre-existing division
Britain after the 1970s.
of labour within the Sangh Parivar, where the BJP had never been regarde
Such alliances are historically shaped - they are not inevitable. as either the sole or even the main mass mobilising force (that dubiou
But they represent an expression of political possibility. Those honour being reserved for the VHP, the Bajrang Dal, etc). I am not
of us who care about social justice can only ignore such pos- claiming that neoliberal pressure was the sole reason that this shif
occurred - indeed, in immediate political terms, the pressures of th
sibilities at great peril. (l3
regional parties were far more critical. However, these shifts opened th
space for neoliberals to endorse the BJP as well.
Email: shankargopal@myfastmail,com 10 'Very high class' includes professionals, businesspeople, farmers wit
more than 20 acres of land and those earning more than Rs 20,000
Notes month, see Heath and Yadav 1999.
11 Again, I am not claiming that this was the sole reason for the NDA's
creation, only that it was among the consequences of its formation.
[I am indebted to Subir Sinha for helping me greatly in consolidating and
Reasons for the NDA's formation include much more complex political
building this argument. Chetan Bhatt's incisive thoughts on these issues also
manoeuvres and state-specific factors.
provided me with several new directions of analysis.]
12 In themselves these are not new measures in Indian education policy,
I A good example of a study of such a hegemonic project is the 'authoritarian though they were now rephrased in increasingly neoliberal terms. I am
populism' view of Thatcherism in Britain [Gamble 1988]. Accepting the indebted to Subir Sinha for pointing this out.
general view of neoliberalism as the "politics constructed from ... freedom
13 It is interesting that this bloc does not necessarily include national capital,
of choice, the market society, laissez faire, and minimal government", as seen in the mixed reactions of national corporates to the Gujarat pogroms
namely, the hegemonic project of transnational circulating capital, they [Roy 2000].
argued thatThatcherism "translat[ed] economic doctrine into the language14 This is not to say that numerous other issues could not have been taken
of experience, moral imperative and common sense, thus providing ... up, and to some extent this selction is indeed arbitrary.
an alternative ethic" [Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993:15; Hall 1983]. 15 The very word pravasi (or 'paravaasii') can be translated as meaning
By refracting genuine social contradictions through the notion of 'freedom' "[one] residing in another's house for some time"
for 'society' from 'government interference', Thatcherism utilised the (www.wordanywhere.com). Hence the beginning of Vajpayee's (2
resonances between a political ideology (conservatism) and an economic speech: "Welcome home."
ideology (liberalism). The result had a coherent, systematic logic that went 16 My effort in this section is not to enter into the actual validit
beyond the contingent or opportunistic combination of two otherwise otherwise of reservations in the private sector. Rather, my goa
unconnected ideologies. to interpret the positions that were taken by Hindutva and neoli
2 In the course of this article I often refer to 'neoliberals' or 'Hindutva forces on this matter.
forces' as if these are monolithic entities. I am aware that this is untrue,
17 This, again, is an analysis of the discourse around this issue, not a criticism
and that this argument perhaps suffers from selection bias in terms ofof economic reservations in themselves.
choosing which voices to treat as 'neoliberal' or saffron. However,
18 Neoliberalism sees all forms of organisation, including the state itself,
considering that this is indeed an exploration, the thrust of the argument as enterprises - and thus their operation becomes a matter of 'management'
might well be severely diluted if I attempted to analyse all the internal [Burchell 1996].
debates within the Sangh Parivar and Indian neoliberalism. Therefore, 19 It may also seem that these moves reintroduced the state as an arbiter
I use these terms as shorthand, and wherever possible specifically identify of mobility. However, the government's other moves in education made
the actors that I am referring to. it clear that, in this case, it saw the state only as a stopgap tool for Sangh
3 In this section, my primary sources for Hindutva are Deendayal Upadhyaya's parivar control. This was reflected in rumours that, for instance, the
'integral humanism' series of lectures and texts drawn from them, as these ministry wished to introduce compulsory Sanskrit courses as well.
are often quoted as the core of the Parivar's socio-economic ideology. 20 Out of more than 30 press pieces surveyed for this argument, only
For neoliberalism, I draw on Foucaldian analyses of the 'Chicago school' one - Jha 2004 - described the controversy as resulting from a 'BJP
of economics (which largely defined the basic tenets of present-dayregime.'
neoliberalism). and on examples from Thatcherism and American
neoliberalism.
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2812 Economic and Political Weekly June 30, 2006

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Golwalkar, M S ('Guruji') (1979): 'Integral Man' in D Upadhyaya, M S Mazoomdar, Jay (2004): 'Fee-Good Is also Feel-Good', Indian Express,
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