Statutory Construction by Rolando Suarez

STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
LL.B., SAN BEDA COLLEGE
Professor of Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law Review, and
Political Law Review
Former Professor of different law subjects in several
colleges (i.e., San Beda College of Law,
Adamson University, MLQU, Lyceum, University of Perpetual Help,
PUP and University of Manila); Lecturer; Powerhouse Law Review
Center; Center for Global Best Practices; IBP-MCLE; UM Review;
Perpetual Help, Las Piñas and Biñan, MLQ Pre-week,
Knowledge Providers Law Review Center,
Suarez, Zamora, Suarez and Suarez
Author: Political Law Reviewer, Constitutional Law Reviewer; Six Months Before
the Bar Outline/Reviewer; Three Months Before The Bar Outline Reviewer
Principles; Comments and Cases in Constitu-tional Law, Volume I, First Edition
and Second Edition; Principles, Com-ments and Cases in Constitutional Law,
Volume II, First Edition and Second Edition; Agrarian Reform and Social
Legislation;
Comparative Study; Roman Law and Philippine Law, First and Second
Edition; Introduction to Law, First, Second, Third and Fourth Editions;
Notes and Comments, Proclamation No. 3 and
The Provisional Constitution of the Philippines; Agrarian Reform,
Cooperatives and Taxation; A Mile to Go for Genuine Land Reform in
the Philippines; Statutory Constitution, First and Second Edition; Torts
and Damages First and Second Edition; Legal Forms; The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Made Easy
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DEDICATION
To my wife, Nora, and children, Revelyn, Rhonnel, Reinna

Ricci, and Rizza; to my beloved and .deceased parents, Marcelo A.
Suarez and Elena Arevalo Suarez, my first teachers, who taught me the
rudiments of writing and the value of hard work; to my thoughtful and loving
aunt, Cornelia Arevalo Vda. De Capul; to my kind and equally thoughtful
mother-in-law, Niflea Lautchang Vda. De Manalese, who just passed away;
to my deceased brothers and sisters, Buendegardo, Proserfina, Elvira,
Manolo, and Rodolfo with whom I have shared the blessings of a modest
home and hardwork-ing parents; to all my former teachers who cared to
enlighten me with their knowledge; to my town mates and friends who share
my thoughts and aspirations for a better society; and above all, to my dear
God who is always generous to help me in any of my endeavors, I dedicate
this humble work.
iu
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I acknowledge the assistance rendered by the members of my present

staff, Hanna Marie M. Manila, and Augusto C. Lusung, Jr., my former
student who found interest to learn how to write a law book and even a non-
law book.
I thank the proofreaders, including my children, Roland Rhon-nel M.
Suarez, a lawyer, and Rhina Rizza M. Suarez, for encoding some
commentaries which I write from time to time.
I also wish to thank the whole Editorial Production Department of Rex
Book Store for helping me throughout the entire printing process.
Above all, I am immensely grateful to God for all the blessings,

guidance and fortune that I have received and those still to come.
V
PREFACE
I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007.

Last year, I was reminded by a concerned staff of REX Book Store that
I am not able to revise the second edition of Statutory
Construction, and I was requested to do so as soon as possible, in
response to numerous requests of students and professors.
I was about to start the revision last year, but I was saddled by my busy
schedule in bar review classes until the first week of August 2013. After the
end of the bar examinations last year, I was all set to start the revision, but
again, and to my dismay, I suffered a stroke last October 2013, and I was
advised to take a rest.
After my recovery, I started reading new cases and jurispru-dence
about the subject. I gathered the important ones and they are now included in
this edition. They are the cases in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.
Like what I have done in all the books I wrote in different sub-jects, I
have tried to have a simplified presentation and discussion of the various
principles and cases covering the subject matter.
I hope that this new edition, like any other book or books I wrote, will
be of valuable help to all students and professors through-out the country.
December 18, 2014, Paranaque City
ROLANDO A. SUAREZ
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT,
PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
Statutory construction, defined........................................................................ 1
Construction distinguished from interpretation.............................................1
The most basic rules to remember..................................................................2
Decisions of the Supreme Court that clarify the rule on
the issue of when to apply and interpret the law 2
Three (3) cardinal rules when the wordings of the
Constitution are subject to interpretation..............................................3
Who interprets the law?....................................................................................3
Purpose of interpretation and construction....................................................4
When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret
and construct?........................................................................................4
New Case
Cynthia S. Bolos v. Danilo T. Bolos
G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010......................................................5
Old Case
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second
25% grant of the special allowance for judges be
included in the computation of his retirement
benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004 7
Ambiguitydefined.............................................................................................9
The present structure of government, and how this
affects interpretation and construction of statutes 9
Legislative power...........................................................................................10
Case
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v.
CA, et al., G.R. No. 125183, September 29, 1997..............................10
ix
Judicial power, traditional concept of judicial power 13
What is the traditional concept of judicial power?...............................13
What is the new definition of judicial power?....................................13
New Case
Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010................................................14
Old Case
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, Manila Hotel
Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 122156,
February3, 1997...............................................................................18
The Court or the judicial arm of the government shall be
governed by rules................................................................................22
Executive Department..................................................................................23
The three (3) principal branches of government..........................................24
CHAPTER II
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
Use intrinsic aids before resorting to extrinsic aids.....................................27
What are the intrinsic aids?...........................................................................27
New Case
Spouses Pascual, et al.,
Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano,
Edwin D. Mariano and Danny R. Mariano v.
Spouses Ballesteros, et al.,
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012..................................................29
Old Case
LandBank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118745, July 5, 1996............................................................31
New Case
South Pacific Sugar Corporation and
South East Asia Sugar Mill Corporation v.
Court Of Appeals and
x
Sugar Regulatory Administration
G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011.....................................................32
Old Case
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v.

Court of Appeals and Herminigildo Pascual,
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997..................................................35
Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348,

June 14, 1996 En Banc, Per Curiam...................................................39
New Case
Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v.
Hon. Court Of Appeals and Asia United Bank
G.R. No. 187919, April 25, 2012........................................................43
Old Cases
People v. Hon. A. Purisima, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L.420050-66, November 20, 1978 ................... 46
U.S. v. Hart, et al.,

26 Phil. 149 ........................................................................ 47
General Milling Corporation v. Torres,

G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991 ........................................ 48
Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169,

November 4, 1996 ............................................................. 50
ExtrinsicAids ............................................................................. 53
1. Contemporaneous circumstances ..................................... 53
2 . Policy .................................................................................. 53
3. Legislative history of the statute ..................................... 54
4. Contemporaneous and practical construction ................. .54
5. Executive construction ...................................................... 54
6. Legislative construction .................................................... 54
7. Judicial construction ......................................................... 55
8. Construction by the bar and legal commentators .......... 55
Simplifications of the rule regarding the use

of extrinsic aids ................................................................. 55
Cases
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 ............................. ............. . 55
Bonifacio v. Judge Dizon, G.R. No. 79416,
September5, 1989.................................................................. 57
Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106
Phil. 466 [1959] and Aguinaldo v. Santos,
212 SCRA 768 [1992].......................................................... 58
Garcia-Padilla v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Fabian C. Ver and General Fidel V. Ramos
& Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel G.R. No. 61388,
April20, 1983.................................................................... 61
Attendant circumstances considered ........................................ 63
Comments on this part of the decision .................................... 64
Contemporaneous circumstances and what was actually
being experienced by the soldiers in the battlefield 64
The historical basis of the President's Power to
suspend the privilege of habeas corpus ........................... 65
Reasons and evils sought to be remedied by LOl 1211.......... 65
Opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court ............................................... 66
Cases
CelsO Halili and Arthur Haul v. C.A. and Helen
Meyers Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 113539,
March12, 1998.....................................................................................73
Emilio M.R. Osmefla and Pablo Garcia v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998......................................................78
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Merida Ruth Romero....................................82

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban................................85
Cases
Joker Arroyo, et al. v. Jose de Venecia, et al.,
G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998..........................................................87
Joseph Estrada V. Aniàno Desierto,

in his capacity as Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 March 2. 2001...................................................90
xli
New Case
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danio B. Faller and
Ferdinand N. Talabong v.
Commission On Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo,
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009................................................99
Old Case
Socrates v. COMELEC & Hagedorn,
G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002............................................101
Background of rules and jurisprudence in case

of termination of employment 103
Cases
Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989.....................................................105
Ruben Serrano v National Labor Relations

Commission and Isetann Department Store,
G R No 117040, January 27, 2000 107
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,
442 SCRA 573 (2004) 109
Presumptions in aids of construction...........................................................110

Presumption of validity......................................................................111
Presumption of constitutionality........................................................111
Presumption of good faith..................................................................112
Presumption agamst injustice 112
Presumption against inconsistency 112
Presumption against absurdity 113
Presumption against ineffectiveness 113
Presumption against irrepealable laws 113
Case
De Guia v. Guingona, et al.,
G R No 119525, April 18, 1995 114
Presumption against implied repeals 115
Presumption against violation of public policy 115
Presumption of knowledge of existing, laws 115
Presumption of acquiescence to judicial
construction 116
.
Presumption of jurisdiction 116
Presumption of acting within the scope of authority 116
Presumption against violation of international law ....... 116
CHAPTER III
LAW, ITS CONCEPT AND CLASSIFICATION
Definition of law ......................................................................... 117
Classification of law ................................................................... 118
Sources of law ............................................................................ 119
Statutes ...................................................................................... 121
Kinds of statutes ........................................................................ 121
As to nature
Penal statutes ................................................................................................................. ... 121
Remedial statutes 121
Substantive statutes ................................................. 121
Labor statutes ........................................................... 121
Tax statutes .............................................................. 121
As to application
Mandatory ................................................................. 121
Directory .................................................................... 121
As to performance
Permanent ................................................................. 121
Temporary ................................................................. 121
As to scope
General ...................................................................... 121
Special ....................................................................... . 121
Local .......................................................................... 121
Other classifications
A statute could either be prospective
orretroactive ...................................................... 121
A statute could either be a repealing act
or an amendatory act ......................................... 121
A statute could either be a reference statute
or a declaratory statute ..................................... 121
Identification of statutes ........................................................... 122
How are statutes identified? ............................................ 122
Partsof statutes ......................................................................... 122
Seven parts of a statute ................................................... 122
Title........................................................................... 122
Preamble ................................................................... 124
Enacting Clause
............................ .
..... . ...................... 125
xiv
125
Body
Proviso.....................................................................................127
Interpretative clause................................................................128
Repealing clause......................................................................128
Savingclause............................................................................129
Separability clause..................................................................129
Otherlaws................................................................................130
1. Presidential issuances.......................................................130
130
Background........................................................................
130
Examples............................................................................
2. Ordinances........................................................................136
Effectivityof laws.........................................................................................140
When shall a law take effect?............................................................... 140
Scope of Tañada v. Tuvera...............................................................140
140
Effectivity of presidential issuances...................................................
140
Effectivity of ordinance......................................................................
Who are subject to Philippine laws?............................................................141
CHAPTER IV
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF STATUTES
Validity and constitutionality of statutes.....................................................142
Actual case or controversy...........................................................................143
Properparty...................................................................................................143
Earliest opportunity......................................................................................143
Decision of the constitutional question
is necessary to determine the case itself.............................................144
Effect of unconstitutional statute.................................................................144
If totally declared unconstitutional..............................................................144
If partially declared unconstitutional...........................................................144
What is the effect of a statute which is declared
unconstitutional?................................................................................145
What is the extent of judicial power to declare the
unconstitutionality of assailed legislative
and executive acts?.............................................................................146
Requisites for declaration of partial unconstitutionality..............................147
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
Statutes must be read and construed as a whole..........................................148
xv
Legislative intent must be ascertained from the
statute as a whole................................................................................148
New Case
Lorenzo T. Tangga-an v.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013...................................................149
Old Case
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit
G.R. No. L-59154, April 3, 1990.......................................................152
Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the

different provisions of the statute including the
conflicting provisions thereof.............................................................153
As a rule, the statute of later date prevails...................................................153
Generalia specialibus non derogant.........................................................154
A special law prevails over a general law....................................................154
Exceptions to this rule..................................................................................155
Parimatenia rule..........................................................................................155
In interpreting reenacted statutes, the court will follow the
construction which such statute received when
previously in force..............................................................................156
In the case of adopted statute, the interpretation of the
courts of the State from which it is adopted should
be considered......................................................................................157
In case of conflict between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter prevails................................................158
Implied repeals are not legally presumed in the absence
of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intentions.............................................................................................159
Case
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004..............................................159
CHAPTER VI
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF
SPECIFIC STATUTES
Specific Statutes...........................................................................................161
Rules of construction of the following statutes............................................161
xw
Construction of each statute..................................................... 162
PenalStatutes............................................................................ 162
How are penal statutes interpreted? ...............................
. 162
RemedialStatutes ..................................................................... 162
How are remedial statutes construed? ............................ 162
Substantive Statutes ................................................................. 162
LaborStatutes ........................................................................... 163
How are labor laws interpreted? ...................................... 163
TaxStatutes............................................................................... 164
How are tax statutes interpreted? ................................... 164
MandatoryStatutes................................................................... 165
DirectoryStatutes ...................................................................... 165
PermanentStatute .................................................................... 168
TemporaryStatute .................................................................... 168
GeneralStatute.......................................................................... 168
SpecialStatute........................................................................... 168
LocalStatute.............................................................................. 168
OtherStatutes ........................................................................... 169
Statutes in derogation of rights....................................... 169
Statutes granting privileges............................................. 169
Naturalization laws .......................................................... 169
Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties ................... 169
Statute authorizing suits against the government ........ 169
Statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing
power of local government units ............................. 170
Statute imposing penalties for non-payment of tax 170
Electionlaws ..................................................................... 170
Adoptionstatutes.............................................................. 170
Amnesty proclamations .................................................... 171
Veteran and pension laws................................................ 171
General welfare legislations............................................. 171
Probationlaw .................................................................... 171
Laws on attachment ......................................................... 171
Rulesof court..................................................................... 171
Statutes prescribing qualifications for an office ............. 171
Election laws on qualification and disqualification........ 172
Other classifications .................................................................. 172
A statute could either be prospective or retroactive............... 172
Prospective statute............................................................ 172
Retroactivestatute............................................................ 173
A statute could either be a repealing act or an
Amendatoryact................................................................. 173
Repealingact ..................................................................... 172
Repeal 174
The repeal of a statute is either total or partial..................... 174
Amendatoryact .......................................................................... 175
A Statute could either be a reference statute, a
supplemental statute, a reenacted statute or an
adopted Statute ................................................................. 176
Reference statute .............................................................. 176
Supplemental statutes...................................................... 176
Reenacted statutes ................................................ . ............ 176
Adopted statutes ............................................................... 177
CHAPTER VII
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING
AND IMPORTANCE
Importance of Latin Maxims .................................................... 178
Latin maxims applicable to statutory construction ................ . 179
On the principle that laws should be prospective,
not retroactive ........................................................... 179
On the principle that when the law is clear, what
the courts should do is to apply it, not to 180
interpretit.................................................................
On the principle that it is not the letter of the law
that killeth, it is the spirit of the law that 181
givethlife ..................................................................
On the principle that what is not included in those
enumerated are deemed excluded........................... 182
On the principle that special provisions prevail
over general provisions ............................................ 183
New Case
Maria Virginia V. Remo v.
The Honorable Secretary Of Foreign Affairs
G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010...................................... 183
On the principle that while the law may be hard,
it is the law that will be followed ........................... 186
New Case
Arnold James M. Ysidoro v. People Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012.............................. 186
On the general principle that without intent, there
can be no crime ......................................................... 188
xvrn
On the principle that ignorance of the law excuses
no one but ignorance of fact may be an excuse......................188
On the principle that when the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish........................................................189
Latin Maxims and phrases related to the subject
of statutory construction.....................................................................189
Mens legislatores................................................................................189
Reddendo singula singulis..................................................................190
Cassus omissus pro omisso habbendus est........................................190
Noscitur a sociis.................................................................................191
Ejusdem generic.................................................................................192
CHAPTER VIII
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

USED IN A STATUTE
How are words and phrases in a statute interpreted?...................................194

Is the statutory definition conclusive to the courts?.....................................194
Rules that govern the following situations...................................................194
When the word used in a statute has a general meaning 195
When the word used has a technical meaning.............................................195
Case
Macasaet v Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989.........................................................196
When the word used has no meaning in harmony with

the legislative intent...........................................................................198
When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in
astatute................................................................................................199
Particular words and phrases........................................................................199
Theword "OR"....................................................................................199
The word "AND.................................................................................201
The term "AND/OR...........................................................................201
New Case
Antonio D. Dayao, et al., v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193643 and
Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. v.
COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193704, January 29, 2013.................................................201
kAm
Old Case
Civil Service Commission v. Saturnino Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004..................................................205
The words "SHALL"..................................................................................206
The word "MAY"........................................................................................208
The word "ALL," "EVERY," and "ANY....................................................208
The words "AND SO FORTH,"
and "AND THE LIKE........................................................................208
Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT,"
and"NO...............................................................................................209
Due process of law.......................................................................................209

Requirements of due process...................................................................................210
Substantive due process...............................................................................210
Procedural due process................................................................................210
Two aspects of procedural due process.......................................................210
Court's power to construe statutes arises only if the
statute is not clear...............................................................................212
In the process of construing a statute, what are those
that the court can do and what are those that
the court cannot do.............................................................................212
What happens if the statute is not capable of
interpretation or construction'.............................................................213
Can the supreme court abandon or overrule its
earlier decision?..................................................................................213
If the decision of the supreme court in a particular case
is not correct, should it be followed by the
inferior courts?...................................................................................215
CHAPTER IX
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
OF CONTRACTS
Can the contracting parties enter into any kind of
agreement and establish such terms and conditions
that they may deem proper?...............................................................216
Who are bound by the terms of the contract 9.............................................217
When is it necessary and not necessary to interpret the
terms of the contract?.........................................................................217
In case of conflict between the words of the contract
and evident intention of the parties,
which prevails?..................................................................................219
How to judge the intention of the parties?...................................................219
xx
Rules governing the following:
Effect of the use of several terms.......................................................220
Effect of stipulations that admit of several
meanings...................................................................................220
Effect of words which may have different
significations............................................................................220
Effect of usage or custom of the place.............................................220
Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract 220
Use of general terms....................................................................................220
Stipulations that admit general meanings....................................................220
Usage or custom of the place.......................................................................220
Obscure words or stipulation.......................................................................220
Rule in case of doubt as to the principal object and as to
the incidental circumstances...............................................................221
Other rules of interpretation.........................................................................221
New Case
Salun-At Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz v.
Eloisa Espejo, et al.,
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010 ..................................................223
CHAPTER X
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
Cases
Emeteria Liwag v.
Happy Glen Loop Homeowners Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012.........................................................227
Philippine International Trading Corporation v.
Commission On Audit
G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010.......................................................227
Batangas Power Corporation v. Batangas City and
National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 152675;
and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Ricardo
R. Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 152771,
April28, 2004....................................................................................228
Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004.................................................231
Mel
United Harbor Pilots' Assn. of the Phils., Inc. v.
Assn. of Int'l. Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 133763,
November 13, 2002............................................................................234
People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

and Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., G.R. No. 101724,
SupremeCourt.....................................................................................235
Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571,

February6, 1991................................................................................238
Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor And
Employment Accreditation Committee For
Medical Clinics v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. 724, April Z, 1931 ...............................................
Maceda v. Macaraig G.R. No. 88291,

May31, 1991 ..................................................................... 240
Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality
of Pililia, G.R No. 90776, June 3, 1991 .......................... 241
Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991 ........... 241
Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991 ......... 241
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 44007,
March 20, 1991 ................................................................... 242
De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416,
April8, 1991 ....................................................................... 242
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991 .................................. 242
People of the Philippines v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269,
June5, 1991.................................................... ..................................244 ..
Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa,

G.R. No. 95122; Board of Commissioners v.
Judge Capulong, G.R. No. 95123;Gatchalian
v. Board of Commissioners, G.R. Nos. 95612-13,
May31, 1991......................................................................................244
Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990.....................................................245
xxil
Meridian Assurance Corporation v. Dayrit,
G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990 ..........................................................245
Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000,
March 23, 1990 247
Fiestan v Court of Appeals, G R No 81552,

May28, 1990......................................................................................247
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

G R No 54470, May 8, 1990 248
Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Zamora, et al.,
G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990.................................... 248
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development

Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al,
G R No 54305, February 14, 1990 249
Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850,
June 29, 1989......................................................................................250
Jandusay, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989.........................................................252
Manila Resource Development v. NLRC,

G.R. No. 80586, May 3, 1989............................................................252
Regidor v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 85815,

May 19, 1989 253
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989............................................................253
Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 810061,
May12, 1989......................................................................................253
Liamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850,
June 29, 1989 254
SM Agri/and General Machineries v NLRC,
G.R.No 748061, January 9 1989 254
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989............................................................254
People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127,

May 5, 1989...........................................................................................255
xon
xxiv
CHAPTER I
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED
Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and

expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided in the law.
II. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM

INTERPRETATION
Construction and interpretation have the same purpose and that is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. A distinc-tion, however, has
been drawn between construction and interpreta-tion. One who interprets
makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself, while one who
constructs makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written
language of the law (Caltex [Philippines], Inc. v. Palomar, L-19650,
September 29, 1966).
Hence, when the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and
ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined
from the language employed, and when there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218
SCRA 227).
When the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary
nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids (People v. Amigo, 67 SCAD 28).
When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language (Security
Bank and Trust Co. v. RTC of Manila, 75 SCAD 519).
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC

RULES TO REMEMBER ARE AS FOLLOWS:
Apply the Law Interpret the Law Construct the Law

When the law speaks in When there is When the intent
clear and categorical ambiguity in the of the legislature
language language of the cannot be
statute, ascertain ascertained by
legislative intent merely making use
by making use of of intrinsic aids, the
intrinsic aids, or court should resort
those found in the to extrinsic aids, or
law itself, those found outside
the language of the
law.
lv. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT

CLARIFY THE RULE ON THE ISSUE OF WHEN TO
APPLY AND INTERPRET THE LAW
The decision of the Supreme Court on the issue of when to apply and
interpret the law has not changed.
1. In Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court said: "When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation or construction. There
is only room for application. A plain and unambiguous statute
speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and
tends only to obscurity." (G.R. Nos. 50999-5100, March 23, 1990)
2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, Second

Division, Feria, J., the Supreme Court made the same ruling, but
explained further when an interpretation can be resorted to, thus:
"Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to it express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would either be
impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." (248 SCRA 590)
3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no

need, in the absence of legislative intent to the
CHAPTER I 3
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, ITS CONCEPT, PURPOSE, AND EFFECT
contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on

Audit, 297 SCRA 168).
4. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199).
5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No. 9227. -

It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the
courts is simple application, not inter-pretation or circumvention.
With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement
benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under RA No.
9227, Section 5 thereof, could not be any clearer. (Re: Request of
Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the special
allowance for judges be included in the computation of his
retirement benefits, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004;
Callejo, Sr., J.)
V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE

WORDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION ARE
SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
FIRST: VERBA LEGIS, which means that whenever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, which means that in case of
ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers.
THIRD: UTMAGIS VALEATOUAMPEREAT, which means that the
Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the
word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available.
10, 2003)
VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?

Anyone can interpret the law. Lawyers, policemen, arbiters,
administrative boards and agencies, government as well as private executives
are involved from time to time in the interpretation of
laws. Their interpretation, however, is not necessarily conclusive nor
can they bind the courts. Hence, in many occasions, the decisions of
regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and

appealed to the Supreme Court in cases where there is abuse of discretion and
authority or when there is a violation of due process or denial of substantial
justice or erroneous interpretation of the law (MantradeFMMC Division
Employee and Workers Union v. Bacungan, G.R. No. L-48437, September
30, 1986, Second Division, Feria, J.).
The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the sign-ificance of a

constitutional or statutory provision, an executive
order, a procedural or a municipal ordinance. It discharges a role
no crucial than the roles played by the two other departments in maintaining
the rules of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it
has to speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with finality
through the highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What it says is definite
and authoritative, binding on those who occupy the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy (Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70443,
September 15, 1986, Second Division, Gutierez, Jr., J.).
VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND

CONSTRUCTION
Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.
VIII. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY

TO INTERPRET AND CONSTRUCT?
It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the follow-ing
reasons exists:
1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or
obscure, when taken in relation to a set of facts;
2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the
language used in the statute.
IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND

CONSTRUCT?
It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in clear
and categorical language. The duty of the court, in
such a case, is to APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT (Go
Ka Toc & Sons v. Rice & Corn Board, G.R. No. L-23607, May 23,
CHAPTER I 5
1967; People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967; Luzon
Security Co. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. L-25659, October 31, 1969).
New Case:
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS

G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
FACTS:
Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Danilo Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on
the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment.
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo and he timely filed the
Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for his failure to
file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
The RTC issued the order declaring its decision final and executory
and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking
to annul the orders of the RTC and prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home
and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC and explained that a motion for recon-sideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case
as the marriage between the parties was solemnized before the Family Code
took effect.
Cynthia sought reconsideration by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court's Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, denied the motion for extension of
time considering that the 15-day reglementary period is non-extendible,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure and the motion for partial reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled 'Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" is
applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
HELD:
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the

law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,
index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."
Furthermore, there is
the mmm verbs legis ,ion et recedendum, or "from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."
CHAPTER I 7
Old Case:
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% grant of the
special allowance for judges be included in the computation of his
retirement benefits,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868, August 13, 2004; Callejo, Sr., J.
Facts: Judge Tito G. Gustilo, then Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 23 requested that the second tranche of the Special Allowance
granted to judges under RA No. 9227 be included in the computation of his
retirement benefits. He claimed that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004
dated March 3, 2004, the first tranche of the Special Allowance equivalent to
25% was implemented starting on November 11, 2003. The next 25%
(second tranche) will be implemented on November 11, 2004. In this
connection, Judge Gustio appealed to the Chief Justice that, in the
computation of his retirement benefits, the second tranche of the Special
Allowance be included since his retirement was only one (1) month and
twelve (12) days before its implementation on November 11, 2004.
The Office of the Court Administrator (0 CA) recommended that the

request be granted, citing Judge Gustio's service record in the judiciary,
which started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of
disposing cases at an average of 2.25 cases each month.
Judge Gustio's letter and the 0 CA's memorandum were referred to the
Court's Chief Attorney, who recommended the denial of the request for not
being in accord with RA No. 9227 and the Guidelines promulgated by the
Court.
Held: (1) It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the
courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention. - With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement
benefits in light of the Special Allowance granted under HA No. 9227,
Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be any clearer:
Section 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retire-

ment Benefits. - For purposes of retirement, only the allowances
actually received and tranche or tranches of the special
allowance already implemented and received pursuant to this Act
by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary
with the equivalent rank of jus-tices of the Court of Appeals and
judges of the Regional
Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the date of

their retirement, be included in the computa-tion of their
respective retirement benefits.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of
retirement, only the allowances "actually received" and the tranche or
tranches "already received and implemented," upon the date of retirement,
shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise
put, before the Special Allowance could be considered in the computation of
retirement benefits, it should have been "actually received" and the tranche
or tranches thereof should have been "already implemented and received" at
the date of retirement.
(2) Accrued; Meaning of. - The Guidelines promulgated by this Court

pursuant to RA No. 9227 is even more definite as it used the term "accrued"
in this wise: "only the special allowance actually received and that which has
accrued at the time of retirement shall be included." As correctly reasoned by
the Chief Attorney:
Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in
the Guidelines instead of "the tranche or tranches of the special allowance
already implemented and received" which is used in Section 5 of IRA No.
9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is con-veyed. The word "accrue"
means "to come into existence as an en-forceable claim: vest as a right" or
"to come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or result" or "to be
periodically accumu-lated in the process of time whether as an increase or a
decrease." Hence, a Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence
as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the recipient judge as a
matter of right cannot be considered in the computation of retire-ment
benefits.
Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and de-mandable;
vested." In the case of Judge Gustilo, on the date of his retirement, the
second tranche of the Special Allowance has not ac-crued as yet; hence, it
cannot be said that the same is due and de-mandable or that it has vested
insofar as he is concerned.
(3) Interpretation of retirement laws generally favors the retiree, except
when the law is clear and unambiguous. - The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly
posits that the strict application of Section 5 of RA No. 9227 is called for by the
fact that, under Section 3 thereof, the source for the Special Allowance is the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) established under PD No. 1949, which
basically comes from the docket fees paid by litigants:
CHAPTER I 9
As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed

in amount, as its amount depends on the amount collected by the
courts and the amount of increase in docket fees that the Court
would impose. The fact of the JDF becoming insufficient has been
foreseen by the Court and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1
of the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the
first tranche of the Special Allowance has been received only for the
months of November 11, 2003 until February 2004. The delay in
receipt thereof may continue if courts nationwide do not timely
transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be
disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under the
JDF account for the Special Allowance tally in accordance with
accounting and auditing rules.
While th[eJ Court had, in certain cases, adopted a liberal stance in

interpreting retirement laws in favor of the retiree, it cannot do so in this case
because, as earlier stated. Sec-tion 5 of RA No. 9227 is quite clear and
unambiguous. In other words, there is no room for interpretation but only
simple
application of the law." (underlining and emphasis supplied)
X. AMBIGUITY DEFINED
Ambiguity is doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, indistinct-ness or
uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 105) It has been held, however, that ambiguity
does not only arise from the meaning of the particular words but also from the
general scope and meaning of the statute when all its provisions are examined.
There is also an ambiguity when a literal interpretation of the words would lead
to unreasonable, unjust or absurd consequences, or where a statute is in conflict
with the Constitution, or where the statute would defeat
the policy of the legislation. (Tarlac Development Corporation v. CA, L-
41012, September 30, 1976)
M. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT, AND

HOW THIS AFFECTS INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
The present government is a presidential form with the executive power
being vested in the President of the Philippines,
10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
the legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines consisting of a Senate

and a House of Representatives, and the judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. This structure upholds
the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances.
There is, however, a more precise and specific meaning attached to
each of the said powers.
XII. LEGISLATIVE POWER

It is the authority of Congress to make laws and to alter or repeal them.
There are two kinds of legislative powers namely:
1. Original Legislative Power— This is a power belonging to the
sovereign people and this is supreme.
2. Derivative Legislative Power - This is delegated by the sovereign
people to the legislative bodies and it is subordinate to the
original power of the people.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

RULED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION
NO. 164 WAS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER AND RULED THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 164 ISSUED BY PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO WAS NULL AND VOID
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA v.

COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 125183,
September 29, 1997
FACTS:
On February 17, 1978, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site
Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the
Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned
proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan
purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the
said squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the municipality be able
to develop and construct its municipal government center on the subject
land.
CHAPPER I 11
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of

San Juan started to develop its government center by constructing the INP
Building, which now serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station
Headquarters, and the site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial
Courts and the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon
are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal High School Annex
Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26,
1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716.
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Associa-tion,

Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch
159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining or-der
against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of
Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either remov-ing or demolishing
the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they
occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition,
ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of
San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in
Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the CA was dismissed in a decision dated July 17,
1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on
April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, pri-vate
respondents hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans
of the land in question, submitting the same to respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their
application for a grant under Proc-lamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents,

petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the
DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of
land covered by Proclamation No. 164. The CA reversed the said decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power?
More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid legislation?
HELD:
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation —Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative
power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a
valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an
equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid
act of legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution on February 1986,
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the
Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom
Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is
elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of
the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When
Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164,
amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when
legislative power was already solely vested in Congress.
The Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an
invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is
hereby declared NULL and VOID -
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid
(Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCR4 734 [1970]). However, this rests upon the
premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This presumption
cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the

executive branch. For th[e] Court to allow such disregard of the most basic
of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption of
validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and
defend the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task that we
take this exception from the Court's usual practice of not entertaining
constitutional questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon,
and adequately argued.
CHAPTER I 13
XIII. JUDICIAL POWER

TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL POWER
What is the traditional concept of judicial power?

The traditional concept of judicial power refers only to the authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the court of justice or the redress of
wrongs for the violation of such rights (Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, by
Jose Agaton R. Sibal, citing Lopez v. Roxas, 17SCRA 756).
What is the new definition of judicial power?

The traditional concept of judicial power, as above-mentioned,
including now the duty of the courts of justice "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government,"
constitutes the totality of the judicial power which is now vested by our
Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law." This is what is known and referred to as the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The significance of the additional sentence "and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amount-
ing to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government"? (Last paragraph Section 1,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
This sentence has, in effect, expanded the power, authority, and
jurisdiction of our courts of justice, particularly the Supreme Court, to
determine whether any branch or instrumentality of our government has
committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In fact, this power, authority and jurisdiction goes beyond the
mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction, whether it is committed, or
entered into by the highest official of the land, or of any official or branch of
our government.
The question of whether the said abuse of discretion is grave or not is
ultimately determined, not by the officials whose acts are in question, but by
our courts, particularly by the Supreme Court, and it is in this sense that the
new provision grants unto the Supreme Court "an expanded jurisdiction and
authority" to look into what it considers as a proper subject of its final
disposition. In so doing, the
Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, enjoys a wide latitude of power and
discretion using, as it may, its honest evaluation of facts, laws, jurisprudence
and any and all materials, books and points of refer-ence which may be
valuable to support its analysis and conclusion.
The wisdom and propriety, for instance, which may be invoked by the
executive department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of
the justices. In the end, the Supreme Court may find itself intervening in
matters which should better be left to the wisdom of the leaders of the nation
who are directly responsible to the sovereign electorate.
In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, et

al. (G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the
sale of 51% of the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel Corporation, pursuant to
the privatization program of the government, cannot contravene the Filipino
First Policy. In this case, the petitioner invoked Article XII, Section 10(2) of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with
the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument that
reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage and culture. Since Manila Hotel is
part of national patrimony and part of the national economy, petitioner should
be preferred after it has matched the offer of Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm.

RULED THAT THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED BYTHE
PRESIDENT WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INSOFAR AS IT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
LOUIS "BAROK' C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION OF 2010 G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
and
REP. EDCEL C. bAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
v .
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY ELORENCIO B. ABAD
G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010
CHAPTER I 15
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of
which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010."
The first case is a special civil action for prohibition instituted by
petitioner Louis Biraogo in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the leg-islative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Consti-tution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. bagman, Rodolfo B.
Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is viola-tive of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. They contend that it does not
apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling
out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) an "ad-venture in partisan hostility."
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to
the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino
III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
"Kung walang corrupt, walang mahi rap." The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the
good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aqui-no

found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous ad-ministration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010.
Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection

clause.
HELD:
Although the purpose of the PTC falls within the investigative power
of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any
persom be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of

this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to
all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the
"previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is

that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimi-nation offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more spe-cific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general
may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed par-takes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires

that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state ac-tions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
CHAPTERI 17
departments of the government including the political and execu-tive

departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of
the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be

struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three
portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedi-cated

solely to investigating and finding out the truth con-cerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration, and which will recom-mend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
Section 1. Creation of a Commission. - There is hereby

created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek
and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of
graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and
offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that
the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
Section 2. Powers and Functions. - The Commis-sion,

which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Adminis-trative Code of
1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thor-ough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to
in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their
co-principals, ac-complices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President,

Congress and the Ombudsman. (Emphases supplied)
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo ad-ministration

is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past ad-ministrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Such discriminating differ-entiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Executive Order No. 1 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

MADE REFERENCE TO THE FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
(THE POLICY OBSERVED AND MADE POPULAR BY
PAST PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA), TO THE
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
MANILA HOTEL, AND TO THE LATIN MAXIM OF UBI
JUS IBI REMEDIUM
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 122156, February 3,
1997
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the shares of
GSIS, owner of 51% of the shares of Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), was
sold by GSIS through public bidding. Manila Prince Hotel and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, participated in the bidding, and both of them
offered to buy 51% of MHC shares. Renong Berhad offered a higher bid.
MHC sent a check to match the bid of the foreign firm. To prevent the
consummation of the bid of Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner's arguments are as follows:
1. Petitioner invokes Article XII, Section 10(2) of the Consti-tution

and submits that Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument that reflects the vibrance
of Philippine heritage and culture.
2. Manila Hotel has become a national patrimony.
CHAPTER I 19
3. Since Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony and part of the

national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
offer of the Malaysian firm.
Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing pro-vision
and requires implementing legislation. Respondents added that even if the
provision is self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the term "national
patrimony."
ISSUE;
Does MHC fall under the term "national patrimony"? Is Section 10(2)
of Article XII self-executing?
HELD:
Section 10, second paragraph, Article XII of the 1987 Cons-titution, is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words, the provision does not require any legislation to put in operation.
It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concession covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just
that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; con-sequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to

heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events, which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government, it plays host to dignitaries and official
visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes

corporations at least 60% of which is owned by the Filipinos. This is very
clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher
bid, it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that
the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the required
approvals. Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos, the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Reluctantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter
into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions
of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is

embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for
future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so it must be enforced. This
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any
reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution
which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention
of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of
foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos
whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business

viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the
asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values- A commercial, nay enen a budgetary, objective should not
be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
CHAPTER I 21
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any
economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.
In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Manila Prince Hotel
v. GSIS, Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., what particularly is the effect of

the Supreme Court's "expanded jurisdiction and authority?"
The power, authority and discretion to determine whether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was
committed goes beyond the mere legality of a questioned act, or transaction,
whether it is committed, or entered into by the highest official of the land, or
any official or branch of our government.
The wisdom and propriety, which may be invoked by the executive
department, may not be considered so by the scrutinizing minds of the
justices.
Example: The privatization of business asset for purposes
of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,

in pursuance of and to implement alleged economic policy, did
not meet the approval of the Supreme Court which took the
position that this argument should not take precedence over non-
material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary objective,
should not be pursued at the expense of national will and dignity.
Respondents argued that Article XII, Section 10(2) is merely a

statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
that it requires an implementing legislation. Respondents also argued that
even if the said provision is self-executing, the hotel does not fall under the
term "national patrimony."
In sum, the privatization of business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, in pursuance of and to
implement alleged economic policy, did not meet the approval of the
Supreme Court which took the position that this argument should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary,
objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity.
Giving emphasis to what it considers to be more deserving of

preference, the Supreme Court added that there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review

when the Constitution is involved.
XIV. IN THE EXERCISE OF THE SAID POWER AND

AUTHORITY HOWEVER, THE COURT OR THE JUDICIAL
ARM OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY
THE FOLLOWING RULES
1. When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to
interpret it; (Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326, 33 SCRA 105;
Quijano p. DBP, 35 SCRA 220, L-26419, October 16, 1970)
2. It is the duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor.
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail; (Article 10, New
Civil Code)
3. When construction or interpretation is necessary, the court
should interpret the law according to the meaning the legislature
intended to give it;
4. If there are two possible interpretations of a law, that which will
achieve the ends desired by Congress should be adopted;
5. Laws of pleading, practice and procedure are liberally construed

in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive de-termination of every
action and proceeding;
6. A judge cannot decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (Article 9,
New Civil Code) In other words, he must decide the case
assigned to him whether or not he knows what law shall be
applied. In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws,
a judge may still be guided by the following:
a. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or public

policy;
b Court decisions, foreign or local, in similar cases,
C.Legal opinions of qualified writers and professors;
d. General principles of justice and equity; and
e. Rules of statutory construction.

CHAPTER I 23
In criminal cases, however, it is an established rule that there is no

crime when there is no law punishing it. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE. If
there is no law therefore which punishes an act
complained of, the judge must dismiss the case
to Law, p. 4).
XV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
"The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines."

Who shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices?
The President of the Republic of the Philippines shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices (Section 17, Article VII) and
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines.
Under and by virtue of all the powers vested in him by the Constitution, the
President is regarded as the most powerful and the most influential person in
the country subject to no other restraint than to comply with the law and the
Constitution.
What does this mean?

This means that he is the "Chief Executive." More specifically, he is
the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and the heads of the
different executive departments who are popularly known and called as
Cabinet Members, are, in effect, merely his advisers, hence, they are subject
to his control and supervision.
Are the powers of the President limited only to those that are
expressly enumerated in the Constitution?
No. The President has residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the President as
steward of the people (Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 66811989]).
What is the so-called residual power of the President?

In the said case (Marcos v. Manglapus ibid.), the Supreme Court,
through Justice Irene R. Cortes, said that "it is a power borne by the
President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It may be viewed
also as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed (see Hyman, the
American President, where the author advanced the view that an allowance
of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged
in the President).
Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, on the other hand, made this
explanation: "Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses'
return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even Filipino
tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past
three years are, however, too valuable and precious to gamble away on
purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order, and
safety be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily,
in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential
prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily
exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines."
What is the executive power of the President?

It is the power to enforce and administer the laws. (Sec-tion 1 and 17,
Article VII) The President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed
(Section 17, Article VII).
Is he still required to determine the validity of a law?

No, this being a question that should be properly resolved by the
judicial department of government. Hence, the President has a duty to
execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. Until and unless a law is
declared unconstitutional, it is not unlawful for the President to perform his
duty of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed.
XVI. THE THREE PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF

GOVERNMENT HELP ONE ANOTHER IN THE
ENFORCEMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF
LAWS
Each Department is Given Certain Powers by which each may
Restrain the others from Exceeding their Constitutional Authority.
Hence, A System of Checks and Balances Provides an Equilibrium
of Governmental Powers.
The following are actual examples:
FIRST: THE LAWS EMANATE FROM THE LEGISLATURE

The legislature enacts laws but these laws have to be presented to
the executive department for its approval. The latter may veto or
CHAPTER I 25
disapprove the acts of the legislative if in its judgment they are not in
conformity with the Constitution or if they will cause hardship to the people.
Here, the judicial arm of the government has no role to play yet. It is
only called upon to interfere and to exercise its authority when an action is
brought to it for decision, and only upon reaching this stage when the courts
should apply, among others, these basic rules, to wit:
When the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to
interpret it.
In applying the law, the court should discover the real intent and
the purpose of the legislature. If that intent and purpose can be
discovered within the law, it is the duty of the court to carry out
that intention. If that intent and purpose cannot be found within
the law, the court should resort to extrinsic aids.
3. When all other rules of statutory construction fail, it is presumed

that the lawmaking body intended, right and justice to prevail.
When conflicting claims are brought to the court for determina-tion, it

is authorized to determine the validity of the said legislative measures or
executive acts.
SECOND: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MAY

MODIFY OR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The executive department, through the pardoning power, may also
modify or set aside the judgment of the courts.
The executive department is not in any way interpreting or constructing
the law in its favor. It is a plain exercise of pardoning power, which is
expressly granted by the Constitution to the Presi-dent.
THIRD: THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT MAY

AMEND OR REVOKE THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT
The legislature may amend or revoke decisions of the courts when in
its judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in harmony
with the general policy of the State. It may do this by enacting a new law or
by amending the old law, THEREBY
ATTAINING AN INTERPRETATION THAT WILL WIPE OUT THE

DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
In this example, the legislature is not interpreting or construct-ing
the law but attains the interpretation it desires by enacting a new law or
by amending the old law.
CHAPTER II
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION
L USE INTRINSIC AIDS BEFORE RESORTING

TO EXTRINSIC AIDS
In determining the intention of the legislature, the courts may use any of the
following:
1. INTRINSIC AIDS - Elements found in the law itself

2. EXTRINSIC AIDS - Facts or matters not found in the law
3. PRESUMPTIONS - Based on logic or established provision of law
The established practice is to resort first to intrinsic aids before resolving to

extrinsic aids and before indulging in presumptions.
H. WHAT ARE THE INTRINSIC AIDS?

Intrinsic aids are any of the following: Title, preamble, words, phrases and
sentences; context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; legislative
definition and interpretation clauses.
1. TITLE. - That which expresses the subject matter of the law. It can
help in the construction of statutes but it is not controlling and not
entitled to much weight.
2. PREAMBLE. - That part of the statute following the title and

preceding the enacting clause which states the reasons or the
objectives of the enactment. It cannot enlarge or confer powers, or
cure inherent defects in the statute.
3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT.

- The intention of the legislature must primarily be
27
determined from the language of the statute and such language

consists of the words, phrases and sentences used therein. The
meaning of the law should, however, be taken from the general
consideration of the act as a whole and not from any single part,
portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or
sentences used.
4. PUNCTUATION. - It is an aid of low degree in inter-preting
the language of a statute and can never control against the
intelligible meaning of the written word. How-ever, if the
punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable
and in apparent accord with the legis-lative will, it may be used
as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the
words thus punctu-ated.
5. HEADINGS AND MARGINAL NOTES. - If the

meaning of the statute is clear or if the text of the statute is clear,
they will prevail as against the headings, especially if the
headings have been prepared by compilers and not by the
legislature.
6. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETA-
TION. - If the legislature has defined the words used in the
statute and has declared the construction to be placed thereon,
such definition or construction should be followed by the courts.
The rules are as follows:
(a) If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be
construed or interpreted in a certain manner, the courts
should follow such instruction;
(b) In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and
the legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute
considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail;
(c) A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in

which it is first defined;
(d) Legislative definition of similar terms in other statute

may be resorted to except where a particular law expressly
declares that its definition therein is limited in application
to the statutes in which they appear.
CHAPTER II 29
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE LAW SPEAKS IN

CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE AND THERE
IS THEREFORE NO REASON FOR INTERPRETATION
OR CONSTRUCTION, BUT ONLY FOR APPLICATION
New Case:
SPOUSES PASCUAL, et al., FRANCISCO A.

PASCUAL, MARGARITA CORAZON D. MARIANO,
EDWIN D.
MARIANO arid DANNY R. MARIANO
V.
SPOUSES BALLESTEROS, et al.,
G.R. No. 186269, February 15, 2012
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land situated in Laoag City which is co-
owned by the spouses Albino and Margarita Mariano, the spouses Melecio and
Victoria Melchor, and Angela Melchor.
Upon the death of the Spouses Melchor, their share was in-herited by their
daughter Lorenza. Subsequently, Lorenza and her husband Antonio Ballesteros
acquired the share of Angela.
In 2000, Margarita, then already widowed, together with her children, sold
their share to Spouses Pascual and Francisco. The old TCT was cancelled and a
new one was issued in their names together with Angela and Spouses Melchor.
Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for legal redemp-tion,

claiming that they did not receive any written notice of the said sale and argued
that they are entitled to redeem the portion sold as co-owners of the same.
RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that they failed to sea-sonably
exercise their right of redemption within the 30-day period pursuant to Article
1623 of the Civil Code notwithstanding the lack of a written notice since they
had actual notice of the said sale.
CA granted the appeal of the respondents.
The petitioners sought for reconsideration, but it was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents could no longer exercise their right of
redemption having failed to exercise the same within 30 days from actual
knowledge of the said sale.
HELD:
Respondents can still exercise their right of redemption.
The Supreme Court held that no reversible error on the part
of the CA in ruling that the 30-day period given to the respondents
within which to exercise their right of redemption has not commenced in
view of the absence of a written notice. Despite the respondents' actual
knowledge of the sale to the respondents, a written notice is still mandatory
and indispensable for purposes of the commencement of the 30-day period
within which to exercise the right of redemption.
Article 1623 of the Civil Code succinctly provides that:
Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or re-demption

shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may
be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompa-nied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining

owners.
The indispensability of the "written notice requirement" for purposes of
the exercise of the right of redemption was explained in
Barcellano v. Bañas, thus:
The written notice of sale is mandatory. The Court has long

established the rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a
co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the
selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the
sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
xxx
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by
this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
CHAPTER II 31
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is

only room for application. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice. x x x (Citations omitted)
Old Case:
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118745, July
5, 1996
"When the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application. Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening
of trust accounts as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA
6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible."
FACTS:
Petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAB) and the Land Bank
of The Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration
contending mainly that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, the opening of
trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance
with the mandate of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is no
legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the
rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their
properties.
The Supreme Court denied their motions for reconsideration.
HELD:
The Court rejects the said contention. Sec. 16(e) of RA No.
6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as
compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds," to wit:
Section 16(e) Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands -

xxx xxx xxx

"Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank des-ignated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act,
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philip-pines. xxx"
The said provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any

doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the
opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of the term "deposit."
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no

reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Thus,
recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a
mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA No. 6657 goes beyond the
scope of the said provision and is therefore impermissible.
As [the Court] ha[s] previously declared, the rule-making power must be

confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved
in favor of the basic law.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE COURT APPLIED THE

LAW ACCORDING TO ITS PLAIN AND OBVIOUS MEANING
New Case:
SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA
SUGAR MILL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SUGAR
REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 180462, February 9, 2011
FACTS:
In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric
tons of sugar due to the effects of El Niño and La Nina
CHAPTER II 33
phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then
President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999,
facilitating sugar importation by the private sector.
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 87 created a Committee on Sugar

Conversion/Auction (Committee) to determine procedures for sugar importation
as well as for collection and remittance of conversion fee.
Under Section 3, sugar conversion is by auction and is subject to

conversion fee to be remitted by Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to the
Bureau of Treasury.
The Committee issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines for sugar
importation. Under the rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within
three working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance
upon arrival of the imported sugar.
The rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or
if the imported sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the
conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the
SRA, to wit:
G. Forfeiture of Conversion Fee
G.1 In case of failure of the importer to make the

importation or for the imported sugar to arrive in the
Philippines on or before the Arrival Date, the 25% of Conversion
Fee Bid already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA and
the imported sugar shall not be classified as "B" (domestic sugar)
unless, upon application with the SRA and without objection of the
Committee, the SRA allows such conversion after payment by the
importer of 100% of the Conversion Fee applicable to the shipment.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Sugar Mill submitted the winning bid for 10,000 metric tons while
Pacific Sugar submitted the winning bid for 20,000 metric tons, for a combined
total volume of 30,000 metric tons of sugar. Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar
Mill and Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fees.
Aa it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar delivered only

10% of their sugar import allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric
tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining 27,000 metric
tons blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. They sought immediate
reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to
P38,637,000.00.
The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee
would be forfeited pursuant to paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules and
notified them that the authority to reconsider their request for reimbursement
was vested with the Committee.
The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and
damages in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
and ordered the SRA to pay plaintiffs the amount of P38,637,000 as
reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee they had paid and held that
paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival of
imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the
forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which merely
cancelled the sugar importation.
Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 seeking to set aside the RTC's Orders as well as the Writ of Execution and
the Amended Writ of Execution. The CA ruled to annul and set-aside all the
orders of the RTC and remanded the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
Dissatisfied, the sugar corporations filed in this Court a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of
P38,637,000.00 in conversion fee.
HELD:
The RTC gravely erred in ordering the SRAto return the forfeited
conversion fee to the sugar corporations. Its strained interpretation of
paragraph G. 1 of the Bidding Rules contemplates cases of delay in the
arrival of imported sugar but not cases of cancellation of sugar importation
defies logic and the express provision of paragraph G. 1. If delay in the
arrival of imported sugar is subject to forfeiture of 25% of the conversion
fee, with more reason is outright failure to import sugar, by cancelling the
sugar importation altogether, subject to forfeiture of the 25% of the
conversion fee.
Plainly and expressly, paragraph G.1 identifies two situations which
would bring about the forfeiture of 25% of the conversion
CHAPTER II 35
fee: (1) when the importer fails to make the importation or

(2) when the imported sugar fails to arrive in the Philippines on or
before the set arrival date. It is wrong for the RTC to interpret the forfeiture provision in a way
departing from its plain and express
language.
Where the language of a rule is clear, it is the duty of the court to
enforce it according to the plain meaning of the word. There is no occasion
to resort to other means of interpretation.
Old Case:
CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL G.R. No.
120363, September 5, 1997 FRANCISCO, J.
The Supreme Court applied the law, RA No. 1199, as

amended by RA No. 2263, according to its plain and obvious
meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right
to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house
thereon.
It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or

purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given
to it by the judiciary. This Court should not deviate therefrom.
FACTS:
In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurrec-cion, the
President of petitioner Cecileville Realty and Service Cor-poration, in the
latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana
Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by op-eration of law. As such tenant she
had a home lot and a house on the landholding. She was assisted in the
cultivation of the land by her son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual,
who also occupies a portion of the landholding distinct from that occupied by
his mother.
Petitioner Cecifieville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion
occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he is
entitled to occupancy since he is helping his mother in the cultivation
of the land, refused to vacate. Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit
against Hermigildo before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy

relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo, the MTC ordered the latter to
vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 monthly from
the filing of the complaint.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the
case be remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication. The court was of
the opinion that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the
cultivation, consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected without
circumventing the law. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the RTC's decision on the basis of Section 5, RA No. 1199, as
amended by RA No. 2263, governing the relations of landlords and tenants,
which provides that a tenant is entitled to the aid and assistance of the
immediate members of his family and other persons who, though not tenants
themselves, are afforded the protection of the law and the security of tenure
accorded the tenant. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hermigildo's
having a house on the landholding is but an incident of the tenancy.
In this petition for review on certiorari Cecileville contends that the

appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is entitled to
work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the
family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial
portion thereof and utilize the same for residential purposes.
HELD:
As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as
amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot and
the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private respondent is not
entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation
of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263. This
section provides in full as follows:
"Section 22.x x x (3) The tenant shall have the right to

demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not
more than 3 per cent, of the area of his landholding provided that
it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be
located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the
landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall
construct
his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs
and other animals and engage in minor industries, the
CHAPTER II 37
products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The

tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already
assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in Section
26 unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between
them as provided under Section 9, or unless the tenant is ejected
for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five (45) days
following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause."
The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it

must be applied according to its plaini arid ob-vious meaning,
according to its express terms.
dum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home
lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here,
private respondent does not dis-pute that he is a mere member of Ana
Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find
private re-spondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to
construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within
the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule otherwise is to make a
mockery of the purpose of the tenan-cy relations between a bona fide
tenant and the landholder as envisioned by the very law, i.e., RA No.
1199, as amended, upon which private respondent relies, to wit:
Section 2. Purpose. - It is the purpose of this Act to

establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and
tenants upon the principles of social justice; to afford adequate
protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders: to
issue the equitable division of the produce and income
derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives
to greater and more efficient agricultural production, to bolster
their economic position and to encourage their participation in the
development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural
communities. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argu-ment and

allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to construct
and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand
(1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted
th[e] Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if
not colonies, of houses. How then can there be "equitable division of the
produce and
income derived from the land" and "more efficient agricul-tural

production" if the land's productivity and use for growing crops is
lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its uncer-emonious
conversion into residential use? It is a fundamental principle that once
the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be
given to it by the judiciary. Th[e] Court should not deviate therefrom.
The landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law. The

policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the underprivileged.
Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private

respondent's mother, has an existing home lot and a house on the subject
property in which private respondent may take refuge while attending to
his work. Curiously, despite its availability, private respondent chose to
construct, without petitioner's permission, a concrete house of his own
thereby saving him the trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the courts
were to abide by the respondent court's inordinate pronouncement that
private respondent is entitled to maintain his own house then we will be
condoning the deprivation of a landholder's property without even a
fraction of compensation.
It taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that private

respondent's having a house of his own on the property is merely
incidental to the "tenancy" and to afford him the convenience of
attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the first place, he is not the
tenant as he himself admits.
Besides, the "incidental" use of his own house can very well be
provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her "old and
infirm" condition, surely needs the attention and care of her children,
one of whom is herein private respondent.
Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also

entitled to the protection of the law, as one of the purposes of the "Act"
is "to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and
landholders."
The policy of social justice, the Court reiterates, is
not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because
CHAPTER II 39
it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as

[the Court] said in Galay, et al. v. CA,, et al., is an imperative of every
humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an
undeserved privilege."

REJECTED RESPONDENT'S PLEA THAT THERE WAS
ROOM FOR ANOTHER INTERPRETATION. INSTEAD,
THECOURTFIRMLYRULEDTHATRESPONDENTJUDGE
MISERABLY FAILED TO EXHIBIT THE OBJECTIVITY
REQUIRED OF MEMBERS OF THE BENCH WHICH IS
NECESSARY, EVEN INDISPENSABLE, TO MAINTAIN
PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURT.
TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA A.M. No. RTJ-

96-1348, 14 June 1996 EN BANG, PER
CURIAM
The respondent Judge should be sanctioned for

digressing from the regular course and procedure of
rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the
prosecution and the defense have rested their respective
cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a
judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the
ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's
right to a hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the
defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.
FACTS:
First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. Tabao,
accused Judge Pedro S. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of
Authority, and (c) Bias in favor of the accused.
In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Fran-cisco Q.
Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before the CA an order
issued by respondent granting bail to the accused without giving the
prosecution a chance to present evidence to op-pose the grant of bail. The
Court of Appeals annulled respondent's orders, granting bail to the accused
and denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the order that
granted bail. Respon-dent failed to comment on this aspect of the complaint
against him.
The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulga-tion of
judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Phils. v.
Salvador Padernal, "a case for violation of RA No. 6425 for drug pushing
and had promulgated his decision thereon despite the defense's manifestation
for time to allow it to submit other docu-mentary evidence, make its formal
offer of exhibits, and to rest its case. Judgment was promulgated and the
prosecution was not given a chance to adduce rebuttal evidence.
Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints,

arguing that he proceeded to decide the case without the documentary
evidence of the defense because they were not submitted on time; that the
evidence to be submitted, consisting of business licenses and permits, was
immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused; that official duty is
presumed to have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown; that
his grant of bail to the accused is now allowed in view of the ruling in People
v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555).
HELD:
The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's acts
constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be sanctioned
for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment,
which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have
rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before
a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in
Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose
bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.
The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with

forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dacudao (170
SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong on
the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an accused charged with a
heinous crime where the imposable
CHAPTER II 41
penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial of

the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due
process, a right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A hearing is
required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those
factors set forth under Rule 114, Section 6, Rules of Court in granting or
rejecting a plea for bail. The hearing for bail though summary in nature is
necessary to afford both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to
prove their respective contentions on the matter of bail for the accused.
The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges

who had granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime punishable
with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required
hearing. In Santos v. Ofilada (245 SCRA 56), the Court expressing almost
exasperation over repeated violations by judges in this regard stated that "it is
indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same
administrative office, th[e] Court still has to contend with the same problem
all over again and to impose once more the same sanction.
It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for

respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to
comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and substantially.
Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon

(234 SCRA 555), since the issue in the present complaints is his having
granted bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable with life
imprisonment; without giving the prosecution the opportunity to show that
evidence of guilt is strong and that as a consequence, the accused is not
entitled to bail. Under the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail is mandatory to
afford the State its right to oppose the granting of bail. The ruling in Simon
did not alter much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail.
Neither did the ruling in Simon cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this
case.
On the issue regarding the manner of promulgating the decision in a

criminal case, respondent judge digressed from the regular course and
procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after the
prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the subject
criminal case, the defense has rested
their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense had yet to rest
its case when respondent rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not
difficult to imagine the grave injustice which
would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before the
defense had rested its case. Of course, respondent judge acquitted the
accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate haste to acquit the
accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by respondent
judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence? And why was the
prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it manifested
its intention to present rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation
of judgment?
Judges should be reminded that in each step in the trial of
criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to
present his defense; so, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always
take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn
not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial
gavel should not be yielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense
of justice and fairness. Respondent judge's conduct in the disposition of the
criminal case subject of the present complaints leaves much to be desired. He
miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the bench
that is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the public's trust and
confidence in the courts.
In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of

the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197,
where the imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He
should also be accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in
the same criminal case before the defense had rested and without according
the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.
NOTE: In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court made reference

to and answered the respondent's contention and citation of the 1946
case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of
Prisons (76 Phil. 756) to support his theory that where the prosecution
recommends bail, it is to be understood as being equivalent to an admission
that evidence of guilt is not strong or a non opposition or a virtual
agreement to the bail application which in effect does away with the need
for a bail hearing. Unfortunately, nowhere in said case may such
conclusion be inferred. Besides, in Ocampo v. Bernabe (77 Phil. 55), the
Court said: [The Court] ha[s] held in Herras
CHAPTER II 43
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons that all persons shall before conviction

be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. The general rule therefore is that all persons, whether
charged or not yet charged are before their conviction entitled to
provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. The
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter
of judicial discretion. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing.
RESPONDENT. THUS, CANNOT PLEAD THAT THERE

WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION AND
THAT THEREFORE HIS ACT TO GRANTING BAIL WITHOUT
HEARING IS BUT A CASE OF INNOCENT ERROR OR MISTAKE
NOT TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. ABD
USUKUR M. TANv. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS.
G.R. NO. 119892, FEBRUARY 13, 1996, EN BANC, MINUTE
RESOLUTION. (Underscoring and Emphasis Supplied)

MADE REFERENCE TO THE PREAMBLE AND TO THE
WHEREAS CLAUSES TO DISCOVER THE SPIRIT AND
INTENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
New Case:
RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and KATHERINE L. GUY v. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and ASIA UNITED BANK G.R. No. 187919
ASIA UNITED BANK v. GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG,
KATHERINE L. GUY, RAFAEL H. GALVEZ and EUGENIO H.
GALVEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 187979
GILBERT G. GUY, PHILIP LEUNG and EUGENIO H.
GALVEZ, JR. v. ASIA UNITED BANK
G.R. No. 188030
April 25, 2012
In this case, the Court holds that AUB, being a commercial bank, is
not beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court asserts that a bank
is a corporation whose fund comes from
the general public and PD No. 1689 does not distinguish the nature of
the corporation. It requires, rather, that the funds of such corporation
should come from the general public. This was highlighted by the third
"whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that the same also
applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds solicited
from the general public."
FACTS:
In 1999, Radio Marine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (RMSI) claim-ing to
do business under the name Smartnet Philippines and/or Smartnet
Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line for various credit
facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). To induce AUB to extend the
Omnibus Credit Line, RMSI, through its directors and officers, presented its
Articles of Incorporation with its 400-peso million capitalization and its
congressional telecom fran-chise.
Satisfied with the credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted a P250

million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name of Smartnet Philippines,
RMSI's Division. Later, it was increased to P452 minion after a third-party
real estate mortgage by an affiliate of Guy Group of Companies, in favor of
Smartnet Philippines, was offered to the bank. Simultaneous to the increase,
RMSI submitted a proof of authority to open the Omnibus Credit Line and
peso and dollar accounts in the name of Smartnet Philippines, Inc., which
Gilbert Guy, et al., represented as a division of RMSI, as evidenced by the
letterhead used in its formal correspondences with the bank and the financial
audit made by SGV & Co. Attached to this authority was the Amended
Articles of Incorporation of RMSI, doing business under the name of
Smartnet Philippines, and the Secretary's Certificate of SPI authorizing its
directors, Gilbert Guy and Philip Leung to transact with AUB. Prior to this
major transaction, however, and, unknown to AUB, Gilbert Guy, et al.
formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only
P62,500.00.
Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines AUB granted it,
among others, an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total sum of $29,300.00
in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd., which is the
subject of these consolidated petitions. To cover this liability Gilbert Guy
executed Promissory Note (PN) in behalf of SPI in favor of AUB. This PN was
renewed twice, once, in the name of SPI, and last, in the name of Smartnet
Philippines, bolstering
CHAPTER II 45
AUB's belief that RMSI's directors and officers consistently treated this letter
of credit, among others, as obligations of RMSI.
When RMSI's obligations remained unpaid, AUB sent demand letters.
RMSI denied liability contending that the transaction was incurred solely by
SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of Companies, which has
a separate and distinct personality from RMSI. It further claimed that while
Smartnet Philippines is an RMSI division, SPI, is a subsidiary of RMSI, and
hence, is a separate entity.
Aggrieved, AUB filed a case of syndicated estafa under Article 315(2)

(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689 against
the interlocking directors of RMSI and SPI, namely, Gilbert G. Guy, Rafael
H. Galvez, Philip Leung, Katherine L. Guy, and Eugenio H. Galvez, Jr.,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Accordingly, an
Information was filed against Gilbert Guy, et al., with the RTC of Pasig City.
Both parties filed their respective Petitions for Review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
The DOJ reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution and ordered the
dismissal of the estafa charges against Gilbert Guy, et al. for insufficiency of
evidence. The AUB's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
AUB then assailed the DOd Resolution before the CA. The CA
partially granted AUB's petition.
Hence, these consolidated petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Gilbert Guy, et al., for the
crime of syndicated estafa under PD No. 1689.
HELD:
Anent the issue as to whether or not Gilbert Guy, et al., should be
charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689, which
states that:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit

estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315
and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling (estafa) is

committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal
act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
"samahang nayon(s)," or farmers associations, or of funds
solicited by corporationsl asso-ciations from the general public.
The Court holds that the afore-quoted law applies to the case at bar.
Gilbert Guy et al. want the Court to believe that AUB, being a commercial
bank, is beyond the coverage of PD No. 1689. The Court holds, however,
that a bank is a corporation whose fund comes from the general public. PD
No. 189 does not distinguish the nature of the corporation. It requires, rather,
that the funds of such corporation should come from the general public. This
is bolstered by the third "whereas clause" of the quoted law which states that
the same also applies to other "corporations/associations operating on funds
solicited from the general public." This is precisely the very same scheme
that PD No. 1689 contemplates to "be checked or at least be minimized by
imposing capital punishment involving funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public" because "this erodes the
confidence of the public in the banking and cooperative system, contravenes
public interest and constitutes economic sabotage that threatens the stability
of the nation."
Old Cases:
PEOPLE v. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al.,

G.R. Nos. 1-420050-66, November 20, 1978
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the intent
and spirit of Presidential Decree No. 9 can be found in the
preamble or "whereas" clauses, which enumerate the facts,
or events that justify the promulgation of the decrees and the
stiff sanctions stated therein.
FACTS:
Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by Judge
Purisima. The latter reasoned out that the information failed to allege an
essential element of the offense; thus: That the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
CHAPTER II 47
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to

subversion, insurrection, rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversion activities and that the preamble of the
statute or that expressed in the "whereas" clauses is not an essential part of an
act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the
statute. It was also argued that the explanatory note merely explains the
reasons for issuing
the decree and this cannot prevail over the text itself.
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General.
Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of
PD No. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the
decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or "whereas"
clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanction stated therein.
U.S. v. HART, et al., 26 PHIL. 149

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that construction
should be based upon something more substantial than mere
punctuation found in the printed act. Argument based upon
punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to
change the punctuation when necessary, to give the act the effect
intended by the legislature.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA
No. 519. This section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be
considered as vagrants such as those "found loitering about saloons or dram
shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country
without visible means of support."
Accused-appellants were prosecuted and convicted for "loitering about

saloons or dram shops or gambling houses" the first part of Section 1. The
second part, it will be noticed is worded as follows: "or tramping or straying
through the country without visible means of support."
It turned out, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had

visible means of support.
The Attorney General argued that "without visible means of support"
as used in the second part, does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but only to tramping or
straying through the country." It was contended that if "without visible
means of support" is intended for the first part, either the comma after
gambling houses would have been omitted, or else the comma after country
would have been inserted.
HELD:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt
that construction of the statute which will give it effect.
The construction should be based upon something more substantial that

the mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the
statute gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with
legislative will, it may be used as an additional argument for adopting the
literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an
argument based upon punctuation is not conclusive, and the courts will not
hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the
effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
The accused-appellants were acquitted.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION v. TORRES

G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991
Private Parties cannot Constitutionally con-tract away the
Applicable Provision of Law.
FACTS:
An alien employment permit was issued by DOLE to Earl Timothy
Cone, as sports consultant and coach of General Milling Corporation. The
change of admission of status of said Earl Timothy Cone was approved to a
pre-arranged employee. Months later, CMC requested that it be allowed to
employ Cone as full pledged coach. The request was granted.
CHAPTER II 49
The Secretary of labor cancelled Cone's permit because General Milling

Corporation failed to submit evidence that there is no person in the Philippines
that is competent and willing to do the services that could be rendered by Cone,
and likewise, there is no proof that Cone's employment will redound to national
interest.
ISSUE:
Was there a grave abuse of discretion in revoking the alien employment
permit of Cone? Is the contention of General Milling Corporation (that it is an
employer's prerogative to hire a foreign coach) valid and tenable?
HELD:
There was no grave abuse of discretion. It is not true that the hiring of
foreign coach is an employer's prerogative. The law is clear on this point. Under
Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must
first obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor. General
Milling Corporation's right to choose who to employ is limited by the statutory
requirement of an employment permit.
GMC will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
No comparison can be made between Cone and Norman Black as the latter is "a
long-time resident" of the country and thus, not subject to Article 40 of the Labor
Code which applies only to "non-resident aliens."
Neither will obligation of contract be impaired by the imple-mentation of

the Secretary's decision. The Labor Code and its imple-menting Rules and
Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before
GMC and Cone entered into their con-tract of employment. Provisions of
applicable laws especially those relating to matters affected with public policy,
are deemed written into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally con-
tract away the applicable provision of law.
GMC's contention that the Labor Secretary should have deferred to the
Immigration Commission's finding as for the need to employ Cone is again
bereft of legal basis.
EXAMPLE OFACASE WHERE THE SUPREME COURT

RULED, AMONG OTHERS, THAT EVERY PART OF THE
STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT, i.e., THAT EVERY

PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE CONSIDERED
TOGETHER WITH THE OTHER PARTS, AND KEPT
SUBSERVIENT TO THE GENERAL INTENT OF THE
WHOLE ENACTMENT.
THE COURTALSO RULED THAT THE SPIRIT RATHER
THAN THE LETTER OF A LAW DETERMINES ITS
CONSTRUCTION; HENCE, A STATUTE, AS IN THIS
CASE, MUST BE READ ACCORDING TO ITS SPIRIT
AND INTENT.
PARAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
An interpretation should, ifpossible, be avoided under

which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,

inoperative or nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory con-struction that

a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
FACTS:
Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City,
who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. COMELEC scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995,
and set the recall election on November 13, 1996. At least 29.30% of the
registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. Due to Paras' opposition, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the
recall election, Paras filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
a
CHAPTER II 51
petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining
order.
The petition was later on dismissed and the TRO was lifted. In a
resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction was filed.
HELD:
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
"Section 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local

official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election."
• It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must

be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole
enactment. (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464)
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official
to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed
together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such election
shall take place.
Thus, subscribing to Paras' interpretation of the phrase regu-lar local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel
provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if
the SK election which is set by RA No. 7808 to be held every three years
from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular
local election," as erroneously insisted by Paras, then no recall election can
be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government
Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the
enactment of a statute. (Asturias
Sugar Central v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617) An

interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as other-wise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, in-
formative or nugatory. (PLDT v. Collector of International
Revenue, 90 Phil. 674)
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction
that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in
conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to "enact a local gov-ernment code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x
Moreover, Paras' too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity,

which we cannot countenance.
The spirit rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
1. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal

working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses,
hence, the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular election for the office of the local elective
official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in
the said election that certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with
the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the

limitation stated under Section 74(b) of the Code considering that the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned
is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on
May 1997. (Paras v. Commission on Election,, G.R. 123169, November 4, 1996,
En Banc, Francisco, J. [Resolution])
CHAPTER II 53
III. EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids are any of the following: Contemporaneous cir-

cumstances, policy, legislative history of the statute, contempora-neous or
practical construction, executive construction, legislative construction,
judicial construction, and construction by the bar and legal commentators.
Extrinsic aids can be resorted to only after the intrinsic aids have been
used and exhausted.
1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. - These are
the conditions existing at the time the law was enacted such as the following:
(a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the law
was enacted;
(b) Previous state of the law;
(c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law; and
(d) The customs usages of the people.

The above-mentioned circumstances constitute the reasons why the
law was enacted. Hence, the one interpreting the law should place himself in
the position and circumstances of those who used the words in question and
be able to feel the atmosphere, the conditions, and the reasons why the law
was enacted.
2. POLICY. - The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the
State may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the intention of the
legislature in enacting the same. Hence, if a new agrarian law is enacted
today and few years from now, there will arise the need to find out why such
a law is enacted, the conditions, the prevailing sentiment of the people, the
policy of the State, and the executive order issued by the Office of the
President preceding the legislative enactment will throw light upon the
intention of the legislature in enacting said law. The same thing is true if
death sentence is imposed for drug pushers and for those currently involved
in the so-called "satanismo" offenses. The conditions of the times and the
very destructive and heinous crimes committed even in broad daylight,
whether in the city or in the provinces, will convince future interpreters of the
law that such a penalty is needed to protect society.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE. -

Such history may be found in reports of legislative committees, in the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during a hearing, legislative
investigation, or legislative debates.
Are personal opinions of some legislators appropriate aids of
construction?
As a general rule, they are not appropriate aids of construction.
However, if there is unanimity among the supporters and oppositors
to a bill with respect to the objective sought to be accomplished, the
debates may then be used as evidence of the purpose of the act.
4. CONTEMPORANEOUS AND PRACTICAL CON-
STRUCTION. - Those who lived at or near the time when the law
was passed were more acquainted of the conditions and the reasons why that
law was enacted Their understandmg and application of the law, especially if
the same has been continued and acquiesced by the judicial tribunals and the
legal profession, deserve to be consid-ered by the courts.
5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. - The construction

given by the executive department deserves great weight and should be
respected if said construction has been formed and observed for a long
period of time. The rules to remember are as follow:
(a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the contempo-raneous
and practical construction made by the officers charged with the
administration and enforcement of the law;
(b) The courts should respect that contemporaneous construction

except if it is clearly erroneous;
(c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the
Chief Legal adviser of the government who can issue opinions to
assist various departments of the government charged with the
duty to administer the law;
(d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal adviser is sub-servient
to the ruling of the judiciary, which is in charge of applying and
mterpretmg laws
- Legislative
construction is entitled to consideration and great weight but it cannot
control as against the court's prerogative to decide on what is the right or
wrong interpretation.
CHAPTER II 55
7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION. - It is presumed that the

legislature was acquainted with and had in mind the judicial construction of
former statutes on the subject. It is also presumed that the statute was enacted
in the light of the judicial construction that the prior enactment had received.
With respect to a statute adopted from another state, it is presumed that it was
adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that State.
Should this construction be followed?

It should be followed only if it is reasonable, in harmony with justice
and public policy and consistent with the local law.
8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COM-
MENTATORS. - It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a statute
by the members of the legal profession is a true one and regarded as one that
should not be lightly changed. The opinion and commentaries of text writers
and legal commentators, whether they are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be
consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited or made as references in court
decisions.
SIMPLIFICATIONS OF THE RULE REGARDING THE

USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids, such as those mentioned above, are entitled to respect,
consideration and weight, but the courts are at liberty to decide whether they
are applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision.
EXAMPLE OFA CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW AS WELL
AS THE POLICY AND OBJECTIVE SOUGHT TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE

PHILIPPINES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989
FACTS:
PD No. 27, EO Nos. 228 and 229, and RA No. 6657 (Compre-hensive
Agrarian Reform Program) were assailed as violative of due process and
therefore unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Is RA No. 6657 constitutional?

HELD:
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
What is required is the surrender of the land and the physical possession of
the land in excess of the retention limit and all the beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the for-mer beneficiary. This is within the power of
the State to take and regulate private property for which payment of just
compensation is provided.
Although the proceedings in Section 16 of CARL are described

as summary, the landowners and other interested parties are never-theless
allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property.
DAR's determination of just compensation is not by any means final

and conclusive upon the landowner or any interested party. DAR's
determination is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the court of justice will still have the right to review with finality
the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
Regarding Section 18 thereof which requires the owners of
expropriated properties to accept just compensation in less than money,
the Supreme Court said: "This is not an ordinary expropriation where
only a specific property is sought to be taken by the State from its owner
for a specific and perhaps local purpose. WHAT WE DEAL WITH
HERE IS A REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION."
Such program will involve not merely millions but billions of pesos.
"[The Court] assume[s] that the framers of the
Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top project of the government. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitation of the government and had
no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full
for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers."
"[The Court] may assume their intention was to allow such manner of
payment as provided by the CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAB of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, the
title remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated."
CHAPTER II 57
EXAMPLE OF CASE WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

DELVED INTO THE INTENTION OF THE LAW AND
WHY THE RIGHT OF CULTIVATION WAS EXTENDED
TO THE LANDOWNER'S IMMEDIATE FAMILY
MEMBERS
BONIFACIO v. JUDGE DIZON

G.R. No. 79416, September 5, 1989
The question (involving the interpretation of Section 36(1) of
BA No. 3844 is this:
Is the ejectment of the agricultural lessee valid when the

landowner-lessor desires to cultivate the landholding?
Section 36 (1) of RA No. 3844 provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future

surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landhold-ing except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that; The
agricultural lessor-own-er or a member of the immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding,
if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes."
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized

not only when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also
when a member of his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law did
not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner
but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family.
The right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and
personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the
right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family
members.
The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's

immediate family members to place the landowner-lessor in parity with
the agricultural lessee who was (and still is)
allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of farm household.
In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural
lessee who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate
farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in
personal cultivation.
Whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee,
the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a re-stricted
connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or
lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's
or lessee's immediate family members.
EXAMPLE OF A CASE WHEN THE SUPREME

COURT CONSIDERED CONTEMPORANEOUS AND
PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION, AND RULED THAT
THE INTERPRETATION MADE BY THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL CANNOT BE APPLIED
PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA

ECIJA, 106 PHIL. 466 (1959) AND AGUINALDO v.
SANTOS 212 SCRA 768 (1992)
An official's re-election expresses the sovereign will of

the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission
constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was
committed during his previous term. The Court may add that
sound public policy dictates it.
This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to

criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have com-mitted during his
previous term.
FACTS:
Mayor Demetriou of Tabaco, Albay charged that Governor Salalima
violated Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the Local Government Code, Section
3, par. (G) of RA No. 3019, and the provisions of PD No 1594, as amended
Mayor Demetriou alleged that despite the delay in the completion of work
under contracts entered into by the Provincial Government for the
construction of Tabaco Public Market, liquidated damages were not imposed,
nor collected from the contractor by the provinces.
In another case, Governor Salalima and the members of the

Sanggumang Panlalawigan were charged with having retained
CHAPTER II 59
the legal services of a private lawyer and disbursing public fund in payment
thereof amounting to P7,380,410.00 in connection with a case filed by the
province against the National Power Corporation. It is alleged that this
violates Section 481 of the Local Government Code that requires the
appointment of a legal officer for the province.
The President found Governor Salalima guilty of the charges and
suspended the latter from office. In the meantime Governor Salalima was re-
elected.
ISSUE:
Salalima contends that the Office of the President committed grave
abuse of discretion in suspending him after he was re elected, since the
administrative offense were allegedly committed during his first term.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no
longer be held administratively liable in 0.P. Case No 5450 in connection
with the negotiated contract entered into on March 6, 1992 with RYU
Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market.
Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No.
5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty.
Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public
officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual v. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija (106 Phil. 466 [1959]) and Aguinaldo
v. Sdntos (212 SCRA 768 [1992]). In Pascual, th[e] Court ruled:

The Court comes to one main issue of the controversy - the legality of
disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by
him during his immediately preceding term of office.
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, [the Court] ha[s]

resorted to American authorities. The Court found that cases on the matter
are confficting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and
constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with
respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authority, however, seems to
incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally

held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
Constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not
extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding
office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms,
and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefore.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to
office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
The Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein:
"Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioners for acts he may have committed
during the failed coup."
However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that

Aguinaldo does not apply because the case against the official therein
was already pending when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his re-
election bid. It is of the view that an official's re-election renders moot
and academic an administrative complaint against him for acts done
during his previous term only if the complaint was filed before his re-
election. The fine distinction does not impress us. The rule makes no
distinction. As a matter of fact, in Pascual, the administrative complaint
against Pascual for
acts committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose,

Nueva Ecija, was filed only a year after he was re-elected.
CHAPTER II 61
The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal

cases are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the
theory that an official's re-election expresses the sovereign will of the
electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. [The
Court] may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would
open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the re-
elected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the
former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have
been committed during his previous term. His second term may thus be
devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public
service. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply
to criminal acts, which the re-elected official may have committed during his
previous term.
Thus, any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have

incurred in the execution of the retainer contract and incidents related
therewith and in the execution of a contract for additional repair for the
Tabaco Public Market are deemed extinguished by his re-election in the May
11, 1992 synchronized elections. So are the liabilities, of petitioner members
of the Sangguniang Paulalawigan ng Albay, who signed a resolution
authorizing Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question who were
re-elected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the
institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the
attendant circumstance.
CELEBRATED CASE IN 1983

GARCIA-PADILLA v. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN.
FABIAN C. VER AND GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS & LT. COL.
MIGUEL CORONEL
G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983
In this case, the principal issue is whether the courts can
inquire on the Presidential suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and whether there is right to bail during
the suspension of the privilege of the said writ.
This case is an example where the Supreme

of contemporaneous circum-
stances and what was actually being experienced
by the soldiers in the battlefield; of the historical
basis of the President's power to suspend the priv-ilege of

Habeas Corpus; of the policy, reasons and evils sought to be
remedied by LOl 1211 authorizing the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order; and of the reasons why it
reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro Rule. This case is
also an example
where the Supreme Court made a lot of references to
opinions, commentaries of legal luminaries and to the rulings
of the U.S. Supreme Court. There were also some
interpretations mentioned in the deci-sion which vested
absolute power to the president on the matter of suspending the
privilege of Habeas Corpus. (The Author disagreed with the
ruling of the Su-preme Court in this case.)
FACTS:
Nine of the fourteen detainees in this case were arrested on July, 1982
at about 1:45 P.M., when three teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, etc., after securing a search warrant issued
by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya,
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during
the raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla,
Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portugese
and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining room
of Dra. Parong's residence which had been going on since 10:00 A.M. of that
same day. The other four detainees were arrested on the following day. The
detainees, herein petitioners, were all detained at the PC/INP Command
Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya from July 6, 1982, until their
transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982, to an undisclosed place
reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela and to
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, a mother of detained petitioner Sabino G.

Padilla, Jr., filed a petition for. habeas corpus on August 13, 1982. It is
alleged in the petition that the arrest of petitioners were patently unlawful
since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding
team which made the arrest were armed only with a search warrant issued by
Judge Sofronio Sayo of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya, and no
where in said warrant was authority given to make arrest, much less
detention;
that the search warrant which authorized respondents to seize
"subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and
CHAPTER II 63
other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong
was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore illegal per se because it
does not state specifically the things that are to be seized; that no criminal
charges have been filed against any of the detainees; that there is no
judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate
the continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported
telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was
shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the
detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been
issued.
In an en banc resolution, the Supreme Court issued a writ of habeas

corpus and respondents were required to make a return of the writ. In the
return to the writ filed on August 23, 1982, respondents, through the Solicitor
General, alleged;
The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the ex-ception of
Tom Vasquez who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982,
are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOT No. 1211
dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No.
2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of PD No. 885;
2. The privilege of habeas corpus cannot be availed of by petitioners.

The courts cannot inquire into the validity and cause of their
arrest and detention.
Upon hearing, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
HELD:
ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED
"x x x At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen
(14) detainees on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having
conference in the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence from 10:00 A.M.
of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen
(14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in
subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Parong as their
headquarters. Caught in flagrante delieto, the nine (9) de-tainees scampered
towards different directions leaving on top of
their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets,

books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how
they would infiltrate the youth and stu-dent sector. Also found were one (1) .38
cal. revolver with eight (8) Eve bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for
M16 armalite, P18,650.00 cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicine packed and ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of print-ing
paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances
attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is
lawful even without a judicial war-rant as specifically provided for under Section
6(a), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on
the mat-ter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed and
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence."
From the facts above narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in fact and in law. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from fact that they
essentially involve a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then,
the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and
existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
COMMENTS ON THIS PART OF THE DECISION

Besides the attendant circumstances aforementioned, the Supreme Court
maintained the position that the arrest of the said detainees fall under the specific
provision of Section 6(a), Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court. The law being
clear and specific, it concluded that the claim of petitioners was
without basis in fact and in law.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AND WHAT WAS

ACTUALLY BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE SOLDIERS IN THE
BATTLEFIELD
x x It i6, likewise, all too well-known that when the rebel forces
capture government troopers or kidnap private individuals,
CHAPTER II 65
they do not accord to them any of the rights now being demanded by the
herein petitioners, particularly to be set at liberty upon the filling of bail. As a
matter of common knowledge, captives of the rebels or insurgents are not
only denied the right to be released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some
instances, they may even be liquidated unceremoniously. What is then sought
by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is among
others, to put the government forces on equal fighting terms with the rebels,
by authorizing the detention of their own rebel or dissident captives as the
rebellion goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces have over
those of the government, as when they resort to guerilla tactics with
sophisticated weapons, is, at least minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's
chances of beating their enemy x x x."
THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE

PRESIDENT'S POWER TO SUSPEND THE
PRIVILEGE
OF HABEAS CORPUS
"Accordingly, [the Court] holds that in times of war and similar
emergency as expressly provided in the Constitution, the President may
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which has the effect of
allowing the executive to defer the prosecution of any of the offenses covered
by Proclamation No. 2045, including, as a necessary consequence, the
withholding for the duration of the suspension of the privilege, of the right to
bail. The power could have been vested in Congress, instead of the President,
as it was so vested in the United States for which reason, when President
Lincoln himself exercised the power in 1861, Chief Justice Taney of the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the opinion that Congress alone possessed this
power under the Constitution." (The Court citing Exparts Merryman,
Federal Case No. 9487 [18611)
REASONS AND EVILS SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED BY

LOl 1211 AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF PCO;
REASONS WHY IT ABANDONED THE LANSANG DOCTRINE
AND WHY IT REVERTED TO
BARCELON AND MONTENEGRO RULE
"The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign
to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right
to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion and those
arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
"Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion does not, upon being
arrested or captured, cease to be as committed to the cause against the
government. Through a grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how
rebellion is committed, involving a great mass of confederates bound together
by a common goal, he remains in a state of continued participation in the
criminal act or design. His heart still beats with the same emotion for the
success of the movement of which he is an ardent adherent and ally x x x."
What has been said above shows the need of reexamining the Lansang
case with a view to reverting to the ruling of Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87), a
1905 decision, and Montenegro v. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882 [1952]), that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
"final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." This well-
settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared that the
"function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was held as permissible, and the test
as laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether
he acted arbitrarily. This would seem to be pure semanticism, if we consider
that with particular reference to the nature of the actions the President would
take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal with, which, as
clearly indicated in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, partakes of
military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to
assume the authority to check, reverse or supplant the presidential actions.
OPINIONS, COMMENTARIES OF LEGAL LUMINARIES

AND RULING OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in his concurring opinion said: "x x x It
cannot be overemphasized that the writ of habeas corpus, as a constitutional
right, is, for eminent commentators, protean in
scope. A reference to the opinion of the Court in Gumabon v. Director of
Bureau of Prisons may not be amiss. Thus: "The writ imposes on judges the
grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is
CHAPTER II 67
any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be

such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease." It continues: Rightly
then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke
of it as "one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." For Willoughby,
it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary
and illegal imprisonment by whosoever detention may be exercised."
Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most
important bulwarks of liberty!' Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to

him, "without it much else would be of no avail." A full awareness of the
potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty coupled
with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices
Arellano, Avancena, Abad Santos, Paras, Bengson and Chief Justice
Concepcion. It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however, to emphasize quite a
few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach." He also said: "there is
no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired (citing Bowen v. Johnston, 306
US 19, 26, 83 L. ed 2d 455, 595 Ct. 422 [19391) and unsuspended, save only
in the case specified in the constitution (citing Smith v. Bennett, 365 US 708,
713, 6 L ed 39, 43, 81 S Ct. 895).
ON THE MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, THE SUPREME

COURT RULED THAT LOI 1211 SHOULD BE VIEWED IN
ITS ENTIRETY AND PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT RELY
ENTIRELY ON PARAGRAPHS I AND 2 OF LOl 1211
Petitioners relied on paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOT 1211, which
contemplate of the first two situations when an arrest can be made, to wit:
1. The arrest and detention effected by virtue of a warrant issued

by a judge;
2. The arrest and detention effected by a military commander or the
head of a law enforcement agency after it is determined that the
person or persons to be arrested would probably escape for
safety. After the arrest, however, the case shall be immediately
referred to the city or provincial fiscal, or to the municipality,
circuit, or district judge for preliminary examination or
investigation who, if the evidence warrants, shall file the
corresponding charges and, thereafter, secure a warrant of arrest;
The Supreme Court ruled, thus: "The reliance of petitioners on

paragraphs 1 and 2 of LOT 1211 as to the alleged necessity of judicial
warrant before a person may be arrested and detained is not well founded.
Neither is the contention that paragraph 3 of LOT 1211 applies only when
judicial process is not possible. This is a narrow and constricted
interpretation of LOT 1211 when viewed in its en-tirety. Even in instances
when a resort to judicial process is possible, where, in the judgment of the
President, a resort thereto would not be expedient because it would endanger
the public order or safety, a
P00 is justified. So, too, when release on bail in the ordinary judicial
process will invite the same danger."
By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOT 1211 is a mere
directive of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers for the ultimate
objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to insure
protection to individual liberties without sacrificing the requirements of public
order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against those seeking the
forcible overthrow of the government and duly constituted authorities." LOT
1211 does not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the
arrest and detention of persons engaged in, or charged with the crimes or
offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that the (President) would subject
himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal judicial
processes in the prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to
issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary investigation is conducted with a
finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an intention on the
part of the President in issuing LOT 1211 seems to do so in their view that
LOT forms of the law of the land under the 1976 amendment of the
Constitution (citing Section 6, l976Amendment to the Constitution).

They would then contend that a PCO issued not in compliance with the
provisions of the LOl would be an illegality and of no effect.
BRIEF COMMENTS OF THE AUTHOR

With all due respect to the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court,
the Author cannot subscribes to the reasoning that it is "impractical" or a
"useless and futile exercise" for our courts to determine whether the President
acted with arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The judicial machinery is embedded in our system of government, or
in any
CHAPTER II 69
democratic system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into

the validity and legality of the acts perpetrated by any of its citizens and
which are being complained of as illegal. The President, I honestly believe,
is not an exception. On the contrary, the courts particularly the Supreme
Court, should use all available means and facilities to inquire whether there
is arbitrariness in
the President's decision to suspend the privilege of
and whether the detention of any of its citizens is arbitrary. If the Supreme
Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic
can effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all
know, that he wields extraordinary powers, especially under the present set-
up? To agree that the President is answerable to his conscience, to the people
and to God is, in effect, to agree that the doctrine of separation of powers
and the democratic processes we are supposed to uphold should be
disregarded.
The decision apparently gives more strength, power, and pro-tection to
the President and to his government machinery instead of affording the
individual citizens of a valid and reasonable recourse that they can make use
of and when they are detained without a warrant of arrest. As between the
government and individual citi-zens, the government enjoys a tremendous
advantage in any respect. To lessen further the rights of the citizens just so
that the President can effectively meet or quell an alleged invasion of
rebellion, or in or-der that the detention of any person can be validated by
and through a Presidential Commitment Order, is by any measure a
deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law.
The underlying reason why the powers of government are allocated to

the different departments is precisely to avoid arbitrary rule and abuse of
authority. It is believed that concentration of the three powers of government
in the same person or body of persons, or in one department, would lead to
abuse. On this point, Justice Brandeis said:
"The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the

Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the government powers, among the three
departments, to save the people
from autocracy." (Myers u. United, 272 U.S. 52, 293)
(Underscoring supplied)
Let each department of the government act within its own sphere of
jurisdiction. And let the system of checks and balances scrutinize the action
of the other to the end that public good may be served. This is the system and
tradition we have been taught to embrace and it is found out to be more
democratic and more in keeping with our culture and tradition as peace
loving people. I submit that there is indeed no justification to abandon the
doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances.
On the issue of bail, the two reasons given by Associate Justice

Pacifico P. de Castro and which are quoted above, are not, in my honest
opinion, sufficient justification to deny the right to bail for the following
reasons:
FIRST: In G.R. No. 61388 entitled "In the Matter of the Peti-tion for
the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. Aurora Parong, et al.,
Josefina Garcia-Padilla, petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen.
Fabian C. Ver, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, and Lt. Col. Miguel Coronel,
respondents," records show that Dr. Aurora Parong is charged with the crime
of illegal possession of firearms. This is clearly a bailable offense. The same
thing is true with respect to the other detainees. No amount of legal nicety nor
the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order can prevail over a clear
consti-tutional guarantee expressed in Section 13, Article III of the New
Constitution which reads:
xxx
"SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall
not be required." (Underscoring sup-plied)
Since it is clear that the said detainee is charged with a bailable offense
and since it is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that she is
qualified to bail, there should be no reason nor any barrier to deny the
petition for bail.
SECOND: While the President has the power to suspend the privilege
of habeas corpus under and by virtue of the exceptions in Section 15, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, it is, on the other hand, the power of the courts
to grant bail to qualified persons not falling under the exceptions mentioned
in Section 13, Article III. I see no justification to the statement that "The duty
of the judiciary
CHAPTER II 71
to protect individual rights must yield to the power of the executive to protect
the State x x x" Ten or one hundred detention prisoners, or even more, even
granting that they are rebels, cannot overwhelm the vast powers of the
government. It will make a serious difference if they are granted the right to
bail. Besides, why should the judiciary yield a power and a duty which is
appropriately its own? Moreover, it is not the particular right of the
individual that is protected or being protected. Rather, it is the doctrine of
separation of powers itself and the system of checks and balances as well as
the very Constitution itself that guarantees all of these that the
judiciary protects. If in the exercise of this duty, an individual or group of
individuals are directly or indirectly benefited, it is because they are part and
parcel of the State and of the government that they have chosen. After all, the
government may come and go at anytime but the people who compose the
State remains. They are actually the ones who work to no end just so that the
nation and the State can survive.
THIRD: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf, x x x"
(Section 14, Article III, 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring supplied). If one's
right to bail is denied, the above-quoted constitutional right will be defeated
and rendered useless. The detainee, for as long as he is detained, cannot
effectively prepare his case and his defense. Added to this is the fact that
during the entire period of his detention and until the case is finally decided,
he is, in the eyes of the law, still presumed innocent. The contrary has yet to
be proven and yet during the interregnum between the inquiry and the final
judgment, he has already lost the battle. Even before the trial starts, he is
already in a very disadvantageous position. While the government, with all
the powers and facilities in its command, is thoroughly preparing its case and
its evidence the detainee suffers the physical and mental burden of being kept
inside the prison cell. Even granting for the sake of argument that he is given
a chance to confer with his counsel, the disadvantage in any respect still
works against the
detainee. This is very evident and clear and any contradiction of

reality will only make the truth very obvious.
NOTE:
THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT ON THIS QUESTION ARE NOW
LAID TO REST BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF
THE
1987 CONSTITUTION.
The conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court on this question are now
laid to rest by Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof. and must
promulgate its decision thereon x x x." (Third paragraph, Article
VII. Section 18. of the 1987 Constitution) (Underscoring Supplied)
The inclusion of the said constitutional provision was made possible by the
approval of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. The latter is apparently guided
by the past cases and decision on this matter. It will be recalled that when
Lansarig v. Garcia was de-cided, the Supreme Court was then presided by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a delegate to the 1986 Constitutional Commis-
sion.
Then and now, the author's position on this subject remains the same. He
cannot subscribe to the reasoning that it is "impractical" or a "useless and futile
exercise" for our courts to determine whether or not the President acted with
arbitrariness in suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The judicial
machinery is embedded in our system of government, or in any democratic
system of government for that matter, precisely to inquire into the validity and
legality of the acts perpetrated by any of its citizens and which are being
complained of as illegal. The President, the author honestly believes, is not an
exception. On the contrary, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, should use
all available means and facilities to inquire whether the privilege of habeas
corpus and whether or not the detention of any of its citizens is arbitrary. If
the Supreme Court is deprived of this right, who else in this Republic can
effectively question the act of the President knowing, as we all know, that he
wields extraordinary powers, especially when
CHAPTER II 73
the country is under martial law? To agree that "the President is answerable
to his conscience, the people, and to God" is, in effect, to agree that the
doctrine of separation of powers and the democratic processes we are
supposed to uphold should be disregarded.

RULED THAT ARTICLE 1621 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS
CLEARLY WORDED AND ADMITS NO AMBIGUITY OF
CONSTRUCTION. THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CITED
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SECTION 1,
ARTICLE XIII OF THE 1935 CONSTITUTION, AND THE
INTENTION BEHIND SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIII THEREOF.
IN RELATION TO THIS, THE SUPREME COURT MADE
REFERENCE TO THE OLD LANDMARK CASE OF KR!
VENKO v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (79 PHIL. 461)
CELSO HALILI AND ARTHUR HALILI v. CA

AND HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, et al., G.R.
No. 113539, March 12, 1998
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in
character, petitioners have no right to invoke Article 1621 of the
Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be
redeemed is rural. The Provision is clearly worded and admits of
no ambiguity in construction.
Undoubtedly, Section 5 (now Section 7) is in-tended to

insure the policy of nationalization con-tained in Section 1 (now
Section 2). Both sections therefore must be read together for they
have the same purpose and the same subject matter.
And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely,

the non-transferability of "Agricul-tural Land" to aliens.
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968,
leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow,
private respondent Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, private respondent
David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9,
1989, Helen executed a deed
of quitclaim, transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles
and interests over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from
Simeon.
Among the said parcels of lands that is now in litigation, situated in
Bagbagum, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No T-170514 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514
was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of David Rey
Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
private respondent Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT NO. T-120259 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-130721 (M) was issued in the latter's name.
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint

before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the
constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances - and claiming
ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Article 1621
of the Civil Code.
In its decision dated March 10, 1992, the trial court dismissed the
complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of
her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of
land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize
David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the
second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no
reason to invoke their right of redemption under. Article 1621 of the Civil
Code
The Hahlis sought a reversal from the CA which, however, denied their
appeal. The CA affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject
land was urban citing Tejido v. Zamacoma and Yap v. Grageda (121 SCRA
244). It further held that although the transfer of the land to David Rey may
have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more
point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has
passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.
Hence, the present petition for review.

Petitioners submitted that the CA erred: (1) in affirming the
conclusion of trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural;
CHAPTER II 75
(2) in denying petitioner's right of redemption under Article 1621 of the

Civil Code; and (b) having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers to
her son David illegal, in not declaring the same null and void.
PIWTOALTO
(1) The land is urban; thus, no right of redemption. - Whether the
land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not
reviewable by th[e] Court. Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings
of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only few exceptions, such as when
the finding are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a
misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on
the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record.
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited ex-ceptions.
In fact, the conclusion of the trial court - that the subject property is urban
land - is based on clear and convincing evidence xxx
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character,

petitioners have indeed no right to invoke Article 1621 of the Civil Code,
which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed, is rural. The
provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction.
"Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also

have the right of redemption when a piece of rural land, the
area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless
the grantee does not own any rural land. xxx"
Under this article, both lands - that sought to be re-deemed and the
adjacent lot belonging to the person exercis-ing the right of redemption -
must be rural. If one or both
are urban, the right cannot be invoked. The purpose of this provision,
which is limited in scope to rural lands not ex-ceeding one hectare, is to
favor agricultural development. The subject land not being rural and,
therefore, not agri-cultural, this purpose would not be served if
petitioners are granted the right of redemption under Article 1621.
Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it.
(2) Sale to Cataniag valid. - Neither do[es] [the Court] find[s] any
reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the sale of the subject
land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the
constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son
David Rey.
True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim - in which she as-signed,
transferred and conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over
the property she had inherited from her husband - collided with the
Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which pro-vides:
"Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain."
The landmark case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds (79 Phil.
461) settled the issue as to who are qualified (and disqualified) to own
public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long discourse
maintaining that the "public agricultural lands" mentioned in Section 1,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and
industrial lands, the Court then state:
"Under Section 1 of Article XIII (now Section 2, Article
XII) of the Constitution, natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect
to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural
resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated
by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this
result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:
'Section 6. Save in cases of hereditary succes-sion,

no private agricultural land will be transferred
CHAPTER II 77
or assigned except to individual, corporations or as-

sociations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.'
This constitutional provision closes the only
remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens
if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizen.
Undoubtedly, as above indicated, Section 5 [now Section
71 is intended to insure the policy of nationalism
contained in Section 1 [now Section 21. Both sections
must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed
that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in
Section 5 [now Section 7] are the very same persons who
under Section 1 [now Section 21 are disqualified 'to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.' And
the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the
non-transferability of 'agricultural land' to aliens. x x x"
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to

lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession.
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien

vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question.
Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid."
The present case is similar to De Castro v. Tan. In that case, a
residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children
executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of
his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the
original vendor to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the
reason that the land has since become
the property of a naturalized
qualified to own land.
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private

Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no
longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provi-sion - to keep our
land in Filipino hands - has been served.

CITED AND MADE REFERENCE TO (A) A HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND OF THE PACKAGE OF ELECTORAL
REFORMS SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED SINCE 1970;
(B) THE REALITIES THAT CONFRONT POOR
CANDIDATES AND THE REASON WHY THERE IS
SUBSTANTIAL OR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
INTEREST JUSTIFYING EXERCISE OF THE
REGULATORY POWER OF THE COMELEC UNDER
ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IN THIS CASE, SOME JUSTICES MADE EXTENSIVE
CITATION AND REFERENCES TO AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE, AMERICAN LEGAL LITERATURE, AND
TO U.S. CASES ACTUALLY DECIDED (i.e., BUCKLEY
v. VALEO; AUSTIN v. MICHIGAN STATE CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE)
EMILIO M.R. OSMEA AND PABLO GARCIA v.

COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998
Political equality and ban on political adver-tising
There is no suppression of political ads, but only a

regulation of the time and manner of adver-tising.
There is a substantial or legitimate govern-ment

interest justifying the exercise of the regula-tory power of
the COMELEC.
COMELEC take-over of the advertising page of
newspapers on the commercial time of radio and tv
stations, and allocating those to the candidates, is valid.
Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only consti-

tutional provision that mandates political equal-
ity. Article XIII, Section 1, requires congress to give
CHAPTER 11 79
the "highest priority" to the enactment of measures designed to

reduce political inequalities. Article II, Sec. 26, declares as a
fundamental principle of our government "equal opportunities
for public service."
FACTS:
Petitioners Emilio M.R. Osmeña, candidate for President of the
Philippines, and Petitioner Pablo Garcia, candidate for governor of Cebu,
urged the re-examination of the ruling in NPC v. COMELEC
upholding the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. They contend
that the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing
field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidates
by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their
most affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching votes like
airplanes, boats, raffles, parades and handbills.
Petitioners claim that the reasoning of NPC is flawed, because it rests

on the misconception that Article TX-C, Section 4, mandates the absolute
equality of all candidates regardless of financial status, when what this
provision speaks of is "equality of opportunity-"
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners filed a petition for pro-hibition,
seeking a re-examination of the validity of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646, the
Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commis-sion on Elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and sustained its ruling in
NPC v. COMELEC on the following grounds:
1. There is no suppression of political ads, but only a
regulation of the time and manner of advertising. - The term
political "ad ban," when used to describe Section 11(b) of RA
No. 6646, is misleading, for even as Section 11 (b)prohibits the
sale or donation of print space and air time to political
candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself
allocate to the candidates space and time in the media.
2. The law's concern is not with the message or content of the ad but
with ensuring media equality between candidates
with "deep pockets," as Justice Feliciano called them in his

opinion of the Court in NPC, and those with less resources.
The law is part of a package of electoral reforms
adopted in 1987. Actually, similar effort was made in 1970 to
equalize the opportunity of candidates to advertise themselves
and their programs of
government by requiring the COMELEC to have a
COMELEC space in newspapers, magazines, and periodicals
and prohibiting candidates to advertise outside such space,
unless the names of all the other candidates in the district in
which the candidate is running are mentioned "with equal
prominence." The validity of the law was challenged in
Badoy,
Jr. v. COMELEC. The voting was equally divided (5-5),
however, with that result the validity of the law was deemed
upheld.
3. There is a substantial or legitimate government interest justifying
exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC - There is no
total ban on political ads, much less restriction on the content of
the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be
controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of
poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate governmental
interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC under Article TX-C, Section 4, of the Constitution.
The Commission may, during the election period,

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or in-formation, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal oppor-
tunity, time, and space and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the
objective of holding free, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of

political ads. They only prohibit the sale or donation
CHAPTER II 81
of print space and air time to candidates but require the

COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media
for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during
the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising
page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV
stations and allocates these to the candidates.
The validity of the COMELEC take over for such

temporary period cannot be doubted. In Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robbins, it was held that a court order
compelling a private shopping center to permit use of a corner of
its courtyard for the purpose of distributing pamphlets or
soliciting signatures for a petition opposing a UN resolution was
valid. The order either unreasonably impaired the value or use of
private property nor violated the owner's right not to be
compelled to express support for any viewpoint since it can
always disavow any connec-tion with the message.
4. The validity of regulation of time, place, and manner, under

well-defined standards, is well-nigh
beyond question. - What is involved here is simply regulation of
this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the
mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC,
of print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and
space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest and
peaceful, and credible elections."
5. Article IX-C, Section 4, is not the only constitutional provision that

mandates political equality. - Article XIII, Section 1, requires
Congress to give the "highest priority" to the enactment of
measures designed to reduce political inequalities. Article II,
Section 26, declares as a fundamental principle of our
government "equal opportunities for public service." Access to
public office will be denied to poor candidates if they cannot
even have access to mass media in order to reach the electorate.
6. The Court cannot grant to petitioners what the legislature denied

them. - The fact is that efforts have been made to secure the
amendment or even repeal of Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646. No
less than five bills were filed in the Senate in the last session
of Congress for this purpose, but they all failed to pass.

Petitioners claim it was because Congress adjourned
without acting on them. But that is just the point.
Congress obviously did not see it fit to act on the bills
before it adjourned
NOTE JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO AND JUSTICE
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN DISSENTED. THEIR DISSENTING
OPINIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH ROMERO
1. A COMELEC study disclosed that newspapers showed

biases for or against certain candidates - Not to be overlooked is the
stark truth that the media itself is partisan In a study commissioned by
the COMELEC itself to determine whether a certain newspaper adhered
to the principles of fairness and impartiality in their reportage of the
presidential candidates in the 1992 election, the results disclosed that
newspapers showed biases for or against certain candidates. Hence, the
contention that "Section 11(b) does not cut off the flow of media
reporting opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications
and platforms and promises" simply is illusory. Editorial policy will
always ensure that the unfavored ones will get minimal exposure, if at
all. This underscores the need to give candidates the freedom to
advertise, if only to counteract negative reporting with paid
advertisements which they cannot have recourse to with the present
prohibition Worse, the ban even encourages corruption of the mass
media by candidates who procure paid hacks, masquerading as
legitimate journalist, to sing them paeans to the high heavens. Wittingly
or unwittingly, the mass media, to the detriment of poor candidates,
occasionally lend themselves to the manipulative devices of the rich
and influential candidates
2 The prohibition actually gives an unfair advantage to those who

have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period. - While
there can be no gainsaying the laudable intent behind such an
objective, the State being mandated to guarantee equal. access
to opportunities for public service, the prohibition has the
opposite effect instead of "equalizing" the position of
candidates who offer themselves for public office the
prohibition actually give an unfair advantage
CHAPTER II 83
to those who have wide media exposure prior to the campaign period.
Instead of promoting the interest of the public in general, the ban
promotes the interest of a particular class or candidates, the prominent
and popular candidates for public office. What is in store for the
relatively obscure candidate who wants to pursue is candidacy? Eager
to trumpet his credentials and program of government, he finds himself
barred from using the facilities of mass media on his own. While
incumbent government officials, show business personalities, athletes
and prominent media men enjoy the advantage of name recall due to
past public exposure, the unknown political neophyte has to content
himself with other for which, given the limited campaign period,
cannot reach the electorate as effectively as it would through the mass
media. To be sure, the candidate may avail himself of "COMELEC
Time," but the sheer number of candidates does not make the same an
effective vehicle of communication. Not surprisingly, COMELEC
Chairman Pardo, at the Oral Argument held by the Court en banc,
admitted that no candidate has as yet applied for COMELEC air time
and space.
More telling, the celebrities are lavished with broader coverage

from newspaper, radio and television stations, as well as via the
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters,
broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists, as they are deemed
more newsworthy by media, thus generating a self-perpetuating cycle
wherein political unknowns, who may be more deserving of public
office, campaign in relative obscurity compared to their more popular
rivals. Instead of equalizing opportunities for public service, the
prohibition not only perpetuates political inequality, but also
invidiously discriminates against lesser-known candidates.
3. The use of modern media gives the poor candidate the opportunity to
make himself known to the electorate at an affordable cost. - Experience
shows that the ban on political advertisement has not been reasonably
necessary to accomplish its desired end. First, there are more than 70
provinces, more than 60 cities and more than a thousand municipalities
spread all over the archipelago. Previous elections have shown that the
ban on political advertising forces a candidate to conduct a nationwide
whistle-stop campaign to attain maximum exposure of his credentials
and his program of government. Obviously, this necessitates
tremendous resources for sundry expenses
indispensable for political campaigns, all within a limited period of 90

days. Given the enormous logistics needed for such a massive effort,
what are the chances for an impecunious candidate who sincerely
aspires for national office?
On the other hand, radio and television reach out to a great majority of the populace more than other instruments of information dissemination, being the most pervasive, effective and inexpensive. A 30-second television advertisement, cost-ing around p35,000.00 at present rates, would, in an instant, reach millions
of their homes. Indeed, the use of modern mass media gives the poor
candidate the opportunity to make himself known to the electorate at
an affordable cost. Yet, these means of com-munication are denied
such candidates due to the imagined apprehension that more affluent
candidates may monopolize the airwaves.
4. If poor and unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office
due to their lack of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its
purpose, as the persons for whom it has been primarily imposed have
been shunted aside and thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits. - To be
realistic, judicial notice must be taken on the fact that COMELEC, in
narrowing down its list of "serious" candidates, considers in effect a
candidate's capability to wage an effective nationwide campaign which
necessarily entails possession and/or availability of substantial financial
resources. Given this requirement, the objective of equalizing rich and
poor candidates may no longer find relevance, the candidates ultimately
allowed to run being relatively equal, as far as resources are concerned.
Additionally, the disqualification of nuisance candidates allegedly due
to their inability to launch serious campaigns, itself casts doubt on the
validity of the prohibition as a means to achieve the state policy of
equalizing access to opportunities for public service. If poor and
unknown candidates are declared unfit to run for office due to their lack
of logistics, the political ad ban fails to serve its purpose, as the persons
for whom it has been primarily imposed have been shunted aside and
thus, are unable to enjoy its benefits.
5. If it is difficult to show the number of candidates that can be

adequately accommodated by "COMELEC Space" and 'COMELEC
Time" Past experience shows that the COMELEC find problem in
-
effectively informing the voting

CHAPTER II 85
populace of the credentials, accomplishments, and platforms of

government of the candidates. There are 17,396 national and local
elective public positions which will be contested by an estimated
100,000 candidates on May 11, 1998. For national positions the list has
been trimmed down to 11 candidates for president, 9 candidates for
vice-president, and 40 candidates for senator. It is difficult to see how
the number of candidates can be adequately accommodated by
"COMELEC Space" and "COMELEC Time." Resolution No. 2983 of
the COMELEC, issued in compliance with Section 92 of B.P. 881,
mandates that at least thirty minutes of prime time be granted to the
Commission, free of charge, from February 10, 1998, until May 9,
1998. Thirty-minutes of prime time for eighty-nine
(89) days is scarcely enough time to introduce candidates to the

voters, much less to properly inform the electorate of the credentials
and platforms of all candidates running for national office. Let us be
reminded that those running for local elective positions will also need
to use the same space of time from March 27 to May 9, 1998, and that
the COMELEC itself is authorized to use the space and time to
disseminate vital election information clearly, "COMELEC Space" and
"COMELEC Time" sacrifices the right of the citizenry to be
sufficiently informed regarding the qualifications and programs of the
candidates. The net effect of Section 11(b) is, thus, a violation of the
people's right to be informed on matters of public concern and makes it
a palpably unreasonable restriction on the people's right to freedom of
expression. Not only this, the failure of "COMELEC Space" and
"COMELEC Time" to adequately inform the electorate, only highlights
the unreasonableness of the means employed to achieve the objective of
equalizing opportunities for public service between rich and poor
candidates.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

1. Actual peso calculations show that Section 11(b), RA No. 6646, is anti-
poor. The majority argues that the ad ban is pro-poor, because it
-
prevents the rich from buying media time and space that the poor
cannot afford or match. This argument assumes that media advertising
is expensive and, thus, beyond the reach of the poor.
I respectfully submit that, such argument is bereft of factual

basis. True, a full-page ad in a major broadsheet may
be priced at about P100,000, a 30-second commercial in a major

television, anywhere from P15,000 to P90,000 depending on the time
and the program; while airtime of an equal duration in a radio station,
anywhere from P300 to P4,500. But even with such price tags, media
ads are necessarily expensive, considering their nationwide reach,
audience penetration, effectiveness and persuasive value.
Realistically, expenses are involved in a candidacy for a National

Office like the Presidency, the Vice-Presidency, and
the Senate. In recognition of this, the law has limited cam-
paign expenditures to ten pesos (PlO) for every voter in the case of
candidates for president and vice-president, and three pesos (P3) per
voter in their constituencies, for other candi-dates. Anyone - whether
rich or poor - who aspires for such national elective office must expect
to spend a considerable sum, whether of his own or from allowable
donations, to make himself and his platform of program of government
known to the voting public.
2. The prohibition is not limited in duration but is, in fact and in truth,
total, complete and exhaustive. The ad ban is constitutional because,
-
according to the majority, it is limited in duration for the reason that

it is enforced only during the election period. In my humble view and
with all due respect, this is both erroneous and illogical. A political
advertisement is relevant only during the campaign period - not
before and not after. As petitioners put it, a ban on mountain skiing
during the Winter season cannot be said to be limited in duration, just
because it is enforced during winter. After all, skiing is indulged in
only when the mountain slopes are covered with snow. To add a
further parallel, a ban against the planting of rice during the rainy
season is not limited simply because it covers only that season. After
all, nobody plants rice during summer when the soil is parched. In
the same manner, campaign ads are not resorted to except during the
campaign period. And their prohibition does not become any less
odious and less comprehensive just because the proscription applies
only during the election season. Obviously, candidates need to
advertise their qualifications and platforms only during such period.
Properly understood, therefore, the prohibition is not limited in
duration but, is in fact and in truth, complete and exhaustive.
CHAPTER II 87
3. The best testament to the utter inutility and ineffectivity

of "COMELEC Time," is the statement of the COMELEC Chairman
that no candidate had applied for COMELEC Time. - Finally, the
majority opines that the grant of free COMELEC media time and space
to candidates more than makes up for the abridgement of the latter's
right to buy political ads. With due respect, I believe this is hollow and
shallow.
Up to this writing, I have yet to hear of any major

candidate using this so-culled free COMJLDC broadcast time.
In fact, during the oral argument of this case on March 5, 1998,
COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo frankly admitted that no
candidate had applied for an allocation of COMELEC Time. Not even
petitioners. This is the best statement to the utter inutility and
ineffectivity of COMELEC Time. Indeed, it cannot be a substitute,
much less a viable alternative, to freely chosen but paid for media ads.
It cannot compensate for the violation of the candidates' right to free
speech and media access, or for the electorate's right to information

MADE REFERENCE TO THE JOURNAL AND THE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
JOKER ARROYO, et al. v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al., G.R. No.

127255, June 26, 1998
There is no need for petitioners to invoke the power of the
Court under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution to
determine whether, in enacting RA No. 8240, the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that it is
what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may
not be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if
petitioners' allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this
case would not affect the validity of RA No. 8240, the rules
allegedly violated being merely internal rules of procedure of the

House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of
laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.
FACTS:
Majority Floor Leader Representative Rodolfo Albano was then
moving for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill that
became RA No. 8240, which led the Chair, then Deputy Speaker Raul Daza,
to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Representative Joker P.
Arroyo asked: "What is that Mr. Speaker?" The Chair allegedly ignored him
and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the question
"What is that Mr. Speaker" was a privileged question or a point of order that,
under the rules of the House, has precedence over other matters,
with the exception to motion to adjourn.
ISSUE:
Is the said contention of Rep. Arroyo valid and meritorious?
HELD:
The contention has no merit. Representative Arroyo did not have the
floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply stood up and
started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and proceeded to ask if
there were objections to the Majority Leader's motion. Hearing none, he
declared the report approved. Rule XVI, Section 96 of the Rules of the House
of
Representatives provides:
"Section 96. Manner of Addressing the Chair.
- When a member desires to speak, he shall rise and
respectfully address the Chair "Mr. Speaker."
Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21, 1996

shows that after complaining that he was being "hurried" by the Majority
Leader to finish his interpellation of the sponsor (Rep. Javier) of the
conference committee re-port, Representative Arroyo concluded and then
sat down. However, when the Majority Leader moved for the approval of
the conference committee report and the Chair asked if there was any
objection to the motion, Rep. Arroyo stood up again and, without
requesting to be recognized, asked, "What is that, Mr. Speaker?"
Apparently, the Chair did not hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on
the Majority Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any objec-tion
and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought down the
gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, "No, no, no, wait a minute," and
asked what the question
CHAPTER II 89
was. Only after he had been told that the Chair had called for objection
to the motion for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo register his
objection. It is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was
simply not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the
Chair.
Nor is it correct to say that the question ("What is that, Mr. Speaker?")
he was raising was a question of privilege or a point of order.
At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a reconsideration of the
ruling of the Chair declaring the conference committee report approved. It is
not true that he was prevented from doing so. The session was suspended,
obviously to settle the matter amicably. From all appearances, the
misunderstanding was patched up during the nearly hour-long suspension
because, after the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. As the
Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows, the session was
thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate, and certified by the respective secretaries of both
houses of Congress as having been finally passed. The following day, the bill
was signed into law by the President of the Philippines.
Petitioners take exception to the following statement in the decision

that "The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House." They contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of
the House remain in the ses-sion hall because the others have gone home, the
quorum may not be questioned.
That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in the
decision, at 11:48 A.M. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo questioned the
existence of a quorum, but after the roll call, it was found that there was
none. After that, he announced he would again, question the quorum,
apparently to delay the voting on the conference report. Hence, the statement
in the decision that the question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of the
conference committee report on what later became RA No. 8240 was
railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is there any
need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court under Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in enacting RA No. 8240,
the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion, since that
it is what we have precisely done, although the result of our review may not
be what petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners'
allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would not affect the
validity of RA No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated being merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of laws. It is well-settled that a legislative act will not be
declared invalid for non-compliance with internal rules.

RESORTED TO THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN
PROVISIONS IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION NOTABLY
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE II AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND THE ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
UNDER SECTION 11 OF ARTICLE VII.
THE SUPREME COURT ALSO CONSIDERED THE
CONTEM-PORANEOUS AND POSTERIOR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTAN-TIAL EVIDENCE INVOLVED IN THE CASE
AND INTERPRET-ED THE SAME AS A JUSTIFICATION TO
THE TOTALITY TEST PRINCIPLE.
THE SUPREME COURT SAID: "AS EARLYAS THE 1803 CASE
OF MARBURY v. MADISON, THE DOCTRINE HAS BEEN LAID
DOWN THAT "IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND
DUTY OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT TO SAY WHAT THE
LAW IS. . - THUS. RESPONDENT'S INVOCATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTION IS BUT A
FORAY IN THE DARK." (Underscoring supplied)
CELEBRATED CASE IN 2001

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 146710-15
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, a
long time friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The next
day, then Senate Minority Leader Teofisto
CHAPTER II 91
Guingona delivered a fiery privilege speech. He accused the petitioner of

receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos
Sur. The House of Representatives conducted its own investigation. The
House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by
Representative Roilo Goilez, decided to investigate the exposé of Governor
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto
Hererra and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner. On October 12, then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
and later asked for petitioner's resignation. However, petitioner strenuously
held on to his office and refused to resign.
On November 13, House Speaker Vifiar transmitted the Ar-ticles of

Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
On December 7, 2000, the impeachment trial started. Several witnesses
were presented by the prosecution, but it was Clarissa Ocampo and Secretary
Edgardo Espiritu who delivered the most serious accusations Clarissa
Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he
affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on account documents involving a P500
million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000
Secretary Espiritu alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW

Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.
On January 16, 2001, on a vote of 11-10 (Those who voted 'yes" to
open the envelope were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano,
Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Blazon, Osmeña III. Those who voted
"no" were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmefla, Aquino-Oreta,
Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revil-la, Sotto III, and Tatad) the
senator-judges ruled against the open-ing of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence show-ing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a
secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde' The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker

Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.
On January 18, 2001, a 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted

candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. This attracted more and more
people. Thereafter, there was a resignation by some cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs. To stem the tide
of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the
opening of the highly controversial second envelope. There was no turning
back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
On January 20, at about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered

the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 P.M.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. He issued the
following press statement:
"20 January 2001
Statement from
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Re-public of the
Philippines, while along with many other le-gal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclama-tion as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will pre-vent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of
our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service
to our people.
I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in
the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

CHAPTER II 93
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the
following letter:
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, lam hereby transmitting this declaration that I am
unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRAJJA"
On the same day, January 20, he signed the following letter and sent
the same to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 A.M. Another copy was
transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was
received only at 9:00 P.M.
On January 22, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
and duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the
following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05 SC, to wit:
'A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC - In re: Request of Vice President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President
of the Republic of the Philippines before Chief Justice - Acting on
the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the
Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an
administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm
the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the
oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposi-tion of

any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."
From day to day after this, respondent Arroyo attended official

functions.
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court isfunctus officio and has been terminated. Senator

Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the
closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to
decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question
of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed
with th[e] Court G.R. No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-
00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757, and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted." He prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution."
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable contro-versy,
whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is
still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined

on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
CHAPTER II 95
HELD:
1. WHETHER THE CASES AT BAR INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION - Petitioner's claim that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her
oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers
of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments.
All these, constitute "the political ticket which the Court cannot enter." This
claim is not applicable and the Supreme Court said
x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not

political questions. The principal issues for resolution re-auire the
proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably Section 1 of Article II. and Section
8 of Article VII. and the allocation of governmental powers un-der
Section 11 of Articile VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the
scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity." As early as the
1803 case of Marbury v Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is Thus, respondent's invocation of
the doctrine of politi-cal question is but a foray in the dark.
(Emphasis and Un-derscoring supplied)
2. WHETHER THE PETITIONER RESIGNED AS PRE-

SIDENT - Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from
a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the Of-fice of the President
was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The
Supreme Court rejected this claim and said:
"x x x In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he evacu-ated Malacanang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned
has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and
after January 20 2001, or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
Using the totality test, [the Court] hold[s] that petitioner resigned as
President."
These contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial

evidence are as follows:
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he
would not be candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
2. The petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a

graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the
country.
3. Again, [the Court] note [s] that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
fact.
4. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the
petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second
round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time

were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period.
5. In sum. [the Court] hold[s] that the resignation of the petitioner

cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaflang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of
the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any
kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed
his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he
called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national
CHAPTER II 97
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he

did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
The Supreme Court concluded: "Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity cannot be attained if he will not give up the
presidency."
3. WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS ONLY TEMPO-
RARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT - Petitioner pos-
tulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice-President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Section
11 of Article VTI." This conten-tion is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance
that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
President.
The Supreme Court rejected this claim and ruled:
Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet,
without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any
support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern
is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign. still? he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that
he is merely unable to govern temnorarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de lure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by th[e]
Court.
4. WHETHER THE PETITIONER ENJOYS IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT: ASSUMING HE ENJOYS IMMUNITY, WHAT IS
THE EXTENT OF THE IMMUNITY - (1) Petitioner makes two
submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted
1
in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys

immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
The Supreme Court held that "When the 1987 Constitution was
crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the
1973 Constitution."
(2) [The Court] rejectis] his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
Since the Imreachment Court is now
functus officio. it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he
should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution.
What is the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President? The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal
in character. They involve plunder, bribery, and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder that carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of th[e] Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the

scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of
the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
Among others the issues related to the subject of statutory construction

are the following:
1. The claim that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th
President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of
Presidency and she has been recognized by foreign governments,
are matters which,
CHAPTER II 99
according to the Supreme Court, "the political ticket which the

court cannot enter." The Supreme Court said:
"x x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not
political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution. notably Section 1 of Article IL, and Section 8 of
Article VII. and the allocation of governmental powers under
Section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for
a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.

They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison the doctrine has been laid down that "it
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is x x x Thus, respondent's
invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray
in the dark." (Emphasis and Underscoring supplied)
This case is also an example where the Supreme Court took into
consideration the contemporaneous circumstances that preceded before
former President Joseph Estrada left Malacanang Palace on June 20, 2001, as
well as the posterior facts and circumstantial evidence that led it to conclude
that:
President Joseph Estrada resigned; and
2. The national spirit of reconciliations and solidarity cannot be
attained if he will not give up the presidency.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND FERDINAND

N. TALABONG
V.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO G.R. No.
184836, December 23, 2009
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows
an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. The best indicator of
the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
FACTS:
Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, re-
spectively. During his third term of office, on September 2005, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a
criminal case he then faced. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently
lifted the suspension order; hence, he resumed per-forming the functions of
his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CO C) for
the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to his COC or
to cancel it on the ground that it would violate the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of BA No. 7160.
The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners.

Subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the preventive suspension of an elected public official is an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule
under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA No.
7160.
HELD:
No. Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-
term limitation.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renun-ciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be con-sidered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 43(b) of RA No. 7160 practically repeats the constitu-

tional provision, and any differnnen in wording does not ssumo any
significance in this case.
CHAPTER II 101
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local

elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than
three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section
8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three
years - during which an official has title to office and can serve.
The second branch relates to the provision's express initiative to

prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of
ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of
office "shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected." This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is

barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive
salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss
of office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability.
Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no
position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This
was what exactly happened to Asio.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an
elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues
to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of
the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent
replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Old Case:
SOCRATES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

HAGEDORN
G.R. Nos. 155083-84, October 16, 2002
The established rule is that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with
the full term of three years for purposes of counting the

consecutiveness of an elective official's term.
Interpretation of the three-term limit.
FACTS:
Petitioner contested respondent's proclamation of private re-spondent's
victory in the recall election and its discretion in uphold-ing the latter's
qualification to run for mayor in the said election on the ground that the same
has served for three consecutive terms prior to the contested recall election,
and as such, he is constitution-ally and statutorily prohibited from running
for the same office for the fourth time and consequently, cannot be
proclaimed the winner and serve a fourth consecutive term for the same
position he has held before.
ISSUES:
a) Whether private respondent's victory in the recall election
constitutes a "fourth term" as contemplated by law.
b) Whether private respondent was qualified to run for mayor in
contested recall election.
HELD:
1. No. What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election
for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission evidently show that the prohibited election
referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after
the third term, not any other subsequent election.
2. From the end of his third term in June 30, 2001 until September
24, 2002, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. His new recall term from
September 24, 2002 until June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together
Hagedorn's previous three terms with his new recall term to make the recall
term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary
interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002, which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of his service as mayor. The
established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official's term.
CHAPTER II 103
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602), the Court had

occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this man-ner:
"x x x the second sentence of the constitutional provision

under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term of which he was elected."
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and
at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. x x x" (Underscoring supplied)
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out

of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted
an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The
Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full
term of three years. The clear intent is that the interruption
"for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary,
is suffi-cient to break an elective local official's continuity of
service.
EXAMPLE OF CASES WHEN THE SUPREME COURT

CONSIDERED THE CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
AFFECTING BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND THE EMPLOYEE; THE
REASON BEHIND THE LABOR POLICY OF SUSTAINING THE
VALIDITY OF THE DISMISSAL OF AN EMPLOYEE FOR JUST
CAUSE BUT ORDERING THE EMPLOYER TO PAY DAMAGES
FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
BACKGROUND OF RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CASE OF

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
RULE PRIOR TO 1989

Dismissal or termination was illegal if the employee was not given any
notice.
The rule that was then consistently followed is the principle of

"TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS" which refers to
substantive and procedural due process.
In accordance with this principle, two (2) requisites must concur
namely:
(1) Dismissal must be for any of the causes provided under Article
282 of the Labor Code; and
(2) The employee must be accorded due process, the elements
of which are notice and the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. (Austria v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 124382,
August 16, 1999; Pizza Hut/Progressive Development
Corporation v. NLRC, et al., 252 SCRA 531 [19961)
THIS RULE WAS REVERSED IN WENPHIL CORP. v.

NLRC G.R. NO. 80587, FEBRUARY 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 69
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that where the employer had a
valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the notice or due
process requirement, THE DISMISSAL MAY BE
UPHELD BUT, THE EMPLOYER SHALL BE PENALIZED TO
PAY AN INDEMNITY TO THE EMPLOYEE.
THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE WAS CHANGED

IN RUBEN SERRANO v. NLRC, etal., G.R.
No. 117040, JANUARY 27, 2000
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that while the violation by the
employer of the notice requirement in termination for just and authorized
causes was not a denial of the due process that will nullify the termination.
THE DISMISSAL IS INEFFECTUAL
AND THE EMPLOYER MUST PAY FULL BACKWAGES
FROM THE TIME OF TERMINATION UNTIL IT IS
JUDICIALY DECLARED THAT THE DISMISSAL WAS NOT
FOR JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSE.
THE DOCTRINE IN SERRANO WAS REVISITED BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN 2004 IN THE CASE OF JENNY AGABON,
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
In this case, the Supreme Court, voting 8-6, came to the con-clusion
that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without ob-servance of the
twin requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the
Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by
CHAPTER II 105
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the
employer, which sanctions, however, must be stiffer than the P1,000.00
imposed on Wenphil.
In the Agabon case, the Supreme Court held that the violation of the
right of petitioners Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilio C. Agabon to statutory due
process by the private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc., as their
employer, warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages, the amount of which, according to the Supreme Court, is addressed
to the sound discre-
tioii of the co1rt 7 takiriB into acconnit the relevant circiimstanices.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the Agabon case, the Supreme

Court ordered private respondent Riviera Home Improve-ments, Inc., as
employer, to pay each of the Agabon petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as
nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process. The
Agabon ruling has been cited with favor and applied in the subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court in Benedicto A. Cajucom, VII v. TPI
Philippines Cement Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. 149090; Third Division)
promulgated on February 11, 2005; in Bernardino A. Caingat v. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 154308; First Division)
promulgated on March 10, 2005; and in Dennis A. Chua u. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 146780; Second Division)
promulgated on March 11, 2005.
WENPHIL CORPORATION v. NLRC, et al.,

G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989
FACTS:
A had an altercation with B, and for which they were suspended on the
following day. In the afternoon of the same day, A was advised, through a
memorandum issued by the Operations Manager, about his dismissal from
the service in accordance with their personnel manual. The formal notice of
dismissal was served to him four days later. A is an employee of the
company for about one (1) year and five (5) months at the time of his
dismissal.
A filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the same was dismissed by
the labor arbiter for lack of merit. The said decision, however, was set aside
by the NLRC which ordered Xs reinstatement to his former position with one
year back wages without qualification
and deduction.
The employer filed a petition for certiorari.

HELD:
The failure of the petitioner to give private respondent the ben-efit of a
hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringe-ment of his
constitutional right to due process of law and equal pro-tection of the laws.
The standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative proceedings
have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of law simply
means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.
The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was not necessary
because the incident which gave rise to the termination of private respondent
was witnessed by his co-employees and supervisors is without merit. The
basic requirement of due process is that which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the
service of an employee without the loss of seniority and the payment of his
wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but
not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it
appears that he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was
found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the
Department of Labor and Employment should be re-examined. It will be
highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the
services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that
warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank
and ifie if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service.
In the instant case, the private respondent appears to be of violent

temper. He caused trouble during office hours and defied his superiors as
they tried to pacify him. He should not be rewarded with re-employment and
back wages. Reason: It may encourage him to do even worse and will render
a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just
cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his former
employment.
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure
to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his
dismissal. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause
and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second
requirement. Thus,
CHAPTER II 107
it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and
conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from
employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must
indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of
this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
committed by the employer.
RUBEN SERRANO v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
AND ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE
G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was a contractual employee in 1984. He became a regular
employee in 1985. He became head of the security checker of private
respondent in 1988. Sometime on October 11, 1991, Is-etann phased out its
security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency.
Consequently, Isetann wrote a memo-randum to petitioner terminating his
services on the very day that said paper was given to him. Hence, petitioner
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter and ordered that
petitioner be given separation pay, unpaid salary and proportionate 13th
month pay. Subsequently, a petition was filed to raise the issue of the validity
of the cause of petitioner's dismissal.
HELD:
It was part of management's prerogative to avoid redundancy.
However, there was an extended discussion on the notice require-ment. While
the court has agreed that the Wenphil Doctrine ought to be abandoned, the
members of the court are not unanimous on the issue of the applicability of
the due process clause to the situation.
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are
simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can
be exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept,
embodied in the Civil Code, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen. Such is the notice
requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the failure either of the
employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in
damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case
may be) void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee
should have received were it not for the termination of his employment
without prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be
awarded.
[The Court] hold[s], therefore, that, with respect to Article 283 of the
Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement
does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a
procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of
employment merely ineffectual.
The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the
employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can
result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing
before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of say, theft, or even
of an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to
keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic

force." But also does it declare that it "recognizes the in-dispensable role of
the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to
needed investment." The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection
to labor." But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the
laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer."
And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one
who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not
economically in his interest to do so.
In sum, [the Court] hold[s] that if in proceedings for reinstate-ment

under Article 283, it is shown that the termination of employ-ment was due
to authorized cause, then the employee concerned should not be ordered
reinstated even though there is failure to com-ply with the 30-day notice
requirement. Instead, he must be granted separation pay in accordance with
Article 283.
If the employee's separation is without cause, instead of being given
separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is
reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should be paid in full
backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in
advance.
On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Article
282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just
causes mentioned in said Article 282, then, in accordance
CHAPTER II 109
with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid

backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his
employment without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private
respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every
year of service, his unpaid salary, and his proportionate 13th month
pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was
terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time of decision herein becomes
final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for
computation of the separation pay, backwages, and other monetary award to
petitioner.
The following justices have dissenting opinions:
(1) Justice Puno;
(2) Justice Panganiban; and
(3) Justice Bellosillo
AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

442 SCRA 573 (2004)
FACTS:
Petitioners Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were employed by re-spondent
Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as gypsum board and cornice installers on
January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. They filed a com-plaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims.
HELD:
The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal illegal, ordered the payment
of backwages, payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement, and
payment of the monetary claims. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that petitioners
abandoned their work and that they were not likewise entitled to any
monetary award. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the
petitioners, finding that they had abandoned their employment having
already started working for another employer. The appellate court, however,
ordered the
payment of petitioner's money claims. Before the Supreme Court, the sole
issue presented is whether petitioners were illegally dismissed, an issue
which in turn implicates the consequence of failure to comply with the notice
requirement prior to the dismissal of employees who are terminated for cause.
Petitioners claim that Riviera Home did not comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. The latter argues, however, that sending
notices to the last known addresses of the petitioners would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore.
The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the

petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private
respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been
useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the
private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the
twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of
due process.
The violation of the petitioner's right to statutory due process by the
private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the
prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at
P30,000.00. [The Court] believe[s] this form of damages would serve to deter
employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of
employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this
fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
PRESUMPTIONS IN AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION

While in the process of construing statutes, the court may in-dulge in
presumptions which are justified by the rules of logic, hu-man experience,
good sense and by specific provision of law. How-ever, there is no need to
apply said presumption if the legislative intent is clear.
What are these presumptions?

They are the following:
(1) Presumption of Validity
(2) Presumption of Constitutionality
CHAPTER II
(3) Presumption of Good Faith

(4) Presumption Against Injustice
(5) Presumption Against Inconsistency
(6) Presumption Against Absurdity
(7) Presumption Against Ineffectiveness
(8) Presumption Against Irrepealable Laws
(9) Presumption Against Implied Repeals
(10) Presumption Against Violation of Public Policy
(11) Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws
(12) Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction
(13) Presumption of Jurisdiction
(14) Presumption of Acting Within the Scope of Authority
(15) Presumption Against Violation of International Law
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid because
the legislature is supposed to have considered the question of its validity in
approving it.
The question of validity of every statute is first determined by the
legislative department of the government itself, and the court should resolve
every presumption in favor of its validity. The courts are not justified in
adjudging a statute invalid in the face of the conclusion of the legislature
when the question of its validity is at all doubtful. The courts must assume
the validity of the statute, and that it was fully considered by the legislature
before it was adopted. Statutes should not be presumed to be invalid unless it
clearly appears that they are within some of the inhibitions of the
fundamental laws of the state. (U.S. v. Ten Yu; 24 Phil. 1; U.S. v. Joson, 28
Phil. 1)
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Every statue passed by the legislature is presumed to be con-
stitutional.
The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain. (Yu Cong Rag u. Trinidad, 47Phil. 385) However,
when the statute is really unconstitutional, the courts are authorized
to declare its invalidity. Again, this is the essence of the separation of powers
and the system of checks and balances. In discharging that duty, the judicial
arm of the government is merely complying with its assigned task of seeing
to it that the other departments have not exceeded their constitutional
authority.
PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

In case of interpretation of a statute, it is presumed that the legislature
had good motives in having considered and adopted a
particular law.
Presumptions also exist that the legislature acted in good faith; that it
acted from patriotic and just motives; that it acted with a desire to promote an
intention to disregard the civil and political liberties of the people. (p. 132,
Statutory Construction, Ruperto G. Martin)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
(Article 10, New Civil Code of the Philippines) The reason for this is
explained by the Code Commission in this vein: It is "necessary" so that it
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice, which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law.
(Comment of the Code Commission, p. 78)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY

The mind of the lawmaking body is presumed to be consistent. In case
of doubt therefore, such a construction should be adopted as will make all the
provision of the statute consistent with one another and with the entire act.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will have the same meaning

throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. (Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461)
"Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemos"
- when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
(Ltbuoan V. Gil, G.R. No. L-21163, May 171, 1972)
CHAPTER H 113
PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY
It is presumed that the legislature does not intend that absurdity will
flow from its enactment. The courts therefore have the duty to interpret the
law in such a way as to avoid absurd result. (People v. Malabanan, G.R. No.
L-1 64 78, Aug. 31, 1961)
Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be construed to be a
useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in the sense of adding
nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon.
(Uytengsu v Republic, 95 Phil 990)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend to adopt laws,
which are unnecessary and ineffective. It is presumed that it intends to
impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and
effective.
There are therefore two important rules of statutory construc-tion on
this point, thus:
Where a law is susceptible of two constructions, one of which
will render it unconstitutional and the other upholds its validity,
the latter must be adopted. (U.S. v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1)
2. Where the language of the statute is susceptible of two or more

constructions, one which will render the statute in-effective or
inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the
evident intent of the legislature, that con-struction which tends to
give effect to the object for which the law was adopted shall
prevail. (Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. DENR, G.R. No. L-29534,
February 23, 1977)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST IRREPEALABLE LAWS

It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that its law
shall be irrepealable.
The legislature cannot enact irrepealable laws or limit its future
legislative acts. (Duarte v. David, 32 Phil. 36) The reason is obvious, The
need of today and the situation obtaining now win not
most likely be the same in the years to come. Coup d'etat is new to
the Philippine government. Drug addiction became a serious menace
in the 60's and the 70's. It is but proper that those issues should be left to the
better judgment of a new legislature. In the year 2000, the people will surely
be confronted with problems of their own
DE GUIA v. GUINGONA, et al.,

G.R. No. 119525, April 18, 1995
CONGRESS HAS THE INHERENT POWER TO AMEND,

MODIFY AND REPEAL ITS OWN LAWS FOR THERE
ARE NO IRREPEALABLE LAWS
FACTS:
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of RA No. 7887, enacted on
February 15, 1995 insofar as it provides that elective members of the
Sanggurnang Panlungsod and Sanggumang Bayan outside Metro Manila
shall be elected at large. RA No. 7887 amend-ed Section 3, paragraphs (c)
and (d) of BA No. 7166, enacted on No-vember 26, 1991, which provides
that said officials shall be elected by district on the May 8, 1995 election. He
argued that RA No. 7887 is contrary to and inconsistent with the earlier law,
RA No 7166" He urges the Court to strike down RA No. 7887 and to
"reinstate RA No 7166"
ISSUE:
Is RA No 7887 contrary to or consistent with RA No 7166?
HELD:
It is of no moment that RA No. 7887 is contrary and inconsistent with
RA No. 7166. HA No. 7887 was enacted precisely to amend Section 3[c] and
[d] of RA No. 7166. Congress has the inherent power to amend, modify and
repeal its own laws for there are no irrepealable laws Its perception of what is
good for our people can change over time. This perception is reflected by
them through the amendment or outright repeal of our existing laws. By the
principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court cannot supersede the
wisdom of Congress in enacting, amending or repealing a law. It cannot
strike down an amendatory law on the ground that the amended law is
better for the people Petitioner's supplication
that the Supreme Court '.reinstate"
ignorance of our constitutional system.
CHAPTER II 115
PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS

Repeals by implication is not favored. There are two require-ments
before a statute can be considered to have repealed a prior statute by
implication, namely:
1. That the statute touch the same subject matter; and
2. That the later statute is repugnant to the earlier one. (Calderon v.
Provincia Del Santisimo Rosario, 26 Phil. 164)
In this connection, there are three basic rules to remember on the

matter of repeal:
1. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary. (Article 7 New Civil Code of the
Philippines)
2. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed,
the law first repealed shall not be thereby re-vived, unless
expressly so provided. However, when a law repeals a prior law,
not expressly but by implication only, its repeal revives the prior
law unless the language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise. (U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)
3. A general law does not repeal a special law unless it is so

expressly provided, or they are incompatible. (Compania General
de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF PUBLIC

POLICY
It is presumed that the legislature designs to favor and foster rather
than to contravene, that public policy which is based upon the principles of
natural justice, good morals, and the settled
wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of life. (Black, Interpretation
of Laws, 2nd Edition, p. 134)
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING LAWS

In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have full
knowledge of all existing laws on the subject. Hence, if there are two laws on
the same subject enacted on different dates, the latter law cannot be held to
have abrogated the former law, unless the
repugnancy is clear, convincing and irreconcilable. (Manila Lodge No. 761 v.

Court of Appeals, et al.)
PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO JUDICIAL

CONSTRUCTION
When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner, and the
lawmaking body made no move to alter or amend the said statute, it is
presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation.
PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or restrict
the jurisdiction of superior courts, or to vest a new jurisdic-tion in them,
unless there are express words or a necessary implica-tion to that effect.
(G.R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976; U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208)
PRESUMPTION OF ACTING WITHIN

THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its authority.
Hence, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that places the
statute outside of legislative competence, and one that places the statute
within the limits of legislative competence, the court should adopt the later
interpretation. (Black, Interpretation of Laws. 2nd Ed., p. 138)
PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is presumed that a statute is in conformity with the rules and
principles of international laws, or with treaties, in line with Section 2,
Article II, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instru-ment of

national policy, adopts the generally accepted prin-ciples of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, coop-eration, and amity
with all nations."
CHAPTER III
I. DEFINITION OF LAW
The term "law, "in its broadest sense, means any rule of action or norm
of conduct applicable to all kinds of action and to all objects of creation. In
this sense therefore, it includes all laws, whether they refer to state law,
physical law, divine law and others.
In a strict legal sense, law is defined as a rule of conduct, just and
obligatory, laid down by legitimate authority for the common observance and
benefit. (Sanchez Roman, p. 23) Based on this definition, law has the
following elements:
1. IT IS A RULE OF CONDUCT - Laws serve as guides of an
individual in relation to his fellowmen and to his community.
2. LAWS MUST BE JUST - The chapter on human rela-tions is

now precisely embedded in the New Civil Code in order to
obtain stability of the social order. Laws, as guides for human
conduct, "should run as golden threads through society; to the
end that law may approach its su-preme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice. (Report of the Code Commission, p.
39)
3. IT MUST BE OBLIGATORY— If laws are not enforced, the
purpose for which they are intended will not be served.
4. LAWS MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY - If laws are not prescribed by legitimate
authority, the people could not be expected to observe them.
Authority to make laws is conferred upon those duly chosen by
the sovereign will of the people. This is in consonance with
Section 1, Article II, of the Philip-pine Constitution, which says
that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them."
117
5. LAWS MUST BE ORDAINED FOR THE

COMMON BENEFIT - This recognizes the famous Latin
Maxim of "SAL US POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX" - the
welfare of the people is the supreme law. Laws should be applied
not only to a particular group of citizens. They are supposed to be
applied equally to all citizens regardless of their religion, political
persuasion, or status in life.
CLASSIFICATION OF LAW
1. NATURAL LAW
This law derives its force and authority from God. It is superior
to other laws. It is binding to the whole world, in all countries and at all
times.
2. POSITIVE LAW
Physical Law - Universal rule of action that governs the
conduct and movement of things, which are non-free and material.
Moral Law - Set of rules which establishes what is right and

what is wrong as dictated by the human conscience and as inspired by
the eternal law.
Divine Law -
(a) Divine Positive Law i.e., Ten Commandments,
(b) Divine Human Positive Law i.e., Commandments of the
church
PUBLIC LAW
(a) Constitutional Law - is the fundamental law of the land, which
defines the powers of the government.
(b) Administrative Law - that law which fixes the organiza-tion and
determines the competence of the administrative authorities and
which regulates the methods by which the functions of the
Government are performed.
(c) International Law - body of rules, which regulates the
community of ntion.
CHAPTER III 119
PRIVATE LAW: Body of rules which creates duties, rights

and obligations, and the means and methods of setting courts in motion
for the enforcement of a right or of a redress of wrong. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 24, 337)
(a) Substantive private law - Those rules which declare legal
relations of litigants when the courts have been properly moved
to action upon facts duly presented to them. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 24, 337)
(b) Procedural or adjective private law - Refers to the means and
methods of setting the courts in motion, making the facts known
to them and effectuating their judgments.
H, SOURCES OF LAW
Law is derived from different sources, namely: (1) legislation;
(2) precedent; (3) custom; and (4) court decision.
LEGISLATION - Before the declaration of martial law in the
Philippines on September 21, 1972, the power to legislate laws is vested in
the Congress of the Philippines, which consists of the Senate and the House
of Representatives Upon the imposition of martial law and after the
dissolution of the old Congress, the power to legislate law is vested in the
President of the Philippines. This is the reason why the President issued
presidential decrees and letters of instructions. When the Batasang Pambansa
was organized, legislative power is principally vested in this body although
the President, under and by virtue of what is known as Amendment No. 6,
continued to issue decrees when the exigency of the situation requires and in
case of other emergencies. Among many others, this is one of the dictatorial
acts that was severely questioned by several lawyers and critics of the past
regime. Now, after the People's Revolt on February 22-25, 1986, and in
accordance with the wishes and the will of the sovereign Filipino people, the
three branches of government operating under the doctrine of separation of
powers are restored, with each department being committed to do its utmost
share in bringing about a more democratic and efficient system of
government that is responsive to the needs of the people.
PRECEDENT •- This means that the decisions or principles

enunciated by a court of competent jurisdiction on a question of law
do not only serve as guides but also as authority to be followed by all other
courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction in all cases involving the same
question until the same is overruled or reversed by a superior
court. In the Philippines, this doctrine of stare decisis is not applied and
recognized in the same manner that it is applied and recognized in common
law countries. However, our new Civil Code provides as follows: "x x x
Judicial decision applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. x x x" (Article 8, New Civil
Code)
Furthermore, although Supreme Court decisions are binding on inferior
courts, there are many instances where the Supreme Court departed from its
previous decision either wholly or partly. In any case, that which is the latest
necessarily amends or reverses those previously rendered by the Supreme
Court.
CUSTOM - Customs have the force of law only when they are
acknowledged and approved by society through long and uninter-rupted
usage.
In the Philippines, there are several requisites before the court
considers custom. They are as follows:
(a) A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of
evidence (Article 12, NCC);
(b) The custom must not be contrary to law (Article 11, NCC);
(c) There must be a number of repeated acts and these repeated acts
must have been uniformly performed;
(d) There must be a judicial intention to make a rule of social
conduct; and
(e) A custom must be acknowledged and approved by society,
through long and uninterrupted usage.
COURT DECISION - Judicial decisions which apply or in-terpret
the Constitution and the laws are part of the legal system in the Philippines
but they are not laws. However, although judicial decisions are not laws, they
are evidence of the meaning and inter-pretations of the laws.
In the Philippines, we adhere to the doctrine of STARE DECI-SIS

which means that once a case has been decided one way, then another case
involving exactly the same question or point of law should be decided in the
same manner. This principle, however, does not necessarily mean that
erroneous decisions or those found to be contrary to law must be
perpetuated. On the contrary, they should be abandoned.
CHAPTER III 121
III. STATUTES
Statutes are enacted by the legislature. They are actually
the bills submitted to Congress for consideration and
approval. Once approved finally by Congress and by the
President of the Philippines these bills become statutes. (The
rules on the approval of bills are found in Article VI, Section 27
of the 1987 Constitution) Other laws, which have the same
binding force as statutes are the presidential
decrees, issued during the period of martial law

and under the 1973 Constitution.
IV. KINDS OF STATUTES

I. AS TO NATURE
1. Penal statutes
2. Remedial statutes
3. Substantive statutes
4. Labor statutes
5. Tax statutes
II. AS TO APPLICATION
1. Mandatory
2. Directory
1. Permanent
2. Temporary
1. General
2. Special
3. Local
V. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS
1. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive
2. A statute could either be a repealing act or an amendatory act
3. A statute could either be a reference statute or a declaratory

statute
V. IDENTIFICATION OF STATUTES
HOW ARE STATUTES IDENTIFIED?

The identification of a statute depends on the respective au-thorities
that enacted them.
Statutes passed and approved by the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Legislature from 1901 to 1935 are identified as
Public Acts.
Those enacted during the Commonwealth period from 1936 to
1946 are identified as Commonwealth Acts.
Those approved by the Philippine Congress from 1942 to 1972 are
identified as Republic Acts.
Those approved by the Batasang Pambansa are identified as BP or
Batas Pambansa
Those that were issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos dur-ing the
martial law regime were identified as PD or Presidential
Decree.
All statutes are identified either by their respective titles or their serial
numbers.
VI. PARTS OF STATUTES
SEVEN PARTS OF A STATUTE

A statute has seven parts such as the following:
1. Title
2. Preamble
3 Enacting Clause
4. Body
5. Exceptions and Provisos
6. Interpretative, repealing, separability and saving clauses
7. Date of Effectivity
TITLE - That part of the statute which gives a general statement
of, and calls attention to, the subject matter of an act, so that
legislators and the public may be appraised of the subject matter of
the legislation, and be put upon inquiry in regard thereto.
(Example: "An Act Enacting a Local Government Code")
CHAFFER III 123
CAN A BILL EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT?
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the New Constitution specifically

requires that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
PURPOSES OF SUCH REQUIREMENT

The purpose of said requirement are the following
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature; and
3. To fairly apprise the people of the subjects of legislation being
considered so that they may have the opportunity of being heard
thereon, if they shall so desire. (Cooley, Coast Limitations, 6
Edition, p 172)
WHAT IS A HODGE-PODGE OR LOGROLLING

LEGISLATION
It is a mischievous legislative practice of embracing in one bill several
distinct matters, none of which, perhaps, could singly obtain the assent of the
legislator, and then procuring its passage by a combination of the minorities
in favor of each of the measure into a majority that will adopt them all
(Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition p 1091) The object of such kind of
legislation is to unite the legislators who favor any one of the subjects in
support of the whole act.
EFFECT OF VIOLATING SAID REQUIREMENT

Statutes passed in violation of said requirement shall be de-clared void
by the courts. However, this requirement shall be rea-sonably applied in
order not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation
(Sumulong v COMELEC, 73 Phil 283)
TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF A TITLE

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the Act It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear terms the nature, scope, and conse-quences of the proposed
law and its operation
The main title of RA 1700 is Anti Subversion Act In addition however,
to this title, said law states that it is "An act to outlaw the
Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations, pe-nalizing

membership therein and for other purposes." The Supreme Court held that
the said title is valid. The statute unequivocally indicates that the subject
matter of the law is subversion in general which has for its purpose the
substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing
Government and not merely subver-sion by Communist conspiracies.
(People v. Hon. Simeon N. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. L-32613, December 27,
1972)
IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY

OF THE TITLE OF THE ACT
When there is doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the act,
the legislation should be sustained. The presumption is in favor of the
validity of the acts.
IS THE SAID REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO

ORDINANCES OF DIFFERENT COUNCILS (MUNICIPAL,
CITY, PROVINCIAL)?
It is not applicable to said ordinances because they are not laws enacted
by Congress, Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution mentions
"Congress" only, thus:
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title hereof." (Underscoring Supplied)
II. PREAMBLE - It is that part of the statute following the title and
preceding the enacting clause, which states the reasons for, or
the objects of the enactment.
EXAMPLE:
'WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the Agrarian
Reform Program of the Government for the early attainment of the
objectives set forth in [RA] No. 3844, as amended;
WHEREAS, among such objectives is to achieve dignified

existence for the small farmers free from the pernicious insti-tutional
restraints and practices which have not only retarded the agricultural
development of the country but have also pro-duced widespread
discontent and unrest among our farmers, one of the causes of the
existing national emergency; and
CHAPTER III 125
WHEREAS, it is believed that the lasting objectives of land

reform may be sooner realized if the whole country is declared a land
reform area."
NOTE : There are three basic points to remember:
A preamble does not create a right nor does it grant any
right;
2. It is not a source of government power; and
3. It is not an essential part of the statute.
IlL ENACTING CLAUSE - It is that part of the statute that indicates the
authority that promulgated the enactment. The enacting clause is
not essential to the validity of the law but this clause clothes the
statute with a certain dignity because the specific authority that
promulgated the law is therein stated.
EXAMPLE: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled"
IV. BODY - It contains the subject matter of the statute.

The body of a statute should embrace only one subject matter as
required in Section 26(1), Article VI of the New Constitution, thus:
"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof." This requirement is not
violated simply because it contains diverse provisions. For as long
as those provisions are allied and germane to the subject and
purpose of the bill, the said requirement is deemed complied with.
EXAMPLE:
"Presidential Decree No. 1612, Anti-Fencing Law of 1979" Sections 1
to 8.
SECTION 1. TITLE. - This decree shall be known as Anti-
Fencing Law.
SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS. - The following
terms shall mean as follows:
a. 'TENCING"is the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any-other manner deal in any

article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
b. "FENCE" includes any person, firm, association,

corporation or partnership or other organization who/which
commits the act of fencing.
SEC. 3. PENALTIES. - Any person guilty of fencing
shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
a.) The penalty of pri.sion mayor, if the value of the property
involved is more that 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if
the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, - the penalty
shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertain-ing
thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be
imposed. -
b.) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is
more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
c.) The penalty ofprision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200
pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
d.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period toprision
correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property is over
50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
e.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such
value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
f.) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
SEC. 4. LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS OF JUDICIAL
PERSONS. - If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation, or
association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who
knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be
liable. -
CHAPTER III 127
SEC. 5. PRESUMPTION OF FENCING. - Mere pos-session

of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery shall be pri-ma facie evidence of
fencing.
SEC. 6. CLEARANCE/PERMIT TO SELL/USED SEC-
- For purposes of this Act, all
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any
goods, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offer-ing the same
for sale to the public, secure the necessary clear-ance or permit from
the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or
city where such store, estab-lishment or entity is located. The Chief of
Constabulary/Direc-tor General, Integrated National Police shall
promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
this section Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit
required by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be
punished as a fence
SEC. 7. REPEALING CLAUSE. - All laws or parts thereof,

winch are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. EFFECTIVITY. - This Decree shall take effect upon
approval
Done m the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen and seventy-nine.
V. PROVISO - It is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of

acting as a restraint upon or as a qualification of, the generality of
the language which it follows.
EXAMPLE
Article 33 of the Family Code
"Article 33 Marriages among Muslims or among members
of the ethnic cultural communities may be per-formed validly
without the necessity of marriage license,
provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or- practices." (Emphasis and un-
derscoring supplied)
VI. INTERPRETATIVE CLAUSE - That part of the statute where

the legislature defines its own language or prescribes rules for its
construction.
EXAMPLE:
Section 4 of the Local Government Code
"Section 4. Rules of Interpretation:
1. Any power of a barangay, municipality, city or province
shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned.
2. The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be
liberally interpreted so as to give more power to local
governments in promoting the economic uplift, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the
community.
3. Vested rights existing on the date of the effectivity of this
Code arising out of contracts or any other source of
obligation between a province, city, municipality or
barangay and another party, shall be governed by the
original terms and provisions of said contracts or the law in
force at the time such rights became vest-ed and in no case
shall this Code infringe on them.
4. When in the resolution of controversies arising under this
Code no legal provision or jurisprudence case be found to
apply, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in
the place where the controversy arose."
VIL REPEALING CLAUSE - That part of the statute that announces

the legislative intent to terminate or revoke another statute or
statutes.
EXAMPLE:
Section 233 of the Local Government Code
"Section 233. Repealing Clause; Metropolitan Manila and the
Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX and XII. -
(1) Except as otherwise provided herein, all laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclama-tions and
administrative regulations, or part or
CHAPTER III 129
parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Code are

hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
(2) Unless otherwise provided by law, nothing in this Code shall
be understood to amend or repeal the pertinent provisions
of PD No. 824 and B.P. 20, and all presidential decrees and
issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila and the
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII."
VIII. SAVING CLAUSE - This restricts a repealing act and preserves

existing powers, rights and pending proceedings from the effects
of the repeal.
EXAMPLE:
Section 31 of the Social Security Law
"Section 31. SAVING CLAUSE. - The Assembly hereby
reserves the right to amend, alter, or repeal any provision of this
Act, and no person shall be or shall deemed to be vested with any
property or other right by virtue of the enactment or operation of
this Act. (As amended by Section 2, RA No. 1792 and Section
20, PD No. 735, S-1975)"
IX. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE - It is clause, which states that if for

any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be
unconstitutional or invoked, the other section or provision of the
law shall not be affected thereby.
NOTE:
1. A separability clause creates a presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the
statute. This means that if one part of the statute is void or
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof which are valid may still stand.
THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule, however, is subject to the limitation that if the
parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and con-nected thereby
creating a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the
nullity or unconstitutionality of one part may vitiate the rest.
VII. OTHER LAWS

1. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES (WHAT ARE INCLUDED IN
THE TERM "PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES"?)
Presidential issuances do not refer only to presidential decrees. They
also include executive orders, administrative orders, memo-randum orders,
memorandum circulars, and general or special or-ders. These issuances, shall
form part of the law of the land. (1976
Amendment No. 6)
BACKGROUND
Before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines on September
21, 1972, the power to legislate laws is vested in Congress, which consists of
a Senate and a House of Representatives. Sec-tion 1 Article VI of the 1935
Constitution provides as follows
"Section 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in a
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representative
Upon the imposition of martial law and after the dissolution of the old
Congress, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, "assumed direction of the
operation of the entire Government" under and by virtue of Proclamation No.
1091 dated September 21, 1972. On this basis, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued presidential decrees and letters of instructions. The prominent
decrees that he issued are PD No. 2 "PROCLAIMING THE ENTIRE
COUNTRY AS A LAND REFORM AREA" and PD No. 27 "DECREEING
THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE
SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND
THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND
MECHANISM THEREFOR."
Said decrees are herein quoted in full:
MALACA1SEANG
Manila
PD NO. 2
PROCLAIMING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS LAND
REFORM AREA
WHEREAS, there is pressing need to accelerate the
Agrarian Reform Program of the Government for the ear-
CHAPTER III 131
ly attainment of the objectives set forth in RA No. 3844, as

amended;
WHEREAS, among such objectives is to achieve dig-nified
existence for the small farmers free from the per-nicious
institutional restraints and practices which have not only retarded
the agricultural development of the country but have also
produced widespread discontent and unrest among our farmers,
one of the causes of the existing national emergency; and
WHEREAS, it is believed that the lasting objectives of

land reform may be sooner realized if the whole country is
declared a land reform area;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested
by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Procla-mation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, as amended, whereby I have assumed
direction of the operation of the entire Government, do hereby
proclaim the whole country as a land reform area.
All agencies and offices of the Government are enjoined to

extend full cooperation and assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform to insure the successful implementation of the
Agrarian Reform Program.
The Agrarian Reform Coordinating Council created under
Executive Order No. 347, series of 1971, is hereby directed to
convene immediately to exercise its functions.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform shall take the necessary
steps for the prompt and effective implementa-tion of this
decree.
Done in the City of Manila, this 26th day of Sep-tember in
the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
PD NO. 27
DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANT
FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL,
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING
THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR.
Inasmuch as the old concept of land ownership by a few
has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that
gave rise to violent conflict and social tension,
The redress of such legitimate grievances being one of the

fundamental objectives of the New Society,
Since Reformation must start with the emancipation of the
tiller of the soil from his bondage.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested
by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September
22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree and order the
emancipation of all tenant farmers as of the day, October 21,
1972;
This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agri-cultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or
not;
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed
estate or not, shall be deemed an owner of a por-tion constituting
a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three
(3) hectares if irrigated;
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more
than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area
or will now cultivate it;
For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be
transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the
value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2)
times the average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;
CHAPTER III 133
The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of

six (6) percentum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in fifteen
(15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations;
In case of default, the amortizations due shall be paid by

the farmer's cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is
a member, with the cooperative having a right of recourse against
him;
The government shall guaranty such amortizations with
shares of stock in government-owned and controlled
corporations;
No title to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under this
Decree shall be actually issued to a tenant-farmer unless and until
the tenant-farmer has become a full-pledged member of a duly
recognized farmer's coop-erative;
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land

Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable
except by hereditary succession or to the Government in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations;
The Department of Agrarian Reform through its Secretary

is hereby empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Decree.
All laws, executive orders, decrees and rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with this Decree are
hereby repealed and or modified accordingly.
Done in the City of Manila this 21st day of October, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
Under the 1973 Constitution, legislative power is vested in

a Batasang Pambansa. (Section 1, Article VIII, 1973
Constitution)
The 1973 Constitution was amended in 1976 principally to
provide for an interim B.P.
Extraordinary legislative power was given to Presi-dent
Ferdinand E. Marcos by the 1976 Amendment No. 6 which
reads:
"Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime

Minister) there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the In-terim Batasang
Pambansa or the Regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment re-quires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or
letters of instructions, which shall form part of the
law of the land."
I *Y I á m
Memorandum Circular of President Ferdinand E.

Marcos in relation to PD Nos. 2 and 22
November 25, 1972

TO: Secretary Conrado Estrella
Department of Agrarian Reform,
Secretary Cesar Virata
Department of Finance
We shall postpone promulgation of the Rules and
Regulations pending the studies in the pilot projects in order that
we can incorporate the lessons we learn in such pilot projects.
However, the following guidelines will be adopted:
1. No tenant will be ejected or removed pending the

promulgation of the Rules and Regulations.
2. Landowners will be encouraged to sell or swap their lands
to the following arrangements:
a. Swap with government lands, whether virgin or
otherwise;
b. Swap with government stocks in government-owned
or controlled corporations or private cor-porations
where the government has holdings;
C. Sell for cash with the arrangement that gov-ernment shall
extend them priority in the purchase of government lands or
government stocks;
CHAPTER III 135
d. Government to offer in lieu of the payments by the

tenants, annuities with guarantees against inflation,
and/or medical insurance or pensions of any class or
nature;
e. Government to help in every way possible, in-
cluding credit financing.
3. Pilot projects may be set up not only in Nueva Ecija
but anywhere else in the Philippines in accordance
with my original instructions.
4. The Secretary of Finance will now set aside such fund,

including at least P50 million from the general fund, as are
available to be utilized for this purpose.
5. Loans from other countries, like the Japanese Com-modity
and Project Loan, shall be used primarily for:
a. Infrastructure of tenanted lands as well as
infrastructure for government virgin lands to be
swapped or sold to landowners or cooperatives.
b. The next Commodity and Project Loan totalling P75
million shall be used primarily for land reform.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
EXAMPLE OF A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
Letter of Instructions No. 140

Restructuring Loans of Farmers Affected by Calamities.
To: The Governor, Central Bank
The President, Philippine National Bank
The Administrator, ACA
Typhoons "Luming" and "Narsing," the floods and locusts in Cotabato,
and the brown planthopper disease have damaged a considerable number of
farms in Cotabato, Central Luzon, Laguna and the Bicol region. Damages to
farms mean that farmers affected will be unable to pay their production loans
borrowed from the rural banks, the Philippine National Bank, or the
Agricultural Credit
Administration. Further, farms which can still be replanted will need

additional loans for land preparation, seeds and fertilizer.
You are hereby directed to take the necessary steps to restruc-ture the
loans of the farmers affected and, in addition, to provide new loans to
farmers who would like to replant and are capable of replanting their farms.
Done in the City of Manila, this 23rd day of October in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.
2. ORDINANCES
The respective legislative bodies of the Sangguniang Baran-gay,
Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang Panglungsod, and the Sang-guniang
Panlalawigan can enact ordinances and resolutions.
Under the rules and regulations implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, particularly under Article 107 to 114, Rule I thereof, the
pertinent provisions related to ordinances and resolutions are as follows:
ARTICLE 107. Ordinances and Resolutions. - The following rules shall

govern the enactment of ordinances and resolutions:
(a) Legislative actions of a general and permanent character shall be
enacted in the form of ordinances, while those which are of temporary
character shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to
proprietary functions and to private concerns shall also be acted upon by
resolution.
(b) Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall be in writing and shall
contain an assigned number, a title or caption, an enacting or ordaining
clause, and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed
ordinance shall be accompanied by a brief explanatory note containing the
justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the author or authors and
submitted to the secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the same to the
sanggunian at its next meeting.
(c) A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for

an ordinance, except that it need not go through a third reading for its final
consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the sanggunian
members.
(d) No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second
reading in any regular meeting unless it has been reported out by
CHAPTER III 137
the proper committee to which it was referred or certified as urgent by the

local chief executive.
(e) Any legislative matter duly certified by the local chief executive
as urgent, whether or not it is included in the calendar of business, may be
presented and considered by the body at the same meeting without need of
suspending the rules.
(f) The secretary to the sanggunian of the province, city or
municipality shall prepare copies of the proposed ordinance or
resolution in the form it was passed on second reading, and shall distribute to
each sanggunian member a copy thereof, except that a measure certified by
the local chief executive concerned as urgent may be submitted for final
voting immediately after debate or amendment during the second reading.
(g) No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular

or special session duly called for the purpose shall be valid unless approved
by a majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance
or resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating
liability, shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all the sanggunian
members for its passage.
(h) Upon the passage of all ordinances and resolutions directing the
payment of money or creating liability, and at the request of any member, of
any resolution or motion, the sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Each
approved ordinance or resolution shall be stamped with the seal of the
sanggunian and recorded in a book kept for the purpose.
ARTICLE 108. Approval of Ordinances. - ( a) Every ordinance enacted

by the sanggunian shall be present to the local chief executive. If the local
chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on
each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the
same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief
executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the
ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive

concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a
province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise,
the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon

approval by a majority of all its members, be signed by the puriong
barangay.
Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - ( a)
The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the saugguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground
that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons
therefore in writing.
(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have
the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance,
an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public
investment program or an ordinance directing the payment of money or
creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items
which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect
unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner as provided in the
immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the item or items in the
appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed,
if any, shall be deemed reenacted.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolu-tion

only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive
concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the
ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive
concerned.
ARTICLE 110. Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within (3)
days after approval, the secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall transmit to the sangguniang panlalawigan for
review, copies of approved ordinances and resolutions approving and
adopting the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such or-dinances
and resolutions, the sanggumang panlalawigan shall ex-amine the documents
or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the
provincial prosecutor for prompt examina-tion. The provincial attorney or
provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from the receipt
of the documents, inform
the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recom-
mendations which may be considered by the sauggumang panlala-wigan in
making its decision.
CHAPTER III 139
(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or

resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall
enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlala-wigan

within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution,
the same shall be presumed consistent with the law and, therefore, valid.
ARTICLE 111. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sang-guniang

Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its
enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay
ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned
for review as to whether the ordi-nance is consistent with law and city or
municipal ordinances.
(b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case
may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case

may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or
municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and
recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment,
amendment or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay
ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.
ARTICLE 112. Enforcement of Ordinances or Resolutions After

Disapproval by Reviewing Authority. - Any attempt to enforce any
disapproved ordinance or resolution adopting the local development plan and
public investment program. After disapproval by the local chief executive or
by the reviewing authority shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or
dismissal of the official or employee concerned.
Effectivity of Ordinances and Resolutions. -

Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution approving the
local development plan and public investment program, the same
shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is
posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city,

municipal, or barangay hail, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other
conspicuous places in the LGU concerned.
VIII. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
WHEN SHALL A LAW TAKE EFFECT?

Before the ruling in Tafiada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), this question is
answered by the express provisions of Article 2 of the Civil Code and the old
ruling in A5kay v. Cosalon (46 Phil. 17.9) and in Balbuena v. Secretary of
Education. (G.R. No. L-14283, November 29, 1960) Hence, if a law provides
for its own effectivity, or "upon approval," the publication in the official
gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character.
This is no longer applicable. In accordance with the ruling in Tafiada

v. Tuvera (ibid.), all laws, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published first and this requirement shall be a condition for
their effectivity. Reason: Lack of publication is a violation of the due process
clause of the constitution. Due process of law contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered against anyone.
SCOPE OF TANADA v. TUVERA

Taflada v. Tuvera (ibid) applies to all laws, including to those of local
application. It does not apply, however, to interpretative regulations and to
those merely internal in nature.
EFECTIVITY OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES

Publication is also a prerequisite for their effectivity. Hence, they take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general publication.
However, those which are treated as interpretative regulations or

which are internal in nature, and not concerning the public, need not be
published.
EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCE
Under 3ection 11 of the Local Government Code, an ordinance
enacted by a local government shall take effect after the lapse of
CHAPTER III 141
ten (10) days from the date a copy of it is posted in a bulletin board located
in a conspicuous place at the provincial, city, municipal or barangay hail, at
the public market, and/or at the church or chapel.
In highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance must, in
addition thereto, be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
city. (Section 11[2], B.P. 337, or the Old Local Government Code)
IX. WHO ARE SUBJECT TO PHILIPPINE LAWS?

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (Article 15, New Civil Code)
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the

country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
(Article 16, New Civil Code)
Matters respecting remedies, such as the bringing of suit, the
admissibility of evidence, and the statute of limitations, depend upon the law
of the place where the suit is brought. (Government v.
Frank, 13 Phil. 236)
CHAPTER IV
VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
I. VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES

The three branches of our government have their respective
functions and responsibilities. The persons entrusted with power in any one
of those branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the power confided
to the others, but that each shall, by the law of its creation, be limited to the
exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other. There
must be independence and equality of the several departments. The
completeness of their separation and their mutual independence does not,
however, extend to the point that those in authority in one department can
ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the other, done pursuant to
the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other
department. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, 108 U.S. 168, 190 251. ed. 377, 386;
Abveua v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612)
There is, however, no absolute separation of the three depart-ments of

government. Each department is given certain powers by which it may
definitely restrain the others from exceeding their con-stitutional authority.
Hence, from time to time, the Supreme Court is called upon to make a
determination if a law is constitutional or not. It is in such cases when the
Supreme Court, as final arbiter, as-serts its power of judicial review and
makes a final judgment.
As the ultimate guardian of our Constitution, the Supreme Court is
indeed the court of last resort on petitions to declare a law unconstitutional.
As much as possible, however, it will try to avoid going into the issue of
constitutionality, if there is any available ground to decide a case. There will
always be a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. It will
be presumed that the law has been the subject of study and careful
deliberation before it was finally enacted.
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In this jurisdiction, no constitutional question will be heard unless the

following requisites of judicial inquiry are. complied with, to wit:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;

2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
II. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

There must be an actual conflict, which needs judicial determination. It
is not a dispute, which is hypothetical, or one that is moot or academic.
It must be a concrete case that is real, one that admits of specific relief
and definite determination of the legal rights of the parties
III. PROPER PARTY

A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of.
IV. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

As a general rule, a constitutional question must be raised in the
pleadings, otherwise, they cannot be considered during the trial. This rule is
subject to the following exceptions:
1. In criminal cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any
time in the discretion of the court.
2. In civil cases, the constitutional question can be raised at any
stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself.
3. In every case, except where there is estoppel, the consti-tutional

question can be raised at any stage if it involves jurisdiction of the
court. (Philippine British Assurance
Co., Inc. v. Mangune, G.R. No. L-24902, November 26,
1970; Uypuanco v. Leuterio, G.R. No. L-22706, March
1969)
V. DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE CASE ITSELF
A constitutional question may have been raised but the Supreme Court
may not find it necessary to resolve it on the ground that the matter brought
before it is a political question, or that the petitioner was estopped from
impugning the constitutionality of the law. The Supreme Court will finally
act on the constitutional question before it only when there are no other
available grounds which it can base its decision. In any case, the requisites of
a judicial
inquiry should be complied with.
VI. EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE

The effects will depend on whether the statute is totally or partially
declared unconstitutional.
VII. IF TOTALLY DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

First View - An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative as though it has never been passed.
Second View - An unconstitutional statute is nevertheless a statute;

that is, a legislative act. Such a statute is commonly spoken of as void. The
Supreme Court cannot set aside a statute as it can a municipal ordinance, it
simply ignores statutes deemed unconstitutional.
A similar ruling was enunciated in Shepard v. Barren (194 U.S. 553).

Here, the court also refused to recognize the statute and to rec-ognize the
rights of the parties as if the statute has no existence. In ignoring the statute,
the court may give its reasons, but the decision affects the parties only and
there is no judgment against the statute.
VIII. IF PARTIALLY DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

When a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Organic law,
while another part is valid, THE VALID PORTION, IF SEPARABLE
FROM THE INVALID, MAY STAND AND BE ENFORCED.
When is a valid portion separable?
It is separable when it can stand independently as a separate statute.
In this case, it may be fair to presume that the legislature would have
enacted it by itself if it has supposed that it could constitutionally do so.
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IX. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A STATUTE WHICH

IS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
There are two (2) schools of thought on this question.
1. ORTHODOX VIEW— Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "when the courts declare a law to be incon-sistent
with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern," represents the orthodox view. Under this view, an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a
law, confers no rights, im-poses no duties and affords no
protection. This view finds support in the well-settled doctrine
that the Constitution is supreme and provides for the validity of
legislative or executive acts. For this reason, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, or the judiciary has the
power under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any
attempted exercise of power in violation of its provisions is to
that extent unwarranted and null. (Fernandez v. Cu-erva, 21
SCRA 1095, 1106 [1967])
2. THE SECOND VIEW— Under this view, the Supreme Court

simply ignores statutes deemed unconstitutional.
(Allisan v. Corker, 60 L.R.A. 564) It does not strike the statute
from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or
annul the statute.
The orthodox view has been applied as early as the case of Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, (297 U.S. 189) but this was expanded
with more vigor in Fernandez v. Cuerva (21 SCRA 1095, 1106) by no less
than former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando. It is in this case where this
ruling was enunciated.
"Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found

by the judiciary to be contrary to the Con-stitution, it is null and
void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a
law to be incon-sistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The above provision of
the Civil Code
reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether

legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no
protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications, however. As the

American Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a
statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot al-ways
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects - with respect to particular regulations, individual
and corporate, and particularconduct, private andof-ficial."
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine

that the Constitution is supreme and provides the measure for the
validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter much
less, this Court, has power under the Constitution to act contrary
to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the

governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
egislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more
appreciative attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of
nullity may have legal consequences which the more orthodox
view would dny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty,
executive order, or ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to
be indisputable. What is more appropriate and logical then than •
to consider it as "azoperative fact."
X. WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF1 JUDICIAL POWER TO

DECLARE THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ASSAILED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
ACTS?
As a rule, our courts, particularly. our Supreme Court, have the power
to declare said acts to be unconstitutional if indeed they are contrary to the
Constitution. Out of respect, however, to the prin-ciple of separation of
powers, our courts have shown restraint in de- daring the.ame to be totally
unconstitutional, if it is still possible, for instance, to salvage the valid portions of
a statute from those
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which, in their assessment, should be declared illegal and uncon-stitutional.

In this manner the will of the legislature is given effect, and the cardinal rule
that the legislature intended right and justice to prevail, is given importance.
In Ty v. Trampe, (250 SCRA 500) it was held that the constitu-tionality

of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be resolved by the courts if the
controversy can be settled on other grounds.
XL REQUISITES FOR DECLARATION OF PARTIAL

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Declaration of partial unconstitutionality is valid only if two conditions
concur, thus:
That the legislature is willing to retain the valid portion even if
the rest is declared illegal; and
2. That the valid portions can stand independently as a separate
statute.
The legislature manifests its willingness to retain the valid portions if
the law itself contains a separability clause. This clause contains a proviso to
the effect that if a provision in the law is declared invalid or unconstitutional,
the remainder of the act shall not be affected by such declaration of invalidity
or unconstitutionality. But even without such clause, the remaining provisions
of the law which are valid must express the legislative will independently of
the void part since the court has no power to legislate. (Barrameda v. Moir,
25 Phil. 44)
EXAMPLES:
In Lim v. Pacquing (240 SCRA 649) Section 3 of PD No. 771 is
violative of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Reason:
Section 3 offends the Constitution, which demands faithful
compliance with the requirement of due process, equal protection
of the law, and non-impairment of contracts.
2. The Bar Flunkers bill was sustained insofar as it amend-ed the

Rules of Court prospectively but the part thereof which
retroactively reduced the passing average in the bar examinations
was declared unconstitutional, the same being an encroachment
to functions belonging to
the judiciary.
CHAPTER V
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
I. STATUTES MUST BE READ AND CONSTRUED AS

A WHOLE
It is basic that a statute must be read and construed in its en-tirety.

Hence, each provision of the statute should be construed in relation to the
other provisions of the statute.
Parts of a statute are not to be viewed in isolation because a statute is
passed and approved as a whole, and more than this, there is a precise
purpose why it was enacted. It is this purpose of the stat-ute as a whole that
is subject of ascertainment.
In trying to ascertain legislative intent, courts should first be guided by
intrinsic aids, or those found in the law itself. There is no need to make use of
extrinsic aids, or those found outside of the written language of the law, if the
legislative intent could be ascer-tained by merely making use of intrinsic
aids. (Casela v. CA, G.R. No. L-26754, October 16, 1970)
These intrinsic aids are the title, preamble, the words, phrases and
sentences, context, punctuations, headings and marginal notes, legislative
definition, and interpretation clauses. All these must be read and construed as
a whole, instead of viewing them in isolation.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT MUST BE ASCERTAINED

FROM THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE
OPTIMA STATULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM
STATUTUM. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. Hence,
in the construction of statutes, what is of prevailing
importance is to discover the legislative intent why the law is enacted. This
intent is primarily determined from the language of the statute.
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CHAPTERV 149
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
The court's honest belief that the legislature intended to enact a law
different to what it actually enacted is of no moment. Neither can the courts
determine whether the statute is wise for that is not its duty. Its duty is to find
out the legislative intent, and this can be done by construing the statute as a
whole, by considering one part of the statute in relation to the other parts,
and by harmonizing all the provisions of the statute whenever possible.
It is to be presumed that the purpose of the legislature is to make every

part of the statute effective.
The basis of this rule is the Latin Maxim -
This means that it is not enough that a statute
should be given effect as a whole but that effect should be given to each of
the provisions in the statute.
This rule applies to amendments because it is presumed that the
legislature, in making changes in the law, finds that there is a necessity for
said amendments. This is a legislative function which is beyond the domain
of the courts.
The cases below illustrate the principles herein discussed.
New Case:
LORENZO T. TANGGA-AN v.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., et al.,
G.R. No. 180636, March 13, 2013
FACTS:
This is a case for illegal dismissal with a claim for the payment of
salaries corresponding to the unexpired term of the contract, damages and
attorney's fees filed by Lorenzo Tangga-an against the Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Universe Tankship Delaware LLC, and Carlos C.
Salinas.
It was alleged that Tangga-an entered into an overseas employ-ment
contract with Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf
of its foreign employer, Universe Tankship Delaware, LLC. Under the
contract, he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief engineer
of the vessel S.S. "Kure" with US$5,000 as basic salary, vacation leave pay
of US$2,500 per month, and US$700 tonnage bonus a month.
On February 11, 2002, he was deployed. On or about Mar. 13,

2002, the vessel berthed at a port in Japan to discharge its cargo.
Thereafter, it sailed to the U.S.A. While the vessel was still at sea, the master
required him and the rest of the Filipino Engineer Offi-cers to report to his
office where they were informed that they would be repatriated on account of
the delay in the cargo discharging in Japan.
Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for

payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, leave pay,
exemplary and moral damages, attorney's fees and inter-est.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision finding the peti-

tioner to have been illegally dismissed As regards to the claim for back
salaries, it ruled that he is not entitled to four months which is equivalent to
the unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months, inclusive of
vacation leave pay, and tonnage bonus pursuant to Section 10 of RA No.
8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 2005.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Respondent's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The CA modified the NLRC decision, as to monetary awards, it
considered only basic monthly salary and disregarded the monthly vacation
leave pay and tonnage bonus and likewise held that the "unexpired portion of
contract" for which he is entitled to back salaries should only be three months
pursuant to Section 1017 of RA No. 8042.
Petitioner filed a Motion for (Partial) Reconsideration, but was denied.

Thus, he filed the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the indemnity awarded by the CA in petitioner's favor
consisting only of three months basic salaries conforms with the proper
interpretation of Section 10 of RA No 8042
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that in resolving petitioner's monetary claims,
the CA utterly misinterpreted the Court's ruling in Skippers Pacific, Inc v
Skippers Maritime Services, Ltd., using it to support a view which the latter
case precisely ventured to strike down. In that case, the employee was hired
as the vessel's Master
on a six-month employment contract, but was able to work for
only two months, as he was later on illegally dismissed. The Labor
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Arbiter, NLRC, and the CA all took the view that the complaining employee
was entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract, but limited
to only three months pursuant to Section 1024 of RA No. 8042. The Court
did not agree and hence modified the judgment in said case. It held that,
following the wording of Sec. 10 and its ruling in Marsaman Manning
Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, when the illegally
dismissed employee's employment contract has a term of less than one year,
he shall be entitled to recovery of salaries representing the unexpired portion
of his employment contract. Indeed, there was nothing even vaguely
confusing in the Court's citation therein of Marsaman
In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, involving Section 10 of

RA No. 8042, it was held:
"[The Court] cannot subscribe to the view that private re-

spondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of
Section 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an
illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3)
months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a
term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the [word-
ing] "for every year of the unexpired term" which follows the [wording]
"salaries x x x for three months." To follow petition-ers' thinking that
private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply
because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook
some words used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is
contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word
thereof be given effect since the law making body is pre-sumed to
know the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have
used them advisedly. Ut res ma-gis valeat quam pereat." (Emphasis
supplied)
It is not disputed that private respondent's employment contract

in the instant case was for six (6) months Hence, no reason to disregard
the ruling in Marsaman that private re-spondent should be paid his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.
Thus, petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the

unexpired portion of his six-month employment contract,
or equivalent to four months. This includes all his corresponding monthly

vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly provided and
guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and
benefit package. These benefits were guaranteed to be paid on a monthly
basis, and were not made contingent.
Old Case:
MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION v. DAYRIT

G.R. No. 1-59154, April 3, 1990
FACTS:
In a suit by the First Western Bank and Trust Company against Atlas
Timber Company, et al., the trial judge rendered judgment ordering Meridian
Assurance Corporation to pay First Western the sum of $21,933.38 or its
equivalent in pesos at the rate of P3.9390 to a dollar, with interest at the legal
rate from the filing of the complaint.
Thereafter, Meridian wrote First Western offering to pay the amount of

the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.
First Western rejected the offer, its view being that the rate of interest should
be 12 % per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416.
Meridian then filed with the trial court a motion manifesting its deposit
with the court of the amount of P170,061.03 representing the principal
indebtedness, the 6% interest on the principal debt at 6% per annum, and
costs of the suit, praying that the deposit be allowed, that it be considered full
satisfaction of the judgment, and that enforcement of the writ of execution be
restrained. The trial court denied the motion stating that Central Bank
Circular No. 416 had changed the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per
annum.
ISSUE:
The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in
relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided by Article
2209 of the Civil Code; or 12% conformably with Central Bank Circular No.
416.
HELD:
1. The issue has already been passed upon and resolved by the Court in two
earlier cases. In one case, the Court held that
CHAPTER V 153
the "judgments spoken of and referred to are (only) judgments in

litigation involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits." It declared that any other kind of monetary judgment which
has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said
law (PD No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted
to the Central Bank. The Monetary Bank may not tread on forbidden
grounds. It cannot rewrite other laws. That function is vested solely
with the legislative authority.
2. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended, which, as distinguished from

Section 1 of the same law, appears to be the actual and operative grant
of authority to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank to prescribe
maximum rates of interest where the parties have not stipulated
thereon, in excluding mention of rates allowed in judgments, should, at
the least be considered as limiting the authority thus granted only to
loans or forbearances of money, etc., and to judgments involving such
loans or forbearances.
III. COURTS HAVE THE DUTY TO RECONCILE OR

HARMONIZE THE DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF
THE STATUTE INCLUDING THE CONFLICTING
PROVISIONS THEREOF
Each provision in a statute is inserted for a definite reason. The one
who drafted the law may have a good reason for inserting provision, which
the reader may not see or appreciate. The courts therefore have the duty to
reconcile or harmonize so far as practi-cable the various parts and provisions
of a statute, including the conflicting provisions thereof, so as to make them
consistent, har-monious and sensible. It is only through this that the statute
will be given effect as a whole.
IV. AS A RULE, THE STATUTE OF LATER DATE

PREVAILS
Where two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date prevails.
The statute of a later date is presumed to be the latest expression of

legislative will on the subject. Hence, Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of
1948 should give way to the provisions of the
Tariff Customs Code and to HA No. 1937, which took effect on July 1, 1957,
much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Besides, it is more reasonable to
conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of
the prerogative to replevin a property that is subject of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. (Pacis v. Averia,
G.R. No. L-22526, November 29, 1966)
V. GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT

Special provisions prevail over the general provisions. (Black in
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 328-329) However, if it is possible

to harmonize the general and special provisions, said rule shall not apply.
Special provisions prevail regardless of the position it occupies in the

statute, and whether it comes earlier or later than the general one.
VI. A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER

A GENERAL LAW
In Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, May 28,
1990, the mortgagor sought the nullity of the extrajudicial foreclo-sure sale
on the ground that the mortgagee (DBP) cannot acquire by purchase the
mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of paragraph 2 Article
1491 and paragraph 7 of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits
agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another, the property whose
administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of
the princi-pal has been given.
The Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition mandated by paragraph 2

of Article 1491 in relation to Article 1409 of the Civil Code does not apply
where the sale of the property was made under a special power inserted in or
attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Act No 3135, as amended
As between a specific statute and a general statute, the former must

prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general
statute does. The Civil Code (RA No. 386) is of general character, while Act
No. 3135, as amended, is a special enactment and therefore the latter must
prevail.
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UnderAct No. 3135, as amended, a mortgagee creditor is allowed to

take part in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions as any other
bidder. Section 5 of Act No. 3135, as amended, creates and is designed to
create an exception to the general rule that a mortgagee or trustee in a
mortgage or deed of trust which contains a power of sale on default may not
become the purchaser, either directly or through the agency of a third person,
at a sale which he himself makes under the power. Under such exception, the
title of the mortgagee creditor over the property cannot be impeached or
defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own
sale.
EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE

The said rule is subject to the following exceptions:
(1) The general law prevails over the special law when it treats the
subject in particular and the special law refers to it in general;
(Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631, December 17, 1976)
(2) The general law prevails over the special law when the
legislature intended the general enactment to cover the whole
subject and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith.
(Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 43 SCRA 670)
VII. PARI MATERIA RULE

Under this rule, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the
same general purpose, should be read and construed together as if they
constituted one law. (C.J.S. pp. 803-806) They shall then be construed and
harmonized with the existing law.
This rule is founded on the assumption that in enacting a law, the
legislature has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject
matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment the new
statute is deemed enacted in accordance with the legislative policy embodied
in the previous statutes that it en-acted.
This rule is subject to two qualifications:

If two or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at
different times and under different conditions and cir-
cumstances, THEIR INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR
CONDITIONS PECULIAR TO EACH. (This rule is based
on the Latin Maxim DISTINGUE TEMPRA ET CON-
CORDABIS JURA)
2. A statute will not be construed as repealing prior act or acts on the
same subject unless the new law is evidently intended to all prior
laws on the matter.
In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied
amendment or repeal and in favor of harmonization of all laws on the
subject.
VIII. IN INTERPRETING REENACTED STATUTES, THE

COURT WILL FOLLOW THE
CONSTRUCTION WHICH SUCH STATUTE
RECEIVED WHEN PREVIOUSLY IN FORCE
A reenacted statute is a statute, which reenacts a previous statute. In
reenacting the provisions of a previous statute, it is presumed that the
legislature has the intention of adopting the construction and the language of
the previous act. Hence, when a provision in the City Charter of Manila
regarding prosecution of crimes by the City Fiscal was incorporated in the
charter of the City of Bacolod, it was ruled that the framers of the charter of
the City of Bacolod has reproduced the provision of the City Charter of
Manila with the intention of adopting also its settled interpretation.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of the City Charter of
Manila to the effect that ("the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila shall
have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of
city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and municipal courts of the
City of Manila. He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of ordinances and prepare the necessary information or make the
necessary complaints against the persons accused, and discharge all other
duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals"),
means that criminal complaints filed by offended parties directly with the
courts without the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila cannot legally be
done. This is the same interpretation that was applied with respect to a
criminal complaint filed by an offended party directly in the City Court of
Bacolod City.
(Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228)

CHAPTER V 157
IX. IN THE CASE OF ADOPTED STATUTE,

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COURTS
OF THE STATE FROM WHICH IT IS ADOPTED
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
Adopted statutes are those which are patterned after, or copied from
the statute of another country. For purposes of construing an adopted statute,
our courts will necessarily be guided by the interpretation and construction
of the courts of the country from which such statute is taken.
The due process clause and the equal protection clause, which are still
found in our Constitution, are of American origin. It is not strange that in
numerous cases, our courts were guided by Amer-ican doctrines and
principles, which are applicable, and by inter-pretations that were made in
classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), is an

example. In this case, the Supreme Court made reference to decisions of the
United States Supreme Court when it pronounced that the guarantee in the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution protects liberty. The
pertinent portion of the decision is as follows:
"Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom

which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right
to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes that right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be drawned into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties to which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as
are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long
array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the
citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any vocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to

choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right to
locomotion."
Our law on corporation and insolvency is of American origin. Hence,

American decisions may, if applicable, be cited in cases brought to our
courts for decision.
X. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN A

COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE AND A STATUTORY
PROVISION, THE LATTER PREVAILS
In Alvendia v. Intermediate Court, G.R. No. L-72138 and Bonamy v.
Justice Paras, G.R. No. 72138, January 20, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled
that equity applies only in the absence of and never against statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure. The Supreme Court denied the plea of Alvendia
that equity be applied in his favor and ruled that:
"The Alvendias cannot invoke equity as a ground for

reopening the case and making the payment of the judgment in
cash possible, where they had all the opportunity to make such
payments on four occasions but failed. These are: (1) from the
time they got the building and construction materials worth
P107,461.50 from the petitioner (from June 26 to August 12,
1975) up to the time they agreed to a compromise agreement on
January 6, 1978; (2) from the compromise judgment to the time
execution was ordered by the respondent court (Order dated
December 6, 1979); (3) from the Execution Order to the
Execution Sale (on January 15, 1981); and (4) from the execution
sale up to the end of the redemption period, finally ending in the
final deed of sale. There may be a moral obligation but if there is
no enforceable legal duty, the action for reconveyance must fail."
On the point that statutory law prevails as against equity, the

Supreme Court said:
"Equity is justice outside legality. It applies only in the

absence of and never against statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure. "Equity follows the law" but where the law gives a
particular remedy and that remedy is bounded and
circumscribed by particular rules, it would
CHAPTER 159
be improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and
to extend it further than the law allows. Courts exercising equity
jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not control
against any well-settled rule of law or public policy."
In Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation

(G.R. No. L-82670, September 15, 1989), the Supreme Court laid
down this ruling: "Principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a
provision of law specifically applicable to a case. The common
law principle that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be
applied in a case which is covered by an express provision of the New Civil
Code, specifically Article 559 Between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction"
XI. IMPLIED REPEALS ARE NOT LEGALLY PRESUMED IN

THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE SHOWING
OF SUCH INTENTIONS
BATANGAS CATV, INC v THE COURT OF

APPEALS, et at.,
G R No 138810, September 29, 2004
In the resolution of this case, the Supreme Court cited the historical
background regarding NTC's regulatory power over the CATV industry.
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and
operate a Community Antenna Television (CATV) system in Batangas City,
which provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of
rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod."
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscrib-er rates

from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote
petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit un-less it secures the
approval of respondent Sanggumang Panlungsod.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition
for injunction. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no
authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in
the Philippines.
After trial, the trial court enjoined the respondents from canceling
petitioner's permit to operate a Cable CATV system in the City of Batangas.
Upon respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the trial court's decision; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is Executive Order No. 205 impliedly repealed by RA No. 7160?
HELD:
At any rate, [the Court] find[s] no basis to conclude that RA No. 7160
repealed Executive Order No. 205, either expressly or impliedly. It is
noteworthy that RA No. 7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly
mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not
include Executive Order No. 205.
Neither is there an indication that Executive Order No. 205 was
impliedily repealed by RA No. 7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals
are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
of such intentions.
CHAPTER VI
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF SPECIFIC STATUTES
SPECIFIC STATUTES
There are several kinds of statutes and each statute has its
own rules of construction.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF THE

FOLLOWING STATUTES
I. AS TO NATURE
1. Penal statutes
2. Remedial statutes
3. Substantive statutes
4. Labor statutes
5. Tax statutes
II. AS TO APPLICATION
1. Mandatory
2. Directory
III. AS TO PERFORMANCE
1. Permanent
2. Temporary
IV. ASTOSCOPE
1. General
2. Special
3. Local
V. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS
1. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive
161
2. A statute could either be a repealing or amendatory act

3. A statute could either be a reference statute or a declara-tory
statute
VI. OTHER STATUTES
CONSTRUCTION OF EACH STATUTE

I PENAL STATUTES
Those, which impose punishment for an offense, committed
against the State. Statutes, which command or prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violation, are considered as penal statutes.
HOW ARE PENAL STATUTES INTERPRETED?

Penal statutes are interpreted against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused (People v Purisima, G R Nos L 42050 66, 46229 32 46313 16
and L 46997, November 20 1978) This rule should not, however, be
unreasonably applied as to defeat the true intent and meaning of the
enactment found in the language actually used (People v Padilla and Von
Arend 71 Phil 261)
The language of a penal statute cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. Only those persons, offenses and penalties, clearly
included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the
operation of the statute
II. REMEDIAL STATUTES

Those designed to correct an existing law, redress an existing
grievance, or introduce regulations conducive to the public good. (In Re:
School Dist. No. 6, etc. 278, N. W, p. 792)
HOW ARE REMEDIAL STATUTES CONSTRUED?

Remedial statutes should be liberally construed because they were
enacted by the legislature precisely to improve the law and so that they will
be in harmony with new ideas and conceptions of justice and proper conduct
of men (Crawford Stat Const p 494)
III. SUBSTANTIVE STATUTES

These are laws, which establish rights and duties. (Bstos u.
Lucero, 81 Phil. 640)
CHAPTER VI 163
What the law grants, the court cannot deny. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 67) Therefore, the first duty of the judge is to apply the law, whether it
is just or unjust, provided that the law is clear and there is no doubt.
In case of doubt, the judge should presume that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. (Article 10, New Civil Code)
Substantive laws create rights and duties. When these rights and duties
are therefore stated in clear and categorical language, there is no more room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. A plain
and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer
is vain labor and tends only to obscurity. (Songco, et al. v. National Labor
Relation Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 30, 1990)
Even equity cannot be set up against clear provisions of law based on

public policy. Thus, a sale of a homestead within 5-year prohibitory period is
void ab initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity
through the passage of time. (Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46955,
February 27, 1989)
Equitable reasons will not control against any well-settled rule of law
or public policy. (Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-
72138; Bonamy v. Justice Paras, G.R. L-72373, January 22, 1990)
In Llamado v. Court of Appeals (G.R. L-84850, June 29, 1989), the

Supreme Court ruled that a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to
enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-
making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration. He must not read in any way of creation. He must not read out
except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. (Underscoring
Supplied)
1V. LABOR STATUTES

Those laws that govern the rights and obligations of employers and
employees, providing as well for the rules by which such rights and
obligations may be enforced.
HOW ARE LABOR LAWS INTERPRETED?

Article IV of the New Labor Code answers this question:
It says: "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of Labor." (Underscoring supplied)
V. TAX STATUTES
Those, which impose rules and regulations, related to taxation or to
creation of particular sources of revenue such as taxes, fees, and charges that
are needed for the support of government and for all public needs.
In case of doubt, statutes levying taxes and duties are to be construed

most strongly against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens,
because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed beyond
what statutes expressly and clearly import. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, et al., G.R. No. L-30644, 9
March 87, Second Division, Paras, J.)
HOW ARE TAX STATUTES INTERPRETED?

They are construed strictly against the taxing power and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. (In Re: Arbuckle's Estate, 18, A.
758) This is because tax laws seek to impose burdens upon persons and
property.
The following rules of construction apply to tax laws:
a. The real purpose of the legislature, if that purpose is discernible
from its statute, will prevail over the literal import of the words
used. (3 Sutherland, Stat. Const. p. 42)
b. The spirit, rather than the letter of an ordinance, deter-mines the

construction thereof, and the court looks less to its word and
more to the context, subject matter, con-sequence and effect.
(Manila Race Horse Owner's Assn. v. De La Fuente, G.R. No. L-
2947, January 11, 1951)
C. The history of the statute should be considered as an aid in the
ascertainment of the intention of the legislature. (Greenfield v.
Meer, CA G.R. No. 156, September 27, 1846)
d. However, tax exemptions, are construed strictly against
taxpayers and in favor of the taxing power. Moreover,
exemptions cannot be claimed unless they are expressly
CHAPTER VI 165
provided for in the law. (Collector v. Manila Jockey Club, 98

Phil. 670)
VI. MANDATORY STATUTES

Those which contain words of command or of prohibition, and non-
compliance with the same renders the proceedings to which it relates illegal
and void.
VII. DIRECTORY STATUTES

Those which are permissible or discretionary in nature and merely
outline the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from
ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than
that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.
In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, intention of

the legislature must be ascertained. The determination of this intention must
not depend on the statute itself. However, the following tests, while not
conclusive or controlling, have often been used to determine the mandatory
or directory nature of statutes and statutory provisions:
1. TERMINOLOGY - The words or phrases regarded as making

a provision mandatory include "shall" and "must, "while the word
"may" and the phrase "it is lawful" are usually regarded as
permissive or directory.
2. MATERIALITY OF THE PROVISIONS - Statutory
provisions which relate to matters of substance or which affect
substantial rights, and are the very essence of the thing required
to be done, are regarded as mandatory. Provisions which are not
material or which do not affect any substantial right, and do not
relate to the essence of the thing to be done, so that compliance is
a matter of convenience rather than substance, are considered to
be directory.
3. CONSEQUENCES —A statutory provision is mandatory

where a failure of performance will result to the injury or
prejudice to the substantial rights of interested persons. If such
failure or performance will not result to the
injury or prejudice of the substantial rights of interested
persons, then the provisions is generally regarded merely
as directory.
4. PENALTY - It is a general rule of construction that where a

legislative provision is accompanied by a penalty for a failure to
observe it, the provision is mandatory. Otherwise, it is directory.
As already stated, the said tests are not conclusive or controlling.

Hence, while the word "shall" is a word of command and generally
considered as mandatory, it shall be considered as permissive when it can be
gathered from the context as well as from the language of the statute that
such is the apparent intention of the legislature.
The word "may" may, at times, be construed as "shall" if the statute
provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty,
or where it vests a public body or office with power and authority to take
such action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals.
Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines is an example of a

mandatory provision. It provides as follows:
"Article 3. Declaration of Basic Policy. - The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employ - ment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State
shall assure the rights of work-ers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work."
Section 28, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is an example of a

directory provision. It provides as follows:
"x x x
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President

to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government."
In Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil.

608, the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase 'x x x shall subject
to avaihbiity of funds 3r x x" implieg nota m9ndtory, but n
discretionary meaning.
CHAPTER VI 167
On this basis, the second sentence in Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, implies that although the word "shall" is used, it is directory. It
provides as follows:
"Section 4. The state shall, by law, undertake an agrarian

reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as
the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the rights of small landowners The State
shall further provide incentives of voluntary land sharing"
(Underlining Supplied)
On the other hand, the use of negative or prohibitory words in a statute

is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. The
words "shall not," "cannot," or "ought not" indicate positive prohibition.
Examples:
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
"Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employ-ment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat
Neither shall he be ap-pointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected."
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

"Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list
representatives, a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof

for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election."
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

"Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, lib-erty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."
VIII. PERMANENT STATUTE

It is a statute whose operation is not limited to a particular period of
time but which continues in force until it is duly altered or repealed.
Example: New Labor Code
IX. TEMPORARY STATUTE

It is a statute whose life or duration is fixed for a specified period of
time at the moment of its enactment, and continues in force, unless sooner
repealed, until the expiration of the time fixed for its duration.
Example: PD No. 851 granting 13th Month Pay
It is a statute which relates to persons, entities, or things as a class or

operates equally or alike upon all of a class, omitting no persons, entity, or
thing belonging to a class.
Example: The Family Code
M. SPECIAL STATUTE
It is a statute, which relates to particular persons, entities or things of a
class.
Example: Child and Youth Welfare Law
XII. LOCAL STATUTE

It is a statute whose operation is confined within territorial limits
other than that of the whole state, or applies to any political subdivision or
subdivisions of the state less than the whole, or to property and persons of
a limited portion of the state, or is directed
CHAPTER VI 169
to a specific locality or spot, as distinguished from a law which operates

throughout the state.
Example: Law granting autonomy in Southern Philippines
XIII. OTHER STATUTES

1. STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS - Price
control laws are in derogation of common or general
rights. They are generally strictly construed and rigidly
confined to cases clearly within their scope of purpose.
2. STATUTES GRANTING PRIVILEGES - Those who

invoke a special privilege granted by a statute must comply
strictly with its provisions. In the case therefore of a legislative
franchise granted to a firm to operate electric light and power, on
condition that it should start operation within a specified period,
the failure of said firm to start operation within the specified
period is a ground for forfeiture of the franchise.
3. NATURALIZATION LAWS - These are strictly con-strued

against the applicant because the right of an alien to become a
citizen by naturalization is merely a statutory right. The desire of
an applicant to become a naturalized citizen will still require the
filing of his formal petition and he has still to prove by
satisfactory evidence that he has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications specified by law. In case of doubt, the doubt
is resolved against the applicant (Cu v. Republic, 115 Phil. 600).
4. STATUTES IMPOSING TAXES AND CUSTOM

DUTIES - Generally they are construed strictly against the
taxing power and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.
(In Re: Arbuckle's Estate, 188 A. 758) The reason for this is
because tax laws impose burdens on the public. The scope of tax
laws cannot be enlarged as to include matters not specifically
pointed out. In case of doubt, they are construed most strongly
against the government (Goulds v. Gould, 62 L. ed. p. 211).

5. STATUTE AUTHORIZING SUITS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT - A statute whereby the state gives its
consent to be sued is strictly construed, and the waiver of
immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not
be lightly inferred. (Equitable Ins. & Casualty Co.,
Inc. v. Smith, Bell & Co. [Phil.], Inc., G.R. No. L-24383, August
26, 1967) To justify a suit against the state or any of its agencies,
the statute conferring the right to maintain the action must be
plain and positive, and its meaning should not be left to doubt
(Compania General de Tabacco de Filipinas v Government 45
Phil 663)
Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution declares
that the State may not be sued without its consent. When this
consent therefore is given, the State
can be sued but this does not necessarily mean that it
concedes to liability. This only means that the one bringing the
suit is merely given the opportunity to prove that the State is
liable.
The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly
or impliedly. The first may be given through a general or special
law. The second is given when the state itself commences
litigation or when it enters into a contract. Here, the state
devolves into the level of an ordinary citizen.
6 STATUTES PRESCRIBING LIMITATIONS ON THE

TAXING POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS - They are strictly construed against the national
government and liberally in favor of the local government units.
Any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power will be
resolved in favor of the local government The reason for this is
that local government units are now granted the power to create
its own sources of revenue. Under the 1973 Constitution, the
local government units have no inherent power of taxation
7 STATUTE IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR NON-PAY-

MENT OF TAX - They are liberally construed in favor of the
government and strictly observed and interpreted against the
taxpayer The reason is obvious, this facili-tates the collection of
taxes and penalties and tax eva-sions will be avoided
8 ELECTION LAWS - They should be construed liberally to

give effect to the expressed will of the electorate Technicalities
should not be allowed to prevail against the true will of the
people
9. ADOPTION STATUTES - They are liberally construed in
favor of the child to be adopted in order to promote the
CHAPTER VI 171
noble objectives of the law. Adoption is not merely an act to

establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an
act which endows a child with a legitimate sta-tus. (Prasnick v.
Republic, 98 Phil. 665) They also supply solace to those who
have no children or to those who have lost them, so that the void,
which exists in a childless
(Yfkigo u. Republic, 93 Phil. 244).
10. AMNESTY PROCLAMATIONS - They should be con-
strued liberally in favor of those who are given amnesty. The
reason for this is to encourage those who have not yet applied for
amnesty to return to the fold of the law and have normal lives
once again.
11. VETERAN AND PENSION LAWS - They should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited by such law in order to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law.
12. GENERAL WELFARE LEGISLATIONS - They are
construed liberally in favor of those intended to be benefited. This
construction is more in consonance with the constitutional
mandate to promote social justice.
Examples: Labor Code of the Philippines, Social Security
Law, and Agrarian Reform Law
13. PROBATION LAW - It should be liberally construed to
achieve its objective, which is to give another chance to first
offenders to go back to normal life.
14. LAWS ON ATTACHMENT - They are liberally construed
in order to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice.
15. RULES OF COURT - Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised

Rules of Court provides as follows:
"Section 6. These rules shall be liberally con-strued in

order to promote their objective and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and in-expensive determination of every
action and pro-ceeding."
16. STATUTES PRESCRIBING QUALIFICATIONS

FOR AN OFFICE - Statutes prescribing the qualifications
of persons to a public office is, as a rule, regarded as
mandatory. This means that a person, who is not eligible or

qualified at the time that he assumed office, may be ousted from
office at anytime upon discovery that he is not indeed qualified
and eligible.
17. ELECTION LAWS ON QUALIFICATION AND DIS-
QUALIFICATION - These are considered mandatory even
after the elections. Hence, a candidate who filed his certificate of
candidacy beyond the period required by law is disqualified to
run for office, as his certificate is void.
This is true even if the disqualified candidate wins the election.
He still remains unqualified for his election and does not validate
his certificate of candidacy (Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA
1102).
XIV. OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS

I. A statute could either be prospective or retroactive
PROSPECTIVE STATUTE - It is one which operates upon or
regulates acts or transactions taking place after it takes effect. As a rule, laws
operate prospectively, not retroactively, except in the following cases:
(a) If the law itself provides that it will be retroactive (Art-icle 4,

New Civil Code);
(b) If the law is remedial in nature;
(c) If the law is penal in nature provided it is favorable to the
accused or the convict, and that the accused or convict is not a
habitual delinquent (Article 22, Revised Penal Code);
(d) If the law is curative; and

(e) If the law is of an emergency nature and authorized by the police
power of the government.
Article 4 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
"Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the

contrary is provided."
In general, laws are prospective, not retroactive, and no court will

hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. In
other words, statutes are to be construed as having only
CHAPTER VI 173
prospective operation, unless the legislature intends that they will have
retroactive effect. This could either be made expressly in the law itself or it
could be implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt will be
resolved against the retroactive operation of laws (Montilla v. Agustinia
Corp., 24 Phil. 229).
RETROACTIVE STATUTE - It is one which creates a new
obligation, one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already passed
(Castro v. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210).
As mentioned earlier, there are times when laws are precisely made
retroactive. When the law itself provides that they shall apply retroactively, or
when the intention to make the law retroactive is implied from the words
used, the problem that may arise is whether the said law is violative or not of
the constitutional provisions on impairment of obligation and contract, ex post
facto law, and bill of attainder, thus:
"Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts

shall be passed." (Article III, 1987 Constitution)
"Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall
be enacted." (Article III, 1987 Constitution)
A good example of a provision, which expressly provides for the

retroactive effect of the law, is Article 256 of the Family Code to wit:
"Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect

insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The retroactive effect of the Family Code, however, is

qualified by the proviso, thus: "x x x insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws" should be respected.
II. A statute could either be a repealing act or an amenda-tory act.
REPEALING ACT - It is one which revokes or terminates another

statute, either by express language or by implication. (Crawford, Statutory
Constitution, p. 110)
REPEAL
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones (Article 7, New Civil
Code) and laws are repealed either expressly or impliedly.
However, implied repeals are not looked upon with favor.
Palacio, 33 Phil. 208) Hence, if both statutes can stand together, there is no
repeal. (Lechoco v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138)
The Civil Code repeals the Old Civil Code of 1889.
The Family Code has expressly repealed Title III on marriage;
Title IV on legal separation; Title V on rights and obligations
between husband and wife; title VI on property relations between husband
and wife; Title VII on the family; Title VIII on paternity and filiation; Title
IX on support; Title XI on parental authority, and Title XV on emancipation
and age of majority.
Article 254 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XV
of Book 1 Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed."
This article specifies the provisions of the Civil Code and the Child and
Youth Welfare Code that were expressly repealed by the Family Code.
The closing sentence in Article 254 which states "x x x all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed," indicates that the repeal
referred to is merely an implied repeal.
THE REPEAL OF A STATUTE IS EITHER

TOTAL OR PARTIAL
A statute, which is totally repealed, is rendered revoked com-pletely.
When the repeal, however, is partial, the portion or portions not affected by
the repeal continue to exist.
Repeal is a question of intent. Express repeal of a statute or any of its
provisions is accomplished by a direct and express provision or declaration
in a subsequent statute so there will be no doubt as to
CHAPTER VI 175
what statute is intended. In this case, the courts should respect the specific
intent of the legislature to repeal what it has so specified.
Article 254 of the Family Code specifically enumerates the provisions
of the Civil Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code that were repealed
by the Family Code
Repeals by implication can be done in two ways (1) By covering the
whole subject matter so that it is intended as a substitute for the earlier
statute, and (2) By containing provisions which are inconsistent and
irreconcilable with the earlier statute.
The courts are slow to hold that a statute has repealed another by
implication If the courts cannot avoid doing so through the use of a fair and
reasonable construction, they will not make adjudication that a statute has
repealed another by implication. This is in accor-dance with the established
principle that repeals and amendments by implications are not favored
(Quisimbing v Lachica G B No L-14683, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 182)
The second sentence in Article 254 of the Family Code which says "x x
x and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed,"
gives rise to this question Will that be considered a repeal? If so, what is it?
It is not an express repeal, unlike the first sentence of Article 254

which states specifically the provisions, and the titles, which are repealed It
is merely an implied repeal because it fails to identify or designate the act or
acts that are intended to be repealed.
AMENDATORY ACT - It makes an addition to the original laws
or it operates to change it
An amendment of a statute is effected through the enactment of an
amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of the statute. The
amendment could either be express or implied.
There is an express amendment when the amendatory act specified the
provisions of a statute that are amended. There is an implied amendment
where a part of a.prior statute embracing the same subject has become
inconsistent with the new provisions as amended
How should the amendment be construed?

1. A statute and its amendment should be construed in its entirety. The
amendment becomes part of the original statute as if it had
always been contained therein;
2. Provisions of the original act which are not affected by the

amendment shall remain in force;
3. The amendment made indicates that the legislature intended a
change in the law or in its meaning. The court therefore give
effect to such intent;
4. As a rule, the amendatory act operates prospectively unless
otherwise provided or if it could be implied from
the language used that the legislature intends to give it
a retroactive effect. Even in the latter case, however, the
amendment cannot be construed retroactively if doing so will
impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts (People v.
Buttler, 120 SCRA 281).
III. A Statute could either be a reference statute, a supplemental

statute, a reenacted statute or an adopted statute.
REFERENCE STATUTE - It is a statute, which refers to other

statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of legisla-tion.
A reference statute should be construed as to harmonize with, and, give

effect to, the adopted statute.
This statute is often used to avoid unnecessary repetitions. By simply
making reference to a particular provision in an existing law and without the
need of introducing another law, the rule, provision or term/s intended to be
applied is stated in the reference statute. Hence, the provision which states
that the terms legal or regular Holiday and Special Holiday, as used in
Article 94 of the Labor Code shall now be referred to as a regular Holiday
and Special day, respectively, indicates that this is a reference statute.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATUTES - They are intended to sup-ply

deficiencies in an existing statutes and to add to, complete, or extend the
statute without changing or modifying its original text.
The original statute and the supplemental act should be con-strued
together in its entirety.
- They reenact provisions of an
earlier statute. The provisions in the earlier statute are reproduced in the
same words or substantially the same words. The courts will therefore
follow the construction, which the adopted statute previ-ously received.
CHAPTER VI 177
ADOPTED STATUTES - They are statutes patterned after, or

copied from a statute of a foreign country. The construction given to them by
the courts of the country from which they were taken will be considered by
the courts. Such construction, however, will not be conclusive to our courts.
Our laws on voluntary and involuntary insolvency is in great part a

copy of the Insolvency Act of California, enacted in 1895, which,
in turn, was based upon the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1867 though it
contains a few provisions from the American Bankruptcy
Law of Life Assurance Co. u. Ingersoll, 42 Phil. 81).
CHAPTER VII
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING
AND IMPORTANCE
I. IMPORTANCE OF LATIN MAXIMS

Latin maxims are used not only in interpreting statutes. They are also
used by judges and justices in their decisions to add elegance to their
language and to give emphasis to the legal points therein discussed. This is
so because Roman legal literature is noted for originality and the style of
Roman jurists is simple, clear, brief and precise.
Likewise, our New Civil Code is Roman in origin. Modern laws and
concepts of persons and family relations, parental authority, marriage,
divorce, concubinage, legitimation, emancipation, adop-tion, guardianship,
property, avulsion, alluvion,
manu, traditio longa manu, constitutum possessorium, obligations and

contracts, nominate and innominate contracts, sale, lease, agency, pledge,
deposits, wills and successions, quasi-delicts, quasi-contracts, negotiorum
gestio, solutio indebiti and many others are Roman in origin. Notwithstanding
the modifications and the enor-mous improvements that have been made, the
Philippines and its citizens cannot remove the great influence that Roman law
still ex-erts in our day to day life, whether it is in the city or in the remote
barrio. The same thing is true to the rest of the world affected by the Roman
legal system.
Roman law is of enormous value to modern nations. It is at hand, ready

for use and able to shed copious light in the solution of the numerous
complex problems which confront the modern civilized world. (Sherman,
Section 6)
178
CHAPTER VII 179
LATIN MAXIMS: THEIR MEANING AND IMPORTANCE
II. LATIN MAXIMS APPLICABLE TO STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION
A. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT LAWS SHOULD BE
PROSPECTIVE, NOT RETROACTIVE
Lex Prospicit, Non The law looks forward, not back-

Respicit ward.
Lex de Futuro. Judex de The law provides for the
Praterio future, the judge for the past.
This principle is still found in Article 4 of our New Civil Code, which
provides as follows:
"Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided."
The general rule has not changed. In this jurisdiction, all statutes are to
be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and
intention of the legislature to give them retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language. In every case of doubt,
the doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect.
Besides the exceptions to this rule, the Supreme Court in MRCA, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-86675, December 19, 1989), enunciated the
ruling that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage It
is in that sense and to that extent that procedural laws are retrospective.
In said case, the plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the order of the Regional Trial
Court dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as
the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be
recovered by it from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of the
court" or "to be proven during the trial."
Invoking the decision of the Supreme Court in Manchester

Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, (149 SCRA 562) the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff opposed the

motion, but the trial court granted it.
Plaintiff argued that since the decision in the Manchester case had not
yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed, the
ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive
effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-observance: the dismissal
of the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
(1) Plaintiffs argument regarding the need for publication of the

Manchester's ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be applied to other
cases is not well taken;
(2) The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. V. Asuncion, et al., (G.R. No. L-789937-38,
February 13, 1989), a case that was already pending before Manchester was
promulgated;
(3) The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988 or ten
months after Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence,
Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun
Insurance case, where we ruled that the court may allow payment of the
proper filing fees "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
prescriptive or reglementary period."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the trial court,
and ordered the complaint reinstated and directed the trial court to allow
plaintiff to amend the complaint by specifying the amounts of damages it
seeks to recover from the defendants and to pay the proper filing fees therefor
as computed by the clerk of court, in line with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Asuncion.
B. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR,

WHAT THE COURTS SHOULD DO IS TO APPLY IT, NOT TO
INTERPRET IT
Absolute Sentencia Expositore When the language of the law is

Non Indiget clear, no explanation of it is
required.
Optima Statuti Interpretatix Est The best interpreter of the
Insum Statutum statute is the statute itself.
CHAPTER VII 181
This principle has been used and applied in a long line of cases that
have been decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, it is well-established in this
jurisdiction that where the law is clear, the court's duty is to apply it, not to
interpret it (Go Ka Toc & Sons Co. v. Rice & Corn Board, G. R. No. L-
23607, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 147).
The old ruling in People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, August 30, 1967,
20 SCRA 1164, is still unchanged. The Supreme Court said:
"Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demoiistrated that applicationi is
impossible or inadequate with them. It is not with-in the
power of a court to set aside the clear and explicit
mandate of a statutory provision."
The ruling in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-84850, June 29,
1989, although basically the same as the ruling in People v. Mapa, is more
articulate. The Supreme Court said that "the words to be given meaning
whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore
limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply those words.
If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the
law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will
effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their
authority and discretion."
C. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS NOT THE

LETTER OF THE LAW THAT KILLETH, IT IS THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAW THAT GWETH LIFE
Ratio Legis Est Anima The reason of the law is its soul.
Ratio Legis Interpretation according to spirit
Cessante Ratione Cesat Ipsa Lex When the reason for the law
ceases, the law ceases also to
exist.
From time to time, this question has been asked: What if the letter of
the law conflicts with its spirit, which prevails?
There are two schools of thought on this matter. In the case of People v.
Sales, et al., G.R. No. L- 66469, July 29, 1986, Justice
Isagani Cruz articulated his thoughts in this manner: "A too literal reading of
the law is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the 'letter that
killeth but in the spirit that giveth life,' which is not really that evanescent or
elusive. Judges must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the
law, seeking to discover by their own lights the reason and the rhyme for its
enactment. That they may properly apply it according to its ends, they need
and must use not only learning but also vision."
The thinking of Justice Isagani Cruz is more in line with Article 10 of

the New Civil Code which says: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of the laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail." This is also the gist of the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the old cases of Torres v. Limhap, 56 Phil. 141; De Castro v.
Olondriz and Escudero, 50 Phil. 725; and in the celebrated case of
Dominador Aytona v. Andres Castillo, et al., G.R. No. L-19313, January 19,
1962.
Former Chief Justice Ramon Aquino, on the other hand, finds it risky
to rely on the "so-called spirit of the law". He said: "It is dan-gerous to rely
on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and about
which we do not know very much." (Villanue-va v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-54718, December 4, 1985)
The author thinks that it is safer to be guided by the ruling in Chartered
Bank Employees Association v. Ople, G.R. No. L-44717, August 28, 1985. In
the said case, this ruling was pronounced. "If the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, then read the law to mean exactly what it says. If not, look
for the intention of the legislature."
D. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED IN

THOSE ENUMERATED ARE DEEMED EXCLUDED
Expresio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - Express mention is implied
exclusion.
This principle has also been used and applied in a litany of cases. The
rule has not changed. The enumeration of specified matters in a statute is
construed, as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different
intention appears.
In Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48468, November 22, 1989,
the Supreme Court ruled that the maxim "expresio unius est
CHAPTER VII 183
exclusio alterius" is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is

not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied
only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose
of the legislature.
E. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT SPECIAL

PROVISIONS PREVAIL OVER GENERAL
PROVISIONS
Generalia specialibus non derogant - A general law does not
nullify a specific or special law.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO v. THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS G.R. No. 169202, March 5,2010
FACTS:
Maria Virginia Remo is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R
Rallonza, whose Philippine passport was then expiring on Octo ber 27, 2000
Prior to its expiry, she applied for renewal with the DFA and requested to
4
revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport while her
marriage still subsists
The DFA denied the request. The motion for reconsideration was also
denied. She then filed an appeal with the Office of the President which the
latter dismissed and ruled that Sec 5(d) of RA No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway for any other interpretation that only
in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of nullity of marriage may a
married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes." The Office
of the President denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition was denied. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE
Whether petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in
her replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the
Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names
provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name once she is married
because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her
civil status. Further, this interpretation is in consonance with the principle
that surnames indicate descent.
The law governing passport issuance is RA No. 8239 and the

applicable provision in this case is Sec. 5(d), which states:
"Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport.
- No passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary
or his duly authorized representative is satisfied that the
applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the
following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated,
divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been an-nulled or
declared by court as void, a copy of the certifi-cate of marriage,
court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of
death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by
the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case
of a divorce de-cree, annulment or declaration of marriage as
void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden
name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under
existing laws of the Philippines; x x x"
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname in her

passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the
cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239. Since petitioner's
marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume using her maiden name
in the replacement passport.
Even assuming RA No. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA No. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with
passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil
Code which is the general law on the use of surnames A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, thus:
CHAPTER VII 185
"[l]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to

the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and
a special law or provision, the latter will control the former
without regard to the respective dates of passage."
Old Case:
In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, G.R. No. L-84811, August 29, 1989, it
was held that B.P. Big. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act)
is the general law, and PD No. 1344 (Decree empowering the Na
tional Housing Authority to issue writs of executions in the enforce-ment of
its decisions under PD No. 957 is the special law.
The conflict sought to be resolved in that case is this: B.P. Big. 129
was promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No.
1344 in 1978. In case of conflict between the two, which prevails?
It was held that in case of conflict between a general law and a special
law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus,
it has been held that "the fact that one law is spe-cial and the other general
creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remarking an
exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as
the law of the particu-lar case."
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the
general act does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it
will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act, and
where the general law is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by
necessarily implication.
In Philippine National Bank v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-80593, December
18,1989, it was held that whenever two statutes of different dates and of
contrary tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the
statute of later date must prevail being a later expression of legislative will.
Thus, the Supreme Court uphold the preference accorded to the

employees in view of the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code. The
phrase "any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding"
indicates that such preference shall prevail despite the order set
forth in Articles 2241 and 2245 of the Civil Code. No exceptions
were provided under said articles. Furthermore, the labor code was signed
into law decades after the Civil Code.
F. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHILE THE LAW MAY BE

HARD, IT IS THE LAW THAT WILL BE FOLLOWED
Dura Lex Sed Lex - The law may be harsh but it is still the
law.
When the law is clearly worded there is no room for interpre-tation. It
is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or favor. It is not
for the courts to decide that the law is unwise. The duty of the courts is apply
the law, whether it is wise or unwise. (Gonzales u Gonzales 58 Phil 67 U S v
Allan 2 Phil 630)
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G R No 192330, November 14, 2012
FACTS
The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSW DO) of
Leyte, Leyte, operated .a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that
provided construction materials to indigent calamity victims with which to
rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries pro-vided the labor needed for
construction.
When construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy a, Baran gay
Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for
the reason that they had to find food for their families This worried Lolita
Garcia, the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage could
result in the loss of construction mate-rials particularly the cement. Thus, she
sought the help of Cristina Polinio,. an officer of the MSWDO in charge of
the municipality's Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to
mal-nourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of
rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom which could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries
Garcia and Pohmo explained the situation to Arnold James M. Ysidoro,

the Leyte Municipal Mayor, and sought his approval. Ysidoro approved the
release and signed the withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of
sardines worth 113,396.00 to CSAP. He instructed Garcia and Pohmo, however,
to consult the accounting
CHAPTER VII 187
department regarding the matter. Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the
Municipal Accountants Office, signed the withdrawal slip on the view that it
was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods. Subsequently,
CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported
the matter to the MSWIO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte,

filed a complaint against Ysidoro for technical malversation, when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP
beuef1ciarie.
The Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reason-able doubt of

technical malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or
embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the
sum misapplied. The Sandliganbayan held that he applied public property to
a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or
ordinance. The Sandi-ganbayan denied Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration.
He appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
HELD:
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which
such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which
they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using
the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from
Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the accounting department if
the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation.

The law punibhes the act of diverting public property earmarked by
law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because a positive law
forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or minis-cule the
amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical malver-sation. The Law
and th[e] Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave, warranting a
mere fine.
G. ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT WITHOUT

INTENT, THERE CAN BE NO CRIME
Cogitationis Poenam Nemo No man may be punished for his

Emeret thought.
Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi The act itself does not make
Mens Sit Rea a man guilty unless his
intention were so.
An act done by me against my
Actus Me Invito Factus Non Est will is not my act.
Meus Actus
These principles are still applicable. Under Article 3 of the Revised

Penal Code, the first element of a felony must be that the act or omission is
voluntary. Hence, if the alleged criminal act is committed by an insane
person, he is not criminally liable but he may be civilly liable. (Article 12,
Revised Penal Code)
H. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

EXCUSES NO ONE BUT IGNORANCE OF FACT MAY BE AN
EXCUSE
Ignorantia Legis Neminem Ignorance of the law excuses no

Excusat one.
Ignorantia Facto Excusat Ignorance or mistake in point of

fact is an excuse.
CHAPTER VII 189
The first maxim is still found in Article 3 of the New Civil Code which
provides as follows: "Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith."
Article 3 applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; U.S. v. Allan, 2 Phil. 630) and whether
substantive or remedial. (Article 12, Revised Penal Code) The maxim,
however, does not apply to the following:
1. Ignorance of foreign law is not ignorance of the law but merely
an ignorance of fact;
2. In Tuvera v. Tafiada, a law should first be published before it
becomes effective.
I. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT WHEN THE LAW DOES

NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH
Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distiguere Debemos - Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
The constitutional guarantee of due process is granted to every
Filipino, rich or poor, learned or ignorant, and regardless of his religious
belief or political persuasion. Article III, Section 1 of the constitution
provides as follows: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
III. LATIN MAXIMS AND PHRASES RELATED TO

THE SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MENS LEGISLATORES
The courts should give the statute a reasonable or liberal construction

which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.
In Prasnick v. Republic (98 Phil. 665), the petitioner likes to adopt his
own acknowledged natural children. He has no other children except the said
acknowledged natural children. The said petition was opposed on the ground
that if a person has at least one child, legitimate or illegitimate, he can no
longer adopt, and that only an unacknowledged natural child may be adopted.
The court held that the opposition is without merit and applied
Article 338 of the New Civil Code as an exception to Article 335
saying that this will be more in keeping with the trend that adoption is not
merely an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation but also as
an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. Consequently, the
Supreme Court denied the contention that there "should be no adoption of an
acknowledged natural child because there is already a relationship of
paternity and filiation," and ruled that in adopting his own acknowledged
natural child, the father is precisely raising such child to the category of a
legitimate child. (The law on adoption is now governed by Article 183 of the
Family Code)
REDDENDO SING ULA SING ULIS

Each word or phrase or clause must be referred to their proper
connection in order to give it proper force and effect, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous. Literally, the maxim means, "referring each to each."
A good example is the wording of Article 31 of the Family Code of the

Philippines, which reads as follows:
"Article 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between
passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or
the plane is in flight, but also during stop-overs at ports of call."
The phrase "may also be solemnized by the ship captain" refers to the
phrase "while the ship is at sea." The phrase "or the plane is in flight" refers
to the "airplane pilot." The more appropriate connec-tion, however, would be
"may also be solemnized" by the airplane pilot "while the plane is in flight."
The phrase "but also during stopovers at ports of call" refers to the ship
captain and airplane pilot.
CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABBENDUS EST

Literally, this means a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted.
The cassus omissus principle means that if a person, object or thing is
omitted from an enumeration in the statute, it must be held to have been
intentionally omitted.
As a rule, therefore, the court cannot insert in a statute that
which has been omitted. The court can only do so if it is necessary
CHAPTER VII 191
LATIN MAXIMS: THEW MEANING AND IMPORTANCE
to obviate repugnancy or inconsistency, or where the omission was made

through clerical error, accident or inadvertence, or where it is necessary to
complete the sense of the statute.
Hence, under Article 7 of the Family Code, a mayor is no longer
authorized to solemnize marriage he being no longer included in the
enumeration of those who may solemnize marriage. Under Article 56 of the
New Civil Code, he is one of those enumerated as one who may solemnize
marriage. The omission is therefore intentional.
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Where a particular word or phrase in a statute is ambiguous in itself or

is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made
clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
Example:
Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates those that are
considered as property of public dominion. It provides as fol-lows:
"Article 420. The following things are property of public

dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, riv-ers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar charac-ter;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth."
A question arises: Is a riverbank a property of public dominion? The
Supreme Court ruled that it is a property of public dominion (Hilario v. City
of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570, April 27,1967) because the bed of a river is of
public dominion, and the bank being a part of the bed, is also a part of public
dominion. The enumeration shows that the words "banks" and "rivers" were
mentioned separately. It did not mention "river banks," and yet it was ruled
that river banks are of public dominion. The interpretation is influenced
apparently
by the company of words enumerated, which the law considers as
properties of public dominion.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
When general words follow the designation of particular things, or
classes of persons or subjects, the general words will usually be construed to
include only those persons or things of the same class or general nature as
those specifically enumerated.
Section 185 of the implementing rules and regulations of the Local
Government Code enumerates the property that shall be exempt from
distraint and levy, attachment or execution. It provides as follows:
"Section 185. Personal Property Exempt from Dis-traint or

Levy. - The following property shall be exempt from distraint and
the levy, attachment or execution thereof for delinquency in the
payment of any local tax, fee, or charge, including related
surcharges and interests;
a) Tools and implements necessarily used by the delin-quent
taxpayer in his trade or employment;
b) One (1) horse, cow, carabao, or other beast of burden, such
as the delinquent taxpayer may select, and necessarily used
by him in his ordinary occupation;
c) His necessary clothing, and that of all his family;
d) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping and used for that purpose by the delinquent
taxpayer, such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
e) Provisions, including crops, actually provided for in-
dividual or family use sufficient for four (4) months;
f) The professional libraries of doctors, engineers, lawyers
and judges;
g) One (1) fishing boat and net, not exceeding the total value
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), by the lawful use of
which a fisherman earns his livelihood; and
h) Any material or article forming part of a house or

improvement of any real property."
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the last para-
graph (h) "Any material or article forming part of a house
CHAPTER VII 193
or improvement of any real property," necessarily apply to

any material or article similar to those specifically enu-
merated for as long as they form part of the house. This may
include therefore a wall clock, a painting, a Singer sewing
machine used by the wife in her home for barong business,
but this will not include the guns, bullets, and ammunitions
found in the house.
CHAPTER VIII
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND
PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE
I. HOW ARE WORDS AND PHRASES IN A STATUTE

INTERPRETED?
It depends. If the words and phrases used are defined in the statute
itself, such definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective
of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual
sense If there is no such definition, the words or phrases in the statute should
be interpreted in accordance with its well-accepted meaning and they should
be construed in the light of the context of the whole statute.
II. IS THE STATUTORY DEFINITION CONCLUSIVE

TO THE COURTS
A statutory definition is not necessarily conclusive to the courts in the
following cases:
1.) When such definition creates obvious incongruities;
2.) When it contravenes the major purpose of the statute;
and
3.) When it becomes illogical as a result of a change in its
factual basis.
In such cases, the words will be given a meaning that will serve the
purpose of the law, or which will make the law logical and free from
incongruities.
III. RULES THAT GOVERN THE FOLLOWING

SITUATIONS
1.) When a word used in a statute has a general meaning;
2.) When the word used has a technical meaning;
194
CHAPTER VIII 195
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES USED IN A STATUTE
3.) When the word used has no meaning in harmony with the
legislative intent; and

4.) When the word or phrase is repeatedly used in a statute.
IV. WHEN THE WORD USED IN A STATUTE HAS A

GENERAL MEANING
The general word should not be given a restricted meaning unless it is
otherwise indicated.
This is founded on the Latin Maxim - GENERALIA VERBA
SUN GENERALITER INTELLIGENCIA, which means that what is generally
mentioned shall be generally understood.
EXAMPLES:
The word "hospital" is known to the general public as a
place where sick persons are treated or confined either for
medical treatment, medical examination or operation. In PD No.
1519, otherwise known as the New Medical Care Law, the word
"hospital" is defined as "any medical facility, government or
private, accredited in accordance with rules and regulations by
the commission." (The word "commission" in PD No. 1519 is
understood to be the Philippine Medical Commission)
The word "medical practitioner" is understood to be a

doctor who is engaged in the general practice of medi-cine.
Under said PD No. 1519, however, the word "medi-cal
practitioner" is defined as any doctor of medicine duly licensed to
practice in the Philippines who is a member in good standing of
the Philippine Medical Association and accredited in accordance
with rules and regulations pro-mulgated by the Commission."
And yet, PD No. 1519, Section 4(a) thereof, defines that the
word "individual" applies only to cases involving natural
persons.. (Vda. De Borrorneo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 207)
V. WHEN THE WORD USED HAS A TECHNICAL MEANING

When the words or phrase used have a technical meaning, they are
considered to have been used in their technical sense.
EXAMPLES:
The word "marriage" has a very special meaning and
technical meaning under Article 1 of the Family Code of the
Philippines which provides as follows:
"Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of perma-nent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an invio-lable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipula-tion, except that marriage settlements
may fix the prop-erty relations during the marriage within the
limits pro-vided by this Code"
The term "negotiable instrument" has a technical meaning

under Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It provides as
follows:
"Section 1. Form of negotiable instrument. - An in-
strument to be negotiable must conform to the following
requirements:
a) It must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer;
b) Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a

sum certain in money;
c) Must be payable on demand or at fixed or determin-able
future time;
d) Must be payable to order or to bearer; and
e) Where the instrument is addressed to a drawee, he must be
named or otherwise indicated therein with reasonable
certainty."
MACASAET v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 83748, May 12, 1989
FACTS:
Under a contract for Project Design and Management Services for the
Development of the Proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club, petitioner
was to be entitled to seven (7%) percent of the "actual construction cost."
Also, periodic payments were to be based
CHAPTER VIII 197
on a "reasonable estimated construction cost." Finally, the contract provides

that the balance of the professional fee was to be computed on the basis of
"the final actual project cost."
Pursuant to the schedule of payments, the Philippine Tourism
Authority made periodic payments of the stipulated professional fees to
petitioner. And, upon completion of the project, the PTA paid petitioners
what it perceived to be the balance of the latter's professional fees.
It turned out, however, that after the project was completed, PTA paid
Supra Construction Company, the main contractor, the additional sum of
P3,148,198.26 representing the escalation cost of the contract price due to
the increase in the price of construction materials.
Upon learning of the price escalation, petitioner requested payment of

P219,301.47 additional professional fee representing seven (7%) percent of
P3,148,198.26.
The PTA denied payment on the ground that "the subject price
escalation" referred to increased cost of construction materials and did not
entail additional work on the part of petitioner as to entitle it to additional
compensation. The COA sustained the PTA.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner entitled to additional professional fees, i.e., should the
price escalation be included in the "final actual project cost?"
HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court set aside the COA's ruling, ordered
the PTA to pay petitioner the additional amount of
P219,302.47 to complete the payment of its professional
fee.
2.) The very terminologies used in the contract call for
affirmative relief in petitioner's favor. The use of the
terms "actual construction cost," graduating into "final
actual project cost" is significant.
3.) The real intendment of the parties was to base the
ultimate balance of petitioner's professional fees not on
"actual construction cost" alone but on the final actual project
cost. By so providing, the contract allowed for flexibility based
on actuality and as a matter of equity for
the contracting parties. For eventually, the final actual project

cost would not necessarily tally with the actual construction cost
initially computed. The "final actual project cost" covers the
totality of all costs as actually and finally determined and
logically, includes the escalation cost of the contract price.
4.) It matters most that the price escalation awarded to the

Construction Company did not entail additional work for the
petitioner. As a matter of fact, neither did it for the main
contractor. The increased cost of materials was not the doing of
neither contracting parties.
5.) That an escalation clause was not specifically provided for in the
contract is of no moment either for it may be considered as
already "built-in", and understood from the very terms "actual
construction cost," and eventually "final actual project cost."
6.) The terminologies in the contract being clear, leaving no doubt as

to the intention of the contracting parties, their literal meaning
control (Article 1370, Civil Code). The price escalation cost must
be deemed included in the final actual project cost and petitioner
held entitled to the payment of its additional professional fees.
Obligations arising from contract have the force of law between
the contracting parties and should be complied with in a good
faith."
VI. WHEN THE WORD USED HAS NO MEANING IN

HARMONY WITH THE LEGISLATWE INTENT
When the words used have no meaning in harmony with the legislative
intent, they can be treated as surplasage and they may entirely be ignored.
Before resorting to this, however, the courts should construe the statute in its
entirety 'and find out if the words used can still admit a reasonable
construction which will give them force and meaning. In the absence of any
reasonable construction, then the said words can be ignored.
Hence, in Montenegro v. Castañeda (91 Phil. 882), the petitioner

argued that the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was void on the ground that it included sedition which is not a ground
provided for in the Constitution. The Supreme Court considered the word
"sedition" in said proclamation as a mistake or
CHAPTER VIII 199
surplasage but its inclusion in the proclamation does not invalidate the entire
proclamation.
VII. WHEN THE WORD OR PHRASE IS

REPEATEDLY USED IN A STATUTE
A word or phrase used in one part of a statute shall receive the same
interpretation when used in every other part of the stat-ute, unless a different
meaning is intended. Likewise, when a word or phrase is repeatedly used in a
statute, it will, as a rule, bear the same meaning throughout the statute.
(Kriuenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461)
VIII. PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES

1.) The words "OR" and "AND"
2) The terms "AND/OR'
3.) The words "SHALL" and "MAY"
4.) The words "ALL," "EVERY" and "ANY"
5) The phrase "AND SO FORTH"
6.) The phrase "AND THE LIKE"
7.) Negative words and phrases like "CANNOT," "SHALL
Nor'
8.) Affirmative words and phrases like "THE FOLLOWING
MAY," "THE FOLLOWING SHALL"
THE WORD "OR"

As a Rule
The word or is a disjunctive term which indicates an alterna-tive.
Hence, when "or" is used, the various members of the sentence are to be
taken separately.
As a rule therefore, it should be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, that it is a disjunctive word
The Word "OR," is not disjunctive in the following cases
1. When the spirit or context of the law warrants it; and
2. Although the persons who can pardon the offender under

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code are
mentioned disjunctively, the said provision should be

construed to mean that the right to institute criminal
proceedings in said cases is exclusively and successively
reposed in said persons in the order in which they are
named. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
"Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adul-
tery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts
of lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents.
grandparents. or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons,
as the case may be x x x" (Underscoring supplied)
In connection with Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the

following rules and jurisprudence are applicable:
1. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right
to institute the prosecution for the above of-fenses,
independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian,
unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon
grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party
who is a minor fails to ifie the complaint, her parents,
grandparents or guard-ians, may file the same. The right to
file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or
guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be
exercised successively in the order herein provided.
(Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court; Article 344,
R.P.C.)
2. The fact that she is a minor (being only 12 years old) is not
an impediment for her to sign the complaint
(People v. Medina, CA, 45 O.G. 338).
CHAPTER VIII 201
3. But if the offended party is insane or physically disabled,

the father can sign the complaint. If the father is dead, the
mother can do it. If both are dead, then the grandfather
should sign the complaint, etc. (U.S. v. Bautista,
40 Phil. 735)
4. It is exclusive, because if the parent of the girl for instance,
refuses to file the complaint, the grandpar-ent cannot file
the complaint.
The Word 'SAND"
As a Rule
The word "and" is a conjunctive term, and if it is used in a
sentence, it means that the members of a sentence are to be taken jointly.
Exception
The word "and" may mean "or" if this is the plain intention of the
legislature which could be gleaned from the context of the statute.
The Term "AND/OR"

The use of the term "and /o?' means that effect shall be given to
both the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or' depending on which
one will serve the legislative intent.
New Case:
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et al. v. COMELEC, et al.,

G.R. No. 193643
and
FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC. v.
COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 193704
January 29, 2013
FACTS:
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by seeking
party-list accreditation with the COMELEC, through a petition for
registration as a sectoral organization for the purpose of participating in the
May 10, 2010 elections under HA No. 7941
or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special interest in
the LPG industry and other allied concerns.
After the requisite publication, verification and hearing, and without
any apparent opposition, LPGMA's petition was approved by the COMELEC
in its Resolution dated January 5, 2010.
Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners lodged before the
COMELEC a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA's registration. They
were later on joined by Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) as a
complainant-in-intervention.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint since the ground for
cancellation cited is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of RA
No. 7941 and the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA's
petition for registration which has long been approved with finality.
COMELEC denied the petitioners' motions for recon-sideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' complaints and motions for reconsideration respectively
HELD:
Section 6, RA No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the
cancellation of party-list accreditation, viz:
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified

complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
1 It is a religious sect or denomination, organiza-tion
or association, organized for religious pur-poses;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its

goal;
2 It ;Q a fortgit party or organzatzon,
4. It is receiving support from any foreign govern-

CHAPTER VIII 203
ment, foreign political party, foundation, orga-

nization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. It [ails toparttcipate in the last two (-?)preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2
01o) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the
registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1)
due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2)
any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.
Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the petition for
registration be previously interposed so that a complaint for cancellation can
be entertained. Since the law does not impose such a condition, the
COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to
promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws, cannot read into
the law that which it does not provide.
Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only dur-ing the

petition for registration proceedings which involves the COMELEC's power
to register a party-list group, as distinguished from the entirely separate
power invoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.
The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from

their basic definitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn down, while to cancel
is to annul or remove. Adopting such meanings within the context of Section
6, refusal of registration happens during the inceptive stage when an
organization seeks admission into the roster of COMELEC-registered party-
list organizations through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the other
hand, takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry is done by the
COMELEC, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a
registered
party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal

is handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on
the registration itself after the petition has been approved.
A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar

conclusion.
The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and
"cancellation" should be taken in its ordinary significance - "refusal
and/or cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or "refusal or
cancellation." It has been held that the intention of the legislature in using
the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used
interchangeably.
The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the
conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that one word or the other may
be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose
intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is
used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive "or" alone
will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of
the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone.
Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and
"refusal or cancellation" according to how Section 6 intended them to be
employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union;
it is pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with," "along or
together with." The use of "and" in Sec. 6 was necessitated by the fact that
refusal and cancellation of party-list registration share similar grounds,
manner of initiation and procedural due process requirements of notice and
hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal" and "cancellation" must
be taken together. The word "or," on the other hand, is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. As such, "refusal or cancellation,"
consistent with their disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to
mean that they are separate instances when the COMELEC can exercise its
power to screen the qualifications of party-list organizations for purposes of
participation in the party-list system of representation.
The clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word
"or" in the first sentence of Section 6 that "[T]he COMELEC
CHAPTER VIII 205
may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition."
Old Case:
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SATURNINO DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004
It is well-settled rule in statutory construction that the
use of the term "andlor"means that the word "and" and the
word "or" are to be used interchange-ably. The word "or" is
a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of
one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term
"or" in this controversy connotes that either the standard in
the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in
determining whether a prospective ap-plicant for the position
under question may qualify.
FACTS:
Respondent was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) when he was promoted to the position of Chief Aviation Safety
Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Annabella A. Calamba of
the ATO Aviation Security Division filed with the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) a protest against respondent's
promotional appointment on the ground that respondent did not meet the 4-
year supervisory requirement for the position.
DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia found the protest to be without merit.

Calamba appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC-NCR). After CSC-
NCR Director Nelson Acebedo had requested ATO Executive Director
Manuel Gio to comment three times to no avail. On November 18, 1997, the
CSC-NCR rendered a decision upholding the protest of Calamba on the
ground that respondent did not meet the requirements of the contested
position and hence recalled his appointment.
Thereafter, ATO Director Gio asked the CSC-NCR to suspend the

order recalling the appointment of respondent and then, subsequently
manifested that Calamba had no legal personality to
ifie the protest because she was not a qualified next-in-rank; that the protest
was filed out of time, and that respondent was qualified to the position. On
January 5, 1998, CSC-NCR Director Acebedo denied the requests of Director
Gil. However, in a letter dated January 13, 1998, Director Acebedo granted
the request of Director Gilo and affirmed the approval of respondent's
appointment. Calamba asked the CSC to implement the January 5, 1998
ruling of Director Acebedo. When asked by the CSC to clarify his conflicting
rulings, Director Acebedo explained that the January 5, 1998 ruling
is unofficial and inexistent. Thus, the CSC treated Calamba's

request as an appeal.
On November 13, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 98-2970
granting the appeal of Calamba, disapproving respondent's appoint-ment, and
directing his reversion to his former position. The CSC having denied his
motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a pe-tition for review with the
CA. The CA granted the petition by setting aside the CSC resolutions and
approving respondent's appointment. Petitioner CSC's motion for
reconsideration having been denied, it filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Civil Service
Commission tenable?
HELD:
Petitioner's insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year
managerial and supervisory experience requirement is misplaced. It is well-
settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term "and/or" means
that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. The
word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of
one thing from another. Thus, the use of the disjunctive term "or" in this
controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the
second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant
for the position under question may qualify.
The Word "SHALL"

The word "shall" is imperative. When used in a statute, it operates to impose a duty, which
may be enforced.
Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-18615, December 24, 1963)

CHAPTER VIII 207
The rule, however, is not absolute. The word "shall" may be construed
as "may" when so required by the context or by the inten-tion of the statute.
(Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608)
THE MANDATORY EFFECT OF THE STATUTE AND THE

APPARENT INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS
ILLUSTRATED IN REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
79582, April 10, 1989
In said case, the Free Patent was issued on April 14, 1967 In 1970, the
widow of the patentee bartered a portion thereof with Seranillo. After
Seranillo acquired the property, he caused the same to be subdivided into
small lots and announced himself as owner. On September 29, 1970, he sold
a portion of the lot in favor of Jamila. Another lot was sold on November 29,
1970, in favor of Poliquit. In other words, the widow of the patentee
disposed of the land within the prohibitory period of five (5) years, as
mandated in Section 118 of the Public Land Act.
HELD:
The provision of the law, which prohibits the sale, or encumbrance of
the homestead within five years after the grant of the patent is mandatory.
The purpose of the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is to
preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the public
land, which the State has gratuitously given to them.
The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within

five years from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between
executory and consummated sales. It would hardly be in keeping with the
primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader the piece of land that the State had gratuitously given to them
"Section 124 of the Public Land Act provides that 'Any

acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of Sections
118, 120, 121, 122 and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null
and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of
annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit,
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and its improvement to the

State."'
It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently

acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom.
The State should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, through its duly
authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, through the Solicitor
General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the
corresponding action for the reversion of the land involved to the public
domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law.
The Word "MAY"

The word "may" is permissive and it operates to confer jurisdiction.
The Word "ALL," "EVERY," and "ANY"

The word "air may be used in its universal sense or in its
comprehensive sense. The phrase "all laws inconsistent with or contrary to
this act are hereby repealed," refers not only to laws that are existing at the
time the repealing law is enacted but also to all rules and regulations intended
to implement them.
The phrase "all the qualifications and none of the disqualifica-tions"
found in the petition for naturalization and as required by CA 473, means
that the applicant possesses all the qualifications pre-scribed in the said law,
and that the applicant must not have any or all of the disqualifications
provided in the law. (Ly Hong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14630, September 30,
1960, Section 5, CA No. 473)
This necessarily means that every ground of disqualification or any of
the grounds for disqualifications is sufficient to deny the application for
citizenship.
The phrase "all citizens, 18 years of age, must register and vote"
includes all Filipino citizens, male or female, who are eighteen years of age,
and not suffering from any disqualification to vote.
The Words "AND SO FORTH,' and "AND THE LIKE"

The words "and so forth" refers to those similar to what is enumerated
or mentioned preceding the words "and so forth."
CHAPTER VIII 209
This is similar to the phrase "and others of similar character."
Example:
"Article 420. The following are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,

rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character x x x"
(Underscoring Supplied)
Negative terms "CANNOT," "SHALL NOT," and "NO"

The use of these words in a statute indicates the intention of the legislature
to make the law mandatory and prohibitive.
EXAMPLE:
"The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it." (Section 15, Article III, 1987 Constitution)
(Underscoring Supplied)
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-erty
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." (Section 1, Ar-ticle III, 1987 Constitution)
"Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their

dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just
and humane manner." (Section 10, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)
The right to "due process of law" is a constitutional guarantee, which need

not be the subject of government grant. They may not be unduly taken by the
government but the government has a duty to protect its citizens from being
unlawfully deprived of such rights.
IX. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Due process of law has procedural and substantive require-ments. From
the procedural point of view, it simply means that the procedure to be observed
should be fair or as Daniel Webster puts it, it is a "law which hears before it
condemns."
A substantive requirement of due process is actually a provi-sion against
oppressive or arbitrary laws. In other words, while the
first portion of the requirement refers to the proper procedures to be

observed, the second portion of the requirements goes to the very substance
of the constitutional provision that life, liberty or prop-erty cannot in any
way be arbitrarily taken away even if there are proper, procedures made and
observed.
REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS

The due process clause should be interpreted both as a substantive and
as a procedural guarantee. Hence, the requirements
of due process are: (1) and (2)
- is a guarantee that life,

liberty, and property shall not be taken away from anyone without due
process of law. If a law is invoked to take away one's life, liberty, and
property, the more specific concern of substantive due process is not to find
out whether said law is being enforced in accordance with procedural
formalities but whether or not the said law is a proper exercise of legislative
power. This will necessarily require the following:
1. There must be a valid law upon which it is based;

2. The law must have been passed or approved to accomplish a
valid governmental objective;
3. The objective must be pursued in a lawful manner; and
4. The law as well as the means to accomplish the objective must
be valid and not oppressive.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - refers to the regular
methods of procedure to be observed before one's life, liberty or property,
can be taken away from him. Simply stated, it means that the procedure to be
observed must be fair. Procedural due process therefore is a guarantee to
obtain a fair trial in a court of justice according to the mode of proceeding
applicable to each case. Now, this includes not only any court of justice but
also any and all administrative boards, bodies or tribunals.
TWO ASPECTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

1. Procedural due process in judicial proceedings; and
2. Procedural due process in administrative proceedings
CHAPTER VIII 211
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The requirements of due process in judicial proceedings, as laid down
in Banco Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil. 921), are as follows:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the
proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
The requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, as laid
down in Ang Ti bay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil.
635), are as follows:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and
7. The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
X. COURT'S POWER TO CONSTRUE STATUTES

ARISES ONLY IF THE STATUTE IS NOT CLEAR
A statute, which is clear and free from ambiguity, need not be
interpreted by the courts. They must be applied to give effect to the intent
expressed in the language of the statute. This principle
is based on the Latin Maxim (The law may
be harsh but it is the law) and in another Latin maxim ABSOLUTA

SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET (When the language
of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required).
When the law, however, is not clear, or when it is ambiguous, the
court is justified to interpret or construe the statute and to resort to all
legitimate aids to construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of
the statute.
XI. IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUING A STATUTE, WHAT

ARE THOSE THAT THE COURT CAN DO AND CANNOT DO
What the court can do?
Primarily, the court's duty is to ascertain the true intent of the
statute.
2. In the pursuit of this duty, the court can resort to all le-gitimate
aids to construction. These aids are those found in the law itself,
known as intrinsic aids, and those ex-traneous facts and
circumstances outside of the statute, known as extrinsic aids.
3. It can depart from the language of the statute if by so doing, the

legislative purpose could be carried out.
4. It may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints, which, if not
corrected, would render the statute meaningless.
5. It can issue guidelines in applying the statute in order to delineate
what the law requires.
What the court cannot do?

1. The court cannot speculate as to the intent of the law.
2. The court cannot supply a meaning not found in the phraseology
of the law.
3. The court cannot assume a purpose, which is not expressed in the
statute.
CHAPTER VIII 213
4. The court cannot change the meaning of the law, especially if the
meaning will defeat the purpose of the law.
5. The court cannot rewrite the law and invade the domain of the
legislature (This is known as JUDICIAL LEGISLA-TION).
6. The court cannot interpret into the law a requirement, which the
law does not prescribe.
7. The court cannot enlarge the scope of the statute and in-clude
transactions or situations not provided by the legis-lature.
MI. WHAT HAPPENS IF THE STATUTE

IS NOT CAPABLE OF INTERPRETATION
OR CONSTRUCTION?
When a statute is not capable of construction or interpretation because
it fails to express a meaning, or if the absurdity in the law cannot be
reconciled despite resorting to all aids in construction, it becomes
inoperative (Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board, 107
Phil. 151).
XLII. CAN THE SUPREME COURT ABANDON

OR OVERRULE ITS EARLIER DECISION?
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, may abandon or overrule its earlier
decision, if it is right and proper to do so but the new decision modifying or
overruling a doctrine or principle should only be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
This is illustrated by the stand of the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether the courts can inquire on the presidential suspension of the privilege
of the court of habeas corpus and whether there is right to bail during the
suspension of the said writ.
The first two leading cases on this point are the cases of Barcelon v.
Baker (5 Phil. 87) and Montenegro v. Castaileda (91 Phil. 882). In both
cases, the Supreme Court decided that the President's decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts
and all other persons."
The Barcelon rule was enunciated in this jurisdiction in 1905 whereas
the Montenegro rule, which reiterated the Barcelon rule,
was enunciated in 1952. This ruling continued to prevail until 1971 when our
Supreme Court came out with another. ruling in the case of Lansang v.
Garcia (42 SCRA 448).
In the said case of Lansang v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled that
courts are allowed to inquire whether or not a presidential suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is arbitrary in order to determine its
constitutional sufficiency. The ruling is premised on the assumption that the
courts can effectively determine whether the President's decision to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is arbitrary or not.
The Lansang doctrine, however, was abandoned on account of the

decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in cases docketed as G.R. No. 61388
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus for Dra. Aurora Parong, et al., Josefina Garcia-Padilla, petitioner, v.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen Fabian C. Ver, Fidel V. Ramos and Lt. Col.
Miguel Coronel, respondent." Decided on April 20, 1983, and G.R. No. 61016
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Horacio R.
Morales, Jr., petitioner, v. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian Ver and
Col. Galileo Kintanar, respondents." Promulgated on April 26, 1983, or 6 days
after the Padilla decision was promulgated.
In the Padilla case, nine justices voted to abandon the doctrine in the
Lansang case and these justices are as follows: Justices Pacifico de Castro,
Efren Plana, Juvenal Guerero, Felix Makasiar, Venecio Escolin, Conrado
Vasquez, Vicente Abad Santos, Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., and Lorenzo Relova.
Two justices voted to retain the doctrine in the Lansang case and they are
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Justice Claudio Teehankee.
The majority decision reverted to the Barcelon and Montenegro rule, as

above-mentioned.
In the Morales case, the justices who previously voted in the Padilla
case in favor of abandoning the doctrine in the Lansang case maintained their
position. Three justices voted to retain the Lansang case maintained their
position. Three justices voted to retain the Lansang doctrine and they are
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando and Justices Claudio Teehankee and
Hermogenes Concepcion.
CHAPTER VIII 215
Xlv. IF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

IN A PARTICULAR CASE IS NOT CORRECT,
SHOULD IT BE FOLLOWED BY THE INFERIOR COURTS?
Unless and until that decision of the Supreme Court is reversed by

itself, sitting en banc, it shall be binding not only upon the inferior courts but
also upon all branches of the government The basis for this is Article 8 of the
new Civil Code, which provides as follows:
"Article 8. Judicial decision applying or interpreting

the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines."
CHAPTER IX
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF
CONTRACTS
Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines a contract as "a meeting of
minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service."
I. CAN THE CONTRACTING PARTIES ENTER INTO ANY

KIND OF AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISH SUCH TERMS
AND CONDITIONS THAT THEY MAY DEEM PROPER?
The contracting parties may enter into any kind of agreement and
establish such terms and conditions that they like provided that they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. (Article
1306, New Civil Code)
Examples:
1.) An undertaking in a letter agreement premised on the
termination of a marital relation is not only contrary to
law but also contrary to Filipino morals and public policy.
As such, any agreement or obligation based on such
unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public
policy should be deemed null and void. (Lichauco de Leon
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80965, June 6, 1990)
2.) An agreement to work, as a servant without pay is im-
moral and void since this would amount to involuntary
servitude. (De los Reyes v. Alojado, 16 Phil. 499)
3.) An agreement exempting a carrier from liability for
gross negligence (Heacock v. Macondray, 32 Phil. 205) is
contrary to public policy.
4.) The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the
school that the students scholarship is good only if he con-
216
CHAPTER IX 217
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS
tinues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer
to another school without refunding the equiva-lent of his
scholarship, is contrary to public policy and therefore, null and
void (Gui v. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15127, May 30,
1961).
5.) Deed of Sale over a parcel of land within five years from the date of
issuance of a patent is null and void because it violates Section
118, Commonwealth Act 141 (Sala u. Court of First Instance,
G.R. No. L-47281, April 27, 1990).
II. WHO ARE BOUND BY THE TERMS

OF THE CONTRACT?
As a rule, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs," and therefore generally, its terms cannot deter-mine the rights of
third persons.
The exceptions to this rule are the following:
(a) Where the obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their NATURE, by STIPULATION, or by
PROVISION of LAW (Article 1311);
(b) Where there is a STIPULATION POUR AUTRUI (a stipulation
in favor of a third party.) (Article 1311);
(c) Where a third person induces another to violate his contract
(Article 1314);
(d) Where in some cases, third persons may be adversely affected by
a contract where they did not participate (See Articles 1312,
2150, 2151; Act No. 1956 the Insolvency Law: R.A. No. 875);
and
(e) Where the law authorizes the creditor to sue on a contract
entered into by his debtor ("Accion Directa').
III. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY AND NOT NECESSARY

TO INTERPRET THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT?
When Necessary
When the terms of the contract are not clear and there is doubt
regarding the intention of the contracting parties, it becomes necessary to
resort to interpretation. This becomes the duty of the court when the parties
decide to seek judicial intervention.
The Supreme Court explained in the case of Marquez v. Espejo,

G.R. No. L-168387, August 25,2010, to wit:
"When the parties admit the contents of written docu-ments

but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties, the de-ciding body is
authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention
of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul
of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequa-
cies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose
of agreements."
When Not Necessary

When the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, interpretation of the same is not necessary.
The first paragraph of Article 1370 provides as follows:
"If the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control"
The Supreme Court explained in the case of Norton Resources and

Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation, G.R. No. L-162523,
November 25, 2009, to wit:
"The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied

in the first paragraph of Article 1370 of the Civil Code: "[I]f the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control." This provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied
by Pennsylvania courts, which assumes that the intent of the
parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and
when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be
discovered only from the express language of the agreement" It
also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows
courts in some cases to search beneath the semantic surface for
clues to meaning. A court's purpose in examining a contract is to
interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively
manifested by them. The process of interpreting a contract
requires the court to make
CHAPTER IX 219
a preliminary inquiry as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous.

A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two reasonable
alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are
not ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the
contract as a matter of law. If the contract is determined to be
ambiguous, then the interpretation of the contract is left to the court, to
resolve the ambiguity in the light of the intrinsic evidence.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is thoroughly discussed in

Bautista v. CA:
"The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to
extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from
that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the
language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must
be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some
good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in
a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite
contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties,
or alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or
by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily
consented to, or impose on him those which he did not."
IV. IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE

WORDS OF THE CONTRACT AND EVIDENT
INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, WHICH
PREVAILS?
The second paragraph of Article 1370 answers the question. It provides as
follows:
"If the words -appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the

parties, the latter shall prevail over the former."
V HOW TO JUDGE THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES

Article 1371 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
"In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their

contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered."
In Ramos v. Sarao, G.R. No. L-149756, February 11, 2005, it

was held that although the parties in the case denominated their contract as
a "Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro," the "sellers" have continued to
possess and to reside at the subject house and lot. This evident factual
circumstance was plainly overlooked by the trial and the appellate courts,
thereby justifying a review of the case. This overlooked fact clearly shows
that the petitioner intended merely to secure a loan, not to sell the property.
Thus, the contract should be deemed an equitable mortgage.
VI. RULES GOVERNING THE FOLLOWING:

(1) Effect of the use of several terms
(2) Effect of stipulations that admit of several meanings
(3) Effect of words which may have different significations
(4) Effect of usage or custom of the place
(5) Effect of obscure words or stipulation in a contract
VII. USE OF GENERAL TERMS

However general terms of a contract may be, they shall not be
understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different
from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
VIII. STIPULATIONS THAT ADMIT

GENERAL MEANINGS
If some stipulations of any contract should admit of several meanings,
it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to
render it effectual.
IX. USAGE OR CUSTOM OF THE PLACE

The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the
interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of
stipulations that are ordinarily established.
X OBSCURE WORDS OR STIPULATION

The interpretation of obscure words or stipulation in a contract
shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
CHAPTER IX 221
XI. RULE IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT

AND AS TO THE INCIDENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES
When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules
established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to inciden-tal
circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and
interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in
favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
XII. OTHER RULES OF INTERPRETATION

Other rules of interpretation are found in Sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines.
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon, and, there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the writ-ten
agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. -
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it
bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.
Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provi-sions.

- In the construction of an instrument where there are several
provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be
adopted as will give effect to all.
Interpretation according to intention; general and

particular provisions. - In the construction of an instrument, the intention of
the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular intent will
control a general one that is inconsistent with it.
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. - For the proper

construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject thereof and
of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in
the position of those whose language he is to interpret.
Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. - The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and gen-eral acceptation, but
evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise
peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular
instance, in which the case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
Section 15. Written words control printed. - When an instru-ment

consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter.
Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. - When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult
to be deciphered, or the language is not un-derstood by the court, the evidence
of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understands the
language, is admissible to declare the characters of the meaning of the
language.
Section 17. Of two constructions, which is preferred. - When the terms
of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed
the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are
otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to
the party in whose favor the provision was made.
Section 18. Construction in favor of natural right. - When an

instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of
natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted.
Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. - An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
CHAPTER IX 223
IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES

THAT PREVAILS, FOR THE INTENTION IS THE SOUL OF
A CONTRACT, NOT ITS WORDING WHICH IS PRONE TO
MISTAKES, INADEQUACIES, OR AMBIGUITIES.
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ v. ELOISA

ESPEJO, et al.,
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010
FACTS
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two par-

cels of agricultural land in Bagabag, Nueva Viscaya, One is located at Ba-
rangay Lantap, tenanted by Nemi Fernandez, and the other in Barangay
Murong, tenanted by Marquez and Dela Cruz.
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc (RBB1) to secure certain loans Upon their failure to pay, the
properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI Eventually title to the properties
were issued in the name of RBBI TCT No T-62096 was issued for the
Murong property and TCT No T-62836 for the Lantap property. Both TCTs
describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite, K-27,"
without any reference to either Barangays Lantap or Murong.
On February 1985 respondents bought back one of their lots The Deed
of Sale did not mention the location but mentioned the TCT winch
corresponds to the Murong property. However, respondents never took
possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the
tenants of the same, or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the and
land On the contrary, Nemi continued workmg on the Lantap property
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner.
The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No T-62096 almost a decade later,
on July 1, 1994
Meanwhile, on June 1990, R]3B1, pursuant to Section 20 and 21 of RA
No 6657 executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in
favor of Marquez and Dela Cruz Both VLTs described the subject land is
located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No T-62836.
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price to
RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAa) on optenibor 5, 1091. Both CLOAa stated that parcekof
agricultural land were situated in Barangay Murong
On February 10, 1997, respondents filed a Complaint before the Regional

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAI)) for the cancellation of CLOAs, the
deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respon-dents, and the
execution of a deed of VLTs by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi based on
theory that the Murong property, occupied by the peti-tioners, was owned by the
respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale.
They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No.
62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
ISSUE:
Whether the admitted contents of the documents adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties.
HELD:
No. Admitted contents of the documents do not adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue
whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of
the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and
into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its
wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors
and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9.
Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. It de-scribed
the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap), and also said that
the location is in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents' Deed of Sale falls
under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule because it referred to 'PCT No. T-
62096" (Murong property), however RBBI con-tended that the true intent was to
sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the case necessitates an

examination of the parties' respective parol evidence, in order to determine
CHAPTER IX 225
the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is
the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the
soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies,
or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence
to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the

Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370.11 the terms of a contract are clear and leave

no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention
of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the cont
racting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall
be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation
of documents is likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. - For

the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances
under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge
may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to
interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale
was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the
VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This
may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
The Supreme Court is convinced that the subject of the 1985 Deed of
Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property because
after its execution, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership to
show that they indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong
property. They did not take possession of the same. As admitted by the
parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners, who
occupied and tilled the same without any objection from
the reopondento. Moreover, petitioner3 paid 1eaeho1d rentzLIB for uirLg the
Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
Aside from respondents' neglect of their alleged ownership rights over

the Murong, respondent Nemi is the farmer actually tilling Lantap, without
turning over the supposed landowner's share to RBBL This strongly indicates
that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBB1) as the owners of
the Lantap property.
Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong
property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs which explicitly refer to land in Barangay Murong in
petitioners' favor. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the
Murox proper(y, midisturbed by axiyoxie for several 1-I years, until
respondents started the controversy in 1997
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and
petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is
the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no
contrary evidence of the parties' actuations to indicate that they intended the
sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT
to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken
belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not
farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular
barangay, where the property is located Moreover, both properties are
bounded by a road and public land Hence, were it not for the detailed
technical description, the titles for the two properties are very smiilar.
CHAPTER X
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
INVOLVING THE SUBJECT OF
EMETERIA LIWAG v. HAPPY GLEN LOOP

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 189755, Jtily 4, 2012
PRINCIPLE:
WHERE A GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE FOLLOWS AN
ENUMERATION OF PARTICULAR AND SPECIFIC WORDS OF
THE SAME CLASS, THE GENERAL WORD OR PHRASE IS TO
BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE - OR TO BE
RESTRICTED TO -THINGS AKIN TO OR RESEMBLING, OR OF
THE SAME KIND OR CLASS AS, THOSE SPECIFICALLY
MENTIONED.
The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that
where a general word or phrase follows an enumera-tion of particular and
specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include - or to be restricted to
- things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned.
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted Section 1 of PD No. 1216,
we find that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare
of the community. Thus, the phrase "other similar facilities and amenities"
should be interpreted in like manner.
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING

CORPORATION v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010
PRINCIPLE:
EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE MUST BE INTERPRETED
WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
227
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Because the
law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in
relation to the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not,
consequently, be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the
fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be
taken into consideration in order to ascertain its meaning.
BATANGAS POWER CORPORATION vBATANGAS

CITY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 152675; and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION v.
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, et at.,
G.R. No. 152771, April 28, 2004
FACTS:
Batangas Power Corporation (BPC) was registered with the Board of
Investments (BOl) on September 13, 1992. On September 23, 1992, the BOl
issued a certificate of registration to BPC as a pio-neer enterprise entitled to a
tax holiday for 6 years. The BPC began operating the power plant in
Batangas City.
On October 12, 1998, Batangas City, through its legal officer,
demanded from the BPC payment of business taxes and penalties from 1994
as provided for in Ordinance XI or the Batangas City Tax Code. BPC refused
to pay, citing its tax exempt status under Section 133(g) of the Local
Government Code (LGC).
On April 15, 1999, the City Treasurer modified the City's tax claim and
demanded payment of business taxes from BPC only for 1998-1999 on the
ground that BPC enjoyed the 6-year tax holiday but such exemption period
expired on September 22, 1998 or 6 years after the BPC registered with the
BOI.
BPC refused to pay and claimed that its commercial operation
commenced on July 16, 1993, the date designated by the BOT as the start of
its tax holiday on account of its failure to operate immedi-ately on account of
a force majeure. BPC claimed that the local tax holiday is concurrent with the
income tax holiday and asserted in the alternative that tax should be collected
from the NPC under the BOT Agreement.
Because the BPC and Batangas City refused to budge from

their respective positions, the NPC intervened. While it admitted
CHAPTER X 229
OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING
assumption of BPC's tax obligations under the BOT Agreement, the NPC
refused to pay BPC's business tax as it allegedly constituted an indirect tax
on NPC, a tax-exempt corporation under its Charter.
Consequently, the BPC ified a petition for declaratory relief with the
Makati RTC against Batangas City and the NPC, and it prayed for a ruling
that it was not bound to pay the business taxes imposed by the City. Pending
the resolution of the case, the City refused to issue to BPC a permit to operate
business unless business taxes amounting to around P29 Million were paid.
The BPC, which has its principal office in Makati City, then filed a
supplemental petition with the Makati RTC to convert its original petition to
an action for injunction to' enjoin the City from withholding the issuance of
its business permit and closing its plant. The City opposed on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action;
The Makati RTC' admitted the supplemental petition but on February

27, 2002, it dismissed the injunction, holding that: (1) BPC is liable to pay
business taxes to the City; (2) NPC's tax exemption was withdrawn with'the
passage of HA No. 7160 (LGC); and (3) the 6-year tax holiday granted to
pioneer business enterprises starts from the date of registration with the BOl
under Section 133(g) of the LGC, and not on the date of actual business
operation.
Hence, BPC and NPC filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The petitions were consolidated.
HELD:
The effect of the LGC on the tax exemption privileges of the NPC has
already been extensively discussed and settled in the recent case of National
Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan. In said case, this Court recognized
the removal of the blanket exclusion of government instrumentalities from
local taxation as one of the most significant provisions of the 1991 LGC.
Specifically, [the Court] stressed that Sec. 193 of the LGC, an express
and general repeal of all statutes granting exemptions from local taxes,
withdrew the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed by the NPC
under its Charter. We explained the rationale for this provision, thus:
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded

the scope of the state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social
justice and the equitable distribution of wealth,
economic progress and the protection of local industries as well
as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even
greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress;
local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and
other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 5. - Each Local Government unit shall have the

power to create its own sources of revenue to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the Local Governments.
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine
development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and
promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country's
highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence
among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also
"dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in
matters of local development on the part of local government leaders. The
only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider
role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to
generate their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, x x x the
1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that
will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines
and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x"
To recall, prior to the enactment of the x x x Local Government Code x

x x, various measures have been enacted to promote local autonomy. x x x
Despite these initiatives, however, the shackles of dependence on the national
government remained. Local government units were faced with the same
problems that hamper their capabilities to participate effectively in the
national development efforts, among which are: (a) inadequate tax base; (b)
lack of fiscal control over external sources of income; (c) limited authority to
prioritize and approve development projects;-..(d) heavy dependence on
external sources of income; and (e) limited supervisory control over
personnel of national line agencies.
Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local

autonomy, the LGC effectively deals with the fiscal constraints
faced by LGU. It widen tax base of LGUa to includc taxes which
were prohibited by previous laws x x x
CHAPTER 231
Neither can the NPC successfully rely on the Basco case as this was
decided prior to the effectivity of the LGC, when there was still no law
empowering local government units to tax instrumentalities of the national
government.
Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under
their 1992 BOT Agreement, the LGC which removed NPC's tax exemption
privileges had already been in effect for six (6) months. Thus, while BPC
remains to be the entity doing business in said City, it is the NPC that is
ultimately liable to pay said taxes
under the provisions of both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991
Local Government Code
Hence, the petition of BPC and NPC were dismissed.
LUCIOMORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G R No 145226,

February 6, 2004
Liberal construction of penal statutes in favor
of the accused
FACTS:
Lucia Barrete and Lucio Morigo were married on August 30, 1990 in
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol A week later, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. Barely a year thereafter, Lucia filed
with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant, which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take
effect on February 17, 1992
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed in the RTC Bohol a complaint
for judicial declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an

Information filed with the RTC Bohol.
After trial, appellant was convicted of bigamy, which conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition.
HELD:
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy,
thus:
1. the offender has been legally married;

2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first.
Applying the forgoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into
by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23,
1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the
marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
1. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family
Code. xxx The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 6620, hence, the decision had long become
final and executory.
2. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused
must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage
to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract
of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to
CHAPTER X 233
speak of The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
3. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from

Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous mar-riage is

necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a 5ubsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."
-
4. It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first mar riage was
actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a
marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a
priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
5. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete
merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, need no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The last issue involves the subject of statutory construction. In this

connection, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statue in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance
in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done.
Under the circum-stances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue
of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic."
Hence, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and the appellant is

ACQUITTED of the offense of bigamy.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS' ASSN. OF THE PHILS.,

INC. v. ASSN. OF INT'L SHIPPING LINES
G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002
FACTS:
In 1985, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued an Ad-
ministrative Order on the payment of additional charges for pilot-age services
on Sundays and Holidays referring to "nighttime and overtime pay." In 1986,
the President issued Executive Order No.
1088 providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services
without mentioning nighttime and overtime pay. The Executive Or-der
contains a repealing clause that all orders, letters of instruction, rules,
regulations and issuances inconsistent with it are repealed or amended
accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether the Executive Order repealed the Administrative Order.
HELD:
No, the Executive Order did not repeal the Administrative Order The
Executive Order provides a general repealing clause, the effect of which fails
under the category of an implied repeal, as it does not identify the orders,
rules or regulations it intends to abrogate.
Repeal by implication is frowned upon in this jurisdiction. It is not

favored, unless it is manifestly intended by the legislative authority enacting
it or, unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the
subject laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that
they cannot co-exist. This is because the legislative authority is presumed to
know the existing law so that if repeal is intended, the proper step is to
express it.
NOTES
In 1922, the Supreme Court in Lichauco & Co v Apostol, 44
Phil. 138 ruled that:
"x x x Repeal by implication proceeds on the pre-mise that

where a statute of a later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject,
that intention must be given
CHAPTER X 235
effect. However, before repeal by implication will be de-creed,

there must be a sufficient revelation of the legisla-tive intent to
repeal; the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest;
otherwise, at least as a general rule, the latter act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first
act and will continue to speak so far as the acts are the same,
from the time of the first enactment. x x x"
1992 CASES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR.
G.R. No. 101724
SUPREME COURT
PRINCIPLES:
B.P. BLG. 195 WHICH AMENDED SECTION 11 OF
REPUBLIC ACT 3019 CANNOT BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
THE DATE OF THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW BE-
COMES THE OPERATIVE DATE FOR THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD OF PRESCRIP-
TION
"[B.P.] 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending
Sec[tion] 11 of RA No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen
(15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive
application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976
yet, for it would be prejudicial to the benefit of the shorter (10 years)
prescriptive period under Sec[tion] 11, RA [No.] 3019 which was an
essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it."
"Protection from prosecution under a statute of limi-tation

is a substantive right. Where the statute fixes a period of
limitation as to the prosecution for a particular offense, the
limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the
offense is committed is a jurisdic-tional fact, it being necessary
that the indictment of in-
formation be actually filed within the time prescribed."
(22 CJS 574)
"Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional

necessarily determined that a prosecution within the period
specified is an essential element of the offense." (People v.
Allen, 118 P. 2d, 927)
"Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospec-tive in
their terms, they do not apply to crimes previously committed."
(22 CJS 576; People v. Lurd, 12 Hun 282; Martine u. State, 24
Tex 61) (Underscoring supplied)
To apply B.P. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto

law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him
criminally liable for a crime that has already been extinguished under the law
existing when it was committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:
"A law passed after the occurence of a fact or com-mission

of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences
or relations of such fact or deed. By Art[idle] 1, Sec[tion] 10 of
U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass any ex post facto
law. Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions
against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law is defined as a law which pro-vides
for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which
aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punish-ment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was com-mitted; a law that changes
the rules of evidence and re-ceives less or different testimony
than what was required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a
law which deprives persons accused of crime of some law-ful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction of amnesty; every law which,
in relation to the offense or its consequenc-es, alters the situation
of a person to his disadvantage. (Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So.
2d 1, 57' (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520)
Since an ex post facto law is prescribed by our Constitution (Section

22, Article III, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan corn-
CHAPTER X 237
mitted no reversible error in ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted
for his supposed violation of RA No. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P.
195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new pre-scriptive period under
that law should apply only to those offenses which were committed after the
approval of B.P. 195."
(2) The date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date for
the commencement of the period of prescription.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of
the law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of
prescription." (Rollo, p.34)
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to
recommend approval of his application for free patent (which both of them
denied doing), the date of violation, for the purpose of computing the period
of prescription, would be the date of filing his application on January 21,
1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not
commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one could have
known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for,
as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "It is not only the Lands Inspector
who passes upon the disposability of public land x x x other public officials
pass upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land
and, therefore, the disposable character thereof' (Rollo, p. 30). Indeed,
practically all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and
approving the application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the
land to ascertain its location and occupancy; (2) the surveyor who prepared
its technical description; (3) the regional director who assessed the
application and determined the land classification; (4) the director of Lands
who prepared the free patent; and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it,
could not have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was
nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" wheth-er it

was the filing of Paredes' application for a free patent in Janu-ary 1976 or his
supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed
ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October
28, 1986, was filed late.
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime
after the lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action,
is that:
"Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of

grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to
prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are
considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are

founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be
allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the
protection of accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond
availability. They serve, not only to bar prosecutions on aged and
untrustworthy evidence, but also to cut off prosecution for crimes,
a reasonable time after completion, when no further danger to
society is contemplated from the criminal activity." (22 CJS573-
574)
"In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute

of Limitations begins to run on the commission of an offense and
not from the time when the offense is discovered or when the
offender becomes known, or it normally begins to run when the
crime is complete." (22 CJS 585) (Underscoring supplied)
Even if ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the

registration and issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on
May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the
prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five
(5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13)
years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on
August 10, 1989, by the filing of the information therein.
1991 CASES
TUPAS v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 89571, February 6, 1991.
PRINCIPLE:
AEQUITASNUNQUAM CONTRA VENIT LEGIS

(EQUITY CANNOT PREVAIL OVER LAW)
Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply
means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often hap-pens,
supplement the law. All abstract arguments based only on eq-
CHAPTER X 239
uity should yield to positive rules, which preempt and prevail over such
persuasions. Emotional appeals to justice, while they may ring the heart of
the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it
remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days
of the Roman jurists - and is now still reverently observed - is "aequUas nun
quam contravenit legs"
On June 26, 1991, The Supreme Court made an additional pro-
nouncement in Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-93401, thus:
"The application by the trial court of its equity
jurisdiction is misplaced Equity is available only in the absence of
law and not as its replacement. All abstract arguments based only
on equity should yield to positive rules (judicial rules of
procedure), which preempt and prevail over such persuasions
Moreover, a court acting without jurisdiction cannot justify its
assumption thereof by invoking its equity jurisdiction."
JOINT MINISTRY OF HEALTH-MINISTRY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT ACCREDITATION COMMITTEE FOR
MEDICAL CLINICS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G R No 78254, April 25, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
LAWS SHOULD BE PUBLISHED AS A CONDITION
FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is so enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature i.e. ,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their

subordinates in the performance of their duties.
This ruling amplifies the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446.
MACEDA v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
REPEAL BY IMPLICATION IS NOT FAVORED;
STRICTISSIMI JURIS (STRICT INTERPRE-
TATION);
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
HAS WEIGHT
Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to
conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or
abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and
convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier. The first effort of a court must
always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of
another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions.
The law did not intend that the provisions of PD No. 938 should be
construed strictly against the National Power Corporation. On the contrary,
the law mandates that it should be interpreted liberally so as to enhance the
tax-exempt status of the National Power Corporation. Hence, the rule on
strictissimi juris with respect to the interpretation of statutes granting tax
exemptions to the NPC cannot be invoked.
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions
running to the benefit of the government itself or its agencies. In such case
the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money
that has to be handled by government in the course
of its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to
government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of non-tax liability
of such agencies.
CHAPTER X 241
In the case of property owned by the State or a city or other public

corporations, the express exemption should not be construed with the same
degree of strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the
State, since as to such property, exemption is the rule and taxation the
exception.
The construction of PD No. 938 by the office charged with its
implementation should be given controlling weight.
PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION

v MUNICIPALITY OF PILILIA
G.R. No. 90776, June 3, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS MUST
BE IN HARMONY WITH STATUTES
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, the former prevails.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 69344, April 26, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
TAX STATUTES ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICT-
LY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND LIBERAL-
LY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYERS
In case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens,
are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (e.g. PD No. 213)
expressly and clearly declares.
BASCO v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
ALL PRESUMPTIONS ARE INDULGED IN FAVOR
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
One who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. That a law may work hardship does
not render it unconstitutional. If any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld
and the challenger. must negate all possible basis. The. courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute. A
liberal interpretation of the Constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. 44007, March 20, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
THE FRANCHISE IS THE LAW BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND THEY ARE BOUND BY THE
TERMS THEREOF
A legislative franchise partakes of the nature of a contract.
Franchises spring from contracts between the sovereign power and
private citizens made upon valuable considerations, for purposes of
individual advantage as well as public benefit. The obligation vesting upon
the grantee to comply with the terms and conditions of the grant constitutes
sufficient consideration. The benefit to the community may constitute the
sole consideration for the grant of a franchise by the State. Such being the
case, the franchise is the law between the parties and they are bound by the
terms thereof.
DE VILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
LEGISLATWE, PROCEEDINGS MAY SERVE AS
GUIDES IN DETERMINING THE CONSTRUCTION
OF STATUTE OF DOUBTFUL MEANING
Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful meaning. Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provi-sion of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberation or discussion on the bill shall be adopted.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R.

No. 83815, February 22, 1991
PRINCIPLES:
A DOUBTFUL PROVISION WILL BE EXAMINED
IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORY OF THE TIMES
CHAPTER X 243
NO PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION IS TO BE

SEPARATED FROM ALL THE OTHERS
IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE. 1987 CONSTITUTION
SEEKS TO IMPOSE A STRICTER PROHIBITION
ON THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, CABI-
NET MEMBER, THEIR DEPUTIES AND ASSIS-
TANTS WITH RESPECT TO HOLDING MULTIPLE
OFFICES OR EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT
DURING THEIR TENURE
THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT TO BE INTERPRETED
AS DEMANDING THE IMPRACTICABLE
DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION GIVE NO LIGHT AS TO THE VIEWS OF THE
MAJORITY WHO DID NOT TALK
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII, is prohi-bitory so
that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Whenever the language used in the Constitution is prohibitory,
it is to be understood as intended to be positive and unequivocal negation.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution" must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of
the Cabinet under Sec. 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of

government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the
impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should
be avoided.
While it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give no light as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. It is safer to construe the Constitution from what appears
upon its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding
thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONATO

G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
PENAL LAWS SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE
EFFECT INSOFAR AS THEY FAVOR THE PERSON
GUILTY OF A FELONY
WAIVER IN DEROGATION OF A STATUTORY
RIGHT IS NOT FAVORED
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two
classes: (a) those in which the State, as well as the accused, is interested; and
(b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of
personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived. Those of the
second may be.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. JUDGE DE LA ROSA

G.R. No. 95122
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. JUDGE CAPULONG
G.R. No. 95123
GATCHALIAN v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991
PRINCIPLE:
LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS
The Philippine law, following the lex loci celebratioais, adheres to the
rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.
Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Article 71 of the Civil Code (now
Article 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed
outside the Philippines in accordance with the
CHAPTER X 245
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country..." And any doubt as to the validity of
the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such
marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered
by Article 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts lean towards the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage,
the authority of parenth over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression."
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption," he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the
foreign law.
1990 CASES
ALVENDIA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No.
72138, January 22, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
EQUITABLE REASONS WILL NOT CONTROL
AGAINST ANY WELL-SETTLED RULE OF LAW
Equity is justice outside legality. It applies only in the absence of and
never against statutory law or judicial rules or procedure. "Equity follows
the law" but where the law gives a particular remedy and that remedy is
bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be improper for the
court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law
allows. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and
have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. Equitable reasons will not
control against any well-settled rule of law or public policy.
MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION

v. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 59154, April 3, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
IN THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR CONTRARY
INTENTION, WORDS AND PHRASES IN STATUTES
SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN ISOLATION
FROM ONE ANOTHER
THE MONETARY BOARD CANNOT REWRITE

OTHER LAWS. THAT FUNCTION IS VESTED
SOLELY WITH THE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
In a suit by the First Western Bank and Trust Company against Atlas
Timber Company, et al., the trial judge rendered judg-ment ordering
Meridian Assurance Corporation to pay First West-ern the sum of $21,933.38
or its equivalent in pesos at the rate of P3.9390 to a dollar, with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the complaint.
Thereafter, Meridian wrote First Western offering to pay the amount of

the judgment with 6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.
First Western rejected the offer, its view being that the rate of interest should
be 12% per annum in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416.
Meridian then filed with the trial court a motion manifesting its deposit
with the court of the amount of P170,061.03 representing the principal
indebtedness, the 6% interest on the principal debt at 6% per annum, and
costs of the suit, praying that the deposit be allowed, that it be considered full
satisfaction of the judgment, and that enforcement of the writ of execution be
restrained. The trial court denied the motion stating that Central Bank
Circular No. 416 had changed the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per
annum.
ISSUE:
The sole issue concerns the rate of interest properly imposable in
relation to a judgment for payment of money: 6%, as provided by Article
2209 of the Civil Code or 12% conformably with Central Bank Circular No.
416.
HELD:
1. The issue had already been passed upon and resolved by the Court
in two earlier cases. In one case, the Court held that the
"judgments spoken of and referred to are (only) judgments in
litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits." It declared that any kind of monetary judgment which
has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or
credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law (PD No.
116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the
Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden
grounds. It cannot rewrite other
CHAPTER X 247
laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority.
2. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended which, as dis-tinguished

from Sec. 1 of the same law, appears to be the actual and
operative grant of authority to the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank to prescribe maximum rates of interest where the parties
have not stipulated thereon in excluding mention of rates allowed
in judgments, should,
at the least be considered as limiting the authority thus
granted only to loans or forbearances of money, etc., and
to judgments involving such loans or forbearances
SONGCO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. Nos. 50999-
51000, March 23, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
• LABOR LEGISLATION AND LABOR CONTRACTS
SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE SAFETY
AND DECENT LIVING OF THE LABORER
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code' s provisions and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and

substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in
Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provision of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor, and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor
of the safety and decent living for the laborer."
FIESTAN v COURT OF APPEALS

G R No 81552, May 28, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
A SPECIFIC STATUTE PREVAILS OVER A GEN-
ERAL STATUTE
The mortgagor sought the nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
on the ground that the mortgagee (DBP) cannot acquire by purchase the
mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of paragraph (2) of
Article 1491 and paragraph (7) of Article 1409 of
the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another,
the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them,
unless the consent of the principal has been given.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 54470, May 8, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE IS ONLY PER-SUASIVE
RESORT TO FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE IS PROPER

ONLY IF THERE IS NO LAW OR JURIS-PRUDENCE
THAT IS AVAILABLE LOCALLY TO SETTLE A
CONTROVERSY
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied
by the courts in the United States "that" the controlling element in determining
loss of earnings arising from death is, as established by authorities, the life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter."
HELD:
1. Resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or
jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of
local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive.
2. For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable
local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206[1] of the Civil
Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life
expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary.
BRENT SCHOOL, INC., et at., v. ZAMORA, et at.,

G.R. No. 48494, February 5, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
A LITERAL INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE RE-JECTED IF IT WOULD
BE UNJUST OR IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS
CHAPTER X 249
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid

presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil, and injuri-ous consequences.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning
that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. A literal interpretation
is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
to absurd results. The fact that the construction placed upon the
statute would lead to an absurdity is an argument for rejecting it.
Where the true intent of the law is clear and calls for the application of the
cardinal rule of statutory construction, such intent or spirit must prevail over the
letter thereof, for whatever is within the statute, since adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain
and vital purpose of the statute.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING &

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. No. 54305, February 14, 1990
PRINCIPLE:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1281 IS A REMEDIAL
STATUTE. ITAPPLIES TOALLACTIONS PENDING
AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT EXCEPT ONLY
WITH RESPECT TO THOSE CASES WHICH HAD
ALREADY ATTAINED THE CHARACTER OF A
FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT
PD No. 1281 is a remedial statute. It does not create new rights or take
away rights that are already vested. It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or
confirmation of rights already in existence. It does not come within the purview
of prospective law. As such, it can be applied retroactively independent of the
general rule against the retrospective application of statutes. Being procedural in
nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment except
only with respect to those cases that had already attained the character of a final
and executory judgment. Were it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to
facilitate the immediate resolution of mining controversies by granting
jurisdiction to a body
or agency adopt to the technical complexities of mining operations, would be

thwarted and rendered meaningless. Litigants in a mining controversy cannot
be permitted to choose a form of convenience. Jurisdiction is imposed by law
and not by any of the parties to such proceedings
1989 CASES
LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989
PRINCIPLE
• WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT ANY STATUTORY LAN-
GUAGE THAT APPEARS TO FAVOR THE AC-CUSED
IN A CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE GIVEN A
"LIBERAL INTERPRETATION," COURTS, HOW.-
EVER, HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO INVOKE "LIB-
ERAL INTERPRETATION" OR "THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAW" WHERE THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE
THEMSELVES LEAVE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT OR
INTERPRETATION.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal
statutes, the court notes that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. The
Court, however, understands petitioner's argument to be really that any
statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should
be given a "liberal interpretation"
Courts, however, have no authority to invoke "liberal inter-pretation"
or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves and as
illuminated by the history of that statute leave no room for doubt or
interpretation. The spirit of the law may not be legitimately invoked to set at
naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by
our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given
effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute The spirit of the law and the intent that is to be
given ef-fect are to be derived from the words actually used by the
lawmaker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source
inde-pendent of and transcending the words of the legislature.
"Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives, which too frequently

impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning that the
law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language
CHAPTER X 251
that the court must apply. The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a
statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, confusion and
uncertainty in application will follow, stability and continuity in the law
much more difficult to achieve.
Where the language is plain, subtle refinements, which tinge words so
as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory, are not only
unnecessary but also decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect
to a given matter is in considerable measure the unwarranted inter-
ference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes
and contracts cutting the words here and inserting them there, making them
fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meaning which they do not ordinarily
have, cutting, trimming, fit-ting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advice their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
interpretation and construction.
The words to be given meaning whether they be found in the

Constitution or in a statute define and therefore limit the authority and
description of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under
cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the
words in fact used by the lawgiver, the judges will effectively escape the
constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and description.
Once the judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words
of the legislative authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In a policy
like ours, which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting power through
the separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly
careful least they substitute their conceptions or preferences of policy for that
actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a judge believes
passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have said on a
particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the
conclusion that the law-making authority was really saying or trying to say, if
somewhat ineptly.
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are
confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in
its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under
the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic
society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gain say that
the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used
by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power that our democracy
has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly
admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the
limitations.
A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.
Whatever temptation the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration. He must not read in any way of creation. He must not
read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions.
JANDUSAY, et al., v.
COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
G.R. No. 48714, April 18, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
ONE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST HIMSELF BE
DESERVING OF EQUITY
The laches of one nullifies the laches of the other. One who seeks
equity must himself be deserving of equity. When parties are in culpability
similarly situated (in eodem loco), one may claim no advantage over the other.
This is a principle of law applied in the 'ari delicto" rule embedded in our
legal system.
MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT v. NLRC

G.R. No. 80586, May 3, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
IMPLEMENTING RULES OF THE LABOR CODE ARE
NOT LAWS AND THEY NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED
Petitioner's argument that the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code

are not effective since it was not published in the Official Gazette is without
merit. Said rules are not "laws" within the meaning of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, the Department of Labor and Employment had published
said Rules in book form printed by the government's printing office and
made available to the general public since 1975.
CHAPTER X 253
REGIDOR v. CHIONGBIAN
G.R. No. 85815, May 19, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
REGULATIONS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CANNOT
ALTER, AMEND OR CONTRAVENE PROVISION
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Govern-ment may
alter, amend, or contravene a provision of the Local Gov-ernment Code. The
implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement,
for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is
a nullity. A rule or regulation that was issued to implement a law may not go
beyond the terms and provision of the law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 84895, May 4, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
GENERAL LEGISLATION MUST GIVE WAY TO
SPECIAL LEGISLATION
General legislation must give way to the special legislation on the same
subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the
special provisions are not applicable. A specific statute prevails over a general
statute. Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.
FRANCISCO v. PERMSKUL
G.R. No. 810061, May 12, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
TO JUSTIFY THE NULLIFICATION OF A LAW,
THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
BREACH, OF THE CONSTITUTION
IN CASE OF DOUBT, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE
JUDICIARY TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO
PRE-VENT THE INVALIDATION OF THE LAW
When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption in favor of its
constitutionality is employed. To justify the nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Con-stitution,

not a doubtful and argumentative implication. Courts will bend over
backward to sustain that presumption.
LLAMADO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84850, June 29, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
WHEREAS CLAUSES ARE NOT PART OF A
STATUTE
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speak-ing. They
are not part of the operative language of the statute. None-theless, whereas
clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or
reason underlying a new enactment (e.g. an enactment which drastically but
clearly change the substantive con-tent of Section 4 existing before the
promulgation of PD No. 1990). Whereas clauses, however, cannot control
the specific terms of the statute. In the instant case, the whereas clauses of
PD No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as
amended.
SM AGRIJAND GENERAL MACHINERIES v. NLRC G.R. No.

748061, January 9, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
• THE TEN-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 223 OF
THE LABOR CODE REFERS TO TEN CALENDAR
DAYS, AND NOT TO TEN WORKING DAYS
When the last day for filing an appeal falls on a legal holiday, the same
can be filed on the next business day following said legal holiday. The
Revised Administrative Code, specifically, Section 1, Article VIII provides
that: "where the day or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted
by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next business day."
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R.

No. 84895, May 4, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
LEGISLATIVE INTENT MUST BE ASCERTAINED
FROM THE WHOLE STATUTE
DOCTRINE OF NOSCITUR A SOCHS
• CHAPTER 255
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the

statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUY

G.R. No. 45127, May 5, 1989
PRINCIPLE:
LAW IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL
The basic principle pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the
enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. Where
a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs
this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. The rule is that there is a
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment.

Statutory Construction by Rolando Suarez

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STATUTORY

REX Book Store

856 Nicanor Reyes, Sr. St.

To my wife, Nora, and children, Revelyn, Rhonnel, Reinna

I acknowledge the assistance rendered by the members of my present

Above all, I am immensely grateful to God for all the blessings,

I wrote the second edition of this book in 2007.

December 18, 2014, Paranaque City

Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation v.

Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348,

U.S. v. Hart, et al.,

General Milling Corporation v. Torres,

Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169,

Simplifications of the rule regarding the use

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Merida Ruth Romero....................................82

Joseph Estrada V. Aniàno Desierto,

Background of rules and jurisprudence in case

Ruben Serrano v National Labor Relations

Presumptions in aids of construction...........................................................110

Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the

INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

How are words and phrases in a statute interpreted?...................................194

When the word used has no meaning in harmony with

Due process of law.......................................................................................209

Lucio Morigo v. People of the Philippines,

People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

Tupas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89571,

Maceda v. Macaraig G.R. No. 88291,

Board of Commissioners v. Judge de la Rosa,

Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

Songco, et al. v. National Labor Relations

Fiestan v Court of Appeals, G R No 81552,

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development

Manila Resource Development v. NLRC,

Regidor v. Chiongbian, G.R. No. 85815,

People of the Philippines v. Dacuycuy, G.R. No. 45127,

I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED

Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and

II. CONSTRUCTION DISTINGUISHED FROM

III. IN A NUTSHELL THEREFORE, THE MOST BASIC

Apply the Law Interpret the Law Construct the Law

lv. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT

2. In Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, September 30, 1986, Second

3. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no

contrary, for any interpretation (Domingo v. Commission on

5. Statutory Construction applied in connection with RA No. 9227. -

V. THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE

VI. WHO INTERPRETS THE LAW?

regulatory boards and administrative agencies have been elevated and

The judiciary has the delicate task of ascertaining the sign-ificance of a

VII. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION AND

VIII. WHEN IS IT NECESSARY

IX. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO INTERPRET AND

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS v. DANILO T. BOLOS

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the

The Office of the Court Administrator (0 CA) recommended that the

Section 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retire-

Trial Court as authorized under existing laws shall, at the date of

(2) Accrued; Meaning of. - The Guidelines promulgated by this Court

As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed