POLITICAL LAW

Morillo Notes

PRE-1935 CONSTITUTION
1. Before ● Tribes were generally free and governed
Spanish by systems of laws promulgated by Datu
POLITICAL LAW Colonization or Council of Elders;
Morillo Notes ● Tribes are bound by commercial ties,
Atty. Juanito Arcilla except when they fall under the sway of
a foreign power (like the Madjapahit and
Sri-Vishajan Empires)
1521 ● F. Magellan discovered the Philippines;
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ● Spanish Laws governed the Philippines.
January 12, ● First Philippine Republic was established
1899 ● Malolos Constitution was the first
Political Law: democratic constitution promulgated in
- It is the branch of public law which deals with the the whole area.
organization and operations of the governmental o Established as a Parliamentary
organs of the State and defines the relations of the System but with the President (not
State with the inhabitants of its territory. (People vs. Prime Minister) as head of the
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887) government.
December Treaty The cession of the Philippines by
Subjects under Political Law: 10, 1898 of Paris Spain to the US.
Constitutional Treats of the nature of constructions, Filipinos resisted the new threat
Law and the validity of legal enactments as to their freedom but the
tested by the criterion of their American Colonized the country.
conformity to the fundamental law. First Schurman A fact-finding survey
(Martin, Philippine Political Law, 1988) Philippine Commission of the Philippine
Administrative Part of public law which fixes the Commission Islands and submit
Law organization of government, determines appropriate
the competence of the authorities that recommendations to
execute the law, and indicates to the the US Congress.
individual the remedies for the violation Second Taft Commission Took over all the
of his rights. (Martin, Philippine Political Philippine legislative powers
Law, 1988) Commission and some of the
Election Law Study of the means by which the executive and judicial
people choose their officials for definite powers of the military
and fixed periods and to whom they governor.
entrust for the time being as their July 4, 1901 Spooner Civil government was
representatives the exercise of the Amendment established in the
powers of government. (Martin, Philippine Islands
Philippine Political Law, 1988) William Howard Taft was
Law of Public Study of public office, its elements, the first governor.
Officer creations and termination, and of public 1907 -1916 ● Philippine Assembly is created by virtue of
officers, their qualifications, powers, Philippine Bill of 1902;
duties, rights and liabilities. (Martin, ● Bicameral Legislature;
Philippine Political Law, 1988) ● Sergio Osmeña was elected Speaker of
Law on Public Study of quasi- and municipal the Assembly
Corporation corporations, such as municipalities, 1916 - 1934 Promulgation of the Jones Law which
provinces, chartered cities and established the Philippine Legislature,
barangays. (Martin, Philippine Political consisting of a Senate and a House of
Law, 1988) Representative;
1934 ● Tydings-McDuffie Act
Basis and Sources of Studying Political Law: o authorized the establishment of the
- The present Constitution; Commonwealth of the Philippines;
- Pertinent statutes; o it promised the independence to the
Filipinos if they could prove their
- Executive orders and decrees; and capacity for democratic government
- Judicial decisions; and during a 10-year transition period.
- Current events in which the law applies ● A Constitutional Convention framed the
- Previous Philippine Constitutions (1935, and 1973 Constitution of 1935.
Constitutions) 1935 CONSTITUTION
- Constitution of the US and its relevant Supreme May 14, 1935 Ratification of the 1935 Constitution;
Court rulings November Inauguration of the Manuel L. Quezon
15, 1935 1935 Constitution. was elected as the
History of the Philippine Constitutional Law: President, while
Sergio Osmeña was

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the Vice-President. - The body of rules and maxims in accordance with
July 4, 1946 ● US formally withdrew it sovereignty over which the powers of sovereignty are habitually
the Philippines. exercised. (Cooley, The General Principles of Law
● Formal Proclamation of the Republic of in the USA)
the Philippines. - It a social contract whereby the people have
1973 CONSTITUTION surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for
September President F. Marcos issued Proclamation the common good. (Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177
21, 1972 No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines SCRA 668 (1989)
under Martial Law
November The draft of the 1973 Constitution was Classes of Constitutions:
30, 1972 formally approved by the Constitutional WRITTEN UNWRITTEN
Convention. Constitution’s precepts are Constitution consists of rules
January 10 to The draft was submitted to the Citizens embodied in one document which have not been integrated
15, 1973 Assemblies for ratification. or set of documents into a single, concrete form but
January 17, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. are scattered in various sources,
such as statutes of fundamental
1973 1102, announcing that the 1973 character, judicial decisions,
Constitution has been ratified, and become commentaries of publicists,
effective. customs and traditions.
January 17, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045 CONVENTIONAL CUMULATIVE
1981 lifting martial law but he retained his Constitution is enacted Constitution is the result of
“Standby Legislative Powers” under several formally at a definite time political evolution, not
decrees such a the National Security Code and place following a inaugurated at any specific
and the Public Order Act. conscious or deliberate time but changing by
1986 SNAP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION effort taken by a constituent accretion rather than by any
1985 Pres. Marcos submitted a resignation body or ruler. systematic method.
effective on the 10 day following the
th

proclamation of the winners in the “Snap
Election” to be called by the legislature.
February 7, Snap Presidential Election was held and it
1986 proclaimed F. Marcos and A. Tolentino as
the President and Vice President – elect.
February 22, ● People Power Revolution happened
1986 which led to the ouster of P. Marcos and
VP Tolentino;
● Marcos was replaced by Cory Aquino,
and Tolentino was replaced by Salvador
Laurel;
1987 CONSTITUTION
February 25, Freedom Constitution was in force while
1986 to there is a pending adoption of a New
February 2, Constitution to be drafted by a
1987 Constitutional Commission.
February 2, The day of the plebiscite of the 1987
1987 Constitution;
The effectivity date of the 1987
Constitution.
May 11, 1988 Elections for the revived Congress was
held;
May 11,1992 General elections for President and Vice-
President were held.
II. NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
Definition of the Constitution:
- It is the written instrument enacted by direct action
of the people by which the fundamental powers of
the government are established, limited and
defined, and by which those powers are distributed
among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.
(J. George Malcolm)
RIGID FLEXIBLE
The constitution may not be The constitution may be
amended except through a changed in the same when it
special process distinct from may be changed in the same
and more involved than the
manner and through the
method of changing ordinary
laws. It is supposed that by same body that enacts
such a special procedure, the ordinary legislation.
constitution is rendered difficult
to change and thereby acquires
a greater degree of stability.
Features of the Philippine Constitution:
- It is written, enacted and rigid;
- It have 18 Articles
- Date of Effectivity (1987 Constitution) is February 2,
1987, it is the date of the plebiscite and not on the
date of its ratification was proclaimed (De Leon vs.
Esguerra, GR. 78059, Aug. 31, 1987)
Doctrine of the “Constitutional Supremacy”:
- The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer. (J. Isagani Cruz)
- It is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It
has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation. (Manila Prince Hotel
vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408)
Can a State exist without a Constitution?
- YES, while a constitution may be very important for
the orderly operations and management of society,
it does not necessarily mean that a State cannot
exist without it. Even without a Constitution and a
Bill of Rights, the basic and fundamental rights of

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the people were still protected pursuant to the
country’s adherence to international agreements
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
(Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10)
Parts of a Constitution:
Constitution of Sets forth the fundamental rights of
Liberty the people and imposes certain
limitations on the powers of the
government as a means of securing
the enjoyment of these rights.
(Lambino vs. Comelec, 505 SCRA 160)
Constitution of Deals with the framework of
Government government and its powers, laying
down certain rules for its
administration and defining the
electorate. (Lambino vs. Comelec, 505
SCRA 160)
Constitution of Prescribes the mode or procedure for
Sovereignty amending or revising the constitution.
(Lambino vs. Comelec, 505 SCRA 160)
Essential Requisites of a Good Written Constitution:
1. Broad – it would provide the basic and general
outline of government and the relations between it
and the people;
2. Brief – it only provides the fundamentals leaving
the details to be worked out in ordinary legislation;
3. Definite – it ensure an orderly society free from
much ambiguities and uncertainties.
Interpretation of the Constitution:
1. Verba Legis – the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. (Francisco vs. HOR,
415 SCRA 44)
2. Ratio legis est anima – the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. (Francisco vs. HOR,
415 SCRA 44)
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat – The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole. (Francisco vs. HOR,
415 SCRA 44)
4. The provisions of the constitution should be given
only a perspective application unless the contrary
is clearly intended. (Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 11)
5. In case of doubt, the constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non self-
executing; mandatory rather than directory; and
prospective rather than retrospective. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law, p. 11)
Self-Executing and Non Self-Executing Provisions:
SELF-EXECUTING NON SELF-EXECUTING
A rule by itself is directly and One that remains dormant
indirectly applicable without unless it is activated by
need of statutory legislative implementation.
implementation.
- General Rule: All provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. “Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing.”
- Exceptions:
o Statements of general principles (such as
those in Art. II of the Constitution) are
usually not self-executing.
o Constitutional provisions on personal
dignity, sanctity of family life, vital role of
the youth in nation-building, values of
education, social justice and human
rights, promotion of general welfare,
promotion of total human liberation and
development are merely guidelines for
legislation.
- Exception to the Exception:
o The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is self-executing. (Oposa vs.
Factoran, GR. 101083, July 30, 1993)
o The promotion and protection under Art.
II, Sec.15, is also self-executing. (Imbong
vs. Executive Secretary, GR. 204819, April
8, 2014)
o Right to information under Art. II (Legaspi
vs. CSC, GR. L-72119, May 29, 1987)
o Filipino First Policy are self-executing.
(Manila Prince Hotel vs. Executive Sec.)
Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution:
- The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite
on February 2, 1987. (De Leon vs. Esguerra, GR.
78059, August 31, 1987)
- Under Section 27, Article XVIII (1987 Constitution,
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon a ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for that purpose and shall
supersede all previous Constitutions.” De Leon vs.
Esguerra, GR. 78059, August 31, 1987)
III. AMENDMENTS OR REVISION
(Article XVII, 1987 Constitution)
Amendments:
- An addition or change within the lines of the
original constitution as will effect an improvement,
or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed. (Lambino vs. Comelec, GR 174153,
October 25, 2006)
Revision:
- A change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation
of powers of the system of checks-and-balances.
(Lambino vs. Comelec, GR 174153, October 25,
2006)
Distinction between Amendment and Revision:
AMENDMENT REVISION
A change that adds, reduces, or Alters the substantial entirety of
deletes without altering the the constitution, as when the
basic principle involved. change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution.
It generally affects ony the It generally affects several
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specific provisions being provisions of the constitution includes all other powers are matters within the
amended essential to the effective competence of Congress in
Source: (Lambino vs. Comelec, GR 174153, October 25, exercise of the principal the exercise of its
2006) power granted, such as comprehensive legislative
power to fix the power, which power
qualifications, number, encompasses all matters
Two-Part Test/Legal Test: apportionment, and not expressly or by
QUANTITATIVE TEST QUALITATIVE TEST compensation of the necessary implication
Ask whether the proposed Inquires in the qualitative effects delegates as well as withdrawn or removed by
change is “so extensive in its of the proposed change in the appropriation of funds to the Constitution from the
provisions as to change directly constitution. The main inquiry is meet the expenses for the ambit of legislative action
the “substantial entirety” of the whether the change will election of delegates and for
constitution by the deletion or “accomplish such far reaching the operation of the
alteration of numerous existing changes in the nature of our Constitutional Convention
provisions. basic governmental plan as to itself.
amount to a revision.” - When Congress (acting as -a The Congress (acting as
Whether there is an alteration in Constituent Assembly) omits a Legislative body) can
the basic structure of to provide for such
enact the necessary
government is a proper subject implementing details after
of inquiry. calling a constitutional implementing legislation
Source: (Lambino vs. Comelec, GR. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006) convention. to fill in the gaps.
- Source: (Imbong vs. Comelec, GR. L-32432,
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC September 11, 1970)
GR no. 174153, October 25, 2006

Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s - VOTING REQUIREMENTS:
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, Congress (acting as a Constituent Assembly) has
the Lambino Group’s propsed changes overhaul two articles (Art. VI full and plenary authority to propose
– Legislature and Art. VII – Executive) affecting a total of 105 Constitutional Amendments or to call a
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed Convention for the purpose, by a ¾ votes of
changes alther substantially the basic plan of government, from EACH HOUSE IN JOINT SESSION assembled by
presidential or parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral
VOTING SEPARATELY. (Imbong vs. Comelec,
legislature.
GR. L-32432, September 11, 1979)
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of 2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION:
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This - Congress called into existence by:
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the
o A vote of 2/3 of all its Members; or
present Bicameral-Presidential System to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary System is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the o A majority vote of all its Members, submit
legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the to the electorate the question of calling
structure of government. such convention. (Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 1987
Constitution)
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OR REVISION: Position of the Constitutional Convention:
- There are two steps in the amendment or revision - 3 theories on the relative position on the relative
of the Constitution: (1) Proposal, and (2) position of the Constitutional convention vis-à-vis
Ratification. the regular departments of the government.
- 1 - Theory - The
of constitutional
I. PROPOSAL: Conventional convention is supreme
Sovereignty over the other
Proposal: (Secs. 1-2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution) departments of the
government because
WHO MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENT OR REVISION? the power it exercises
1. CONGRESS (acting as Constituent Assembly): are in the nature of
- Upon a vote of ¾ of ALL its members; (par. 1, Sec.1, sovereignty powers.
Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution) (Loomis vs. Jackson, 6
W Va.613.)
Congress as Constituent Assembly vs. as - 2 - The constitutional convention is inferior to the
Legislative Body: other departments of the government since it
CONSTITUENT is merely a creation of the legislature.
- LEGISLATIVE BODY (Wood’s Appeal)
ASSEMBLY
- Congress has fell and plenary ● The power to enact the - 3 - As long as it exists and confines itself within
authority to propose implementing details, the sphere of its jurisdiction, the
Constitutional Amendments, contained in Resolution constitutional convention must be considered
or to call a Convention for Nos. 2 and 4 and RA 6132, independent of and co-equal with the other
that purpose. does not exclusively pertain departments of the government. (Frantz vs.
- The grant of such plenary to Congress acting as a Autry, 91 Pac. 193)
authority to call a Constituent Assembly.
constitutional convention ● Such implementing details
3. PEOPLE (People’s Initiative):

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 POLITICAL LAW
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- Upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. (Sec. 2, Art. XVII, 1987
Constitution)
amendment is “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
propsed amendments. (Lambino vs. Comelec, GR.
174153, Octber 25, 2006)

INITIATIVE – the power of the people to propose

amendments to the Constitution or to propose and II. RATIFICATION:
enact legislations through n election called for the
purpose. (Sec. 3(a), RA 6735) 2. Ratification: (Sec. 4, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution)

REFERENDUM – the power of the electorate to “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
approve or reject a legislation though an election called under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
for the purpose. (Sec. 3(c), RA 6735) majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
3 SYSTEMS OF INITIATIVE: approval of such amendment or revision.”
INITIATIVE ON
INITIATIVE ON THE INITIATIVE ON
LOCAL “Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be
CONSTITUTION STATUTE LEGISLATION valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
Refers to a Refers to a Refers to a petition plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
petition proposing petition proposing proposing to enact later than ninety days after the certification by the
amendments to to enact a a regional, Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.”
provincial, city,
the Constitution; national
municipal, or
legislation; barangay law, - The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled
resolution or an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the
ordinance. voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the
Source: Sec. 3(a), RA 6735 draft of the Constitution then under revision had
been approved. SC approve the petition to prohibit
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC the plebiscite. (Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA
GR no. 127325, March 19, 1997 702)
o The SC interpreted the requirement of Art.
RA 6735 is not intended to or cover initiative on amendments to the XV (1935 Constitution) that the proposed
Constitution. First, Sec. 2 of the RA 6735 does not suggest an amendments shall be “approved by a
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
majority of the votes cast at an election at
word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane or relevant to the said section, which exclusively which the amendments are submitted to
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, the people for ratification.” The use of the
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to “election” in the singular meant that the
amendments on the Constitution. entire Constitution must be submitted for
ratification at one plebiscite only.
Second, RA 6735 does not provide for the contents of a petition for (Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702)
initiative on the Constitution. Sec. 5(c) thereof requires statement of o Furthermore, the people were not give a
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
proper “frame of reference” in arriving at
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of their decision because they had at the
initiative on the Constitution. time no idea yet of what the rest of the
revised Constitution would ultimately be
Third, there is no subtitle provided for initiative on the Constitution. and, therefore, would be unable to assess
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the the proposed amendment in the light of
main thrust of RA 6735 is initiative and referendum on national and the entire document. (Tolentino vs.
local laws. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702)
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned.
Judicial Review of Amendments:
- The validity of the process of amendment is not a
REQUIREMENTS OF PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE ON THE
political question because the Court must review if
CONSTITUTION:
constitutional processes were followed. (Lambino
Two Essential Elements in Initiative Petition: vs. COMELEC, GR 174153, October 25, 2006)
1. The people must author and thus sign the entire - The judiciary may declare invalid:
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on o A proposal adopted by less than ¾ of the
their behalf. members of the Congress; or
2. As an initiative upon petition, the proposal must be o A call for Constitutional convention by less
embodied in a petition. than 2/3 of the legislature; or
o A ratification made less than a majority of
Note: These essential elements are present only of the full the votes cast; or
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to o A plebiscite irregularly held. (Sanidad vs.
the people who express their assent by signing such COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333)
complete proposal in a petition. Therefore, an

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Morillo Notes
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 (1976)
FACTS:
Petitioners question the authority of the President in issuing several
Presidential Decrees proposing amendments to the New
Constitution and calling for a national referendum-plebiscite for the
said amendments.
RULING:
1. The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a justiciable question.
2. In a crisis government, the President shall have the power to
assume the constituent power to propose amendments lodged
in the Legislative body.
IV. CONCEPT OF STATE
Definition of State:
- It is a community of persons, more or less
numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory,
and possessed of an independent government
organized for political ends to which the great body
of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (Malcolm,
The Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands, 2 nd
Edition; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, p.
41))
- It is an entity which has been referred to as a body
politic, or society of men united together for the
purpose of promoting their mutual safety and
advantage by the joint efforts of their combined
strength. (Cooley (1927), A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations, 8 Edition, Vol. 1)
th
Essential Elements of a State:
1. People;
2. Territory;
3. Government, and
4. Sovereignty.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE
PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
GR no. 183591, October 14, 2008
In the Montevideo Convention, it specifies the accepted criteria for
the establishment of a State, namely, (a) permanent population; (b)
a defined territory, (c) a government, and (d) a capacity to enter into
relations with other states. These elements were considered by the
SC in declaring unconstitutional the proposed MOA-AD between
the Government of the Philippines and the and the MILF which
would have paved the way for the conversion of the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE).
1. Permanent Population:
- The MOA-AD defined “Bangsamoro People” as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of
conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether
mixed or full blood, including their spouses.
2. Defined Territory:
- The MOA-AD described the Bangsamoro homeland as the
landmass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
6 – MORILLO NOTES
- It indicated that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all
natural resources within its ‘internal waters’ extending 15
kms from the coastline of the BJE area.
- That the BJE shall also have ‘territorial waters’ which shall
stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines
of the Philippine Republic south east and south west of
mainland Mindanao.
- Notably the Jurisdiction over the internal waters is not
similarly described as “joint.”
- MOA-AD further provided for the sharing of minerals on
territorial waters between the Central Government
(Philippine Republic) and the BJE, in favor of the latter,
through production sharing and economic cooperation
agreement.
3. Government:
- The MOA-AD stipulate that the “Bangsamoro people are
acknowledged as having the right to self-governance,
which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality
exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their
sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw.”
-
4. Capacity to enter relations with other states:
- The MOA-AD stated that “the BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign
countries and shall have the option to establish trade
missions in those countries.”
These considerations led the SC to describe the relationship of the
Central Government and the BJE under the MOA-AD as
“associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility”,
stressing that the in “international practice”, the ‘associated state’
arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device
offormer colonies on their way to full independence.
The SC state that the BJE is not an expanded version of the ARMM
but has a relationship status that is entirely different from the
ARMM.That BJE is a state in all (but name) as it meets the criteria of
a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws. The very concept underlying them, the associative
relationship envisioned between the Government of the Philippines
and the BJE, are unconstitutional for the concept presupposes that
the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
A. PEOPLE
What is definition of “People”?
- It simply refers to the inhabitants of the State.
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 21)
Characteristics:
- They must be numerous enough to be self-sufficing
and to defend themselves and small enough to be
easily administered and sustained. (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, p. 21-22)
Difference between Nation and Citizen:
NATION CITIZEN
Refers to membership Refers to the membership
based more on cultural and based on political ties
social ties.
In regard to inhabitants, the terms national and citizen
may be used interchangeably.
B. TERRITORY
What is Territory?
- It is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth
inhabited by the people of the State.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- It must be neither too bog as to be difficult to
administer and defend nor too small as to be
unable to provide for the needs of the population.
- o The coastal State may exercise control
National Territory of the Philippines:
- The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of terrestrial, fluvial, and
aerial domain, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breath and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Article
I, 1987 Constitution)
What is an Archipelago?
- An expanse of water with many scattered islands
or a group of islands (Merriam-Webster Dictionary)
- A group of islands, including parts of islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features
which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters and other natural features form an intrinsic
geographical, economic and political entity, or
which historically have been regarded as such. (Art.
47, UNCLOS III)
Archipelagic Doctrine:
- The waters around, between, and connecting the
islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breath and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines. (second sentence, Art. I,
1987 Constitution)
- The entire archipelago is regarded as one
integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so
many thousand islands.
Components of a Territory:
a. Terrestrial Domain – the Land mass
b. Fluvial Domain – the internal waters; (such as
rivers and lakes)
c. Aerial Domain – the Air space above the land and
the waters
d. Maritime – Territorial Seas, external waters.
United Nations Conventions of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III):
● Territorial Sea:
o Every State has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit
not exceeding 12 nautical miles,
measured from the baselines determined
in accordance with this Convention.
(Article 3, Sec. 2, UNCLOS III)
o The sovereignty of a coastal State
extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an
archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters,
to an adjacent belt of sea, described as
the territorial sea.
● Contiguous Zone:
o The Contiguous Zone may not extend
beyond 24 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. (Art. 33, Sec. 2,
UNCLOS III)
necessary to:
▪ Prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws
and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea;
▪ Punish infringement of the above
laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
● Exclusive Economic Zone
o The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) shall
not extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured. (Art. 57,
UNCLOS III)
o The coastal State has:
▪ Sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of
the seabed and its subsoil, and
with regard to other activities for
the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the
production of energy from the
water, currents and winds;

What are “Straight Baselines”?
- Under Art. 7 of UNCLOS III, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be
employed in drawing the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
- Straight baselines are drawn joining the outermost
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of
the archipelago. (Gorospe (2016) Political Law, p.
24)
- In this way, all the islands and the waters included
within such baselines would be considered as a
single body.
Republic Act no. 9522:
- This an Act which defines the Archipelagic Baseline
of the Philippines (Sec. 1, RA 9522)
- Under Sec. 2 thereof; The baseline in the following
areas over the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as
“Regime of Islands” under Republic of the
Philippines consisted with Art. 121 of the UNCLOS:
o The Kalayan Island Group (KIG) as
constituted under PD 1596; and
o Bajo de Masinloc (aka Scarborough Shoal.
MAGALLONA vs. ERMITA
GR no. 187167, August 16, 2011
Baseline laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific based points along their coasts from
which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 7
 POLITICAL LAW
UNCLOS States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters.
C. GOVERNMENT:
What is the meaning of Government?
- it is the agency or instrumentality through which
the will of the State is formulated, expressed and
realized. (Poindexter vs. Greenhow, 114 US. 270)
Functions of the Government:
CONSTITUENT FUNCTION MINISTRANT FUNCTION
1. The keeping of order and providing
● Those undertaken
for the protection of persons and
advance the interests of
property from violence and
robbery; society, such as public
2. The fixing of the legal relations works, public charity, and
between husband and wife and
regulation of trade and
between parents and children;
3. The regulation of the holding, industry.
transmission and interchange of ● These functions are merely
property, and the determination of
optional.
its liabilities for debt or for crime;
4. The determination of contractual
rights between individuals;
5. The definition and punishment of
crimes;
6. The administration of justice in civil
cases;
7. The administration of political
duties, privileges and relations of
citizens; and
8. The dealings of the State with
foreign powers; the preservation of
the State from external danger or
encroachment and the
advancement of its international
interests.
● In PVTA vs. CIR (65 SCRA 416), the SC noted that the
distinction between the two function had become
blurred because of the repudiation of the laissez faire
policy in the Constitution.
Doctrine of Parens Patriae:
- The government is tasked to be the guardian of the
rights of the people who may be disadvantaged or
suffering from some disability or misfortune.
- In the case of PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. MONTE
DE PIEDAD (35 Phil 728), contributions were
collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of
the victims of an earthquake but part of the money
was never distributed and instead deposited with
the defendant bank (Monte de Piedad). An action
for its recovery was filed later by the Government
of the Philippines, defendant bank questioned the
competent of the Government of the Philippines
contending that the suit could be instituted only by
the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their
heirs. The SC rejected defendant bank’s
contention and upheld the right of the Government
of the Philippines to file the case for the State as
‘parens patriae’ in representation of the legitimate
claimants.
- In the case of CABAÑAS vs. PILAPIL (58 SCRA 94),
the government of the Philippines acting for the
State as ‘parens patriae’ chose the mother of an
8 – MORILLO NOTES
Morillo Notes
illegitimate (as against his uncle) to be the trustee
of the insurance proceeds left him by his father.
The State shall strengthen the family as a basic
social institution. If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even
if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have
led the lower court to decide as it dad.
De Jure and De Facto Government:
DE JURE GOVERNMENT DE FACTO
GOVERNMENT
Has rightful title but no This is a government of
power or control, either fact, that is, it actually
to because this has been exercises power or control
withdrawn from it, or but without legal title.
because it has not yet
actually entered into the
exercise thereof.
Kinds of De Facto Government:
1. By Revolution, Insurrection, or Cessation:
- The government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter,
such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliamentary and later
by Cromwell as Protector.
2. Against the Parents State:
- That was established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state,
such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt against the Union during
the was of secession in the US.
3. By Invasion:
- That which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and
which is denominated as a government of
paramount force, such as the cases of Castine
in Maine, which was reduced to a British
possession in the 1812 War, and of Tampico,
Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico
by the troops of the US. (Co Kim Chan vs.
Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113)
Government of the Philippines:
- It is the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various
arms though which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms
of local government. (Sec. 2(1), Administrative
Code of 1987)
Government Agency:
- This refers to any of the various units of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

including a department, bureau, office, - Non-political law continue in operation, for the
instrumentality or Government Owned or reason also that they regulate private relations only,
Controlled Corporation (GOCC), or a local unless they are changed by the new sovereign or
government or a distinct unit therein. (RA 10149, are contrary to its institutions.
Sec. 3(k))
Act of State:
Government distinguished from Administration: - An act of State is an act done by the sovereign
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION power of a country, or by its delegate, within the
The agency or The group of persons in limits of the power vested in him.
instrumentality through whose hands the reins of - An act of State cannot be questioned or made the
which the will of the State is government are for the time subject of legal proceedings in a court of law.
formulated, expressed and being.
realized.
This is Permanent This is Transitional
V. DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
D. SOVEREIGNTY
Definition of Sovereignty:
Constitutional Basis:
- This refers to the supreme and uncontrollable “The State may not be sued without its consent.”
power inherent in a State by which that State is (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, Constitution)
governed. (Garner, Political Science and
Government) Justification for the Doctrine of Immunity:
- The doctrine of non-suability is based on the fact
Kinds of Sovereignty: that there can be no legal right against the authority
LEGAL POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY which makes the law on which the right depends.
SOVEREIGNTY (J. Holmes; Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83).
The authority which has the The power behind the legal - The demands and inconvenience of litigation will
power to issue final sovereignty, or the sum of divert the time and resources of the State from the
commands. the influences that operate more pressing matters demanding its attention, to
upon it. the prejudice of the public welfare. (Cruz (2014)
INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY Political Law, p. 48)
The power of the State to The power of the State to
control its domestic affairs. direct its relations with other IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES:
States (also known as Constitutional Basis:
Independence) - The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted
- In our country, the Congress is the legal sovereign, principles of international law as part of the law of
while the different sectors that mold public opinion the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
make up the political sovereign. (Cruz (2014), equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
Political Law, p.43) with all nations. (Art. II, Sec. 2)

Characteristics of Sovereignty: Principle of Par In Parem Non Habet Imperium:

- “Equals have no sovereignty over each other”
- Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive,
- A sovereign state cannot exercise jurisdiction over
comprehensive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable
another sovereign state.
and imprescriptible. (Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856)
- However, this does not mean that foregin state
would at all times be immune from suits filed
Effect of Belligerent Occupation:
against it before courts of a host or local state.
- Gen. Rule: No change in sovereignty. (Ruffy vs.
Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875) Conflicting Concepts of Sovereign Immunity:
- Exemption: However, political laws (except the law CLASSICAL or ABSOLUTE NEWER or RESTRICTIVE
on treason) are suspended (Laurel vs. Misa, supra); THEORY THEORY
municipal laws remain in force unless repealed by A sovereign cannot, without
The imunity of the sovereign
the belligerent occupant. its consent, be made a is recognized only with
- At the end of the belligerent occupation, when the respondent in the courts of
regard to public acts (jure
occupant is ousted from the territory, the political another sovereign. imperii) of a state, but not
laws which had been suspended during the with regard to private acts
occupation shall automatically become effective (jure gestionis).
again, under the doctrine of Jus Postliminium. Source: Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr., GR no. 101949,
December 1, 1994
Effect of Change of Sovereignty:
- The Political Laws of the former sovereign are Process of Suggestion:
abrogated. - When a state or international agency wishes to
plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 9

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state
where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity. (Holy See vs.
Rosario, supra)
- In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity and, thereafter,
the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its
endorsement to the court either by:
o Just sending a letter directly (International
Catholic Migration vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130);
o Sending a telegram to that effect (WHO vs.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242);
o When a foreign state asked the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make a “suggestion” to the
judge. (Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1)
Determination of Immunity by the Department of Foreign
Affairs:
- The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has
no binding effect in courts. (Liang vs. People, GR
no. 125865, January 28, 2000)
IMMUNITY OF STATE’S DIPLOMATIC AGENTS:
Diplomatic Agents:
- This refers to the head of the mission or a member
of the diplomatic staff of the mission. (Art. 1, Sec.
e, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations)
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 22:
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The
agents of the receiving State may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take
all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the
mission or impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and
other property thereon and the means of transport
of the mission shall be immune from search,
requisition, attachment or execution.
IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), ITS
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS:
- The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized
agencies, are likewise beyond the jurisdiction of local
courts. (Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations; Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of Specialized Agencies of the United Nations)
- Permanent international commissions and administrative
bodies have been created by the agreement of a
considerable number of States for a variety of
international purposes, economic or social and mainly
non-political. In so far as they are autonomous and
beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct
juridical personality independent of the municipal law of
the State where they are situated. As such, they must be
deemed to possess a species of international personality
of their own. (SEAFDEC vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 580)
10 – MORILLO NOTES
Waiver of Immunity:
- As a general rule, The State may not be sued:
- Exception: If the State consent to be sued.
Figure 1: Concept of Waiver of Immunity
Gen. Rule: "The State Cannot be Sued"
Exception: If the State Consents to be Sued"
Express Consent Implied Consent
When the State When the State
General Law Special Law
Enters into a
Commences
Contract Litigation
Only if the nature of the
contract is for Private,
Act No. 3083
Proprietary or Business
CA 327, as
Merrit vs Government of the
amended by PD
Philippine Islands
1445
Forms of Consent:
A. Express Consent:
- When a law expressly provides that the State be
sued.
- This is manifested either by a general law or special
law.
- The express consent of the State to be sued must
be embodied in a duly enacted statute and may not
be given by a mere counsel of the government.
(Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470)
I. General Law:
- Act no. 3083, declaring that “the Government of
the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits
to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contracts, express or implied,
which could be serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
- Under CA no. 327 (as amended by PD no. 1445), a
claim against the government must first be filed
with the Commission on Audit (COA) within 60 ays.
Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on
Certiorari and in effect sue the State with its
consents. (PD no. 1445, Secs. 49-50)
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs. NLRC
(GR no. 104269, November 11, 1993)
The States’ consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act no. 3083, where
the Philippine Government “consents and submits to be sued
upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties.
The claims of private respondents (underpayment of wages,
overtime pay, and similar items) arising from the Contract of
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Service clearly constitute money claims. Act no. 3082 gives the
consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability from contract, express or implied. However,
pursuant to CA no. 327 (as amended by PD 1445), the money
claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Exception to the Requirement that “Money claims
must first be brought to the Commission on Audit”
(Under CA 327, as amended by PD 1445):
- In the case of Amigable vs. Cuenca (GR L-26400,
February 29, 1972), where the question raised was
the right of the plaintiff Amigable to sue the
government for recovery of the value of her
property which had been converted into public
streets without payment to her of just
compensation. Although it was shown that she had
not previously filed her claim with the Auditor
General as normally required The SC decided in
her favor.
II. Special Law:
- When the Philippine Legislature enacted a law
authorizing an individual to sue the Philippine
Government for injuries he had sustained. (Merrit
vs. Government of the Philippines, 34 Phil. 311)
- This special express consent must be embodied in
in a duly enacted statute and may not be given by
a mere counsel of the government. (Republic vs.
Purisima, supra.)
MERRIT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GR L-11154, March 21, 1916)
Plaintiff E. Merritt got into a collision with a Government
Ambulance which he sustained injuries thereof. The Philippine
Legislature enacted Act No. 2457, an act authorizing E. Merritt
to bring suit against the government of the Philippines Islands
for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle
and the ambulance of the General Hospital.
B. Implied Consent:
- This is given when the State itself commences
litigation or when it enters into a contract.
I. When the State Enters into a Contract:
- A State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. (USA vs. Ruiz, 136
SCRA 487)
- Gen. Rule: There is implied consent when the
State Enters into a Contract.
- Exception: When the State enters into a contract
in Jure Imperii (sovereign acts), there is not implied
consent, and the State enjoys immunity.
Application of the Restrictive Theory:
- State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. (USA vs. Ruiz, GR, L-35645, May 22,
1985)
- is being sued in his personal capacity will not
Difference between ‘Jure Imperii’ and ‘Jure
Gestionis:
JURE IMPERII JURE GESTIONIS
Sovereign Governmental Private, commercial and
Acts of the State propriety acts of the
State
Covered by Immunity Not Covered by
Immunity
Source: USA vs. Ruiz, supra)
USA vs. RUIZ
GR. L-35645, May 22, 1985)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.
Note: The correct test for the application of State
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act. (USA vs. Ruiz,
supra)
- In the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (204
SCRA 212), the doctrine of State Immunity cannot
be successfully invokedto defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs
property.
II. When the State Commences Litigation:
- When the State itself files a complaint, the
defendant is entitled to file a counterclaim against
it.
- In the case of Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping
Corp. (GR L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950), the SC held
that the government impliedly allowed itself to be
sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for
the purpose of a asserting a claim for affirmative
relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of vessel.
- On the other hand, in the case of Lim vs. Brownell
(107 SCRA 345) where the Philippine Government
(as successor-in-interest of the US to the
properties claimed by the latter) filed a complaint in
intervention to join the defendant the defendant in
invoking the doctrine of State immunity to secure
the dismissal of the action. As the Philippine
Government was not asking for any affirmative
relief from the plaintiff but had intervened only for
the purpose of resisting his claim the SC held
that no implied waiver of immunity could be
assumed.
Suits against Public Officers:
- The mere allegation that a government functionary
automatically remove him from the protection of
the law of public officers and the doctrine of state
immunity. (Sanders vs. Veridiano II, GR no. L-
46930, June 10,1988)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 11
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- The general rule that a sovereign state and its
political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts
except when it has given its consent, it cannot be
invoked by both the military officers to release
them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims
to demand indemnification from the government.
Public official who have been found to have acted
beyond the scope of their authority, may be held
liable for damages. (Republic vs. Sandoval, GR.
84607, March 19, 1993)
- In the case of Festejo vs. Fernando (94 Phil. 504),
wherein the Director of Public Works took over
(without authority) property belonging to the
plaintiff and constructed a public irrigation canal
thereon. The SC held that the action for the
recovery of the land or its value was properly filed
against the defendant in his personal capacity and
was therefore not covered by the doctrine of state
immunity.
SANDERS vs. VERIDIANO II
GR no. L-46930, June 10, 1988
Two American employees of the Subic Naval Base sued its
commanding general and director of special services for
damages for allegedly defamatory remarks made by the
defendants.
The SC held that “petitioners were, legally speaking, being
sued as officers of the United States government. As they have
acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners
personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the
trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a
right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be
satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but
by the United States government as their principal. This will
require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount
to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.”
REPUBLIC vs. SANDOVAL
GR no. 84607, March 19, 1993
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in
this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no
affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the
State in its political capacity, even though the officers or
agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. The
SC has made it clear tha even a “high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another.
The conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for
the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability
should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. Public
official who have been found to have acted beyond the scope
of their authority, may be held liable for damages.
Suits Against Government Agencies:
- Where a suit is filed against a government agency,
it must be ascertained whether or not the State (as
the principal that may ultimately be held liable) has
given its consent to be sued.
12 – MORILLO NOTES
- This ascertainment will depend in the first instance
on whether the government agency is incorporated
or unincorporated.
Incorporated vs. Unincorporated Government Agency:
INCORPORATED UNINCORPORATED
AGENCY AGENCY
Concept It has a charter of its It has no separate
own that invests it juridical personality but
with a separate is merged in the
juridical personality. general machinery of
the government.
Example SSS, Municipal Department of Justice,
Corporation, State Department of Finance,
Universities, etc. Department of
Education, etc.
Test of its If its charter From the nature of the
Suability provides that it is functions in which the
suable agency is engaged, it is
suable if they are
proprietary, and not
suable if they are
governmental.
A. Incorporated Agency:
- In the case of Rayo vs. CFI Bulacan (GR no. L-
55273-83, December 19,1981), the SC held that it
is not necessary to determine whether or not the
NPC performs a governmental function with
respect to the management and operation of the
Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the
government has organized a private corporation,
put money in it and has allowed it sue and be sued
in any court under its charter.
-
B. Unincorporated Agency:
If Principal Function is Governmental:
- In the case of Veterans Manpower & Protective
Services, Inc. vs. CA (214 SCRA 286), the SC said
that the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are
instrumentalities of the national government
exercising primarily governmental functions
(regulating the organization and operation of
private detective, watchmen or security guard
agencies, and thus may not be sued without
consent.
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC. vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
and BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
GR no. L-23139, December 17, 1966
-
The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of
Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of
its own apart from that of the national government. Its
primary function is governmental that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre
service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said
revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and
collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship
agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the
declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed.
And this checking up requires that the landed
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable
place in the customs premises to enable said customs
officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.
- Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the
primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs, so that engaging in the same does not
necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function
without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign
immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as
to the necessary means to that end.
BUREAU OF PRINTING vs. BUREAU OF PRINTING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU)
GR no. L-15751, January 28, 1961
- the Local Government Code (LGC),31 which also vests
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
the execution of all printing and binding, including work
incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character
as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary
of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to
undertake . . . ." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no
corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided
for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet
the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a
service bureau and, obviously, not engaged in business
or occupation for pecuniary profit.
- government units to issue or grant such
Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to
undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended
that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The
additional work it executes for private parties is merely
incidental to its function, and although such work may be
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that
the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general
governmental functions.
- consent had not been secured for this purpose. This is
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit,
action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any
effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding
against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection.
If the Principal Function is Proprietary:
- In the case of ATO vs. Ramos (GR 185695,
February 23, 2011), the SC held that the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) was an :an agency of
the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that
was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its
sovereign capacity.
- corporations Cannot be seized under execution against
C. Municipal Corporations:
- Municipal Corporations, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy
the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless,
they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that
they can sue and be sued. (Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union vs. Judge Firme, GR L-52179,
April 8, 1991)
CITY OF BACOLOD vs. MAYOR LEONARDIA
GR no. 190289, January 17, 2018
Consent may be express or implied, such as when the
government exercises its proprietary functions, or where
such is embodied in a general or special law.30 In the
present case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter's
refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo operations and
for closing its business on account of the lack of such
permit. However, while the authority of city mayors to
issue or grant licenses and business permits is granted by
local government units with corporate powers, one of
which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has
held that the power to issue or grant licenses and
business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the
police power of the State, ergo a governmental act. This
is clearly elucidated by the Court in Acebedo Optical
Company, Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals:32
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject
business permit as having been issued by
respondent City Mayor in the performance of
proprietary functions of Iligan City. As
hereinabove elaborated upon, the issuance of
business licenses and permits by a municipality
or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The
authority, which devolved upon local
licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise
of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of
the Local Government Code.
No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can
thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of
the power to issue business permits and licences.
Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that
they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's
notwithstanding petitioners' failure to raise this
exculpatory defense at the first instance before the trial
court or even before the appellate court.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN vs.
FERNANDEZ
GR no. L-61744, June 25, 1984
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in
the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil.
629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended
and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for
which municipal corporations are created, and that to
subject said properties and public funds to execution
would materially impede, even defeat and in some
instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it
is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public
property but also the taxes and public revenues of such
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it.
Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus,
it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the
possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 13
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer
of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are
exempt from execution.
Suability vs. Liability:
SUABILITY LIABILITY
The result of the express or Determined after hearing on
implied consent of the State the basis of the relevant
to be sued. laws and established facts.
When is the State liable?
- The State shall be responsible for torts only when it
acts through a special agent and not when the
damage has been caused by the official or
employee to whom the task done properly pertains.
(Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
supra)
When can a Public Officer be held liable?
- It is a general rule that an officer-executive,
administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or
otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may
thereby render himself amenable to personal
liability in a civil suit. If he exceed the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself
by the plea that he is a public agent acting under
the color of his office, and not personally. In the
eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without
authority. (Festejo vs. Fernando, GR no. L-5156,
March 11, 1954)
When is a Municipal Corporation Liable?
- Municipal corporations are suable because
their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such
entities to be sued, the State merely gives the
claimant the right to show that the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity
when the injury was committed or that the
case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover. (Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union vs. Judge Firme, supra)
- In the case of Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte
(GR no. L-10659, January 31, 1958), a claim for
recovery of damages against a provincial
government failed when it was shown that the
injury complained of occurred in connection with
the repair of streets then being undertaken by the
defendant through its regular agents. This was
clearly a governmental function.
Consent to be Sued does not Include Consent to
Execution:
- The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by
14 – MORILLO NOTES
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action
‘only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of the execution’ and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. (Republic vs. Villasor, GR L-30671, November
28, 1973)
VI. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
I. PREAMBLE:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government that shall embody our ideals and
aspiration, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony and secure to ourselves and our prosperity the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law
and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
II. REPUBLICANISM:
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
Essential Features of Republicanism:
● Representation; and
● Renovation
-
Manifestation of a Republican State:
● Ours is a government of laws and not of men
(Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778);
● Rule of the majority or Plurality in Elections;
● Accountability of Public Officials;
● Bill of Rights;
● Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws;
● Separation of Powers.
Source: Nachura (2016), Outline in Political Law, p. 73
III. INCORPORATION CLAUSE:
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
3 Aspects under Sec. 2, Art. II
● Renunciation of War as an instrument of National
Policy;
● Incorporation Clause; and
● Adherence Policy.
Difference between ‘By Incorporation’ and ‘By
Transformation’:
INCORPORATION: TRANSFORMATION:
Applies when, by mere Requires that an
constitutional declaration, international law principle be
international law is deemed transformed into domestic
to have the force of law through a constitutional
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
domestic law. mechanism, such as local
legislation.
Source: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines vs. Duque, GR no. 173034, October 9, 2007
The Incorporation Clause:
● International law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. Treaties become part of the law of
the land through pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. 21.
(Pharmaceutical, supra)
● By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied
the rules of international law in a number of cases
even if such rules had not previously been subject
of statutory enactments, because these generally
accepted principles of international law are
automatically part of our own laws. (Kuroda vs.
Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171)
● The phrase “generally accepted principles of
international law” refers to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on
all states, eg. Renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy, sovereign immunity, a person’s
right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt
servanda. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. Duque, supra)
Conflict between municipal law and international law:
● In the case of Ichong vs. Hernandez (101 Phil.
1155), the Petitioner Ichong asked for the
invalidation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Act
on the ground that it contravened several treaties
concluded by us which, under the rule of pacta
sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of
international law should be observed by us in good
faith. The SC found no conflict, however, the
local statute that should be upheld because it
represented an exercise of police power which,
being inherent, could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of treaty.
IV. SUPREMACY OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY:
Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector
of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty
of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
- The military powers of the President includes the
power to prevent, as Commander-In-Chief, military
personnel from testifying in legislative inquiries.
(Gudani vs. Senga, GR no. 170165, August 15,
2006)
IBP vs. ZAMORA
GR no. 141284, August 12, 2000
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of
the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The
limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides
the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in
charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro
Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-
Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI,
the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of
the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover,
the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force.
Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation
of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General
Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of
the aforecited provision. The real authority in these
operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Such being the case, it does not matter
whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any
authority or control over the same. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy
the civilian character of the PNP.
V. THE DEFENSE OF THE STATE:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to
render personal, military or civil service.
PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN
GR no. L-45892, jULY 13, 1938
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are
charged with a violation of National Defense Law. It is alleged
that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached
the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully
refused to register in the military service between the 1st and
7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they
had been required to do so. The appellants defense is that
they have not registered in the military service because
Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a
brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman
also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend
the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens
would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted
by reason on the actual existence of war does not make our
case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what
justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 15
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it
more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the
appellants have dependent families to support does not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before
the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists,
they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and,
at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance
to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).
VI. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Related Constitutional Provisions:
● No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. (Art. III, Sec. 5)
● The party-list representatives shall constitute 20%
of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For 3 consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, ½ of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except
religious sector. (Art. VI, Sec.5(2))
● The Commission on Election shall exercise the
following powers and functions: x x x (5) Register,
after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government; and accredit citizens’ arm
of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be
registered. x x x (Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(5))
● Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Art. VI,
Sec. 28(3))
● No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. (Art. VI, Sec. 29(2))
● At the option expressed in writing by the parents or
guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to
their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by
instructors designated or approved by the religious
authorities of the religion to which the children or
16 – MORILLO NOTES
wards belong, without additional cost to the
Government. (Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3)).
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ
GR no. L-45459, March 13, 1947
When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion
in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious
sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt
from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes. Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,
preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such
is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art.
XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm.
Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays because
of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of
the state.
VII. SOCIAL JUSTICE:
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.
Concept of Social Justice:
● Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated. (Calalang vs. Williams,
70 Phil. 726)
● Social justice means the promotion of the welfare
of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex. (Calalang vs. Williams, supra)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
● Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number." (Calalang vs. Williams,
supra)
● In the case of Maglakas vs. NHA (GR no. 138823,
September 17, 2008), Petitioner invoked social
justice as a ground for rejecting the respondent’s
efforts to relocate her. The SC ruled: “For sure, the
NHA's order of relocating petitioner to her assigned
lot and demolishing her property on account of her
refusal to vacate was consistent with the law's
fundamental objective of promoting social justice in
the manner the will inure to the common good. x x
x It is also worth noting that petitioner's continued
refusal to leave the subject property has hindered
the development of the entire area. Indeed,
petitioner cannot invoke the social justice clause at
the expense of the common welfare.”
VIII. REARING THE YOUTH:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth
in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. vs. Montano
(GR no. 182836, October 13, 2009)
● The SC declared that “an unborn child can b
considered a dependent.
● The term “child” can be understood to include the
unborn fetus in the mother’s womb”.
Meyer vs. Nebraska (262 US 390):
● It is incompetent for the government to prohibit the
teaching of the German language to students
between certain age levels since there is nothing
inherently harmful in the language that will impair
the upbringing of the child.
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters (262 US 510):
● A law prohibiting the establishment of private
schools and in effect confining the education of the
youth to public institutions of learning was likewise
annulled because it would standardize the thinking
of the children, who, according to the court, were
not “mere creatures of the State.”
IX. WOMEN:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
RA 9262 (Violence Against Women and Children of
2004):
● Enacted to protected women and their children
from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security (Ang vs. CA, GR no. 182835, April 20,
2010)
Related Constitutional Provision:
● The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions,
taking into account their material functions, and
such facilities and opportunities that will enhance
their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation. (Art. XIII,
Section 14, Constitution)
X. ECONOMY:
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role
of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform.
ESPINA vs. ZAMORA
GR no. 143858, September 21, 2010
SC Ruling:
● While Sec. 19, Article II, Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it
does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment.
● The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from the maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
● The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. While it does not
encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not
prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
● The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a
balance between protecting local business and allowing the
entry of foreign investments and services.
XI. RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL
ECOLOGY:
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.
- While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to
predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 17
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come — generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. (Oposa vs. Factoran,
GR no. 101083, July 30, 1993)
XII. LOCAL AUTONOMY:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
BASCO vs. PAGCOR
GR no. 91649, May 14, 1991
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed.,
1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision
of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in
imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a
measure of decentralization of the function of government.
(emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what
may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it
is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.
XIII. FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE:
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT vs. COMELEC
GR no. 177271, May 4, 2007
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every
right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect
and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime. Without a government’s acceptance of the
limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold
18 – MORILLO NOTES
individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of
those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the
Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any
attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and
may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be
informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
unavailing.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official records
are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is
further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a
measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military,
trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national
security.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded
precise definition. But both terms embrace, to borrow from
Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an
ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to
determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of
interest or importance to the public.
VII. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Constitutional Basis:
- Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum. (Art. VI, Sec. 1)
- The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, Sec. 1)
- The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
Purposes:
- The doctrine is intended to prevent a concentration
of authority in one person or group of persons that
might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its
exercise to the detriment of our republican
institution.
- The doctrine is intended to secure action, to
forestall over-action, to prevent despotism and to
obtain efficiency. (Justice Laurel)
- It ordains that each of the three great branches of
the government has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139)
Blending of Powers:
- When powers are not confined exclusively within
one department but are assigned to o shared by
several departments.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Examples:
- The President shall submit to the Congress within
30 days from the opening of every regular session,
as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures. (Art. VII, Sec. 22)
- No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. (Art.
VI, Sec. 29(1))
- Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (Art. VII, Section 19)
- The COMELEC shall have the power and function
to deputize, with the concurrence of the President,
law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Art. IX-C, Section 2(4))
Check and Balances:
- When one department is allowed to resist
encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other
departments.
- Theory: The ends of the government are better
achieved through the exercise by its agencies of
only the powers assigned to them, subject to
reversal in proper cases by those constitutionally
authorized.
Examples:
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it. The
President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. (Art.
VI, Section 27, Constitution)
- Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress. (Art. VII, Section 19,
supra)
- No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Art. VII,
Section 21, supra)
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Art. VIII,
Section 1, supra)
- The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members. (Art. VIII, Section
2, supra)
- All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Art. VIII, Section 4, supra)
- Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc. (Supra)
The Role of the Judiciary:
- When the Supreme Court mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of
a coordinate body, what it is upholding is no its
own supremacy by the supremacy of the
Constitution. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139)
Justiciable and Political Questions:
A. Meaning of Justiciable Question:
- A purely justiciable question implies a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right, and a remedy
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 19
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of
right. (Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642)
B. Meaning of Political Question:
- Political Question connotes a question of policy. It
refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
(Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051)
- Political Questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality
or validity of contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC,
73 SCRA 333)
- Political question is characterized as a question,
which under the Constitution, is to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. The Court cannot intervene in
matters concerning a question of policy,an issue
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of the
Senate’s action. (Sps. Dela Paz vs. Senate
Committee, GR no. 184849, February 13, 2009)
Application of the Doctrine:
BELGICA vs. OCHOA
GR no. 208566, November 11, 2013
FACTS: Six Whistle-blowers filed their affidavits with the NBI
regarding JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation that had allegedly
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade
and that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.
After the filing of several criminal complaints for graft and corruption
against the interested parties. Petitioners Belgica filed a Petition
seeking for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the annual
Pork Barrel System for being violative of the separation of powers.
RULING: There is a violation of the doctrine of the separation of
powers. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive
branch of government. The Court explained that the phase of
budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of
budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release
of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the
budget execution cycle. This is rooted in the principle that the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is
a grant of all powers inherent in them. Thus, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation
of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any
other appropriation law.
WHAT POST-ENACTMENT MEASURES ALLOWED
LEGISLATORS TO INTERVENCE ANS/OR ASSUME DUTIES
THAT PROPERTY BELONG TO THE SPHERE OF BUDGET
EXECUTION IN VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS?
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following:
20 – MORILLO NOTES
1. Scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and
2. Investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
AGCAOILI vs. FARIÑAS
GR no. 232395, July 3, 2018
EXEMPTION OF JUSTICES FROM ANY COMPULSORY
PROCESSES WHICH VERY WELL INCLUDE THE CONGRESS’
POWER OF INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION:
The principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the
basic postulates for exempting the Justices, officials and
employees of the Judiciary and for excluding the Judiciary's
privileged and confidential documents and information from any
compulsory processes which very well includes the Congress'
power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
However, as in all privileges, the exercise thereof is limited to
matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the
Court in the exercise of the Members' adjudicatory functions and
duties.
Political Questions Under the New Constitution:
Expanded Definition of Judicial Power:
- Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Sec. 1,par. 2,
Rule VIII)
VIII. DELEGATION OF POWERS
Basis of the Principle:
- The rule is “Protestas delegate non potest
delegare” (What has been delegated cannot be
delegated).
- This is based on the ethical principle that delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. (Nachura
(2015), Outline in Political Law, p. 101)
Application:
- The principle is best applied in the case of Belgica
vs. Ochoa (supra).
GRECO BELGICA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR no. 208566, November 11, 2013
Wherein the SC observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar
as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in
Congress.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law."
To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the
Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue
for (b) a specified purpose.
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators
are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to
perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF
Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which contain the similar legislative identification feature as
herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Permissible Delegation: (P. A. L. E. T.)
1. Delegation of legislative power to the People at
large;
2. Delegation of legislative powers to Administrative
bodies;
3. Delegation of legislative powers to Local
governments;
4. Delegation of Emergency powers to the President;
5. Delegation of Tariff powers to the President.
A. Delegation to the People at Large:
- Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provisions
on initiative and referendum. (Art. VI, Sec. 1)
- The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least
10% of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof. (Art.
VI, Sec. 32)
Initiative vs. Referendum:
INITIATIVE REFERENDUM
The power of the people to ● The power of the electorate to
propose amendments to the approve or reject a legislation
Constitution or to propose and through an election call for the
enact legislations through an purpose. (Sec. 3(c), RA 6735)
election called for the purpose. ● A method of submitting an
(Sec. 3(a), RA 6735) important legislative measure
to a direct vote of the whole
people. (Black’s Law
Dictionary)
3 Systems of Initiative:
a. Initiative on Constitution pennon proposing amendments
b. Initiative on Statutes pennon proposing national legislation a
c. Initiative on Local Legislations regional 1 provincial etc
" "
to enact a .
resolution
exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition
or ordinance
d-
indirect initiative:
sent to Congress or local legislative body for action
2 Classes of Referendum
a. Referendum on Statutes;
b. Referendum on Local Laws
Definition of Plebiscite:
- The decree of the people:
- It is a device to obtain a direct popular vote on a
matter of political importance but chiefly in order to
create some moe or less permanent political
conditions (Strong, Modern Political Constitutions)
- It refers to the electoral process by which a
initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people. (Sec. 3(e), RA 6735)
-
B. Delegation to Administrative Agencies;
- With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the “Power of Subordinate
Legislation. (Cruz (2014), Political Law, p. 174)
- Administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the
details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by the promulgation known as
“Supplementary Regulations.” (eg. The
implementing Rules and Regulation of the Labor
Code)
- Administrative Agencies are allowed to ascertain
the existence of particular contingencies and on
the basis thereof enforce or suspend the operation
of a law.
CRUZ vs. YOUNGBERG
56 Phil. 234
The law involved here prohibited the entry into the country of
foreign cattle, which had been determined by the Philippine
Legislature as the cause of a rinderpest epidemic that had killed
many local livestock.
However, the same law authorized the Governor-General to lift the
prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the
lawmaking body, if he should ascertain after a fact-finding
investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from
imported cattle.
C. Delegation to the Local Government;
- Local government units are more knowledgeable
than the lawmaking body on matters of purely local
concern and are, therefore, in a better position to
enact the necessary and appropriate legislation
thereon.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 21
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Police Power:
- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of general welfare. x x x
(Sec. 16, Local Government Code)
Eminent Domain:
- The local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws; x x x (Section 19,
Local Government Code)
Taxation:
- Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments. (Art. X, Sec.
5, Constitution)
D. Delegation of Emergency Powers;
Constitutional Basis:
- In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdraw by a resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon its next
adjournment. (Art. VI, Section 23(2))
Conditions for the delegation of Emergency Powers:
1. There must be war or other national emergency;
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only;
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe;
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by the Congress.
Note: “Other national emergency” may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic,
typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nation-
wide proportions or effects.
Conditions for the vesture of emergency powers in the
President:
1. There must be war or other national emergency;
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only;
3. The Delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe;
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by the Congress.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017:
22 – MORILLO NOTES
- Proclamation Declaring the State of National
Emergency.
- Therefore Clause: “NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: “The
President . . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress . . . rebellion . . . ,” and in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.”
Note: Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is illustrated
in the case of David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo.
DAVID vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR no.171396, May 3, 2006
FACTS:
Due to the escape of some Magdalo Members and the
discovery of a plan to assassinate PGMA, the latter issued
Proclamation no. 1017 in order to suppress lawlessness,
violence and rebellion to bring down the government.
DISCUSSION:
- The provisions of PP no. 1017 is divided into three
provisions:
First Provision: The Calling-Out Powers:
- Pertinent Provision in PP 1017: “by virtue of the
power vested upon me by Section 18, Art. VII ... do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion"
- The above provision is known as the “Calling-out”
powers of the President which is provided under
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Constitution.
- Under the calling-out powers of the President the
armed forces of the Philippines to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasions and
rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-
out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For
this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater
power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
STATE OF REBELLION:
● There is a distinction between the President’s authority
to declare a "state of rebellion" the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. While
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
President Arroyo’s authority to declare a "state of
rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority was Section 4,
Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, stating:
o Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring
a status or condition of public moment or
interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made
to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.
● President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion"
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words
of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance,
and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be
deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
- It is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of
Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces
to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
Second Provision: “Take Care” Power
- Pertinent Provision in PP 1017: “and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction;"
- The above provision pertains to the power of the
President to ensure that all laws must be faithfully
executed, as provided under Art. VII, Section 17 of
the Constitution.
- As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to
be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect
that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, "execute its laws." In the exercise of such
function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-
in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
including the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
- The SC rejects the contention of the Petitioners
that PP1017 is unconstitutional because it
arrogated to the President the power to enact laws
and decrees which is in violation of Art. VI, Section
1 of the Constitution which vests the power to
enact laws in Congress.
- IS IT WITHIN THE POWER OF PRESIDENT ARROYO
TO PROMULGATE “DECREES”?
-
- The SC ruled that PGMA’s ordinance power is limited
only to (a) Executive Orders; (b) Administrative Orders; (c)
Proclamations; (d) Memorandum Orders; (e)
Memorandum Circulars; and (f) General or Special
Orders. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
same category and binding force as statutes because
they were issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.
-
- This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
- CAN PRESIDENT ARROYO ENFORCE OBEDIENCE TO
ALL DECREES AND LAWS THROUGH THE MILITARY?
-
- President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It
follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot
be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.
She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
- Pertinent Provision under PP 1017: "as provided in
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency."
- This is governed under Art. XII, Section 17 of the
Constitution.
Power to declare “a state of national emergency” vs.
Power to exercise emergency powers:
The power to declare “a state of national emergency is
enshrined in Art. VII, Section 18 of the Constitution.
As to the power to exercise emergency power, please see
Art. VI, Section 23 of the Constitution.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect
of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
"the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest,"
it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or
not the President may exercise such power is dependent
on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to
a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
E. Delegation of Tariff Powers:
Constitutional Basis:
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 23
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

- The Congress may by law authorize the President for at least 2 years represent;
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such immediately preceding the 5. Resident of the Philippines
last day of the election. for at least 1 year
limitation and restrictions as itmay impose, tariff
immediately preceding the
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
last day of the election.
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, within Term of Office
the framework of the national development 6 years 3 years
program of the Government. (Art. VI, Section. 28(2)) Term Limits
2 consecutive terms 3 Consecutive terms
Comments:
- The President is granted flexible tariff powers due
to the necessity of the President to act immediately THE SENATE:
on certain matters affecting the national economy Composition:
lest delay in results in hardship to the people.
(Cruz, supra)
- The Senate shall be composed of 24 senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of
- The legislative process is too cumbersome for the the Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Art. VI,
speedy solution pf some economic problems, Section 2)
especially foreign trade. (Cruz, Supra)
Qualifications:
- No person shall be Senator unless he is a natural-
Test of Valid Delegations: born citizen of the Philippines, and of age, able to
1. Completeness Test; and read and write, a registered voter and a resident of
2. Sufficient Standard Test the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election. (Art.
Completeness Test: VI, Section 3)
- The law must be complete in all its essential terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature so Term:
that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do - The term of office of the Senators shall be 6 years
when it reaches him except to enforce it. (US vs. and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by
Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil; Nachura, supra) law, at noon on the 30 day of June next following
th

their election. (Art. VI, Section 4)

Sufficient Standard Test: - No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive
- This test is intended to map out the boundaries of terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative length of time shall not be considered as an
policy and indicating the circumstances under interruption in the continuity of his service for the
which it is to be pursued and effected. This is full term for which he was elected. (supra)
intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative power from the legislature to the Is the Congress a Continuing Body?
delegate. The standard is usually indicated in the LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC
law delegating legislative power. (Ynot vs. GR no. 157870, November 3, 2008
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659)
Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved
cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became
mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th
IX. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted
during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also
became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th
Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be
Matrix of Comparison:
used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or
subsequent Congresses.
SENATE HOUSE OF
(Art. VI, Sec. 2-4) REPRESENTATIVES The members and officers of each Congress are different.
(Art. VI, Sec. 5 – 8) All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become
Composition functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and
24 Senators elected at large Not more than 250 members, must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
unless otherwise provided by Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the
law, consisting of: cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills
1. District had to start from square one again, going through the
Representatives; and legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time,
2. Party-List from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of
Representatives; the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides
Qualifications that “All pending matters and proceedings shall
1. Natural-born citizen; 1. Natural-born citizen; terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but
2. At least 35 years old on 2. At least 25 years old on the may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
the day of the election; day of the election; presented for the first time.
3. Able to read and write; 3. Able to read and write;
4. A registered voter; 4. A registered voter in the Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of
5. Resident of the Philippines district he or she seeks to

24 – MORILLO NOTES

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of
Business shall consist of the following: x x x At the end
of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. Thus, the deliberations during the
11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well
as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses
on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009
certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do
not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.
GARCILLANO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008
On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body”, there
is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
“continuing”, as it not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the Congress before
it.
Sec. 123 of the Rules of the Senate provides that all
matters and proceedings (ie. unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration
of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate
of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not
be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body
even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Composition:
A. District Representatives:
- The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. (Sec. 5(1),
Art. VI)
Rules on Legislative Districting:
2501000
minimum - Each legislative district shall compromise, as
population far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least 250, or each province, shall have at
lease one representative. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VI)
- The 250,000 minimum population requirement
for the establishment of legislative districts
under Sec. 5(3), Art. VI applies only to cities.
(Mariano, Jr. vs. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211)
MARIANO, JR. vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 211
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
AQUINO III vs. COMELEC
GR no. 189793, April 7, 2010
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate
the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each
province" point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And
the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of
the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has
increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Re-Apportionment of Legislative District: agreement
- Within 3 years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative district based on the standards provided
in this section. (Sec. 5(4), Art. VI)
- In the case of Tobias vs. Abalos (239 SCRA 106),
the SC declared that the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
automatically resulted in its establishment as
legislative district. It should be noted that a
plebiscite was necessary for the validity of said
conversion, consistent with the provision of Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution. However, there would
be no need for such plebiscite where no new
territory or no change in an existing territory is
made under a law, and only a reapportionment or
the creation of an additional legislative district is
done.
Gerrymandering:
- The arrangement of districts in such a way as to
favor the election of preferred candidates (usually
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 25
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
re-electionists) through the inclusion therein only of
those areas where they expect to win, regardless of
the resultant shape of such districts.
- The Constitution prohibits Gerrymandering, it has
been described as “an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an
unfair advantage to the party in power. (Navaro vs.
Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010)
B. Party-List Representatives:
- The party-list representatives shall constitute 20%
of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. (Sec. 5(2), Art. VI)
- For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
a party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector. (Sec. 5(2), Art. VI)
RA 7941 (An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor):
DECLARATION OF POLICY:
(Sec. 2, RA 7941)
The State shall promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House
of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.
NOTE:
The provision mandates a state policy of promoting
proportional representation by means of Filipino-style party-
list system, which will “enable'' the election of the House of
Representatives of Filipino Citizens;
1. Who belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties; and
2. Who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. Who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole. (Ang Bagong Bayani
vs. Comelec, GR no. 147598, June 26, 2001)
Proportional Representation:
- refers to the representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
26 – MORILLO NOTES
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
(Ang Bagong Bayani vs Comelec, Supra)
Marginalized and Underrepresented:
I
- it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representative
must annually
representation of the marginalized and
belong
these underrepresented, because representation is easy
to
groups
to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or
party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the
persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties. (Ang Bagong Bayani vs.
Comelec, Supra)
Lack of Well-Defined Constituency:
- refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable
electoral group, like voters of a congressional
district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests
identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented. (Ang Bagong Bayani vs.
Comelec, Supra)
The Party-List System – it is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the COMELEC. Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently,
provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system. (Sec. 3(a), RA 7941)
Party – means either a political party or a sectoral party or
coalition of parties. (Sec. 3(b), RA 7941)
limited
Tommy together of different political parties for a
period of time or a gov't that is formed this way
,
Distinguish: Political Party; National Party; and Regional
Party:
Political An organized group of citizens advocating
Party an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
National When its constituency is spread over the
Party geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions.
Regional When its constituency is spread over the
Party geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
Source: Sec. 3(c), RA 7941
Sectoral Party – refers to an organized group of citizens
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector, which belongs to any of the
following sectors:
a. Labor;
b. Peasant;
c. Fisherfolk;
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
d. Urban poor;
e. Indigenous cultural communities;
f. Elderly;
g. Handicapped;
h. Women;
i. Youth;
j. Veterans;
k. Overseas workers; and
l. Professionals. (Sec. 3(d), RA 7941)
Sectoral Organization – refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interest or
concerns. (Sec. 3(e), RA 7941)
assembly/ batch
Coalition – refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral, parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes. (Sec. 3(f), RA 7941)
Who are allowed to register as a Party-List?
- Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization
or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. (Sec. 5, RA 7941)
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC
GR no. 147598, June 26, 2001
FACTS: In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna
objects to the participation of "major political parties." On the
other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded
political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941
allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It
argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
RULING: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House
of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." The purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional district
elections to win a seat in Congress. Therefore, political parties –
even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Although political parties may participate in the party-list
elections, it does not mean that any political party (or any
organization or group for that matter) may do so. The requisite
character of these parties must be consistent with the
Constitution and Sec. 5, RA 7941.
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC
GR no. 203766, April 2, 2013
Parameters in Determining Who are Qualified To
Participate in Party-List Election:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-
list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations;
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector;
3. Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative -
congressman
district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and
is linked to a political party through a coalition;
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well- defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are "marginalized and underrepresented"
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth;
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
representatives
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
of sectoral parties underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
must belong
to that
group
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-
defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations;
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
1 nominee is
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
sufficient
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
May a Political party participate in the party-list system
of elections?
- YES, Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 27
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and
is linked to a political party through a coalition;
Qualifications:
- No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen
of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and
write and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of
election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
Residence:
- It is defined as the place where one habitually
resides and to which, when he is absent, he has
the intention of returning. (Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Comelec, GR no. 119976, September 18, 1995)
- The term "residence" is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi). (Pundaodaya vs.Comelec, GR
no. 179313, September 17, 2009)
temporary permanent
Residence vs. Domicile:
- The essential distinction between Residence and
Domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for which the resident
has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes
his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
(Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec, Supra)
- There is a difference between domicile and
residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place
of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his
place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without
intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
(Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec, Supra)
28 – MORILLO NOTES
- Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a
question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must
be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have
a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired;
and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time. (Pundaodaya vs. Comelec,
Supra)
Domicile of Origin:
- If one wishes to successfully effect a change of
domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide tegwunate
intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one, and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.17 Without
clear and positive proof of the concurrence of
these three requirements, the domicile of origin
continues. (Pundaodaya vs. Comelec, Supra)
Domicile by Choice:
- There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old
domicile. In other words there must basically be
the intention of
animus manendi with animus non revertendi.
remaining
- When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later
on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay
there by registering as a voter there and expressly
declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where
she spent her childhood and school days, as her
place of domicile. (Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Comelec, Supra)
RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003):
- Natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. (Sec. 3, RA 9225)
- Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Sec. 3,
RA 9225)
Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years
of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines. (Sec. 4, RA 9225)
Civil, Political Rights and Liabilities that were Re-
acquired by virtue of RA 9225: Urizen retention & accvnsuhon
re
of 2003
act .
a. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage Idwal citizen
ship )
must Meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
b. Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath;
c. Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
d. Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
e. That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised
by, or extended to, those who:
i. are candidates for or are occupying any
public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
ii. are in active service as commissioned or
non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Sec. 5, RA 9225)
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
GR no. 195649, April 16, 2013
The SC declared that a candidate who take his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executes an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his American citizenship in accordance with RA
9225, but thereafter he continue using his American passport, is
to be considered as having recanted his oath of renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and shall, therefore, be ineligible to run for
elective office as he thereby reverts to his status as a dual citizen.
SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC
GR no. 198742, August 10, 2012
The petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to
be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of
the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement
made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on
H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. The SC
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American
or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the
law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
Term:
- The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the 13th day of June next following their
election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected. (Sec. 7, Art. VI)
Jurisprudential Situations wherein the consecutive
terms were considered or not considered as having
been involuntary interrupted or broken:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed the
when a vacancy is
filled accdrg to
.
position pursuant to the rules on succession under
the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion
the rules of succession
the term can not beof the term of the replaced official cannot be
considered as one treated as one full term as contemplated under the
full term
subject constitutional and statutory provision that
service cannot be counted in the application of any
term limit. (Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR no.
133495, September 3, 1998). If the official runs
again for the same position he held prior to his
assumption of the higher office, then this
succession to said position is by operation of law
and is considered an involuntary severance or
interruption. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, GR no.
180444, April 8, 2008);
2. An elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term,
but later won in a - recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service.
For, he had become in the interim, ie., from the end
of the 3rd term up to recall election, a private
citizen. (Adormeo vs. COMELEC; GR no. 147927,
February 4, 2002; Socrates vs. COMELEC, GR no.
154512, November 12, 2002);
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the
conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by
itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s
continuity of service. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, GR
no. 154829, December 10, 2003);
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting
event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during
the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during
this period. (Aldovino vs. COMELEC, GR no.
184836, December 23, 2009);
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an
elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest
and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him
from serving what would otherwise be the
unexpired portion of his term of office had the
protest been dismissed. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,
GR no. 135150, july 28, 1990; Dizon vs. COMELEC,
GR no. 182088, January 30, 2009). The break or
interruption need not be for a full term of 3 years or
for the major part of the 3-year term; an
interruption for any length of time, provided the
cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 29
 POLITICAL LAW
continuity of service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC, GR
no. 154512, November 12, 2002);
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest
and said decision becomes final after said official
had served the full term for said office, then his loss
in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the
term from start to finish. his full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of
term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term.
(Ong vs. Alegre, GR no. 163295 & 163354, January
23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473)
Election:
- Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the
Second Monday of May. (Sec. 8, Art. VI)
Vacancies: special electron
- In case of vacancy in the Senate or House of
Representatives, a special election may be called
to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by
law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term. (Sec. 9, Art. VI)
Salary: no
( must
increase unless the congress approves happen after a
- The salaries of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be determined by
law. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. (Sec. 10,
Art. VI)
Illustration:
Congress passed a law increasing its salary in
2016. The House of Representative Congress
expires on 2019; The 12 Senator’s term expires
on 2019 while the other 12 senator will expire on
the year 2022, the effectivity date thereof shall
be on the year 2022.
PHILCONSA vs. VELASCO & MATHAY
GR no. L-25554, October 4, 1966
The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of RA
3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective
officials of both houses of Congress. It is significant
that the law provided that the retirement benefits
would be immediately available upon its approval. It
claimed that its provision on retirement gratuity was
“an attempt to circumvent thee Constitutional ban on
increase of salaries of the members of Congress
during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of
Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the 1935 Constitution.
The SC sustained the petition and declared the law
unconstitutional. It noted that the retirement benefits
30 – MORILLO NOTES
Morillo Notes
were “immediately available thereunder, without
awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs
counter to the prohibition in Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution.
Parliamentary Immunities:
Two kinds of Immunities:
Privilege of Speech and
Immunity from Arrest
Debate
Intended to ensure Enables the legislator to
representation of the express views bearing upon
constituents of the member of the public interest without fear
the Congress by preventing of accountability outside the
attempts to keep him from halls of the legislature for his
attending its sessions. inability to support his
statements with the usual
evidence required in the court
of justice.
A. Privilege from Arrest:
- A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged
full )
term
from arrest while the Congress is in session. (Sec.
11, Art. VI)
- The term “Session” referred under this section
refers to the entire period of the Congress from its
initial convening until its final adjournment.
- The immunity applies only while the Congress is in
session.
B. Privilege from Speech and Debates:
- Two requirements:
a. the remarks must be made while the
legislative committee is functioning, that
is, in session; and
b. that they must be made in connection with
the discharge of official duties.
- The privilege could not be invoked by a legislator
who had allegedly maligned the plaintiff in an open
letter to the President coursed through and
published in the newspapers. The finding was that
he had written the letter at a time when the
Congress was in recess and in his private capacity
only. (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876)
- In the case of Osmena vs. Pendatun (GR no. L-
17144, October 28, 1960), the Philippine President
himself who had been vilified by the Petitioner
could not file any civil or criminal action against him
because of this immunity. Nonetheless, the
majority of the members of the House of
Representatives in which the questioned speech
was delivered were not precluded from
demonstrating their loyalty to the chief executive by
declaring Osmena guilty of disorderly behavior and
suspending him in the exercise of their disciplinary
power under what is now Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI, of the
1987 Constitution.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
INHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS:
- Obligations of the Members of the Congress when
there exist a conflict of interest upon assumption of
office:
1. Make full disclosure of their financial and
business interests.
2. Notify the House concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors. (Sec. 12, Art. VI,
Constitution)
INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES:
a. Incompatible Office:
- “No Senator or Member of the House of
no member of the
Representatives may hold any other office or
congress shall have
in
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
concurrent position
another office in the
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. x x “(Sec. 13, Art. VI)
- Purpose: To prevent such member from owing
loyalty to another branch of government, to the
detriment of the independence of the legislature
and the doctrine of separation of powers
- Exception: The prohibition against the holding of
an incompatible office is not absolute; what is not
allowed is the simultaneous holding of that office
and the seat in the Congress. Any legislator may
hold another office or employment in the
government provided he forfeits, as a result, his
position in the Congress. Forfeiture of the
Legislator’s seat, or cessation of his tenure, shall
be automatic upon the holding of the incompatible
office.
- Therefore, a congressman who was elected
provincial governor was deemed to have
automatically forfeited his seat in the House of
Representatives when he took his oath for the
provincial office. No resolution was necessary to
declare his legislative post vacant.
- The office of the Chairman of the Phil. National Red
Cross (PNRC), despite its having been created by a
special law, is not to be considered a government
office or a GOCC office for purposes of the
prohibition under Sec. 13. (Liban vs. Gordon, GR
no. 175352, July 15, 2009)
SESSIONS:
b. Forbidden Office:
- Kinds of Sessions: (a) Regular Sessions; and (b)
- “x x Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments
a. Regular Session:
thereof increased during the term for which he was
- “The Congress shall convene every year on the 4th
elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI)
- Purpose: To prevent trafficking in public office.
- Note that this provision does not apply to elective
b. Special Session:
offices, which are filled by the voters themselves.
- “ x x, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
- The appointment of the member of the Congress to
the forbidden office is not allowed only during the
term for which he was elected, when such office
was created or its emoluments were increased.
After such term, and even if the legislator is re-
elected, the disqualification no longer applies and
- The President may call a special session at any
he may, therefore, be appointed to the office.
- No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office. (Sec. 14, Art.
VI)
- Purpose: To prevent the legislator from exerting
undue influence, deliberately or not, upon the body
where he is appearing.
- The lawyer-legislator may still engage in the
practice of his profession except that when it
comes to trials and hearings before the bodies
above-mentioned, appearance may be made not
by him but by some other member of his law office.
PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN
113 SCRA 33
A legislator entered his appearance as counsel for one
of the parties to an intra-corporate dispute before the
SEC. He disted when his representation was
challenged under the above-mention section (Sec. 14,
Art. VI). Thereafter, he purchased P200,000.00 worth of
stocks in the corporation from the faction he was
representing and sought to intervene in the said
dispute, this time as a stockholder.
The SC did not allow him to do so as his evident
purpose was to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition. The SC declared that “We are constrained
to hold that there has been an indirect ‘appearance as
counsel before an administrative body’ and that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
‘intervention’ was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceeding in some other
capacity.. To belive the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case, would be pure naivete. He would still appear as
counsel indirectly.”
Special Sessions
Monday of July for its regular session x x” (Sec. 15,
Art. VI)
shall continue to be in session for such number of
days as it may determine until 30 days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.” (Sec. 15,
Art. VI)
time. (Sec. 15, Art. VI)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 31
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Special Sessions under the Constitution:
- “The returns of every election for President and
Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.” (Art. VII, Sec. 4(4));
- “The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning
of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of
call
the President and Vice-President occurs, convene summon
in accordance with its rules without need of a call
and within seven days, enact a law calling for a
special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call.
The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the
date of the next presidential election.” (Art. VII, Sec.
10)
- “x x x. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt
of the last written declaration, or, if not in session,
within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,
voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise,
the President shall continue exercising the powers
and duties of his office.” (Art. VII, Sec. 11)
- “The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or
32 – MORILLO NOTES
suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call. (Art. VII, Sec. 18)
OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS:
- The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote
of all its respective Members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deemed
necessary. (Sec. 16(1), Art. VI)
- The Senate President and the Speaker of the
House do not have a fixed term and may be
replaced at any time at the pleasure of a majority of
all the members of their respective chambers.
- Other officers usually chosen are the following:
- Senate President Pro Tempore;
- Speaker Pro Tempore;
- Majority Floor Leaders;
- Minority Floor Leaders;
- Chairman of various standing and special
committees; and
- The secretary and The Sergeant-At-Arms.
- “The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the
House of Representatives may decide to have
officers other than the Speaker, and that the
method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control. In the
case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which
involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority
Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this
Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker
of the House of Representative,] it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter
says is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.' [As such], the
method of choosing who will be such other officers
is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.”
(Baguilat vs. Speaker Alvarez, GR no. 227757, July
25, 2017)
QUORUM:
- A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide. (Sec. 16(2),
Art. VI)
- “Quorum” → defined as any number sufficient to
transact business, which may be less than the
majority of the membership. (Sec. 16(2), Art. VI)
AVELINO vs. CUENCO
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
83 Phil. 17
FACTS:
The Petitioner Avelino, who was then Senate President. motu
proprio adjourned a session of the Senate and walked out with
his followers, leaving 12 other members who continued meeting
and replaced him with Respondent Cuenco as Acting President.
Petitioner thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against
Respondent, contending that the latter had not been validly
elected because 12 members did not constutte a majority and,
hence, a quorum of 24 of the 24-member-Senator.
RULING:
At first, the SC dismissed the petition on the ground that it
involved a political question. However, on the motion for
reconsideration, SC assumed jurisdiction and ruled inter alia that
the 12 members were sufficient to constitute a quorum, being a
majority of 23, not 24. The reason was that one senator was then
in US and therefore outside the coercive jurisdiction of the smaller
number of members who could “adjourn from day to day and
compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and
under such penalties” as the Senate might provide.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS:
a. Rules of Proceedings:
- Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, x x x(Sec. 16(3), Art. VI)
DELA PAZ vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
GR no. 184849 February 13, 2009
The SC explains Sec. 16(3), Art. VI: “Each House shall
determine its Rules of Proceedings”. The SC declares
that “This provision has been traditionally construed as
a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of
this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision
and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, raised by petitioner in the case
at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a
matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate.
The issue partakes of the nature of a political question
that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a
question which, under the Constitution, is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional
grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its
own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify
these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.
Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is
clearly a question of policy, an issue dependent upon
the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.”
b. Power to Suspend or Expel a Member:
- Each House may x x x, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of ⅔
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed 60 days. (Sec. 16(3), Art. VI)
SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR no. 128055, April 18, 2001
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan
to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension
order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Sec. 13 thereof provides “The provision of suspension
pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a
valid information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service."
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state
that the public officer concerned must be suspended
only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged.
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office"
would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
Lastly, the SC declared that Republic Act No. 3019
does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
JOURNALS AND RECORDS:
- Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings. (Sec. 16(4), Art. VI)
Definition of Journal:
- These are a record of what is done and past in a
legislative assembly.
- They are useful not only for authenticating the
proceedings but also for the interpretation of laws
through a study of the debates held thereon and
for informing the people of the official conduct of
their respective legislators.
Matters mandated by the Constitution to be entered in
the Journals:
- “Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 33
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the
Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.” (Art. VI, Sec. 16(4));
- No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal. (Art. VI, Sec. 26(2));
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it. (Art. VI,
Sec. 27(1));
- A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded. (Art. XI, Sec. 3(3)).
Definition of Enrolled Bill: passed by congress approved by president
- Refers to one “which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the governor
(or president) and filed by the secretary of the
state. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th rev. ed., p. 624)
CASCO PHILIPPINES vs. GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 374
FACTS:
Petitioners claimed that the phrase “Urea Formaldehyde” as used
in a statute should be read as “Urea and Formaldehyde,” to
rectify an alleged error in the printing of the enrolled bill.
RULING:
The SC dismissed such claim and declared the following:
“Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde",
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however,
that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde",
and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea"
34 – MORILLO NOTES
and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore,
it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has
been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
TOLENTINO vs. SECRETARY
235 SCRA 630
The SC emphasized that “Our cases manifest form adherence to
the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also its due enactment. Not even claims that a
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the
requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that
certain provisions of a statute had been “smuggled” in the
printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind
the proceedings of a co-equal branch of the government
ADJOURNMENT:
- Neither House during the session of the Congress
shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for
more than 3 days, nor to any other place than that
in which the two Houses shall be sitting. (Sec.
16(5), Art.VI)
THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:
- “The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. (Sec. 17, Art. VI)
Composition:
- Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of 9
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
SC to designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice
in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Sec.
17, Art. VI)
BONDOC vs. PINEDA
201 SCRA 792
Issue: Whether the House of Representative could (at
the request of the dominant political party therein)
change its representative in the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), presumably
“to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
reached by the Tribunal”.
Ruling: While acknowledging the independence of the
Tribunal as the “sole judge” of the election contests
involving the members of the HOR, the SC assumed
jurisdiction and declared that: “The independence of
the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by
the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a
myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished
from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal,
to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives
removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he
cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's
candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of
Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for
the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which
the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone
NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority
party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence,
even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach
of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion
resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security
of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except
for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof
that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from
the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause,
hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
Jurisdiction:
- The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the HOR.
(Reyes vs. COMELEC, GR no. 207264, June 25,
2013)
- Requisites to become a “Member in the HRET:
a. A valid proclamation;
b. Proper oath; and
c. Assumption of Office.
- A “Proper Oath” would be one taken before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives “in
opensession,” consistent with the provisions of
Sec. Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives. (Reyes vs. COMELEC,
Supra)
- The HRET would have jurisdiction over a petition
for disqualification based on citizenship filed
against a Member of the House Representatives,
as said qualification is a continuing requirement
and may be taken cognizance of by the HRET even
if filed beyond the prescribed prescriptive period
for the institution of the same. However, according
to the SC, ot is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute that may
question the illegality or invalidity procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a
matter that may be raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizen’s
descendant. (Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, GR nos.
178831-32, April 1, 2009)
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS:
Composition:
- Senate President (Ex Officio Chairman;
- 12 Senators
- 12 Members of the House of Representatives
Notes:
- The Senators and Members of the HOR
shall be elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. (Sec. 18,
Art. VI)
- The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in a case of a tie. (Sec. 18,
Art. VI)
DRILON vs. DE VENECIA
GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
It is worth recalling that, in the 11th Congress, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel advocated the allocation of a position in the
Commission on Appointments for the Party-List Representatives.
Just like the Petitioner in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first
wrote to the Senate President, requesting that the Commission
on Appointments be restructured to conform to the constitutional
provision on proportional representation. xxx Without awaiting
final determination of the question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition
for Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme Court. In the
said case, the Honorable Court ruled:
"The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 35
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House
the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members
would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal.
xxxx
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise
a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not this
Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution,
party-list representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET
and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of
the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties
in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the
House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently, petitioner’s direct recourse
to this Court is premature.
Following the ruling in Pimentel, it cannot be said that recourse
was already had in the House of Representatives. Furnishing a
copy of Petitioner’s letter to the Senate President and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives does not constitute the
primary recourse required prior to the invocation of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Further, it is the Members of
the House who claim to have been deprived of a seat in the
Commission on Appointments that must first show to the House
that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled
to seats in the Commission on Appointments. Just like Senator
Pimentel, demanding seats in the Commission on Appointments
for Congressmen, who have not even raised the issue of its
present composition in the House, is not Senator Madrigal’s
affair.
DAZA vs. SINGSON
180 SCRA 496
Petitioner questioned his replacement in the Commission on
Appointments, insisting that his designation thereto as a
representative of the Liberal Party was permanent and could not
be withdrawn. For his part, the Respondent contended that he
could be validly named in the petitioner’s place in view of the
political realignment in the House of Representatives following
the organization of the LDP, to which he belonged. Petitioner
claimed that the formation of the LDP was merely temporary
development whereas the Respondent maintained that it had
permanently altered the political composition of the House of
Representatives.
The SC ruled in favor of the Respondent, and declared the
following: “In the course of the spirited debate on this matter
between the petitioner and the respondent (who was supported
by the Solicitor General) an important development has
supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy. The
petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-
registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the
permanent political realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority
36 – MORILLO NOTES
is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual,
because the LDP, not being a duly registered political
party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges
granted by law to political parties' (See. 160, BP No.
881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be
considered in determining the required proportional
representation of political parties in the House of
Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18,
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right
of representation in the Commission on Appointment
only to political parties who are duly registered with the
Comelec.
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged
against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections
in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First
Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP
for registration as a political party. This has taken the wind out of
the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to
shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party
must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is
not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining
the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only
recently and has not yet "aged."”
Power:
- The Commission on Appointments shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session
days of the Congress from their submission. (Sec.
18, Art. VI)
- The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members. (Sec. 18, Art. VI)
ORGANIZATION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS:
- The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty
days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. (Sec. 19,
Art. VI)
- The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein
conferred upon it. (Sec. 19, Art. VI)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
X. POWERS OF THE CONGRESS
MATRIX OF LEGISLATIVE POWER:
Legislative Power in General
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
NATURE OF THE POWER:
- Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the
framing and enactment of laws, effected through
the adoption of a bill, or a proposed or projected
law, which becomes a statue once it is approved.
(Cruz, p. 269)
WHO MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE POWER:
- Generally, Legislative power is vested to the
Congress of the Philippines, except to the extent
reserved to the people through the systems of
initiative and referendum. (See. Sec. 1, Art. VI)
- Also, the Executive Department can also exercise
delegated legislative powers as expressly stated by
the Constitution.
LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER:
a. Substantive Limitations:
- Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts
to limits its power to amend or repeal laws,
The SC has the duty to strike down such act
for interfering with the plenary powers of the
Congress. (Duarte vs. Dade, 32 Phil. 36)
b. Procedural Limitations:
- All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills, shall
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments. (Sec. 24, Art. VI)
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. No bill passed by
either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal. (Sec. 26, Art. VI)
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same he shall
sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed
to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof,
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it. The President shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object. (Sec. 27, Art. VI)
PROHIBITED MEASURES:
a. No Increasing Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court:
- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
- Purpose: to prevent further additions to the
tremendous case of the Supreme Court which
includes the backlog of the past 2 decades. (Cruz,
p. 278)
- The SC nullified “Sec. 27, RA 6770, and Sec. 7,
Rule III, AO no. 7”, insofar as they provide for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from
the Ombudsman to the SC. According to the SC,
“such provision was violative of Sec. 30, Art. VI of
the Constitution as it expanded our appellate
jurisdiction without our advice and concurrence.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 37
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

(Fabian vs. Desierto, GR no. 129742, September PROCEDURE IN THE PASSAGE OF BILLS:
16, 1998)
BRIEF ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROCEDURE:
DIAZ vs. CA
GR no. L-109698 December 5, 1994

On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect.

Sec. 30, Art. VI, thereof provides: "No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without
its advice and concurrence."

On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No.

172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace
the Board of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party
adversely affected by a decision, order or ruling of the
Board . . . may file a petition to be known as petition for
review with the Supreme Court."

On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated

Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides
that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial
agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals.

It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was

enacted without the advice and concurrence of this
Court, this provision never became effective, with the
result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently,
the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases
from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
110571, 7 October 1994).
A.
If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court
or Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only
course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal.
There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers
of erroneous appeals from one court to another
(Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12
November 1990).
b. No granting a Title of Royalty or Nobility:
- No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted. (Sec. 31, Art. VI)
- Purpose: to preserve the republican and
democratic nature of our society by prohibiting the
creation of privileged classes with special
requisites not available to the rest of the citizens.
(Cruz, p. 277; Art. II, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
Origin of Bills:
- All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. (Sec. 24, Art. VI)
- Where the Expanded VAT Law was questioned on
the ground that the revenue measure did not
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as it was the result of the
consolidation of 2 versions introduced separately in
the 2 chambers of Congress. By a 9-6 vote, the SC
rejected the challege, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to
the version originated in the House of
Representatives. What the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative must come from the
House of Representatives. (Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance, 235 SCRA 630)

Appropriation Bill - one wherein the primary and specific

purpose of which is authorize the release of funds from the
public treasury. (Bengzon vs. Secretary of Justice, 299 US
410)

Revenue Bill - One that levies taxes and raises funds for the
government. (US vs. Norton, 91 US 566)

Tariff Bill - One that specifies the rates or duties to be

imposed on imported articles. (Black’s Law Dictionary, p.
1628)

38 – MORILLO NOTES

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Bill Increasing the Public Debt - illustrated by one floating
bonds for public subscription redeemable after a certain
period. (Cruz, p. 276)
Bill of Local Application - one involving purely local or
municipal matters, like charter of a city. (Cruz, p. 276)
Private Bills - illustrated by a bill granting honorary
citizenship to a distinguished foreigner. (Cruz, p. 276)
B. Title of Bills:
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. (Sec. 26(1), Art. VI)
Purposes of this Rules:
1. To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature;
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such
publications of its proceedings as are usually
made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they should so desire. (Philippine
Judges Association vs. Prado, GR no. 105371,
November 11, 1993)
Meaning of Log-Rolling Legislation:
- Any act of containing several subjects dealing with
unrelated matters representing diverse interests,
the main object of such combination being to unite
the members of the legislature to favor any one of
the subjects in support of the whole act. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, p. 172)
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO
GR No. 105371 November 11, 1993
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail
of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible. As has been correctly
explained: ”The details of a legislative act need not be specifically
stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed
in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to
create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to
remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the
title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).”
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley
writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same
subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It
would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act
and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of
previous legislations connected therewith.”
LIDASAN vs. COMELEC
21 SCRA 496
The challenged law was entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” when
in fact the said municipality comprised not only barrios in Lanao
del Sur but also two municipalities to be dismembered in the
adjacent province of Cotabato.
The SC declare the said law unconstitutional and observed the
following: “The baneful effect of the defective title here presented
is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.”
TOBIAS vs. ABALOS
GR no. 114783, December 8, 1994
A law entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” was
challenged on the ground that it also provided for its conversion
into a separate legislative district.
The SC said this was a consequence of Art. VI, Sec. 5(3)
requiring each city with a population of 250,000 or more to have
at least one representative. The SC reiterated its earlier
pronouncement that the rule should be given “a practical rather
than a technical construction” and said it should suffice if “the
title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.”
C. Formalities:
- No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal. (Sec. 26(2), Art. VI)
Definition of Journal:
- These are a record of what is done and past in a
legislative assembly.
- They are useful not only for authenticating the
proceedings but also for the interpretation of laws
through a study of the debates held thereon and
for informing the people of the official conduct of
their respective legislators.
Definition of Enrolled Bill:
- Refers to one “which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the governor
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 39
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
(or president) and filed by the secretary of the
state. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th rev. ed., p. 624)
- An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally
passed by both Houses, authenticated by the
proper officers of each, and approved by the
President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President. Court
is bound under the doctrine of separation of
powers by the contents of a duly authenticated
measure of the legislature [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil 1; Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255,
August 14, 1997], If a mistake was made in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by
Congress and approved by the President, the
remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not
a judicial decree [Casco (Phil) Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347].
CONFLICT BETWEEN JOURNAL AND ENROLLED BILL:
- When there exists between the journal and the
enrolled bill, the latter shall prevail over the formal,
except as to matters which, under the Constitution,
must be entered in the Journal. (Astorga vs.
Villegas, 56 SCRA 714)
EFFECTS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF A
BILL:
- The Constitution provides that the bill calling for a
special election “after the vacancy in the offices of
the President and Vice-President” shall be deemed
certified. (Art. VII, Sec. 10)
- As for the sufficiency of the ground for the
presidential certification, the “growing budget
deficiency,” which the petitioners claimed did not
partake of “a public calamity or emergency”
(Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, GR no. 115455,
235 SCRA 630)
D. Conference Committee:
- A mechanism for compromising differences
between their respective versions of a bill or joint
resolution. (Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado, GR no. 105371, November 11, 1993)
- It is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House bill or in the Senate
bill. (Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, GR
no. 105371, November 11, 1993)
E. Approval of Bills:
- Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by
40 – MORILLO NOTES
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any
bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it
shall become a law as if he had signed it. (Sec. 27,
Art. VI)
Three Methods by which a Bill may become a Law:
1. When the President signs it;
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is
overridden by ⅔ vote of all the members of each
House; and
3. When the President does not act upon the measure
within 30 days after it shall have been presented to
him.
Veto Power:
- The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. (Sec.
27, Art. VI)
- The President may disapprove or veto a measure
upon any ground sufficient for him, as where he
considers it unconstitutional or merely inefficacious
or unwise. In every case, he should indicate his
objections thereto known as a “veto message” so
that the same can be studied by the members for
possible overriding of his veto. Two-thirds of each
House will be sufficient to invalidate the veto and
convert the bill into law over the President’s
objections. On the other hand, the Congress may
agree with the President’s objections and decide to
revise the measure as he suggests.
Is Partial Veto allowed under the Constitution?
- General Rule: The President must approve entirely
or disapprove in toto.
- Exception: Appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
any particular item or items of which may be
disapproved without affecting the item or items to
which he does not object. (Cruz, p. 288)
F. Power of Congressional Oversight
- Broadly defined as the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over
the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
(Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR no.
166715, August 14, 2008)
Purpose of Congressional Oversight:
a. To monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives;
b. To determine whether agencies are properly
administered;
c. To eliminate executive waste and dishonesty;
d. To prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority; and
e. To assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
(Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR no.
166715, August 14, 2008)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Three Categories of Oversight Powers of Congress:
a. Scrutiny;
- Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity
and continuity of attention to administrative
operations.
- Its primary purpose is to determine the economy
and efficiency of the operation of government
activities.
- In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress
may request information and report from other
branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved. (Abakada
Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR no. 166715,
August 14, 2008)
b. Investigation;
- Congress investigation involves a more intense
digging of facts.
- The power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under Sec. 21,
Art. VI.
c. Supervision;
- Supervision connotes a continuing and informed
awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a
given administrative area.
- Congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of
that delegated authority. (Abakada Guro Party List
vs. Purisima, GR no. 166715, August 14, 2008)
What is a Legislative Veto?
- It is a statutory provision requiring the President or
an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to
approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect.
- Legislative Veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-
turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash. (Abakada Guro Party List vs.
Purisima, GR no. 166715, August 14, 2008)
Is a Legislative Veto Constitutional?
- Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, rather, it is an integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. However, to forestall the danger of
congressional encroachment ‘beyond the
legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes 2
basic and related constraints on Congress:
1. Congress may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either
executive and judicial power; and
2. When it exercises its legislative powers, it
must follow the ‘single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered procedures’
specified under the Constitution, including
the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.
- Therefore, any post-enactment congressional
measure should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative Vetoes fall in this
class. (Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR
no. 166715, August 14, 2008)
The Power of the Legislative Inquiry
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- The Senate or the House of Representatives or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected. (Sec. 21, Art. VI)
A. IN AID OF LEGISLATION:
- This power of inquiry is granted to the Senate and
House of Representatives as well as to any of their
respective committees. (Sabio vs. Gordan, GR no.
174340, October 17, 2006)
- In the case of Bengzon vs. Senal Blue Ribbon
Committee (203 SCRA 767), the Petitioners sought
to restraint the Respondent Committee from
investigating their participation in the alleged
misuse of government funds and the illicit
acquisition of properties being claimed by the
PCGG for the Philippine Republic. The SC granted
the petition, holding that “the petitioners are
presently impleaded as defendants in a case
before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues
intimately related to the subject of contemplated
inquiry before the Respondent Committee,” and
that no legislation was apparently being
contemplated in connection with the said
investigation. The decision failed to consider that
proceeding before the Sandiganbayan was not
criminal in nature and that the purpose of the
legislative investigation was to ascertain the
disposition of funds and properties claimed to be
public in nature. Its findings on this matter could be
the subject of legislation although it may not have
been expressly stated that such was the purpose
of the inquiry.
B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH DULY PUBLISHED RULES
OF PROCEDURE:
- The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.”
(Garcillano vs. House of Representatives, GR no.
170338, December 23, 2008)
- Note that the SC also explained that publication of
the said Senate Rules through the internet cannot
be considered as compliance with this
constitutional requirement. (Garcillano vs. House of
Representatives, Supra)
C. RIGHTS OF WITNESSES MUST BE RESPECTED:
Whether legislative inquiry would encroach upon judicial
powers vested only in courts?
- The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 41
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be
extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by
Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting
a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely,
the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of
which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation.
(Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee on
Banks, GR no. 167173, December 27, 2007)
- The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has
the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must
be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power. How could a legislative body
obtain the knowledge and information on which to
base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of
its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the
realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department’s authority to be full and
complete, independently of each other’s authority
or power. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal, every
act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it,
the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it
is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith,
with affronts committed against its authority or
dignity. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, GR no. 167173, December
27, 2007)
- The exercise by Congress or by any of its
committees of the power to punish contempt is
based on the principle of self-preservation. As the
branch of the government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and punish
contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui
generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign
character of the legislature as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of
government. (Standard Charter Bank vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, GR no. 167173, December
27, 2007)
- In this case, petitioners’ imputation that the
investigation was "in aid of collection" is a direct
challenge against the authority of the Senate
Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In
this light, we find the contempt citation against the
petitioners reasonable and justified. (Standard
Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR
no. 167173, December 27, 2007)
Does the power of legislative inquiry violate the right to
privacy?
- With respect to the right of privacy which
petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it
to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While
it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
42 – MORILLO NOTES
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of
persons affected by the legislative investigation,
not every invocation of the right to privacy should
be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional
inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,we have held that the
right of the people to access information on
matters of public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. Employing the
rational basis relationship test, as laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this
case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed
with the assailed legislative investigation. (Standard
Charter Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR
no. 167173, December 27, 2007)
May the President prevent a member of the Armed
Forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?
- The President, as Commander-in-Chief, may validly
prohibit a general from appearing in a legislative
inquiry, although the legislature would not be
“precluded from seeking judicial relief to compel
his attendance. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR no. 170165,
August 15, 2006)
What is the period of imprisonment for contempt during
inquiries in aid of legislation conducted by the House of
Representatives?
- The SC pointed out again that where imprisonment
is imposed for contempt of a legislative body in the
United States, it terminates with the adjournment of
the session of the body in which the contempt
occurred. We emphasize again the absolute
absence of any judicial precedent which
acknowledges the right of a legislative body to
extend punishment for contempt beyond the
adjournment of the session, and that to go against
the unanimous authority to the contrary, would be
to sanction a power for the Houses of the
Philippine Legislature greater than that which any
legislative body in the United States, including the
Houses of the Congress of the United States, is
permitted to exercise. (Lopez vs. Delos Reyes, 55
Phil. 170, GR no. L-34361, November 5, 1930))
- In other words, the punishment could last only for
the duration of the session when the contempt was
committed. (Lopez vs. Delos Reyes, Supra)
What is the period of imprisonment for contempt during
inquiries in aid of legislation conducted by the Senate?
- The Court finds that the period of imprisonment
under the inherent power of contempt by the
Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should
only last until the termination of the legislative
inquiry under which the said power is invoked.
(Balag vs. Senate of the Philippines, GR no.
234608, July 3, 2018)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
What are the 2 instances when legislative inquiry of the
Senate is considered terminated?
1. Upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee
Report:
- The Senate Committee is required to issue a
Committee Report after the conduct of the
legislative inquiry. The importance of the
Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate
Rules because it mandates that the committee
begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen
(15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The
said Committee Report shall then be approved by
a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is
disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject
matter of the next order of business, and it shall be
acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the
Committee Report is the culmination of the
legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval
signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is
now up to the Senate whether or not to act upon
the said Committee Report in the succeeding order
of business. At that point, the power of contempt
simultaneously ceases and the detained witness
should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends,
the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant
witness likewise ends. (Balag vs. Senate of
thePhilippines., GR no. 234608, July 3, 2018)
2. When the legislative inquiry of the Senate also
terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress:
- All pending matters and proceedings, such as
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional
on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take
up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the first time. Again, while
the Senate is a continuing institution, its
proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress at the final adjournment of its last
session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends
upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the
detained witnesses likewise ends. (Balag vs.
Senate of the Philippines, GR no. 234608, July 3,
2018)
Appearance of Department Heads
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, as the rules of each
House shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted
to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. When the security of
the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conducted in executive session. (Sec. 22, Art.
VI)
Distinctions between the power to conduct legislative
inquiry under Sec. 21, Art. Vi and the power to conduct a
question hour under Sec. 22, Art. VI:
- Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related
and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function.
- When Congress merely seeks to be informed on
how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid
of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
- In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
- Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information. (Senate vs. Ermita, GR
no. 169777, April 20, 2006)
Nature of Executive Privilege:
- Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power
of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly,
Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and
high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public."
- "The expectation of a President to the
confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations, for example, has all the
values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is
the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions
in Presidential decision-making. A President and
those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 43
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution. (Senate vs. Ermita, Supra)
- There is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic and other national security
matters. The same case held that closed-door
Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation
on the right to information.
- The right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as "privileged information under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It
also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national
security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused were exempted from
the right to information.
The War Powers
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in a joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war. (Sec. 23(1), Art. VI)
The Emergency Powers
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof. (Sec. 23(2), Art. VI)
Sec. 17, Art. XII:
- In times of national emergency, when the public
interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
Power to declare “a state of national emergency” vs.
Power to exercise emergency powers:
- The power to declare “a state of national
emergency is enshrined in Art. VII, Section 18 of
the Constitution.
- As to the power to exercise emergency power,
please see Art. VI, Section 23 of the Constitution.
- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an
aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public
interest is just another facet of the emergency
44 – MORILLO NOTES
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President.
Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. (David
vs. Macapagal-arroyo, GR no. 171396, May 3,
2006)
The Power of Appropriation
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(Sec. 29(1), Art. VI)
DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATION:
- A statute the primary and specific purpose of which
is to authorize the release of public funds from the
treasury, eg. the public works act and the general
appropriations act. (Cruz, Political Law, p. 305)
- A law creating an office and providing funds
therefor is not an appropriation law since the main
purpose is not to appropriate funds but to create
the office.
IMPLIED LIMITATIONS:
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS
110 Phil. 331
FACTS: An appropriation measure contained an item for the
construction of roads in a private subdivision which
subsequently were turned over to the Philippine Government.
RULING: The SC annulled this item, observing that the property
sought to be improved with public funds was private in nature at
the time the appropriation was made. The circumstance that the
roads were later donated to the government did not cure the
basic defect of the appropriation as it was null and void ab initio.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:
A. On General Appropriations:
- “The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. The
form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.” (Sec. 25(1),
Art. VI)
- Rationale for the above rule is the theory
that the President knows more about the
needed appropriations than the
legislature. However, while the Congress
may not increase the President’s
budgetary recommendations, there is no
prohibition against its reducing such
recommendations, particularly those
relating to the executive department.
(Cruz, Political Law, p. 308)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- Reduction is not permitted when it comes
to the appropriations for the Judiciary.
(Sec. 3, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution.
- “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which
it relates.” (Sec. 25(2), Art. VI)
- The budget is only a proposal, a set of
recommendations on the appropriations
to be made for the operations of the
government. It is used as a basis for the
enactment of the general appropriations
law. (Cruz, Political Law, p. 308)
- Purpose of Sec. 25(2), Art. VI): to prevent
“riders” or irrelevant provisions that are
included in the general appropriations bill
to ensure their approval. (Cruz, Political
Law, p. 309)
GARCIA vs. MATA
65 SCRA 520
Certain provisions dealing with the activation and
retirement of reserve officers of the Armed Forces were
incorporated in the General Appropriations Act for
1956. The SC annulled these provisions and
declared the following:
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails
to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act
as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11
itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when
there is no emergency, no reserve officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be
called to a tour of active duty for more than
two years during any period of five
consecutive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident.
While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation
of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the
said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental
government policy matters of the calling to active duty
and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers
in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue
throughout the entire paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was
indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional
inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation
act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
- “The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies. (Sec. 25(3), Art. VI)
- Rationale: To prevent the adoption of
appropriations sub rosa by the Congress.
B. On Special Appropriation:
- “A special appropriation bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified
by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein. (Sec.
25(4), Art. VI)
- Purpose: To discontinue the practice of
fictitious appropriations that were
frequently enacted by the Congress even
if it knew that no funds were available.
(Cruz, Political Law, p. 308)
C. Discretionary Funds:
- “Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes
to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law. Sec. 25(6), Art. VI)
TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATIONS:
- Constitutional Provision: “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, thr Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. (Sec. 25(5), Art. VI)
- This provision prohibits one department from
transferring some of its funds to another
department and thereby make it beholden to the
former to the detriment of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Such transfers are also
unsystematic and disregard the will of legislature
that enacted the appropriations measure. (Cruz,
Political Law, p. 311)
BELGICA vs. OCHOA
GR no. 208566, November 11, 2013
DISCUSSION:
1. Constitutionality of PDAF
- The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form
of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Violation of doctrine of separation of powers:
- The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v.
Hon. Carague (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that
the phase of budget execution "covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly
includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities," the "regulation and release of
funds" as well as all "other related activities" that
comprise the budget execution cycle.This is rooted in
the principle that the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. Thus, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go
into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 45
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
appropriation law.
- In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should
not cross over the field of implementing the national
budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly
the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr.,
the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture
when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of
its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an
appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -
making role necessarily comes to an end and from
there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must "not
concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive."
3. Violation of delegation of powers:
- In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013
PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates
the principle of non-delegability since said legislators
are effectively allowed to individually exercise the
power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa
– is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." To understand what constitutes an act
of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by
law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013
PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
AUTOMATIC RE-APPROPRIATION:
- “If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill
is passed by the Congress.” (Sec. 25(7), Art. VI)
APPROPRIATIONS FOR SECTARIAN PURPOSES:
- “No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
46 – MORILLO NOTES
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. (Sec. 29(2). Art. VI)
- This prohibition is applicable only where the
appropriation is intended purposely to benefit a
religious institution.
- The purchase of a religious image by the barangay
council with private funds raised from voluntary
contributions did not violate Sec. 29(2), Art. VI of
the Constitution. (Garces vs. Estenzo, 105 SCRA
510)
- When the Philippine Government authorized a
special stamp issue on the occasion of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress under the
sponsorship of the Catholic Church which was
opposed by the Philippine Independent Church,
the SC held the validity of the aforesaid stamps
because the purpose of the stamp issue was
evidently focus attention not o the Eucharistic
Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract
tourists to our country and not primarily to
publicize the religious event. (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64
Phil. 201)
SPECIAL FUNDS:
- “All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred
to the general funds of the Government.” (Sec.
29(3), Art. VI)
The Power of Taxation
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation.” (Sec. 28(1), Art. VI)
Uniform Taxation → The persons or things belonging to the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
Equitable Taxation → The tax burden must be imposed
according to the taxpayer’s capacity to pay. It requires the
tax imposed to be determined on the basis of the value of
the property. (Cruz, Political Law, p. 319)
Progressive System of Taxation → One which tends to
accelerate instead of arrest economic growth. Furthermore,
the tax system should be suited to the social conditions of
the people. (Montejo, The New Constitution, p. 128)
DELEGATION OF TARIFF POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT:
- The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development
program of the Government. (Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
TAX EXEMPTIONS:
- ART. VI, Sec. 28(3): “Charitable institutions,
churches and personages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.”
LLADOC vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
14 SCRA 292
FACTS: A donation of P10,000.00 was accepted by a
parish priest for the construction of a church. The BIR
sought to impose a donee’s tax upon his successor,
who protested, invoking the constitutional exemption
from taxation of religious institutions.
RULING: The SC sustained the BIR, holding that the
tax imposed was an excise tax, a tax levied not upon
the church itself but upon the parish priest for the
exercise by him of the privilege of receiving the
donation. The taxes covered by the constitutional
exemption are real estate taxes or ad valorem taxes
imposed on the property itself.
LUNG CENTER vs. QUEZON CITY
GR no. 144104, June 29, 2004
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act
No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the
petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution;
and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY
and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to
the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner
to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.” If real
property is used for one or more commercial purposes,
it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes
but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or
"principal use" cannot be substituted for the words
"used exclusively" without doing violence to the
Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of
the property for charitable purposes is the direct and
immediate and actual application of the property itself
to the purposes for which the charitable institution is
organized. It is not the use of the income from the real
property that is determinative of whether the property
is used for tax-exempt purposes.
- ART. VI, Sec. 28(4): “No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.”
- Congress has the power to grant tax
exemptions over and above the power of
the local government’s delegated power
to tax. (City Government of QC vs. Bayan
Telecommunications, GR no. 162015,
March 6, 2006)
The Power of Concurrence
POWER OF CONCURRENCE:
- Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
- No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Sec. 21,
Art. VII)
PIMENTEL vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR no. 158088, July 6, 2005
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered
into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution
also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties
entered into by the executive.
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify
treaties belongs to the Senate.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of
the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or,
having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it.
Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been
signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The
Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for
by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text
of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Referendum and Initiative
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION:
- The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or
reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least
ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereof. (Sec. 31, Art. VI)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 47
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT:
Meaning of Initiative:
- The power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the
purpose. (Sec. 3(a), RA 6735)
Meaning of Referendum
- The power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for the
purpose. (Sec. 3(c), RA 6735)
Kinds of Initiative:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. (Sec. 3(a), RA 6735)
Kinds of Referendum:
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition
to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and
2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition
to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies. (Sec. 3(c), RA 6735)
XI. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
The President
QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Natural Born Filipino Citizen;
2. Registered Voter;
3. Able to Read and Write;
4. At least 40 years old on the day of the election;
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
immediately preceding the election. (Sec. 2, Art.
VII)
ELECTION:
- The President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of 6 years which shall begin at
noon on the 30th day of June next following the
day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date 6 years thereafter. (Sec. 4, par. 1, Art.
VII)
- The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. (Sec. 4, par. 1, Art. VII)
48 – MORILLO NOTES
- The regular election for President shall be held on
the 2nd Monday of May, unless otherwise provided
by law. (Sec. 4, par. 3, Art. VII)
CANVASS OF VOTES AND PROCLAMATION:
A. Manner of Canvass of Voters:
1. The board of canvassers of each province or city
shall certified the returns of election for President;
2. The certificate of canvass shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the Senate President;
3. Upon the receipt of the certificate of canvas and
not later than 30 days after the day of election, the
Senate President shall open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives in a Joint Public Session; and
4. Upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates, the Congress shall
canvass the votes. (Sec. 4, par. 4, Art. VII)
NOTE: The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates. (Sec. 4, par. 6, Art. VII)
B. Manner of Proclamation:
- The person having the highest number of votes
shall be proclaimed elected. (Sec. 4, par. 5, Art. VII)
- In case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
(Sec. 4, par. 5, Art. VII)
Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET):
- The Supreme Court, sitting En Banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President and
Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose. (Sec. 4, par. 7, Art. VII)
MACALINTAL vs. P.E.T.
GR no. 191618, November 23, 2010
Petitioner Macalintal questioned the Constitutionality of the PET
as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Sec. 4, Art. VII.
Furthermore, Petitioner claimed that PET exercises quasi-judicial
functions which is contrary to Sec. 12, Art. VIII, which provides
that Members of the SC and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative agency.
The SC ruled the following:
A. As to the Constitutionality of the PET:
- The SC has original jurisdiction to decide presidential
and vice-presidential election protests while
concurrently acting as an independent Electoral
Tribunal. the PET is not a separate and distinct entity
from the SC, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the
Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Sec. 4, Art. VII, and it faithfully
complies with the constitutional directive.
- The adoption of a separate seall, as well as the change
in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the
Assoc. Justices into Chairman and Members of the
Tribunal, respectively, was designated simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s
functions as a special electoral court.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
B. As to the Nature of the PET’s power and functions:
- The SC clarified that “the set up embodied in the
Constitution and status characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power.”
- With the explicit provision, the present Constitution
has allotted to the SC, in conjunction with later’s
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof.
- The power wielded by the PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole,
the Constitution draws a thin distinct line between PET
and the SC.
- The PET is an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department. The decision of
the electoral tribunals are still subject to judicial review
( via petition for certiorari) if there is a showing that the
decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. RAMOS
PET Case No. 001, February 13,1996 (253 SCRA 559)
Among the grounds relied upon the PET in providing for the
dismissal of the election protest filed by Petitioner-Protestant
Defenser-Santiago was her having filed a certificate of candidacy
for Senator in the May 1995 elections.
PET’s Decision, it emphasized that she campaigned for such
office and submitted herself to be voted upon. Therefore, ”She
knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be
elected would be six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election and to end at noon of 30
June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is
most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve
the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest.
In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate
without any qualification, condition, or reservation.
In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the
electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of
Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as
such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens
which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.
The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995
election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the
last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11
May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant
Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very
least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination
to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of
who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or
withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public
interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the
results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the
all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery.
TERM:
- The President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of 6 years .. (Sec. 4, par. 1, Art.
VII)
- The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. (Sec. 4, par. 1, Art. VII)
- No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than 4 years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
(Sec. 4, par. 1, Art. VII)
- Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for
which he was elected. (Sec. 4, par. 2, Art. VII)
The Vice-President
QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Natural Born Filipino Citizen;
2. Registered Voter;
3. Able to Read and Write;
4. At least 40 years old on the day of the election;
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years
immediately preceding the election. (Sec. 3, Art.
VII)
NOTE: There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. (Sec. 3, Art. VII)
ELECTION AND TERM OF OFFICE:
- The Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date, six years thereafter. (Sec. 4,
par. 1, Art. VII)
- No Vice-President shall serve for more than two
successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Sec. 4, par.
2, Art. VII)
Oath of Office
OATH OF OFFICE:
- Before they enter on the execution of their office,
the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting
President shall take the following oath or
affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or
Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God."
(In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)
Source: Sec. 5, Art. VII)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 49
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Perquisites
Constitutional Provision:
- The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall
be determined by law and shall not be decreased
during their tenure.
- No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was
approved.
- They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other
source. (Sec. 6, Art. VII)
DEFINITION OF EMOLUMENT:
- It is the profit arising from office or employment;
that which is received as compensation for
services, or which is annexed to the possession of
office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage,
gain, public or private. (PhilConsA vs. Gimenez,
GR no. L-23326, December 18, 1965)
EMOLUMENT REFERRED IN SEC. 6, ART. VII:
- The Emolument refers to any compensation
received for services rendered or from possession
of an office.
- This means the President cannot accept other
employment elsewhere, whether in the government
or in the private sector, and must confine himself to
the duties of his office, although in the case of the
Vice-President, he may be appointed to the
Cabinet. (Cruz, p. 357)
Presidential Succession
WHEN MAY THE VICE-PRESIDENT ACT AS
PRESIDENT?
1. If the President-elect fails to qualify at the
beginning of his/her term, the Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until the President-elect shall
have qualified;
2. If a President shall not have been chosen at the
beginning of his/her terms, the Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have
been chosen and qualified; (Sec. 7, Art. VII)
WHEN MAY THE VICE PRESIDENT BECOME THE
PRESIDENT?
1. in case of death of the president; or
2. In case of permanent disability of the President; or
3. In case where the President is remove from his or
her office; or
4. In case of the resignation of the President. (Sec. 8,
Art. VII)
WHEN BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT
ARE ABSENT, INCAPABLE AND UNQUALIFIED:
- Where no President and Vice-President shall have
been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both
shall have died or become permanently disabled,
the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of
50 – MORILLO NOTES
Representatives, shall act as President until a
President or a Vice-President shall have been
chosen and qualified. (Sec. 8, Art. VII)
- The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner
in which one who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or a Vice-President shall
have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in
the next preceding paragraph. (Sec. 7, Art. VII)
- In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of both the President
and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified. (Sec. 8, Art. VII)
- The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall
serve as President in case of death, permanent
disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He
shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President. (Sec. 8,
Art. VII)
PRESIDENT’S TEMPORARY INABILITY:
ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
GR no. 146738, Mach 2, 2001
Petitioner Estrada questioned Arroyo’s right to succeed him as
President, claiming that he had left Malacaniang only to defuse
the tension building up among the protesters in EDSA who were
demanding his resignation/ He denied that he resigned and said
that he had every intention to return after the People Power has
ended.
SC rejected his claim and ruled that his resignation cannot be
doubted, and by leaving the malacanang palace, his resignation
was confirmed.
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of Gloria Arroyo as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about
its legality;
2. He emphasized that he was leaving the Palace. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability appears;
3. He expressed his gratitude to the People for the
opportunity to serve them;
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country, Estrada’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president
which he has given up; and
5. Esyrada called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give
up his final act of farewell.
Vice Presidential Succession
VICE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
- Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-President during the term for which he was
elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-
President from among the Members of the Senate
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately. (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
Vacancy in the Offices of the President
and the Vice-President:
Constitutional Provision:
- The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President
to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later
than sixty days from the time of such call.
- The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
- Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this
Constitution.
- The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed.
- No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of
the next presidential election. (Sec. 10, Art. VII)
Inhibitions
Constitutional Provision:
- The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
1. Hold any office or employment during their term;
2. Practice (directly or indirectly) any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
3. Conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
4. Nepotism - “The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure,
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.” (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR no. 83896, February 22, 1991
Petitioner Civil Liberties challenged EO. 284 which, in effect,
allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries and other appointed officials of the Executive
Department to hold other positions in the government albeit
subject to the limitations imposed therein. They contend that it is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 13, however, Respondent Secretary
opposed Petitioner’s argument, invoking Art. IX-B, Sec. 17,
which allows the holding of multiple positions by the appointive
official “if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position.”
The SC declared EO 284 to be unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government
and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec. 13, Art. VII prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
Ex-officio posts or those required by the primary functions of the
executive official concerned do not fall within the definition of
“any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. Being head of an executive department is more than
a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge,
skills and expertise.
Difference between Sec. 13, Art. VII and Sec. 7, Art. 1X-
B:
ART. VII, Sec. 13 ART. IX-B, Sec. 7

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or The President, Vice-President,
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the the Members of the Cabinet,
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed and their deputies or
as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Constitution, hold any other
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or office or employment during
offices, including government-owned or controlled their tenure. They shall not,
corporations and their subsidiaries. (Sec. 13, Art. during said tenure, directly or
VII) indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any
What are the Inhibitions? The President, Vice President, business, or be financially
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistant, interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special
shall not do the following:
No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to
any public office or position
during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by
law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other
office or employment in the
Government or any
subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 51
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
privilege granted by the including Government-owned
Government or any or controlled corporations or
subdivision, agency, or their subsidiaries.
instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned
or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.
- This prohibition (Art. VII, Sec. 13) must not,
however, be construed as applying to posts
occupied by the Executive officials without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity,
as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the said officials’ office. The reason is
that these posts do not comprise “any other office”
within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials. To illustrate,
the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the
Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position
being actually and in legal contemplation part of
the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation attached to the
principal office. (Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary, GR no. 83896, February 22, 1191)
FUNA vs. ERMITA
GR no. 184740, February 11, 2010
Petitioner Funa questioned, on the basis of Art. VII, Sec. 13, the
constitutionality of the designation of the undersecretary of the
DOTC as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA). Respondent Undersecretary Baustista justified her
concurrent holding of said post and invoked Sec.7, par. 2, Art.
IX-B, which allows the holding by an appointive official of another
office if allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
The SC declared Bautista’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of
the MARINA to be unconstitutional for being violative of Sec. 13,
Art. VII. The SC also explained the concept of “holding” an office
and held the following: “Respondent Bautista being then the
appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office
is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither
was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is
that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not
receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA,
respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as
52 – MORILLO NOTES
such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport.
The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as
well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words
which were not even found in Sec. 13, Art. VII nor in Sec. 7, par.
2, Art. IX-B. To ‘hold’ an office means to possess or occupy’ the
same, or ‘to be in possession and administration,’ which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties
of the office.”
BETOY vs. BOARD OF DIRECTORS
GR nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011
Congress enacted the EPIRA and designate some Members of
the Cabinet as Members of the National Power Board of
Directors.
The SC upheld the validity of said law and ruled the following:
“The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB
does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as
the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry
involves the close coordination and policy determination of
various government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly
shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial,
budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination
with local government units.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the
restructuring of the electric power industry inherently involves the
participation of various government agencies. In Civil Liberties,
this Court explained that mandating additional duties and
functions to Cabinet members which are not inconsistent with
those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by
virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their
respective executive offices, is a practice long-recognized in
many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of
efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination among
the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of
its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws
affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering
basic services to the people.
The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of
national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the
people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the
respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the
NPB, valid.
This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of the
EPIRA is not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned
Cabinet secretaries compose the NPB Board only in an ex-officio
capacity. It is only in Section 52 creating the Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) that
they are so designated in an ex-officio capacity. xxx
Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of the
Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition was not
violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet secretaries
were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in the
NPB do not constitute "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of
Directors were designation by Congress of additional functions
and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were designated
as members of the Board of Directors. Designation connotes an
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or
grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation
does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to
the position, and not a mere designation.
Hence, Congress specifically intended that the position of
member of the Board of NPB shall be ex-officio or automatically
attached to the respective offices of the members composing the
board. It is clear from the wordings of the law that it was the
intention of Congress that the subject posts will be adjunct to the
respective offices of the official designated to such posts.”
Presidential Immunity
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY:
- During his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
the President may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it
in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of
state, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important
that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. (Rubrico vs. Arroyo, GR no. 183871,
February 18, 2010)
- Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the
many great and important duties imposed upon
him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. (Rubrico vs. Arroyo,
Supra)
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR
GR no. 82585, November 14, 1998
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness
for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands
undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President
by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of
the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
Executive Privilege
DEFINITION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
- It is the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress. (Almonte vs. Vasquez, 314 Phil. 150)
- It is the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information
from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public.
KINDS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES:
1. Informer’s Privilege - the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of a person
or persons who furnish information on violations of
law to officers charged with the enforcement of tht
law.
2. Privilege accorded to Presidential Comm-
unications - presumed privileged without
distinguishing between those which involve matters
of national security and those which do not, the
rationale for the privilege being that “a frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, iessential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked
to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
Power.
3. Deliberate Process Privilege - covers documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
4. Diplomatic Negotiations Privilege - to encourage
a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations
from public view. (Akbayan vs. Aquino, GR no.
170516, July 16, 2008)
WHO MAY INVOKE?
NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
GR no. 180643, March 25, 2008
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked,
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control over the matter.” A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and
certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of
privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the
Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 53
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to
be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," we
find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita
specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in
the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings,
etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.” The
following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People's Republic of China. Given
the confidential nature in which these information were
conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, the Congress
must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of
respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
XII. POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
Executive Power in General
Constitutional Provision:
- The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines. (Sec. 1, Art. VII)
DOES THE PRESIDENT EXERCISE THE TOTALITY OF
EXECUTIVE POWER?
PLANAS vs. GIL
GR no. L-46440, January 18, 1939
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive authority
over the public service is granted the President of the
Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1
with the declaration the "The Executive power shall be vested in
a President of the Philippines." All executive authority is thus
vested in him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of
seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VII, sec. 11,
subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he
cannot evade, he is granted specific and express powers and
functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and
express powers and functions, he may also exercise those
necessarily implied and included in them. (Myers vs. United
States [1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160; 47 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
21; Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, sec. 953, citing
Taft's Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, p. 139.) The
National Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or
impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the President of
the Constitution. (Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil.,
599.) The Constitution provides that the President "shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices"
(Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise general
54 – MORILLO NOTES
supervision over all location governments as may be provided by
law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of control and supervision
is an important constitutional grant. The President in the exercise
of the executive power under the Constitution may act through
the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the
executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents
in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts,
promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively
his acts. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122 U. S., 543; 30
Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep., 1141. See also U. S. vs. Eliason
[1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U. S. [1890], 137
U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct., Rep., 80; Wolsey vs.
Chapman [1880], 101 U. S., 755; 25 Law. ed., 915; Wilcox vs
Jackson [1836], 13 Pet., 498; 10 Law. ed., 246.) The power of
removal which the President may exercise directly and the
practical necessities of efficient government brought about by
administrative centralization easily make the President the head
of the administration. (Willoughby, Constitution of the United
States, Vol. II, 2nd ed., sec. 959.) Independently of any statutory
provision authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of
the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature
and character of the executive authority with which the President
of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant to him of
power to exercise general supervision over all local governments
and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorized him to order an investigation of the act
or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a
meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not
automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of
actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and
investigation.
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief
Executive by our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to
the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is
endowed with broad and extraordinary powers by our
Constitution, and who is expected to govern with a firm and
steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing interference and
much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the power
to order the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should
avoid that result.
MONDANO vs. SILVOSA
GR no. L-7708 may 30, 1955
The power of the President to remove officials from office as
provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code
must be done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines he "may at any time remove a person
from any position of trust or authority under the Government of
the (Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal
must be exercised conformably to law.
RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT:
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUZ
GR no. 88211, September 15, 1989
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand
[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The
American President, where the author advances the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any
government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The
American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the
peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in
times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential
duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-
chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief
the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude
the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short
of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar
the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by members
of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed
in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to
the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under
the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342,
Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines,
rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
MAY THE PRESIDENT DELEGATE EXECUTIVE POWER?
ANGELES vs. GAITE
GR no. 165276, November 25, 2009
Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58
is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of
control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. This
argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority
to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum
Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified
political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment
of a single executive, "all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."
The Appointing Power
Constitutional Provision:
- The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
(Sec. 16, Art. VII)
LIMITATIONS ON THE APPOINTING POWER:
- The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed
as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. (Sec, 13, par.
2, Art. VII)
- Appointments extended by an Acting President
shall remain effective, unless revoked by the
elected President, within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of office. (Sec. 14, Art
VII)
- Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. (Sec. 15, Art. VII)
DE CASTRO vs. JBC
GR no. 191002, March 17, 2010
The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section
15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary.
They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many
principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves
apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles
of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15,
Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments
to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under
the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read
into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 55
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the
period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions
thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing
so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of
the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section
9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and
explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them. Interpolation
of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to
fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other
words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended
to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear
and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words,
interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the
legislative intent is in the language of the law itself.
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
”Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.”
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be
stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of
any quarter.
KINDS OF APPOINTMENT:
● Permanent vs. Temporary Appointment:
- Permanent appointments are those extended to
persons possessing the requisite eligibility and are
thus protected by the constitutional provision on
security of tenure.
- Temporary Appointments are given to persons
without such eligibility, are revocable at will and
without the necessity of just cause or a valid
resignation.
GENERAL vs. URRO
GR no. 191560, March 29, 2011
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent
a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a
person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a
permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts
the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called to do by the appointing authority. Therefore, his
term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. His separation from the service does not
import removal but merely the expiration of his term — a mode
of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage
of the constitutional provision on security of tenure since no
removal from office is involved. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature and the limitations on or
qualifications in the exercise of this power are strictly construed.
In the present case, the petitioner posits that the law itself, R.A.
No. 6975, prohibits the appointment of a NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in an acting capacity by staggering his term of
office.
Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to
minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to appoint a
majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to
56 – MORILLO NOTES
ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered
term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or
indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary
appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or
temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants.
Given the wide latitude of the President’s appointing authority
(and the strict construction against any limitation on or
qualification of this power), the prohibition on the President from
issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there
must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the office and
the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the President’s
appointing power appears to be clearly deducible from the text
of R.A. No. 6975 in the manner we ruled in Nacionalista Party v.
Bautista. In that case, we nullified the acting appointment issued
by the President to fill the office of a Commissioner of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground that it
would undermine the independence of the COMELEC. We ruled
that given the specific nature of the functions performed by
COMELEC Commissioners, only a permanent appointment to the
office of a COMELEC Commissioner can be made.
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an
expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action
to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability
at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo
warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on
the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his
clear right71 to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his
petition must fail.
● Appointment vs. Designation:
- Appointment may be defined as the selection, by
the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
on the other hand, Designation means the
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a
person already in the public service.
● Acting Appointment:
- The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office
of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of his ir her choice
as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of his or her choice could assume office.
(Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR no. 164978, October 13,
2005)
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
GR no. 164978, October 13, 2005
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
nature of the office of a department secretary, the President
must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.
Moreover, “The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of
this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the
executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe
the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office”
OFFICIAL SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTMENT POWERS
OF THE PRESIDENT:
A. 6 Categories of Officials who are subject to the
appointing power of the President:
1. The heads of the executive departments;
2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
3. officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain;
4. Those other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution;
5. All other officers if the government whose
appointments are not provided for by law;
6. Those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. (Sec. 16, Art. VII; Cruz, p. 395)
B. Appointments subject to Confirmation:
- The heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
(Sarmiento vs. Mison, GR no. 79974, December 17,
1987)
- The second sentence of Sec. 16, VII, states that he
shall also appoint [a] All other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law; and [b] Those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. (Sarmiento
vs. Mison, Supra)
C. Appointments not subject to Confirmation:
- In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already
pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers was to exclude presidential appointments
from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason
to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII
the word "alone" after the word "President" in
providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
(Sarmiento vs. Mison, GR no.. 79974, December
17, 1987)
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
GR no.79974, December 17, 1987
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were
approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under
which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,
like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act
No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec.
16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on
the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to
make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise
the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the
salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
REGULAR vs. AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS:
REGULAR AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENTS APPOINTMENTS
Appointment is made during Appointment is made during
the legislative session the recess
This is made only after the This is made before the
nomination is confirmed by the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments Commission on Appointments
Once confirmed by the The appointment shall cease
Commission on Appointments, to be valid if disapproved by
the appointment continues the Commission on
until the end of the term of the Appointments or upon the next
appointee. adjournment of the Congress.
Nature of Ad Interim Appointment:
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 57
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character
by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. Thus, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such
disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw
or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
(Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR no. 149036, April 2,
2002)
- An ad interim appointment can be terminated for
two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim
appointment by the Commission on Appointments.
The second cause is the adjournment of Congress
without the Commission on Appointments acting
on his appointment. These two causes are
resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These
resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword
of Damocles over the heads of ad interim
appointees. No one, however, can complain
because it is the Constitution itself that places the
Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad
interim appointees. (Matibag vs. Benipayo, Supra)
MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO
GR no. 149036, April 2, 2002
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without
reappointment" appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of
any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The
second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously
appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first
set of appointees under the Constitution. In either case, it does
not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term
of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any
kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction
of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term
of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is
made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an
unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the
President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders
inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments.
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has
been appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person
completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold
otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s
power to make ad interim appointments.
58 – MORILLO NOTES
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments
usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim
appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim
appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will
certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most
of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere
inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
constitutional power of the President to make ad interim
appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital
government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a
proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three
constitutional commissions. The framers of the present
Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first
is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been
previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less
than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of
the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the
fixed term of seven years.
STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS:
- The usual steps in the appoing process are the
nomination, which is made by the President; the
confirmation, which is the prerogative of the
Commission on Appointments; and the issuance of
the commission, also done by the President. This is
where the appointment is regular.
- On the other hand, in case of the ad interim
appointment, the appointment comes before the
confirmation, which is made by the Commission
when it reconvenes following the legislative recess.
- The nomination of the regular appointee is made
and approved during the session, when the
Commission on Appointments is authorized to
meet. But the ad interim appointment is made
during the recess and becomes effective then,
subject to confirmation or rejection later, during the
next legislative session.
The Removal Power
Constitutional Provision:
- From the express power of appointment, the
President derives the implied power of removal.
However, it is not correct to say that all officials
appointed by him are also removable by him since
the Constitution prescribes certain methods for the
separation from the public service of some such
officers. (Cruz, p. 407)
- As a general rule, the power of removal may be
implied from the power of appointment. However,
the President cannot remove officials appointed by
him where the Constitution prescribes certain
methods for separation of such officers from public
service, e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of
Constitutional Commissions who can be removed
only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In
the cases where the power of removal is lodged in
the President, the same may be exercised only for
cause as may be provided by law, and in
accordance with the prescribed administrative
procedure. (Nachura, p. 295)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
OFFICIALS SUBJECT TO THE REMOVAL POWER OF
THE PRESIDENT:
- Under the doctrine of implication, the power to
appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a
general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him. The
exception to this is when the law expressly
provides otherwise - that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority
other than the appointing power. In some cases,
the Constitution expressly separates the power to
remove from the President's power to appoint.
Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President. However, Members of the Supreme
Court may be removed after impeachment
proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2,
Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be
removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its
administrative supervision over all its personnel
(Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons
and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the
Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C),
and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article
IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President,
but they may be removed only by impeachment
(Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the
Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the
President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article
XI). (Gonzalez vs. Office of the President, GR no.
196231, January 20, 2014)
GONZALES III vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR no. 196231, January 28, 2014
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down
in express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid
officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from
office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with
was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing
its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What
the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more
than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and
discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably
insulated from the whims of politicians.” And so it was that
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the
creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are
described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally
mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government
Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI
prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment
Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of
office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the office
Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the
exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak
of independence is meant to build up the Office of the
Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as
official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog
and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to
extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its
officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the
Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the
discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two
restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the
Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for
the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be
observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for
impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states
that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the
same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or
compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can
only be had on grounds provided by law.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF REMOVAL:
- No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided
by law. (Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B)
- The President is without any power to remove
elected local officials, since the power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly
provided for in the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the
Local Government Code. (Sangguniang Barangay
of Don Mariano Marcos vs. Martinez, GR np.
170626, March 3, 2008)
- Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose
continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of
the President may be replaced at any time, but
legally speaking, their separation is effected not by
removal but by expiration of their term. See Alajar
v. Alba, 100 Phil 683)
The Control Power
Constitutional Provision:
- The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 17, Art.
VII)
Control - the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter. (Mondano vs. Silvosa, GR
no. L-7708, May 30, 1955)
Supervision - means “overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the
former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 59
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
to make them perform these duties. (Mondano vs. Silvosa,
Supra)
SCOPE OF THE POWER OF CONTROL; DISTINCTION OF
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION:
DRILON vs. LIM
235 SCRA 135
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
PHILLIPS SEAFOOD vs. BOI
GR no. 175787, February 4, 2009
The executive power of control over the acts of department
secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the
"power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the
structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision
is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial
decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in
the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence,
constitutionally subject to this Court’s rule-making power. The
Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to.
LACSON-MAGALLANES vs. PANO
GR no. L-27811, November 17, 1987
The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority
of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that
had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the
lower court.
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is,
that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them
at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit
then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may
not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a
decision of a department secretary.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the
President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it
so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive
Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The
President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of
the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
60 – MORILLO NOTES
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that
"under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts
for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any
order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue
ANG-ANGCO vs. CASTILLO
GR no. L-17169, November 30, 1963
The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by
any other law to remove officers and employees in the classified
civil service?
The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of
the Revised Administrative Code,The phrase "conformably to
law" is significant. It shows that the President does not have
blanket authority move any officer or employee of the
government but his power must still be subject to the law that
passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the
procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may
be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated we
have such law which governs action to be taken against officers
and employees in classified civil service. This law is binding upon
President.
Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the
Revised Administrative Code, The phrase "in accordance with
the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even
granting for administrative purposes, the President of the
Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil
Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know with regard to
officers and employees who belong to classified service the
finality of the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service
or the Civil Board of Appeals.
Let us now take up the power of control given to President by
the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive
department which is now in by respondents as justification to
override the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power
of control couched in general terms for it does not set in specific
manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of
Hebron v. Reyes, supra, had already occasion to interpret the
extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter,” to distinguish it from the
power of general supervision over municipal government, but the
decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department.
Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control
over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent
himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside
the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as
used in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant
to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices
under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or
modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices", and
under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over
the executive department only refers to matters of general policy.
The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method
adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual, and
it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes
within the meaning of control over a specific policy of
government.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY (Alter
Ego Principle):
- Under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
department secretaries are alter egos or assistants
of the President and their acts are presumed to be
those of the latter unless disapproved or
reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved
party affected by the decision of a cabinet
secretary need not appeal to the Office of the
President and may file a petition for certiorari
directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of
the said secretary. (Manubay vs. Garilao, GR no.
140717, April 16, 2009)
ANGELES vs. GAITE
GR no. 165256, November 25,, 2009
The SC upheld the validity of a memorandum circular issued by
the President limiting his review of resolutions, orders or
adjudications of the Secretary of Justice to offenses punishable
for reclusion perpetua to death on the basis of the doctrine of
qualified political agency.
Moreover, the SC said that the “President has not fully abdicated
his power of control as Memorandum Circular no. 58 allows an
appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the
President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations
decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper
the other important duties of the President by having to
scrutinized each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in said matter.”
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs.
MANALANG-DEMIGILLO
GR no. 185571, March 5, 2013
Petitioner TIDCORP sought to justify the its reorganization, as
directed by its board of directors, by invoking the Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency, stating that since the members of its
board are cabinet secretaries, their act of providing for the
reorganization shuld be considered as the act of the President,
who, under existing laws, possess the continuity authority to
reorganize the executive department, including the petitioner.
Although the SC upheld the validity of the reorganization, it did
so NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED
POLITICAL AGENCY, but on ther grounds. The SC explained:
“The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended
to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some
of its members being themselves the appointees of the President
to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No.
1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8494,24 the five ex officio members were the Secretary of
Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, and the Chairman of the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other
members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at
least one of whom should come from the export community),
who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board for a
term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President
of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the
Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not
because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat
them in the Board.
Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of
Directors effected the assailed 2002 reorganization, they were
acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of
the President. We cannot stretch the application of a doctrine
that already delegates an enormous amount of power. Also, it is
settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred.
THE “TAKE-CARE” CLAUSE:
- In any event, the President has the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed.
BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010
GR no. 192935, December 7, 2010
The SC declared EO no. 1, issued by the President, to be
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
However, the SC declared that the President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of law
(in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency) is inherent in the President’s power as the Chief
Executive.
Therefore, the SC explained; “That the authority of the President
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this
power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in
statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our
laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health vs. Composano, the
authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the
Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines
was upheld. It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing
ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land”
Moreover, “The President’s power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It
flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under
Art. VII, Section 17 thereof. As the Chief Executive, the president
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws
are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.
He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the
executive department. Invoking this authority, the President
constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action.”
The Military Powers
Constitutional Provision:
“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 61
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.” (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
Military Powers: The military power of the President to:
1. Command all the armed forces of the Philippines;
2. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and
3. Declare martial law.
A. TO COMMAND THE ARMED FORCES
TO CALL OUT THE ARMED FORCES:
- Grounds: “The President shall be the Commander-
in-Chief of all armed forces x x x, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. “ (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
IBP vs. ZAMORA
GR no. 141284, August 15, 2000
Petitioner IBP questioned the command of the president Estrada
in deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility
patrols around metro Manila for the purpose of crime prevention.
The order was obviously based on the deteriorating peace and
order in the metropolis. The IBP contended that there was no
emergency or a state of “lawless violence” to warrant the calling
of the Armed Forces, which would have the effect of militarizing
the government to the prejudice of individual liberties and the
supremacy of civilian authority.
The SC dismissed the petition, holding that inasmuch as the IBP
had not shown that the President had committed grave abuse of
62 – MORILLO NOTES
discretion in issuing his command, it was not inclined to overrule
the President’s determination of the factual basis for the calling
of the Marines.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This
is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However,
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist
no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise,
no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a
manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s
duty of "purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
DAVID vs. ARROYO
GR no. 171396, May 3, 2006
Pertinent Provision in PP 1017: “by virtue of the power vested
upon me by Section 18, Art. VII ... do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
The above provision is known as the “Calling-out” powers of the
President which is provided under Art. VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution.
Under the calling-out powers of the President the armed forces
of the Philippines to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasions and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President
must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power,
the greater are the limitations.
KULAYAN vs. TAN
GR no. 187298, July 3, 2012
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what
became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article
VII thereof.
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding
the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for
local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the
police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their
authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law,
and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to
day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional
Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is
subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control. A local chief executive, such as the provincial
governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and
may exercise control only in day-to-day operations,
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not
endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise
by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra
vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465
of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed
subsequently.
POWER TO DECLARE A STATE OF REBELLION:
DAVID vs. ARROYO
GR no. 171396, May 3, 2006
There is a distinction between the President’s authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to
declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book
II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, stating:
“Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have
the force of an executive order.”
President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is
more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied
on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary
power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
POWER TO DECLARE A STATE OR EMERGENCY:
DAVID vs. ARROYO
GR no. 171396, May 3, 2006
Power to declare “a state of national emergency” vs. Power
to exercise emergency powers:
The power to declare “a state of national emergency is enshrined
in Art. VII, Section 18 of the Constitution.
As to the power to exercise emergency power, please see Art. VI,
Section 23 of the Constitution.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the
emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public
interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether
or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on
whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a
state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has
no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take
over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short,
the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers
of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.
B. TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
MEANING OF HABEAS CORPUS:
- The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the
person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his
caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and
receive whatever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in his behalf. (Moran, Rules of
Court, Voll. I, p. 499; Cruz, p. 435)
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS::
- This means that when the court receives an
application for the writ, and it finds the petition in
proper form, it will the writ as a matter of course, ie.
the court will issue an order commanding the
production before the court of the person allegedly
detained, at a time and place stated in the order,
and requiring the true cause of his detention to be
shown to the court. If the return to the writ shows
that the person in custody was apprehended and
detained in areas where the privilege of the writ has
been suspended or for crimes mentioned in the
executive proclamation, the court will suspend
further proceedings in the action. (Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 131; Cruz, p. 435)
GROUNDS FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT:
- Invasion, rebellion or when public safety requires it.
(Sec. 18, Art. VII)
ARTICLE III, SECTION 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION:
- The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it. (Sec.
15, Art. III)
C. TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 63
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
GROUNDS:
- “In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he (the president) may x x x x
place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.” (Sec. 18, Art. VII)
LAGMAN vs. MEDIALDEA
GR no. 231658, July 4, 2017
A. Locus Standi of the Petitioners:
- As a general rule, the challenger must have "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. a prime example of
which is found in Section 18 of Article VII which
provides that any citizen may file the appropriate
proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. "[T]he only requisite for standing to
challenge the validity of the suspension is that the
challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a
taxpayer."
- In the Lagman Petition, petitioners therein did not
categorically mention that they are suing's citizens
but merely referred to themselves as duly elected
Representatives. That they are suing in their official
capacities as Members of Congress couLd have
elicited a vigorous discussion considering the
issuance by the House of Representatives of
House Resolution No. 1050 expressing full support
to President Duterte and finding no reason to
revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such resolution,
the House of Representatives is declaring that it
finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the martial law declaration, which is
in direct contrast to the views and arguments being
espoused by the petitioners in the Lagman Petition.
Considering, however, the trend towards relaxation
of the rules on legal standing, as well as the
transcendental issues involved in the present
Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self-
restraint and will not venture into this matter. After
all, "the Court is not entirely without discretion to
accept a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of a [bona fide] case or of standing.
Considerations paramount to [the requirement of
legal standing] could compel assumption of
jurisdiction.” In any case, the Court can take
judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the
Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines
since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for
them to be elected as representatives. We will
therefore consider them as suing in their own
behalf as citizens of this country. Besides,
respondents did not question petitioners' legal
standing.
B. Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate
proceeding” mentioned in paragraph 3, Section 18,
Arti. VII of the Constitution refers to a petition for
certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Art. VIII:
- A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18,
Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority
64 – MORILLO NOTES
to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
- To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding"
refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the
expanded jurisdiction of this Court would,
therefore, contradict the clear intention of the
framers of the Constitution to place additional
safeguards against possible martial law abuse for,
invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article
VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution
added the safeguard under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court.
- The unique features of the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should
be treated as sui generis separate and different
from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition
filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule
on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision
of the Constitution also limits the issue to the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by
the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The
usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for
Certiorari is likewise not applicable under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the
limited period within which this Court has to
promulgate its decision.
- A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the
form in which actions are to be brought and
defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of
conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of
opposing judgments, and of executing.” In fine, the
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing
on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the
purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's
emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter
to be resolved by the Court.
C. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress:
- The Court may strike down the presidential
proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient
factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
- In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available
to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings.”
On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike
the Court I which does not look into the absolute
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
correctness of the factual basis as will be
discussed below, Congress could probe deeper
and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
facts presented before it.
- In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it
is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an
appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other
hand, Congress' review mechanism is automatic in
the sense that it may be activated by Congress
itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
- Thus, the power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only totally
different but likewise independent from each other
although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of
Congress.
D. The scope of the power of the SC to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law; The “sufficiency of factual basis test”:
- To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, which
was decided under the 1935 Constitution, held that
it can inquire into, within proper bounds, whether
there has been adherence to or compliance with
the constitutionally-imposed limitations on the
Presidential power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. "Lansang limited the review
function of the Court to a very prudentially narrow
test of arbitrariness.” Fr. Bernas described the
"proper bounds" in Lansang as follows: ”What,
however, are these 'proper bounds' on the power
of the courts? The Court first gave the general
answer that its power was 'merely to check - not to
supplant - the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his
act. More specifically, the Court said that its power
was not 'even comparable with its power over civil
or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal...in
which cases the appellate court has all the powers
of the courtof origin,' nor to its power of quasi-
judicial administrative decisions where the Court is
limited to asking whether 'there is some evidentiary
basis' for the administrative finding. Instead, the
Court accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion
that it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that
the President's decision is correct and that public
safety was endangered by the rebellion and
justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
suspending the writ, the President did not act
arbitrarily.”
- Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing
only for judicial review based on the determination
of the sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact
done away with the test of arbitrariness as
provided in Lansang.
- Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous
construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
are presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence
at the time they were drafting the Constitution.
Thus, the phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be
understood as the only test for judicial review of
the President's power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the
President's decision is correct, rather it only needs
to determine whether the President's decision had
sufficient factual bases. We conclude, therefore,
that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of
judicial review by the introduction of the
"sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
- In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court
should look into the full complement or totality of
the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
Neither should the Court expect absolute
correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation
and in the written Report as the President could
not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity
of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation. To require precision in the President's
appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-
making. Such a requirement will practically
necessitate the President to be on the ground to
confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to
him within a period that only the circumstances
obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a
scenario, of course, would not only place the
President in peril but would also defeat the very
purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon
him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice Antonio
T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an end to
the root cause of the emergency". Possibly, by the
time the President is satisfied with the correctness
of the facts in his possession, it would be too late
in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have
already escalated to a level that is hard, if not
impossible, to curtail.
E. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of
the factual basis:
- Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for
the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and
(2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power.” Without the concurrence of the two
conditions, the President's declaration of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must be struck down.
- As a general rule, a word used in a statute which
has a technical or legal meaning, is construed to
have the same technical or legal meaning. Since
the Constitution did not define the term "rebellion,"
it must be understood to have the same meaning
as the crime of "rebellion" in the Revised Penal
Code (RPC)
- Rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could
only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 65
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
of the RPC. To give it a different definition would
not only create confusion but would also give the
President wide latitude of discretion, which may be
abused - a situation that the Constitution seeks to
prevent. Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following
elements must be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a)
public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or
movement is either (a) to remove from the
allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii)
any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress,
wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives
F. Was there a sufficient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus?
- A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the
Court to conclude that the President, in issuing
Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President's conclusion, that there was an armed
public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was
the removal from the allegiance of the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his
powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the
President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof.
- After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only
the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Pardoning Power
Constitutional Provision:
- Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
Pardon - An act of grace which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law
inflicts for the crime he has committed.
Commutation - A reduction or mitigation of the penalty (eg.
when the death sentence is reduced to life imprisonment)
Reprieve - This is merely a postponement of a sentence to
a date certain, or a stay of execution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS:
1. Pardon cannot be granted in cases of impeachment
(Sec. 19, Art. VII);
66 – MORILLO NOTES
2. No pardon can be granted for the violation of any
election law, rule or regulation without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission on Election (Sec.
5, Art. IX-C);
3. Pardon can be granted only after conviction by final
judgment:
PEOPLE vs. SALLE, JR.
GR no. 103567, December 4, 1995
We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment"
limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies
or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not appealed
from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by
the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of
an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of
sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of
the accused from confinement.
And now in the instant case. Considering that appellant
Ricky Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to
him should not have been enforced. Nonetheless, since he
stands on the same footing as the accused-appellants in
the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full force, impact,
and effect of the rule herein pronounced subject to the
condition set forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons
extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of
the grantee's appeal.
LLAMAS vs. ORBOS
GR no. 99031, October 15, 1991
Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant
executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution
The SC ruled the following: “Moreover, applying the
doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire
debemos," We cannot sustain petitioner's view. In other
words, if the law does not distinguish, so We must no
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between
which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically
excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and
convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or
support the exercise of the executive clemency in
administrative cases.
However, We wish to stress however that when we say the
President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
KINDS OF PARDON:
1. Absolute or Conditional Pardon:
- An absolute pardon is one extended without any
strings attached, whereas a conditional pardon is
one under which the convict is required to comply
with certain requirements.
- Where the pardon is conditional, the offender has
the right to reject it since he may feel that the
condition imposed is more onerous than the
penalty sought to be remitted. However, if the case
is an absolute pardon, the pardonee has no option
at all and must accept it whether he likes it or not.
(Cruz, p. 446)
- Remedies against violation of conditions of
Pardon:
ESPUELAS vs. PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF BOHOL
GR no. L-13223, may 30, 1960
Petitioner Espuelas accepted a pardon subject to the
condition that he would not, thereafter, commit a
violation of the penal laws of the Philippines. Later on,
he was convicted by the municipal court of the crime
of usurpation of public functions but the case was
provisionally dismissed for lack of witnesses when he
appealed it to the CFI. Ordered administratively
reincarcerated by the President of the Philippines for
violation of hid conditional pardon. Escuelas filed a
petition for habeas corpus.
The SC denied his petition, holding that “mere
commission, not necessarily conviction by the court, of
any other crime, is enough in order that the petitioner
may be deemed to have violated the condition of his
parole or pardon. Determination of violation of such
condition rests exclusively in the sound judgment of
the Chief Executive and the courts will not interfere by
way of review with any of his findings.”
2. Plenary or Partial Pardon:
- A plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including the
accessory disabilities, whereas a partial pardon
does not.
EFFECTS OF PARDON:
VIDAL vs. ESTRADA
GR no. 206666, January 21, 2015
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It
is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in
fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal
against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211
(DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving
moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to
run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact
that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement
expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is
disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post
despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by
former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not
expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his
(former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for
public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given
to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually
specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that
former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same
cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN
GR no. 78239, February 9, 1989
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would
explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon,
the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for which
she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this
strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number
of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is
not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume
that which we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness
implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been
established by the most complete method known to modern
civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and
forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase
the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed.
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While
we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to
the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should
not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe
to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 67
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Morillo Notes

if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement,
dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This
such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to
character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen. upon the issuance of the clemency.

Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are
"historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of
mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men
will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the
actor."
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil
rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind
lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the
privilege.
GARCIA vs. COA CHAIRMAN
GR no. L-75025, September 14, 1993
Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon
upon the individual to whom it is granted. In Monsanto v.
Factoran, we have firmly established the general rule that while a
pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence
of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent
as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate
for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or
remission of guilt and not forgetfulness . It does not erase the
fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof.
Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The
pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public
office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for
reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service
entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to
petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation
for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from
the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of
the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner.
Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have
been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to
those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is
no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was
not the result of any criminal conviction that carried with it
forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but is the direct
consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the
Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has
the power of control. The President's control has been defined to
mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to the judgment of the former for the latter." In
pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief
Executive exercised his power of control and set aside the
decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
The clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and relieved
him from administrative liability. The separation of the petitioner
from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back
wages.
AMNESTY:
- The Constitution itself provides that amnesty can
be granted by the President only with the
concurrence of the Congress. This concurrence
must be given by a majority of all the members of
the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII)

But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of Distinctions Between Amnesty and Pardon:
the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new
man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the AMNESTY PARDON
offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did
not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from Usually addressed to crimes Condones infractions of the
all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to against the sovereignty of the peace of State
him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character State, to political offenses
prior to the finding of guilt.
Addressed to classes or Addressed to an individual.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for
persons
dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service.
However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge
of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was No need for distinct acts of There must be distinct acts of
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was acceptance acceptance
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on
the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to Requires concurrence of Does not need concurrence of
him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court Congress Congress
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason A public act which the courts This is a private act of the
behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the may take judicial notice of President which must be
favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the Ministry pleaded and proved
of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission. Looks backward and puts into Looks forward and relieves the
oblivion the offenses itself. pardonee of the consequences
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect of the offense.
completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative
decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his Source: People vs. Casido, 336 Phil. 344; Magdalo vs.
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the COMELEC, GGR no. 190793, June 19, 2012)
executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the

68 – MORILLO NOTES

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
The Borrowing Power
Constitutional Provision:
- The President may contract or guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
and subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days
from the end of every quarter of the calendar year,
submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted
or guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations which would
have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by
law. (Sec. 20, Art. VII)
The Diplomatic Power
Constitutional Provision:
- No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Sec. 21,
Art. VII)
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT:
BAYAN MUNA vs. ROMULO
GR no. 159618, February 1, 2011
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties
and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the
contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers. Neither, on the
domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct
from another for accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-
requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional
scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a
treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate,
and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement,
takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.
To be sure, the nullity of the subject non-surrender agreement
cannot be predicated on the postulate that some of its provisions
constitute a virtual abdication of its sovereignty. Almost every
time a state enters into an international agreement, it voluntarily
sheds off part of its sovereignty. The Constitution, as drafted, did
not envision a reclusive Philippines isolated from the rest of the
world. It even adheres, as earlier stated, to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually
have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state
power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive
and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in
this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a
pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant
the same privileges or immunities to the other. On the rationale
that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an
unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.
POWER TO RATIFY TREATIES:
- Treaties and other international agreements
concluded by the President are also subject to
check by the Supreme Court which has the power
to declare them unconstitutional. (Secs. 4(2) and
5(2)(a), Art. VIII)
PIMENTEL vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR no. 158088, July 16, 2008
Petitioner Pimentel sought to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Dept. of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court to the
Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Sec. 21, Art. VII, Constitution.
The SC dismissed Pimentel’s petition and states that; “It should
be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the
Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving
or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for
its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious
step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached
by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot
issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.”
The Budgetary Power
Constitutional Provision:
- The President shall submit to the Congress, within
thirty days from the opening of every regular
session as the basis of the general appropriations
bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and
proposed revenue measures. (Sec. 22, Art. VII)
Additional Notes:
- The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of
the Government as specified in the budget. (Sec.
25(1), Art. VI)
The Informing Power
Constitutional Provision:
- The President shall address the Congress at the
opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time. (Sec. 23, Art VII)
Other powers of the President
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 69
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Other Powers of the President:
- The Congress shall convene once every year on
the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days
as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The
President may call a special session at any time.
(Sec. 15, Art. VI)
- The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. (Sec.
27, Art. VI)
- The COMELEC shall exercise the following powers
and functions x x x Deputize, with the concurrence
of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C)
- The COMELEC shall exercise the following powers
and functions x x x commend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C)
- In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof. (Sec. 23(2), Art. VI)
- The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development
program of the Government. (Sec. 28(2), Art. VI)
XIII. THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Independence of the Judiciary
SAFEGUARDS IN THE CONSTITUTION:
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It
cannot be abolished nor may its membership or the
manner of its meetings be changed by mere
legislation. (Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII);
2. The members of the Supreme Court may not be
removed except by impeachment. (Sec. 2, Art. XI);
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as
prescribed in Art. VIII, Section 5, Constitution. (Sec.
2, Art. VIII);
70 – MORILLO NOTES
4. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court
may not be increased by law without its advice and
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI);
5. Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated by
the Judicial and Bar Council and no longer subject
to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII);
6. The Supreme Court now has administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their
personnel. (Sec. 6, Art. VIII);
7. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to
discipline judges of lower courts. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII);
8. The members of the Supreme Court and all lower
courts have security of tenure, which cannot be
undermined by law reorganizing the judiciary.
(Supra);
9. They shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII);
10. The salaries of judges may not be reduced during
their continuance in office. (Sec. 10, Art. VIII);
11. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Sec. 3,
Art. VIII);
12. The Supreme Court alone may initiate rules of
court. (Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII);
13. Only the Supreme Court may order the temporary
detail of judges. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VIII);
14. the Supreme Court can appoint all officials and
employees of the judiciary. (Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII).
Judicial Power
TRADITIONAL MEANING:
- “The judicial power is vested not only in the
Supreme Court but in such lower courts as may be
established by law.” (Sec. 1, par. 1, Art. VIII)
- This involves settling conflicting rights as conferred
by law.
- “Lower Courts” refers to all other courts below the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the only
constitutional court, all the lower courts being of
statutory creation.
- As the Constitution speaks only of “one” Supreme
Court, it is not competent for the legislature to
create even a temporary Supreme Court.
VARGAS vs. RILLORAZA
80 Phil. 297
Sec. 20 of the People’s Court Act provided that
whenever the SC had to hear collaboration cases, the
members thereof who were disqualified because they
had also participated in the Occupation government
would be temporarily replaced by ad hoc members to
be designated by the President of the philippines from
either the CA or the CFI. The result was the creation of
two Supreme courts; one the regular body and the
other the temporary court to sit only in collaboration
cases.
The Supreme Court held that this arrangement was
unconstitutional in view of the provision that “the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by
law.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
EXPANDED MEANING:
- “Judicial powers includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.” (Sec. 1, par. 2,
Art. VIII)
IBP vs. ZAMORA
GR no. 141284, August 15, 2000
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial
review by providing that "(T)he Judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” Under this definition, the Court cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved
is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met or the limitations respected, is
justiciable - the problem being one of legality or
validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to
delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the official whose action is being questioned.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Under this definition, a court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated. But while this Court has
no power to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress or of the President, it may look into the
question of whether such exercise has been made in
grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary
power is granted either department of government,
may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to
justiciable controversy.
Jurisdiction
Constitutional Provision:
- The Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary
when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members. (Sec. 2, Art. VIII)
NATURE OF JURISDICTION:
- Jurisdiction is defined as the authority by which the
courts take cognizance of and decide cases, the
legal right by which the judges exercise the
authority. (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 991)
LIMITATIONS IN CONGRESS’ POWER TO PRESCRIBE
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT:
- The SC shall have the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. (Sec. 5, par. 1, Art.
VIII)
- The SC shall have the power to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved. (Sec. 5, par. 1,
Art. VIII)
- No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
Appointments
QUALIFICATIONS:
- A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence. (Sec. 7(3), Art. VIII)
a. Justices of the Supreme Court:
- Qualification:
1. Natural-Born Filipino Citizen;;
2. At least 40 years old;
3. Have been for 15 years or more, a judge
or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines. (Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII)
KILOSBAYAN vs. ERMITA & ONG
GR no. 177721, July 3, 2007
The President appointed Respondent Ong to fill up the vacancy
created by the retirement of Assoc. Justice Calleja, Sr. Petitioner
Kilosbayan contested Ong’s appointment for being
unconstitutional because Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact
is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 71
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate reveals that
Ong’s father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Ong
opposed Petitioner’s claim, and claimed that he traces his
ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on
November 25, 1881, that he was allegedly a Filipino citizen who
married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that they two had a son,
Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of
which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at
that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby
also became a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong subsequently
obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a
certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
The Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the records of
respondent Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as
B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No.
8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified
to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he
is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of
eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen.
As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted
his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His
birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and
that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,
respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau
of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were
naturalized along with his father.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the
nationalities of respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births,
marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the
existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of
evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent
Ong’s mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still
appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the
burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as
his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until
this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to
this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For
this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
TOPACIO vs. ONG
GR no. 179895, December 18, 2008
The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v.
Ermita, given Ong’s actual physical possession and exercise of
the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion the de
facto doctrine.
Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in
possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color
of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from
an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed to
an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will
confer on him the status of a de facto officer.
72 – MORILLO NOTES
”x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the
prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is
open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it
is a well-established principle, dating back from the earliest
period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of
decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as
valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.”
If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with
persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State,
and without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de
facto doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out to be
either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally
appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired, or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights, among
which is that his title to said office may not be contested except
directly by writ of quo warranto, which contingencies all depend
on the final outcome of the RTC case.
b. Justices of Lower Collegiate Courts:
- Qualification: No person shall be appointed
Member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. (Sec. 7(1),
Art. VIII)
c. Judges of Lower Courts:
- Qualification: The Congress shall prescribe the
qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no
person may be appointed judge thereof unless he
is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar. (Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII)
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC):
A. Composition of the JBC:
- Ex-Officio Members: Chief Justice (Chairman);
Secretary of justice, and Representative of
Congress.
- Regular Members: Representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8(1), Art.
VIII)
- Secretary Ex-Officio: the Clerk of the Supreme
Court. (Sec. 8(3), Art. VIII)
CHAVEZ vs. JBC
GR no. 202242, July 17, 2012
The SC clarified that the Congress may have only one
representative in the JBC, and not two representatives, or one
from each House, with each having only ½ vote.
A rotational scheme similar to that of the Senate and the
constitutional commissions is provided for the council, with the
original regular appointees being given staggered terms of four,
three, two and one year respectively, to be followed with new
appointees who shall each serve for the full term of 4 years.
B. Appointment/Term:
- The regular members of the Council shall be
appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative
of the private sector for one year. (Sec. 8(2), Art.
VIII)
C. Function of the JBC:
- The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it. (Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII)
D. Appointment from List of Nominees:
- The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees preferred by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issued the
appointment within ninety days from the
submission of the list. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
AGUINALDO vs. AQUINO
GR no. 224302, November 29, 2016
The primordial question then for resolution of the Court is
whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited
to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by
the JBC for each specific vacancy. The Court answers in the
negative.
The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the
principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary.[47] It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in
the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure
and partisan activities.[48] The extent of the role of the JBC in
recommending appointees vis-a-vis the power of the President
to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) .
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC
cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to
appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom
he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President
appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is
valid. On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino
was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the JBC,
especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists
encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of
the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be
qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous
vacancies for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice,
and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees, designate a
numerical order of seniority of the prospective appointees. The
Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding
Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into seven divisions,
with three members each. The numerical order of the seniority or
order of preference of the 20 Associate Justices is determined
pursuant to law by the date and order of their commission or
appointment by the President.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is
the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of
such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order
of issuance of said members' appointment or commission
papers. By already designating the numerical order of the
vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order
of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly
arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of
appointment.
Fiscal Autonomy
Constitutional Provision:
- The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released. (Sec. 3, Art. VIII)
BENGZON vs. DRILON
GR no. 103524, April 15, 1992
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by
the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the
Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we
need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to
Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility needed
in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated
for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence
and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to
constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
IN RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATIONS OF THE
APPRAISED VALUE OF PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY
RETIRED JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
AM no. 11-7010-SC, July 31, 2012
The SC was by the COA to “determine the proper formula to be
used in computing the appraisal value that a retire Chief justice
and several Assoc. Justices of the SC have to pay to acquire the
government properties they used during their tenure.” The
request was made after a finding by the COA of :underpayment”
with respect to the three vehicles purchased by a retired Chief
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 73
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
justice, and the vehicles and other personal properties, inclufding
a television set, acquired by 4 other Justice of the SC, upon their
retirement.
The SC, relying on recommendations of its Office of
Administrativ Services, confirmed the in-house computation of
the appraisal value made by its Property Division, and declared
that the authority of the COA to conduct post-audit examinations
on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy under Sec. 2(1)
of Art. IX-d, Constitution, “must be read not only in the light of
the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the
constitutional provisions on judicial independence and Court
rulings on these matter.”
By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention
to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices
of specifically designated properties that they used during their
incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a
benefit. This has become an established practice within the
Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized. The En
Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form
of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its
officials and employees in the exercise of its power of
administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority,
the Court has the power to administer the Judiciary’s internal
affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the
retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as
provided by law and by its own grants. Thus, under the
guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc
determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of
the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court
officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Court’s
granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and
restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner
the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of.
Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and
benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also
encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the
Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the
Judiciary’s own affairs.
Moreover, “One of the most important aspects of judicial
independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just
as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or
her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court
from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not
enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may
not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their
funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a
general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the
purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of
interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciary’s
fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal
branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its
primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command
adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise
(or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national
purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts
of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is
necessary to maintain judicial independence and is expressly
provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal
autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.”
Composition of the Supreme Court
74 – MORILLO NOTES
FILLING UP OF VACANCY:
- The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(Sec. 4(1), Art. VII)
- During the period covered by Sec. 15, Art. VII, the
SC held that “The President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so, and and Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
means that the President is required to fill
vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15, Art.
VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every 6
years.” (In Re: Appointment of Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Placido Vallarte, AM no. 98-5-01-SC,
November 9, 1998)
- The ruling in In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and
Vallarte has been reversed by the SC in the case of
De Castro vs. JBC.
DE CASTRO vs. JBC
GR no. 191002, March 17, 2010
The SC declared that the President may provide for
appointments in the judiciary even within “two months
immediately before the next presidential election and
up to the end of his term.”
The SC explained “Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. VII to the
appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Sec. 15, Art. VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the
supreme Court in Art. VIII itself, most likely in Sec. 4(1),
Art. VIII. that such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.”
EN BANC AND DIVISION CASES:
- All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII)
- Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc. (Sec. 4(3), Art. VIII)
Power of Judicial Inquiry
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
INQUIRY:
- The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)
- All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and
all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII)
REQUISITES OF A JUDICIAL INQUIRY:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by
the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
(Dumalo vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392)
A. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
MEANING OF CONTROVERSY:
- It involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. (Cruz, p. 491)
- The case must not be moot or academic or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.
PACU vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
97 Phil. 806
Petitioners challenged a regulation of the Respondent requiring
all private colleges and universities to firt obtain a permit from the
Department of Education before they could open and operate.
However, it appeared that all petitioners had previously obtained
the required permit and that they were questioning the regulation
only because of the possibility that such permit might be denied
them in the future.
The SC declared that the case was premature as there was no
showing at the time of any conflict of legal rights that would
justify assumption of jurisdiction by the judiciary. The Court said
that “mere apprehension that the Secretary of education might,
under the law, withdraw the permit of one of the Petitioners does
not constitute a justiciable controversy.”
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP PEACE PANEL
GR no. 183591, October 14, 2008
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result
of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of
respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties
under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and
statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy
ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
GARCILLANO vs, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GR no. 170338, December 23, 2008
The SC dismissed the petition filed for purposes of
prohibiting the respondents from playing the “tape
recordings and from including the same in their
committee report.” It noted that “the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members”
and that there is also “the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the ‘Hello Garci’ inquiry were
completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the
respondent committees. Having been overtaken these
event, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for
being moot and academic.”
PRINCIPLE OF MOOTNESS:
- A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in
academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things,
cannot be enforced. (Garcillano vs. House of
Representatives, Supra)
Exception to the Mootness Principle:
1. There is a grave violation of Constitution;
2. The exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
3. When the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of the controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 75
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. (David vs. Arroyo, GR no. 171396, May 3,
2006; Garcillano vs. House of Representatives,
Supra)
B. PROPER PARTY
DIRECT INJURY TEST; MEANING OF PROPER PARTY:
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. vs. FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
GR no. 166006, March 14, 2008
The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in court
requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a
case. In private suits, locus standi requires a litigant to be a "real
party in interest," which is defined as "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the "direct injury test" to
determine locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera, it was
held that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The "direct
injury test" in public suits is similar to the "real party in interest"
rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Recognizing that a strict application of the "direct injury" test
may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in
cases of "transcendental importance" or with "far reaching
implications." Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also
been held that locus standi may be waived in the public interest.
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a
private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil
suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It
was required, and it did pay, the ₱10 levy imposed for every bag
of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true that
Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate
consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the
constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it
bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the
possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact
of payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.
Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the
LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy.
The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and
other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their
business consists not only in fewer clients because of the
increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate
strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and
other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy
just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the
business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus
standi.
ELEMENTS TO DETERMINE LOCUS STANDI:
SENATE vs. ERMITA
GR no. 169777, April 20, 2006
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right
essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a
democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is
not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of
the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to
law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the
76 – MORILLO NOTES
controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality
of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential
decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court
held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with
legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its
petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the
ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish
(1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets
involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard
of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3)
the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. The first and last determinants
not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and
specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner
PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation
that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and
uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it
shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a
dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution. In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged
interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal
standing.
PROPER PARTY IN A QUO WARRANTO:
TOPACIO vs. ONG
GR no. 179895, December 18, 2008
The SC dismissed the petition filed by one who was not seeking
the seat of the Respondent as an Associate Justice in the
Sandiganbayan. It said that the petition, which essentially called
for the nullification of the respondent’s appointment in said court,
constituted a collateral attack on a public officer’s title. The SC
stressed that such a challenge may be done only directly by way
of Quo Warranto proceedings, which may be filed only by the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or
by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. “For
a Quo Warranto petition to be successful, the private person
suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not
even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a
modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.”
TAXPAYERS AS PROPER PARTY:
- A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the
act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised taxation and that he will sustain a
direct injury because of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. (Mamba vs. Lara,
GR no. 165109, December 14, 2009)
- Two Requisites for a Taxpayer’s suit to prosper:
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
1. Public funds derived from taxation are
disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed;
and
2. The petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act. (Mamba vs. Lara, Supra)
CONCERNED CITIZENS AS PROPERTY PARTY:
DAVID vs. ARROYO
GR no. 171396, May 3, 2006
The plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected
by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the
New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In
matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real
parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen
to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held
that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds
to his injury cannot be denied."
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the
cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue,
provided that the following requirements are met:
xxxxx
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early;
LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GR no. L-72119, May 29, 1987
What is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner
has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very
nature, is a public right. It has been held that: “* * * when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is
to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L-
63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).”
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general
"public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the
Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who have no
direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of
the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in
the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56,
Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court: “* * *
"Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly
construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who
have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in
the particular information sought are given the right of inspection
is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra at p. 387).”
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.
LEGISLATORS AS PROPER PARTY:
- A member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential
veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, GR
no. 113105, August 19, 1994)
AN ORGANIZATION AS PROPER PARTY:
AGUINALDO vs. AQUINO
GR no. 224302, November 29, 2016
One of the fundamental purposes of the IBP is to improve the
administration of justice. As the association of all lawyers in the
country, petitioner IBP has an interest in ensuring the validity of
the appointments to the Judiciary. It is recognized that the
administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of the
judge and the lawyer. Definitely, lawyers cannot effectively
discharge their duties if they entertain doubts, or worse, had lost
their faith in judges and/or justices. It is clearly imperative for the
IBP to prevent that situation from happening by exercising
vigilance and ensuring that the judicial appointment process
remains transparent and credible.
IBP vs. ZAMORA
GR no. 141284, August 15, 2000
The IBP has no legal standing in this case. The SC ruled the
following:
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest"
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its
alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the
standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific
and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its
fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession
and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and
cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should
also be noted that the interest of the National President of the
IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure,
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 77
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that
it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition,
has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may
suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none
of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the
joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members
has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated
by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as
injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement
which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may
cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the
presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully
established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the
validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however,
does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no
standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The
IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that
it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the
controversy.
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE IS
RAISED:
KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA
GR no. 113375, May 5, 1994
Petitioner Kilosbayan, an association of citizens and taxpayers,
challenge a contract entered into by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) with a foreign corporation for the
operation of a nationwide lottery.
The SC ruled the following: “We find the instant petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are
of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than
those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects
of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of
the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural
barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.”
C. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
WHEN IS THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE A
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION?
General Rule:
- The rule is that the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity, such
that if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and if it not considered in
the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
(Matibag vs. Benipayo, 667 SCRA 150)
Exceptions:
1. In criminal cases, the constitutional question can
be raised at any time in the discretion of the court;
2. In civil cases, the constitutional question can be
raised at any stage if it is necessary to the
determination of the case itself;
78 – MORILLO NOTES
3. In every case, except where there is estoppel, the
constitutional question may be raised at any stage
if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. (Cosco
Phils. Shipping vs. Kemper Insurance, GR no.
179488, April 23, 2012)
SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES
GR no. 167614, March 24, 2009
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in
mind that the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at
the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the
pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is
not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot
be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal. Records disclose that the issue
on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not
in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration with said labor tribunal, and reiterated in his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Nonetheless, the issue is
deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the
CA which has the competence to resolve the constitutional issue.
The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial
function – its function in the present case is limited to
determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of
R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself; thus,
its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042,
and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on
the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial review or the
power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof,
such as the subject clause. Petitioner's interposition of the
constitutional issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable.
The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its
decision.
APEC MINING CO., INC. vs. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO
GLOBAL MINING CORP.
GR no. 152613 &152628, November 20, 2009
The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
In the instant case, it must be pointed out that in the Reply to
Respondent SEM’s Consolidated Comment filed on 20 May
2003, MAB mentioned Proclamation No. 297, which was issued
on 25 November 2002. This proclamation, according to the MAB,
has rendered SEM’s claim over the contested area moot, as the
President has already declared the same as a mineral reservation
and as an environmentally critical area. SEM did not put to issue
the validity of said proclamation in any of its pleadings despite
numerous opportunities to question the same. It was only after
the assailed Decision was promulgated -- i.e., in SEM’s Motion
for Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed on 13 July
2006 and its Motion for Referral of the Case to the Court En
Banc and for Oral Arguments filed on 22 August 2006 -- that it
assailed the validity of said proclamation.
Certainly, posing the question on the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 297 for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
In fact, this Court, when it rendered the Decision ,it merely
recognized that the questioned proclamation came from a co-
equal branch of government, which entitled it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. The presumption of its
constitutionality stands inasmuch as the parties in the instant
cases did not question its validity, much less present any
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
evidence to prove that the same is unconstitutional. This is in line
with the precept that administrative issuances have the force and
effect of law and that they benefit from the same presumption of
validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes.
D. NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION
Note:
- Every law has in its favor the presumption of
validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the
law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the
same is valid and binding for all intents and
purposes. (SEC vs. Interport Resources Corp., GR
no. 135808, October 6, 2008)
ZANDUETA vs. DELA COSTA
66 Phil. 115
Petitioner Zandueta, an incumbent judge, accepted an ad interim
appointment to a new court created under a law that had
reorganized the judiciary by abolishing some judgeships and
creating others. When his appointment was by-passed, he
returned to his former court in Manila but found that Respondent
Dela Costa had already been appointed thereto. Zanduega
thereupon filed a Quo Warranto proceedings against Dela Costa,
arguing that he had not abandoned his old court in Manila by his
acceptance of the new court in Palawan. One of his reasons was
that the law creating the latter court was unconstitutional
because it violated judicial security of tenure.
Although the constitutional question had been raised squarely,
the SC did not find it necessary to resolve it. One justification
given was another ground available to it for its decision which is
the principle of estoppel. Since under this rule, a person cannot
question the validity of a law under which he had previously
accepted benefits, the SC held that Zandueta was estopped
from impugning the constitutionality of the judiciary
reorganization law.
GENERAL vs. URRO
GR no. 191560, March 29, 2011
The SC chose not to rule on the constitutionality of the
Respondent’s appointments in the light of a subsequent
Executive Order providing for the recall of the same. It
considered the constitutionality of said appointments as not the
“Lis Mota”, or the “cause of the suit or action,” of the case.
The SC said that “From the submitted pleadings, what is
decisive is the determination of whether the Petitioner has a
cause of action to institute and maintain the present petition
which is a Quo Warranto against Respondent Urro. If the
Petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for Quo Warranto,
a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the
Respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion
of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the
essential character of the Petitioner’s action since he does not
even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest in
raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents
are concerned.”
SEVEN PILLARS OF LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions "is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity
in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the
thought tht, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts
an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
legislative act.";
2. The Court will not "anticipate question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it." ..... "It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case;
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.";
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from
the highest court of a state challenging its decision
of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be
sustained on an independent state ground;
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than
the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks
a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by
a public official interested only in the performance
of his official duty will not be entertained..... In
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen
who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the challenge of the federal
Maternity Act was not entertained although made
by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens;
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits;
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.'(Demetria vs.
Alba, GR no. 71977, February 27, 1987)
EFFECTS OF A DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
Orthodox View:
- An unconstitutional act is not a law; itt confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative, as
if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken
from the statute books and considered never to
have existed at all. Not only the parties but all
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 79
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
persons are bound by the declaration of the
unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted
to apply it in subsequent cases. It is a total nullity.
(Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US. 425)
Modern View:
- The court in passing upon the question of
constitutionality does not or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
just as if such statute had no existence.
- The Court may give its reasons for ignoring or
disregarding the law, but the decision affects the
parties only and there is no judgment against the
statute.
- The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as
a precedent for the determination of other similar
cases, but it does not strike the statute books; it
does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the
statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by
the judgment, but no one else is bound. (Shepard
vs. Barren, 194 US. 553)
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. vs. FERTIPHIL
GR no. 166006, March 14, 2008
The “General Rule rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights imposes no duties and affords no protection..
It has no legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been
passed.” The SC added that: “The doctrine of operative fact, as
an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the
accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC
GR no. 176951, August 24, 2010
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as
unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior
to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact
doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. The
operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be
applied as an exception to the general rule that an
unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked
to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The
operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an
unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the
unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of
the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the
effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law
itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case,
the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate
80 – MORILLO NOTES
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of
the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration
of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the "new cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does
not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void.
Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional
laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to
innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of
the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their
unconstitutionality.
PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
- A declaration of partial unconstitutionality will be
valid only if 2 conditions concur; (1) That the
legislature is willing to retain the valid portions even
if the rest of the statute is declared illegal, and (2)
That the valid portions can stand independently as
a separate statute.
- The legislative willingness to retain the valid
portions may be expressed in the “Separability
Clause”.
- This usually provides that “if for any
reason any section or provision of this Act
is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
remainder of the Act shall not be affected
by such declaration.”
- But even without such a separability clause, it has
been held that if the valid portion is so far
independent of the invalid portion, it may be fair to
presume that the legislature would have enacted it
by itself if it had supposed that it could
constitutionally do so.
- In the case of Flores vs. COMELEC (184 SCRA
484), Sec. 9 of RA 6679 was declared
unconstitutional while the rest of the statute was
upheld.
Powers of the Supreme Court
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
- The SC shall have the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. (Sec. 5(1), Art. VIII)
PEOPLE vs. CUARESMA
GR no.L- 67787, April 18, 1989
The institution of the special action of certiorari at bar does not
save the day for the People. The action suffers from serious
defects. In the first place, the action was filed by a Second
Assistant City Fiscal and not by the Solicitor General, and was
hence dismissible on this account. In the second place, the
certiorari suit is being made to substitute for, and perform the
function of, an appeal, which is not permissible. Again, the action
was filed much too late; it was commenced only after about
three (3) years had elapsed from the promulgation of the order
sought to be annulled, no explanation for the delay being at all
essayed; it was therefore barred by laches.
Furthermore, the remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any
agency or officer exercising judicial functions or of any judge
which are claimed to be "without or in excess of its or his
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion."It does not lie for principle of “judicial courtesy” applies where there is “a strong
the correction of errors of judgment which may be brought about probability that the issues before the higher court would be
only by appeal. Not every error in procedure, or every erroneous rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of
conclusion of law or of fact of serious nature, is correctable by the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.
certiorari, appeal being the appropriate remedy, except where
the error constitutes grave abuse of discretion, i.e., "such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts:
to lack of jurisdiction. " The error here committed by His Honor
BANEZ, JR vs. CONCEPCION
obviously does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. It was
GR no. 159508, August 29, 2012
an error of law, involving what was then deemed unsettled
principle whether or not the filing of a complaint in the office of
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
the fiscal interrupted the period of prescription of the offense
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
charged. It is not correctable by certiorari. A last word. This
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,1981, the latter's
the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. " This concurrence of
“xxx. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts
be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which
lawyers must strictly observe.“
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra — resulting from the GIOS-SAMAR vs. DOTC
deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate GR no. 217158, March 12, 2019
jurisdiction" was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court
pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the Where the 1935 Constitution only referred to the original
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate jurisdiction which the Supreme Court possessed at the time of its
Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed adoption, the 1973 Constitution expressly provided for the
with it. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs.

In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs

CREBA vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
became concurrent with the CA, pursuant to Batas Pambansa
GR no. 183409, June 18, 2010
Bilang 129 (BP 129) or The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
BP 129 repealed RA No. 296 and granted the CA with "[o]riginal
The SC declared that “although The SC, thr CAs and the RTCs
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of Certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” In
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
addition, Section 21(2) of BP 129 bestowed the RTCs (formerly
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court thus
the CFIs) with original (and consequently, concurrent with the
reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain resort to it
Supreme Court) jurisdiction over actions affecting ambassadors
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
and other public ministers and consuls.
courts, and exceptional interest and of serious implictions, justify
the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
Seven years after the enactment of BP 129, the Philippines
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.”
ratified the 1987 Constitution; Article VII, Section 5(1) of which
provides the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which is
In the same case, the SC also discussed the principle of “judicial
an exact reproduction of Section 5(1), Article X of the 1973
courtesy”, which is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies
Constitution.
only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. The

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 81

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
APPELLATE JURISDICTION:
The SC shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,
assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved. (Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII)
Right to Appeal is not embraced in Due Process:
- As long as the parties have been given the
opportunity to be heard in the lower court, they
cannot demand the right to appeal if the legislature
sees fit to withhold it. Appeal is, as a general rule, a
matter of statutory right entirely dependent upon
the discretion or policy of the lawmaking body.
(Cruz, p. 540)
Competence of the Supreme Courts to decide
Constitutional Questions:
- The RTC have the authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive
orders, presidential decrees and other ossuances.
The Constitution vests that power not only in the
Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.
(Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil, GR no.
166006, March 14, 2008)
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO vs. CAMACHO
GR no. 163583, August 20, 2008
While the above statute confers on the CTA jurisdiction to
resolve tax disputes in general, this does not include cases
where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a law, or a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of
whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power,
which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Issue on jurisdiction of lower courts:
ERISTINGCOL vs. CA
GR no.167702, March 13, 1998
Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June
82 – MORILLO NOTES
Vilvestre (Vilvestre) from this suit, Eristingcol insists that her
complaint against UVAI and the defendants was properly filed
before the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAI’s
Construction Rules and asks that damages be paid by Limjoco
and the other UVAI officers who had inflicted injury upon her.
Eristingcol asseverates that since the case before the RTC is one
for declaration of nullity, the nature of the question that is the
subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the
parties, should determine which body has jurisdiction. In any
event, Eristingcol submits that the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its officers,
including Limjoco, for affirmative relief from that court.
Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which
body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only
the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the
nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must
look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the
essence of the relief prayed for.
Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for
declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction.
However, we have, on more than one occasion, held that the
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the
action.
A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint
reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy
only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction
Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation
and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction
rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as
Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be
exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth
in UVAI’s Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not
assail the height restriction of UVAI’s Construction Rules, as she
has readily complied therewith.
TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES:
- The SC shall have the power to assign temporarily
judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignments
shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VIII)
CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE OF TRIAL:
- The SC shall have the power to order a change of
venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (Sec. 5(4), Art. VIII)
LARRANAGA vs. CA
GR no. 130644, March 13, 1998
Judge Martin Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, and the state
prosecutors assert that petitioner is no longer entitled to a
preliminary investigation because he had previously waived his
right to such investigation. In his omnibus order dated October
14, 1997, Judge Ocampo held that petitioner waived his right to
preliminary investigation when he failed to appear during the
preliminary investigation set by the City Prosecutor in the
afternoon of September 17, 1997, despite the express warning
that "failure of the counsel (to present the petitioner to the Cebu
City Prosecutor on said time and date) would be treated as a
waiver of his clients right to preliminary investigation."
We disagree. A waiver, whether express or implied, must be
made in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner
and his counsel to appear before the City Prosecutor in the
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
afternoon of September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a
waiver of his right to preliminary investigation, considering that
petitioner has been vigorously invoking his right to a regular
preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings
before the City Prosecutor. At 9:00 in the morning of September
17, 1997, petitioners counsel appeared before the City
Prosecutor of Cebu and moved that petitioner be accorded a
regular preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor, however,
denied the motion, stating that petitioner is entitled only to an
inquest investigation. Petitioner orally moved for a
reconsideration, to no avail. Petitioner assailed the decision of
the City Prosecutor before the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. After the Court of Appeals
dismissed said petition, petitioner went to this Court, still
asserting that he should be accorded a regular preliminary
investigation.
Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been
arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he
was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea
during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this
Court regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel are
inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of
procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver
appears to be clear and informed.
RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT:
- The SC shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Sec. 5(5), Art.
VIII)
Limitations on the Rule-Making power:
1. The rule shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;
2. The rules shall be uniform for courts of the same
grade; and
3. The rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. (Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR no. 132601, January 19, 1999
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court
for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power
to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.
BUSTOS vs. JUDGE LUCERO
GR no. L-2068, October 20, 1948
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after
renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of that
waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is
estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did
not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for
the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs.
Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case
the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused,
over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her
witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be
cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order.
We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that
"while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is nothing
in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court
of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to
bring out the truth.”
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of
right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his
presence what they had said at the preliminary examination
before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to
the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be
confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be
done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right
of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
IN PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
BM no. 1678, December 17, 2007
The SC declared that “in the judicial system from which ours has
been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.” This prerogative of the SC is acknowledged
in Serning “the admission to the practice of law.”
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. He must
also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications; passing the bar examinations; taking the lawyer’s
oath and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk
of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.
IN RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION
OF THE G.S.I.S. FOR PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
AM no. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 83
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
The SC denied the Petitioner’s claim of statutory exemption from
the payment of legal fees under Sec. 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court and stressed that “the payment of legal fees is vital
component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards off
this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s
exclusive domain.”
JAVELLA vs. DILG
GR no. 102549, August 10, 1992
The SC denied the petition filed by Petitioner Javellana to declare
DLG Memorandum Circular nos. 80-38 and 90-81, and Sec. 90
of RA 7160 unconstitutional for being violative of Sec. 5(5), Art.
VIII of the Constitution.
The SC explained: “With respect to the present case, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing
the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge
against him.
In the first place, complaints against public officers and
employees relating or incidental to the performance of their
duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by
express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust.
The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang
against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against
the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which
petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against
City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against
the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining
employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against
City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent
interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off
tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the
Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the
practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between
the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate
against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any
occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian
members "may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If
there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is
because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely
than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.”
APPOINTMENT OF COURT PERSONNEL:
- Thw SC shall have the power to appoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law. (Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII)
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF COURTS
84 – MORILLO NOTES
- The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof. (Sec. 6, Art. VIII)
MACEDA vs. VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464
“Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of
the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate
unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial
independence.”
Indeed, the “Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against
the judges and court personnel filed before it referred to the SC
for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is
involved therein. this rule should hold true regardless of whether
an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For,
aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for
and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also administrative concerns.”
AMPONG vs. CSC
GR no. 167916, August 26, 2008
The SC, while acknowledging the general administrative
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission over the civil service,
nevertheless emphasized that “the SC is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel”
and declared that “it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a
court employee belongs to the SC, regardless of whether the
offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.”
Salaries of Members of the Judiciary
SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY:
- The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During the
continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased. (Sec. 10, Art. VIII)
NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF BIR
GR no. 78780, July 23, 1987
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding
the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment
of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers
and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law
fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but
such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at
the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
Tenure of Judges
Constitutional Provision:
- The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of
the lower court shall hold office during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
DELA LLANA vs. ALBA
112 SCRA 292
The law challenged on the principal ground that it was violative
of judicial security of tenure in that the incumbent judges were
actually being removed by the legislature and not by the SC
pursuant to its authority under Art. X, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution.
The SC, by a vote of 13 to 1, upheld the law on the main
justification that statutory courts may be abolished by the
legislature provided only that the abolition is done in good fair.
Dissenting Opinion (J. Tehankee):
“I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the
abolition of courts and consequent ouster of the incumbent
judges.
The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior
courts has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme
Court, and if the judiciary is to be strengthened, it should be left
to clean its own house upon complain and with the cooperation
of the aggrieved parties and after due process and hearing.”
NOTE: Dela Llana case has been rendered obsolete with the
adoption of the second paragraph in Sec. 2 of Art. VIII which
provides that “No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary
when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
HOW ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
JUDGES MAY BE INSTITUTED?
1. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
2. Upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate
said allegations; or
3. Upon an anonymous complaint supported by
public records of indubitable integrity. (Rule 140,
Sec. 1, Rules of Court; Sinsuat vs/ Judge Hidalgo,
AM no. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008)
JUDGE CAOIBES, JR. vs. OMBUDSMAN
AND JUDGE ALUMBRES
GR no. 132177, July 19, 2001
It appears that the present case involves two members of the
judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises
over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all
cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred
to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold
true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the
act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already
pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the
Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed
of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court, because in determining
whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other
administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of
Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of
the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate
unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial
independence.
En Banc Cases:
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, executive order, or presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision
imposes the death penalty;
3. Criminal cases wherein a change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice is requested
or may be involved;
4. Cases raising novel questions of law;
5. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls;
6. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of
the Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Elections, Commission on Audit, and of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases;
7. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the
suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00,
or both;
8. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by
the Court en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed;
9. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion
of at least three (3) members thereof merit the
attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable
to a majority of the actual membership of the Court
en banc; and
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 85
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
10. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority
of its actual membership may deem of sufficient
importance to merit its attention. (Bar Matter no.
209 - In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Court Rules and
Regulations)
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE GACOTT
GR no. 116049, July 13, 1995
Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge on the inclusion of
the adverbial phrase "en banc" in referring to this Court in the
quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution and, from this, he
argues that it is only the full Court, not a division thereof, that can
administratively punish him.
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII
clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged
therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,"
is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the
Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be
explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation
contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first
by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc
can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the
administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by
the full Court itself.
It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989,
the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that: ”A
decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court
(Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).”
That guideline or rule in the referral to the Court en banc of cases
assigned to a division thereof rests on the same rationale and
applies with equal force to confute the antithetical theory of
respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos thereto, it
would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal
with situations like the one subject of this resolution with more
perspicacity and circumspection.
Prohibition against Designation to Quasi-Judicial or
Administrative Agencies
Constitutional Provision:
- The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative function. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII)
MAKALINTAL vs. PET
GR no. 191618, November 23, 2010
At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as
congressional and senatorial – exclusive and original jurisdiction
86 – MORILLO NOTES
is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives
and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally
speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the
explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article
IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides,
when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election
contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a
petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a
showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers
of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did
not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in
Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated
to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of
judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between
the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the
Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would
violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article
VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge
that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article
VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit
in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively,
effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the
prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the
Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the
Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same
prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an
agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is
to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State
of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use
it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as
intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the
grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic
view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and
constitutional grant of judicial power.
IN RE JUDGE MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
AM no. 880701861-RTC, October 5, 1988
Judge Manzano was appointed by Ilocos Norte Governor to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice of Ilocos Norte. He wrote a letter to CJ Fermin
authorizing him to accept the position.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
The SC denied his request and held the following:
“Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and
other courts established by law shag not be designated to any
agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution,
the Court is constrained to deny his request.
‘While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory
not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot
justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is
implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from
its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to
decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is
indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a
norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the
maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less”
Consultations of the Court
Constitutional Provision
- The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case
submitted to it for the decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before the
case assigned to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect
signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case
and served upon the parties. Any Member who
took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a
decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed
by all lower collegiate court. (Sec. 13, Art. VIII)
VIOS vs. PANTANGCO
GR no. 163103, February 6, 2009
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of
a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the
trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the
litigation in the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order
does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something
to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the
Revised Rules of Court to be appealable. Rule 47 is a remedy
based on external fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The intent to use
this Rule suggests itself, not only because of the title of the
petition, but because of its substance.
The remedy of annulment of judgment can […] be resorted to
only where ordinary and other appropriate remedies, including
appeal, are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In the case at bar, the loss of the remedies of appeal and
certiorari is attributable to the petitioners. Despite the
manifestations of their intention to file an appeal, and
subsequently a petition for certiorari, and their request for an
extension of the filing period, the petitioners never availed of
these remedies. Realizing the consequence of their negligence,
the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in a last
ditch effort to reverse the decision of the regional trial court. The
rules do not sanction petitioners’ procedural lapse.
Doctrine of Finality of Judgment:
VIOS vs. PANTANGCO
GR no. 163103, February 6, 2009
The law of the case doctrine applies in a situation where an
appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and
thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court
becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any
subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which the legal rule or decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.
It is a hornbook rule that once a judgment has become final and
executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land, as what remains to be done is the purely
ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the
risk of occasional errors, the judgment of adjudicating bodies
must become final and executory on some definite date fixed by
law. […], the Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of
immutability of final judgment is adhered to by necessity
notwithstanding occasional errors that may result thereby, since
litigations must somehow come to an end for otherwise, it would
"be even more intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is
designed to correct."
Decisions of the Court
Constitutional Provision:
- No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration
of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor. (Sec. 14, Art. VIII)
RULES ON DECISIONS OF THE COURT:
VALDEZ vs. CA
GR no. 85082, February 25, 1991
An examination of the decision of the trial court dated April 9,
1986 shows that there are no findings of facts to serve as basis
for its conclusions in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Also, Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court
also provides clearly as follows: “Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments.
— All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 87
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
That is the reason why this Court, through Administrative Circular
No. 1 dated January 28, 1988, reminded all judges "to make
complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize
closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced."
Of course, when a petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court is denied due course,
or is otherwise denied, it is not necessary that such findings of
facts be made. However, the denial must state the legal basis
thereof.
In the present case, the three-paged decision of the trial court
contained in the first two pages a statement of the allegations of
the pleadings of the parties and enumerates the witnesses
presented and the exhibits marked during the trial. Thereafter,
the trial court arrived at a one-paragraph conclusion.
This is not what is contemplated under the Constitution and the
Rules as a clear and distinct statement of the facts on the basis
of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing one paragraph
statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law
arrived at by the trial court without stating the facts which serve
as the basis thereof. Indeed the conclusion of fact therein that
petitioners had not registered the sale to them is traversed by the
records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered
the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party
has proven his case while the other has not, is not the findings of
facts contemplated by the Constitution and the rules to be
clearly and distinctly stated.
ALBANA vs. BELO
GR no. 158734, October 2, 2009
The instant complaint involves an election offense case with a
prayer for disqualification. The Law Department thus conducted
an investigation both as regards the criminal and electoral aspect
of the case. Respondents were fully apprised that the
investigation would determine whether or not there is basis for
the disqualification because they were furnished a copy of the
complaint.
The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to
inform the person reading the decision, especially the parties, of
how it was reached by the court after a consideration of the
pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable laws. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to
a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus,
a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can
assign errors to it.
The petitioners in this case cannot feign denial of due process
and pretend that they were unable to understand the basis for
the COMELEC’s recommendation as, in fact, they were able to
assign specific errors to the COMELEC's resolution and discuss
them. In fine, the COMELEC’s resolution substantially complies
with the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
MAHAWAN vs. PEOPLE
88 – MORILLO NOTES
GR no. 176609, December 18, 2008
In his last assigned error, petitioner insists that the Court of
Appeals erred in denying his motion for reconsideration without
setting forth the factual and legal bases for the denial.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that "no petition
for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor." This requirement was fully complied
with when the Court of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its
decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to
change its ruling, because petitioner had not raised anything
new. Thus, its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration states:
For consideration is accused-appellant’s motion for
reconsideration of this Court’s decision promulgated
on May 25, 2006. Acting on the motion filed by the
accused-appellant, and considering that the same
discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to
warrant a reconsideration or modification of our
assailed decision which has already considered, if not
squarely ruled upon, the arguments herein presented,
we resolve to deny the motion.
WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reason for us to
depart from our questioned findings, we hereby DENY
the aforementioned motion
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. CASTRO
AM no. 2756, March 15, 1988
No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the
Court's Minute Resolution, dated January 12,1988, denying the
motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised
therein having been previously duly considered and passed
upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so
that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be ... denied
without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even
if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial
and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional
requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for
denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).
Effect of Lack of Certification:
The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of
the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief
Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The
certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases.
From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in
administrative cases have not been accompanied by. any formal
certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in
administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be
deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this
Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de
Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but
an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt
that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at
after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted
attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion
of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any
member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
SOLID HOMES, INC. vs. LASERNA
GR no. 166051, April 8, 2008
The SC held that Art. VIII, Sec. 14, Constitution, does not apply
to decisions in administrative proceedings, like those rendered
by the Office of the President, or the determinations of the
Secretary of Justice and prosecutors, who are not members of
the judiciary and do not even exercise quasi-judicial functions.
The SC explained herein: “It must be stated that Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions
rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar.
Said section applies only to decisions rendered in judicial
proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its
provisions have particular concern only with respect to the
judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold
or even imply that decisions of executive departments or
administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements
under Section 14, Article VIII.
served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued
within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period,
the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may
have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide
or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for
determination, without further delay. (Sec. 15, Art. VIII)
SESBRENO vs. CA
GR no. 161390, April 16, 2008
Petitioner Sesbreno insisted that the CA should have affirmed
the trial court’s decision in view of the delay in resolving the
case, and should have denied the appeal because of the formal
defects in the appellant’s brief. He relied on the cases of
Malacora vs. CA and Flora vs. Parajilla where it was uniformly
held that an appealed case which had been pending beyond the
time fixed by the Constitution should be “deemed affirmed.”
The SC rejected this contention of the Petitioners and held:

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not We cannot apply the cited cases to the one at bench because
violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process they were decided on the basis of Section 11 (2), Article X of the
has been satisfied.” 1973 Constitution, which reads: ”With respect to the Supreme
Court and other collegiate appellate courts, when the applicable
maximum period shall have lapsed without the rendition of the
corresponding decision or resolution because the necessary vote
PROTACIO vs. LAYA MANGHAYA & CO.
cannot be had, the judgment, order, or resolution appealed from
GR no. 168654, March 25, 2009
shall be deemed affirmed x x x.”
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ resolution which
That provision is not found in the present Constitution. The court,
denied his motion for reconsideration violated Article VIII, Section
under the 1987 Constitution, is now mandated to decide or
14 of the Constitution.
resolve the case or matter submitted to it for determination
within specified periods.31 Even when there is delay and no
Obviously, the assailed resolution is not a "decision" within the
decision or resolution is made within the prescribed period, there
meaning of the Constitutional requirement. This mandate is
is no automatic affirmance of the appealed decision. The
applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due
appellate court, therefore, cannot be faulted in not affirming the
course and after filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
RTC’s decision. While we do not tolerate delay in the disposition
pleadings, as the case may be.25 The requirement is not
of cases, we cannot dismiss appealed cases solely because they
applicable to a resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of
had been pending in court for a long period, especially when the
the decision. What is applicable is the second paragraph of the
appeal is highly meritorious as in the present case.
above-quoted Constitutional provision referring to "motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court." The assailed
resolution complied with the requirement therein that a resolution
denying a motion for reconsideration should state the legal basis Annual Report
of the denial. It sufficiently explained that after reading the
pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate court did not find any
cogent reason to reverse itself. ANNUAL REPORT:
- The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from
the opening of each regular session of the
Periods for Decision Congress, submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the Judiciary. (Sec. 16, Art. V)
Constitutional Provision:
Section 15:
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-
four months from date of submission for the Supreme
Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for
all other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a
certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the
presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy
thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 89

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
XIV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS (ART. IX-A)
Constitutional Guarantees of Independence
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF INDEPENDENCE:
1. These bodies are created by the Constitution itself
and may not be abolished by statute. (Sec. 1, Art.
IX-A);
2. Each of them is expressly described in the
Constitution as “independent.” (Supra);
3. Each of them is conferred certain powers and
functions which cannot be withdrawn or reduced
by statute. (Sec. 1, Art. IX-A, B, C, and D);
4. The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions may not be removed from the office
except by impeachment. (Sec. 2, Art. XI);
5. The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions are given the fairly long term of
seven years. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B, C, and D);
6. The terms of office of the chairmen and members
of all of these Commissions are staggered in such
a way as to lessen the opportunity for appointment
of the majority of the body by the same President.
(Supra);
7. The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions may not be reappointed or appointed
in an acting capacity. (Supra);
8. The salaries of the chairmen and members of all of
these Commissions are relatively high and may not
be decreased during their continuance in office. (
Sec. 3, Art. IX-A; Sec. 17, Art. XVIII);
9. the Commissions all enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Sec.5,
Art. IX-A);
10. each Commission may promulgate its own
procedural rules. (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A);
11. The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions are subject to certain
disqualifications and inhibitions calculated to
strengthen their integrity. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-A); and
12. The Constitutional Commissions are allowed to
appoint their own officials and employees in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. (Sec. 4, Art.
IX-A).
Disqualifications
DISQUALIFICATIONS:
- No member of a Constitutional Commission shall,
during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in
any way, may be affected by the functions of his
office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly
or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
90 – MORILLO NOTES
instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (sec.
2, Art. IX-A)
Staggering of Terms
STAGGERING OF TERMS:
- All members of the 3 Constitutional Commissions
(with the exception of the first appointees) are
supposed to serve for a term of 7 years. However,
they will not vacate their offices at the same time
because of the system for the staggering of their
terms provided for in the Constitution. (Sec. 17, Art.
XVIII)
- under this system, the original appointees were to
be given terms of three, five, and seven years,
respectively, so that a vacancy was supposed to
occur every two years and to be filled by
subsequent appointees who would serve the full
term of seven years. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX0B,C, and D)
PURPOSE OF SCHEME:
- To minimize the opportunity of the President to
appoint during his own term more than one
member or group of members in the Constitutional
Commissions and thereby bind the majority thereof
to a debt of gratitude and loyalty to him that might
impair their independence.
- It is also intended to ensure continuity of the body
and its policies.
REQUISITES FOR THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE
“ROTATIONAL SCHEME”:
1. The original members of the Commissions shall
begin their terms on a common date; and
2. Any vacancy occurring before the expiration of the
term shall be filled only for the balance of such
term. (Republic vs. Imperial, 96 Phil. 770)
REPUBLIC vs. IMPERIAL
GR no. L-8684, March 31, 1955
The SC made the statement that, once appointed, regardless of
the duration of his tenure, amember of the Commission on
Elections could no longer be reappointed because of the express
prohibition in the Constitution. Reviewing the original
appointments to the Commission on Elections, the SC said:
“We find that the terms of office of the first appointees under the
constitution should be computed as follows:
Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, nine-year term, from
June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1950.
Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, six year term, from
June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1947.
The first 3 year term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20,
1944, was not filled.
Thereafter, since the first three-year term had already expired,
the appointment (made on July 12, 1945) of the Honorable
Vicente de Vera must be deemed for the full term of nine years,
from June 21, 1944, to June 20, 1953.
The first vacancy occurred by expiration of the initial 6-year term
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
of Commissioner Enage on June 21, 1937 (although he served as
de facto Commissioner until 1949). His successor, respondent
Rodrigo Perez, was named for a full nine-year term. However, on
the principles heretofore laid, the nine-year term of
Commissioner Perez (vice Enage) should be held to have started
in June 21, 1947, to expire on June 20, 1956.
The second vacancy happened upon the death of Chairman
Jose Lopez Vito, who died on May 7, 1947, more than two years
before the expiration of his full term. To succeed him as
Chairman, Commissioner Vicente de Vera was appointed. Such
appointment, if at all valid, could legally be only for the unexpired
period of the Lopez Vito's term, up to June 20, 1950.
To fill the vacancy created by Vera's assumption of the
Chairmanship, Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira was appointed on
May 22, 1947. Pursuant to the principles laid down, Rovira could
only fill out the balance of Vera's term, until June 20, 1953, and
could not be reappointed thereafter.”
No Reappointment/No Acting Capacity
Constitutional Provision:
- The chairmen and members of all of these
Commissions are given the fairly long term of
seven years. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B, C, and D);
MEANING OF NO REAPPOINTMENT:
- The constitutional prohibition against the
reappointment of a commissioner refers to his
second appointment to the same office after
holding it for nine years. As Justice Dizon
observed, "[T]he occupant of an office obviously
needs no such second appointment unless, for
some valid cause, such as the expiration of his
term or resignation, he had ceased to be the legal
occupant thereof." (Funa vs. COA Chairman, GR
no. 192791, April 24, 2012
APPOINTMENT NOT COVERED BY THE BAN ON NO
REAPPOINTMENT:
1. Where an ad interim appointee after
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments serves his full 7-year term.
- Such person cannot be reappointed
whether as a member or as chairman
because he will then be actually serving
more than seven (7) years.
2. Where the appointee, after confirmation, serves
part of his term and then resigns before his
seven-year term of office ends.
- Such person cannot be reappointed
whether as a member or as chair to a
vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee
serving more than seven years.
3. Where the appointee is confirmed to serve the
unexpired portion of someone who died or
resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term.
- Such person cannot be reappointed
whether as a member or as chair to a
vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee
also serving more than seven (7) years.
4. Where the appointee has previously served a
term of less than seven (7) years, and a vacancy
arises from death or resignation.
- Even if it will not result in his serving more
than seven years, a reappointment of such
person to serve an unexpired term is also
prohibited because his situation will be
similar to those appointed under the
second sentence of Sec. 1(20), Art. IX-C
of the Constitution [referring to the first set
of appointees (the 5 and 3 year termers)
whose term of office are less than 7 years
but are barred from being reappointed
under any situation].” (Funa vs. COA
Chairman, Supra)
FUNA vs. COA CHAIRMAN
GR no. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, President Arroyo appointed
Gullermo Carague as Chairman of the Commission of Audit
(COA) for a term of 7 years. Carague’s term of office commenced
on February 2, 2001 and was yo expire on February 2, 2008. On
February 7, 2004, President Arroyo appointed Reynal Villar as the
third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February
2, 2004. He was to serve as such until February 2, 2011. Upon
Carague’s retirement on February 2, 2008, and during the fourth
year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as
Acting Chairman of the COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14,
2008. On April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as
Chairman of COA. His appointment was confirmed by the
Commission in Appointments on June 11, 2008. As expressly
provided for in his appointment papers, Villar was to serve as
Chairman of COA until the expiration of his original term as COA
Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
When his appointment as COA Chairman was challenged, he
initially maintained that his appointment as Chairmen of the
Commission gave him a fresh term of 7 years, and that he was,
accordingly, entitled to remain in office as such until February 2,
2015.
In the meantime, Evelyn San Buenaventura was appointed as
COA Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as
Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011. Before the Court could
resolve this petition, and was replaced by Grace Pulido-Tan.
RULING: Despite Villar’s resignation, the SC proceeded to rule
on the petition and held the following:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term
of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only
be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or
CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years
and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 91
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition
against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman.
Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the
length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in
the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies
that "reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means
a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner
to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
BRILLANNTES vs. YORAC
GR no. 93867, December 18, 1990
Respondent Yorac, an associate commissioner of the
COMELEC, was designated by President aquino as its acting
chairman when the regular chairman assumed other position in
government. Petitioner Brillantes challenged the designation,
invoking the independence of the COMELEC and specifically the
prohibition against the appointment or designation of any
member in a temporary or acting capacity.
The SC agrees with Brillantes and ruled held that following: “A
designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially
temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of
the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such
designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent
cannot be removed at will from her permanent position as
Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can
be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus
deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary
position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no
justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by
extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent.
This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem
allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the
members of the Commission on Elections themselves without
the participation of the President, however well-meaning.”
MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO
GR no. 149036, April 2, 2002
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a
new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking
92 – MORILLO NOTES
power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the
Commission on Appointments to give its consent after
deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision,
the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as
on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no
longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by
the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of
time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is
another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not
been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is
no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to
renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.
This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission
on Appointments, which provides as follows: "Section 17.
Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the
President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the
President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at
the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the
President and, unless new nominations or appointments are
made, shall not again be considered by the Commission."
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a
by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President
renews the appointment.
Rulemaking Power
Constitutional Provision:
- Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own
rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
(Sec. 6, ART. IX-A)
- Note that the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial
bodies (such as the Constitutional Commissions)
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme court. (Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII)
ARUELO vs. CA
GR no. 107852, October 20, 1993
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from
receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition
(Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed
when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of
motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend
the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-
day period to file his answer.
The SC do not agree. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil
Case No. -343-M-92) with the Regional Trial Court, whose
proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

matter is deemed submitted for decision or
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss
and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: ”Sec. 2. or memorandum required by the rules of the
Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.” may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules
receipt of a copy thereof. (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A)
of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto
cases pending before the regular courts. VOTING REQUIREMENT IN DECISION:
ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule
GR no. 160465, May 27, 2004
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts.
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
FACTS: In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc
and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7)
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
members of the COMELEC participated: Commissioners
Benjamin Abalos, Sr., Luzviminda Tangcangco, Rufino S.B.
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional
Javier, Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.
Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August
6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted
Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after
for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner Borra
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars.
dissented.
Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within
which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and
RULING: Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which
provides: “SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a
The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy
majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a summary
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules of
decision or resolution. x x x”
Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. Commission on
Elections, 185 SCRA 86 [1990]). Pre-proclamation controversies
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the
should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators'
majority vote of all its members and not only those who
desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
winning candidate be done with dispatch and without
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in
unnecessary delay. Questions as those involving the
which constitutional provisions are couched express the
appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which
objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted
require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are
constitutional provision states "all of its members," without any
left for examination in the corresponding election protest (Abella
qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989]; Alonto v. Commission on
Elections, 22 SCRA 878 [1968]).
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the
Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from the
An election protest does not merely concern the personal
questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just three
interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the
(3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC.
desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to
determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, it is a
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the
well-established principle that laws governing election protests
doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc
must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will,
shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority
expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely
technical reasons, be defeated. vote of "all its members," and NOT majority of the members
who deliberated and voted thereon.

See also the following:

● AM no. 07-4-15-SC (RULES OF PROCEDURE IN
ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS
INVOLVING ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL AND
BARANGAY OFFICIALS)
● AM no. 10-4-1-SC (2010 RULES OF PROCEDURE
IN ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE THE COURTS
INVOLVING ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS)
Decisions
Constitutional Provision:
- Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its Members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or
MARCOLETA vs. COMELEC
GR no. 181377, Apri 34, 2009
While at first impression, the November 6, 2007 Resolution of the
Comelec En Banc seems to have affirmed the First Division’s
ruling, the said Resolution merely reflected the manner of voting
of the Comelec members.
From the 2-3 voting, it is readily discerned that the Comelec En
Banc cannot overturn the First Division on mere two assenting
votes. On the other hand, the same situation obtains in the case
of the dissenters, there being a shortage of one vote to sustain
the First Division’s findings.
To break this legal stalemate, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure provides that: “Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion
is Equally Divided.—When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 93

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached,
the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.”
Majority, in this case, means a vote of four members of the
Comelec. The Court in Estrella v. Comelec pronounced that
Section 5 (a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only
those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order
or ruling.
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three
commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First Division,
cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide
for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of
the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the
participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of
presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and
amplifying their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a
majority in the En Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The
Resolution served no more than a record of votes, lacking in
legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First
Division Resolution. Accordingly, the Comelec did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.
MODE OF REVIEW FROM DECISIONS:
- A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except
as hereinafter provided. (n; Bar Matter No. 803, 17
February 1998). (Sec. 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court)
- Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court)
Expanded Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals:
- The CA shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, x x x x “ (Sec. 2, RA 7902)
CAYETANO vs. COMELEC
GR no. 193846, April 12, 2011
94 – MORILLO NOTES
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC
Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari. Furthermore, a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a COMELEC
Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a
motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC
Division shall be resolved by the division which issued the
interlocutory order, except when all the members of the division
decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are
not appealable, nor can they be proper subject of a petition for
certiorari. To rule otherwise would not only delay the disposition
of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court docket and
unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved
party is without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the
motion for reconsideration. The aggrieved party can still assign
as error the interlocutory order if in the course of the proceedings
he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc.
The exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the
interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is a patent nullity
because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the interlocutory
order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary
restraining order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or
where a COMELEC Division admitted an answer with counter-
protest which was filed beyond the reglementary period, which is
the Kho case.
This Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro,
that "it is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
that, in accordance with Section 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution,
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." The
exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case
because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory
orders of the COMELEC First Division in this case are not a
patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case involve the
interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will
the Rosal case apply because in that case the petition for
certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC
Second Division and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main
case were already consolidated.
Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction to
review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final
resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the
Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of
the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-
A of the Constitution.1avvphi1
CAGAS vs. COMELEC
GR no. 194139, January 24, 2012
"We have interpreted this provision (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A) to mean
final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en
banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via
certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en
banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law.
Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a
ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of
the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a
motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-
requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.xxX
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the
denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner
to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest
on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the
denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en
banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon
the merits.
Other Provisions
FISCAL AUTONOMY:
- The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released. (Sec. 5, Art.
IX-A)
SALARIES:
- The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased
during their tenure. (Sec. 3, Art. IX-A)
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (ART. IX-B)
Composition and Qualifications
COMPOSITION:
- The civil service shall be administered by the Civil
Service Commission composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners x x. (Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-B}
QUALIFICATIONS:
1. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years old at the time of their
appointment;
3. He/She shall proven capacity for public
administrations; and
4. He/She must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment. (Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-B)
APPOINTMENT AND TERMS:
- The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, a Commissioner for five years, and another
Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Sec.
1(2), Art. IX-B)
Scope of the Civil Service
Constitutional Provision:
- The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government- owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. (Sec.
2(1), Art. IX-B)
WHAT IS A GOVERNMENT AGENCY?
- This refers to any of the various units of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality or GOCC, or a local government or
a distinct unit therein. (Sec. 3(k), RA 10149)
HIDALGO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR no. 179793, July 5, 2010
ISSUE: W/N the employees of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services, which was
organized pursuant to Letter of Instruction no. 31 of Pres.
Marcos in 1972, were subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, considering that the entity was engaged in
proprietary functions, that civil service rules were never followed
with respect to the hiring, appointment, discipline and dismissal
of said employees, and that they were enrolled in the Social
Security System, and not the Government Service Insurance
System.
SC RULING: “Since it cannot be denied that petitioners are
government employees, the proper body that has jurisdiction to
hear the case is the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Such fact
cannot be negated by the failure of respondents to follow
appropriate civil service rules in the hiring, appointment,
discipline and dismissal of the petitioners. Neither can it be
denied by the fact that respondents chose to enroll petitioners in
the SSS instead of GSIS. Such considerations cannot be used
against the CSC to deprive it of its jurisdiction. It is not the
absence or presence of the required appointment from the CSC,
or the membership of an employee in the SSS or in the gsis that
determine the status of the position of an employee.
We agree with the opinion of the AFP Judge Advocate general
that it is the regulation or the law creating the Service that
determines the position of the employee. Petitioners are
government personnel since they are employed by an agency
attached to the AFP. Consequently, as correctly observed by the
CA, the Labor Arbiter’s decision on their complaint for illegal
dismissal cannot be made to stand since the same was issued
without jurisdiction.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY OF PARANAQUE
GR no. 191109, July 18, 2012
The SC held that Philippine Reclamation Authority, which was
established under PD 1084, cannot be considered as a
government-owned or controlled corporation not only by reason
of the fact that it cannot be considered as either a stock
(because it is not authorized or a non-stock (because it does not
have members) corporation but also because, while it “may have
passed the first condition of common good,” it failed the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 95
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
economic viability.”
The SC explained that: “Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the
creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities.
Neither was it created to compete in the market place
considering that there were no other competing reclamation
companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned
earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a public service
considering that it was primarily responsible for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation, administration and
operation of lands belonging to the government with the object
of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development
consistent with the public interest.”
DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATION (GOCC):
- It refers to any agency organized as a stock or
nonstock corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly
or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least a majority of
its outstanding capital stock: Provided, however,
That for purposes of this Act, the term “GOCC”-
shall include GICP/GCE and GFI as defined herein.
(Sec. 3(o), RA. 10149)
GOCC WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS:
DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs. CSC
GR no. 95237-38, September 13, 1991
By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter," We mean government owned or controlled corporation
created by a special law and not under the Corporation Code of
the Philippines. Thus, in the case of Lumanta v. NLRC (G.R. No.
82819, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 79, 82), We held:
The Court, in National Service Corporation (NASECO)
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No
69870, promulgated on 29 November 1988, quoting
extensively from the deliberations of 1986
Constitutional Commission in respect of the intent and
meaning of the new phrase "with original character," in
effect held that government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charter refer to corporations
chartered by special law as distinguished from
corporations organized under our general incorporation
statute — the Corporations Code. In NASECO, the
company involved had been organized under the
general incorporation statute and was a subsidiary of
the National Investment Development Corporation
(NIDC) which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine
National Bank, a bank chartered by a special statute.
Thus, government-owned or controlled corporations
like NASECO are effectively, excluded from the scope
of the Civil Service. (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has
been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those
corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code.
Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but
on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and
are governed primarily by its provision.
96 – MORILLO NOTES
GOCC includes the following:
1. Government Instrumentalities with Corporate
Powers (GICPs)/Government Corporate Entities
(GCEs) - refer to instrumentalities or agencies of
the government, which are neither corporations nor
agencies integrated within the departmental
framework, but vested by law with special
functions or jurisdiction, endowed with some if not
all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy usually through
a charter including, but not limited to, the following:
the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA), the Philippine Fisheries Development
Authority (PFDA), the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA), the Cebu Port
Authority (CPA), the Cagayan de Orb Port
Authority, the San Fernando Port Authority, the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and the
Asian Productivity Organization (APO). (Sec. 3(n),
RA 10149)
2. Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) - refer
to financial institutions or corporations in which the
government directly or indirectly owns majority of
the capital stock and. which are either: (1)
registered with or directly supervised by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; or (2) collecting or
transacting funds or contributions from the public
and places them in financial instruments or assets
such as deposits, loans, bonds and equity
including, but not limited to, the Government
Service Insurance System and the Social Security
System. (Sec. 3(m), RA 10149)
Is the Philippine National Red Cross a GOCC?
LIBAN vs. GORDON
GR no. 175352, July 15, 2009
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation
Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
if it wants to be a private corporation.
CASES/JURISPRUDENCE:
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) vs. NLRC
GR no. L-69870, November 29, 1988
On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the
instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of
decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the
parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a
subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or
controlled corporation without original charter.
TUPAS vd. NHC
GR no. 49677, May 4, 1989
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal and the Civil Service rules and regulations.
dismissal involving the same respondent corporation, We had
ruled that the employees of NHC and of other government
owned or controlled corporations were governed by civil service
Classes of Service
laws, rules and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution
which provided that "the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government,
CLASSES OF POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE:
including government-owned or controlled corporations."
A. CAREER SERVICE:
It was therein stressed that to allow subsidiary corporations to be - Characteristics:
excluded from the civil service laws would be to permit the 1. Entrance based on merit and fitness to be
circumvention or emasculation of the above-quoted determined as far as practicable by
constitutional provision. As perceptively analyzed therein, "(i)t competitive examinations, or based on
would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create highly technical qualifications;
a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code 2. Opportunity for advancement to higher
funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation
career positions; and
could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary
corporation rations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their
3. Security of tenure.
officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from - Positions under Career Service:
the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and a. Open Career positions for appointment to
the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would which prior qualification in an appropriate
not be subject to the competitive restraints of the open market examination is required;
nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment." b. Closed Career positions which are
scientific or highly technical in nature;
The rule, however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the
these include the faculty and academic
corresponding provision whereof declares that "(t)he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and staff of state colleges and universities,
agencies of the government, including government-owned or and scientific and technical positions in
controlled corporations with original charters." scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own
Consequently, the civil service now covers only government merit systems;
owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative c. Positions in the Career Executive Service,
charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
general legislation.
Bureau, Regional Director, Assistant
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to Regional Director, Chief of Department
form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or Service and other officers of equivalent
to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to rank as may be identified by the Career
employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Executive Service Board, all of whom are
Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including appointed by the President;
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, d. Career officers, other than those in the
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
Career Executive Service, who are
not be abridged"
appointed by the President, such as the
Foreign Service Officers in the DFA;
e. Commissioned officers and enlisted men
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs. MOJICA
GR no. 166365, September 30, 2005
of the Armed Forces, which shall maintain
a separate merit system;
DFP was created under Executive Order (EO) No. 46 on f. Personnel of government-owned or
September 4, 1986 primarily to augment the service facilities for controlled corporations, whether
tourists and to generate foreign exchange and revenue for the performing governmental or proprietary
government. In order for the government to exercise direct and functions, who do not fall under the non-
effective control and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, career service; and
their establishment and operation was vested in the Ministry,
g. Permanent laborers, whether skilled,
now Department of Tourism (DOT), through its implementing
arm, the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). All the net profits
semi-skilled, or unskilled.
from the merchandising operations of the shops accrued to the
DOT. B. NON-CAREER SERVICE:
- Characteristics:
As provided under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 564, PTA is a 1. Entrance on bases other than those of the
corporate body attached to the DOT. As an attached agency, the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for
recruitment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of all its personnel the career service; and
was governed by a merit system established in accordance with
2. Tenure which is limited to a period
the civil service rules. In fact, all PTA officials and employees are
subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. specified by law, or which is coterminous
with that of the appointing authority or
Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive authority of the subject to his pleasure, or which is limited
PTA, it follows that its officials and employees are likewise to the duration of a particular project for
subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. Clearly then, which purpose employment was made.
Mojica’s recourse to the Labor Arbiter was not proper. He should - Positions under Non-Career Service:
have followed the procedure laid down in DFP’s merit system

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 97

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
a. Elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff;
b. Department heads and other officials of
Cabinet rank who hold positions at the
pleasure of the President and their
personal or confidential staff;
c. Chairmen and members of commissions
and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
d. Contractual personnel or those whose
employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed 1 year, and
perform or accomplish the specific work
or job, under their own responsibility with
a minimum of direction and supervision
for the hiring agency; and
e. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Appointments
HOW APPOINTMENT IS MADE?
- Appointments in the civil service shall be made
only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to
positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination. (Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-B)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Policy-determining positions:
- One charged with the laying down of principal or
fundamental guidelines or rules, such as that of a
head of a department.
2. Primarily confidential position:
- One denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust on
confidential matters of state. (Delos Santos vs.
Mallare, 87 Phil. 289)
- The position of chief legal counsel of the Philippine
national Bank (PNB), or of city legal officer, is
primarily confidential and highly technical.
3. Highly technical positions:
- Requires the appointee thereto to possess
technical skill or training in the supreme or
supreme degree. Therefore, the position of a city
engineer may be technical but not highly so
because he is not required or supposed to possess
a supreme or superior degree of technical skill. The
duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and can be discharged
even by non-technical men. (Delos Santos vs.
Mallare, Supra)
CORPUS vs. CUADERNO
GR no. L-23721, march 31, 1965
98 – MORILLO NOTES
It is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil
Service law and regulations as a member of the non-competitive
or unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must
be for cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53 Off. Gaz.
132; Arcel vs. Osmeña, L-14956, Feb. 27, 1961; Garcia vs.
Executive Secretary, L-19748, September 13, 1962).
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions
(such as private secretaries of public functionaries) ends upon
loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long
as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves
no removal. But the situation is different for those holding highly
technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The
Constitution clearly distinguished the primarily confidential from
the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to
the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation
expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is
illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk,
stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure
and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer,
such as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and
reputation, should be denied security and be removable at any
time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No
technical men worthy of the name would be willing to accept
work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by
the Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled
by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at the
humor to their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly
technical positions will have to be filled by incompetents and
yes-men, who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill
but on their ability to curry favor with the powerful. The entire
objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the
Civil Service on the basis of merit would be thus negated.
Of course, a position may be declared both highly technical and
confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require.
But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this
category.
The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied
upon by the appellant Bank, is not applicable since said case
involved the office of city engineer that the court expressly found
to be "neither primarily confidential, policy-determining nor highly
technical"
PAGCOR vs. ANGARA
GR no. 142937, November 25, 2005
From the nature of respondents' functions, their organizational
ranking, and their compensation level, it is obviously beyond
debate that respondents, occupying one of the lowest ranks in
petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees. Their
job description spells out their routinary functions. As
enumerated in their functions, there is nothing to suggest that
their positions were 'highly, or much less primarily confidential in
nature. There is no showing of that element of trust indicative of
a primarily confidential position, as defined in De los Santos vs.
Mallare, thus: “Every appointment implies confidence, but much
more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a
position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes
not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters
of state. “
Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents' dismissal on
loss of trust and confidence since the latter are not confidential
employees. Being regular employees that enjoy security of
tenure, respondents can only be dismissed for just cause and
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

3. Neglect of duty;
with due process, notice and hearing. Petitioner cannot, in the
alternative, allege that respondents are being dismissed for 4. Misconduct;
dishonesty since petitioner's thesis, in its motion for 5. Disgraceful and immoral conduct;
reconsideration in the CSC and petition before the CA, has 6. Being notoriously undesirable;
always been that respondents, as confidential employees, can 7. Discourtesy in the course of official duties;
be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Besides, 8. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance
dishonesty is not the reason for which they were dismissed per of official duties;
the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss of trust and 9. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other
confidence.
valuable thing in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other
valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
CSC vs. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment
GR no. 190147, March 5, 2013
than that accorded other persons, or committing
The General Manager of a water district who is appointed on acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;
coterminous status may serve or hold office for a maximum of 10. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
six years, which is the tenure of the appointing authority, subject 11. Improper or unauthorized solicitation of
to reappointment for another six years unless sooner removed by contributions from subordinate employees and by
the BOD for loss of trust and confidence, or for any cause teachers or school officials from school children;
provided by law and with due process. 12. Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules or
reasonable office regulations;
It may also be mentioned that under Section 36 of P.D. No. 198,
as amended, the L WUA is empowered to take over the
13. Falsification of official document;
operation and management of a water district which has 14. Frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness in
defaulted on its loan obligations to L WUA. As the bondholder or reporting for duty, loafing or frequent unauthorized
creditor, and in fulfillment of its mandate to regulate water absences from duty during regular office hours;
utilities in the country, LWUA may designate its employees or 15. Habitual drunkenness;
any person or organization to assume all powers or policy- 16. Gambling prohibited by law;
decision and the powers of management and administration to 17. Refusal to perform official duty or render overtime
undertake all such actions as may be necessary for the water service;
district's efficient operation. This further reinforces the
conclusion that the position of General Manager of a water
18. Disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to
district is a non-career position. entering the service;
19. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
In fine, since the position of General Manager of a water district immoral or vicious habits;
remains a primarily confidential position, Rafanan was validly 20. Borrowing money by superior officers from
reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, subordinates or lending by subordinates to
2005 under coterminous status despite having reached the superior officers;
compulsory retirement age, which is allowed under Section 12 21. Lending money at usurious rates of interest;
(b), Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as
amended by Resoluton No. 011624 dated October 4, 2001.
22. Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to
pay taxes due to the government;
23. Contracting loans of money or other property from
PERMANENT vs. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS: persons with whom the office of the employee
concerned has business relations;
PERMANENT TEMPORARY
24. Pursuit of private business, vocation or profession
APPOINTMENTS APPOINTMENTS
without the permission required by Civil Service
rules and regulations;
Issued to a person who meets Do not have a definite term
all the requirements for the and may be withdrawn or
25. Insubordination;
position to which he is being discontinued, with or without 26. Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
appointed, including the cause, by appointing power. activities by one holding a non-political office;
appropriate eligibility 27. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
prescribed, in accordance with service;
the provisions of laws, rules 28. Lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative
and standards promulgated in halls or offices without authority;
pursuance thereof
29. Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private
Source: 1987 Administrative Code, Book V-A, Sec. 27 enterprises that are not intended for charitable or
public welfare purposes and even in the latter
cases if there is no prior authority;
Security of Tenure 30. Nepotism as defined in Section 59 of this Title.
(Sec. 46(b), Book V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
Constitutional Provision: NOTE: Nepotism is defined as “All appointments in the
- No officer or employee of the civil service shall be national, provincial, city and municipal governments or
removed or suspended except for cause provided in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
by law. (Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B) government-owned or controlled corporations, made
in favor of a relative of the appointing or
recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau
GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINE OF CIVIL SERVANTS:
or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
1. Dishonesty; supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
2. Oppression;

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 99

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
As used in this Section, the word “relative” and
members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of
affinity. (Sec. 59(1), Book V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
PROCEDURES FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF CIVIL
SERVANTS:
A. Procedure:
1. Administrative proceedings may be commenced
against a subordinate officer or employee by the
Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or
head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other person.
2. In the case of a complaint filed by any other
persons, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his
witnesses together with his documentary evidence.
If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is
found not to exist, the disciplining authority shall
dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he
shall notify the respondent in writing, of the
charges against the latter, to which shall be
attached copies of the complaint, sworn
statements and other documents submitted, and
the respondent shall be allowed not less than
seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to
answer the charges in writing under oath, together
with supporting sworn statements and documents,
in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects
a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer is found
satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss
the case.
3. Although a respondent does not request a formal
investigation, one shall nevertheless be conducted
when from the allegations of the complaint and the
answer of the respondent, including the supporting
documents, the merits of the case cannot be
decided judiciously without conducting such an
investigation.
4. The investigation shall be held not earlier than five
days nor later than ten days from the date of
receipt of respondent’s answer by the disciplining
authority, and shall be finished within thirty days
from the filing of the charges, unless the period is
extended by the Commission in meritorious cases.
The decision shall be rendered by the disciplining
authority within thirty days from the termination of
the investigation or submission of the report of the
investigator, which report shall be submitted within
fifteen days from the conclusion of the
investigation.
5. The direct evidence for the complainant and the
respondent shall consist of the sworn statement
and documents submitted in support of the
complaint or answer, as the case may be, without
prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence
deemed necessary but was unavailable at the time
of the filing of the complaint or answer, upon which
the cross-examination, by respondent and the
complainant, respectively, shall be based.
100 – MORILLO NOTES
Following cross-examination, there may be redirect
and recross-examination.
6. Either party may avail himself of the services of
counsel and may require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary
evidence in his favor through the compulsory
process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
7. The investigation shall be conducted only for the
purpose of ascertaining the truth and without
necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in
judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by the
disciplining authority concerned or his authorized
representative. (Sec. 48, Book V(A), 1987 Admin.
Code)
B. Appeals:
1. Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a
petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed,
which petition shall be decided within fifteen days.
Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the
disciplining office, which shall forward the records
of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to
the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing
of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any.
The notice of appeal shall specifically state the
date of the decision appealed from and the date of
receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth
clearly the grounds relied upon for excepting from
the decision.
2. A petition for reconsideration shall be based only
on any of the following grounds: (a) new evidence
has been discovered which materially affects the
decision rendered; (b) the decision is not supported
by the evidence on record; or (c) errors of law or
irregularities have been committed which are
prejudicial to the interest of the respondent:
Provided, That only one petition for reconsideration
shall be entertained. (Sec/ 49, Book V(A), 1987
Admin. Code)
C. Summary Proceedings:
- No formal investigation is necessary and the
respondent may be immediately removed or
dismissed if any of the following circumstances is
present:
1. When the charge is serious and the
evidence of guilt is strong;
2. When the respondent is a recidivist or has
been repeatedly charged and there is
reasonable ground to believe that he is
guilty of the present charge; and
3. When the respondent is notoriously
undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining
authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is
committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal
except those by the President, himself or upon his
order, may be appealed to the Commission. (Sec.
50, Book V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
D. Preventive Suspension:
 POLITICAL LAW
- The proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend any subordinate officer or employee under
his authority pending an investigation, if the charge
against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of
charges which would warrant his removal from the
service. (Sec. 51, Book V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
E. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending
Administrative Investigation:
- When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the
period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided,
That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided. (Sec. 52, Book V(A), 1987 Admin.
Code)
F. Removal of Penalties or Disabilities:
- In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of
the Commission, the President may commute or
remove administrative penalties or disabilities
imposed upon officers or employees in disciplinary
cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he
may impose in the interest of the service. (Sec. 53,
Book V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
REVISED RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE
CIVIL SERVICE (CSC Resolution no. 1101502, November
18, 2011)
A. Preliminary Investigation:
Section 15. Preliminary Investigation; Definition. – A
Preliminary Investigation is a proceeding undertaken to
determine whether a prima facie case exists to warrant the
issuance of a formal charge. It involves a fact-finding
investigation or an ex-parte examination of records and
documents submitted by the complainant and the person/s
complained of, as well as documents readily available from
other government offices.
Section 16. How conducted. – Within five (5) days from
receipt of the complaint sufficient in form and substance,
the person/s complained of shall be required to submit
his/her/their counter-affidavit/comment. Where
complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, the
disciplining authority or his authorized representative shall
issue a show-cause memorandum directing the person/s
complained of to explain why no administrative case should
be filed against him/ her/them. The latter’s failure to submit
the comment/counter-affidavit/explanation shall
considered a waiver thereof and the preliminary
investigation may be completed even without his/her
counter-affidavit/comment.
If necessary, the parties may be summoned to a conference
where the investigator may propound clarificatory and other
relevant questions.
For cases filed before the Commission or any of its
Morillo Notes
Regional Offices, the preliminary investigation may be
entrusted to lawyers of other agencies pursuant to Section
117 of this Rules.
Section 17. Duration of the Investigation. – A preliminary
investigation shall commence not later than five (5) days
from receipt of the complaint by the disciplining authority
and shall be terminated within twenty (20) days thereafter.
Section 18. Investigation Report. – Within five (5) days
from the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall submit the Investigation Report
with recommendation and the complete records of the case
to the disciplining authority.
Section 19. Decision or Resolution After Preliminary
Investigation. – If a prima facie case is established during
the investigation, the disciplining authority may issue either
a formal charge or a notice of charge/s pursuant to Rule 5
of this Rules.
In the absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be
dismissed.
B. Institution of the formal charge or Notice of charge:
Section 20. Issuance of Formal Charge; Contents. –
After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining
authority shall formally charge the person complained of,
who shall now be called as respondent. The formal charge
shall contain a specification of charge/s, a brief statement
of material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true
copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn
statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a directive
to answer the charge/s in writing, under oath in not less
than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice
for the respondent to indicate in his/her answer whether or
not he/she elects a formal investigation of the charge/s,
and a notice that he/she may opt to be assisted by a
counsel of his/her choice.
Section 21. Notice of Charge/s. – In instances where the
complaint was initiated by a person other than the
disciplining authority, the disciplining authority may issue a
written notice of the charge(s) against the person
complained of to which shall be attached copies of the
complaint, sworn statement and other documents
submitted. The notice shall contain the charges against the
person complained of with a statement that a prima facie
case exists. It shall also include a directive to answer the
charge(s) in writing, under oath in not less than seventy-
two (72) hours from receipt thereof, and a notice that
he/she may opt to be assisted by a counsel of his/her
choice.
the Section 22. Prohibited Pleadings. - The disciplining
authority shall not entertain requests for clarification, bills
of particulars, motions to dismiss or motions to quash or
motions for reconsideration. If any of these pleadings are
interposed by the respondent, the same shall be
considered an answer and shall be evaluated as such.
be
GARCIA vs. MOLINA
GR nos. 157383 & 174137, April 2, 2010
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal
charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and
void. However, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in
form and substance, the disciplining authority shall require the
person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 101
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word
"shall" quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at
least respondent should be given the opportunity to comment
and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set
forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal
charge and the comment required therein is different from the
answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the CSC Rules.
Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority
himself, as in the present case. To comply with such
requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal
charges. With respondents’ comments, petitioner would have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a
conclusion that there was a prima facie case against
respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal
charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the
administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the
day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore,
that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination
by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a
prima facie case against respondents.
It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.
Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the
lack of preliminary investigation, records show that in their
Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents questioned
the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges
against them for lack of preliminary investigation.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (RA 6770):
A. Powers and Functions:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases;
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as
well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties;
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by
any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
102 – MORILLO NOTES
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer;
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedures, to furnish it with
copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
and report any irregularity to the Commission on
Audit for appropriate action;
5. Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents;
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the
matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4)
hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with
due prudence: Provided, that the Ombudsman
under its rules and regulations may determine what
cases may not be made public: Provided further,
That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall
be balanced, fair and true;
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards
of ethics and efficiency;
8. Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to
examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;
9. Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules
of Court and under the same procedure and with
the same penalties provided therein;
10. Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or
representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the
powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter
provided;
11. Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexpired wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved therein. (Sec.
15, RA 6770)
B. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority:
- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government- owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. (Sec. 21, RA 6770)
C. Investigatory Powers of the Ombudsman:
- The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power
to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or
employee of the government and a private person,
the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have
jurisdiction to include such private person in the
investigation and proceed against such private
person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or
employee and the private person shall be tried
jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties
and liabilities. (Sec. 22, RA 6770)
D. Formal Investigation:
1. Administrative investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance
with its rules of procedure and consistent with due
process.
2. At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may
refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary
authority for the institution of appropriate
administrative proceedings against erring public
officers or employees, which shall be terminated
within the period prescribed in the civil service law.
Any delay without just cause in acting on any
referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman
shall be a ground for administrative action against
the officers or employees to whom such referrals
are addressed a and shall constitute a graft offense
punishable by a fine of not exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00).
3. In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman
may (a) enter and inspect the premises of any
office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine
and have access to any book, record, file
document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings
with both the complaining individual and the official
concerned. (Sec. 23, RA 6770)
E. Preventive Suspension:
- The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgement the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a)
the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the
case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing
the period of suspension herein provided. (Sec. 24,
RA 6770)
F. Penalties:
1. In administrative proceedings under Presidential
Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided
therein shall be applied.
2. In other administrative proceedings, the penalty
ranging from suspension without pay for one year
to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine
ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to
twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost,
or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking
into consideration circumstances that mitigate or
aggravate the liability of the officer or employee
found guilty of the complaint or charges. (Sec. 25,
RA 6770)
THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS:
A. Disciplinary Jurisdiction over Public School
Teachers:
- Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who
should at least have the rank of a division
supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national
teacher's organization and a supervisor of the
Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The committee shall
submit its findings and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools within thirty days from
the termination of the hearings: Provided, however,
That where the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested party, all the members
of the committee shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Education. (Sec. 9, RA 4670)
CSC vs. CA
GR no. 176162, October 9, 2012)
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the
creation of disciplinary committees and governing bodies in
different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities
of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints
against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it
may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the
passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for
the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the
CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline
government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the
CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and
accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend
the Constitution itself.
Moreover, the SC held that: “the inescapable conclusion is that
the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed
directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state
college or university. This is regardless of whether the
complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil service
and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents
of the School.
CAMACHO vs. GLORIA
GR no. 138862, August 15, 2003
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 103
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the
Respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of
Regents, was contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he
cites no specific provision of the Civil Service Law which was
violated by the respondents in forming the investigating
committee. The Civil Service Rules embodied in Executive Order
292 recognize the power of the Secretary and the university,
through its governing board, to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint
against a state university official may be filed either with the
university's Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service
Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation of
a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department,
agency, official or group of officials to conduct such investigation
AMPONG vs. CSC
GR no. 167916, August 26, 2008
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
"control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations.” This authority grants to the CSC the right to take
cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the
examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court
is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It
may take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the
Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court
employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
B. Reorganizations:
DARIO vs. MISON
GR no. 81954, August 8, 1989
Petitioners questioned their separation from the Bureau of
Customs as a result of the reorganization undertaken by the
Respondent Commissioner of Customs pursuant to EO 127.
SC ordered Petitioner’s reinstatement and gave the following
ruling: “Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that
as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation
or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition'
104 – MORILLO NOTES
takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio.
There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change
of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of ample funds.”
Partisan Political Activity
Constitutional Provision:
- No officer or employee in the civil service shall
engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign. (Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-B)
Additional Comments:
- No officer or employee in the Civil Service including
members of the Armed Forces, shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity
or take part in any election except to vote nor shall
he use his official authority or influence to coerce
the political activity of any other person or body.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood to
prevent any officer or employee from expressing
his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of candidates for
public office whom he supports: Provided, That
public officers and employees holding political
offices may take part in political and electoral
activities but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject
them to any of the acts involving subordinates
prohibited in the Election Code. (Sec. 55, Book
V(A), 1987 Admin. Code)
MEANING OF PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY:
SENERES vs. COMELEC
GR no. 178678, April 16, 2009
This case involved an Acting Administrator or Chief of the Land
Railway Transport Authority (who was concurrently the president
of a political party) who was accused of having engaged in
electioneering for having signed, in his capacity as the head of
the said political party, the list of the latter’s nominations for the
party-list elections.
The SC found nothing wrong with what he did and declared that
the act of submitting a nomination list “cannot, without more, be
considered electioneering or partisan political activity within the
context of the Election Code,”
Sec. 79 of the Election Code provides that the terms “Election
Campaign” or “Partisan Political Activity” refers to the following:
1. Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign for or against a candidate;
2. Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
3. Making speeches, announcements or commentaries,
or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for pubic office;
4. Publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials designed to support or oppose the election
of any candidate; or
5. Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or
support for or against a candidate.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
DELOS SANTOS vs. YATCO
GR no. L-13932, December 24, 1959
The Secretary of National Defense was sought to be restrained
from conducting a house-to-house campaign on behalf of the
administration during the 1959 elections, but he claimed that he
was not covered by the constitutional provision.
The SC sustained him, noting that (according to the records of
the Constitutional Convention of 1934), a delegate had moved
for the formal inclusion of Cabinet members in the rule but the
motion had been defeated. Furthermore, it was observed that
Cabinet members were supposed to be the alter ego of the
President of the Philippines and were in fact usually chosen
principally for the political influence they were expected to exert
for the purpose of ensuring support for the administration.
As already noted, all public officers and employees holding
political offices are now permitted to take part in political and
electoral activities.
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
GR no. 189698, February 22, 2010
The SC emphasized that the constitutional proscription against
partisan political activities pertains only to “civil servants holding
apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does
not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that ‘the civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.’ This is because
elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage
in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside
of the campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable
essence of a political office, elective positions included. The
prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees
are allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political
issues, or mention the names of certain candidates for public
office whom they support.”
CAILLES vs. BONIFACIO
GR no. L-45937, February 25, 1938
Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution prohibits members of the
armed forces form engaging in any partisan political activity, or
otherwise taking part in any election except to vote, but it does
not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. It
prohibits partisan political activity or taking part in any election
except to vote, but permits the exercise of the right to vote only if
such right is granted by law. As section 431 of the Election Law,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233, disqualified from
voting only members in the active service of the Philippines Army
and no claim is made that this discrimination is violation of the
Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve
force, is not disqualified from voting. Stated otherwise, the
respondent being a qualified elector and the possession by him
of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial
office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of
provincial governor to which he has been elected.
xxxxx
It was evident that the intention was to continue by in
corporation in the Constitution the then existing prohibition
against officers and employees of the Civil Service from,
engaging in political or electoral activities except to vote, for the
reason that public officers and employees in the Civil Service
"are servant of the State and not the agents of any political
group." "Members of the armed forced" were not included in the
original draft but finally it was though advisable by the
Constitutional Convention to extend the prohibition to them. In
including only those in the active service were contemplated.
Upon the other hand, a contrary interpretation would lead to the
disqualification of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages
of 20 and 50 years - not specially exempted by the National
Defense Act - from holding election public offices or otherwise
taking part in any election except to vote and this result, for
obvious reasons, should be avoided.ch
Self-Organization
Constitutional Provision:
- The right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees. (Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B)
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. CA
GR no. 85279, July 28, 1989
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of
the right of government employees to organize, the President
issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of
the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14
thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government
service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service
Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the
confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so,
or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and
as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated
that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against
strikes?
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of
the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government
agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands. As now provided
under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern
the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-
Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed
by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose
of securing changes thereof."
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 105
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Temporary Employees
Constitutional Provision:
- Temporary employees of the Government shall be
given such protection as may be provided by law.
(Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-B)
AMBAS vs. BUENASEDA
201 SCRA 308
Petitioners’ appointments, albeit temporary, were for a fixed
period of 1 year, pursuant to the Hospital Residency Law.
According to the SC, “the fact that petitioners’ appointments
were classified as temporary did not grant a blanket authority to
the Secretary of health to remove them at any time without
cause, for the term fixed by law protects the right of the resident
trainees from being removed from office without cause.”
IN RE: VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING SC SHUTTLE BUS
NO. 3 WITH PLATE NO. SEG-357 DRIVEN BY GERRY B.
MORAL, DRIVER II-CASUAL
The SC declared that “even a casual or temporary employee
enjoys security of tenure and cannot be dismissed except for
cause enumerated in Sec 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations and other pertinent laws.”
A government employee holding a casual or temporary
employment cannot be terminated within the period of his
employment except for cause.
RA 6850:
- All government employees as of the approval of
this Act who are holding career civil service
positions appointed under provisional or temporary
status who have rendered at least a total of seven
(7) years of efficient service may be granted the
civil service eligibility that will qualify them for
permanent appointment to their present positions.
(Sec. 1, RA 6850)
Objectives of the Civil Service
OBJECTIVES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION:
1. Establish a career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in
the civil service.
2. Strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate
all human resources development programs for all
levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability.
3. Submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs. (Sec. 3,
Art. IX-B)
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI vs. CSC
GR no. 131392, February 6, 2002
Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the power to
interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them with its
interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.
Since the commission is an instrumentality of the state,
106 – MORILLO NOTES
exercising delegated powers, its orders are of the same force as
would be a like enactment by the Legislature. It therefore follows
that the interpretation officially placed on the order or rule by the
commission becomes a part of the rule. Further, the rule is
susceptible of no other interpretation.
An efficient and honest bureaucracy is never inconsistent with
the emphasis on and the recognition of the basic rights and
privileges of our civil servants or, for that matter, the
constitutional mandates of the Civil Service Commission. In fact
only from an enlightened corps of government workers and an
effective CSC grows the professionalization of the bureaucracy.
Indeed the government cannot be left in the lurch; but neither
could we decree that government personnel be separated from
their jobs indiscriminately regardless of fault. The fine line
between these concerns may be difficult to clearly draw but if we
only exerted extra effort to rebel against the allure of legal over-
simplification, justice would have been done where it is truly due.
Oath
OATH:
- All public officers and employees shall take an oath
or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution. (Sec. 4, Art. IX-B)
Standardization of Compensation
STANDARDIZATION OF COMPENSATION:
- The Congress shall provide for the standardization
of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters,
taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications
required for, their positions. (Sec. 5, Art. IX-B)
Disqualifications
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 6, ART. IX-B
Constitutional Provision:
- No candidate who has lost in any election, shall
within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the Government or any Government-
owned or controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries. (Sec. 6, Art. IX-B)
Additional notes:
- Except for losing candidates in barangay elections,
no candidate who lost in any election shall, within 1
year after such election, be appointed to any office
in the Government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their
subsidiaries. (Sec. 94(b), Local Government Code)
- The prohibition does not apply to nominees of
losing party-list groups. (COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 19-0677)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR no. 164185, July 23, 2008
The SC nullified the acquittal of a municipal payor who was
charged with violating the provisions of Art. 244, Revised Penal
Code, which punishes any public officer who shall knowingly
nominate or appoint to any public office any person lacking the
legal qualifications therefor. This mayor was prosecuted for said
offense for having appointed, upon his assumption into office, a
relative of his wife, who had only 2 months before lost his
mayoralty bid in another municipality.
The SC ruled: “The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the
qualifications for a position are provided by law and that it may
well be that one who possesses the required legal qualification
for a position may be temporarily disqualified for appointment to
a public position by reason of the one-year prohibition imposed
on losing candidates. However, there is no violation of Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from
temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee
possesses all the qualifications stated in the law.
There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for this interpretation.
On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under the law.
Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing
candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to
any office in the government or any government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.
Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991.”
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER
SECTION 7, ART. IX-B
Constitutional Provision:
- No elective official shall be eligible for appointment
or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. (Sec. 7, Art. IX-B)
ART. IX-B, SEC. 7 VERSUS ART. VII, SEC. 13:
- Section, par. 2, Art. IX-B is not applicable to the
officials covered by Art. VII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR no. 83896, February 22, 1991
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is
quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries.
We (The SC) rule in the negative.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory
and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers
of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents'
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the
exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the
Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on
the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other,
may hold any other office or position in the government during
their tenure.
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER vs. ELMA
GR no. 138965, June 30, 2006
ISSUE: W/N the validity of the concurrent appointment of
Respondent Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission
on Good Governance (PCGG) and Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC).
SC RULING:
1. It declared the same as unconstitutional, for being in
violation of sec. 7, par. 2, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution,
since these are incompatible offices. “The duties of the
CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal
advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations
involving heads of executive departments and agencies,
as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is,
without question, an agency under the Executive
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are
subject to the review of the CPLC.”
2. It added that “as CPLC, respondent Elma will be required
to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG
Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve
himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on
his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the
situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
prohibition against holding incompatible offices.”
3. It further explained that the “strict prohibition under Sec.
13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 107
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
PCGG Chairman nor to CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even
if the former may have the same rank as the latter
positions.”
4. It subsequently emphasized that “had the rule thereunder
been applicable to the case, the defect of these two
incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The
said section allows the concurrent holding of positions
only when the second post is required by the primary
functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an
ex-officio capacity. Although Respondent Elma waived
receiving remuneration for the second appointment, the
primary function of the PCGG Chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.” it likewise clarified though that
“this ruling does not both appointments void. Following
the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices,
Respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as
PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as
CPLC.”
Double Compensation
Constitutional Provision:
- No elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title
of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as
additional, double, or indirect compensation. (Sec.
8, Art. IX-B)
DUAL PURPOSE ON THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
ADDITIONAL, DOUBLE OR INDIRECT COMPENSATION:
a. To inform the people of the exact amount a public
functionary is receiving from the government so
they can demand commensurate services; and
b. To prevent the public functionary from dividing his
time among the several positions concurrently held
by him and ineptly performing his duties in all of
them because he cannot devote to each the proper
attention it deserves. (Cruz, p. 647)
Exception on the prohibition against additional, double
or indirect compensation::
- Where the law allows him to receive extra
compensation for services rendered in another
position which is an extension or connected with
his basic work, as where the chairmen of the
committees on education in the two houses of the
Congress may collect allowances as ex-officio
members of the UP Board of Regents.
PERALTA vs. AUDITOR GENERAL
GR no. L-8480, March 29, 1957
This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle
that a public office is a public trust. It is expected of a
government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in
mind the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public
service. He is there of course entitled to be rewarded for the
performance of the functions entrusted to him, but that should
not be the overriding consideration. The intrusion of the thought
108 – MORILLO NOTES
of private gain should be unwelcome. The temptation to further
personal ends, public employment as a means for the acquisition
of wealth, is to be resisted. That at least is the idea. There is then
to be an awareness on the part of the officer or employee of the
government that he is to receive only such compensation as may
be fixed by law. With such a realization, he is expected not to
avail himself of devious or circuitous means to increase the
remuneration attached to his position.”
VELOSO vs. COA
GR no. 1977, September 6, 2011
The SC nullified an ordinance which granted to three-term
councilors of the City of Manila retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position
for 3 consecutive terms.
The SC declared the following: “The recomputation of the award
disclosed that it is equivalent to the total compensation received
by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary,
additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance,
representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance,
financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and
cash gift. This is not disputed by petitioners. There is nothing
wrong with the local government granting additional benefits to
the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the
granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of
these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of
these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must
not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.
As clearly explained by the Court in Yap v. Commission on Audit,
the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the
salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be
commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein,
additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be
necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and
functions of the government officers and employees. Without this
limitation, government officers and employees may be paid
enormous sums without limit or without justification necessary
other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed
by the government. Public funds are the property of the people
and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent
dissipation and waste.
Undoubtedly, the above computation of the awardees' reward is
excessive and tantamount to double and additional
compensation. This cannot be justified by the mere fact that the
awardees have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Neither can it be justified that the reward is
given as a gratuity at the end of the last term of the qualified
elective official. The fact remains that the remuneration is
equivalent to everything that the awardees received during the
entire period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their
salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of
them at the end of their last term.”
The SC (in line with existing jurisprudence) did not require said
former city councilors to refund said retirement and gratuity pay,
despite upholding the disallowance by the Commission on Audit
of the same, “because all the parties acted in good faith.” It
noted that “the city officials disbursed the retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration in the honest belief that the amounts given
were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with
gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such reward.”
DIMAGIBA vs. ESPARTERO
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
GR no. 154952, July 16, 2012
The SC considered the gratuity pay sought to be given to the
Petitioners “by reason of the satisfactory performance of their
work” as a bonus, which “partakes of an additional remuneration
or compensation.”
“It bears stressing that when petitioners were separated from
LIVECOR, they were given separation pay which also included
gratuity pay for all the years they worked thereat and
concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting them another gratuity
pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust agreement
would be indirectly giving them additional compensation for
services rendered in another position which is an extension or is
connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This can only
be allowed if there is a law which specifically authorizes them to
receive an additional payment of gratuity. The HSDC Board
Resolution No. 05-19-A granting petitioners’ gratuity pay is not a
law which would exempt them from the Constitutional
proscription against additional, double or indirect
compensation.”
Petitioners claim that the proscription against double
compensation does not include pensions and gratuity. We (The
SC) are not persuaded. We quote with approval what the CA
said, thus: ”The second paragraph of Section 8, Article IX
specifically adds that "pensions and gratuities shall not be
considered as additional, double or indirect compensation." This
has reference to compensation already earned, for instance by a
retiree. A retiree receiving pensions or gratuities after retirement
can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he
accepts another government position to which another
compensation is attached.”
The grant to designees Dimagiba et al. of another gratuity from
HSDC would not fall under the exception in the second
paragraph as the same had not been primarily earned, but rather
being granted for service simultaneously rendered to LIVECOR
and HSDC. Hence, to allow the release of the second gratuity
from HSDC would run afoul over the well-settled rule that "in the
absence of an express legal exception, pension or gratuity laws
should be construed as to preclude any person from receiving
double compensation.
QUIMZON vs. OZAETA
98 Phil. 705
The SC held that the prohibition of the Constitution was against
double compensation, not double appointment. hence, a second
position may be held concurrently with the principal position as
long as the two are not incompatible, but the incumbent cannot
collect additional salaries for services rendered unless
specifically allowed by law.
The purpose of the prohibition against acceptance of any
present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign
state is to insulate the public functionary from improper foreign
influence, which ma be exerted on him to the prejudice of the
national interest. At times, however, the gesture of the foreign
state may be a sincere manifestation of appreciation or respect
and without any sinister or ulterior motive, in which case it would
be ungracious of the intended recipient to reject the token
offered. In such an event, the prohibition may be relaxed and the
offer accepted with the consent of the Congress.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTION (ART. IX-C)
Composition and Qualifications
Constitutional Provision:
- There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective
positions in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-C)
- The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for
seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. (Sec.
1(2), Art. IX-C)
MAJORITY OF COMELEC MEMBERS MUST BE
LAWYERS:
- The provision that majority of COMELEC members
should be lawyers pertains to the desired
composition of the COMELEC. While the
appointing authority may follow such constitutional
mandate, the appointment of a full complement of
lawyers in the COMELEC membership is not
precluded. (Marcoleta vs. Borra. (AC no. 7732,
March 30, 2009)
“ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW”; MEANING:
- Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of
the term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by
the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry,
a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Cayetano vs. Monsod, GR no.
100113, September 3, 1991)
ACTING CAPACITY:
BRILLANTES vs. YORAC
GR no. 93867, December 18, 1990
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially
temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of
the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such
designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 109
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Morillo Notes
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the
Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by
the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it.
In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and
not the President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the
Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she
issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her
goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation
in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the
case at bar.
al l
MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO
GR no. 149036, April 2, 2002
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable
except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how
briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject
only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent
appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor
General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the
President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments
that take effect immediately.
Powers and Functions
Constitutional Provision: The COMELEC shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall;
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable;
3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters;
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President,
law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
110 – MORILLO NOTES
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections;
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to
uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
are supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections, constitute interference in national affairs,
and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may
be prescribed by law;
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices;
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies;
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any
officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision;
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
(Sec. 2, Art. IX-C)
A. ENFORCEMENT OF ELECTION LAWS (Sec.
2(1), Art. IX-C):
ENFORCEMENT TO REGISTER VOTERS:
- See the following laws:
1. RA 8189 (Continuing Registration Act);
and
2. RA 10367 (Mandatory Biometrics Voters
Registration)
Who are allowed to register?
- All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18)
years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election, may
register as a voter.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Any person who temporarily resides in another city,
municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession, employment in private or
public service, educational activities, work in the
military or naval reservations within the Philippines,
service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
National Police Forces, or confinement or detention
in government institutions in accordance with law,
shall not be deemed to have lost his original
residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may
not have reached the required age or period of
residence but, who, on the day of the election shall
possess such qualifications, may register as a
voter. (Sec. 9, RA 8189)
Who are Disqualified from Registering?
1. Any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than
one (1) year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote
under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire
the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years
after service of sentence.
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to
the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime
against national security, unless restored to his full
civil and political rights in accordance with law:
Provided, That he shall automatically reacquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after
service of sentence; and
3. Insane or incompetent persons declared as such
by competent authority unless subsequently
declared by proper authority that such person is no
longer insane or incompetent. (Sec. 11, RA 8189)
Manner of Registration
- A qualified voter shall be registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or
municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote
in any election. To register as a voter, he shall
personally accomplish an application form for
registration as prescribed by the Commission in
three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any
date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
- The application for registration shall contain three
(3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and
legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints,
with four (4) identification size copies of his latest
photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the
expense of the Commission.
- Before the applicant accomplishes his application
for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him
of the qualifications and disqualifications
prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to
it that the accomplished application contains all the
data therein required and that the applicant's
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and
photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the
voter's application. (Sec. 10, RA 8189)
Biometrics, Definition:
- This refers to the quantitative analysis that provides
a positive identification of an individual such as
voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris and/or
such other identifiable features. (Sec. 2(b), RA
10367)
Mandatory Biometrics Registration; Purpose:
- The Commission shall implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters. (Sec.
10, RA 10367).
- It is the policy of the State to establish a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters
through the adoption of biometric technology. (Sec.
1, RA 10367)
ENFORCEMENT TO ANNUL AN ILLEGAL REGISTRY OF
VOTERS:
- Any book of voters not prepared in accordance
with the provisions of this Code or the preparation
of which has been effected with fraud, bribery,
forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force, or any
other similar irregularity or which list is statistically
improbable may, upon verified petition of any voter
or election registrar, or duly registered political
party, and after notice and hearing, be annulled by
the Commission: Provided, That no order, ruling or
decision annulling a book of voters shall be
executed within sixty days before an election. (Sec.
145, Omnibus Election Code)
PRUDENTE vs. GENUINO
GR no. L-5222, November 6, 1951
In the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, the first duty of the
Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious
preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of
election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots,
appointments of members of the boards of inspectors,
establishment of precincts and designation of polling
places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters,
so as to put in readiness on election day the election
machinery in order that the people who are legally
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage may be able
to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is
incumbent upon the Commission to see that all these
preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest
elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code
contain regulations relative to these processes
preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the
Commission on Elections to see that all these
preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in
an orderly manner. It is essential that the Commission
or its authorized representatives, in establishing
precincts or designating polling places, must act freely,
honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also essential
that the printing of election forms and the purchase of
election supplies and their distribution are done freely,
honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further
essential that the political parties or their duly
authorized representatives who are entitled to be
represented in the boards of inspectors must have the
freedom to choose the person who will represent them
in each precinct throughout the country. It is further
essential that once organized, the boards of inspectors
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 111
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform
their duties in accordance with law freely, honestly and
in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In
other words, it is the duty of the Commission to see
that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are
placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their
duties without any pressure, influence and interference
from any private person or public official. All these
preparatory steps are administrative in nature and all
questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive
powers of the Commission to resolve. All irregularities,
anomalies and misconduct committed by any official in
these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power
of the Commission to correct. Any erring official must
respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these
preparatory acts, the preparation of the permanent list
of voters is the matter involved in this case, which to
our mind is completely an administrative matter.
ENFORCEMENT TO CANCEL A PROCLAMATION MADE
BY A BOARD OF CANVASSERS BASED ON
INCOMPLETE OR IRREGULAR CANVASS:
- It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has
the power to annul an illegal canvass and an illegal
proclamation as when they are based on
incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be
made by counting the returns wrongfully excluded.
(Lacson vs. COMELEC, GR no. L-16261,
December 28, 1951)
ENFORCEMENT TO DECIDE PRE-PROCLAMATION
CASES
- Under the Omnibus Election Code, this refer to
questions pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by any candidate or b any matter raised
under Sec. 233 (When the election returns are
delayed, lost or destroyed), Sec. 234 (Material
defects in the election returns), Sec. 235 (When
election returns appear to be tampered with or
falsified), and Sec. 236 (discrepancies in election
returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns. (Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code; Ibrahim
vs. COMELEC, GR no. 192289, January 8, 2013;
Cruz, p. 662)
Issues which can be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
as mentioned in Secs. 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate’s. (Sec. 343, Omnibus
Election Code)
112 – MORILLO NOTES
ENFORCEMENT TO DENY DUE COURSE TO A
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY:
A. Grounds:
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election
Code)
B. Procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition,
furnish a copy of the Petition, through personal
service to the respondent. In cases where personal
service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to
receive the Petition, or the respondents'
whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner
shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or
circumstances therefor and resort to registered
mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or
the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be
filed;
2. The Petition intended for the Commission shall be
in eleven (11) copies. Upon receipt of the Petition,
payment of the filing fee of P10,000.00 and legal
research fee of P100.00 and official receipt, the
Office of the Clerk of the Commission shall docket
the Petition and assign to it a docket number,
which must be consecutive according to the order
of receipt, and must bear the year and prefixed as
SPA (DC);
3. The Petition shall contain the correct information as
to the addresses, telephone numbers, facsimile
numbers, and electronic mail of both parties and
counsel, if known.
4. No Petition shall be docketed unless the
requirements in the preceding paragraphs have
been complied with;
5. Upon the proper filing and docketing of the
Petition, the Clerk of the Commission shall, within
three (3) days, issue summons with notice of
conference through personal service, or in the
event of impossibility or shortness of time, resort to
telegram, facsimile, electronic mail, or through the
fastest means of communication to the respondent
and notice of conference to the petitioner;
6. Within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from
receipt of summons, the respondent shall,
personally or through his authorized representative,
file his verified Answer to the Petition with the
Office of the Clerk of the Commission in ten (10)
legible copies, with proof of personal service of
answer upon the petitioner. A motion to dismiss
shall not be admitted, but grounds thereof may be
raised as an affirmative defense. The failure of the
respondent to file his verified Answer within the
reglementary period shall bar the respondent from
submitting controverting evidence or filing his
memorandum.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
7. The Clerk of the Commission or, in his/her
absence, his/her duly authorized representative,
shall preside during the conference. It shall be the
duty of the parties or their duly-designated
counsel, possessing a written authority under oath,
to appear during the conference. Should the
petitioner or his authorized counsel fail to appear,
the Petition shall be dismissed. Should respondent
or his authorized counsel fail to appear, the Petition
shall be deemed submitted for resolution. If the
petitioner or respondent is not present during the
conference, the failure of the counsel to produce a
written authority under oath shall have the effect of
non-appearance unless the counsel has previously
filed a pleading bearing the conformity of his client.
The following matters shall be taken up during the
conference:
a. Production of a written authority under
oath of counsel;
b. Comparison between the original and/or
certified true copies and copies of
documentary and real evidence; and
c. Setting of the period to file the parties'
respective memorandum, which shall not
be later than ten (10) days from the date of
the conference.
8. Unless the Division or the Commission En Banc
requires a clarificatory hearing, the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution upon the receipt
of both parties' Memoranda or upon the expiration
of the period to do so, whichever comes sooner.
9. The Memorandum of each party shall contain, in
the above order herein indicated, the following:
a. "Statement of the Case", which is a
clear and concise statement of the nature
of the action, a summary of the
documentary evidence, and other matters
necessary to an understanding of the
nature of the controversy;
b. "Statement of the Issues", which is a
clear and concise statement of the issues;
c. The "Argument" which is a clear and
concise presentation of the argument in
support of each issue;
d. The "Objections to Evidence", which
states the party's objections to the real
and documentary evidence of the other
party and stating the legal grounds for
such objection;
e. The "Relief" which is a specification of
the judgment which the party seeks to
obtain. The issues raised in his/its
pleadings that are not included in the
Memorandum shall be deemed waived or
abandoned. The Commission may
consider the memorandum alone in
deciding or resolving the Petition, said
memorandum being a summation of the
parties' pleadings and documentary
evidence; and
f. Annexes - which may consist of the real
and documentary evidence, including
affidavits of witnesses in lieu of oral
testimony, in support of the statements or
claims made in the Memorandum.
10. Prior to promulgation of a decision or resolution, a
Division or the Commission En Banc may, in its
discretion, call for a hearing in the event it deems it
necessary to propound clarificatory questions on
factual issues.
11. No other pleadings seeking affirmative relief shall
be allowed. If after termination of the Conference,
but prior to promulgation of a decision or
resolution, a supervening event occurs that
produces evidence that could materially affect the
determination of the grant or denial of the Petition,
a party may submit the same to the Division or
Commission En Banc, where applicable, through a
Manifestation. (Sec. 4, Rule 23, COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523)
FERMIN vs. COMELEC
GR no. 179695, December 18, 2008
Having thus determined that the Dilangalen petition is one under
Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now declares that the same
has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. Aznar
v. Commission on Elections and Loong v. Commission on
Elections give ascendancy to the express mandate of the law
that "the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy." Construed in relation to reglementary periods and
the principles of prescription, the dismissal of "Section 78"
petitions filed beyond the 25-day period must come as a matter
of course.
As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC "may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy."
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his
CoC in order to ascertain whether the Dilangalen petition filed on
April 20, 2007 was well within the restrictive 25-day period. If it
was not, then the COMELEC should have, as discussed above,
dismissed the petition outright.
The record in these cases reveals that Fermin filed his CoC for
mayor of Northern Kabuntalan for the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections on March 29, 2007. It is clear therefore that the
petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermin’s CoC was filed
by Dilangalen well within the 25-day reglementary period. The
COMELEC therefore did not abuse its discretion, much more
gravely, when it did not dismiss the petition outright.
ARATEA vs. COMELEC
GR no. 195229, October 9, 2012
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give
rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
The SC acknowledged that there may be instances when the
grounds for both Secs. 68 and 79 may overlap, as when a
candidate who represents that he is a resident of the place
where he seeks election but is actually a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country, in which case, he would clearly
also not be a resident of the place where he seeks election for at
least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. In
such cases, the Court clarified that one who would like to assail
the candidacy of that person may avail himself of either remedy.
ENFORCEMENT TO REJECT A NUISANCE CANDIDATE:
A. Grounds:
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 113
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to
give due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts
which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has
no bona fide intention to run for the office for which
the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate. (Sec. 69, Omnibus Election Code)
B. Procedure:
- Except for motu propio cases, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8 and 9 of Rule 23 shall apply in proceedings
against nuisance candidates. (Sec. 5, Rule 24,
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, as amended
by COMELEC Resolution no. 9523)
- NOTE: Please see Procedures under “Enforcement
to Deny due course to a certificate of candidacy”.
DELA CRUZ vs. COMELEC
GR no. 192221, November 13, 2012
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to
amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by enumerating
those changes brought about by the new automated election
system to the form of official ballots, manner of voting and
counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions
between manual and automated elections validly altered the
rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or
nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez
III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at
bar because the rules on appreciation of ballots apply only to
elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the
ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that,
especially in local elections, political rivals or operators benefited
from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to
cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential nuisance
candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full
name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes
brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by
similarity of surnames of candidates for the same position and
putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had
already been rectified by the new voting system where the voter
simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the
elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified
candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also
from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if
COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be
deleted from list of official candidates if the official ballots still
carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the
votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the
same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As earlier
114 – MORILLO NOTES
discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69
of the OEC should be distinguished from a petition to disqualify
under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of
a COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a
candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and Local
Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were
properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio because
COMELEC published the same before election day. As we
pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive knowledge of
such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as
it is then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio
could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate,
petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if
the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on
election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the
automated voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance
candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to
vote for could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct
the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more
consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our jurisprudence that
laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral
experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the
delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of
Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil
sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates
during elections
ENFORCEMENT TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE:
A. Grounds:
- Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Sec. 12,
Omnibus Election Code)
- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by
this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is
a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws. (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code)
- Under the Local Government Code, The following
persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving
sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of
an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country
or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded. (Sec. 40,
Local Government Code)
B. Distinctions between Sections 68 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code:
FERMIN vs. COMELEC
GR nos. 179695 & 182369, December 18, 2008
We must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition. They
are different remedies, based on different grounds, and
resulting in different eventualities. Private respondent’s
insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact
captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not
persuade the Court.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation
to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate.
Failure to meet the one-year residency requirement for the
public office is not a ground for the "disqualification" of a
candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the
commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds
for disqualification,
A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the
legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for
disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the
appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other
words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot
supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for the
filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and
a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of
CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.
C. Procedure:
- Except in motu proprio cases, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, and 8 of Rule 23 shall apply in proceedings to
disqualify a candidate. (Sec. 4, Rule 25, COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution no. 9523)
- NOTE: Please see Procedures under “Enforcement
to Deny due course to a certificate of candidacy”.
D. Effects of Disqualification:
1. RA 6646:
- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Sec. 6,
RA 6646)
CODILLA, SR. vs. DE VENECIA
GR no. 150605, December 10, 2002
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., respondent Locsin filed a
Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner’s
proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second
Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt was attached
evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the
petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a
copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division
issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner.
Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest
the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The
Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent
Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the
Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time
as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend
proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate’s
guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division
did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner’s
guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of
the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the
petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition . . . the Commission
(2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 . . . and
considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders."
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of
the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely
abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 115
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
2. Second placers and succession:
- If the winning candidate is not qualified
and cannot qualify for the office to which
he was elected, a permanent vacancy is
thus created. “The second placer is just
that, a second placer - he lost in the
elections, he was repudiated by either the
majority or plurality of voters. He could not
be proclaimed winner as he could not be
considered the first among the qualified
candidates. To rule otherwise is to
misconstrued the nature of the
democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voter’s preference.
(Geronimo vs. Ramos GR no. L-60591,
May 14, 1985)
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
GR no. 195649, April 16, 2013
The SC declared the petitioner as “not the second placer as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates. The SC explained the following: “With Arnado’s
disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so.
The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not
constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form
part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who
are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not
possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC
that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety
of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor
said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is
also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting
qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is
not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count
is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and
has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior
116 – MORILLO NOTES
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the
COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides: “Section 6. Effect of
Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.”
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be
suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only
filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and
after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and
an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy.
He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based
on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position." The
prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under
any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer
to the petition when the elections were conducted already and
he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long
after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the
May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will
not apply.
3. Electoral aspect vs. Criminal aspect of
Disqualification:
LANOT vs. COMELEC
GR no. 164858, November 16, 2006
The electoral aspect of a disqualification case
determines whether the offender should be disqualified
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

result of the election, the Commission shall, on the
from being a candidate or from holding office.
Proceedings are summary in character and require basis of a verified petition by any interested party
only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring and after due notice and hearing, call for the
candidate may be disqualified even without prior holding or continuation of the election not held,
determination of probable cause in a preliminary suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed a date reasonably close to the date of the election
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa. not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect but not later than thirty days after the
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case
cessation of the cause of such postponement or
determines whether there is probable cause to charge
a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec.
the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which 6, Omnibus Election Code)
determines whether probable cause exists. If there is
probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law
PRESBITERIO vs. COMELEC
Department, files the criminal information before the
GR no. 178884, June 30, 2008
proper court. Proceedings before the proper court
demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond
A failure of election may be declared only in the three instances
reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall
stated in Section 6 of the OEC: the election has not been held;
result in the disqualification of the offender, which may
the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law;
even include disqualification from holding a future
and the preparation and the transmission of the election returns
public office.
have given rise to the consequent failure to elect, meaning
nobody emerged as the winner. Furthermore, the reason for such
The two aspects account for the variance of the rules
failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism,
on disposition and resolution of disqualification cases
fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC
filed before or after an election. When the
can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
disqualification case is filed before the elections, the
election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established,
question of disqualification is raised before the voting
namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned
public. If the candidate is disqualified after the election,
on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
those who voted for him assume the risk that their
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast
votes may be declared stray or invalid. There is no
would affect the result of the election.
such risk if the petition is filed after the elections. The
COMELEC En Banc erred when it ignored the electoral
In the instant case, it is admitted by the petitioners that elections
aspect of the disqualification case by setting aside the
were held in the subject locality. Also, the private respondents
COMELEC First Division’s resolution and referring the
and four of the petitioners won in the elections and were
entire case to the COMELEC Law Department for the
proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials. There is
criminal aspect.
nothing in the records from which the Court can make even a
slim deduction that there has been a failure to elect in Valladolid,
ENFORCEMENT TO POSTPONE AN ELECTION: Negros Occidental. Absent any proof that the voting did not take
place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and
- When for any serious cause such as violence,
2,000 more supporters of the petitioners cannot even be
terrorism, loss or destruction of election considered as a basis for the declaration of a failure of election.
paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other Had petitioners been aggrieved by the allegedly illegal
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding composition and proceedings of the MBOC, then they should
of a free, orderly and honest election should have filed the appropriate pre-proclamation case contesting the
become impossible in any political subdivision, the aforesaid composition or proceedings of the board, rather than
Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified erroneously raising the same as grounds for the declaration of
petition by any interested party, and after due failure of election. On the TRO issued by the MCTC and the
subsequent defiance thereof by the MBOC, suffice it to state that
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties
the propriety of suspending the canvass of returns or the
are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall proclamation of candidates is a pre-proclamation issue that is
postpone the election therein to a date which solely within the cognizance of the COMELEC. In sum,
should be reasonably close to the date of the petitioners have not adduced any ground which will warrant a
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a declaration of failure of election.
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after
the cessation of the cause for such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect. ENFORCEMENT TO CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION:
(Sec. 5, Omnibus Election Code) 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before a
regular election, the Commission shall call a special
ENFORCEMENT TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF
election to be held within sixty days after the
ELECTION:
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the
- If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
unexpired term.
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
2. In case of the dissolution of the Batasang
any polling place has not been held on the date
Pambansa, the President shall call an election
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed
which shall not be held earlier than forty-five nor
by law for the closing of the voting, or after the
later than sixty days from the date of such
voting and during the preparation and the
dissolution.
transmission of the election returns or in the
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in
for the holding of the election to its provincial election
a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who
failure or suspension of election would affect the

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 117

 POLITICAL LAW
shall post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous
places preferably where public meetings are held in each
city or municipality affected. (Sec. 7, Omnibus Election
Code)
PROMULGATE RULES FOR PURPOSES
REGULATING ELECTIONS:
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY vs. COMELEC
GR no. 136781, October 6, 2000
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en
banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules
and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
SC RULING: In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent
parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-
list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA
7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory
provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the
Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the
power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both
petitioners and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our
lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer
election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to
the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no
violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA
7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions
as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they each be given
additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such
plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional
representation" mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
B. JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION CONTESTS
(Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C):
I. Original Jurisdiction:
- Over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials (Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C)
- it is the COMELEC, and not the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which
has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
qualifications of party-lists, although the latter
would have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
118 – MORILLO NOTES
Morillo Notes
nominees of political parties once they have
become Members of the House of Representatives.
(Layug vs. COMELEC, GR no. 192984, February
28, 2012)
- The COMELEC would retain its jurisdiction over the
OF qualifications of a congressional candidate until he
becomes a Member of the House of
Representatives, ie., after he had been validly
proclaimed, taken his proper oath and assumed
office as such. The COMELEC is not a judicial
tribunal but only an administrative body. Even so,
its decisions orders and rulings may be challenged
in a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 7, on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. (Reyes vs. COMELEC, GR no.
207264, June 25, 2013)
JAVIER vs. COMELEC
GR nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning;
on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope
conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution
should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any
matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office,
made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not
the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to
stress, the term should be given a consistent meaning and
understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and
Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify,
we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns"
to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns
and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction:
- Over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Sec.
2(2), Art. IX-C)
- The COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction over
contests involving municipal or barangay officials
as originally decided by regional or municipal trial
courts, and its decisions in these cases shall be
final, executory and not appealable. This rule does
not conflict with the minimum appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2),
which covers only the final judgments and orders
of courts of justice. (Reyes vs. Comelec, Supra)
Election contest involving barangay officials:
- Municipal trial courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all election contests involving
elective barangay officials. (Sec. 2, Rule 2, AM no.
07-4-15-SC)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- A decision of the Commission on Elections, either
in division or en banc, in a disqualification case
shall not bar the filing of a petition for quo warranto
based on the same ground, except when the
Supreme Court has affirmed the COMELEC
decision. (Sec. 10, Rule 2, AM no. 07-4-15-SC)
Election contests involving municipal officials:
- Regional trial courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all election contests involving
municipal officials. (Sec. 1, Rule 2, AM no. 10-4-1-
SC)
- The decision of the COMELEC, either en banc or in
division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar
to the filing of a petition for quo warranto based on
the same ground, except when the Supreme Court
has affirmed the COMELEC decision. (Sec. 9, Rule
2, AM no. 10-4-1-SC)
C. DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS
(Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-C):
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS:
- General Rule: The COMELEC shall have the
power to decide all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location
of polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters. (Sec.
2(3), Art. IX-C)
- Exception: Matters involving the right to vote.
(Supra)
D. DEPUTIZATION OF LAW-ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES (Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C)
Constitutional Provision:
- The COMELEC shall have the power to deputize,
with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C)
Additional Notes:
- This power may be exercised only with the consent
of the President as provided under Sec. 2(8), Art.
IX-C,
E. REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES (Sec.
2(5), Art. IX-C):
WHAT POLITICAL PARTIES MAY NOT BE REGISTERED?
- Parties, Organizations and Coalitions that seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means shall be denied registration. (Magdalo Para
sa Pagbabago vs. COMELEC, GR no. 190793,
June 19, 2012)
MAGDALO vs. COMELEC
GR no. 190793, June 19, 2012
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force,
usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which
is employed against common right, against the laws,
and against public liberty. On the other hand, an
unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not
be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite
with evil intent for it to exist.
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one
that was attended with violence. As publicly
announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their
dissatisfaction with the administration of former
President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption
in the military and the supposed sale of arms to
enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the
President, her cabinet members, and the top officials
of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these
goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by
civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with
ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building.
These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to
ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw
its support from the government constituted clear acts
of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held
hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use
of impelling force to take over and sustain the
occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other
unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government obscure the actual
circumstances surrounding the encounter. The
deliberate brandishing of military power, which
included the show of force, use of full battle gear,
display of ammunitions, and use of explosive devices,
engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At
the very least, the totality of these brazen acts
fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not,
therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the
predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or
threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
LIBERAL PARTY vs. COMELEC
GR no. 191771, May 6, 2010
It is established that “to join electoral contests, a party
or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation” Moreover, “political
coalitions need to register in accordance with the
established norms and procedures, if they are to be
recognized as such and be given the benefits
accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered
political parties carry a different legal personality from
that of the coalition they may wish to establish with
other similarly registered parties. If they want to
coalesce with one another without the formal
registration of their coalition, they can do so on their
own in the exercise of their and their members’
democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive
official recognition for their coalition. Or they can
choose to secure the registration of their coalition in
order to be accorded the privileges accruing to
registered coalitions, including the right to be
accredited as a dominant majority or minority party.
There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 119
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
terms.”
RA 7941 - REGISTRATION OF PARTY-LIST GROUPS/
ORGANIZATIONS:
- Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not
later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating
its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization
or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors
shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. (Sec. 5, RA 7941)
ATONG PAGLAUM vs. COMELEC
GR no. 203766, April 2, 2013
A "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector."
- The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections;
6. It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
(Sec. 6, RA 7941)
BANAT vs. COMELEC
120 – MORILLO NOTES
GR no. 179271, July 8, 2009
The SC declared as unconstitutional the other
ground specified in Sec. 6, to with “failure to obtain
at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.”
To wit: “The additional seats, that is, the remaining
seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall
be distributed to the party-list organizations
including those that received less than two percent
of the total votes. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this
threshold mathematically and physically prevents the
filling up of the available party-list seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in
a second round of seat allocation according to the
two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21
April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.”
RELEVANCE TO SECTION 8, ART. IX-C:
- No representation in registration, election and
canvassing boards
F. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
ELECTION OFFENSES (Sec, 2(6), Art. IX-C)
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION: COMELEC and DOJ:
- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the
other prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and
prosecute the same." (Sec. 43, RA 9369)
- The COMELEC does not derive its “exclusive
power” to investigate and prosecute cases of
violations of election laws from the Constitution,
but from the Omnibus Election Code. “The phrase
‘where appropriate’ leaves to the legislature the
power to determine the kind of election offenses
that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or
concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the
government.” (BANAT vs. COMELEC, Supra)
ARROYO vs. DOJ
GR no. 199082, September 18, 2012
The SC acknowledged that complaints for violations of election
laws may be filed either with the COMELEC or with DOJ and
that it may even initiate, motu propio, complaints for election
offenses. “Pursuant to law and the COMELEC’s own Rules,
investigations may be conducted either by the COMELEC itself
through its law department or through the prosecutors of the
DOJ”, which has been further acknowledged to possess, along
with “other prosecuting arms of the government,” not only a
“mere delegated authority” but, concurrent jurisdiction with the
COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses and to prosecute the same. Indeed, this concurrent
jurisdiction may even be exercised jointly by the COMELEC and
the DOJ.
En Banc and Division Cases
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Constitutional Provision:
- The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre- proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. (Sec. 3, Art.
IX-C)
TWO DIVISIONS:
- The COMELEC meets in two divisions, each
consisting of 3 members. Their decisions may be
elevated in a motion for reconsideration to, and
may be reviewed by, the COMELEC sitting En
Banc. (Cruz, p. 685)
ONLY FINAL ORDERS OF A DIVISION MAY BE RAISED
BEFORE THE COMELEC EN BANC:
General Rule:
- Only final orders of the COMELEC division may be
raised before the COMELEC En Banc, which may
entertain only motions for reconsideration of final
“decisions” pf a division. (Cayetano vs. COMELEC,
GR no. 193846, April 12, 2011)
- A division of the COMELEC may however not
elevate an appeal to the COMELEC En Banc
without first resolving it. (Eriguel vs. Comelec, GR
no. 190526, February 26, 2010)
- In the case of Cagas vs. COMELEC (GR no.
194139, January 24, 2012), The SC declared that it
has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
questioning the interlocutory orders of a division of
the COMELEC, such as an order providing for the
denial of a party’s special and affirmative defenses.
Exception:
- The only time that the SC may review an
interlocutory orde of a division of the COMELEC
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is when it acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, as when it rules on a matter which only
the COMELEC En Banc may properly determine in
accordance with the COMELEC’s Rules of
Procedure. (Kho vs. COMELEC, GR no. 124033,
September 25, 1997)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION(MR) MANDATORY
AND JURISDICTION BEFORE REVIEW BY SUPREME
COURT:
ESTEVES vs SARMIENTO
GR no. 182374, November 11, 2008
Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions (Sec. 3, Art. IX-C
and Sec. 7, Art. IX-A), the requirement that an aggrieved party
must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the
Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and
jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme
Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes
a ground for dismissal of the petition.
All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. As
held in Ambil v. Commission on Elections, the power of review of
the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only
to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and
not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC must first be elevated to the COMELEC en banc by
filing a motion for reconsideration.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because
the mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC
en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the
tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-recognized
exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a
special civil action for certiorari. The rationale therefore is that the
law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity
to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before
resort to the courts of justice can be had.
Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the review of a
resolution of the Division by the COMELEC en banc, the filing of
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is premature. The
petition does not allege that petitioner indeed filed a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The
unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the
adverse consequences of petitioner's own omission to file the
required motion for reconsideration. A litigant should first
exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before
seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The premature
invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
SEC. 3, ART. IX-C ONLY APPLIES TO DECISIONS IN THE
EXERCISE OF ADJUDICATORY OR QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS:
CANICOSA vs. COMELEC
GR no. 120318, December 5, 1997
Canicosa finally insists that it was error on the part of COMELEC
sitting en banc to rule on his petition. He maintains that his
petition should have first been heard by a division of COMELEC
and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for
reconsideration, pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the
Constitution.
But this provision applies only when the COMELEC acts in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not
when it merely exercises purely administrative functions. To
reiterate, the grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition are that:
(a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of
voters in their respective precincts; (b) more than one-half of the
legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers
voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he
actually received; (d) the control data of the election returns was
not filled up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without
padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in
the delivery of election returns.
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 121
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Clearly, all these matters require the exercise by the COMELEC
of its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the
COMELEC with regard to the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections.
Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear
and decide cases first by Division and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional. In the instant case, as aforestated, the issues
presented demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative functions.
Regulation of Public Utilities,
Franchises, Mass Media, Etc.
Constitutional Provision:
- The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Sec. 4, Art. IX-C)
RATIONALE:
- Such grants (especially those dealing with
transportation and communication) can be used to
improper advantage by political parties or
candidates to the detriment of their rivals who may
not be enjoying the same privileges. Therefore,
radio or television time can be allotted unfairly or
transportation facilities monopolized by certain
candidates only unless the COMELEC interposes
its supervisory or regulatory powers. (Cruz, p. 674)
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE vs. COMELEC
244 SCRA 272
The SC declared as unconstitutional a resolution of Respondent
COMELEC directing to provide it with free space of not less than
one half-page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The SC held that the compulsory “donation” was a
“taking” of private property without payment of just
compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the
Respondent COMELEC had not established the necessity of the
taking, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space, let alone its own authority to expropriate.
No Pardon, etc. without recommendation
from COMELEC
Constitutional Provision:
122 – MORILLO NOTES
- No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission. (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C)
Multi-Party System; No Block voting; Political parties
not represented in Boards; No Political Harassment
MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM:
- A free and open party system shall be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people,
subject to the provisions of this Article. (Sec. 6, Art.
IX-C)
NO BLOCK VOTING:
- No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution. (Sec. 7, Art. IX-C)
POLITICAL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED IN BOARD:
- Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in
accordance with law. (Sec. 8, Art. IX-C)
NO POLITICAL HARASSMENT:
- Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and
discrimination. (Sec. 10, Art. IX-C)
Election Period
Constitutional Provision:
- Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
special cases, the election period shall commence
ninety days before the day of election and shall end
thirty days thereafter. (Sec. 9, Art. IX-C)
ELECTION PERIOD vs. CAMPAIGN PERIOD
ELECTION PERIOD CAMPAIGN PERIOD
This commence ninety This cannot extend beyond
days before the day of election day and, ends 2
election and shall end thirty days before the election
days thereafter.
PENERA vs. COMELEC
GR no. 181613, November 25, 2009
The SC ruled that a candidate is liable for election offenses only
upon the start of the campaign period period. It declared that,
under existing laws (Sec. 79(a), Omnibus Election Code and Sec.
15, RA 8436) “any person who filed his certificate of candidacy
within the filing period shall only be considered a candidate at
the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate
of candidacy” and that “any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
campaign period.”
Fiscal Autonomy
FISCAL AUTONOMY:
- Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to
defray the expenses for holding regular and special
elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and
recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special
appropriations and, once approved, shall be
released automatically upon certification by the
Chairman of the Commission.(Sec. 11, Art. IX-C)
Judicial Review
Constitutional Provision:
- Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its Members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. (Sec. 7, Art. IX-A)
ARATUC vs. COMELEC
GR no. L-49705-09, February 28, 1979
The SC observed that its present jurisdiction “over orders,
rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC is not as broad as it
used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due
process.
A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of
judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of
discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is
otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of
the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight
pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational
deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of judgment may not
differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are
matters that by their nature ought to be left for final
determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or
entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the faithful
observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING vs. FERRER
135 SCRA 25
“What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings, and
decisions’ of the COMELEC reviewable by Certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers.” Hence, an order of the COMELEC
awarding a contract for the construction of voting booths, being
merely administrative in character, may be questioned not in a
petition for certiorari with the SC but an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (ART. IX-D)
Composition and Qualifications
COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS:
- There shall be a Commission on Audit composed
of a Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing experience, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment. At no time shall all
Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession. (Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D)
Term
TERM:
- The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven
years, one Commissioner for five years, and the
other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D)
FUNA vs. COA CHAIRMAN
GR no. 192791, April 24, 2012
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that
his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a
completely fresh 7-year term––from February 2008 to February
2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court,
starting in De Vera, then Imperial, Visarra, and finally Matibag.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of
the word "reappointment," there has been unanimity on the
dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as
chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would
allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation
and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc
to the spirit of the rotational system of succession. Imperial,
passing upon the rotational system as it applied to the then
organizational set-up of the COMELEC, stated: “The provision
that of the first three commissioners appointed "one shall hold
office for 9 years, another for 6 years and the third for 3 years,"
when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9
years without reappointment, evinces a deliberate plan to have a
regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the commission,
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 123
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
by having subsequent members appointable only once every
three years.”
To be sure, Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman partakes of a
promotional appointment which, under appropriate setting,
would be outside the purview of the constitutional reappointment
ban in Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, such
appointment, even for the term appearing in the underlying
appointment paper, ought still to be struck down as
unconstitutional for the reason as shall be explained.
SUMMARY OF COURT’S RULINGS:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three
constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the
uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full
term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term
as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes
(death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only
be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than
the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or
CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years
and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission.
Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under
the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition
against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the
Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service
as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of
Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that
"reappointment" found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different
position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would
constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict
legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Powers and Functions
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT:
- The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property,
owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government- owned
or controlled corporations with original charters,
124 – MORILLO NOTES
and on a post- audit basis. x x x However, where
the internal control system of the audited agencies
is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit,
as are necessary and appropriate to correct the
deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of
the Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Sec. 2(1),
Art. IX-D)
AGENCIES UNDER POST-AUDIT AUTHORITY OF THE
COMMISSION OF AUDIT:
1. Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this
Constitution;
2. Autonomous state colleges and universities;
3. Other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and
4. Such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy
or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. (Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-D)
AUTHORITY TO VETO:
- The Commission shall have exclusive authority,
subject to the limitations in this Article, to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties. (Sec.
2(2), Art. IX-D)
CALTEX PHILIPPINES vs. COA
GR no. 92585, May 8, 1992
The ruling on this particular point, quoted by petitioner from the
cases of Guevarra vs. Gimenez and Ramos vs. Aquino, are no
longer controlling as the two (2) were decided in the light of the
1935 Constitution.
There can be no doubt, however, that the audit power of the
Auditor General under the 1935 Constitution and the
Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution authorized
them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds
and property. Our present Constitution retains that same power
and authority, further strengthened by the definition of the COA's
general jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines and Administrative Code of 1987.
Pursuant to its power to promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds, the COA
promulgated on 29 March 1977 COA Circular No. 77-55. Since
the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and
regulations, it goes without saying that failure to comply with
them is a ground for disapproving the payment of the proposed
expenditure.
VERSOZA vs. CARAGUE
GR no. 157838, March 8, 2011
The SC held the COA may examine and audit the Coconut
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Development Authority’s (CDA) decisions regarding procurement
of equipment for its own use, including computers and its
accessories, which are subject to the COA’s auditing rules and
regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures.
“Necessarily, CDA’s preferences regarding the brand of its
equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules
on what is a reasonable price for the items purchased.”
MONETARY CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT:
- In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or
claims, other than those of accountable officers,
the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and
holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts
or claims need reference to other persons, office or
offices, or to a party interested, the period
aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last
comment necessary to a proper decision is
received by him. With respect to the accounts of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act
on the same within one hundred days after their
submission, Sundays and holidays excepted. (Sec.
1, CA no. 327)
PACETE vs. ACTING CHAIRMAN OF COA
185 SCRA 1 (1990)
Petitioner Pacete contended that the failure of COA to act on his
claim within the reglementary period resulted in its automatic
approval pursuant to Sec. 1, CA 327/
The SC disgreed, holding that the Petitioner’s remedy was to file
a petition for mandamus to compel the COA to render a decision
on his claim.
UP vs. DIZON
GR no. 171182, August 23, 2012
The SC emphasized that “trial judges should not immediately
issue writs of execution or garnishment against the Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities to
enforce money judgments. (Administrative Circular No. 10-2000
dated October 25, 2000) They should bear in mind that the
primary jurisdiction of examine, audit and settle all claims of any
sort due from the Government or any of its subdivision, agencies
and instrumentalities pertains to the COA pursuant to PD nno.
1445.” SC added, “it was of no moment that a final and
executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.
The settlement of the monetary claim was still subject to the
primary jurisdiction of the COA despite the final decision of the
RTC having already validated the claim. As such, Stern builders
and Dela Cruz as the claimants had no alternative except to first
seel the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.”
REVIEW OF COA DECISION, ORDERS OR RULINGS:
- The decisions, orders or ruling of the COA may be
reviewed by the SC within 30 days from receipt of
a copy of the same. (Rule 64, Rules of Court).
Prohibited Exemptions
PROHIBITED EXEMPTIONS:
- No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiaries in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Sec.
3, Art. IX-D)
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012
ISSUE: W/N the purchase of shares of stock in a private banking
corporation using coconut levy funds was subject to the audit
jurisdiction of the COA.
SC RULING: “The Constitution, by express provision, vests the
COA with the responsibility for State audit. As an independent
supreme State auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be
undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of
the 1987 Constitution, "[n]o law shall be passed exempting any
entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever,
or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.” Following the mandate of the COA and
the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear
that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special
public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares
purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said
funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to
private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public
funds of the government, and consequently renders them
impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent
provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its
constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its
constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the
coconut levy funds presents a classic example of an investment
of public funds. The conversion of these special public funds into
private funds by allowing private individuals to own them in their
private capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the
COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle
such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased
using special public funds into pure and exclusive private
ownership has taken, or will completely take away the said funds
from the boundaries with which the COA has jurisdiction.
Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt
or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III,
Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down
for being unconstitutional, be they assayed against Section 2(1),
Article XII (D) of the 1973 Constitution or its counterpart provision
in the 1987 Constitution.”
Report
REPORT:
- The Commission shall submit to the President and
the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an
annual report covering the financial condition and
operation of the Government, its subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities, including
government- owned or controlled corporations,
and non-governmental entities subject to its audit,
and recommend measures necessary to improve
their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit
such other reports as may be required by law.
(Sec. 4, art. IX-D)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 125
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
XV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
STATEMENT OF POLICY:
- Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. (Sec. 1, Art. XI)
Impeachment
DEFINITION OF IMPEACHMENT:
- It is defined as a method of national inquest into
the conduct of public men. (Cruz, p. 730)
- It is the power of Congress to remove a public
official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. (Corona vs. Senate,
GR no. 200242, May 9, 2008)
IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS:
1. The President;
2. The Vice-President,;
3. Members of the Supreme Court;
4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions; and
5. The Ombudsman. (Sec. 2, Art. XI)
MARCOLETA vs. BORRA
AC no. 7732, March 90, 2009
An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be
disbarred without first being impeached. Complainant’s
availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to
skirt this rule is specious.
It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec
members should be lawyers pertains to the desired composition
of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may follow such
constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of
lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded.
At the time the present complaint was filed, respondents and
three other commissioners were all lawyers. As an impeachable
officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent
Borra must first be removed from office via the constitutional
route of impeachment before he may be held to answer
administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and actions.
IN RE: GONZALES
AM no. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988
A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a
Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held
by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer,
during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the
Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries
with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service
of which would amount to removal from office.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that
it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred to
126 – MORILLO NOTES
above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or
other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that
there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be
observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from
office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections
2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure
of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SERENO
GR no. 237428, May 11, 2018
FACTS:
DISCUSSION:
1. Can the Supreme Court assume jurisdiction and
give due course to a petition for Quo Warranto
against an impeachable officer?
- A quo warranto petition is allowed against
impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
- The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA
and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including
quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed
when there are special and important reasons
therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is
justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition
is likewise of transcendental importance and has
far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered
to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise
restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s
appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial
duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s
duty to settle actual controversy squarely
presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the
exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty
and power to decide cases and settle actual
controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be
abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference
to, any other branch of the government including
the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment
court through the Senate.
- To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto
involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or
validity of the election or appointment of a public
official based on predetermined rules while
impeachment is a political process to vindicate the
violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of
the appointment. The title to a public office may
not be contested collaterally but only directly, by
quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public
office is treated as a public wrong and carries with
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
it public interest, and as such, it shall be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines through the
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The
SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal
authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the
government policy on the matter at hand.
2. Can Quo Warranto and impeachment proceed
independently and simultaneously?
- Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and
impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping
and is allowed.
- Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed
independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3)
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues, either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. The
test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs
sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of
whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief
Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other
hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses.
Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public
office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno
legally holds the public office and thus, is an
impeachable officer, the only issue being whether
or not she committed impeachable offenses to
warrant her removal from office.
- Moreover, the reliefs sought are different.
respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be
adjudged to cease from holding a public office,
which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of
the respondent from the public office that he/she is
legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that he/she, in
the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.
- Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because
the impeachment proceedings before the House is
not the impeachment case proper, since it is only a
determination of probable cause. The
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing
of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The process
before the House is merely inquisitorial and is
merely a means of discovering if a person may be
reasonably charged with a crime.
3. Is the Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over a Quo Warranto petition not violative of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers?
- The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
- The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an
action for quo warranto involving a person who
would otherwise be an impeachable official had it
not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the
core constitutional provision that impeachment
cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the
Senate. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized.
An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither
does a writ of quo warranto conclusively
pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise of
its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does
not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.
- However, logic, common sense, reason,
practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic
bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public
official should be removed from the position
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal
requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply
because of perceived availability of another
remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically
intended to be long and arduous and compel the
entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to
focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the
outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing
laws and case law.
- For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or
omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that
the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed
and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject
of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the
act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.
4. Is impeachment an exclusive remedy by which an
invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable
official may be removed from office?
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 127
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which
an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.
- The language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto
action against impeachable officers: “Section 2.
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The
provision uses the permissive term “may” which
denote discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere
possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment
ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of
removal by other methods when there are other
adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”
- The principle in case law is that during their
incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries
with it the penalty of removal, and if they are
required to be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged
with disbarment. The proscription does not extend
to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right
to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to
question the eligibility of the President and the
Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
officers.
- Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable
offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete
statement of the causes of removal from office. If
other causes of removal are available, then other
modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To
subscribe to the view that appointments or election
of impeachable officers are outside judicial review
is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-
prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise
be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the
appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned even when, for instance, he or she has
been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in
offices where Bar membership is a qualification,
when he or she fraudulently represented to be a
member of the Bar.
5. Does Prescription not lie against the State?
- Prescription does not lie against the State.
- The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing
contained in this Rule shall be construed to
authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the
128 – MORILLO NOTES
cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner
to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously,
the one-year prescriptive period has been applied
in cases where private individuals asserting their
right of office, unlike the instant case where no
private individual claims title to the Office of the
Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government itself
which commenced the present petition for quo
warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
- Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor, when directed by
the President of the Philippines, or when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to
believe that any case specified in the preceding
section can be established by proof must
commence such action.” It may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have
no application to quo warranto proceeding brought
to enforce a public right. There is no limitation or
prescription of action in an action for quo warranto,
neither could there be, for the reason that it was an
action by the Government and prescription could
not be plead as a defense to an action by the
Government.
- That prescription does not lie in this case can also
be deduced from the very purpose of an action for
quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end
a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations
applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent
and just court would allow an unqualified person to
hold public office, much more the highest position
in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be
faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for
office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster
because even up to the present, Sereno has not
been candid on whether she filed the required
SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment
was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
6. Is Sereno ineligible as a candidate and nominee for
the position of Chief justice?
- Sereno is ineligible as a candidate and nominee for
the position of Chief Justice.
- Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity
cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice
- Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public
office must be possessed at the time of
appointment and assumption of office and also
during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing
requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination
as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding
that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to
be nominated for said position follows as a matter
of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do
so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as
the Court can take judicial notice of the
explanations from the JBC members and the OEO.
he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains
the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the
public office, position or franchise of all the parties
to the action as justice requires.
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
- Neither will the President’s act of appointment
cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an
office constitutionally created, the participation of
the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC
itself.
- An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law.
While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing
power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all
other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible
to attack.
- The effect of a finding that a person appointed to
an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that
confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For
lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is
ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As
such, Sereno has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the
office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from
the appointive position of Chief Justice.
7. Does compliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably reflect on a person's integrity?
- Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is
constitutionally and statutorily mandated to
perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets
and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a
public office do so cum onere, or with a burden,
and are considered as accepting its burdens and
obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and
undertake to perform all the duties of their office.
The public has the right to demand the
performance of those duties. More importantly,
while every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary
- Noncompliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not
merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering
that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum
and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of that act as defined by the law, and
not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated.
Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT:
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution - wrongful,
intentional or willful disregard or flouting of the
fundamental law. This act must be deliberate and
motivated by bad faith to constitute as a ground for
impeachment.
2. Treason - committed by any person who, owing
allegiance to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines, levies war against it or adheres to its
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. (Art. 114,
Revised Penal Code)
3. Bribery - committed by any public officer who shall
agree to perform an act, whether or not constituting a
crime, or refrain from doing an act which he is officially
required to do in connection with the performance of
his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by him personally or
through the mediation of another, or who shall accept
gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (Arts. 210-
211, Revised Penal code)
4. Other high crimes - refers to those offenses which,
like treason and bribery, are of so serious and
enormous a nature as to strike at the very life or the
orderly workings of the government.
5. Graft and corruption - those prohibited acts under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
6. Betrayal of Public Trust - a catch-all ground to cover
all manner of offenses unbecoming a public
functionary but not punishable by the criminal statutes,
like inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse
of authority, breach of official duty by malfeasance or,
misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, obstruction of
justice.
GONZALES vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GR no. 196231, September 4, 2012
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment
under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds
of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was
deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of
office, the impreciseness of its definition also created
apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be
too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary
exercise by the legislature.” Indeed, the catch-all phrase
betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not
punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless,
render the officer unfit to continue in office” could be easily
utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in
office. However, deliberating on some workable standard
by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the
Constitutional Commission recognized that human error
and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it
reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public
trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal
but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust,
tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty,
favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers.” In
other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public
trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than
criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such
gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for
impeachment.
PROCEDURE ON IMPEACHMENT:
1. Initiation:
- The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. (Sec. 3(1), Art. XI)
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 129
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
Limitations on the exclusive power of the House to
initiate impeachment cases:
- Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official. (Francisco vs. House of Representatives,
GR no. 160261, November 10, 2003)
Who may initiate filing an impeachment complaint?
- Any Member of the house of Representatives; or
- By any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by
any Member thereof (sEC. 3(2), Art. XI)
- In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed. (Sec. 3(5), Art. XI)
Meaning of “to initiate”:
- No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. (Sec. 3(5), Art. XI)
- The term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
“taking initial action of said complaint. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be fled
against the same official within a one year period.
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR no.
160261, November 10, 2003)
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to
start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and
make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with
the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third
of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution.”
- An impeachment complaint need not allege only
one impeachable offense. Infact, multiple
complaints may be considered so long as they
would all be simultaneously referred or endorsed to
the proper Committee of the House of
Representatives, and would lead to only one
impeachment proceedings. (Gutierrez vs. House of
Representatives, GR no. 193459, February 15,
2011)
2. Referral to the proper Committee:
- A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed
by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
130 – MORILLO NOTES
Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. (Sec. 3(2), Art. XI)
3. Hearing by the Committee:
- The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof. (Sec. 3(2), Art. XI)
4. Submission of Report by the Committee to the
House with the Resolution:
- The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof. (Sec. 3(2), Art. XI)
5. Consideration of the Resolution by the House:
- The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to
the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof. (Sec. 3(2), Art. XI)
6. Voting by all the Members of the House:
- A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded. (Sec. 3(3), Art. XI)
7. Trial by the Senate:
- The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines
is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate. (Sec. 3(6), Art. XI)
8. Judgment:
- Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to
law. (Sec. 3(7), Art. XI)
- A judgment of the Congress in an impeachment
proceeding is normally not subject to judicial
review because of the vesture in the Senate of the
sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. Interpretation of the meaning of
different grounds for impeachment and
assessment of the evidence presented at the trial
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes

involve the exercise of wisdom or discretion which - A special court, of the same level as the Court of
comes under the category of “Political Questions”. Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of
- However, the Courts may annul the proceedings if a court of justice, to be known as the
there is a showing of a grave abuse of discretion Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a
committed by the Congress or of noncompliance presiding justice and fourteen associate justices
with the procedural requirements of the who shall be appointed by the President. (Sec. 1,
Constitutions, as where the charges are instituted RA 8249)
without a verified complaint, or by less than one-
third of all the members of the House of ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN:
Representatives, or where the judgment of 1. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
conviction is supported by less than two-thirds otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
vote in Senate. (Cruz, p. 746, See Francisco vs. Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
House of Representatives, GR no. 160261, II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
November 10, 2003) Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the
9. Rules on Impeachment: government, whether in a permanent, acting or
- The Congress shall promulgate its rules on interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose the offense:
of this section. (Sec. 3(8), Art. XI) a. Officials of the executive branch
- Meaning of to “promulgate” its rules: occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified
GUTIERREZ vs. HOUSE OF
as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the
REPRESENTATIVES
GR no. 193459, February 15, 2011 Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict specifically including:
"promulgation" to "publication," the former should be i. Provincial governors, vice-
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is governors, members of the
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how sangguniang panlalawigan, and
to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the provincial treasurers, assessors,
same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine
engineers, and other provincial
that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. department heads:
ii. City mayors, vice-mayors,
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of members of the sangguniang
government how to promulgate when the Constitution panlungsod, city treasurers,
itself has not prescribed a specific method of assessors, engineers, and other
promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a city department heads;
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the iii. Officials of the diplomatic service
Constitution.
occupying the position of consul
and higher;
iv. Philippine army and air force
FRANCISCO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
colonels, naval captains, and all
GR no. 160261, November 10, 2003
officers of higher rank;
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress v. Officers of the Philippine National
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to Police while occupying the
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." position of provincial director and
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on those holding the rank of senior
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively superintendent and higher;
carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these vi. City and provincial prosecutors
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
and their assistants, and officials
Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
and prosecutors in the Office of
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its the Ombudsman and special
power to make rules, prosecutor;
vii. Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-
The Sandiganbayan owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or
Constitutional Provision: foundations.
- The present anti-graft court known as the b. Members of Congress and officials thereof
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be the Compensation and Position
provided by law. (Sec. 4, Art. XI) Classification Act of 1989;
c. Members of the judiciary without prejudice
COMPOSITION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN: to the provisions of the Constitution;

POLITICAL LAW NOTES 131

 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
d. Chairmen and members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
e. All other national and local officials
classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under
the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a. of this section in relation to their
office.
3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986. (See. Sec. 2, RA 10660)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN:
- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided. (Sec. 2, RA 10660)
- The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or
which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court. (Sec. 2, RA 10660)
The Ombudsman
COMPOSITION OF THE OMBUDSMAN:
- There is hereby created the independent Office of
the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to
be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and
at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed. (Sec. 5,
Art. XI)
QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS:
- The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of
their appointment, at least forty years old, of
recognized probity and independence, and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have
been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman
must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the
same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided
for in Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.
(Sec. 7, Art. XI)
APPOINTMENT:
132 – MORILLO NOTES
- The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least six
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council, and from a list of three nominees for every
vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall
require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur. (Sec. 9, Art.
XI)
SALARY:
- The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the
rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of
the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall
receive the same salary which shall not be
decreased during their term of office. (Sec. 10, Art.
XI)
TERM:
- The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a
term of seven years without reappointment. They
shall not be qualified to run for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation
from office. (Sec. 11, Art. XI)
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN::
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate
case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of
documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
and report any irregularity to the Commission on
Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards
of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law. (Sec. 13, Art. VI)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors
of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials
or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify
the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof. (Sec. 12, Art. XI)
The Special Prosecutor
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR:
- The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known
as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Sec. 7, Art. XI)
ZALDIVAR vs. GONZALES
GR no. 79690-707, October 7, 1988
Respondent Gonzales (who had been appointed Tanodbayan
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution) claimed he was
the Ombudsman under the new charter.
The SC ruling: “The Office of the Tanodbayan, which was
formerly heeld by the respondent, was originally created by PD
no. 1607 pursuant to Art. XIII, Sec. 8, 1973 Constitution. It was
converted into the Office of the Special Prosecutor by Article XI,
Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution and allowed to retain only such of its
powers as had not been transferred to the Ombudsman. It is this
new office as reduced in status by the present charter that is
now held by the respondent.
The Office of the Ombudsman was directly created by the self-
executing provision of Art. XI, Sec. 6, 197 Constitution. No
implementing legislation was needed to bring it into existence,
which legally commenced on February 2, 1987, when the charter
was ratified. It was recently filled by the President with a person
other than Respondent Gonzales. The Respondent Gonzales is
not and never has been the Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution. What is more, it is now the new Ombudsman who
carries the title of Tanodbayan.
The clear intention of the Constitution is to vest the Ombudsman
with more authority, prestige and importance and reduce the
Special Prosecutor to the rank of a mere subordinate of the
former. Obviously, the Special Prosecutor under this set-up
cannot claim to be concurrently the Ombudsman and exercise
the latter’s powers as this would be a violation of the
Constitution.”
Ill-Gotten Wealth
Constitutional Provision:
- The right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel. (Sec. 15, Art. XI)
Additional Notes:
- this provision applies only to civil cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal
cases, such as for violation of the provisions of RA
no. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
involving ill-gotten wealth.
REPUBLIC vs. DESIERTO
438 Phil. 201 (2002)
The SC declared that, in the prosecution of cases pertaining to
behest loas obtained during the Marcos regime, the prescriptive
period shall be reckoned from the discovery of such loans. “The
reason for this is that the government, as an aggrieved party,
could not have known that those loans existed when they were
made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to
perpetrate fraud against the government. They could only have
been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution when the
people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that
date, no person would have dared question the legality or
propriety of the loans.”
REPUBLIC vs. COJUANGCO
GR no. 139930, June 26, 2012
Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing,
what is questioned here is not the grant of behest loans that, by
their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the
simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is
rather involved here is UCPB’s investment in UNICOM, which
corporation is allegedly owned by respondent Cojuangco,
supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not, however,
appear to have been withheld from the curious or from those
who were minded to know like banks or competing businesses.
Indeed, the OSG made no allegation that respondent members
of the board of directors of UCPB connived with UNICOM to
suppress public knowledge of the investment.
Accordingly, the SC dismissed the charges against the
respondent in said case for his violation of the provisions of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground of
prescription. The SC said: “Prescription of actions is a valued
rule in all civilized states from the beginning of organized society.
It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone
the filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant,
through the passage of time, of access to defense witnesses
who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to documents
that would have been discarded or could no longer be located.
Moreover, the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There
is an absolute need in the interest of fairness to bar actions that
have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.
Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against
them failed to show probable cause. They point out that, prior to
the third amendment of UNICOM’s capitalization, the stated
value of the one million shares without par value, which belonged
to its incorporators, was ₱5 million. When these shares were
converted to 5 million shares with par value, the total par value of
such shares remained at ₱5 million. But, the action having
prescribed, there is no point in discussing the existence of
probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019.”
Loans
LOANS:
- No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose may be
POLITICAL LAW NOTES 133
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granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-
owned or controlled bank or financial institution to
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman,
or to any firm or entity in which they have
controlling interest, during their tenure. (Sec. 16,
Art. XI)
Assets and Liabilities
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES:
- A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath
of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case
of the President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court,
the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed
forces with general or flag rank, the declaration
shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law. (Sec. 17, Art. XI)
OMBUDSMAN vs. RACHO
GR no. 185685, January 31, 2011
By mandate of law, every public official or government
employee is required to make a complete disclosure of
his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress
any questionable accumulation of wealth because the
latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.
Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired
money or property manifestly disproportionate to his
salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie
presumed to have illegally acquired it.
It should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail
is "acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source
of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted,
then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not
penalize.
CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES:
- Public officials and employees have an obligation
to accomplish and submit declarations under oath
of, and the public has the right to know, their
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years
of age living in their households. (Sec. 8, RA 5713)
Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial
Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those
who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections and those of their spouses
and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in
their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
a. real property, its improvements, acquisition costs,
134 – MORILLO NOTES
assessed value and current fair market value;
b. personal property and acquisition cost;
c. all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or
in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
d. liabilities, and;
e. all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
a. within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
b. on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
c. within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to
file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty
(30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the
necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all
appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and
financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the
year when they first assumed any office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees
may file the required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall
be filed by:
1. Constitutional and national elective officials, with the
national office of the Ombudsman;
2. Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of
the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator;
and all national executive officials with the Office of the
President.
3. Regional and local officials and employees, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
4. Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, with the Office of the President, and
those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman
in their respective regions; and
5. All other public officials and employees, defined in
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.
Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty
of every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to
the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the
Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by
the Civil Service Commission.
Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed
under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at
reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or
reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are
filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required
to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and
mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the
public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement.
After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless
needed in an ongoing investigation.
Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or
use any statement filed under this Act for:
a. any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
b. any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the
general public. (See Sec. 8, RA 6713)
 POLITICAL LAW
Morillo Notes
DOES COMPLIANCE WITH THE SA.L.N. REQUIREMENT
INDUBITABLY REFLECT ON A PERSON’S INTEGRITY?
- CD
- Noncompliance with the SALN requirement
indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not
merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect
Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering
that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum
and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of that act as defined by the law, and
not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated.
Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
(Republic vs. Sereno, GR no. 237428, MMay 11,
2018)
Dual Citizenship/Dual Allegiance
Constitutional Provision:
- Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law. (Sec. 18, Art. XI)
DUAL CITIZENSHIP vs. DUAL ALLEGIANCE:
DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Arises when, as a result of the Refers to the situation in which
concurrent application of the a person simultaneously owes,
different laws of two or more by some positive act, loyalty to
states, a person is two or more states.
simultaneously considered a
national by the said states.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO
GR no. 135083. May 26, 1999
The SC, in interpreting the disqualification of “dual citizenship”
under Sec. 40, RA 7160, declared that dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance.
“Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern
of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per
se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.”
JACOT vs. DAL
GR no. 179846, November 29, 2008
The SC pronounced that the “petitioner’s act of running for
public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. hile this Court has
previously declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
remuneration of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already
adjudge superseded by the enactment of RA 9225 on August 29,
2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.”
RA 9225 (CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-
ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003):
- Natural born citizens who are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine Citizenship after their
naturalization as citizens of foreign country, or who,
after the effectivity of said law, shall be allowed to
retain their Ohilippine Citizenship despite their later
becoming citizens of a foreign country, upon taking
an oath of allegiance to the Republic, may be
elected or appointed to public office only upon
taking a second otah consisting of, this time, also a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship. (Secs. 5(2) and (3), RA 9225)
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
GR no. 195649, April 16, 2013
A candidate who took such second oath was considered to have
recanted the same because of his having used his American
passport after taking said oath renouncing allegiance to America.
He was, accordingly, disqualified from running for mayor.
SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC
GR no. 198742, August 10, 2012
The SC provided that failure to renounce foreign citizenship in
accordance with the exact tenor of Sec. 5(2), RA 9225, renders a
dual citizenship ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office. It stressed that foreign citizenship must be formally
rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath”.
Therefore: “The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and
averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia
sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that
her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship. Under the provisions of the
aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point,
she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On
September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective
public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in
Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
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