G.R. No.

L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO

DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA
RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and
Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of
the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be
freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and
Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos'
be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be
governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil
Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the
petitioners.  1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos,
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No.
37.  2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon
the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.  3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.  4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter,
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for
adoption.  5
Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the
Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or

children by legal fiction;

xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add
grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that
what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez,  that the
6

adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the
family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect,
permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent
reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating
the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a
clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.  7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously
intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The
Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for
the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy
would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein.
But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to
"children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no
child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of
paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship.   The present tendency, however, is
8

geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that
objective.  Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
9

or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 

10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6355-56             August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of
Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of
Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the
income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary
from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from
October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were
jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a
rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the
salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the
arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought
up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United
States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue,
our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress,
because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home
his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office
during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
 discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand
pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto
case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according
to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto
case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at
least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We
quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not
to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly
section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by
the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer)
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in
order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will
have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al.,
44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would
lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a
statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the
 suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of
the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important
functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not
contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with
the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its
meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate
it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on
a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe
that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the
old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the
decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full
salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his
income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax
comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been
decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income
tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in
advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not
receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say,
twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or
P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months)
we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685,
which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice
Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of
receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving
P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his
salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became
Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law
was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any
exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income
tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court
of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers,
like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on
Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service
Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these
officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other
judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107
Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason
behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court
and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public
policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs.
Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but,
like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to
promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of
the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and
the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its
spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption,
especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as
P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be
derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional
exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much
less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by
the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life,
on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he
does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of
exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit.
They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less
afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be
real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is
based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in
cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in
the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark
or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making
such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and
juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used
exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].)
Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest
they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of
the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army
who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax.
(Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the
Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No.
35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his
income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying
taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence
of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution
and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task
of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 78780               July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila,
seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries.

In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in
and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response
to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed
the Chief Justice's directive as follows:

RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. — The Court REAFFIRMED the Chief
Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this
Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices
of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the judiciary.

That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has
deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement. As will be shown
hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give
substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner
Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos,
that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to
all taxpayers.

This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured
by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since
then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary.
The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
properly subject to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment
of such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office ...  (Emphasis supplied).
1 

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ...  (Emphasis ours).
2 

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including

constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.  3

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.  (Emphasis supplied).
4 

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the
original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate
such contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________
and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos.  (Emphasis ours)
5 

During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two Commissioners presented
their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:

MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of justices, does this
not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and the principle of equal protection of
the law? After all, tax is levied not on the salary but on the combined income, such that when
 the judge receives a salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not
the salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?

MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the increase or

decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way of decreasing their salary
and affecting the independence of the judges.

MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect tenure, but the
special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of the principle of uniformity in
taxation and the equal protection clause.  6

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. OPLE. x x x

Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor, Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect, to surround the Supreme Court and the
judicial system as a whole with the whole armor of defense against the executive and
legislative invasion of their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside,
especially the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a bastion of
justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of extra territoriality under
the Republic of the Philippines, because a good number of powers and rights accorded to
the Judiciary here may not be enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the
government.

An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic immunity, which
is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and the legislative.  7

And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986, Commissioner Cirilo A.
Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to "decreased" and that the words "nor
subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches
in the government.

Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, defended the
original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs. Meer  that "the independence of
8 

the judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries."
Commissioner Rigos then moved that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas
stood up "in support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:

FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment saying that it is
not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income tax," because if that is all
that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and
in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the statement will read:
"During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE
SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the
argument seems to be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax
because they already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are many
people who have accepted employment in the government involving a reduction of income
 and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the only citizens whose income is
reduced by accepting service in government.

Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment. Commissioner Rustico
F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the session. Upon resumption, Commissioner
Bernas announced:

During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original proponent,

Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4 would read: "During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be DECREASED."But this is on the understanding
that there will be a provision in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General
Provisions of the 1973 Constitution, which says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including

constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the salary of justices
is subject to tax.

When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption from tax of
salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:

FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General Provisions.
But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on the understanding that
the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.

The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally approved without
objection.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is that there will
be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could Commissioner Rosario Braid
kindly take note that the salaries of officials of the government including constitutional
officers shall not be exempt from income tax? The amendment proposed herein and
accepted by the Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income tax" is deleted. 9

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
10 

assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
11 

mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 12 

1avvphi1

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:
 The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation
of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of
enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a
strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the
discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David  must be declared discarded. The framers of the
13  14 

fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms
the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. L-3629             March 19, 1951

ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN CABRERA, respondent.

Rivera, Castaño, Medina and Lozada and Roman Cruz for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public
convenience to install, maintain, and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily
productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several municipalities of Batangas
province as well as in the City of Lipa. Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of
public convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that
their service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not require
the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera. Instead of the Commission conducting the
corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors,
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H.
Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the
provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the Public Act Attorney Aspillera
conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary, the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a
decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, and finding from the evidence that public interests and convenience
will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by authorizing the applicant to operate a
 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino citizen and is financially qualified
to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant, the oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat
are hereby overruled, and a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in
the City of Lipa is hereby granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera, the said certificate
to be subject to the following.

Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:

ERROR I. — That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a
Commissioner in contested cases; consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to
Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.

ERROR II. — That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the
certificate to applicant-respondent Belen Cabrera.

We shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same
disposes of this appeal. The legal point raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the
Commission. At the beginning of the hearing before Attorney Aspillera, counsel for oppositors, Silva,
now petitioner, asked that the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a
contested case. When his petition was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing "with the
hearing of this case shall not be understood as a waiver of our objection" (t. s. n., p. 3). It is therefore
clear that petitioner is not raising this issue here for the first time.

While petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to
take the testimony of witnesses was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public
Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, respondent equally claims that said delegation is
perfectly proper and legal. It will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was made
under the provisions of section 32 of the Public Service Act (Com. Act No. 146). Said section reads
as follows:

SEC. 32. The Commission may, in any investigation or hearing, by its order in writing, cause
the depositions of witnesses residing within or without the Philippines to be taken in the
manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Commission may also, by proper
order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of division to receive
evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the
Peace of the Philippines to take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the
Commission where such witnesses reside in places distant from Manila and it would be
inconvenient and expensive for them to appear personally before the Commission. It shall be
the duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance or justice of the peace so commissioned to
designate promptly a date or dates for the taking of such evidence, giving timely notice to the
parties, and on such date to proceed to take the evidence, reducing it to writing. After the
evidence has been taken, the justice of the peace shall forthwith certify to the correctness of
the testimony of the witnesses and forward it to the Commission. It shall be the duty of the
respective parties to furnish stenographers for taking and transcribing the testimony taken. In
case there was no stenographers available, the testimony shall be taken in long-hand by
such person as the justice of the peace may designate. For the convenience of the parties
the Commission may also commission any other person to take the evidence in the same
manner.

For purpose of reference we are also reproducing the pertinent portion of section 3 of the same Act
as amended by Republic Act No. 178, relied upon by the petitioner:
 All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of
the Commissioner, acting either individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The
Commissioners shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases and those that
may hereafter be submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine,
and shall proceed to hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however,
That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for
reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the
affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a
decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the
Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners, who
shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to
render its decision. (Underlining is ours)

After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree
with the petitioner that the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner
in which he received the evidence, was contrary to the provisions of the public Service Act.

The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is
authorized to conduct the hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the
evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so
received by him.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 146 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 178, the Public
Service Commission only of a Public Service Commissioner and a deputy Commissioner. The
Deputy Commissioner acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner,
and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead. The Public Service
Commissioner alone heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested. There could
therefore be no hearing or decision in banc. The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146
evidently believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service Commissioner or his deputy if
properly commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving
the fixing of rates. Under said Commonwealth Act 146 before amendment, particularly section 32
thereof, the Commission besides authorizing the taking of depositions and the testimonies of the
witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance and justice of the peace in the provinces, also
authorized the reception of evidence by the Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions. Then
came Republic Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146 making the
Commission to consist of one Public Service Commissioners and two Associate Public Service
Commissioner under the second section, and under section 3, as already seen from the
reproduction of said section, requiring that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, he heard
and decided by the three Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be
delegated to one of the Commissioners alone. The inference is obvious. In contested cases like
present, the Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of
evidence to anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly
authorized.

It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a
mere authority `to take the testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the
form of a deposition and not a reception of evidence, much less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for
respondent), and so does not violate section 3. An examination of the record does not support this
contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent the Commission, act as a sort of
Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive evidence, oral and documentary, and pass upon petitions
and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing. He even addressed questions to the
witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of exhibits and admitted them. In the
transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred to as the "Commission"
and the proceedings had before him on different dates as "hearings". (t. s. n. pp. 1, 3, 52, 62, 86,
90.) After the submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the "Case submitted". (t. s. n. p.
227.) It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or
testimonies, and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a
deposition under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera
was rather that of a Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a representative of the
Commission that made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial,
either overruling or sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the
question was overruled, and then making his findings and report to the body that commissioned him.

Respondent cites the case of Abel G. Flores, applicant vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.,
oppositor, case No. 27141 of the Public Service Commission wherein the same point of the legality
of a delegation to take testimony was involved. The oppositor in that case believing that the
Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme
Court under G.R. No. L-1637 but its petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit. From this,
respondent infers that even in contested cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a
person other than one of the Commissioners. We have examined that case and we find that the
authority given there was not to receive evidence but to take a deposition and that the person
delegated was a justice of the peace. We quote a portion of the order of Associate Commissioner
Gabriel P. Prieto in that case:

Es verdad que el articulo 3 de la Ley claramente dispone que en los asuntos contenciosos y
en que envuelven la fijacion de tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads
pruebas a cualquiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto, que la deposicion no
una delegacion de la recepcion de las pruebas, porque al funcionario que la toma, la ley no
le concede las facultades del tribunal que ha ordenado dicha deposicion. En efecto, la Regla
18 de los Reglamentos que regula esta actuacion, no autoriza al funcionario que toma la
deposicion para resolver las cuestiones que surgen o se suscitan durante su actuacion; no
le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de derecho; ni le permite, siquiera, rendir
informe o report de todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es certificar la declaracion tal como
ha sido prestada por el deponente. El que toma la deposicion no es como el arbitro o
comisionado de que habla la Regla 34 de los Reglamentos, que actua por delegacion y obra
en representacion del tribunal que le ha nombrado.

It will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above-quoted that Commissioner Prieto admits
that under section 3 as amended, in contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, the
Commission may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the Commissioners and to no
one else.

The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu Transit Co. Inc., vs. Jereza, (58 Phil.,
760), wherein this court held that the Commission was authorized to designate Commissioners for
the purpose of receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any prohibition. That case is
inapplicable for at that time in the year 1933 when the case was decided, Republic Act 178 had not
yet been promulgated, said Act having passed only in 1947.

In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended
by Republic Act 178, the reception of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of
the Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such reception of evidence consists
in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and
competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the
hearings, and receiving and rejecting evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under
section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the fixing of rates, any
attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a
Justice of the Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses,
provided that the same is done under provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow
down its tempo in the disposal of contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially
where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is clear, neither this court nor the
commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the
law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the
necessity of amending the law, and persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the
authority so given, are in violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside
the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings had thereunder to be null
and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service
Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the
Commission in banc of before any of the Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course,
said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re-submit the evidence already presented and taken
down, with such modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such
other evidence which they may wish to present. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.